Professional Documents
Culture Documents
AD Number: ADA076180 Subject Categories: MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS Corporate Author: ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS Title: Tactics of the Soviet Army Regiment. Descriptive Note: Final rept., Personal Authors: Conroy,Bruce ; Report Date: 14 MAY 1979 Pages: 144 PAGES Supplementary Note: Master's thesis. Descriptors: *MILITARY TACTICS, USSR, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), MILITARY DOCTRINE, THESES, WAR GAMES, TACTICAL ANALYSIS, ARMY OPERATIONS, TACTICAL WARFARE, REGIMENT LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS. Abstract: This research project is designed to facilitate an understanding of Soviet tactics at the regimental level and below and to draw attention to material available for additional study of Soviet tactics. This paper is the result of analyzing numerous primary and secondary sources to ascertain which forms of tactics the Soviets use and which forms we, as US authors, say they use. A review of recent Soviet tactical exercises was used to confirm their implementation of espoused tactical doctrine. The meeting engagement, the offense, the defense, and the withdrawal are the forms of tactics. A chapter is devoted to each form and possible implementation under given circumstances if postulated. Organization for combat and necessary support elements are included to serve as an aid to wargamers. (Author) Limitation Code: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Source Code: 037260
, . , I
._ ..
;.,ember, i o n s u i t i n ( ? :s.cult:'
The o p i n i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e c ? t h e i n d i . v i d u a 1 s t u d e n t a u t h c r and d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y rel:res e n t t h e v i e w s o f e i t h e r t h e US Army Corr,;r,and and . G e n e r a l Z.:af? T c l l e p e o r rtry o.ti:er ; : , o v e r n r e r t a l w - e x : , ' . ( : ? e f e r e n c e e 'to t t i s s t u d y s!iould i n c l u d e t k e f o r e r o i r : ? ; s t a t e m e n t . )
ii
ABSTRACT TACTICS OF THE SOVIET ARMY REGIMENT, by Bruce Conroy, Major, USA, 14) pages. This research project is designed to facilitate an understanding of Soviet tactics at the regimental level and below and to draw attention to material available for additional study of Soviet tactics. This paper is
the result of analyzing numerous primary and secondary sources to ascertain which forms of tactics the Soviets use and which forms we, as US authors, say they use. review of recent Soviet tactical exercises was used to confirm their implementation of espoused tactical doctrine. The meeting engagement, the offense, the defense, and the withdrawal are the forms of tactics. A chapter A
is devoted to (lach form and possible implementation under given circumstances if postulated. Organization for com-
bat and necessary support elements are included to serve as an aid to wargamers.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
iv
Fage
TITLEPAGE.
0
................
a .
i
ii
I .
iii
iv
V
viii
CXAFTER
INTRCDUCTICN
1-1
1-2
1-3
2.
1-1
1-3
1-4
ANOTHER VIEW
............
*
2-4
2-5
2-6
CONCLUSIONS
ENDNOTES
............ ..............
.- -
.......
*
-.
2-16
2-17
3.
3-1
3-2
GENERAL
2'RONT ARMY.
3-3
3- 1
3-2
3- 8
Fage
3-4
3-5
3-6
4-1
4-2
3-13
3-22 3-28
GENERAL
CONDUCT
4-3
4-4
4-5
4-6
. .........
4-1
4-3
4-19
4-20
4-20 4-25
TI-iE OFFENSE
5-1
5-2
5-3
5-4
5-5
6
5-6
6-1
6-2
.. ........ CONDUCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . From t h e March . . . . . . . . . . From D i r e c t C o n t a c t . . . . . . . Breakthrough . . . . . . . . . . . Fursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . OPERATIONAL SUPPORT . . . . . . . . SPECIAL TROOPS SUPPORT . . . . . . . DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GENERAL
e e
5-1
5-4
5-4
5-10
5-11
5-14
5-16
5-17
5-18
5-21
TIHE DEFENSE
GENERAL
CONDUCT
..............
6-1
6-3
6-3
6-7
6-3
6-4
. ......
0
Page
6-9
6-10
6-5
.
.
6-6
. . . . . . . . . .. . . .
s
.............
* *
e
0
....
6-10
6-14
THE WITHDRAWAL
7-1 GENERAL
7-2
7-3
8
8-1
8-2
APPENDIX
A
7-1
7-2
7-3
8- 1
.. ....
....
TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
8-1
Bibliography
US Government Documents
.........
BOOkS
A-1
A-1
Initial Distribution L i s t
.........
3-1
v ii
LIST OF XGURES
Figure
1 2
3
4
5
6
..................... 3-4 Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9 S e l e c t e d Elements of Group o f S o v i e t F o r c e s Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10 Tank D i v i s i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14
Front Notorized R i f l e C i v i s i o n N o t o r i z e d R i f l e Regiment Tank Regiment
Page
7
6
9
.................
............
........... ...........
3-15
4-5 4-6
4-11
4-12
Regimental O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r Combat
......
viii
CHAFTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1-1
3ACKGROUND.
l a t i o n 381-1.
wm 4
s t u d y r e q u i r e d manual wargaming o r f o r c e - o n - f o r c e
and equipment.
s i d e r a b l e d u p l i c a t i o n of e f f o r t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of numerous
T h r e a t Appendixes.
Appendix t o a i d i n t h e i n i t i a l p h a s e s of s t u d i e s h a s been
1-1
This
s p e c i f i c Threat.
kept u n c l a s s i f i e d t o a l l o w t h e w i d e s t p o s s i b l e dissemination.
p o r t i o n s included i n t h i s paper.
a d d i t i o n a l information.
I n o t h e r words, view t h i s t r e a t i s e
u c t unto i t s e l f .
I t h a s been w r i t t e n t o provide a c c e s s t o
t h o s e u n c l a s s i f i e d documents already available and encourage personnel t o seek a d d i t i o n a l information from p e r t i n e n t documents.
I t would be presumptuous t o assume t h i s a n a l y s i s
h a s reviewed a l l u n c l a s s i f i e d documents a v a i l a b l e , and Threat
Managers should t a k e note of a d d i t i o n a l primary and seconda r y source material w h i c h can h e l p them.
1-2
1-2. PURPOSE.
T h i s document i s intended t o provide T h r e a t Managers
w i t h a s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of T h r e a t Appen-
and t r a i n i n g developments s t u d i e s r e q u i r i n g T h r e a t i n p u t
Within
c a t e g o r y by i t s e l f .
Although p r i m a r i l y o f f e n s i v e i n n a t u r e ,
Withdrawal has a l s o
1-3. SCOPE.
The preponderance of Threat a n a l y t i c a l e f f o r t s i n support of s c h o o l s t u d i e s h a s focused on t h e regimental l e v e l o r lower.
Thus, t h i s s t u d y h a s surveyed echelons
.i
above regiment and placed t h e main t h r u s t on regimental operations. Within t h e source m a t e r i a l t h e r e are s e v e r a l interchangeable terms used t o d e s c r i b e various f a c e t s of S o v i e t tactics.
A p o r t i o n of each r e l e v a n t c h a p t e r h a s been dedi.I
..
'
Other
Thus complete i d e n t i f y i n g
Persons reading t h i s s t u d y w i l l r e a d i l y
recognize there i s an abundance of a d d i t i o n a l source mater i a l from which f u r t h e r information can be obtained.
Readers
a r e encouraged t o provide full i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l source m a t e r i a l t o CACDA. The information c u t o f f d a t e f o r r e f e r e n c e material is 1 February 1979.
A l l r e f e r e n c e s used i n t h i s r e s e a r c h e f f o r t a r e un-
classified.
w r i t t e n by S o v i e t a u t h o r s , was used f o r a n a l y s i s .
1-4
surveys echelons above regiment and suggests c o n s i d e r a t i o n s when organizing u n i t s f o r combat. Chapters 4, 5, 6 , and 7 d i s c u s s t h e meeting engagement, o f f e n s e , defense, and w i t h drawal, r e s p e c t i v e l y .
The
concluding c h a p t e r r e f l e c t s on p o t e n t i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and t e c h n o l o g i c a l changes which might impact on S o v i e t t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e , and provides r e l e v a n t conclusions. Within q u o t a t i o n s from t r a n s l a t i o n s t h e r e a r e some apparent punctuation and grammatical errors. author had a c t u a l l y w r i t t e n . the applicable translation. I n i t i a l l y , one of t h e d r i v i n g f a c t o r s f o r t h i s paper
was t o e x p l a i n t h e e f f e c t of s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , such as
The o r i g i n a l
After
River c r o s s i n g s
1-5
o p e r a t i o n s on urban t e r r a i n , c a l l e d WOUT i n US parlance, a r e planned for when necessary, rather t h a n considered separately. There is no q u e s t i o n t h a t extreme c o l d , h e a t
Although h a r d t o game, a i r b o r n e f o r c e 8 both a i r dropped and a i r landed should be considered for employment w i t h i n any s c e n a r i o . Airborne f o r c e s u t i l i z a t i o n should be of
primary i n t e r e s t w i t h i n any s t u d y done t o support U combat S s e r v i c e support. Our t r a i n s , DISCOMS and COSCQMs w i l l o f f e r Further,
l u c r a t i v e targets for S o v i e t a i r b o r n e f o r c e s .
