Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Steve Snow
Wagner College
reform and reaction. During the reformist biennium (1931-33), moderate leftist
and peasants faced. Greatly complicating these efforts, however, investors and landowners
liquidated productive assets and all but ceased domestic investment. Bank accounts were
emptied, billions of pesetas drained from the country, the stock market dropped
precipitously, and many landowners sold their holdings at bargain rates. The effects were
calamitous: capital flight and the sharp decline in investment were major causes of the
Spanish economic crisis of the 1930s (Comín and Martín 1984: 254; Palafox 1991: 205).
Why the panic? The most obvious, yet ultimately unconvincing, explanation is that
owners of capital predictably reacted against radical policies. A close examination of the
Spanish financial press and employers' publications reveals that labor militance––most
1
Preliminary versions of this article were presented at the Society for Spanish and
Portuguese Historical Studies Conference, St. Louis, Missouri April 23-26 1998, and at the
Mediterranean Studies Association Conference, University of Coimbra, Portugal, May 26-29. For
their comments and criticisms, I thank the conference participants, John Keeler, Stanley Payne,
George Rappaport, Richard Sherman, Cheryl Wheeler and Kim Worthy. Translations from
Spanish are mine.
unease and hostility. The modal complaint was that the Government was allowing the
workers to run wild, not that social reforms wrecked profits. To win back business
meant the suppression of labour. Politicians obliged with a vengeance beginning in late
1934, contributing to the radicalization of the workers and their political allies, and in turn
pushing Spain towards civil war. Explaining investors' attitudes, therefore, is crucial to
The initial Governments of the Second Republic were not unique in their
investment forms a crucial constraint for all leftist reformers to overcome (Lindblom 1977,
Przeworski 1985). Politicians know that citizens tend to vote their pocketbooks and punish
those in office when crises hit. Consequently, they listen closely to investors' concerns, to
avoid disinvestment and the resulting economic and political dislocation. Accounting for
Hirschman (1970) and Kalecki (1943), some analysts argue that disinvestment is often a
weapon used against political enemies, and not merely a response to economic concerns
(see, e.g., Offe 1986: 246-7). This reasonable assertion, however, is unhelpful in
explaining specific events, as it does not spell out when investors' ideological concerns
appropriate to assume that a desire for profit primarily motivates investors. Among those
sharing this assumption, one can distinguish between 'economistic' and 'class-struggle'
frameworks. Proponents of both approaches tend to supply little in the way of systematic,
supporting evidence for their arguments. To explain Spanish investors' motivations, and to
make a larger point about investment under leftist governments in general, this paper
examines the Spanish financial press, employers' newsletters, and government bulletins, as
well as daily and monthly fluctuations in stock prices, number of bills in circulation, and
value of the peseta, among other measures. These data provide crucial information
regarding the levels of business confidence at different points during the Republic, and
focus on purely economic factors. Kolm (1979: 64), for example, argues the political
catastrophes that have befallen leftist governments are best understood 'if they are viewed
in terms of economic variables.' Those who take this view also tend to focus on investors'
responses to radical policies. Their maxim might be: when governments 'threaten the very
institution of private profit...rational capitalists will not invest' (Przeworski 1985: 44-45).
This insight helps explain the economic dislocation that befell, for example, the Chilean
Unidad Popular Government led by Salvador Allende. Yet, it neglects an analysis of the
varied causes of capital strikes, which do not occur only when investors face desperate
circumstances. If Spanish investors responded only to economic factors, given the scale of
capital flight from 1931-1933, one would assume that the leftist governments threatened
free enterprise. This was not the case, however; they adhered to orthodox and deflationary
macro-economic policies. While the micro-economic reforms did lead to wage increases
and thereby increased costs, at the worst this had mixed effects on profits.
Class-struggle theorists, on the other hand, focus on the ways in which workers
have helped win reforms, overcoming capitalist resistance. They are hopeful about the
political possibilities offered by workers' direct action. Authors such as Miliband (1969)
and Block (1977) assert that militance is the key to successful implementation of
progressive policies, and emphasize the possibilities that crises offer leftist administrations.
Block (1977: 22) argues that economic depression and post-war reconstruction reduce the
importance of business confidence and at the same time increase the intensity of working-
class pressure on the government. One can productively apply this interpretation to
successful reforms that take place under unusual conditions, such as the New Deal in the
U.S. and the post-war Labour-government reforms in Britain. It does not, however,
adequately account for the financial dislocation capital flight causes during economic
depression, nor that which occurs in response to more moderate policies. This paper
Labour militance can lead to reforms that otherwise would not have occurred, and
at the same time cause disinvestment and rally political opposition. Strikes and
demonstrations often lead to legislative victories, but also tend to frighten business, and
thus threaten the longevity of reformist legislation as well as the political viability of the
government. In the case of the French Popular Front, for example 'popular militancy was
the government's truest, indeed its only, ally, and the best hope which Blum and his
Socialist colleagues had... in forcing through further and more extensive reforms'
(Miliband 1969: 105). The very militancy that allowed great gains by the French workers,
however, stoked investors' hostility and led to economic crisis and the political defeat of
the government (Snow 1999). There was a similar dynamic at work in Spain, where the
Depression did not reduce investors' power to influence the economy, and worker
mobilization did not smooth the path for successful reforms. Capital flight exacerbated the
Spanish economic crisis, and mobilized political opposition. This led to the election of
rightist parties in 1933, which nullified many of the most important gains of the reformist
biennium. Militance often results in short-lived reforms and political defeat for the
government––as during the French Popular Front––and occasionally complete political and
managed the economy quite prudently; workers' direct action, however, hurt the governing
left by enraging investors and employers. Throughout the Second Republic, investors
reacted sharply against labour militance, which took various forms––all of which were
termed 'disorder.'2
Strikes, about which we have the best statistics, increased drastically under the
Republic, especially when compared to the period of the Primo dictatorship (1923-1929)
(Figure 1).
