plication of more integrate and innovative technolo-gies, normally applied in the advanced transportationfields like ITS or in other structures, safety ad-vanced, like Nuclear Power Plant; as far as weknow, a vision restricted to the Tunnel structureboundaries only.3
THE SAFETY STATE OF THE ARTa.
HIGHWAYFor long-one tube tunnel, the last word on safetyis certainly the Monte Bianco equipment structuredsystem. The technological apparatus of the tunnelincreased until the actual 41 video cameras for traf-fic control, 116 safety boxes (with visual variablemessages), 72 emergency places (every 300 m withphone and extinguisher ), 15 turning-bays (every600 m allows rescue vehicles to operate in the tun-nel), 116 new aspiration ores, and fresh air ventila-tion on one new underway emergency exit, two con-trol room a computerized help for emergency, threespecial "Giano" fire brigade trunk, posted 24 h aday, (one in the middle of tunnel the other two at theopposite extremities) (Alamberti 2001).In Japan, some time ago, tunnels were catego-rized in five levels, in term of dangerous structuresand decreasing severity class:AA, A, B, C, D, and “….the categorization is de-termined in such way, that a probability of one acci-dent every 22 million which is ensured, regardless of tunnel length and traffic volume…".As matter of fact, it means to consider one unifiedsafety approach providing a nearly equal safetylevel, for all tunnels!In Japan many further studies have been per-formed also about evacuation systems. From the ex-perience of earthquake, vantages and drawback of principles, utilized in the system for people evacua-tion, are analyzed in order to find the best way to ob-tain easier exit, and to lower time-queues, very dan-gerous during fire accidents.b.
RAILWAYThe most advanced safety organization for rail-way tunnel is, up to now, in the opinion of the au-thor, the systems utilized in the undersea Euro Tun-nel. As it is well known, this tunnel was designedwith a service tunnel between the north and thesouth running tunnels. After the 1996 fire accident,inside safety systems have been improved muchmore. Fortunately, this accident occurred with nodeaths or seriously injured, but the damages werevery high, nevertheless the very big emergency or-ganization involved: about 450 firemen, from Franceand England, who exhausted at least 250 oxygenportable reservoirs (Brouke 1996).In spite of this very effective and rapid safety re-sponse the Channel Tunnel was closed no less than15 days for restoration. No deaths also in the last fireaccident (lorry on freight shuttles) September 2008the tunnel was closed for few days.Except for one fire (Hokuriku 1972) all the fireswith multiple fatalities occurred when a train wasforced to stop in a tunnel.c.
UNDERGROUNDThe underground safety system could representthe most serious and complex situation, especiallyfor the evacuation problems from the tunnels or thestations remembering the 1100 people in Philadel-phia in Sept.6 1979.Among other serious accidents, it is worth tomention the fire in the Metro of Baku in 1995 (289people killed) and the fire on the cableway toKitzsteinhorn, Austria, in 2000 (155 people killed).Both tunnels had relatively small cross sectionalarea (Kitzsteinhorn 10 m
and Baku Metro 28 m
).In the annual of statistics it is possible to find thatbetween the years 71 -87 it was possible to countaround the world about 30 significant metro fires,including also the tragedy example of the King'sCross Underground Station fire (1987), with 31 pas-sengers killed in the hall of the station.4
RISK EVALUATIONQuantification of risk is the main way to perform agood safety approach. Risk analysis started in theUS for the nuclear power plants. This methodologywas also applied to road and rail, in E.U. especiallyin the northern countries. In Denmark, it was appliedto both road and railway about in 1970. In Germanyin 1983 was edited the Safety Concept for Tunnelsin New Railway, applied to the new high-speed rail.One study on the risk (H
j 2002) concerning thedangerous goods through the tunnel was prepared by(OECD-PIARC-E.U.) in 1999, the total risk of openroute versus tunnel route was evaluated as usual(frequency /yr - fatalities).In Italy, until now, PRA is very far from tunnels,roads or, other transport systems, but an E.U. Direc-tive 2004/54/EC, on minimum safety requirementsfor tunnels in the trans-European road network, waspublished in 2004.The comparative analysis and the study of thestate of the art of tunnel safety allowed us to intro-duce and define the concept of “Dynamic Tunnel”, apoint of view very different from the generic unifiedsafety vision, normally utilized by engineeringgroups or corporation.Starting from the obvious consideration that: eachtunnel is different from the other ones’.This underlines the incorrect vision, previous in-troduced, of the “Tunnels Unified Safety Criteria”based on the concept that we called “Static Tunnel”.In general we may argue that for some parametersone tunnel is never equal to itself, in other words,each tunnel has its own degree of risk, not constant