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Case No. 11-2164 In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Bryan J. Brown Appellant v. Elizabeth Bowman, et al. Appellees
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PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT BRYAN J. BROWN

Bryan J. Brown KS Bar No. 17634 Attorney pro se 827 Webster Street Fort Wayne, IN 46802 (260) 515-8511 Brown1634@gmail.com

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CIRCUIT RULE 26.1

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Appellate Court No: 11-2164 Short Caption: Brown v. Bowman, et al To enable the judges to determine whether recusal is necessary or appropriate, an attorney for a non-governmental party or amicus curiae, or a private attorney representing a government party, must furnish a disclosure statement providing the following information in compliance with Circuit Rule 26.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1. The Court prefers that the disclosure statement be filed immediately following docketing; but, the disclosure statement must be filed within 21 days of docketing or upon the filing of a motion, response, petition, or answer in this court, whichever occurs first. Attorneys are required to file an amended statement to reflect any material changes in the required information. The text of the statement must also be included in front of the table of contents of the party's main brief. Counsel is required to complete the entire statement and to use N/A for any information that is not applicable if this form is used. [ ] PLEASE CHECK HERE IF ANY INFORMATION ON THIS FORM IS NEW OR REVISED AND INDICATE WHICH INFORMATION IS NEW OR REVISED.

(1) The full name of every party that the attorney represents in the case (if the party is a corporation, you must provide the corporate disclosure information required by Fed. R. App. P 26.1 by completing item #3):
Bryan J Brown

(2) The names of all law firms whose partners or associates have appeared for the party in the case (including proceedings in the district court or before an administrative agency) or are expected to appear for the party in this court:
Bryan J Brown

(3) If the party or amicus is a corporation: i) Identify all its parent corporations, if any; and
Not applicable

ii) list any publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the partys or amicus stock:
Not applicable

Attorney's Signature:

s/ Bryan J Brown

Date: February 15, 2012

Attorney's Printed Name: Bryan J Brown Please indicate if you are Counsel of Record for the above listed parties pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(d). Address: Yes No

827 Webster Street

Fort Wayne, IN 46802

Phone Number: (260) 515-8511 E-Mail Address: brown1634@gmail.com

Fax Number: (260) 423-1771 (prefer brown1634@gmail.com)

rev. 01/08 AK
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Table of Contents
I. Introduction and Overview of the Petition Listing in Detail Those Points Allegedly Overlooked or Misapprehended ..............................................................................................................1 II. A. B. 1. 2. The Argument Introduced .................................................................................................................4 Resolved: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is a great mischief maker.......................4 Resolved: Rooker-Feldman is of extremely limited applicability ..............................5 The Panel utilized mostly pre-2005 precedent ....................................................................5 The 2002 Brokaw opinion confesses confusion .................................................................6

3. The 2004 Taylor Decision is philosophically opposed to a narrowing of RookerFeldman .................................................................................................................................................6 C. Resolved: The 2006 Loubser opinion is the law of the Circuit governing RookerFeldman analysis when corrupted state court proceedings are alleged .................................8 D. Resolved: Since the High Court wants Rooker-Feldman reined in the arguments found in Justice John Paul Stevens dissent should be considered ........................................9 1. Stevens identified an oxymoron at the heart of Rooker-Feldman .................................9

2. Stevens believed that Rooker-Feldman wrongly conflated appellate review and collateral attack .................................................................................................................................10 3. Stevens believed that Equal Protection analysis would eventually unravel RookerFeldman ...............................................................................................................................................11 E. Resolved: The Equal Protection Clause is violated when a license-seeking applicant is processed in a manner that is intentionally discriminatory..................................................11 F. Resolved: The federal courts employ Rooker-Feldman to intentionally treat bar applicants differently from other license seekers but can cite no basis for said differential treatment that can pass constitutional muster........................................................13 1. Does Rooker-Feldman trump the Fourteenth Amendment? .........................................13

2. Does Rooker-Feldman grant state bar committees license to unconstitutionally discriminate?......................................................................................................................................13 G. Resolved: The Seventh Circuits 1974 Whitfield opinion allows all competing interests at bar to be resolved through the application of Loubser and the allowance of Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment-based claims. ........................................................................14 III. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................15