2
In the 1930s Spanish labour engaged in peaceful, violent, economic and
revolutionary strikes, demonstrations and protests. This paper, which cannot seek to
disentangle these often intertwined strands, aggregates all such types of labour militance,
as did conservative Spanish politicians, the financial press, and employers.
strikes strikers days lost
1200 16000000
14000000
1000
12000000
strikes and strikers
800
10000000
days lost
600 8000000
6000000
400
4000000
200
2000000
0 0
1924'25 '26 '27 '28 '29 '30 '31 '32 '33
1924 - 1933
1400000
1200000 60000
1000000
UGT, CNT
PSOE
800000 40000
600000
400000 20000
200000
0 0
1923 '24 '25 '28 '29 '30 '31 '32 '33
1923 - 1933
The difference is especially notable in the period immediately following the proclamation
of the Republic in April 1931. Compared to the previous three months, the first twelve
weeks of the Republic (April-June) saw the average monthly strike rate more than
quadruple (Boletín del Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social [BMT], Nos. 7-12).
Commenting on these trends, La Semana Financiera (24 July 1931) saw 'a very
accentuated breakdown in the principle of authority.' Not only did the number of strikes
grow, likewise did membership in the Anarchist (CNT) and Socialist (UGT) unions, as
well as membership in the Socialist Party (PSOE) (Figure 2). The Socialists were
politically moderate in the early 1930s and demanded only a bigger slice of the economic
pie, while the Anarchists wanted total social revolution, and were often violent. In any
case, the skyrocketing number of Socialists and unionized workers meant that the days of
employer dominance were ending. In sum, the 1930s in Spain were marked by 'the trade
Investors and employers said they wanted to preserve 'order' in the face of these
shocking developments; their main interest was actually to protect the existing economic
order; and their greatest fear was the violent overturning of society. The wealthy did desire
to keep the social peace in the face of often-violent actions by the working classes. The
central meaning of their denunciations of 'anarchy' and 'indiscipline,' however, was that
they intended to fight to retain their privileges in the face of calls for social justice. With
the fall of the Primo dictatorship, large landowners and industrialists lost their formal,
institutional representation in the political system, and state elites would no longer direct
policy toward maximizing their incomes. Most obviously, the capitalist and oligarchic
classes could no longer count on the government to restrain salaries through repression of
174-5). One of the first acts of the Provisional Government, for example, was to make
legal the formation of labour unions. The newly assertive workers posed an economic
threat, as they represented bargaining power that would lead to higher wages, which could
Preserving 'order' meant both maintaining peaceful streets and continued profits. It
also, and most importantly, meant banishing the nightmare of complete destruction of the
social and political order by revolutionary masses. Among the moneyed classes, labour
militance in Spain during the 1930s caused fear, hostility and eventually calls for violence–
times, fear of unruly workers can intrude on the calmest investor's mind and overwhelm
the criteria that usually govern business decisions. As Block (1977: 22) points out,
investors tend to ask themselves a simple question: 'Is the working class under control?'
(see also Kalecki 1943: 326). In Spain, financial journals repeatedly referred to the lessons
of the Bolshevik revolution, and lauded the Fascists' fight against workers and the political
left in Italy and Germany. In the first months of the Republic many Spaniards saw an
anarchist putsch as a very real danger. What frightened the financial elites most about
labour militance, in sum, was the idea that 'the bourgeois Republic of 14 April be
conquered in rapid stages by the socialist Republic and then by communism' (La Semana
Financiera 1 May 1931). Spaniards had more than contemporary examples against which
to compare their politics. The First Republic (1873-74) was remembered mainly for the
social dislocations and 'anarchy' which accompanied it, and these ghosts were haunting
insurrection ended that brief federal experiment, as the protector of 'order.' In the words of
El Financiero (17 April 1931), published only days after the proclamation of the Republic,
This prediction came true. By the spring of 1936, conservatives and business
interests warned they would rather destroy democracy than endure more drastic militance
by the working classes. In July of that year, General Franco justified his insurrection in
part by pointing to the 'anarchy' in the countryside (Snow 1998). In short, one can interpret
investors' reactions to labour militance in economic terms alone, but this only tells part of
the story. A more complete account allows a fuller understanding of the Second Republic's
hiring non-union labour during disputes with unionized workers, instituted the eight-hour
day, widened the scope of collective bargaining, and established grounds for reasonable
dismissal.
