Human Studies 21: 227234, 1998.

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Book review

Luhmann, N. (1995), Social Systems. Translated by John Bednarz, Jr. with Dirk Baecker. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 627 pages including bibliographic references and index. Readers who are not well-versed in the classical and contemporary debates of western social philosophy and sociological theory will nd many aspects of Social Systems difcult. However, anyone interested in learning about Luhmanns unique brand of systems theory should invest the time and effort in this comprehensive and challenging volume. Social Systems, originally published in German in 1984, is Luhmanns attempt to provide a thorough review of his reformulation of traditional systems theories, with attention to more recent developments in epistemology. This edition includes a new preface by Luhmann and a lengthy foreword by Eva M. Knodt. As a sociologist, Luhmann is often considered the European counterpart to Talcott Parsons, the leading American proponent of structure functionalism as a general theory of social systems. Some writers (Murphy, 1987, p. 346) have argued that Luhmann is more of a postmodern theorist who incorporates elements of phenomenology and existentialism into his work, and who attempts to move away from grounded theories of social order. In Social Systems, Luhmann attempts to clarify his theoretical task by dening what he sees as a major paradigm shift which can revolutionize sociological thinking. In the Foreword, Knodt describes the autopoietic turn in general systems theory which serves as Luhmanns starting point. Luhmann suggests that his theory of self-referential systems avoids the conceptual pitfalls of other attempts to understand the basis of social order, continuity, and stability. For Luhmann, conceptualizing the social as self-referential will salvage sociological theory from, for example, the social realism of classical theory, the determinacy of structuralism, and the solipsism of phenomenology and existentialism. 1. The Autopoietic Paradigm For Luhmann, the autopoietic turn in general systems theory has been accomplished in disciplines such as thermodynamics, biology, computer science,

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and cybernetics. However, an encounter between a theory of self-producing systems and sociological material is necessary. This sort of maneuver is not new. The history of sociological theory is replete with attempts to use insights gained from the natural and organic sciences to understand social systems. What innovative theoretical turn, then, does Luhmann hope to gain from such a venture? According to Luhmann, the most important shift in systems theory is the rejection of the understanding that order or identity emerges from an arche a causal beginning or ground (pp. 4, 10, 324). In sociology, this notion of order is reected best in theories which presuppose a social ontological realism. In such theories, society as an integrated totality is comprised of parts but cannot be reduced to the mere sum of these elements. Consequently, social order can be guaranteed only when unity is secured through structural or organic means. In such foundationalist theories, human agency is often reduced to contingency which must be regulated in order to avoid chaos. A normative regulating principle, such as collective value orientations or social roles, must exist as an institutionalized form of integration. Certainly, Parsons systems theory is based on a realist view of social order. Luhmann contends, however, that Parsons and others who replaced the part-whole distinction with an emphasis on the relationship between systems and environments, initiated the turn toward a theory of self-referential social systems. If a social system is self-producing then, for Luhmann, this implies the radical temporalization of the concept of element (p. 11). Luhmann further explains that in autopoietic systems elements composing the system can have no duration (p. 11). The implications of these assumptions are farreaching. Social realism is no longer viable. When social systems are viewed as comprised of reexive relationships, then social order is not assumed to exist as a one-dimensional identity, as ahistorical, with a priori (natural) boundaries and prerequisites. For Luhmann, the autopoietic turn calls into question the classical subject-object epistemology, and by-passes causal models of social order (pp. 910). Since the social is self-producing and no archimedean source of regulation as the authentic social model must be uncovered, social reality is demystied for the observer (p. 10). The social system is always in the process of a recursive, immediate self-production. The identity of the system is ever-changing, not in the sense of development toward an increasingly more sophisticated form, but in terms of a continual selection of constituting, related elements. Obviously, Luhmanns move to develop a theory based on the radical temporalization of social order, requires that the more familiar assumptions of systems theory be reconceptualized. These reformulated suppositions will seem particularly unique to readers

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who are more familiar with the work of American sociologists and social philosophers. 2. The Autopoietic System Luhmann eschews social realism as a legitimate understanding of social systems. However, he assumes that systems exist; he begins with no epistemological doubt thereby also avoiding the reductionism and nominalism of some classical sociological theories. For Luhmann, the part-whole distinction has been replaced in systems theory by the differentiation between system and environment. However, while Parsons and other early writers assumed that systems were open, existing within an environment, the system-environment relationship was often characterized as mechanistic, involving an exchange of inputs and outputs. The systems integrity was measured in terms of structural soundness the ability to manage environmental inputs while maintaining and maximizing institutional and organizational stability. Again, the theoretical focus was on securing social order by structured means so that differentiation could be rationalized, made neutral, and transformed into information useful to the system. For traditional systems theorists, difference is anathema to order and stability. For Luhmann, a theory of self-referential systems begins with focus on the difference between identity and difference (p. 10). To engage in selfproduction the identity of the self (system) must be understood, but identity exists only as difference from something else. Using the term systematicity Luhmann suggests that order implies the unity not the exclusion of difference (p. 18). Self-referential systems must manage difference, they must reduce complexity, cope with internal inadequacies, and limit variations and relations among elements. However, for Luhmann the reduction of complexity implies a selection, a process that qualies elements by cutting off some of their possibilities (p. 39). System elements are not xed entities or facts which refer to a paramount or ultimate reality. Furthermore, selection, the structuring of system boundaries, is a self-generated, reexive process. Self-organization presupposes that selections are required and this process is accomplished through communication. To continue to exist systems must provide constitutive elements with the capacity for connection, that is, with meaning (p. 11). In other words, social and action systems are constituted by meaning. 3. Meaning-Constituted Systems For Luhmann, meaning constitutes the system relations or connections which allow autopoiesis. Each system is differentiated from its environment by

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meaning constituted boundaries (p. 194). Accordingly, meaning refers to a surplus of possibilities of experience and action (p. 60). Meaning has structural value (p. 61) to the system, but is also a temporalized complexity (p. 63) unstable, in motion, with a built-in need for self-alteration (p. 65). Interestingly, Luhmanns discussion of meaning includes reference to Husserls horizon metaphor and to the notion of decentering an image and theoretical maneuver typically associated with deconstruction and other postmodern thinking. Luhmann reformulates the notion of horizon, however, to avoid what he see as Husserls centeredness on the subject (p. 145). For Luhmann, the world is not just the sum of all possibilities and meaningful references, but the unity of these possibilities (p. 70). This world horizon is a lifeworld since each specic actuality is meaningful, but only with doubts and uncertainties momentarily absent (p. 170). Meaningful action and experience can exist without excising all contingencies. The truth does not have to be discovered for social relations to be authentic and real. Difference, that is the system-environment difference, is present or potentially present in every actuality. Hence, for Luhmann, meaning underpins identity but an identity or reality that exists only under certain conditions and for a limited period. Hence, Luhmanns concept of meaning is not synonymous with truth or an ultimate understanding. To clarify this rendition of meaning, Luhmann develops the concept of what he calls meaning dimensions, or world dimensions, or dimensions of difference (pp. 7075). Again reference to Husserl is used to describe the double horizons of each meaning dimension. However, Luhmann also notes that the notion of dimensions allows him to abandon the concept of the subject. Luhmann is reacting perhaps to Husserls (1970, p. 358) suggestion that human beings are always standing out against the world-horizon. That is, Husserl is suggesting that horizons are grounded on intersubjectivity. Luhmann states that meaning is stripped of its multidimensional complexity, if understanding can be collapsed to a transcendental subject. For Luhmann, understanding requires social reexivity, that is, discerning and considering the lifeworld (experiences and actions) of other systems. But every experience of meaning is also an experience of difference. Order is constructed when a connection is made between differences. The meaning dimensions, each with a double horizon, are actualized within the difference between the two horizons (p. 75). Through the concept of meaning dimensions Luhmann feels he avoids not only subjectivism but also the possible tautology implied by a paradigm of a self-referential system of meaning. The social, factual, and temporal dimensions imply that the identify of meaning is, at any moment, only a selective occurrence. The double horizons