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Cases
Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir, 1988) .....................................................................15
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1,2 (1971) .......................................................................................15 Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7thCir.2002). .....................................................................................6 Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir.2009) ..................................................................................14 Edwards v. Illinois Board, 261 F.3d 723 (7thCir.2001) ...................................................................... 5, 6 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)...........................................................................10 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).......................................................................................................................................... 4, 5, 7 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries, 544 U.S. 280, 292-93 (2005) ......................................2 GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726 (7th Cir.1993) ................................................. 5, 7 Golden v. Sigman, 611 F.3d 356 (7th Cir.2010). ..................................................................................14 Hale v. Comm. On Character and Fitness (Illinois), 335 F.3d 678 (7thCir.2003) .............................5 Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600 (7th Cir.2008) ................................................................7 Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459,126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006) ......................................... 4, 5 Long v. Shorebank, 182 F.3d 548 (7thCir.1999).................................................................................... 5, 6 Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439 (7th Cir.), cert dend 548 U.S. 907 (2006). ....................... 2, 10, 11 Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 444 (7th Cir.2006) (Sykes, J., concurring and dissenting) .................8 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) ...............................................................................................10 Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir.1995) .................................................................................... 8, 9 Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir.2000) ............................................6 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 247, 249 (1957) ..........................................................14 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ........................................................................................10 Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. -- , 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1297, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011)....................................4 Taylor v. Fed.Natl Mortg. Assn, 374 F.3d 529 (7thCir.2004) .......................................................... 6, 7 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting ................................................................................................................................. 9, 11, 13, 15 Truserv v. Flegles, 419 F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir.2005) ...............................................................................5 Whitfield v. Ill.Bd. Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7thCir.1974) ........................................................14 Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) ..................................................................................... 11, 12 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) .......................................... 11, 15 Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225 (7thCir.1996) .........................................................................................5

Rules
28 U.S.C. 1257 ...........................................................................................................................................17 Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) ............................................................................................................................... 3, 6

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I.

Introduction and Overview of the Petition Listing in Detail Those Points Allegedly Overlooked or Misapprehended

This petition places at least three issues of great import before this Honorable Court: The width of Rooker-Feldman abstention, the breadth of expert witness immunity and the heights to which Equal Protection (and other constitutional doctrines) can ascend in the context of law licensure.1 Petitioner argues that the Panels decision expands the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, threatens the Nesses-Loubser exemption with extinction, approves invidious discrimination against persons of faith in state court licensure cases and deputizes nonattorney state agents with the authority to create absolutely immune reporting structures, among other concerns set forth herein. Front loading this petition with one of the most pressing concerns, Petitioner alleges that the following paragraph (from the heart of the Panels analysis) erects a legal standard opposed to the current state of the law, both within the Seventh Circuit and the nation over: True, [Browns] complaint does not explicitly request a lower federal court to overturn an inconsistent state court judgment, but that is not the only circumstance in which Rooker-Feldman applies. The key question is whether Browns civil rights claims involving the process by which his application was evaluated are so inextricably intertwined with the Indiana Supreme Courts adjudication of his Bar application that in practical effect a lower federal court would be required to review a state court decision. Panel Opinion, p.11, lines 5 15 (emp.add.) Five pages later the Panel built upon this legal standard to rule that Because Browns claims of religious bias require a federal district court to review the judicial process followed by the Indiana Supreme Court in deciding the merits of Browns bar admission application, Browns claims are inexorably
A factual record set forth in detail and anchored to affidavits and admissions is set forth in Plaintiffs Appellate Brief (AB) at Section VII and Plaintiffs Reply Brief (RB) at Section I(D,E&F). The facts are to be reviewed with deference to the Plaintiff since this Courts de novo analysis is to take place against the rubrics of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
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intertwined and fall squarely under Rooker-Feldmans jurisdictional bar. Id. at p.13, ln. 12-17 (emp.add.) Plaintiff fears that this language (and other sentences) from Brown v. Bowman (hereinafter Bowman) will be used in subsequent decisions to expand the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and end the Nesses-Loubser exemption from the same. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries, 544 U.S. 280, 292-93 (2005) and Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439 (7th Cir.), cert dend 548 U.S. 907 (2006). This petition affords the Court opportunity to apply the Nesses-Loubser line of cases after the flurry of RookerFeldman decisions issuing from the High Court since 2005. 2 Petitioner argues that Rooker-Feldman does not actually reach the instant litigation, primarily because (1) he does not seek redress for harm caused by a state court judgment; and (2) because he seeks remedies not allowed him in any previous court action; and (3) he is currently suing persons never previously adverse to him (as defendants) in litigation; and (4) he alleges that the Defendants corrupted an informal and nearly standardless state judicial process, resulting in an unfavorable licensure application ruling. The present petition also grants this Court opportunity to consider the merits of Justice John Paul Stevens arguments issued at the birth of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in light of the Supreme Courts repeated, recent calls for a narrowing of Rooker-Feldman.