1-6
CHAPTER 2
SOVIET TACTICS
2 - 1 . TACTICSDEFINED.
ANOTFIER VIEW
TAKTIKA (VOYENNAYA) ( m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s ) A s p e c i a l f i e l d i n t h e t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e of m i l i t a r y a r t which s t u d i e s t h e o b j e c t i v e laws of comb a t and d e v e l o p s methods of p r e p a r i n g f o r combat and c o n d u c t i n g i t , on l a n d , a t sea, and i n t h e a i r . M i l i t a r y tactics occupies a subordiante p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o o p e r a t i o n a l a r t and s t r a t e g y , a c t i n g i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , and s e r v i n g t o a c h i e v e t h e g o a l s s e t f o r i t by t h e operat i o n a l a r t . Each S e r v i c e and b r a n c h , by v i r t u e of it:; i n t r i n s i c p e c u l i a r i t i e s , h a s i t s own t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and c o n d u c t o f combat a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , i t s own t a c t i c s t o o , w h i c h arf c a l l e d S e r v i c e t a c t i c s o r branch (arms)
tactics.
The S o v i e t s c l e a r l y d e f i n e t h e i r development o f d o c t r i n e
as a s c i e n c e which h a s t h r e e p h a s e s :
art, and t a c t i c s .
strategy, operational
by t h e S o v i e t s .
2-2.
KETFICDCLCGJ.
The purpose o f t h i s c h a p t e r is t o r e s o l v e t h i s d i s c r e p -
I n most US
c o n t a c t t t h e breakthrough
and t h e p u r s u i t .
'I2
T h i s theme
t h e most common o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n on t h e n u c l e a r b a t t l e -
field.'I3
One c a n h a r d l y q u e s t i o n t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e meet-
considered.
S o v i e t Army Operations c h a r a c t e r i z e d S o v i e t
t y p i f i e s t h e o f f e n s e as i n c l u d i n g t h e meeting engagement,
d e l i b e r a t e a t t a c k a g a i n s t a d e f e n d i n g f o r c e , and p u r s u i t . 6
'I
. . . the
meeting engagement
. . . i n c l u d e s advance t o
2-2
contactr engagement of defense and breakthrough1 and the p~rsuit."~This definition of phases of an offensive operation appeared in an earlier booklet from the same school. The most recent handbook on the Soviet Army contains the following definition of the offensive: "The Soviets classify offensive actions into three major types8 the meeting engagement, and the pursuit.
l''
the breakthrough,
Even manuals
dealing with small unit tactics have also included the meetXowever, one reing engagement as a form of the ~ f f e n s e . ~ port dealing with tank battalion tactics does treat the meeting engagement as a separate form of combat action. T h e Soviets consider the meeting engagement to be the most important battalion operation and it frequently is the focus of training exercises. ,110 Perhaps we should change our terminology for this operation to the encounter battle, to align ourselves with the British, Canadians, and the Soviets. VSTRECSNOYE SRAZHENIYE (BOY) (encounter battle) - A clash between opposing sides when they are simultaneously striving to fulfill assigned missions by means of offensive actions. An encounter battle may occur during a march (maneuver) or in the course of an attack mounted to repel enemy counterattacks or counterblows, and also when reserves or second echelons move up to counterattack or to inflict counterblows when in defense. An encounter battle is characterized by obscurity of the situation and by abrupt changes in it, by the rapid movement to contact of the two sides and by the decisiveness and dynamic nature of their encounter, by rapid changes in march, approachmarch and combat formations, by the swift build-up of effort from depth, by an intense struggle to
2-3
g a i n time and t o s e i z e and hold t h e i n i t i a t i v e , and by t h e presence of open f l a n k s , and f r e e maneuv e r . R e s e n t - d a y s e a and a i r b a t t l e s arelpredomi n a n t l y i n t h e encounter b a t t l e c a t e g o r y . Although t h e o f f e n s i v e i s a necessary i n g r e d i e n t once t h e meeting engagement has begun, i t may be conducted d u r i n g offensive o r defensive operations.
A review of S o v i e t w r i t -
e r s ' opinions of t h e meeting engagement i s i n o r d e r . The S o v i e t s d r a w h e a v i l y upon t h e i r experiences i n "The Great P a t r i o t i c War," t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e Second World War fought by them. The defending s i d e , s e t t i n g up powerful f i r e means, and a l s o mobile and deep r e s e r v e s and second echel o n s , introduced them f o r executing c o u n t e r a t t a c k s and f o r i n f l i c t i n g counterblows w i t h d e c i s i v e g o a l s . A s a r e s u l t of such a c t i o n s , meeting engagements began t o appear i n both o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a t a l l s t a g e s and under t h e most h i g h l y varied c o n d i t i o n s of a s i t u a t i o n a l 2
The a u t h o r c o n t i n u e s t o d e s c r i b e l e s s o n s l e a r n e d from enemy
combat I I n t h e o f f e n s i v e , meeting engagements appeared when r e p u l s i n g enemy c o u n t e r a t t a c k s and counterblows and when overcoming t h e t a c t i c a l zone of h i s defense ( t r o o p o f f e n s i v e of t h e South-Western f r o n t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of Kharkov i n Kay o f 1 9 4 2 ) ; d u r i n g t h e development of succes8 i n a s t r a t e g i c depth (meeting engagement and combat of t h e Voronezh f r o n t i n t h e Belgorod-Kharkov o p e r a t i o n i n August, 1943, and t h e f o u r t h guards tank army i n t h e Sandomirsk-Sllesian o p e r a t i o n i n January, 1945, and o t h e r s ) ; d u r i n g p u r s u i t (meeting engagements of t h e 38th and 3 r d tank armies i n November, 1943, toward Z h i t o m i r and K a z a t i n ) ; i n r e p e l l i n g enemy attempts t o b r e a k t h e i n t e r n a l o r e x t e r n a l f r o n t o f an enc i r c l e m e n t (meeting engagements of l a r g e Cormations o f t h e 2nd and 6 t h t a n k armies i n t h e Morsun'Shevchenko o p e r a t i o n , t h e r i f t h g u a r d s tank armi s i n t h e Eastern-Frussian o p e r a t i o n , and o t h e r s ) . 13 2-4
3 e f u r t h e r e x p l a i n s t h e need f o r t h e p r a c t i c e of t h e meeting engagement t o meet e x i g e n c i e s of t h e modern b a t t l e f i e l d . The most f r e q u e n t time t h i s form of combat w i l l o c c u r i s
a f t e r i n i t i a l p e n e t r a t i o n o f a d e f e n s e h a s o c c u r r e d and manu-
v e r i n g r e s e r v e s w i l l be encountered.
is a p p l i c a b l e t o b o t h n u c l e a r and non-nuclear b a t t l e f i e l d s .
w i l l n o t be t h e o n l y time f o r an e n c o u n t e r b a t t l e d u r i n g
t h e defense.
I n contemporary c o n d i t i o n s , meeting engagements i n d e f e n s e c a n o c c u r n o t o n l y d u r i n g c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a g a i n s t a p e n e t r a t i n g enemy, b u t a l s o when e n c o u n t e r i n g a n advancing enemy w i t h s u b u n i t s which have advanced t o s h u t o f f b r e a c h e s and b r e a k s w h i c h have formed t h e combat deployment of t r o o s, a n d t o c o v e r i m p o r t a n t p o s i t i o n s and d i r e c t i o n s .
5 i
:le goes on f u r t h e r t o s t a t e l
The v a r i e t y of c o n d i t i o n s of t h e appearance of meeting engagements depends n o t o n l y on t h e form of combat a c t i o n i n w h i c h t h e y a p p e a r , b u t a l s o on t h e l o c a t i o n of u n i t s and s u b u n i t s i n t h e combat c o n s t r u c t i o n of t r o o p s , which w i l l i n f l u e n c e t h e grouping of f o r c e s and equipment, t h e p r e p a r a t i o n f o r combat a c t i o n , and t h e a r a c t e r of deployment and e n t r y i n t o combat.
t o modern combat.
Small u n i t t a c t i c s a l s o emphasize t h e meeting engage-
2-5
Meeting engagements, t h e r e f o r e , can occur d u r i n g an o f f e n s i v e , a s w e l l as a d e f e n s i v e , o p e r a t i o n . They a l s o are p o s s i b l e when our t r o o p s are w i t h drawing, i n which c a s e t h e b a t t a l i o n w i l l have t o a c t as t h e r e a r guard, and o f t e n may be forced t o attack a pursuing enemy i n o r d e r t o d e l a y him a t a c e r t a i n l i n e and g a i n time.17 S o v i e t t a c t i c i a n s a l s o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e meeting engagement
w i l l be a r a p i d l y developing i f n o t somewhat confusing s i t u -
ation.
