Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Content
Background and construction sequence Observations up to the point of collapse, including monitoring The collapse Post-collapse investigations Design errors Jet grout layers Ground conditions and the buried valley The need for a trigger Back analyses of the collapse Relative vertical displacement and forced sway The bored piles Collapse mechanism and its trigger Lessons to be learnt
34m Diameter Temporary Staging Area (TSA) Shaft 35m deep 210m 2-cell cut & cover tunnels 200m cut & cover deep 30m - 33m stacked 4-cell scissors crossover tunnel 3-level cut & cover Station (NCH)- 30m deep 25m
C824
Collapse site M3 area
800m twin bored tunnel
370m stacked 2-cell cut & cover tunnel 20m - 25m deep
C825
C824 - 2km of cut and cover construction mostly in soft clay - up to 35m deep
Reclamation dates
Beach Road
The Concourse Plaza Hotel
NCH station
1970s reclamation
TSA shaft
Kallang Basin
31700
54+900
ABH30 NOR RTHING (m)
ABH32
M3
ABH85 AC-2
ABH34
AC-4 ABH35
M2 31650 54+812
MC3007 ABH83
ABH29
31600 31550
31600
31650
31700
31750
31800
EASTING (m)
SOUTH
100
Fill Upper estuarine Upper U
ABH 32
NORTH
90
Marine Clay
Upper F2
Upper F2
80
70
Typical section in M3
0 0
0.4 04
1.6 16
0 0
20
80
100
Nkt=12
Depth (m)
Depth (m)
20
20
30
30
40
40
SOUTH
NORTH
Fill
Upper E
gp Driven kingpost Permanent bored piles supporting rail boxes 10 levels of steel struts at 3m +3.5m vertical centres
Upper F2
Sacrificial JGP
Permanent JGP
Lower E Lower F2 OA SW2 (N=35) OA SW1 (N 72) (N=72) OA (CZ)
General Excavation sequence for M3 up to level for removal of sacrificial JGP and installation of 10th level strut
Tidal sea
TSA Shaft
M3
Utility crossings
M2
Curved walls
Nicoll Highway
24/3/04
Support beam Shaft M3 No waler C channel stiffener Jacking point Walers Splayed strut Non-splayed strut Kingpost
M2
Two Struts Bearing Direct on Single panel Single Strut with Splays g y Bearing on Waler for Single panel Struts on Walers - No Splays
Excavation for the 10th level of struts, including removal of the sacrificial JGP
North wall
M301 M302 M303 M304 M305
333
334 H KP 181
335
336 H KP 182
337
338 H KP 183
339
340
M306
M307
M308
M309
M310
Excavation in progress
S335-9 S335 9
S338-9 S338 9
GWV24 I 65
I 104
Excavation Front Beyond S335 at the start of Day Shift on 18th April 2004
SG3358 Total Force SG3359 Total Force
5000
4500
Excavation Front Approaches S335 at the end of Day Shift on y 17th April 2004
4000
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
15th April
140 130 120 110
16th April
100 90
17th April
80 70 60
18th April
50 40
19th April
30 20 10
20th April
0 0
3500
Waler Buckling Observed 335(N) Support Bracket at 335(S) Drops Off Waler Buckling Observed
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
Strut Load 335-9
1500
1000
500
0
6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00 15.00 16.00
In nstallation of 9th f
8th
Observed
9th
18 April 2004
20
3.30pm
The trends were consistent with there being g yielding of the 9th level strut-waler connection when the excavation passed beneath but with no f th significant changes i l d i either further i ifi t h in load in ith the 9th or 8th level struts until the collapse was initiated
10
10
North Wall
20 De epth (m)
20 De epth (m)
30
30
