locations. For example, some 75 percent of the population of the United States and 80 percent of itseconomic power are located within 200 miles of a coastline. With increasing threats of cruise missilesarmed with Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) warheads, there is a real possibility of significantdamage to key population centers and vital, homeland-based military assets.DoD recognizes the pressing need for an improved active defensive capability to protect the home-land from attack by cruise missiles. At the same time, any improvements in homeland defense capabilitieswill also improve CMD of deployed forces, friends and allies. While some CMD capability already existsand technology for improvement is being developed by the services, the processes necessary to integrateinto a holistic, warfighter operational and system architecture are lagging.
Cruise Missile – Weapon of Choice
Technological advances have greatly improved the accuracy of cruise missiles, turning them into precision weapons capable of effectively destroying specific targets. The Global Positioning System(GPS) and its Russian counterpart, the Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), havemade cruise missiles much more effective at longer distances. Because technology such as GPS is avail-able commercially, anyone who can obtain an older cruise missile can greatly improve its precision at arelatively low cost.A number of other factors make cruise missiles attractive to U.S. adversaries. Cruise missiles arecheaper to build and buy than ballistic missiles, making them attractive to countries with less advancedmilitaries and to non-state actors as well. Tracking proliferation of cruise missiles is difficult because thematerials and technology involved have multiple uses. They are also easy to hide and transport/relocate because of their smaller size. Once launched, these low-flying missiles are especially difficult to detect/engage in the clutter of ground objects. The restrictions of line-of-sight, due to the earth’s curvature, onsurface-based sensors also make detection and engagement extremely difficult; that is, a low-flying CMcannot be seen until it breaks the sensor’s horizon, usually at close range. Current technology also makescruise missiles more versatile by making it easier to convert one type to another (e.g., an anti-ship cruisemissile for use against targets on land).
Current CMD Responsibilities/Capabilities
Prior to 11 September 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), thecombined U.S.-Canadian headquarters located in Colorado Springs, Colorado, was the leading elementresponsible for cruise missile defense of North America. Following the terrorist attacks on the U.S.homeland, NORAD’s mission was expanded to include all low-altitude threats to North America (i.e.,civil aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs) and was renamed Homeland Air and Cruise MissileDefense of North America (HACMD of NA). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) charged NORAD with creating the Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) for HACMD. The document, staffedwithin the Canadian and United States militaries, identifies the need for interoperability and cooperationamong Canadian and United States defenses and other governmental interagency entities responsible for both homeland security and homeland defense.Within DoD, each branch of the armed services has responsibility to develop and field cruise missiledefense capabilities. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Joint ForcesCommand, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency allhave roles in CMD. Outside DoD, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Coast Guard and the FederalAviation Administration also have responsibilities regarding CMD. Specific service and agencyresponsibilities include: