Jonathan Jacobs The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008, Chapter

4 Afterward November 28th, 2010 Thomas Ricks presents a detailed account of the radical shift in US military and political policy in Iraq following three years of failure. Ricks describes how the military and political establishment finally heeded the warnings of disaster that were ignored from 2003 onward, making radical and unexpected changes in its Iraq war approach. The success of the surge, beginning in 2007, can be attributed to the following factors: new leadership at the top, an increase in local knowledge, the elimination of structural secrecy, and the end of mirror imaging. However, even with the turnaround, the surge presented policy mistakes and dangers. These included short term gains coupled with long term losses, an inability to translate military victory into political gain, and a variant of mission creep. By analyzing the implementation of the surge in the Iraqi war, the reader can learn about successful policy decisions and strategies and what institutional failures continued to impede full success. Throughout the narrative Ricks presents specific changes made at the intuitional level of the military operation which were in direct juxtaposition to how the military functioned prior to the first three years of the war operation. One major change was the appointment of General Petraeus in 2007 to command the coalition forces in Iraq. With that selection, the Bush administration was turning the war over to the opposition inside the US military (128). Bushs previous selections for the political and military voices of the administration were those who had a strong hawkish opinion of the war in Iraq. Their inherent conformation bias led to a disregard for any criticism of the war planning. By appointing those who have warned of tail risk, the worst possible consequences of an event, a disaster is more likely to be averted or corrected. As Ricks writes in the afterword of the narrative, One of the causes of catastrophic failuressometimes is a lack of imagination in assessing a situation (314-315). By promoting individuals who had been pessimistic about the administrations policy, the military was set for greater success. Once appointed, Petraeus made two major decisions which helped turn the war effort around. First, Petraeus was able to work with and appoint people who disagreed wit him from both inside and outside the military establishment. For any organization to thrive, especially the military, leadership must create a strong doctrine and sense of purpose for its agents. Nevertheless, strict bureaucracies such as the military are prone to policy errors, as the institutional leaders and people within these organization have difficulty thinking outside of their organization-biased scope. To ameliorate this situation, Petraeus drew on those inside the military who were, dissidents, skeptics, and outsiders (134). Additionally, some of Petraeuss closest advisors on counterinsurgency strategy were foreigners untouched by the established doctrine of the US military. One of his closest advisors, Sadi Othman, a Jordanian translator, said the following about Petraeus: Petraeus is always searching for new insights especially from people with different perspectives (144). By building a new strategy for Iraq through the help of people outside of the military, the US was able to formulate a more realistic game plan for the war going forward. Second, Petraeus was able to do what Gen Casey had never been able to do -- formulate a clear-cut strategy for his troops to implement on the ground. He communicated that the war in Iraq was a counterinsurgency and did away with the grandiose goals of democracy and state building of the previous leaders. The new primary goal was protecting the security of the Iraqi

people, by, putting troops among the people andprotecting the population (201). The formulation of a clear military strategy helped combat structural secrecy and allowed for greater local knowledge to combat the problem of mirror imaging. Under Gen Casey there was no defined strategy of how to wage the war. As a Colonel describes in the narrative, The biggest difference is, we have doctrine now (201). This led to a more transparent and well run military. Without a strategy from its leaders, the military did not act in concert and military leaders on the ground would carry out their own strategy independently. Structural secrecy insured that each part of the military above and below did not communicate its goals, tactics, and problems to each other. Instead, during the surge, for the first time since the invasion, US forces were all pursuing the same goal in the same way. A new counterinsurgency strategy formulated by previous skeptics of the war allowed for a, unity of effort [which] radically increases the effectiveness of military operations (201). By placing the troops amongst the people, the US military was able to garner local knowledge and combat a mirror imaging problem that had been present since before the war. In the lead up to the war and throughout the first three years of implementation, the US fell victim to mirror imaging, which is the assumption that the Iraqis think and act in the same way that the US does. However, by placing US troops amongst the people and allowing them to become familiar with both our enemies and civilians we could better see things through an Iraqi perspective. One example of this took place in the Iraqi prisons. Gen Stone, the new leader of the detention system, ordered his soldiers to interact more with the prisoners and treat them as they would like be treated. He said the following: [We] create risk when we make the mistake of judging a detainees actions in the context of our own culture, rather than his own (196). Outside of the prisons soldiers knew more about Iraqi culture and therefore were better suited to succeed by acting Iraqi. Ricks writes, in some ways, the story of the Iraq War in 2007 was the Iraqification of the American effort (219). Even with a large decrease in Iraqi and US casualties in July 2007 and onward, there are warning signs of more problems ahead. The surge was built on a clear cut, realistic strategy of stabilizing Iraq and securing the population. However, similar to when US troops marched through Bagdad in 2003, the question becomes what comes next? It is possible that some of our short-term strategy and success may have come at the expense of long-term problems. One such problem was our short-term tactic of power sharing. During the surge we employed Shiite militants while propping up Sunnis in power, carefully balancing ethnic tensions. However, as analyst John McCreary described in 2008, power sharing is always a prelude to violence (317). Another problem is the lack of a political strategy after the surge. As Ricks describes, military victory does not necessarily translate into a political gain (283). A lesson learned here is that a policy maker must always be cognizant of what comes next and plan for a realistic strategy for a transition period. The surge may have worked as a purely militarily strategy, fulfilling its shortterm goals, but the question remains, what comes next?