40
40
50
50
10
10
North Wall
20 De epth (m)
20 De epth (m)
30
30
40
40
50
50
Horizontal displacement (mm) 0 0 I 104 10 April 15 April 17 April 200 400 400
10
10
North Wall
20 De epth (m)
20 De epth (m)
30
30
40
40
50
50
Horizontal displacement (mm) 0 0 I 104 10 April 15 April 17 April 20 April 10 200 400 400
North Wall
20 De epth (m)
20 De epth (m)
30
30
40
40
50
50
500
400
300
South wall
200
North N th wall ll
100
0 5-Jul
9-Aug
13-Sep
18-Oct 2003
22-Nov
27-Dec
31-Jan
6-Mar
10-Apr 2004
S338-9 stood for 8 days under load and was 20m from excavation front S335 9 stood for 2 5 days under load and was over S335-9 2.5 8m from excavation front B th S335-9S & S338 9N b kl d within 10 minutes Both S335 9S S338-9N buckled ithi i t Load in S335-8 and S335-9 was almost constant between 18 A il and i iti ti of collapse b t April d initiation f ll All C-channel connections failed downwards at both ends The south wall was pushing the north wall back
Key observations
The collapse
3.33pm
3.33pm
3.34pm
3.34pm
3.34pm
3.41pm
3.46pm
Design errors
Errors Misinterpretation of BS5950 with regard to stiff bearing length b i l h Omission of splays Effects Design capacity of strut-waler connection was 50% of strut waler required design capacity where splays were omitted
Capacity based on BS5950:1990 = 2550 kN Average ultimate capacity based on physical load tests = 4100 kN Based on mill tests, 9 % of connections had 95% f capacity of 3800 kN- 4400kN Predicted 9th level strut load in 2D analyses which ignored bored piles was close to ultimate capacity therefore collapse was considered by the COI to be inevitable Inevitability of collapse
Method A and Method B refer to two alternative ways of modelling undrained soil behaviour in Plaxis (Pickles, 2002) Method A is an effective stress analysis of an undrained problem bl Assumes isotropic elastic behaviour and a MohrCoulomb f C failure criterion As a result mean effective stress p is constant until y p yield Method A was being applied to marine clays which were of low over-consolidation or even under-consolidated over consolidation under consolidated because of recent reclamation Method B is a total stress analysis
Methods A and B
t
Cu from Method A
Cu from Method B
Method A
105 100 95 90 85 RL (m) 80 75 70 65 60 55 -0.050
Method B
105 100 95 90 85 RL (m) 80 75 70 65 60 55 -0.050
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
Method A
105 100 95 90 85 RL (m) 80 75 70 65 60 55 -500 0 -3000 -2500 -2000 -1500 -1000 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
RL (m) 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55
Method B
-500
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
-3000
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
4000
Method M th d A
g 3000 2800 2600 2400 2200 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 ( )
3000 2800 2600 2400 2200 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0
Method B
2383
2206
Strut Load (kN/m)
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9
Method A over-estimates the undrained shear strength of normally and lightly overconsolidated clays l Its use led to a 50% under-estimate of wall displacements and of bending moments and an under-estimate of the 9th level strut force of 10%
