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P. 1
Kissinger Creates Israels Nuke Opacity 9Jul1969 Memo To Nixon

Kissinger Creates Israels Nuke Opacity 9Jul1969 Memo To Nixon

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Published by Guy Razer
Quick Look...Page2 What We Want
Quick Look...Page2 What We Want

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categoriesTypes, Letters
Published by: Guy Razer on Feb 23, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

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11/01/2013

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MEMO
RAN
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UM
FOR
T
HE
PR
ESI
DENT
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ROM:
H
enr
y
A.
Kiss
in
ger
SUB
JE
C
T;
Is
ra
eli
Nu
clear
Pr
o
gra
ITl
Yo
uwi
ll
reca
ll
t
hat
you
created a
specia
lg
rou
p --bec
au
se oft
he
se
n
siti
vi
ty
of
the
i
ss
ue
--
to
con
sider
th
e
st
at
us
of
th
e Is
rae
li
nu
cl
e
ar
p
rogr
arri
and
our
possib
le
re
s
ponses
to
it.
Wehave
met
tw
iceat the t
op
le
vel
(P
acka
rd,
Ri
ch
ar
ds
on,He
I
rn
s,Wh
ee
le
r,K
iss
inger)
to
con
s
ider
ana
lyses
drawn
up
by
a
s
rna
ll
wo
rking
g
roup
u
nde
r
us
.T
he
pa
p
er
at T
ab
A
is ITlys
urn.rna
r
y
of
th
e
si
t
uati
onas ourgro
up
se
es
it
afte
r
reviewing
the
intelligence
and
of
ou
r
dis
cus
si
on
of
the
is
su
es
wh
ich
that
si
tu
at
ion
r
ai
se
s.
T
hi
sis lo
ng
, butI
be
li
eve
y
ou
wi
ll
wan
t
to
read
t
hr
oughit
becau
se
th
is
is
aco
rnp
Ie
x
p
rob.l
ern
,
~
 
THE
SI
T
UA
T
IO
N
~
 
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We
j
ud
ge
th
a t
th
e
introduction
of
nuclear
weapons
i
ntothe
Near
Ea
s twouldinc
re
asethe
dangersin
an
alr
e
ad
y da
nge
rous
si
tu
ati
onand
the
ref
or
e
not
be
in
our
interes
t.
I
sra
elhas
12
s
ur
fac
e-
t
o-sur
face
rn
i
ss
i
le s d
elive
red
f
ro
rn
Franc
e.
It
ha
sset
up
a p
roducti
on
line
and
plan
s
by
the
end
of
1970
to
h
ave
a
to
talf
or
ceof
24
-
30
,
ten of
wh
ich
a
re
p
rogranune
d for
nuc
lear
wa
r
heads.
Wh
en
th
eI
sr
a
elis sig
ned
tl:
e c
on
t
rac
tb
uying
theP
ha
ntoITl a
ircr
aft
last
Nov
e
rn
ber,
they
c
ornrni
tt
ed
th
ern
selve s
"ri
ot
to
be
the
fi
rst
to
introd
uce
nu
cle
ar
we
a
po
ns
i
nt
otheNe
ar
Ea
st.
II
B
ut
it
was
pla
in
from
the
d
is
cuss
ionthat
t
hey
interpreted t
hat
to
me
an
theycould
possess
nuclea
r
wea
po
ns
as
long
as
t
hey did
no
t
tes
t,
de
pl
oy
,
or
rria
ke
them
publ
ic
.
In
si
gn
ing
the
cont
ract
,we
wrot
e
Rab
in
sayi
ng
that
we
believ
e
me
re
"
po
s s ess
i
on"
co
ns
t
i
tutes
"i
ntroduc
t
io
n"
andt
l"l
rit
I s ~
 
a e L '
 
:
 
: 3
 
i
n
cr
oduc
t
i
orico
ntra
c
t.
DECLASSIfIED
E.O.12958,
<IS
amended.Sect 3.5
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~
I
NO
DIS/SEl;Sl l'lVE
-2
Deliv
ery
of the
Phant
oms
is
s
cheduled
to
beginin
Sept
e
rn
ber ,
But
some
of
the
air
craft
wi
ll
be
rea
dy
at
the
factoryin
August,
andtheIs
r
ae
l.i
s
have
as
k
edto
be
gintakin
g
delivery
then.
WHAT
WE
V
rANT
There
was
gener
alagr
ee
ment
in
our
group
that
we
must
r
ecognize
one
im.E
0rtant
d
 