The Nesses-Loubser exemption applies to the instant case due, inter alia, to the following paragraphs from the verified complaint: Upon information and belief all of the foregoing alleges that Plaintiff was the subject of a conspiracy to fail him through the JLAP process by Defendants and others, including the Doe Defendants, acting in collusion and out of biases, invidious discriminatory intent and animus causing them to target him because of his pro-life beliefs arising out of his traditional Christian worldview and constitutional, conservative political perspective. ECF 1, 265. This litigation, at core, alleges a conspiracy to discriminate against Plaintiff in the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program that culminated in the filing of fraudulent reports obtained through unconstitutional means with the Board of Law Examiners that influenced said governmental body to Plaintiffs detriment. ECF 1, 17. The JLAC processing and bar denial are linked by a common and discriminatory legal theory, see ECF 1, 153-56.
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Petitioner further argues that he faced invidious discrimination violative of the federal and state constitutions during his processing by the government agents at bar, rendering him a class of one as to his Equal Protection claim. This argument is presented against the backdrop of the Supreme Courts Willowbrook v. Olech opinion, infra. This petition further affords this Court the opportunity to revisit its 1974 Whitfield v. Illinois Bar Examiners decision in light of the principles animating the Fourteenth Amendment, which were pled in the complaint at bar. Petitioner additionally argues that the District Court erred in extending absolute immunity to nontestifying, nonwitnesses in circumstances far removed from the crucible of judicial process. Petitioner posits that the Panel erred by approving the District Courts analysis (in dicta), granting licensing bodies the license to discriminate against core First Amendment rights. (This dicta could cause much mischief in subsequent use.) The above constitute the major points of law that the Petitioner alleges the Panel to have overlooked or misapprehended in the February 2, 2012 decision. Other points, including points of overlooked or misapprehended fact, are set forth at the footnote below.3
Panel Opinion (PO) at p. 2, ln. 7 9: Plaintiff pled torts, statutory violations and conspiracy besides constitutional claims. PO p.4, l.10: District Courts notice that Plaintiff was sentenced to five years ban when statute allows only two ignored. Springmann decision at p.6 versus p.12; PO, p.6, ln.12: Sixty complaints not found in record before Court. PO, p7, ln.5: Disciplinary action was nonaction, as that complaint was dismissed on merits and should in no way be utilized against Plaintiffs interests at this point in the litigation. PO, p7., ln.11: Brown did not submit Bowman report, see RB, p.10. PO, p7., ln.16: Report referenced contained no legal citations. PO, p.12, ln. 17: Panel misrepresents Defendants as BLE rather than JLAC. PO, p.13, ln.12: Court misstates law of Circuit. PO, p.13, ln. 18-22: Panel adopts simple analysis and refuses to acknowledge numerous substantive differences between bar application motion practice and federal litigation at bar. PO, p.14, ln. 17: Court errs by conflating Defendants at bar with the BLE. PO, p.14, ln.29: Court errs by labeling verified complaint at bar as similar to Bar Applicant 24128s filings before the Indiana Supreme Court. PO, p.16, ln. 10: Court errs in concluding Defendants were court appointed experts as that no such appointment records are at bar. PO, p.17, ln. 6: Court errs in finding Defendants were commissioned by the Indiana Supreme Court. No such commission testimony is at bar. PO, p.17, ln. 6: Court errs in concluding Defendants acted in keeping with court-appointed duties. No accounting of such duties or appointments are at bar.
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Finally, Petitioner avers that the Panel erred by weighing the facts at bar against him during Rule 12(b)(1) analysis. The Panels decision presents no standard of review as to factual interpretation. (See AB IX(A)(pp.17-18) for suggested standard.) This alleged failure to heed the proper standard of review (as well as deferring to the government for the factual record) was exacerbated by the governments alleged misrepresentation of the facts at bar. See RB I(A-F).