The larger than predicted displacements mobilised the capacity of the JGP layers at an earlier stage p y y g than predicted
Method A
St t l design errors Structural d i Removal of splays at some strut locations p y Introduction of C-channel waler connection detail Use of Method A in soil-structure interaction analysis C ll Collapse was an i inevitable consequence of th it bl f the design errors which led to the applied loads on the struts increasing with time and equalling the capacity of the strut-waler connection
St t l design errors Structural d i Removal of splays at some strut locations p y Introduction of C-channel waler connection detail Use of Method A in soil-structure interaction analysis C ll Collapse was an i inevitable consequence of th it bl f the design errors which led to the applied loads on the struts increasing with time and equalling the capacity of the strut-waler connection
Jet grout
Design thickness
0 0 2 4 6 8
31700
DN3 BN2E CN2 DN2E EN2 FN2 DN2W DN1E DN1W BN2W
54+900
CN1
M3
AN1 66KVNI
M2 31650 54+812
FN1 EN1 CL 3g CL-3g CL-2
66KVS CFVN CTSN CPTNa CPTN FS1 DS2E DS2W DS3E CS3 ES3 DS3W EASTING (m) DS1E DS1W ES1 CS2 CS1
TSAS2 TSAS2b
BS2E BS2W
AS2
31600
ES2
31550
31600
FS2
31650
BS3E BS3W
AS3
31700
31750
31800
BS4W
BS4E
CS4
BS4Ea
DS4W DS4E
0 0
0.4
1.6
0 0
0.4
1.6
BN1W qt u2 fs 10
BS2W qt u2 fs 10
North
South
D Depth (m)
20
De epth (m)
0 0.4 0.8 Pore pressure, u2 (MPa) 0.02 0.04 Friction, f s (MPa) 0.06 1.2
20
30
30
40
40 0 0.4 04 0.8 08 Pore pressure, u2 (MPa) 0.02 0.04 Friction, f s (MPa) 0.06 1.2 12
0.08
0.08
100
t (kP Pa)
s' (kPa)
=35o
P36 BN3
P42/P48 P33
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100 105
CN3
P40
P41/P47 P54
P45
31700
DN3
Tender SI boreholes Tender SI CPTs Detailed design SI Detailed design SI CPTs Post collapse SI Post collapse SI CPTs Boreholes for bored piles Magnetic logging boreholes
54+900
ABH32
M3
AN1 ABH85
ABH34
31650
54+812
CFVN
CTSN CPTN
CPTNa
ABH27
BN1W 66KVNI CN1 WN2 BN1Ea BN1E WN6 WN4 WN8 WN3 WN1 ABH30 WN12WN10 WN7AWN5 DN1E FN2 WN14 WN11 WN9 WN16 DN1W WN13 WN18 WN15 WN20 WN17 WN22 WN19 WN24 WN21 MC3007 EN1 WN26 M3010 CL-1a WN23 ABH83 WN28 WN25 AC-3 AC 3 WN30A WN27 CL-2 FN1 WN29 CL-3g WN32 WN31 WN34 BS1Ea WN33 WS1 ABH84 SPTSa BS1Eb WS3 66KVS ABH31 WN37 WN35 WS9 WS7 WS5 WS11A WS12A WN36 WS13A WS11C WS12C WS15WS13C WS10 WS8 WS6 WS4A WS2 WN38 WS14 BS1W WS11B WS17 WS12B WS12 WS13B WS11 WS13 DS1E WS19 AS1 WN39 WS16 WS21 ABH29 WN40 WS18 ABH82 WS23 WS20 WS25 WS22 CS1 WS27 WS24 DS1W ABH28 WS29 WS26 WS34 WS31 WS28 WS30 ABH81 WS36 WS32 ES1 WS35A WS33 MC2026 WS37 AS2 BS2E WS38 FS1 CS2 BS2W M2064
AC-2 AC-4
M2
TSAS2 TSAS2b
M2065
31600 31550
MC2025 ES2
31600
FS2
31650
DS3E DS3W ES3 CS3
31700
31750
31800
EASTING (m)
BS4W CS4 BS4Ea BS4E
DS4W DS4E
110
100
90 ELEVATION (mRL) (
80
70
60
50
Bottom of F2 Clay in Marine Clay Detailed design site investigation Bottom of F2 Clay in Marine Clay Post collapse site investigations Top of OLD ALLUVIUM Post collapse site investigations
110
100
80
70
60
50
P36 BN3 77.02 P42/P48 P33 86.39 CN3 82.27 P45 86.20 P52 85.98 BN2E 82.61 DN2E 81.94 P40 86.30 86.90 P41/P47 86 90 86.84 P54 86.58 86.07
31700
DN3 81.91
Tender SI boreholes Tender SI CPTs Detailed design SI boreholes Detailed design SI CPTs Post collapse SI boreholes Post collapse SI CPTs Boreholes for bored piles Magnetic logging boreholes