"The b a t t a l i o n ' s d i s p o s i t i o n o f t e n w i l l n o t be t h a t
r e q u i r e d f o r t h e concept of a meeting engagement, and r e d i s p o s i t i o n w i l l take time t h a t may n o t always be a v a i l a b l e . ,,I8 The d e f e n s e a l s o o f f e r s unique problems f o r t h e defender.
"The s p e c i a l f e a t u r e s of t h e meeting engagement f o r t h e de-
t h e i r last w a r .
t u a l l y , t h e encounter can take place d u r i n g d e f e n s i v e operations. "An encounter b a t t l e can occur i n t h e course of a
lVz1
blost a v a i l a b l e
e n v i s i o n e d i n a modern war.
The p o s s i b i l i t y of e n c o u n t e r i n g
a h e l i b o r n e a s s a u l t , w h i l e occupying d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s ,
c a n n o t be p r e c l u d e d . The t r a d i t i o n a l use of p a r a c h u t e f o r c e s
a l s o o f f e r s opportunities f o r encounters.
COL V. Ye. S a v k i n , a l e a d i n g S o v i e t t a c t i c i a n , a l s o
i n c l u d e s t h e e n c o u n t e r b a t t l e as a s e p a r a t e form of a c t i o n i n combat i The given p r i n c i p l e of o p e r a t i o n a l a r t and t a c t i c s f i n d s its expression i n practice i n constant i n f l u e n c e on t h e enemy w i t h an u n i n t e r r u p t e d b u i l d up of t h e f o r c e of a t t a c k s , i n a n t i c i p a t i n g t h e enemy i n d e s t r u c t i o n by f i r e , i n d e l i v e r i n g a t t a c k s and executing maneuver, and i n making u s e of f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e s i t u a t i o n f o r imposing o n e ' s w i l l on t h e enemy i n a l l forms of combat a c t i o n s . I n examining t h i s p r i n c i p l e it i s i m p o r t a n t t o d i r e c t a t t e n t i o n p r i m a r i l y on i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n d i f f e r e n t forms of combat a c t i o n s i n t h e o f f e n s e , d e f e n s e , and m e e t i n g engagement ( o r b a t t l e ) . 22
p l a c e d u r i n g t h e o f f e n s i v e , b u t meeting engagements d u r i n g
t h e d e f e n s e are viewed as a d i s t i n c t p r o b a b i l i t y by t h e
2-7
Soviets.
a l l phases of t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s .
a f u t u r e war.
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , a US p u b l i c a t i o n has t h e
following observation: The S o v i e t s d e f i n e t h e meeting engagement as combat between opposing columns r a p i d l y advanci n g towards each o t h e r . They p r e d i c t i t w i l l occur I a. A t t h e outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s when t h e enemy h a s been s u r p r i s e d and i s a t t e m p t i n g t o deploy i n t o forward d e f e n s i v e a r e a s . b. During a breakthrough when t h e enemy's t a c t i c a l r e s e r v e is deploying f o r a countera t t a c k o r t o ' p l u g a gap. I c . I n t h e depth of t h e defense where t h e enemy's r e s e r v e is deploying t o blocking positions. d . During an enemy w i t h d r a w a l when he i s flanked. e . I n a d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n when t h e enemy axes of advance a r e i d e n t i f i e d o r when a counterattack i s launched.23 2-4. THE WITHDRAWAL.
T h i s s e c t i o n p r e s e n t s U and S o v i e t views concerning S
the withdrawal.
Some U S p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e it as a por-
w i t h d r a w a l may be made o n l y w i t h t h e p e r m i s s i o n
of t h e s e n i o r commander.24
"Three t y p e s of d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a r e employed i n
r e t r o g r a d e movements.
They are t h e d e l a y i n g a c t i o n , t h e
T h i s first e f f o r t a t
w i t h d r a w a l , and t h e retirement.
w i d e s t p o s s i b l e u n c l a s s i f i e d d i s s e m i n a t i o n of S o v i e t t a c t i c s
However, t h i s
L o c a l w i t h d r a w a l s are normal t o a n area d e f e n s e and a r e omployed t o r e d u c e v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o n u c l e a r f i r e s , t o c a n a l i z e t h e enemy, and t o r e g r o u p def e n s i v e f o r c e s . The S o v i e t r a r e l y e x e c u t e s a g e n e r a l w i t h d r a w a l , p r e f e r r i n g t o conduct d e l a y i n g a c t i o n s . 2% An e a r l i e r p u b l i c a t i o n d i s c u s s e s t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a n i n t e g r a l p o r t i o n of t h e d e f e n s e 1 S o v i e t d o c t r i n e stresses sudden disengagement, p r e f e r a b l y d u r i n g d a r k n e s s . A r e a r guard c o v e r s w i t h d r a w a l of t h e main f o r c e . E i t h e r a c o u n t e r a t t a c k o r massed f i r e s may be used t o b r e a k cont a c t , w i t h w i t h d r a w a l t o r e v i o u s l y prepared p o s i t i o n s when p o s s i b l e . 2?
A s e r v i c e s c h o o l pamphlet m i r r o r s t h e same i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 1
W i t h d r a w a l p l a n s a r e made when p l a n n i n g t h e d e f e n s e . Enemy d o c t r i n e stresses sudden d i s e n gagement, p r e f e r a b l y d u r i n g d a r k n e s s . A rear guard c o v e r s w i t h d r a w a l of t h e main f o r c e . E i t h e r a c o u n t e r a t t a c k o r massed f i r e s may be used t o break contact t o allow a w i t h d r a w a l t o r e v i o u s l y :prepared p o s i t i o n s , when p o s s i b l e . 38
h l a t e r p u b l i c a t i o n from t h e same s c h o o l d e a l i n g w i t h t h e
The S o v i e t s view t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a d e f e n s i v e measure t o g a i n t i me t o p r e p a r e f o r a c o u n t e r a t t a c k . Whenever p o s s i b l e , w i t h d r a w a l begins d u r i n g t h e h o u r s o f d a r k n e s s o r reduced v i s i b i l i t y . C o n t a c t i s broken, a c o v e r i n g f o r c e and r e a r guard are e s t a b l i s h e d , and t h e main body o c c u p i e s new d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s i n t h e r e a r . The S o v i e t s employ d e f e n s i v e f i r e s and smoke and use armor f o r c e s t o c o n f u s e and d e l a y t h e enemy as much as p o s s i b l e . A c o u n t e r a t t a c k can be e x p e c t e d as soon as t h e main bod h a s t i me t o o r g a n i z e and c o n s o l i d a t e i t s f o r c e s . 3-9
S dowever, n o t a l l U p u b l i c a t i o n s d e a l i n g w i t h S o v i e t
t a c t i c s p l a c e t h e w i t h d r a w a l as p u r e l y a d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n . While t h e w i t h d r a w a l i s u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e d e f e n s e ,
i t i s a l s o used when s h i f t i n g f o r c e s f o r t h e o f f e n s e t o
a n o t h e r s e c t o r o r t o s t r e n g t h e n a n o t h e r s e c t o r which i s c o n s i d e r e d e s p e c i a l l y d a n g e r o u s.
w~~
Other publications,
e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e d e a l i n g w i t h small u n i t t a c t i c s , a l s o t r e a t t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a s e p a r a t e form o f combat: B e f o r e a s u c c e s s f u l w i t h d r a w a l c a n be made, disengagement from c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy is r e q u i r e d . The S o v i e t s withdraw o n l y on o r d e r s of a s e n i o r commander. The p u r p o s e s of a w i t h d r a w a l by a t a n k b a t t a l i o n a r e a a. To occupy more advantageous t e r r a i n . b. To auoid enemy n u c l e a r o r c o n v e n t i o n a l fires. c . To a d j u s t a p o s i t i o n t o s e c u r e a n exposed f l a n k d u r i n g a d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e . d . To r e g r o u p a f t e r a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n o f a meeting engagement o r a f t e r s t u b b o r n enemy resistance. e . To avoid e n c i r c l e m e n t . f . To s h o r t e n l i n e s o f communication. g. To f r e e men and equipment f o r o t h e r operations. The t e n o r o f S o v i e t m i l i t a r y w r i t i n g on t h e w i t h d r a w a l o p e r a t i o n i s t h a t i t is a u s e f u l t a c t i c t o f r e e a f o r c e f o r a new m i s s i o n b u t i s n o t t o be d i c t a t e d by enemy p r e s s u r e . 31
2-10
The a u t h o r e n v i s i o n s a m o d i f i c a t i o n of S o v i e t t a c t i c s i n o r d e r t o accomplish t h e w i t h d r a w a l 8 The t a c t i c s employed by t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n i n w i t h d r a w a l o p e r a t i o n s show t h a t t h e S o v i e t s , though normally p r e f e r r i n g t o maneuver as one u n i t , are t r a i n e d t o move by bounds of companies o r even p l a t o o n s when t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n requires. 32 Company l e v e l t a c t i c s are also espoused as u s i n g t h e
w i t h d r a w a l as a s e p a r a t e form of combat:
S o v i e t c o n c e p t s a l l o w w i t h d r a w a l t o avoid enemy n u c l e a r s t r i k e s o r t o occupy a more advantageous p o s i t i o n . I n t h e defense t h e operation is carried out t o reposition a unit's front towards a f l a n k i n r e s p o n s e t o enemy a c t i o n o r t o r e d u c e t h e l e n g t h of a t h r e a t e n e d s u p p l y l i n e . During advance t o c o n t a c t , a w i t h d r a w a l can be o r d e r e d when s t u b b o r n enemy o p p o s i t i o n i s met o r a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of an u n s u c c e s s f u l meeting engagement. 33 The a p p r o v a l o f a h i g h e r commander i s n e c e s s a r y t o conduct
a w i t h d r a w a l , and t h e enemy should n o t f o r c e t h e o p e r a t i o n 8
"A w i t h d r a w a l is u s u a l l y c a r r i e d o u t i n f a c e of enemy a c t i o n
t o dictate a withdrawal.