II.

The Argument Introduced

The District Court dismissed the instant litigation on jurisdictional and immunity grounds: [The] Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the Plaintiffs claims and the Defendants are entitled to immunity. Order, ECF 63, p.1. The Panel did the same. The Panels February 2, 2012 decision rightly describes Rooker-Feldman as a judge made jurisdictional bar. The doctrine was forged at the Supreme Court in its District of Columbia v. Feldman decision almost thirty years ago. See AB, IX(B)(4). The High Court has showed increasing interest in the so-called Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in the past seven years. AB, pp. 19 20 identifies Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (Mar.30,2005) (Exxon), Lance v. Dennis, (Feb.21,2006)(Lance) and Skinner v. Switzer, (Mar.7,2011) (Skinner) as a Trifecta repeatedly ordering the lower courts to rein in use of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See AB, IX(B) for full cites and case presentations. A. Resolved: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is a great mischief maker Justice John Paul Stevens rejoiced in the alleged demise of Rooker-Feldman just a few short years ago: Last Term, in Justice [Ginsburgs] lucid opinion in Exxon, the Court finally interred the so-called Rooker- Feldman doctrine. And today, the Court quite properly disapproves of the District Court's resuscitation of a doctrine that has produced nothing but mischief for 23 years.
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Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 468, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1200 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As it turns out the rumors of Rooker-Feldmans death were greatly exaggerated. The decision at bar is proof that Rooker-Feldmans reign of mischief continues unabated. B. Resolved: Rooker-Feldman is of extremely limited applicability

The High Court borrowed heavily from the Seventh to narrow and further define the Rooker-Feldman doctrine over the past decade. GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726 (7th Cir.1993) supplied bedrock for the erection of a more reasonable and consistent Rooker-Feldman jurisprudence in Exxon. Soon after Exxon issued, Circuit Court Judge Kanne (joined by Coffey and Ripple) noted that the High Court had ordered up a sea-change in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: [A] recent Supreme Court opinion discussed the scope of the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine and held that it has an extremely limited applicability: it applies only to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. Truserv v. Flegles, 419 F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir.2005)(emp.add.,int.cits.omit.) (Given the above definition, Rooker-Feldman does not apply to Bowman.) 1. The Panel utilized mostly pre-2005 precedent Despite a plethora of recent Seventh Circuit cases addressing Rooker-Feldman, Bowman is built almost exclusively from pre-Exxon cases. Edwards v. Illinois Board, 261 F.3d 723 (7thCir.2001) and Hale v. Comm. On Character and Fitness (Illinois), 335 F.3d 678 (7thCir.2003) directly challenged state court orders from actual bar examiners and are therefore easily distinguished. See RB, II(E). While Plaintiff can employ Long v. Shorebank, 182 F.3d 548 (7thCir.1999) to argue that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable at bar, the Panel interpreted this precedent otherwise. The Panel likewise employed Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225 (7thCir.1996) to define the concept of inexorably intertwined the