54+900
CN1 83.13
ABH32
M3
BN1Ea BN1E 81.57 80.68
83.41
AN1 82.91 ABH85 81.69 AC-2 81.73 AC-4 79.98 ABH35 AC-1 80.76 ABH33 80.51 81.69
M2 31650 54+812
WN38 WN29 WN30A WN31 78.34 77.51 WN32 WN33 77.71 WN34 78.02 WN35 80.58 WN36 80.53 80.66 WN37 81.43 78.35
WN6 WN7A 82.16 82.31 81.25 WN9WN8 81.38 WN10 WN11 81.42 81.38 81.43 WN12 DN1E 81.05 WN13 81.25 WN14 81.21 WN15 80.95 80.66 WN16 80.37 M304 WN17 81.86 80.72 WN18 M305 79.86 WN19 81.86 WN20 80.81 WN21 80.31 80.88 WN22 80.94 M303 WN23 79.93 WN24 79.91 M3010 WN25 80.15 MC3007 WN26 80.65 82.55 ABH83 80.95 WN27 80.36 M302 79.57 CL-3g KP182 KP183 79.72 AC-3 83.39 M209 M210 KP181 CL-2 CL 2 M211 80.22 81.69 BS1Ea M301
338
WN39 81.06
80.83
WS24 81.48 WS25 79.93 WS26 80.03 81.23 DS1E WS27 79.99 81.59 WS28 80.37 79.76 WS29 81.09 78.25 WS30 78.52 WS31 79.57 WS32 78.78 79.23 79.10 79.25
ABH82
74.60 66KVSSPTSa BS1Eb 74.72 ABH84 M308 M309 M310 WS3WS1 ABH31 WS2 71.09 71.52 M307 WS4A 78.20 WS9WS8 WS7 M212 & M306 WS10 76.59 82.07 75.20 73.84 72.61 missing82.57 72.70 76.77 WS15 72.28 WS16 AS1 WS17 81.39 M213 WS18 81.39 WS19 75.98 WS20 WS21 81.28 CS1 WS22 ABH29 81.45 81.38 WS23 80.84 82.01
78.04
TSAS2b 82.16
ABH27 80.69
31600 31550
MC2025 81.70
31600
31650
EASTING (m)
31700
31750
31800
BS4Ea 80.96
BS4E 80.33
-6
-4
-2
10
12
DS4E 79.24
There was a buried valley crossing the site of the collapse diagonally from south-west to north-east The presence and setting of the buried valley explain the asymmetric conditions and the different collapse on the north and south sides The buried valley coincides with the major ground distortion on the south side and was clearly influential in the collapse Below the Lower Marine Clay the buried valley was infilled with estuarine organic clays on the south side and fluvial clays on the north side Gas exsolution almost certainly occurred in the deep y p organic clays as a result of stress relief, reducing their strength further
CN3
DN3 TSAN2
DN2E
ABH-34
GA S MA
DN1E
66KVN
ABH-30
FN2
AC-4
IN
WN20
M3010
KP181
CL-1A
KP183 KP182
FN1 WN34 WN35 WN37 WN38 CPTNa CFVN WN40 ABH-28 CPTN WN39
AC-3
MC3008 AC-1
ABH-35
BS1Ea CL-2 66KVS I-104 ABH-84 SPTSa WS10 WS20 ABH-82 I-103 WS27 DS1E ABH-29 CS1 TSAS2 TSAS2B BS1Eb BS1W WS1 ABH-31 ABH 31 AS1
I-66
ABH-33
WS30 WS31
WS29 WS28
DS1W WS26
WS33
ES1 FS1
SE
AL W
L
MC2026 BS2E AS2 BS2W CS2
M2065
M2064
DS2E
BS3E
AS3
BS3W
BS4E
CN1
A GA S S MA
DN1E
66KVN
WN1
I AC
ABH-30
66kV Cable
IN
N1W 5 WN24
WN20
M3010
KP181
CL-1A
KP183 KP182
AC-3
BS1Ea CL-2 66KVS I-104 ABH-84 ABH 84 SPTSa WS10 WS20 ABH-82 DS1E ABH 29 ABH-29 CS1 BS1Eb BS1W WS1 ABH-31 AS1
DS1W WS26
LL
The buried valley was crossed without collapse developing Strut forces would have been a maximum in the buried valley and would have varied across the valley The collapse was not, therefore, inevitable An external influence (trigger) is required to explain the timing of the collapse and why it occurred after crossing the buried valley
S338-9 stood for 8 days under load and was 20m from excavation front S335-9 stood for 2.5 days under load and was over 8m from excavation front Both S335-9S & S338-9N buckled within 10 minutes Load in S335-8 and S335-9 was almost constant between 18 April and initiation of collapse All C-channel connections failed downwards at both ends The south wall was pushing the north wall back