As the class-struggle approach would predict, workers took a hand in the process of
reforms. The wage-arbitration system, for example, gave workers an institutional opening
to win concessions from employers that they used to great advantage. The decree of May
1931 established a national system of 'mixed juries' (jurados mixtos) for industry and
management. These bodies had jurisdiction over working conditions, salaries, length of
contracts, and rights of those fired, among other issues. Workers used them to gain many
improvements in working conditions at the local level (Harrison 1989: 89). As a result,
employers and investors criticized them harshly (Cabrera 1983: 202-204). In the process
of land reform as well, some peasants took matters into their own hands. In September
1932, fed up with legislative delays, farm workers in Extremadura invaded a set of
eventually responded by allowing peasants to plough the disputed lands for two years.
Further, while the Government stated the policy would apply to only some 30,000
120,000. The Minister of Agriculture gave 'recognition to many of the farm invasions by
disguising them as legal settlements'; these concessions, in fact, were the reformists' 'only
real accomplishment' in land reform (Malefakis 1970: 241, 281). Such gains were
certainly symbols of the workers' power to take matters into their own hands, as per the
Those holding financial portfolios did not wait for workers to assert themselves
before selling assets. After the declaration of the Republic on 14 April 1931, business and
investors disinvested on a massive scale, the economic and political fallout from which the
leftist governments of the reformist biennium never fully recovered. Fearing the worst,
wealthy Spaniards wanted cash, and they wanted it out of the country. While they were
shaken by the change in regimes, they were most alarmed by the prospect of rampaging
workers.
The Madrid Bolsa (stock market) was in a secular downward trend before April 14
1931, but this cannot obscure the effects of the Republic's establishment. It had lost about
1% of its value in the six weeks prior to that date; but in the next six weeks, it dropped by
around 15% (Figure 3).3 The peseta, which had been advancing modestly relative to other
currencies in the weeks before April 14, fell by more than 15% in the six weeks after that
date (Figure 4). Indeed, the peseta hit a low against the pound sterling that it had not
reached since Spain's defeat in the Spanish-American War, thirty-two years before (El
Financiero, 5 June 1931).4 In a typical sign of capital flight, the number of bills in
circulation skyrocketed as bank accounts were emptied and pesetas exchanged for other
currencies, sent abroad or stashed under the bed. Within a mere fifty days, the increase in
bills in circulation exceeded those registered in any first semester of the previous ten years
3
The Spanish financial press did not consistently calculate and publish stock
indexes. I have therefore constructed two different measures, for daily and monthly stock
prices in the Madrid Bolsa, based on data in El Economista. The stock indexes equally
weight all stocks and indicate their average percentage change during the relevant periods.
This index is an indicator of the markets' general response to events, not an instrument to
measure their precise movements. Further, I assume the interests of Spanish capitalists as
a whole were roughly similar, although one could argue that regional differences caused
different economic perspectives and behaviour. There were some regional variations in
investment confidence. According to data in El Economista, for example, after the
proclamation of the Republic the Barcelona stock market fell 19% from 10 April to 29
May 1931, yet the Bilbao stock market dropped only 9% in the same period. Finally, as
there was no clear difference of opinion between the financial press and employers'
publications, the paper will not distinguish between their views, and will assume that both
generally reflected the opinion of most investors and employers.
4
Martín (1987: 129) argues the years of Spanish budget deficits and permissive
money policies caused the rapid depreciation of the peseta in the spring of 1931. While
these factors doubtless influenced the secular trend of the currency, Figure 2 makes clear
the effects of the proclamation of the Republic.
Stocks Peseta
103
104
98
Madrid stockmarket
101
Peseta
93
98
Republic proclaimed
April 14
88
95
92 83
3/1/31 4/14 5/27
March 1 - May 27 1931
5.2
4.8
4.6
1/31 4/11 7/31
January - July 1931
The countryside saw the same dynamic with different assets. There was a rash of
sales of livestock and farmhouses, driving down property values (López 1984: 216-23). A
panicked Cardinal even tried to smuggle out religious artifacts (Bahamonde and Toro
1981, 320). Often Spaniards accompanied their cash in its flight abroad. During the
summer of 1931, the best hotels in the south of France were bustling with business,
'jammed with Spain's largest landowners and nobility who fled Spain' (The New York
Times, 6 August 1931). Owners of capital did not soon change their opinion about the
Republic. During its first year, investors exported from Spain roughly 2 billion pesetas
(Harrison 1985: 99; Florensa Palau 1980, 320; cf. Robinson 1970, 83). By April 1932, the
peseta had lost 25% of its value, according to the weekly data in El Economista. By
December 1933 the stock market had fallen by nearly half (Anuario Estadística 1933:
451).
Spanish politicians argued over the causes of this exodus of wealth and the
wealthy. Socialist Indalecio Prieto, Finance Minister under the Provisional Government,
conservative economic interests, asserted in a series of speeches given in 1931 that there
was no such conspiracy. The cause of capital flight was 'disorder' (Ventosa 1932: 23 and
passim; Robinson 1970: 84). Despite such denials, however, Monarchists had in fact
distributed a series of leaflets in the initial weeks of the Republic that encouraged
disinvestment to subvert the new government (Ben-Ami 1978: 276-77; also see Payne
1993: 44). For the majority of investors, who did not engage in economic sabotage, there
certainly was no shortage of reasons to disinvest in the spring of 1931. A dramatic change
in political regime naturally produces disquiet and anxiety among the moneyed. In
addition, the presence in Government of three Socialist Ministers (Justice, Finance and
Labour) doubtless added to the worries. After a few months, however, it became obvious
to all that the Government was firmly in the hands of moderates who were not about to
change in regimes and Socialists in Government, investors and owners of capital focused
their anxiety and hostility on strikes, land occupations and occasional violence by the
working class. The reforms hurt profits, but labour militance seemed to threaten the entire
system.