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of each dimension imply that all actualized meaning should be considered relativized, a temporary constraint on possibilities (p. 82). For Luhmann, this maneuver implies the universality of the claim to validity (p. 76) for every meaning and experience. No particular interpretation of the world can claim a priori legitimacy or other seignorial status. No foundational elements or natural, material points of reference can secure the duration, support, or validity of any dimension of meaning. Accordingly, the factual dimension cannot provide material things with an essential identity. Material and other things are groundless constructions, but are nonetheless meaningful and provide valid references for the self and all other possible identities (p. 90). The double horizon of time excludes the possibility of a beginning or an end. The immediacy of the present is always dissolving into the past and the future. The present is an interpretation of the difference between what is momentarily the past and the future. Time cannot, for Luhmann, appear to be a cause, an empirical referent which can x or locate events (p. 91). The social dimension provides for interpenetration between human beings. The self is bound to horizons which foster a continuous comparison with the experiences and possible courses of action of others. The others perspective must always be considered as a potentially viable interpretation. Such interpenetration, for Luhmann, occurs between human beings as well as between systems and human beings. Hence, the complex of meanings of one system, which may be momentarily incomprehensible to others, can be made available as potential selections. Luhmann suggests, following more traditional systems theorists, that interpenetration is what allows order to emerge from noise. 4. Autopoietic Systems and Structure Luhmann argues that the autopoietic turn does not preclude the concept of structures. Structures exist in self-referential systems but they are no longer imbued with the a priori facticity proposed by Durkheim and other realists. In a self-referential system, structures dene how elements are related, including how human beings are bound to one another and to systems. For Luhmann, structure is not determining but merely limiting, representing a temporal selection form the plurality of combinatory possibilities (p. 283). Identity is established, via norms, but can provide only a type of expectational security, which Luhmann argues is a necessary aspect of social life (p. 308). While structures provide self-referencing systems with a type of internal guidance, they cannot stabilize events or elements. Actual structures disappear when their relational elements disappear.

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5. Is the Autopoietic Turn A Radical Departure? Luhmann is clear that he is not proposing a theory which attempts to uncover the ground, arche, or norm-center of the social. He invokes the imagery and ideas of theorists such as Husserl and Derrida to suggest that social order is temporal, a shifting centerless occurrence. Luhmann suggests that a theory of self-referential systems seriously calls into question the traditional subject-object dualism of western social philosophy and hence sociological theory. Throughout this volume, he provides critiques of both social ontological realism and nominalism proposing to avoid a theory that results in totalizing or subjectivizing experience. In fact, Luhmann appears, like many postmodern writers, to be providing a critique of essentialist and foundationalist approaches to social realty. Is Luhmann able to demonstrate how the radical temporalization of reality results in a truly new theoretical demarche? In Social Systems Luhmann makes great strides in outlining the implications of rejecting grounded theories of social order. By emphasizing the temporal nature of meaning, structure, system boundaries, and identity, order and stability are cast as momentary selections from an endless myriad of possibilities. When social systems are seen as self-referential then no extra-system sources are required to direct, inform, or guide self-identity to fruition. However, Luhmann appears in dening certain concepts not to have completely jettisoned the social ontological realism of more traditional systems theories. While he is unwillingly to ground social systems on an ultimate reality, Luhmann also rejects the idea that social systems or any system can be constituted by human beings. He rejects what he calls humanism (Marx, Hegel, and others), Husserls monadic and transcendental subjectivism, as well as other theories that understand the social in terms of intersubjectivity. For Luhmann, social systems are not composed of individuals and cannot be created out of bodily or psychic processes (p. 256). Rather, human beings are part of and belong to the environment of social and perhaps other systems. Hence, persons are caught up in social systems since the world for Luhmann is the difference between systems and environments. While systems are self-referential they exist in relationship to an environment, a connected but separate realm of experience. Furthermore, social systems represent a reduction of complexity since the environment is always more complex than the system. The environment, in fact, is not only more complex but also shows less existing order than the system (p. 212). In the environment persons are conceded more freedom, including greater latitude in irrational and immoral behavior. Luhmann suggests with this imagery that an aspect of human existence is distinct, asocial, and somehow naturally more wild than what is permitted in social situations. This thinking suggests that social relationships are entered into when