Another company-level t a c t i c s
3i
2-11
Another U paper a s s e s s e s t h e meeting engagement a s S a n o t h e r a r e a i n which t h e w i t h d r a w a l may be conducted by the Soviets: The meeting engagement ends when one opponent adopts a new t a c t i c such as, e s t a b l i s h i n g a defens i v e p o s i t i o n o r w i t h d r a w i n g . According t o t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n the Soviets i n i t i a t e a elib! e r a t e a t t a c k , a pursuit, o r a withdrawal.3t Although some o f t h e e a r l i e r p u b l i c a t i o n s tended t o p l a c e t h e w i t h d r a w a l a s a f o r m of r e t r o g r a d e o p e r a t i o n s o r w i t h i n t h e conduct of t h e d e f e n s e , t h e r e h a s been a t r e n d t o cons i d e r t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a s e p a r a t e form o f combat a c t i v i t y .
A l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n i s t o examine how t h e S o v i e t s view t h e
of t h e C i v i l War, t h e enemy, a f t e r t h e first d e f e a t s , could withdraw h i s t r o o p s and r e o r g a n i z e a defense o r even o f f e n s e . ,,37 Kowever, t h i s l e s s o n l e a r n e d by t h e i3olsheviks was a p p a r e n t l y ignored d u r i n g t h e period p r i o r t o The Great P a t r i o t i c War:
I n p r i n c i p l e , our prewar t h e o r y allowed f o r t h e forced r e t r e a t of t h e t r o o p s i n i s o l a t e d s e c t o r s . !lowever, t h e problem o f w i t h d r a w a l of l a r g e f o r c e s f r o m under enemy s t r i k e s was n t developed, e i t h e r theoretically o r practically.3
The a u t h o r f u r t h e r c i t e s experience i n t h e i r l a s t war and t h e need t o be prepared t o conduct w i t h d r a w a l o p e r a t i o n s : During t h e war i n i n d i v i d u a l s e c t o r s a s i t u a t i o n may a r i s e i n which f o r c e s can be saved from i n e v i t a b l e d e f e a t o n l y a t t h e c o s t of g i v i n g up conquered t e r r i t o r y by means o f a temporary v B d r a w a l . Troops may be forced t o withdraw a s a
2-12
unprovided f o r o f f e n s i v e by i n d i v i d u a l g r o u p s . Sometimes t h e w i t h d r a w a l w i l l be p r e m e d i t a t e d s o t h a t t h e t r o o p s c a n g a i n a more a d v a n ta g e o u s p o s i t i o n f o r subsequent a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s . Withdrawal h a s always been n e g l e c t e d i n a l l armies. iiowever, h i s t o r y h a s t a u g h t t h a t armed f o r c e d which have n o t mastered t h e o r g a n i z e d w i t h d r a w a l c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d as b a t t l e - r e a d y , s i n c e s u c h t r o o p s a r e most o f t e n d e f e a t e d . The R u s s i a n army i n t h e p a s t h a s s u f f e r e d most o f i t s l o s s e s d u r i n g w i t h d r a w a l . Lenin t a u g h t t h a t : I one who knows how t o advance and h a s n o t l e a r n e d how i n c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t circumstances t o adapt t o i t , t o withdraw, w i l l l o s e t h e war. Wars w h i c h have begun arid ended w i t h a v i c t o r i o u s o f f e n s i v e a r e n o t e v i d e n t from world h i s t o r y o r i f t h e y have occurred, a r e exceptions. '39
r e s u l t o f an unsuccessful d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e o r an
...
Other S o v i e t
similar v e i n .
consequences stemming t h e r e f r o m . I n d i v i d u a l c o u n t e r a t t a c k s , t h e placement of f i r e b a r r i e r s on t h e p a t h s of t h e a t t a c k e r o r t h e p u r s u i n g enemy, t h e f i r m h o l d i n g o f c o n s e c u t i v e l y occupied l i n e s by r e a r g u a r d s , l e a d i n g t h e enemy a s t r a y by d i v e r s i o n s , s e t t i n g up ambushes, o b s t a c l e s , and d e s t r u c t i o n on t h e a x e s o f t h e enemy attack a l l these are forms i n which t h e a c t i v e n e s s of t r o o p s is m a n i f e s t e d i n a w i t h d r a w a l . 4 0 Withdrawal must be conducted i n a n o r g a n i z e d manner w i t h t h e a p p r o v a l o r d i r e c t i o n o f h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y and f o r a s p e c i f i c pur pos e. %he S o v i e t s a r e p a i n f u l l y aware of t h e r e s u l t s o f
I n making
a n ad hoc w i t h d r a w a l .
2-13
W i t h d r a w a l is a f o r m o f combat a c t i o n a p p l i e d f o r t h e purpose o f regrouping, occupying more s u i t a b l e p o s i t i o n s , o r withdrawing ones own t r o o p s from under p o s s i b l e a t t a c k s of t h e enemy. Usually, t h e n e c e s s i t y of w i t h d r a w a l appears i n t h e course o f d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s , when only by t h e temporary l e a v i n g of p a r t of t h e t e r r i t o r y i s i t p o s s i b l e t o withdraw ones t r o o p s from under i t s attack o f s u p e r i o r forces of t h e enemy, and s e t them i n more p r o f i t a b l e p o s i t i o n . The n e c e s s i t y of withdrawal can appear w i t h t h e u n s u c c e s s f u l o u t come o f meeting engagement and t o g e t o u t of an encirclement.41
d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e a u t h o r opines t h a t o f f e n s i v e oper-
However,
contact o f f e r advantages.
During a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n of t h e enemy t h e withdrawing t r o o p s are forced t o c o u n t e r a c t him w i t h p a r t and sometimes a l l of t h e f o r c e s , cond u c t p e r s i s t e n t b a t t l e on s u i t a b l e l i n e s t o d e l a y t h e advance of t h e enemy, i n f l i c t l o s s e s on h i m , g a i n time, and c r e a t e p r o f i t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r going i n t o t h e designated area. Although a c t i v e , d e c i s i v e combat a c t i o n s by withdrawing t r o o p s i s t h e basis of such a w i t h d r a w a l , t h i s method i s l e s s p r o f i t a b l e . i t i s considered more expedient t o accomplish w i t h d r a w a l without occupation o f intermediate l i n e s and on as many r o u t e s as p o s s i b l e , i n o r d e r t o reduce t h e d e p t h s of columns and t h e time f o r accomplishing t h e withdrawal .42 Proponents o f a book f o r b a t t a l i o n - l e v e l t a c t i c s have t h e i r views of t h e w i t h d r a w a l :
A withdrawal may b e undertaken
remove o n e ' s s u b - u n i t s from under a p o s s i b l e enemy a t t a c k , e s p e c i a l l y one i n f l i c t e d on t h e f l a n k and i n t h e r e a r of o u r s u b - u n i t s . 1143 Again, emphasis i s placed on a p p r o v a l from hi.gher e c h e l o n s and t h e f a c t i t may be conducted i n a v a r i e t y of c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I n an a t t a c k , i t is c a r r i e d o u t when t h e enemy o f f e r s s t u b b o r n r e s i s t a n c e i n one s e c t o r , w h i l e i n a n o t h e r s e c t o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s are f a v o u r a b l e f o r d e v e l o p i n g t h e attack o r c o m p l e t i n g newly a r i s i n g m i s s i o n s . A w i t h d r a w a l may a l s o be u n d e r t a k e n when t h e o u t m of a n e n c o u n t e r e battle is unsuccessful.
$8
The w i t h d r a w a l a l s o h a s a p p l i c a t i o n d u r i n g t h e d e f e n s e :
I n carrying out a defensive operation, the n e c e s s i t y f o r a w i t h d r a w a l may a r i s e when moving t h e b a t t a l i o n from one s e c t o r t o a n o t h e r t h r e a t ened s e c t o r , f o r c o v e r i n g gaps formed i n t h e d e f e n c e as a r e s u l t of enemy n u c l e a r s t r i k e s , o r t o s e c u r e open f l a n k s . 4 5
The w i t h d r a w a l h a s o t h e r a p p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h have both
o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s .