but their monetary and fiscal policies were notable for conservatism and adherence to
economic orthodoxy. Despite the demands for increased government spending in a time of
great economic hardship, the Government by no means obliged. In real and nominal
terms, in fact, the budget deficits during the period 1931-1933 were less than those under
the last three years of the Primo dictatorship (1927-1929), which was a period of economic
expansion (Comín and Martín 1984: 251). Examination of the less accurate data available
to investors at the time indicates even more financial rectitude. According to Finance
Ministry figures (in El Sol, 19 May 1934), the budget deficit for the first full year of the
rule of the left (1932) was less than half of the deficit for 1929, the last year of the
dictatorship. Both of the first two years of the Republic (1932 and 1933) had deficits
lower than any year under Primo. It is difficult to believe, therefore, that owners of capital
thought they faced profligate leftists willing to spend the nation into bankruptcy. The
financial press' initial observations regarding the new Government support this view.
'sense of diligence and prudence in the realm of finance and economics, and if this road
November 1931)––after the earthshaking reform decrees that summer––the same paper
commended Prieto for his 'honourable management of the Ministry of Finance...[and] good
orientation and intentions' (see also Bahamonde and Toro 1981: 318; Harrison 1989: 99).
Jaume Carner, the subsequent holder of the Finance portfolio, received similar
approbation. La Actualidad Financiera (23 December 1931) asserted 'his designation has
London (27 February 1932) noted that Carner was a 'hard-headed' Finance Minister who
sought 'to clean up the whole financial position inherited from eight years of
dictatorship...[which] played ducks and drakes with the nation's finances.' In sum, the loss
of confidence during the first biennium is quite difficult to trace to investors' worries about
leftist profligacy.
plausible, though still exaggerated, case. Without question, financial journals complained
loudly about the social reforms' economic effects (Bahamonde and Toro 1981). A
common complaint was that they were bankrupting business and forcing owners of capital
to abandon productive activities. The legislation certainly raised costs for producers,
especially in agriculture. Reliable statistics are quite difficult to come by, but wages likely
increased by over 20% in real terms from 1931-33 (Tortellá Casares 1983: 131; Cabrera
1983: 132). The degree to which agricultural profits were affected remains unclear, yet
large landowners, which dominated Spanish agricultural life, likely did not suffer as much
as they claimed (Cabrera 1983: 162-3). In addition, higher pay not only raised costs, it
raised consumption, which benefited specific sectors of the Spanish economy and had an
important counter-cyclical economic effect (Fontana and Nadal 1977: 484-5; Cabrera
1983: 132; Harrison 1989: 80). The Catalan textile industry, for example, was hurt by the
loss of export markets due to the Depression, yet did not experience a drop in production
thanks to increased domestic consumption. This was true also of specific agricultural
commodities, as well as consumer goods more generally (Benavides 1972: 46). Despite
the protestations of a 'crippled' agricultural sector, production remained high from 1931 to
1935 (Malefakis 1970: 284). Had it not been for the increase in salaries, the especially
abundant harvests of 1932 and 1934 would have lowered agricultural prices much more
sharply, and with them the fortunes of producers (Tortellá Casares 1983: 131).
The reforms did hurt profits for many businesses and landowners, in large part
because Spanish capitalism was premised on low salaries gained by repression, not
impact, yet it is clear that there exists a sharp contrast between the financial press' strident
claims and the facts of the matter. Payne (1993: 15 3) who generally has been sympathetic
with Spanish conservatives of the 1930s, terms as 'hysteria' some of business' complaints in
this period. According to the Anuario Financiero, average profits were down 10% in 1930
compared to the previous year, while in 1931, they fell by only 6%. Further, in 1932, the
first full year of the Republic, the Anuario shows an increase in average profits over 1931.
Even in 1933, the worst year of the Depression, of the 47 largest Spanish businesses only
11 declared fewer profits than the year before, and many did quite well (Tuñon de Lara
1976: 127). One cannot disregard completely the notion that a strictly rational, calculated
response to costly social reforms drove investors' actions. This perspective, however,
cannot explain the scale of capital flight in 1931 and 1932. Neither can it account for the
absence of investors' enthusiasm when the reforms began to be dismantled in 1934. Nor
can it explain the sharp upturn in stock prices when the rightist Governments of 1934-35
The first elections under the Republic, which resulted in a huge victory for the
reformers, indicate that investors were not worried as much about reforms as they were
about social unrest. The Republican-Socialist reformist alliance won 407 seats, with 51 for
the intransigent rightist opposition (Payne 1993: 50-51). Strikingly, the financial journals
did not express much concern about this victory for the left. Instead, they limited
July 1931) struck a typical note. 'The impression produced by Sunday's electoral result has
been satisfactory…[but there is] as much effervescence and passion in those lower
Financiera (3 July 1931) declared 'The first impression of the electoral stage was
Economista (4 July 1931) argued the Government must make 'its first duty the re-
establishment of tranquillity.' The financial journals stressed this theme because they were
convinced that normal investment patterns would never return unless the workers were
5
Critics of the reformist biennium also argued the social reforms caused the
Depression in Spain (see, e.g., El Financiero, 30 October 1931; Ventosa 1932). If true,
this clearly would have affected investors' behaviour. If the reformers had ruined the
Spanish economy, they would have lost the confidence of owners of capital-and quite
rightly. In fact, Spain was clearly feeling the Depression's effects before the establishment
of the Republic in April 1931. For statistics see Cabrera (1983: 84-5, 97, 116) and
Hernandez (1983: 299-302).