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social (more rational) action is necessary or desirable. But the social is never presupposed. Luhmanns imagery suggests that a pure realm, unfettered by social demands, may exist. Thought and actions which are not co-constituted, linguistically or intersubjectively, may be possible. Luhmanns discussion of the meaning dimensions also suggests that social relationships are but one of multiple sources of interpretations. In addition, Luhmann states that every meaning requires a social reference, in that one can ask of every meaning whether another experiences it in exactly the same way I do (p. 80). While this statement could represent an advance over structural images of social relations, Luhmann is not clear on how this rapport between persons is constituted. Language and communication obviously represent important means for social understanding. But, again Luhmann suggests that communication creates social situations. When one wants to express information via utterances to the other, communication is initiated. The understanding that results from communication is temporal. However, suggesting that the meaning synthesized from communication is local and relative does not overcome the theoretical problem created when intersubjectivity is not presupposed. If the social is merely one of many dimensions, and human beings are yet an additional realm of existence, then a coordinating mechanism (or mechanisms) is needed to integrate or enmesh these various layers of reality. In fact, Luhmann alludes to such a requirement when he suggests that interhuman interpenetration is possible only by forming social systems (p. 228). Hence, in this view the social appears to be more of a regulating force than a reexive selection. While Luhmann alludes to the work of postmodern writers he seems unwilling to embrace completely their critique of essentialist and foundationalist thinking. Postmodernists have suggested that social reality is discursive, nothing exists outside the text or language. As Lyotard (1984, p. xxiv) writes, postmodernism is dened as an incredulity toward metanarratives, or in other words a skeptical approach to discourses which justify social arrangements. When social reality is understood as a text or language, human action is taken seriously as the origin of social order. The social is presupposed when language is viewed as constituting reality. As Murphy (1989, p. 72) suggests, every linguistic maneuver presupposes the existence of others. Hence, the exibility and temporality of reality is revealed since no single interpretation can claim unquestionable authenticity when the social is understood as a negotiated language game (Lyotard, 1984, p. 10), enacted by a myriad of players. Experience is mediated by language and therefore always intersubjective. No singular subject can transcend or act outside the social context, and the social can not escape from human interpretation.

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For autopoiesis to represent a nonessentialist view of order, wherein formal and grounded identity is rejected, self-referencing must be constituted on a social, inter-human dimension. Otherwise, meaning and action can be assumed possibly to originate from nonlinguistic, nondiscursive sources. Such an assumption would reinvoke the idea that an archimedean source of reality, unimpinged by human interpretation, is possible the very realism Luhmann hopes to avoid. Social reality can be assumed to be temporal, selected, and contingent, as Luhmann would prefer, only if the creative and social capacity of language is understood (Barthes, 1985, p. 162). A comprehensive theory of social systems which relies neither on social realism or other ontological dualism seems to imply a contradictory and impossible task. Luhmann makes an excellent case for why such a maneuver is desirable, and in Social Systems the reader is treated to a thought-provoking analysis of modern social philosophy and sociological theory. The book is challenging as Luhmann freely uses language and imagery from a variety of disciplines and writers. Nonetheless he has produced a discourse on the fundamental questions of how social reality is constituted from which American sociology and social philosophy can greatly benet. Karen A. Callaghan Barry University, U.S.A.

References
Barthes, R. (1985). The Grain of the Voice. New York: Hill and Wang. Husserl, E. (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Murphy, J.W. (1987). Review of Religious Dogmatics and the Evolution of Societies by Niklas Luhmann. Cross Currents Summer/Fall: 346348. Murphy, J.W. (1989). Postmodern Social Analysis and Criticism. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.