" A w i t h d r a w a l may
a l s o be u n d e r t a k e n d u r i n g a n e n c i r c l e m e n t b a t t l e .
In this
2-15
2-5. CCNCLUSIONS.
T h e meeting engagement i s viewed by t h e S o v i e t s as a
W should r e a l i g n o u r t h i n k i n g e
A t t h e i n i t i a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s when t h e enemy is
moving i n t o d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .
. After a r u p t u r e
of a defense.
of i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n s has o c c u r r e d
, Against h a s t i l y prepared p o s i t i o n s i n t h e d e p t h s
. Against r e s e r v e s
initiated.
, I n t h e d e f e n s e when a c o u n t e r a t t a c k h a s been
, N i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of h e l i b o r n e , p a r a c h u t e , o r
sea-landed f o r c e s i n t o t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . The w i t h d r a w a l a l s o has a p p l i c a t i o n as a s e p a r a t e f o r m o f combat and is viewed as such by t h e S o v i e t s .
Most times
t h e w i t h d r a w a l w i l l be conducted i n a d e f e n s i v e mode, b u t
i t d e f i n i t e l y h a s a p p l i c a t i o n d u r i n g t h e o f f e n s i v e and meet-
i n g engagement.
The withdrawal c a n o c c u r
ENDNOTES..
_ I
'A. I . Radziyevskiy, e d . , D i c t i o n a r y of a a s i c M i l i t a x Terms, T r a n s l a t e d by t h e DCIS h l u l t i l i n g u a l S e c t i o n , T r a n s l a t i o n u u r e a u , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Department, Ottawa, Canada, and p u b l i s h e d under t h e a u s p i c e s of t h e USA?'. (Washington1 GPO, 1 9 7 6 ) , 218. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r a s Rad z i y e v s k i y , D i c t i o n a r y .
. P
. a.)
'Soviet Army O p e r a t i o n s ( S A O ) ( A r l i n g t o n 1 U S A I T A C , A p r i l 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 3-7. ( C i t e d - h e r e a f t e r as S&.) 5'iandbook on S o v i e t Ground Forces (?I; 30-40). (Washi n g t o n r G P 0 , 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 5-7. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as 1% 30-40.) 'Soviet T a c t i c s i n t h e Gffense (PT 100-3, 'JCL 1 1 . ') ( 7 o r t Leavenworthi U S A C G X , J u l y 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 2 , 7 , and 4.C. 2-17
USJACGLC,
>.
%andbook on t h e S o v i e t hrmed F o r c e s i i l ~ ~ - 2 6 8 0 - 4 0 - 7 8 ) . ( N a s h i n g t o n : D I A , r'ebruary 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 8-15. 'Soviet Tank Company T a c t i c s (DDI-1120-129-76). (Washi n g t o n : Din, Liay 19761, p. 31, and The S o v i e t ivlotorized R i f l e Company (001-llOC-77-76). (Washington: D i A , OctoTer 19761, p. 5 . ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as DCi-1120-129-76 and D D I 1100-77-76.) "Soviet Tank B a t t a l i o n Tactics (DDi-1120-1C-77). (Washington: DIA, August 1 9 7 7 ) , p. 11. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as DDi-1120-10-77.) "Radziyevskiy,
I2V.
D i c t i o n a r y , p . 51.
ed.,
G . Reznichenko,
T a c t i c s . T r a n s l a t e d by t h e 130. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r
P * 132.
16i5id.
I 7 G . I . Garbuz, D . F. Loza, and I . F . Sazonov, .T h e Motorized R i f l e Z a t t a l i o n i n B a t t l e , 2d e d . T r a n s l a t e d by Office of t h e Assistant Chief OP S t a f f f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e . (Washington: 1978), p . 55.
'%bid -'
p . 57.
l9U., 5 8 . p.
2oF. I . Itonoplya and M. A . Maykov, The Tank B a t t a l i o n i n Combat, C h a p t e r s 3 , 4, 5 . T r a n s l a t e d b y h e M u l t i l i n g u a l
2-18
-9
P. ~25.
p . 2-17.
3OsA0, p. 4-18,
31DDI-1120-10-77, 3 2 w . , p . 48. 33~DI-1120-129-76, p . 53.
341bid.
p . 45.
p . 9.
3 5 ~ ~ ~ - 1 1 C 0 - 7 7 - 7 6 ,. 10. p 36DDI-1100-143-76,
37V. D . S o k o l o v s k i y , e d . , S o v i e t M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y , 3d ed. T r a n s l a t i o n , commentary and a n a l y s i s by H a r r i e t F a s t S c o t t . (New Yorkt Crane, Russak and Co., I n c . , 1 9 7 5 ) , p . 123.
38w., p . 133.
3 9 -b i d 1
9
p . 296.
Savkin,
P r i n c i p l e s , p . 251. T a c t i c s , p . 242.
41Reznichenchko,
].bid.
m,
, 3. 1. Konoplya and N. A . hlaykov, The Tank B a t t a l i o n i n Combat, C h a p t e r s 6 , 7 , 8 , 9. T r a n s l a t e d by t h e K u l t i l i n g u a l S e r v i c e s D i v i s i o n , T r a n s l a t i o n d u r e a u , De artrnent of S t a t e , Canada. (Ottawa; October 1 9 7 4 ; , p . 79. ?Cited 6 , 7, 8, 9.) h e r e a f t e r as Konoplya,
2-19
2-20
CHAPTER 3
ECHELONS ABOVE REGIMENT
3-1
GENERAL
A review of units l a r g e r t h a n r e g i m e n t a l s i z e i s
3-2. FRONT.
FRONT ( F r o n t )
formation of armed formations, and major f i e l d f o r c e s o r s t r a t e g i c formations of ground t r o o p s , a i r f o r c e s , and sometimesleven n a v a l f o r c e s ( r i v e r f l o t i l l a s , e t c . ) ; Note on S o v i e t Nomenclature and Terms. A number o f S o v i e t terms have no e x a c t English e q u i v a l e n t . The terms l i s t e d below a r e t h o s e used f r e q u e n t l y i n t h i s d i c t i o n a r y . F r o n t - Highest l e v e l of an ob"yedineniye. A f r o n t may be formed from major f i e rorces ( s t r a t e g i c formations, soyedineniyi: and u n i t s from t h e v a r i o u s S e r v i c e s o f t h e armed f o r c e s ) . ' F r o n t ' may a l s o be used as an a d j e c t i v e when r e f e r r i n g t o u n i t s organic t o a f r o n t . 0b"yedinenive - Major F i e l d Forces o r S t r a t e g i c Tormation. An o-oerational and o r a a n i z a t i o n a l ent i t y i n t h e d i f f e r e n t S e r v i c e s of-the armed f o r c e s , an ob"yedineniue is formed from v a r i o u s s e r v i c e branches ( o r arms) f o r t h e purpose of conducting m i l i t a r y operations. Soyedineniye - Formation. The h i g h e s t l e v e l of m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n 1 Corps, D i v i s i o n , o r 3rigade l e v e l e q u i v a l e n t . I t may be formed from a s i n g l e branch of v a r i o u s branches and S e r v i c e s , i n c l u d i n g navalZsquadronst
. . .American E d i t o r ' s
...
...
A preponderance of what we
would c a l l combat s e r v i c e support t r o o p s w i l l have t o be activated from the reserves. The b e s t e q u i v a l e n t peace-
3-2
a Front.
F r o n t - l e v e l s t a f f s a r e planned o n l y f o r U n t i l 1968, t h e Headquart e r s f o r t h e Southwest F r o n t was t o have been formed from p a r t s of MOD Prague and t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s of M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t Tabor. S i n c e t h e n , p l a n s are t o form t h i s headq u a r t e r s s t r i c t l y from CGF assets. I n 1971/ 1972, however, Czech o f f i c e r s were a g a i n a s s i g n e d t o t h e Southwest F r o n t S t a f f , probably f o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s . 3
t h e S o v i e t Army.
The Northern Group o f F o r c e s ( N G F ) , C e n t r a l Group of Forces (CGF), from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, could be F r o n t s as w e l l as GSFG.
So a t l e a s t f o u r F r o n t s would be
immediately a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n of a Theater
a t t a c k against NATO, and t h e three most w e s t e r n m i l i t a r y
d i s t r i c t s of t h e USSR ( a a l t i c , B e l o r u s s i a n , and C a r p a t h i a n )
Also, t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of a i r b o r n e u n i . t s , o r g a n i c
3-3
FRONT
F I
SSM
Ferry Units
T a c t i c a1
Airborne Division
Lridging Units
Signal Units
biaint Units
Medical Units
Transport Units
Intel Units
IIGURE 1
3-4
an a r t i l l e r y d i v i s i o n w h i c h s u p p o r t s i t as a matter of
routine,and
t h e same i s t r u e w i t h t h e 1 6 t h Tactical A i r
Tactical A i r Army.