Repeatedly in the next four years, employers and the financial press repeated that
Economista (1 August 1931), for example, stated 'the withdrawal of money, [is a] natural
conflicts...The country suffers much with this state of unrest [intranquilidad], and the stock
market reflects that' (1 August 1931). According to El Financiero (15 May 1931), Spain
needed 'public order and social peace, without which nothing can survive nor could survive
in the economic and financial realms.' For these editorialists, it was clear that international
investors as well were watching the labour unrest. 'The Government should face
resolvedly, urgently and radically the problem of public order, without which there is
neither internal nor external credit,' argued La Semana Financiera (24 July l931). El
Financiero (11 Sept. 1931) similarly traced the peseta's difficulties to specific Spanish
strikes. The first week of September started calmly in the foreign currency markets,
according to an editorial, 'but then the revolutionary strike in Zaragoza happens, and in
London the pound jumps, very actively, over 54 [pesetas]; the strike of Zaragoza is
followed by the general strike in Barcelona, and in London the rate on the pound jumps
over 55.'
These writers' proposed solution to the investment crisis was predictable in light of
their analysis of its causes. 'Strengthening order and social peace will cause a renaissance
in the life of business and increase production,' said La Semana Financiera (23 October
1931). Noting the continuing drop in the stock markets, La Actualidad Financiera (3 June
Financiero (17 July 1931) quoted approvingly this 'man of order': 'It is necessary,' Lerroux
stated, 'to put an end to the liberty many so poorly bear.' It was argued that this would
have beneficial economic consequences. The social reforms were expensive for some, but
were not the main preoccupation of investors and employers. In evaluating Spain's
economic climate, they anxiously looked to the situation in the streets and countryside. In
short, on the interpretation of Spanish businessmen and investors, it was not the world
economic crisis that was harming their businesses, 'but rather a simple lack of public order,
and they asked for a policy of "inexorable punishment" for those who disturbed it' (Tuñon
de Lara 1976 II:49). When finally put into effect, this policy brought business confidence
back to Spain.
In November 1933 the first nation-wide elections took place since the victory of the
reformist parties in the summer of 1931, and they functioned in part as a referendum on the
reformist biennium. The financial press lobbied hard for the eventually victorious rightist
parties. Strikingly, journals did not emphasize typical economic issues. As La Semana
Financiera (3 November 1933) pointed out at the end of the campaign, 'With two weeks to
go before the election we don't know how the different political parties are going to
proceed on the issues [such as] budget matters, economic recovery, agrarian and industrial
amok,' combined with systematic denunciation of the complete lack of order in the streets
and countryside.6 As they did during the reformist biennium, the financial journals linked
the lack of 'order' with the dearth of investment confidence. In 1933, however, they began
to use violent language and advocate repressive measures against the workers as a means
Actualidad Financiera September 27 1933), for example, stated 'It is necessary that the
'It won't be possible for economic activity to be reborn while all the centres of anarchist
December), Spanish economic problems stemmed from 'social indiscipline that will only
where 'to animate the businessman, he has to assume the misery of his collaborators...the
admitted and irremediable misery of the Spanish factors of production' (quoted in Palafox
1991: 274). The political tide was running against such humane views, however.
newsletter, made clear the wealthier classes' increasingly extremist views. The caption
6
There were isolated and half-hearted complaints about 'immoderate increases in
spending' (La Semana Financiera 13 Oct. 1933) and 'monstrous deficits' (Labor 14
October 1933). Such comments, however, were very much the exception, and did not
accurately represent the facts, as we have seen.
