2
iv.
Current practices are not Fair and Equal or lawful and are subject to further legal challenges.3)
The Voters:a.
Voter Registration Rolls:
Section 7 of the Federal Voters Right Act requires voter registration rolls to bepurged.i.
What has Illinois done to purge the historic dead from the registration rolls?ii.
What is ISBE doing about the 16 election jurisdiction with over 100% voter registration?iii.
Action Point:
Address the issue of the integrity and security of our voter registration lists.4)
Casting the Ballota.
Early Voting:
What protocols are in place for auditing early voting?i.
The use of employees to administer early voting has resulted in non-citizens being responsible foradministering the vote in, at least, Chicago.ii.
Action Point:
Recommend that the law require employees who administer at early votingfacilities will be US Citizens and registered voters.b.
I-9 Forms
: The I-9 forms of these employees are not in compliance with the law. I-9
’
s forms for
75% ofthe early voting employees that staff sites in Chicago are not filled out correctly.
i.
The Chicago Board of Elections has not responded to my FOIA asking them for current 1-9
’
sforms.ii.
Action Point:
Send communication to Chicago Board of Elections about their non-compliancewith Federal employment law. Follow-upc.
The Audit:
Vulnerability Assessment and Security Audit
of the Chicago Board of Election’s
Election Day
procedures. This surprise audit was conducted after multiple irregularities in security in Chicago’s
November 2010 and February 2011 Elections were observed.
Our
findings document serious flaws in Chicago’s election system.
In Chicago, on Election Day inApril 2011, we evaluated 239 polling places on 11 security measures which were taken out of the 2011Illinois (and Chicago) Election Judge Training Guide. 215 (91%) precincts failed in one or more measures.
139 (59%) precincts were documented with unsealed ballot boxes.
Our report summarizing this audit was peer reviewed and published in Argonne NationalLabor
atory’s
Dr. Johnston found that the security protocol
s in place were “wholly inadequate” and essentially
100% ineffective in promoting a tamper resistant voting environment.