I t would n o t be u n u s u a l t o r e i n f o r c e
d e f e n s e a r t i l l e r y , e n g i n e e r s and chemical s u p p o r t .
Most s t a n d a r d s c e n a r i o s have a l r e a d y a l l o c a t e d s u p p o r t
t o Armies from t h e F r o n t .
avoid u s i n g
3 .
3-5
Mission, Enemy, T e r r a i n , Time, and Troops (METTT) availThus it i s imperative t o analyze t h e mission and perT h i s same procedure holds t r u e for t h e
What is b e s t
f o r one u n i t may n o t be t h e best f o r an adjacent u n i t . n o t mean t h a t each Army should receive a regiment.
Just
because one Army receives an e n t i r e a r t i l l e r y regiment does Also, do n o t f o r g e t t o include special t r o o p s support w i t h t h e opera t i o n a l troops support. t o us.
Repair, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , POL and
of augmentation t o lower l e v e l s .
As an example, a d d i t i o n a l
t o be expended i n preplanned a r t i l l e r y f i r e s w i l l d r i v e t h e ammunition h a u l i n g requirement more than j u s t t h e number of a r t i l l e r y tubes. I n o t h e r words, develop a thorough
o p e r a t i o n w h i l e organizing a u n i t or combat.
A F r o n t i s capable of independent o p e r a t i o n s w i t h i n
t h e t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s , b u t t h e F r o n t s w i l l probably
assigned t o t h e t h e a t e r .
3-6
Don't
trap of always assigning the same missions to the same type units. Bear in mind that Front objectives will be both The immediate objective for the This
step down process holds true through battalion level. Another major consideration is whether the planned battle will be nuclear or non-nuclear. This has a tremendous
impact on the missions and widths of zones of attack assigned to Armies. There also is a strong impact on the width and
depth of assigned defensive sectors. Also, the play of electronic warfare will have an impact on organizing the forces for combat. The same con-
siderations for other force allocations are valid for the distribution of radio-technical troop assets to lower levels. The integration of jamming with the physical
destruction of' facilities by artillery is called radioelectronic combat. The Soviets plan to neutralize our
command and control communications by jamming one-quarter to one-third of o u r critical nets and destroying an additional one-quarter to one-third of our command and control facilities. Thus, if they can incapacitate fifty percent
of o u r necessary communication8 links, they feel they have effectively destroyed o u r command and control capabilities. The integration of radio-electronic combat into all wargames is an essential task. This is another area which
3- 7
3-3.
ARMY.
c o n s i s t i n g of s e v e r a l formations of v a r i o u s branches and s p e c i a l t r o o p s , and intended f o r t h e conduct of o p e r a t i o n s (combat a c t i v i t i e s ) ; (2) ground t r o o p s ( f o r c e s ) ; ( 3 ) sometimes t h e word army i s used t o d e s i g n a t e t h e armed f o r c e s of a t a t e , e.g., t h e Red Army o r t h e So v i e t Army.
The T a c t i c a l A i r
A Combined A r m s
3-8
.'iGURE 2
3-9
1st Guards T'ank Army 6 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n 7 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n 9 t h Tank Division 1 1 t h G u a r d s Tank D i v i s i o n 2 7 t h Guards Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n
2d Guards Army 1 6 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n 2 1 s t blotorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n 25th Tank D i v i s i o n 9 4 t h Guards Niotorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n 3d Shock Army 1 0 t h G u a r d s Tank D i v i s i o n 1 2 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n 4 7 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n 207th Guards iviotorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n 8 t h Guards Army 2 0 t h Guards 3 9 t h Guards 5 7 t h Guards 79th Guards Motorized R i f l e g i v i s i o n Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n Xotorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n Tank D i v i s i o n
'
TICURE
3-10
nothing t o do w i t h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o r funct i o n of t h e armies. The term 'Guards' does not r e f e r t o an e l i t e u n i t w i t h s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g and equipment. The d e s i g n a t i o n i s given t o u n i t s f o r t r a d i t i o n a l r e a s o n s or f o r s p e c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f acheivement i n t r a i n i n g or p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n . 5 The preponderance of S o v i e t u n i t s earned t h e i r "Guards" d e s i g n a t i o n d u r i n g "The Great P a t r i o t i c War."
I t was used
as a morale b u i l d e r and f r e q u e n t l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h
l a r g e numbers of t h e u n i t becoming members of t h e Communist P a r t y , t o ensure l o y a l t y t o "Mother Russia."
which was a combined arms u n i t of a t l e a s t two d i v i s i o n s , which could o p e r a t e as a s u b o r d i n a t e u n i t of a n Army, or perform independent missions.
I t could be f o r m e d w i t h
a p p r o p r i a t e o p e r a t i o n a l and s p e c i a l t r o o p s s u p p o r t , t o
c a r r y o u t s p e c i a l missions i n a p a r t i c u l a r s e c t o r .
There
a f u t u r e war i s q u e s t i o n a b l e .
iviost approved s c e n a r i o s have a l r e a d y designated which
Army w i l l be played, what i t s mission w i l l be, and provided t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s l i c e of o p e r a t i o n a l end s p e c i a l t r o o p s support. The s t e p s i n a l l o c a t i n g support t o d i v i s i o n s a r e aeware of t h e "Cookie
up o b j e c t i v e i s t h e Army's immediate o b j e c t i v e . Usually, Combined A r m s Armies l e a d a Front a t t a c k , w i t h t h e Tank Army o r Armies i n t h e F r o n t ' s second echelon as an e x p l o i t a t i o n force.
The same g e n e r a l a r r a y may hold t r u e
Do n o t , however,
3e f l e x i b l e , and p l a n according
is t o provide c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o f a r t i l l e r y assets f o r
a s p e c i f i c purpose o r period of time. Long range a r t i l l e r y
i n t h e s c e n a r i o , o r made by t h e gamer.
3-12
3-4. D I V I S I O N , .
DIVIZIYA (division) The basic t a c t i c a l f o r m a t i o n of t h e v a r i o u s s e r v i c e b r a n c h e s (arms), c o n s i s t i n g of s e v e r a l units and s u b u n i t s . I n foreign armies, a ground f o r c e s d i v i s i o n cons i s t s of' b r i g a d e s , combat g r o u p s , i n d i v i d u a l b a t t a l i o n s , and o t h e r u n i t s and subu i t s of v a r i o u s b r a n c h e s and s p e c i a l t r o o p s .
T h i s s t u d y w i l l h i g h l i g h t t h e u s e of Tank Although t h e r e a r e a l o t
and Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n s .
u n i t s t o have one r e g i m e n t equipped w i t h i n f a n t r y combat v e h i c l e s (IjbIPs) i n each motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n , w i t h t h e o t h e r two motorized r i f l e r e g i m e n t s h a v i n g armored p e r s o n n e l
carriers (bTRs).
equipped t r o o p s w i t h i n t h e motorized r i f l e r e g i m e n t .
units outside
may n o t be a p p r o p r i a t e .
The approved s c e n a r i o o r t h e D I A
3-13
TANK
DIVISION
I
Div
KQ
1sJ Cp -ni O :
l-I-1
Control Co
FIGURE 4
3-14
I
Regt
I "" [
1-1
Chem Def
Engineer
Transport
l'ralfic
C o n t r o l Co
1 I aakery I
FI.GURE
3-15
The c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n
Long range
a r t i l l e r y from F r o n t and Army, as well as o r g a n i c m u l t i p l e r o c k e t l a u n c h e r s , are i d e a l l y s u i t e d f o r t h i s mission. you form a DAG mix t h e a r t i l l e r y c a l i b e r s t o avoid pres e n t i n g a unique s i g n a t u r e . The FROG b a t t a l i o n i s u s u a l l y
If
c o n t r o l l e d s e p a r a t e l y by t h e d i v i s i o n commander, d u e t o
i t s l o n g range n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y .
T h e c a p a b i l i t y of t h e
S o v i e t s t o mass t h e i r a r t i l l e r y f i r e s allows f o r d i s p e r s i o n
o f f i r i n g elements throughout t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .
Most com-
3-16
Offense
3-17
. Operate a s F r o n t Reserve.
Defense
a s u s t a i n e d p e r i o d , a d d i t i o n a l r e i n f o r c e m e n t s would have
t o be provided from e i t h e r F r o n t o r Army a s s e t s . irlithin T a n k D i v i s i o n s assigned t o SSFG, each Tank Xegiment h a s an o r g a n i c h o t o r i z e d R i f l e Company.
This
a s p e c i a l mission u n i t .
ae
p r i o r t o o r g a n i z i n g your f o r c e f o r t h e game.
3-it3
positions.
:!owever, Tank u n i t s a r e c a p a b l e of d e f e n d i n g .
arms 1
The f o l l o w i n g i s a sequence f o r p l a n n i n g and o r g a n i z i n g
t h e f o r c e f o r combat which i s n o t a l l i n c l u s i v e , b u t m i g h t
prove u s e f u l i n p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e wargamei
a.