read 'We must combat the Socialist "cancer"; not with therapeutics like hygiene, but a
decisive surgical operation that extirpates it. Will a vote against be enough?' Some
editorials went even further, expressing admiration for fascism. As early as 1931 financial
writers had praised the Italian solution to militant workers. La Semana Financiera (23
October 1931), for example, noted approvingly that while 'socialization of a Communist
character' had threatened Italy, Mussolini's march on Rome had nipped this in the bud by
The attraction of such extreme measures was much more widespread by 1933. El
Financiero (24 November 1933), for example, stated 'We defend the notion [of] a regime
redeeming fascio germ would be welcome.' The author then went on to praise Hitler's new
Government 'for the policy of sacrifice and pain leading to the organic coexistence that we
advocate.' Striking a rare defensive note, the editorial concluded 'you have to look for the
good and efficient where you can find it.' Vida Económica (10 December 1933) sounded a
similar tone, declaring 'Once the state acquires vigour, class interest passes to a very
secondary position and the interest of the community prevails in unsuspected ways. So it
has happened in Fascist Italy and Hitlerite Germany.' These attitudes foreshadowed both
the repression which was to be so successful in reassuring investors and employers, and the
Upon the electoral victory of the rightist forces in November 1933, the financial
journals again demonstrated their preoccupation with labour militance, which was soon
appropriate policy priorities for the incoming rightist Government, there was again much
less interest in typical financial matters than one would suppose from financial papers, just
as during the election campaign. La Semana Financiera (22 December 1933), for
example, argued 'The first concern of public power, in order of urgency, is reestablishment
of social peace, moral discipline and the prestige of the law.' Only after making this point
did the author go on to discuss more typical economic issues; even then, repeal of the
agrarian-reform legislation was ranked last out of ten priorities. El Trabajo Nacional
(March 1934) argued likewise. 'The first and essential task of a Government that wants to
worry about Spain's economic resurgence has to consist in re-establishing the principle of
Economia y Hacienda (November 25 1933) offered a ten-point program for the newly
elected Government, leading off with 'First. Re-establishment of the principle of authority,
ending the anarchy of control and re-establishing everywhere social discipline and respect
of law.' El Economista (23 December 1933) specified what it saw as the proper aims of
authority and put policy in some order.' Investors hoped the Government would heed this
1933 electoral defeat of the left. According to data in El Economista and El Financiero,
the peseta increased in value by nearly 4%, recovering sharply from its free-fall during the
election campaign; stock prices rose by close to 10%. According to the interpretation of
La Actualidad Financiera (27 December 1933), the markets 'reacted with certain optimism
facing the prospects of tranquillity and calm that the new governmental situation has
brought.' The year 1934 did see a slight increase in some measures of confidence. The
external capital finance available to corporations, for example, increased by 55% over
1933 (the nadir of Spain's economic depression), and the amount of credit granted by
Spain's six largest banks accelerated its steady growth from the depths of January 1932. In
sum, 'investors' state of confidence showed evidence of symptoms of recuperation from the
start of 1934' (Palafox 1991: 232-4; 235). The upswing in the stock market did not last
long past the election of the rightists, however, sputtering out in late January. In general,
one would have expected more of a rise in investment confidence during 1934. Certainly,
the improvement in this regard was not as striking as that of 1935, by which time the
government had completely crushed the working class. Investors demanded from the new
Government violent repression of the workers, and were not patient in waiting for such
measures. The new Government, led by Lerroux, took office on 19 December 1933. The
declaration the new Prime Minister read in the Cortes on that date clearly echoed the
concerns of the financial press. 'The first preoccupation of this Government has to be, in
order of urgency, re-establishment of social peace, moral discipline and rule of law'
(quoted in El Economista 23 December 1933). Only after expanding on this theme did
Lerroux argue that his Government would also 'correct the defects of the existing [reform]
laws.' The 'corrections,' however, were to prove insufficient for investors and employers.
Quoting the employers' publication Labor, Cabrera (1983: 234) accurately summarizes up
election. Wages dropped by 60%, and employers denied jobs to unionized workers
(Preston 1978: 103). While the Government allowed the landowners to impose their will
in the countryside, the government moved to attack the reformist legislation. One of the
earliest measures was a change in the system of mixed juries. Granting a long-standing
demand of employers, in January 1934 the Government decreed that presidents of these
arbitration boards appointed by the Ministry of Labour could not be current or recent
members of trade unions. This greatly decreased the chance of labour-friendly board
decisions (Cabrera 1983:219). As for agrarian issues, the Government in May 1934
returned to their original owners large parcels of land that had been expropriated as part of
agrarian reform. That same month the Government abolished the direct confiscation
clauses of the Agrarian Reform Law. It also repealed the Law of Municipal Boundaries,
which had prevented landowners from importing farm workers from other provinces at
harvest time in order to avoid paying higher wages to local organized workers. Instead of
being repealed outright, other reforms (e.g., minimum salaries), were simply ignored and
thereby abrogated by lack of enforcement (Tuñon de Lara 1976II:21). Just to make sure
that local political leaders were sympathetic to this new orientation, the Interior Minister
demanded the removal of those who 'did not inspire confidence in matters of public order'
(quoted in Preston 1978:112). One hundred and ninety-three leftist mayors and municipal
councils were replaced (Payne 1993:198). In spite of this movement towards satisfying the
hard right, the government was unable to make progress on an issue that financial analysts
had been complaining about for years: strikes. The first three months of the new
Government saw an average of 120 strikes per month. This was not a great improvement
over the average rate of 149 per month during the last three months of the leftist
Government's rule (BMT, Nos. 39-45). La Semana Financiera (5 January 1934) chose to
draw an historical analogy. 'It was said to the Carthaginian warrior that "You know how to
win, Hannibal, but you don't know how to take advantage of victory." It would be sensible
for us if this phrase gained currency.' The next month, impatient for stronger action
against strikers, Labor (10 February 1934) acidly declared the new Government
supposes that its mission is based on crossing its arms before illegal strikes….If the
Government did not completely shirk its responsibilities during the development of
these conflicts, which cause so much damage and annoyance, they would all be
radically suppressed.