very font of overreaching from which the Trifecta repeatedly warns the lower courts to drink of no more. Two of the pre-2005 cases that the Panel relies upon merit greater review. Taylor v. Fed.Natl Mortg. Assn, 374 F.3d 529 (7thCir.2004) and Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7thCir.2002). 2. The 2002 Brokaw opinion confesses confusion The Brokaw Court admitted that it was applying Rooker-Feldman in a less-than-ideal juridic setting, noting that the exact parameters [of the Doctrine] are less than clear and that discerning which claims are and which claims are not inextricably intertwined with a state judgment is a difficult process. Id. at 664 (citing Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir.2000)). Brokaw drags Edwards and Long into this jurisprudential fog, admitting that [w]hether [Plaintiff] is presenting an independent claim rather than a claim premised on an injury caused by the state court's judgment is a complex question, as it is often difficult to distinguish between situations in which the plaintiff is seeking to set aside a state court judgment and ones in which the claim is independent. Edwards v. Illinois Bd. of Adm. to the Bar, 261 F.3d 723, 72829 (7th Cir.2001 (quoting Long, 182 F.3d at 555) Brokaw, 305 F.3d at 665 (emp.add.) Thankfully the Trifecta and post-Trifecta Seventh Circuit precedent have since answered most of these complex and difficult then-pending questions. 3. The 2004 Taylor Decision is philosophically opposed to a narrowing of Rooker-Feldman The use of the analysis from Taylor, standing alone, justifies reconsideration of the February 2, 2012 opinion. Issued in 2004, Taylor labors under the pre-Trifecta belief in an expansive Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Major traps threatening pre-2005 federal plaintiffs are showcased in Taylor, including the judicial bias against those claims [] inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment. Id. at 534 The question of how such claims are
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recognized is answered only in the abstract, as that the Taylor Panel admitted to approaching that question as a somewhat metaphysical concept. Id. After establishing that Rooker-Feldman leads the Court into realms highly abstract, subtle, or abstruse, the Taylor Panel then unveiled its test for inextricably intertwined as the subjective analysis of whether the plaintiff indirectly seeks to set aside a state court judgment. Id. The concept of reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state court proceedings is yet another trap set forth in Taylor. Id. The Panels use of these traps from Taylor renders Bowman a Seventh Circuit precedent widening Rooker-Feldman in the face of the Supreme Courts numerous orders to narrow the doctrine.4 Bowman stands opposed to numerous recent, post-Exxon Circuit and District Court cases, including Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600 (7th Cir.2008):
We note that the Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected the reasonable opportunity exception prior to Exxon Mobil, [ ] and the Sixth Circuit eliminated this exception as a result of Exxon Mobil. [ ] By dramatically narrowing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court ensured that litigants always will have subject matter jurisdiction to bring claims that are independent of the state court judgment in federal district court. Hence, there is no need for a reasonable opportunity exception in those types of cases. . The reasonable opportunity exception was developed during a time when federal courts applied Rooker-Feldman much more expansively. Post- Exxon Mobil, the reasonable opportunity exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is of questionable viability.

Kelley, 548 F.3d at 607 (emp.add., int.cites.omit.).

By way of example, the Panel ruled that Plaintiff is estopped from filing civil conspiracy claims against the instant defendants since he raised those or similar claims while being processed for a state license (in a judicial process devoid of defendants). Yet [i]f a federal plaintiff presents an independent claim, it is not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction even if that the same or [similar] question was earlier aired between the very same parties in state court. Exxon, 544 U.S. 292-93 (quoting GASH).
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C. Resolved: The 2006 Loubser opinion is the law of the Circuit governing Rooker-Feldman analysis when corrupted state court proceedings are alleged This Courts 2006 Loubser decision issued about two weeks after the second prong of the Trifecta. Loubser built upon Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir.1995) in the post Exxon legal environment. See RB, II. Circuit Court Judge Diana Sykes noted, in her dissent and concurrence, that
[t]here is no question that Loubser's amended complaint is an attack on the proceedings in her state court divorce case, alleging due process and equal protection violations and, therefore, that the district court's [erroneous] conclusion that Rooker-Feldman blocked federal jurisdiction was thus quite understandable.

Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 444 (7th Cir.2006) (Sykes, J., concurring and dissenting)(emp.add.). The same could be said of the complaint at bar, with this exception Plaintiff Brown does not seek an order reversing (directly or indirectly) the Indiana Supreme Courts denial of admission. He rather knowingly and purposefully swears off the same, asking the federal court to join him in eschewing such a litigation goal. AB, VI(A) 10-11. Judge Sykes noted that the Seventh Circuit had staked out unique ground on RookerFeldman a full decade before the High Courts Exxon ruling:
But this court has held that Rooker-Feldman does not prevent litigants from seeking a federal remedy for alleged violations of their constitutional rights where "the violator so far succeeded in corrupting the state judicial process as to obtain a favorable judgment." Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1995)