Key observations
3D effects cannot explain why the collapse was initiated at 9am S338 was 20-24m from the 20 24m excavation face and had stood for 8 days without distress, S335 was 8-12m from the excavation face Time effects cannot explain why the collapse was initiated at 9am there was no evidence of load increases in the monitoring
Potential triggers
In nstallation of 9th f
8th
9th
18 April 2004
20
3.30pm
Trigger
Load
Yielding of 9th
Analyses by Dr Felix Schroeder and Dr Zeljko Cabarkapa using Imperial College Finite Element p g p g Program (ICFEP) 2D section through M307 (I104) and M302 (I65) Bored piles are not modelled ( p (enhanced JGP) ) Upper and Lower Marine Clays, F2 and lower Estuarine Clay modelled using Modified Cam Clay Coupled consolidation p Fill and OA sand modelled using Mohr Coulomb. OA-CZ clay/silt modelled as Tresca
Geotechnical analyses
W ll EI reduced t allow f cracking, b Wall d d to ll for ki based on d reinforcement layout Bending moment capacities set according to reinforcement layout and ultimate strengths of steel a d concrete and co c ete as supp ed supplied JGP treated as brittle material 9th level strut capacity set and strut allowed to strain soften 72 hours after excavation to 10th level.
Geotechnical analyses
North
Fill Estuarine Upper Marine Clay F2 Lower Marine Clay F2 OA (Sand) - OA-CZ +71.00 +67.00 +63.00 +84.58 +81.58 +85.57 +82.07 +102.9 +98.58 +96.58 +102.9 +98.58 +97.07 Fill Estuarine
South
Upper Marine Clay F2 Lower Marine Clay +63.57 +61.57 +57.57 OA (Clay/Silt) - OA-SW-1 OA (Sand) - OA-CZ OA (Clay/Silt) - OA-CZ
OA (Clay/Silt) - OA-CZ
North wall
100
9th
South wall
100
95
95
90
90
measured
Elevation (m RL)
85
85
80
80
75
75
70
70
65
65
60
60
55 50 0
North wall
100
10th
South wall
100
95
95
90
90
measured
Elevation (m RL)
85
85
80
80
75
75
70
70
65
65
60
60
55 50
Predicted t e ds in 7th, 8th and 9th strut loads ed cted trends a d st ut oads
4500 4000
3500 3000
2500
Strut 7
9
2000
Strut 8 Strut 9
1500 1000
8 7
500 0 280.00
281.00
282.00
283.00 ( )
284.00
285.00
286.00
Time (days)
6 hours
In nstallation of 9th f
8th
Observed
9th
18 April 2004
20
3.30pm
The analyses matched reasonably well the build up in horizontal wall movements, and the trends in the forces in the 7th, 8th and 9th level struts To match movements and forces at all stages it was necessary to model the jet grout as a brittle material The upper JGP was predicted to pass its peak strength during excavation to the 6th level and the lower JGP to pass its peak strength during excavation to the 9th level Th 9th l The 9 h level strut reached i capacity d i excavation l h d its i during i to the 10th level
The collapse had to be initiated by allowing the 9th level strut to strain soften a ductile failure of the connection was not associated with a collapse The bending moment capacity of the south wall was reached on the first stage of excavation below the 9th level, b t a hi l l but hinge did not f t form in th wall until th i the ll til the sacrificial JGP layer had been removed
100
Up
50
0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
-50
Down
-100
500
200
100
Distance (m)
Predicted vertical displacement of lower JGP layer after excavation to 10th level
20
kin ngpost