Mission Analysis.
(1) Determine m i s s i o n . (2)
Determine t r o o p s a v a i l a b l e .
(a)
('3)
(c)
(d)
b.
Analyze t e r r a i n .
(1) I n t h e O f f e n s e .
(c)
1.
2.
4. 5.
2. Command and C o n t r o l ?
Logistics f a c i l i t i e s ? Artillery? Reserves?
-. 6
3-19
Gbstacles?
Cover and c o n c e a l e d w i t h d r a w a l routes? Likely points f o r counterattacks? K i l l i n g z o n e s? Key a x i a l and l a t e r a l r o u t e s' ? L i n e s o f Communication? >oundaries? Strongpoints'?
jattle areas/positions?
Overwatch p o s i t i o n s ? Alternate/supplemental N uc l e a r d e l i v e r y means?
EIJ a s s e t s ?
positions?
Airfields? ?orward Observers'? Any o t h e r known l o c a t i o n s o r e x p l o i t a b l e weaknesses? Ascertain canalizing t e r r a i n . Determine natural/manmade o b s t a c l e s t o movement. Analyze r i v e r s / s t r e a m s which w i l l have t o be c r o s s e d , i n o r d e r t o assess e n g i n e e r s u p p o r t requirements. Choose key t e r r a i n . Analyze r o a d and r a i l networks t o d e t e r mine l o g i c a l c h o k e p o i n t s f o r l i n e s o f communication. Determine areas where you w i l l oe v u l n e r a b l e t o f l a n k a t t a c k s and/or ambushes.
3-20
(j)
(2)
I n t h e Defense.
(a)
Determine enemy r o u t e s o f advance, avenues of a p p r o a c h , i n t o y o u r d e f e n s i v e s e c t o r . F i g u r e two l e v e l s down, i f you a r e t h e d i v i s i o n commander, l o o k f o r b a t t a l i o n s i z e avenues of a p p r o a c h . 'dhere a r e l i k e l y l o c a t i o n s :or enemy's I the
(b)
1. -. 2
Objectives? Locations? Command and C o n t r o l Logistics f a c i l i t i e s Artillery Nuclear d e l i v e r y means - EW a s s e t s Airfields Assembly areas Forward o b s e r v e r s Overwatch p o s i t i o n s O t h e r , as s u i t a b l e
(c)
Look a t t h e t e r r a i n from a X u e p o i n t o f view. I n o t h e r words, l o o k a t t h e t e r r a i n as i f you h a d t o a t t a c k i n t o your own p o s i t i o n s . T h i s w i l l a i d i n determining where t o p l a c e o b s t a c l e s , minefields, e t c .
(d)
( e ) Choose t e r r a i n which c a n s u p p o r t b a t t a l i o n
(f)
(g)
Look f o r s u b s e q u e n t t e r r a i n f o r a n i n depth defense. Ascertain locations f o r platoon s i z e ambushes a l o n g avenues of a p p r o a c h . Determine o t h e r l o c a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r building an all-around defense.
(h)
3-21
c.
I n t h e d e f e n s e t h i s w i l l a l l o w you t o a d j u s t
y o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat and f o r c e d i s p o s i t i o n , i n o r d e r t o meet a n a n t i c i p a t e d a t t a c k . I t w i l l also a i d i n t h e s t r u c t u r i n g of r e s e r v e f o r c e s .
d.
e.
f.
158 BLIZXAYSEAYA ZADACHA (immediate o b j e c t i v e ) - T h a t p a r t of t h e o v e r a l l combat m i s s i o n of t r o o p s i n a n o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n which must be accomplished f i r s t . Depending on t h e s i t u a t i o n , a n i n i t i a l o b j e c t i v e may be t o a n n i h i l a t e t h e enemy's means of n u c l e a r a t t a c k , b r e a k up h i s basic g r o u p i n g , o r t o t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of r e g i o n s , l i n e s , o r p o s i t i o n s , t h e c a p t u r e of which w i l l e n s u r e s u c c e s s f u l execution of a f u t u r e ( t h e next) mission.
242 VVGD V 50Y (commitment t o combat) An o r g a n i z e d movement f o r w a r d , deployment and engagement o f u n i t s of t h e second e c h e l o n and combined-arms r e s e r v e i n o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e t h e e f f o r t along a given axis, t o develop t h e success a c h i e v e d by t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n , t o r e p l a c e t h e t r o o p s o f t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n when t h e l a t t e r h a s l o s t i t s combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a r e s u l t of enemy n u c l e a r a t t a c k , and a l s o t o f u l fill new combat m i s s i o n s .
243 VVGD V SRAZSENIYE (commitment t o b a t t l e ) An o r g a n i z e d advance of a f o r m a t i o n of t h e second e c h e l o n (combined-arms r e s e r v e ) of a f r o n t (army) i n t o t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n , and t h e i r deployment i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e o p e r a t i o n t o i n c r e a s e t h e e f f o r t a l o n g t h e a x i s of t h e main a t t a c k , t o d e v e l o p t h e s u c c e s s achieved by t h e first e c h e l o n , t o t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of i m p o r t a n t areas, o r t o c a r r y o u t o t h e r m i s s i o n s .
Troops a i r l i f t e d t o t h e enemy rear t o conduct combat a c t i v i t i e s t h e r e . Accordi n g t o i t s s c a l e , a n a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t may b e t a c t i c a l , o p e r a t i o n a l , o r s t r a t e g i c . The a s s a u l t may b e e f f e c t e d e i t h e r by p a r a c h u t e o r from landed a i r c r a f t , o r by a c o m b i n a t i o n of b o t h .
376 VTOROY ES:!ELGN (second e c h e l o n ) The p a r t of a n o p e r a t i o n a l f o r m a t i o n o r combat f o r m a t i o n of t r o o p s which i s n o t d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a n engagement ( b a t t l e ) a t a g i v e n moment, b u t which i s i n t e n d e d t o be used t o b u i l d UF t h e f o r c e of a s t r i k e d u r i n g a n o f f e n s i v e , t o i n c r e a s e t h e s t a b i l i t y and a g g r e s s i v e n e s s of d e f e n s e , and t o r e p l a c e t r o o p s of t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n i n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e l a t t e r s u s t a i n s heavy l o s s e s . The e x i s t e n c e of a second e c h e l o n c r e a t e s f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r b u i l d i n g up s t r e n g t h , c a r r y i n g o u t a maneuver, o r r a p i d l y t r a n s f e r r i n g e f 3 o r t from one s e c t o r t o a n o t h e r d u r i n g a n o p e r a t i o n ( b a t t l e ) . i n cont r a s t t o a combined-arms r e s e r v e , combat m i s s i o n s f o r a second e c h e l o n a r e a s s i g n e d a t t h e same time as t h o s e f o r t h e first echelon.
3-23
436 GLAVNYY UDAR (main s t r i k e ) The a g g r e g a t e o f n u c l e a r s t r i k e s and c o o r d i n a t e d s t r i k e s d e a l t by main e l e m e n t s o f n a v a l f o r c e s i n t h e s e c t o r o r r e g i o n o f d e c i s i v e i mp o r t a n c e for p u t t i n g t h e enemy t o r o u t and c o m p l e t i n g t h e combat m i s s i o n . T h e main s t r i k e i s d e l i v e r e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p ur p o s e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n o r b a t t l e and t h e s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s of t h e s i t u a t i o n .
ZADACFA ( f ollowup objective) The p o r t i o n of t h e o v e r a l l combat m i s s i o n i n an o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n ( o r combat) c a r r i e d o u t on c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e i n i t i a l m i s s i o n . Envisaged i n t h e f o l l o w u p m i s s i o n a r e t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f any f u r t h e r n u c l e a r a t t a c k capab i l i t y m a n i f e s t e d by t h e enemy, t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of h i s r e s e r v e s , and a t t a i n m e n t of t h e g o a l of t h e o p e r a t i o n (combat )
507 DLVIZIOrdNAYA ARli'ILLERiYSKAYA GRUPPA ( D A G ) ( d i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y a t t h e direct d i s p o s a l of t h e a r t i l l e r y group) d i v i s i o n commander, c o n s i s t i n g o f more t h a n one b a t t a l i o n , c r e a t e d f o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f combat t o f u l f i l l m i s s i o n s on b e h a l f of t h e d i v i s i o n , and u n i t e d by a common command. A d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y g r o u p i s made up of d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y and attached a r t i l l e r y , and b e a r s t h e d i v i s i o n ' s number. The main p u r p o s e of a d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y g r o u p i s t o s u p p o r t r e g i m e n t s w i t h f i r e , and t o engage t h e enemy's t a c t i c a l weapons, a r t i l l e r y , and m o r t a r s .