Loubser, 440 F.3d at 445. The instant Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants at bar so far succeeded in corrupting a state judicial licensure process with anti-religious biases and discrimination as to burden the Plaintiff with an unfavorable character and fitness report from JLAC, which impacted (through the report of social worker Tim Sudrovech), but did not necessarily dictate, an unfavorable licensure ruling from the Board of Law Examiners. AB, Facts. EDF 1, 17, 55, 103, 151, 165, 204, 207, 265. Judge Sykes plumbed the depths of the Loubser opinion (Posner and Williams) and Nesses (Posner and Kanne), concluding [to] the extent that Loubser is contending she was denied the right to be judged by an uncorrupted tribunal and seeks damages for the
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resulting harm, Nesses holds that Rooker-Feldman does not apply. Loubser, 440 F.3d at 445 (emp.add.). Judge Sykes ran the Nesses-Loubser analysis through the paces before the Loubser case ended with cert denied, (548 U.S. 907 (2006)) and before the High Court issued its third warning in six years (AB, pp. 19-20) that Rooker-Feldman was being used too freely to abort meritorious federal litigation. Given the subsequent legal developments there is no foundation to deny the continued viability of Nesses and Loubser. Both should be brought to bear on the verified complaint at bar, which seeks damages from those alleged to have corrupted a licensure tribunal.5 D. Resolved: Since the High Court wants Rooker-Feldman reined in the arguments found in Justice John Paul Stevens dissent should be considered The High Court has directed the federal courts to cut back on Rooker-Feldman three times since 2005. While a majority of the current Supreme Court Justices have joined opinions critical of Rooker-Feldman, no currently sitting Justice has joined a Supreme Court opinion advancing the doctrine. 1. Stevens identified an oxymoron at the heart of Rooker-Feldman On the day of Rooker-Feldmans creation Justice Stevens may have overstated its reach, reporting that: [Today] the Court concludes that a United States District Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that [attorney licensing] rules have been administered in an unconstitutional manner [by state bar examiners]. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 488, 490 (1973)(Stevens, J., dissenting). This may have been overstated since no mere statutory construction should be able to trump First Amendment case law repeated ratified over the decades prior and the decades
See ECF 1, 44-47, 82-87, 103-05, 147-50, 154-55, 163, 174-80, 189, 196-203, 207 and petition for certiorari at ECF 52-1, which demonstrate an ineffectual state remedy and farcical nature of Indianas law licensure proceedings. Presentation of evidence of collusion could not be tendered to the Indiana Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court. Neither was Plaintiff allowed opportunity to seek relief, in either damages or specific performance, before those tribunals. See esp ECF 52-1.
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following. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (condition[ing] the availability
of benefits upon willingness to violate a cardinal principle of religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of constitutional liberties.). See also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.

872, 877 (1990) (government may not impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.) Yet the probing of religious and religiously informed views and beliefs alleged (under oath) at bar support the inference that the government violated both Sherbert and Smith while processing Plaintiff. Such violations may be by design: Curiously, Justice Stevens continued, the Court today ignores basic jurisdictional principles when it decides a jurisdictional issue affecting the licensing of members of the legal profession. Id.6 2. Stevens believed that Rooker-Feldman wrongly conflated appellate review and collateral attack Justice Stevens then addressed concepts that foreshadowed the analysis found in the Nesses-Loubser line of cases: The Court's opinion fails to distinguish between two concepts: appellate review and collateral attack. If a challenge to a state court's decision is brought in United States District Court and alleges violations of the United States Constitution, then by definition it does not seek appellate review. It is plainly within the federalquestion jurisdiction of the federal court. [] There may be other reasons for denying relief to the plaintiff-such as failure to state a cause of action, claim or issue preclusion, or failure to prove a violation of constitutional rights. [] But it does violence to jurisdictional concepts for this Court to hold, as it does, that the federal district court has no jurisdiction to conduct independent review of a specific claim that a licensing body's action did not comply with federal constitutional standards.