i
 
s
 
t i
 
~
l c t
i
o
n
 
to
beg
inwith:
1.
Israel's secret
possession
of
nuclear
weapons
wou ld
in
crease
the
poten
tial
danger in
the Middle
East,
and
we
do
notdes
irecomp
li
city
in
it.
2.
In
this
case,
public
knowledge
is
almost
as
dangerous
as posses
sion
itself.
This
is
wh a t
mi
ght
spark
a
Soviet
nuclear guara
nteefor
the
Arabs,
ti
ght
entheSoviet
hold
on
the
Arabs and
i
n creas
e
the
danger
of
our
involvement.
Indeed,the
So
viets
m
ig
h t
have
an
incentive
not
to
know.What
this
meansis
that, while
we
might
ideallylike
to
halt actual
Israeli
posses
s
i
on ,
what
we
really
want
at
a
minimum may
be
just
to
keep
Israeli
possession from
becoming
an
established international
fact.In
our
discussions,
the following
positions
were
taken:
1.
Everyone
agreed
that,
as
a
minimu
rn,
we
want
Is
r
a el
to
sign
the
NPT. This
is
not
because
signing
wi
ll
make
any
difference
in
Is
r
a el ' s
actual
nuclear
pro
gram
becaus
e
Israel
could
produ
c e
warheads clandestinely.
Israel's
signature
would,
however,
give
us
a
publicly
feasible
issue
to
raise
with
tf
ie
Israeli
goverrunent
--
a
way
of opening
the
dis
cussion.
It
would
also
publicly
commit
Israel
not
to
acquire
nuclear
weapons.
2.
Everyone
agre
ed
that, in
addition,
we
should
try
to
get
from
Israel
a
bilateral
understanding
on
Israel's
nuclear
intentions
because
the
NPT
is
not
precise
enough
and
because
the
Phantom
aircraft are
potential nuclear
weapons
carriers.
3. Opinio
nwasdi.vided on
the
n
ature
of
th
e
as
s
urances we
should
seek
a
nd
o
n
tile
ta
c
ti
cs
of
se
e
ki
ng
th
crn
:
TOP
SE
CL\.
ET
Il
"J
ODIS/SENSITIVE
 
TO
PS
E6rtET!
NOD
IS
/
E ~
\ j "
S I T
 
I
V
 
E
-3
--
The JCS
felt that
if
Ls
r ael
l
s
program
becomes
known.we
should
be
in
a
position
to
say
we
did
everything
in
our
power
to
pr
event
Israel
from
goin
g
nuclear.
JCS
felt
that
we
should
tr
y
to
stop
Israel's
mis
sile
production
and us
e
the
Ph
antomsas
levera
ge.
--
D
efe
ns
8f
elt
that
we
could
live
withthe
existence
of
Israe
li
riuc
lear
wca
pons
pro
vided
the
y werenot d
epl
oyed.
Defen
seagr
eed
t
ha
t
w
esh
ou
Id
try
to
st
op
mi
s
sil
e
prod
u
ction
and
th
at
we
sh
ou
ld
us
e
the
Phantoms
as
levera
ge
to
get
the
as
s
ur
ari
c
es
vre
wa
nt
,--
State
beli
e
ved
that
we
should
try
to
keep
Is
r
a.el
from
goi
ng
any
furth
er
with
its nuclear
weap
ons
program
--
~ i t
 
may
be
so
clos
e
to
completion
th
at
Israel
would
be
willin
g
--
and
make
a
record
for
ou
rs e
lv
e s
of
having
tried.
State
has
joined
in
su
g-
g
estin
g
as
kingthe
Ls
racl
i
sto
halt
prod
uction
ofthe
mi
s
sile
s.
State
would
notth
re
at
en
to
withhold
the
Pha
ntomsin
the
first
approach
to
the Is
ra
elis
butwould
be
prepar
ed
to
imply
that
threat
if
they
w
ere
unresponsive
to
our
first
approach.
At
the end
of
our
discussion
s.Stat
e.
Defense. and
JCS
a
greed
to
describe
a
course
of
actio
n
which
represent
ed
as
nearly
as possible
the cons
ensus
of
our
group.
Despite
the
d
ifferent
shades
of
opinion
expres
s
ed
inour
discussions.
the
State.
Defense
and
JCS
members
have
concurred
in
the
paper
at
Tab
B
which
proposes askin
g
the
Israelis
to:
1.
Si
gn
the
NPT
at
an
early
date
(by
the end
of
this
year)
and
ratify
it
soo
n t
he
reafter.
2.
Reaffirm
to
th
e
US
in
writin
g
the
assurance
that
Israel
will
no
t
be
th
e
firs
t
to
i
ntroduce
nuclear
weaponsinto
the
Near
East.
specifyin
g
that
1Jintroduetion"
shall
rri
ea n
po
ss
es
s
i
on
of
nuclear
expl
o
siv
e
devi
ces.[For
our
own
internal
purposes.
we would
decide that
we
cou l d
tolerate
Israeli
activity
short
of
assembly
of
a
co
mpleted
nucl
ear
de
vice.]
3. Give
us
assurances
in
writi
ng
that
it
will
stop
production
and
will
not
deploy
"Jericho"
rni
s
siles
or
any
other
nuclear-
capable
strate
gic
missile.
[NOTE:
I
do
not
be
Ii
ev
e
we
can
ask
Israel
not
to
produc
e
mi
ssiles.
Isra
elis
s
over
ei
gn
in
this
d
eci s
i
on,
an
d
Ido not
5"'8
h
ow
w
e
ca
n
a
sk
i
t:
no:
to
p
ro
du
ce
a
Vie2.?On
jus
t
enoec
...
ri
u
cl
car
 
cause
w
c10
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it
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ff
e
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i
v
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t
J
 
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..
i ~ J .
 
~
c
·
 
-
:t
war
he
ads.
We
rn
ightpersuadeth
err;
!
1
L ' ~
 
~
o
 
.--
_2101'
W
~l
J .
 
~
 
they
p
ro
d
uce
on
gro
un
.d
sthat
th
er
est
of
thewor
Id
wi
ll
b
elieve
that
them
is
s
i
Ies
rri
us
t
have
nu
cle
ar
war
he
ads.
J

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