Sout wall th
Calibrated FE analyses predict downward displacement of Dwall and upward displacement of kingpost when sacrificial JGP layer excavated Survey data supports upward vertical displacement of centre of strut relative to ends
KP180
KP181
KP182
KP183
KP184
335
336
337
338
339
340
9th level
Sacrificial JGP
Post collapse Post-collapse investigations Structural steel physical tests and numerical analyses. The effect of relative vertical displacement
5000
Waler
4000
3000
2000
1000
5000
Waler
4000
3000
C channel stiffener
Waler
2000
1000
C channel stiffener has similar capacity to double plate stiffener but becomes brittle after an initial ductile response Unforced sway
4000
3000
C channel stiffener
Waler
2000
1000
3000
C channel stiffener
Waler
2000
1000
5000
4000
3000
C channel stiffener
Yield 2000
Waler
1000
5000 8m strut
4000
3000
2000
C channel stiffener
Waler
1000
3000
2000
C channel stiffener
1000
Reduced restraint increases brittleness and reduces d til plateau d d ductile l t 8m strut effective kingpost 18m strut ineffective kingpost
Waler
4000
3000
2000
C channel stiffener
Waler
1000
3000
2000
C channel stiffener
Waler
1000
RVD reduces ductile plateau, increases brittleness, makes stable situation unstable Forced sway
Force, P
Ductile D til
strain
Ductile
2000 Run 4apf2100drop Run 4apf2100drop4 Run 4apf2100drop3 p p Run 4apf2100drop2 Run 4apf2100 ( p 1000 500 0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 )
1500
Run 4apf2100 R 4 f2100 Run 4apf2100drop2 Run 4apf2100drop3 Run 4apf2100drop4 Run 4apf2100drop
Ductile no collapse
2000
1500
1000
500
6 hours 9 days
0 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
21 days
20 25
Force, P
hours to collapse
strain
Th There was relative vertical di l l ti ti l displacement b t t between th the diaphragm wall, which settled when the sacrificial JGP was removed, and the kingpost, which rose, i.e. gp relative vertical displacement between the ends and centre of the strut (RVD) The strut-waler connection was ductile-brittle. The ductile plateau explains why both ends could fail p p y The brittleness of the connection determines the time taken for the collapse to develop
RVD reduces the length of the ductile plateau and increases the brittleness RVD can make a stable situation unstable k t bl it ti t bl RVD can shorten the time to collapse
Why downward failure at both ends? Why collapse after crossing the buried valley?
CN1
A GA S S MA
DN1E
66KVN
WN1
I AC
ABH-30
66kV Cable
IN
N1W 5 WN24
WN20
M3010
KP181
CL-1A
KP183 KP182
AC-3
BS1Ea CL-2 66KVS I-104 ABH-84 ABH 84 SPTSa WS10 WS20 ABH-82 DS1E ABH 29 ABH-29 CS1 BS1Eb BS1W WS1 ABH-31 AS1
DS1W WS26
LL
31650
CL-2
31640
NORT THING (m)
WS17
WS13C 12 2.5
WS S11C 14.7
WS16
WS15
WS14
WS13B 13.7 WS13 16 WS13A 26 .2 WS12B 15. 12 WS12 9 WS12A 19 17.5 WS11B 1 WS11 19.6 WS11A 13.5
66KVS
WS12D
WS11D
31630
Post collapse SI boreholes Magnetic logging boreholes Unsuccessful magnetic logging boreholes 2005 boreholes
WS13E WS13F
31700
1 M212
1 Gap
1 M306
1. Panels M306 and M212, each side of the gap, and panel 213 fail by toe kick-in and rotate back. back 2. Soil flows through resulting gap between M306 and M307, rotating panel 307. 3. Soil flows th 3 S il fl through resulting gap b t h lti between M307 and M308, rotating panel 308, etc.