In Justice Stevens defense, he was in the majority in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), which had ruled (without dissent) a mere eleven years earlier that [t]he very purpose of 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the peoples federal rights to protect the people from the unconstitutional action under color of state law, whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial. Id. at 242 (emp.add).
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Feldman, 460 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., dis.)(emp.add.) The Nesses-Loubser analysis parallels the above reasoning. It has set many a plaintiff free from Rooker-Feldmans grasp, and should have done so in Bowman. Since it did not this question arises: Does Nesses-Loubser reach those applying to become officers of the very system that is supposed to be dedicated to due process, the rule of law and constitutional governance ber alles? 3. Stevens believed that Equal Protection analysis would eventually unravel Rooker-Feldman Justice Stevens closed his dissent with a hypothetical fact pattern strikingly similar to the one at bar: Constitutional challenges to specific licensing actions may, of course, fail on the merits. But in my view, if plaintiffs challenging a bar admissions decision by a state court prove facts comparable to the allegations made by the appellants in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886), they would clearly be entitled to relief in the United States District Court. If they were seeking admission to any other craft regulated by the state, they would unquestionably have such a right. Id., 460 U.S. at 488 (emp.add.) The instant fact-rich record affords this Court the opportunity to vindicate Justice John Paul Stevens, as well as Bryan Brown, who clearly alleges Equal Protection, Due Process and First Amendment claims. See ECF 1, Legal Claims, esp. Claims 12 and 13 and ECF 52 (dend petition for cert). E. Resolved: The Equal Protection Clause is violated when a license-seeking applicant is processed in a manner that is intentionally discriminatory Speaking of Yick Wo, the Supreme Courts decision in Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) grants this Court a path through the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As the Panel noted, Rooker-Feldman is judge made law. Bowman, p.18. The Equal Protection Clause finds its genesis in a higher law. What is the result when the two collide on the docket, as is the case at bar?
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Does Plaintiff lose out simply because the Feldman decision (which issued 115 years after Congress adopted the Fourteenth Amendment) allegedly trumps his constitutional right to be free from illegitimate government biases and discriminatory actions, even as to religion and politics? Willowbrook suggests that this show must go on. The municipality entered upon the docket of the High Court after the Seventh Circuit had already determined that the citys nemesis could allege an equal protection violation by asserting that state action was motivated solely by a spiteful effort to get him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective. Id. Brown alleges as much, and even more. See fn. 2, supra. Willowbrooks petition for certiorari was granted to determine whether the Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a class of one where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group. Id. The High Court determined that [o]ur cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a class of one, where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. [ ] In so doing, we have explained that [t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the States jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents. Willowbrook, 528 U.S. 562(emp.add, cit.omit.). Willowbrook is difficult to square with the dismissal of Bowman via Rooker-Feldman, since Brown, (a person), clearly alleges (on oath) intentional and arbitrary discrimination through the improper execution of state authority by duly constituted agents that resulted in a five year law banishment from the law licensure application process when the state statute allows for only a two year banishment. See Judge Theresa Springmanns March 31, 2011 decision at p.6 (five year ban) versus p.12 (two year statute). AB, appendix. Can this be anything save intentionally different treatment that is both arbitrary and a revelation of official animus?

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F. Resolved: The federal courts employ Rooker-Feldman to intentionally treat bar applicants differently from other license seekers but can cite no basis for said differential treatment that can pass constitutional muster The Rooker-Feldman doctrine targets unwanted bar applicants (be they attorneys or nonattorneys of any race, any gender, any religion) with disparate treatment as compared to all others seeking professional licenses from the State. Justice Stevens could not understand why the law licensing process should be immune from such just ends, opining that [t]he fact that the licensing function in the legal profession is controlled by the judiciary is not a sufficient reason to immunize allegedly unconstitutional conduct from review in the federal courts. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It would seem that unwanted bar applicants are nonpersons as far as Equal Protection analysis is concerned. 1. Does Rooker-Feldman trump the Fourteenth Amendment? If Willowbrook isnt applicable in this instance, that is, if Browns Equal Protection claims need not apply, then Rooker-Feldmans judge made law has triumphed over the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Bar applicants are cast outside the zone of protection afforded land use zoning applicants, barbers, colonic hydrotherapists, psychiatrists, nurses, engineers, motor vehicle operators and every other licensure applicant in America. 2. Does Rooker-Feldman grant state bar committees license to unconstitutionally discriminate? Given Bowman, the proper take-away for Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin bar application officials is do what thou wilt with applicants. Future applicants may face affirmative action quotas (on most any characteristic) and weltanschauung reviews that would make all but the most hardened statists blush. At footnote two and on page 13 the Panel pre-approves discriminatory inquiries: Because Browns claims of religious bias require a federal district court to review the judicial process followed Rooker Feldman bars jurisdiction and thus approves the government to demand apostasy as the price for a law
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license. Future panels will have to determine if Bowman also authorizes blatant racial, gender, ethnic, sexual orientation and political affiliation discrimination. 7 G. Resolved: The Seventh Circuits 1974 Whitfield opinion allows all competing interests at bar to be resolved through the application of Loubser and the allowance of Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment-based claims. Nine years prior to the Feldman decision, Circuit Judge Stevens weighed the complaint of an unsuccessful bar applicant. In Whitfield v. Ill.Bd. Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7thCir.1974), this Court determined it would be justified in interfering with bar applicant processing if faced with proof that a denial was predicated upon a constitutionally impermissible reason. Id. at 477. The Whitfield Court stood on the shoulders of the Supreme Court when ruling that there may very well be situations in which a capricious denial by state officials may give rise to a federal remedy. Id. That Supreme Court decision held the courthouse door open to individual bar applicants whose Fourteenth Amendment rights were denied, stating that [r]efusal to allow a man to qualify himself for the [legal] profession on a wholly arbitrary standard or on a consideration that offends the dictates of reason offends the Due Process Clause. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 247, 249 (1957). (Frankenfurter, J., concurring, joined by Clark, J. and Harlan, J).8 While Richard Schware found his way to
Plaintiff argued that the latitude as to court consultant immunity granted by Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir.2009) be reconsidered and narrowed in light of Golden v. Sigman, 611 F.3d 356 (7th Cir.2010). Bowman advances the proposition that any expert appointed by
7

