C 5235,2011 WL 66030 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
46 (CookCty. Cir. Ct. May
,2010),and defendant provides no persuasive reason for this Court to reach a different
conclusion.Defendant cites a First Circuit case for the proposition that"though not unqualified, a citizen's rightto film government officials,including law enforcement officers,in the discharge
their duties in a publicspace is a basic,vital,and well-established liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment." Def. Mot.
Cir. 2011)) But the Seventh Circuit has held,to the contrary,
nothing in the Constitution which guarantees the right to record a public event."
F .3d 1106,1111 (7th Cir. 1997).Other federal courts,in the context
qualifiedimmunity analyses,have held that there is no clearly established right to record police officers.
622 F.3d 248,263 (3d Cir. 2010);
2010 WL 1007859, at
2009 WL 1565864,at *4 (E.D.La. Jun. 2,2009).
did not hold that there is a First Amendment right to audio recordconversations with or between unconsenting government officials;rather,the issue there was whether there
was a right to video record police officers in the course
making an arrest.
655 F.3d at 80.Furthermore,
involved openly recording the officers in their plain
The instant case involvedthe defendant surreptitiously recording a telephone conversation with an assistant administrator at the CookCounty Court Reporter's Office. Mrs. Taylor was never informed
the recording,nor did she consent.Defendant further contends that the statute is unconstitutional because it places greater prohibitionson recordings made by civilians than it does on recordings made by police officers. Def. Mot.
Withoutlegal or evidentiary support, defendant concludes that this difference in treatment between civilians and lawenforcement leads to speaker-based discrimination. Def. Mot.
However,the prohibition on recording