charged with watching over public order...[who follow a] vacillating, indecisive, and often
In March 1934, two strikes gave the Government a chance to demonstrate to critics
its firm hand. Employees at the newspaper ABC downed tools when it hired non-union
workers, and the Interior Minister took the opportunity to declare a state of alarm and close
this development, thundering 'if you want peace, prepare for war.' ABC fired the union
workers, and with government help defeated the strike. La Semana Financiera (16 March
1934) thought it saw some positive signs in these developments. 'Public order has come
out of the test more invigorated than it was before; the principle of authority has shown to
redeem itself from earlier weaknesses (flaquezas).' Some were not so impressed. La
Actualidad Financiera (21 March 1934) lamented a lack of toughness in putting down the
strike. As summed up La Semana Financiera (20 April 1934), 'tolerance is fine in normal
times, but in abnormal times, the first thing is to re-establish the disturbed order.' The
Government attempted to brandish its intolerance. When the Socialist farm workers' struck
later that spring, the Interior Minister disbanded local municipal governments, imprisoned
as many as 7,000 farm workers and even arrested four deputies of the Cortes suspected of
being among the leaders of the strike (Malefakis 1970: 340). The employers' association
Unión Económica commended the 'fortifying of authority,' while the Revista de Hacienda
y Economía kept the pressure on. 'The government must not vacillate in continuing the
action it has begun; it will have the resolute support of the opinion of the nation that
desires order, peace and work' (quoted in Palafox 1991:237). Lest the Government forget
its position on this issue, La Semana Financiera (11 May 1934) stated it again. 'In Spain
for some time now the principal problem has been the establishment of a policy of
After the failed Socialist uprising in Asturias, employers and investors got the
violent repression of the working class they had long been calling for, and in response the
stock market soared. From that October 1934 until the victory of the Popular Front in
February 1936, landowners and factory bosses prevented or broke most strikes. On 3
October 1934, the Socialists called a nation-wide general strike to protest the inclusion of
extreme-right ministers into the Government. The strike failed in most areas. In the
province of Asturias, however, there was a serious insurrection as miners occupied small
villages and even gained control of Oviedo, the provincial capital, declaring it a
attempt at social revolution, the new far-right Ministers insisted on extreme severity
against the rebels and leftists more generally. All over Spain, police rounded up union
leaders; closed down Socialist party branches; removed city councils; suspended mixed
juries; imposed press censorship; and jailed between 30-40,000 citizens suspected of
having leftist sympathies. Two months after the uprising, the Government downgraded the
state of martial law to a 'state of alarm.' There was no further progress to normal
government.
The Government took this opportunity to end strikes and other labour militance. In
abusiva) which applied to those work stoppages that were not in response to specific
labour issues. Workers who downed tools without making specific economic demands
could be fired and their contracts abrogated. Employers took this opportunity to dismiss
troublesome workers on a massive scale. In sum, the law 'left the workers' associations
without any possible defence' (Cabrera 1983: 242). Throughout 1935, the mixed juries and
municipal governments remained suspended, the political prisoners stayed in jail (Jackson
1966: 174), and the unions were unable to undertake their basic functions (Preston 1978:
132). The situation in the countryside was worse. Landowners evicted tens of thousands
of tenants from their lands while the Minister of Agriculture declined to intervene
(Robinson 1970: 202). Employers refused to hire union workers, and conditions were
abysmal for those who had work. By July 1935, landowners had by various pretexts
evicted as many as 80,000 tenant farmers (Robinson 1970: 203) in their drive to 'reduce the
peasantry to submissiveness once more' (Malefakis 1970: 329). Even Francoist historian
Ricardo de la Cierva admitted that the landowners, in this process of re-establishing their
dominance, 'were genuinely ferocious' (quoted in Payne 1993: 237). In the Cortes, the
modest agrarian reform legislation passed during the first biennium was almost completely
eviscerated, although none of the reformist legislation was formally repealed. Instead, the
Government refused to enforce them, so employers and landowners were free to ignore
them. La Semana Financiera (6 September 1935) lost no sleep over these developments.
'Perhaps there is some boss that commits abuses, but in general what is needed today is not
to preach social justice, but reaffirm discipline and work.' The employers' association El
Bloque (18 March 1935) was more blunt in an article titled 'Manifesto to the Classes of
Order.' 'It is a duel to the death, and will only end with the annihilation of one of the two
Finally fulfilling the noisy demands of the financial press, strikes virtually halted
under this repression. From November 1933 to September 1934––the first 11 months of
the rule of the right-the average number of strikes per month was 102. In the following 14
months, from October 1934 (when began the repression resulting from the Asturias
uprising) to December 1935, the average number of strikes per month was 17 (BMT,
'normalization' of work life, with 'bosses and workers channeling their efforts to raising the
productive spirit...this is how work has gone for several months, without difficulties or
conflicts, without animosity or distrust...a perfect union [of capital and labour].' The stock
market reflected this new 'order.' Between September 1934 and December 1935, it rose
over 21%. La Actualidad Financiera (14 August 1935) wrote 'the stock market, as a
whole, can't be more brilliant.' This rise was all the more striking when compared to the
first nine months of rightist rule, when the market fell nearly 5%. Figure 5 below charts an
index of the Madrid Bolsa against the number of strikes, marking the start of the repression
that began in response to the October 1934 uprising. After the rightist victory in
November 1933, stocks rose only briefly as the new Governments proved unwilling to end
strikes by whatever means necessary. As the number of strikes dropped dramatically after
strikes stocks
182 Repression of
labour begins: 115
Oct. 1934
110
122
Strikes
92
105
62
100
32
2 95
N '34 O '35
August 1933 - November 1935
financing of corporations almost doubled, and the number of firms accessing the capital
market increased by a third. More substantially, industrial production hit its highest point
under the Republic (Palafox 1991: 232). The rightist Governments of 1935 were more
extreme than those of 1934, and did more to ensure the effective abrogation of the social
legislation. Their most important contribution to confidence, however, was the harsh
crackdown on labour. The data indicate that it was only when the government met the
There are other possible explanations for this upturn in confidence. None are
terribly convincing. For example, the rightist Governments of 1934-35 did not institute
investor-friendly economic policies, according to financial writers. Early in the rule of the
right, La Actualidad Financiera (2 May 1934) complained about economic policy. 'The
truth is that the economic management of the previous [leftist] governments is being
repeated enormously faithfully in this Government, with regard to the vacuity, the lack of a
plan.' A year later, even the rightist Finance Minister Chapaprieta himself admitted as
much. 'I do not see that the Governments of the left had any different economic policy
from the Governments of the right. I have not found these differences' (quoted in Revista
de Economía y Hacienda, June 1 1935). That same journal (May 25 1935) complained 'the
current economic tendency is the road to disaster... [it is] the wrong policy followed since
1931.' The figures on budget deficits support these criticisms. The total deficits during the
two years of rightist rule (1934 and 193 5), in real and nominal terms, were greater than the
total of the three years from 1931-1933 (Comín and Martín 1984: 251).