d drag
dr rag
304
305
drag
4
303
3
302
2
301
1
306
2a
3a
4a
SOUTH
NORTH
Fill Upper E
Upper F2
Sacrificial JGP
Permanent JGP
Lower E Lower F2 OA SW2 (N=35) OA SW1 (N 72) (N=72) OA (CZ)
The bored piles had a major influence on the displacements of the Dwall panels during the collapse and on their post-collapse positions The bored piles restricted toe movements on the south side and prevented failure as the buried valley was crossed Loads carried by the bored piles contributed to the under-reading under reading of the strain gauges
North wall
M301 M302 M303 M304 M305
333
334 H KP 181
335
336 H KP 182
337
338 H KP 183
339
340
M306
M307
M308
M309
M310
Excavation in progress
CN1
A GA S S MA
DN1E
66KVN
WN1
I AC
ABH-30
66kV Cable
IN
N1W 5 WN24
WN20
M3010
KP181
CL-1A
KP183 KP182
AC-3
BS1Ea CL-2 66KVS I-104 ABH-84 ABH 84 SPTSa WS10 WS20 ABH-82 DS1E ABH 29 ABH-29 CS1 BS1Eb BS1W WS1 ABH-31 AS1
DS1W WS26
LL
Upward displacement of KP 180 and 181 accentuated by toe displacement of M306 and M212, where bored piles had been re-positioned and additional t movement was possible dditi l toe t ibl Resulting RVD fed back into buried valley
KP180
KP181
KP182
KP183
KP184
335 335
9th level
Upper JGP
C channel stiffened connection undergoes brittle failure Critical length of strut and of load in strut result in minimal lateral restraint to connection Restraint from rising kingpost results in downward force on connection RVD results in reduction in ductility of connection and increase in brittleness RVD makes a stable situation with overstress unstable bl RVD results in downward failure of connection
RVD was the trigger for the failure Failure mode of connection and RVD
Overall conclusions
The use of Method A in the numerical analyses to model near normally consolidated soils is fundamentally incorrect Its use led to under prediction of wall displacements and under-prediction bending moments and so to a reduction in the redundancy in the system. The JGP was strained beyond its peak and a plastic hinge formed in the wall as excavation of the sacrificial JGP was underway
Overall conclusions
There were errors in the design of the strut-waler connection resulting in a design capacity that was 50% of the required capacity where splays were omitted The collapse initiated some time after the excavation crossed the buried ll th b i d valley, where f h forces on th under-designed strutthe d d i d t t waler connections would have been a maximum An additional perturbation or trigger was necessary to explain the timing of the collapse, the downward failure of the walers at both ends and the trends in the monitoring data
Overall conclusions
The permanent bored piles in combination with the JGP p y played a significant role in p g preventing the collapse as the g p valley was crossed The collapse was triggered when working in the vicinity of the 66kV cable crossing At this location, the permanent bored piles had been repositioned and the JGP layout had been modified, allowing the wall toe to kick-in and cause additional uplift of g p the local kingposts
Overall conclusions
This additional upward displacement of the kingposts relative to the wall fed back into the system, introducing forced sway failure Downward movement of the walls has been predicted by analysis; the potential for relative upward movement of the kingposts has been confirmed by surveys Forced sway failure red ced the strain o er which the s a fail re reduced over hich connection remained ductile, increased the brittleness of the connection and allowed a stable situation to become unstable Forced sway failure can explain the timing of the collapse, the form of the observed distortions, the trends in the monitoring data, data and the speed at which the collapse developed
Overall conclusions
The collapse was not caused by hydraulic base heave and was not related to poor workmanship Wall rotation, which had been linked with inadequate , q penetration of the wall into the OA, was not the cause of the collapse Several factors had to act in combination to cause the collapse
Unforgiving site
Deepest excavation in marine clay in Singapore shortcomings in use of Method A not previously apparent because of depth dependence Ground conditions buried valley in OA infilled with soft fluvial and organic clay, rapid variation in depth of marine clay along and across th excavation resulting i an asymmetric section d the ti lti in ti ti p q g q Curvature of walls in plan requiring more frequent use of walings Presence of 66kVA crossing Need to adopt sacrificial JGP layer, removal of which caused p y , step increase in 9th level strut load and step increase in wall settlement
Lessons learnt
JGP is a brittle material The mass properties of JGP need to be more carefully evaluated Coring of JGP is not an adequate check The use of numerical modelling of soils in design should be carried out by specialists and its incompatibilities with current codes needs to be removed The potential for brittle failure of C channel connections must be recognised tb i d
Lessons learnt
Temporary and permanent works should be subject to independent checks The effects of relative displacement between kingposts g and walls should be considered in the design of strutted excavations Forced sway failure and its consequences should be y q recognised as a potential mechanism in design Monitoring did not warn of the impending collapse