a government social worker enjoys absolute immunity for words raised against a bar applicant, no matter how libelous or irresponsible. See witness arguments, AB & RB. 8 The Schware Court famously added, We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a 'right' or 'privilege.' Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State's grace. 353 U.S. n.5. Yet if Bowman is allowed to stand as written, the take away is that it is all about the States grace and not about constitutional rights at all, opposing Black letter law: State-created rules governing the grant or denial of licenses must comply with constitutional standards and must be administered in accordance with due process of law. [It] should be beyond question that a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over an individual's lawsuit raising federal constitutional challenges. 460 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (Stevens, J., 14

the Supreme Court via 28 U.S.C. 1257, Justice Frankfurter and the Whitfield Court -were of the opinion that Schware could have entered the federal system via the district court given his civil rights claim. The Whitfield Court concluded that, Since nothing in plaintiff's complaint indicates that he was denied admission for a [constitutionally impermissible] reason, the district court correctly rejected plaintiff's request to overrule the judgment of the Board of Examiners. Id. Find at bar a verified complaint, affidavits and reports from government agents demonstrating that political views, religious beliefs and empathy were weighed and found lacking on route to law license denial. (See, e.g., Bowman at n.2.) Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971) holds that views and beliefs are immune from bar association inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law. Id., at 2. But compare ECF 1, 37, 40, 52, 56, 85, 140-44, 149-50, 153-56, 160-64. See AB, pp.7-15; see also RB,II. Such was the case when the states were barring Marxists from the practice of law. Does the rule of constitutional law fail when religious applicants are so processed?9

III.

Conclusion
Rehearing or rehearing en banc should follow, for the good of the Republic.

dissenting) Bowman denies First and Fourteenth Amendment claims quarter in federal court, an end foreign to the jurisprudential history of our Republic and threatening the same. 9 In Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir, 1988), the en banc Seventh Circuit interpreted Yick Wo as standing for the proposition that a government may not selectively enforce their laws in ways that violate other rules, such as the prohibition of racial discrimination, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886), or the first amendment--they could not, for example, rescue Republicans but not Democrats. In the present instance it appears that students of Karl Marx are approved but disciples of Thomas Aquinas are not; which is to say, those mixing their religion with the governments politics need not apply. 15

Respectfully submitted on February 16, 2012,

Bryan J. Brown 827 Webster Street Fort Wayne, IN 46802 (260) 515-8511 Brown1634@gmail.com Certificate of Service I hereby certify that I, Bryan Brown, timely delivered hard copies of this Petition for Rehearing to the following counsel of record via the U.S. Mails and this day delivered the same via electronic mail: Mark Baeverstad For Defendant Elizabeth Bowman Rothberg , Logan & Warsco, LLP 505 East Washington Blvd. PO Box 11647 Fort Wayne, IN 46859-1647 Sharon L Stanzione Stephen M. Brandenburg For Defendant Stephen Ross11051 Broadway Suite B Crown Point, IN 46307 Francis Barrow For JLAP/Supreme Court Defendants Shepard, Harrell and Sudrovech Indiana Attorney General's Office - IAG/302 Indiana Govt Center South, 5th Floor 302 W. Washington Street Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770.