The financial press had other complaints regarding the rightists' management of the
economy. Labor (January 19 1935), for example, wrote 'With confidence in the political
situation, business is undertaken, but confidence alone is not enough...The money that
creates new money must be protected and stimulated, but the Treasury does not see it that
way.' In sum, the financial papers were not at all impressed with the rightists' handling of
the economy, which therefore could not be the cause of increased confidence. Neither was
any improvement in Spain's economy behind the increase in stock prices, according to La
Actualidad Financiera (31 July 1935). Responding to another Spanish journalist who had
written the rising market was 'a reflection of the beginning of economic prosperity,' the
editorialist responded 'we disagree totally with this colleague,' arguing that the money
flowing into the stock market was seeking the safest place, and was not a reflection of
5.0 Conclusion
Before the massive repression that began after October 1934, Spanish investors had
not seen the stock market as a safe place. This is remarkable, given that the rightist parties
had in 1933 wrested control of the government away from the left, and during 1934 greatly
weakened the reforms of the first biennium. If Spanish investors looked strictly to their
pocketbooks, it is doubtful that they would have been so reticent during the rule of
politicians whose sympathy for business was only overshadowed by their conservatism.
The massive scale of capital flight that occurred after the proclamation of the Republic is
likewise difficult to explain using the assumption that investors only rationally analyse
economic factors. From the start of the Republic, Spanish investors and employers were
willing to tolerate democracy, but clearly held 'order' more dear. This catchall term
encompassed different levels of meaning. The moneyed classes wanted peaceful streets,
docile unions respectful of the traditional economic hierarchy, and, most crucially, no
threats of social revolution. The financial press knew all along what policies would bring
back investor confidence, and so they never ceased calling for a violent end to the
Spanish workers did not wait for the government to hand them reforms. To their
credit, they took advantage of democracy and struck and bargained and fought for their fair
share; some demanded much more. The backlash was deadly, however, and pushed Spain
towards civil war. The ruthless repression of 1935 radicalized the unions and their
political allies, increased support for root-and-branch revolution, and led directly to the
bitterly contentious factory and farm occupations of the spring and summer of 1936. To
'anarchy' and 'disorder,' we must first understand the dynamic of the preceding years
Bahamonde Magro, A. and J. Toro Mérida. (1981): 'Prensa económica y bolsa ante la
Guadiana.
Ben-Ami, S. (1978): The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Block, F. (1977): 'The Ruling Class Does Not Rule', Socialist Review, 7 (May-June).
Comín Comín, F. and P. Martin Aceña, (1984): 'La Política Monetaria y Fiscal Durante la
Florensa Palau, S.V. (1980): 'Españia frente a la gran depresión. Cambios, precios y
Harrison, J. (1985): The Spanish Economy in the Twentieth Century. London: Croom
Helm.
University Press.
Kolm, S.G. (1979): 'A General Theory of Socialist Failure', in. Persson, B. (ed.),
Malefakis, E. (1970): Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the
Martin Aceña, P. (1987): 'Sobre la economía del primer bienio', in Garcia Delgado (ed.),
Miliband, R. (1969): The State in Capitalist Society. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
Payne, S. (1993): Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936. Madison:
Preston, P. (1978): The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and
Robinson, R. (1970). The Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the Republic and
Juliá, S. (1989). 'The origins and nature of the Spanish Popular Front', in M. Alexander
Snow, S.G. (1998). 'Balancing on the Brink: Rationality, Radicalism and Military
Insurrection in Spain and Chile', Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol.
________ (1999). 'Reformers and Investors: Crisis and Confidence during the
ARCHIVAL SOURCES
Statistical compendia:
Government publications:
Financial journals:
El Economista (Madrid)
El Financiero (Madrid)
Employers' periodicals:
Labor (Madrid)
El Bloque (Madrid)
Newspapers:
El Sol (Madrid)