3-24
( s u p p o r t of a n o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) ) - The a g g r e g a t e of m u t u a l l y - c o o r d i n a t e d measu r e s t a k e n by t h e command, s t a f f s , and t r o o p s ( o r f o r c e s ) f o r t h e purpose of c r e a t i n g t h e most f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r combat o p e r a t i o n s , both i n t h e p r e p a r a t o r y s t a g e and i n t h e c o u r s e of a n o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) . The n a t u r e of such measures is determined by t h e a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n and by t h e missions assigned t o t h e troops. T h e basic t y p e s of o p e r a t i o n a l support, a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l s e r v i c e s , are: r e c o n n a i s s a n c e i p r o t e c t i o n of t r o o p s ( o r f o r c e s ) and r e a r i n s t a l l a t i o n s from weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n 1 e n g i n e e r i n g s u p p o r t ; camouflage1 r a d i o - e l e c t r o n i c c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s ; and t o p o g e o d e s i c , h y d r o m e t e o r o l o g i c a l , and r e a r s u p p o r t .
arms f o r m a t i o n s , and a l s o f o r m a t i o n s ( o r u n i t s ) of v a r i o u s
Combined-
1102 ~LJW GFERATSII ( o p e r a t i o n p l a n ) - An o p e r a t i o n a l document f o r m u l a t e d by t h e s t a f f 0.P a major f i e l d r o r c e j o i n t l y w i t h t h e c h i e f s of s e r v i c e b r a n c h e s , s p e c i a l t r o o p s , and s e r v i c e s , on t h e b a s i s of a d e c i s i o n by, and on t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e commanding g e n e r a l . I n d i c a t e d i n a n o p e r a t i o n p l a n a r e t h e g r o u p i n g o f enemy I'orces and l a c i l i t i e s , and t h e p o s s i b l e n a t u r e of h i s a c t i v i t i e s , t h e i n i t i a l and s u b s e q u e n t m i s s i o n s of t h e major f i e l d f o r c e , t h e i r d e p t h , t h e time limits I'or t h e i r c o m p l e t i o n , and t h e . r a t e of advance: t h e s e c t o r s of t h e main, and o t h e r , t h r u s t s ; t h e o b j e c t i v e s t o b e d e s t r o y e d by n u c l e a r weapons a t t h e o u t s e t and i n t h e course of t h e o p e r a t i o n ! t h e o p e r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , t h e m i s s i o n s of t h e t r o o p s , and t h e d i v i d i n g l i n e s between them! a d j a c e n t u n i t s and t h e i r m i s s i o n s : t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e c o n t r o l p o s t s . Also determined i n a n o p e r a t i o n a l plan are t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of nuclear munitions, of r e i n f o r c e m e n t s and a i r s u p p o r t , t h e r a t i o s of f o r c e s and weapons, and a l s o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f m a t e r i e l r e s o u r c e s .
i'ODCERZ:.IIVIYUS.iC%AYA ARTiLLERZYA ( s u p p o r t i n g a r t ill e r y ) - ; i r t i l l e r y which, w h i l e remaining subordinated t o t h e s e n i o r a r t i l l e r y commander, c a r r i e s o u t f i r e m i s s i o n s a s s i g n e d by t h e commander o f t h e combined-arms f'ormation ( o r u n i t ) 5 e i n g s u p p o r t e d . A r t i l l e r y t e m p o r a r i l y drawn i'rom second e c h e l o n s t o s u p p o r t combat o p e r a t i o n s 0: u n i t s o r . f o r m a t i o n s of t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n i s a l s o regarded as s u p p o r t i n g a r t i l l e r y i n r e l a t i o n t o such u n i t s o r f o r m a t i o n s . RilDIOTElil-I:IIC~iESKI"9 VCY:ii:.,i ( r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l t r o o p s ) 1287 S p e c i a l t r o o p s intended t o conduct r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l reconn a i s s a n c e o f the l a n d , s e a , and a i r enemy, t o c r e a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h h i s r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l f a c i l i t i e s , and t o ensure r a d i o remote c o n t r o l of weapons and a i r b o r n e v e h i c l e s . R a d i o - t e c h n i c a l t r o o p s c o n s i s t oE u n i . t s ( o r s u b u n i t s ) , and c o n s t i t u t e p a r t o f t h e v a r i o u s Services, service branches, and s p e c i a l t r o o p s .
1135
1312 RXZGRANIC'<ITEL'NYYZ L1;SIi ( d i v i d i n c l i n e s ) .'ypothetical l i n e s on t h e t e r r a i n , c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e b o u n d a r i e s between t h e zones ( o r a r e a s ) of a c t i o n o f a d j a c e n t major f i e l d f o r c e s o r strategic formations ( o r formations, units, s u b u n i t s ) . 3 i v i d i n g l i n e s a r e d e f i n e d ( o r changed) upon a s s i y n m e n t o f missions.
1344 REZERVNYYE VOYSKA (reserve t r o o p s ) X i l i t a r y echelons n o t i n c l u d e d i n the c o m p o s i t i o n 03 f r o n t s , f l e e t s , major f i e l d formations o r s t r a t e g i c formations of n a t i o n a l a i r d e f e n s e f o r c e s , o r s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e f o r c e s . Under modern c o n d i t i o n s , t h e r o l e and i m p o r t a n c e o f r e s e r v e t r o o p s h a s i n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l e i n comparison w i t h t h e p a s t .
3-26
1345 RLZERVY ( r e s e r v e s ) (1) .-iuman a n d material r e s o u r c e s which may o e used i n a viar as a whole, o r i n a n o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t 1 e ) i ( 2 ) p a r t of t h e o p e r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a major f i e l d f o r c e o r s t r a t e g i c f o r m a t i o n , o r p a r t of t h e combat o r d e r of a f o r m a t i o n ( o r u n i t ) .
1356 RODA SUK'-;OPUTNYK-IVCYSK ( b r a n c h e s o f t h e ground f o r c e s ) Components of t h e ground f o r c e s , d i f f e r i n g from one ano t h e r i n t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n , armament, and r o l e i n combat. i n each b r a n c h , s u b u n i t s , u n i t s , and f o r m a t i o n s have t h e same basic armament, and t h e a p p r o p r i a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n and t a c t i c s . T h e b r a n c h e s are missile t r o o p s and a r t i l l e r y a i r d e f e n s e t r o o p s , motor r i f l e t r o o p s , t a n k t r o o p s , and a i r - a s s a u l t t r o o p s . Ljesides t h e b r a n c h e s , t h e ground f o r c e s a l s o i n c l u d e s p e c i a l t r o o p s , namely: e n g i n e e r , c h e m i c a l , communications, r a d i o and r a d i o - t e c 9 n i c a 1 , m o t o r - t r a n s p o r t , highway, and o t h e r s .
1443 SREDSTVA USILENIYA ( r e i n f o r c e m e n t s ) A subunit, unit, o r f o r m a t i o n , n o t o r g a n i c t o a u n i t , f o r m a t i o n , o r major f i e l d f o r c e o r s t r a t e g i c formation, r e s p e c t i v e l y , but a t t a c h e d t o i t by 'nigher a u t h o r i t y f o r a c e r t a i n time t o r e i n f o r c e i t q u a n t i t a t i v e l y and q u a l i t a t i v e l y , t h e r e b y e n s u r i n g more s u c c e s s f u l accomplishment of m i s s i o n s i n a n o p e r a t i o n (or b a t t l e ) .
1521 TEATR VCYENNYK:-! DEYSTVIY ( t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s ) - A particular t e r r i t o r y , together w i t h the associated air s p a c e and s e a areas, i n c l u d i n g i s l a n d s ( a r c h i p e l a g o s ) , w i t n i n whose limits a known p a r t of t h e armed .Forces of t n e c o u n t r y (or c o a l i t i o n ) o p e r a t e s i n w a r t i m e , engaged i n s t r a t e g i c m i s s i o n s w h i c h e n s u e from t h e war p l a n . X t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s may be ground, m a r i t i m e , or i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l . According t o t h e i r m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l and economi.c i m p o r t a n c e , t h e a t e r s of o p e r a t i o n s a r e c l a s s i f i e d as main or s e c o n d a r y .
1522 TEATR vOYNY ( t h e a t e r of war) The t e r r i t o r y of any one c o n t i n e n t , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e s e a areas a d j o i n i n g i t and t h e a i r s p a c e above i t , on w h i c h h o s t i l i t i e s may dev e l o p ( f o r example, t h e European t h e a t e r of war). A t h e a t e r of war u s u a l l y i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l t h e a t e r s of o p e r ations.
1610 !iSEL' OPERATSII (.jOYA) ( g o a l of a n o p e r a t i o n ( o r T h e end r e s u l t w h i c h must be a t t a i n e d i n a g i v e n battle)) s p e c i f i c o e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) . ':?le g o a l o.f an o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e 7 is t h e u t t e r d e f e a t of t h e enemy main o p p o s i n e g r o u p i n g . To t h i s may be added, i n the c a s e of a n o l f e n -
3-27
frustrating the enemy attack, holding occupied areas, and creating conditions for going over to the offensive.
1635 ESHELONIROVANIYE VOYSK (SIL I of troops (forces and facilities)) formations, and major field forces in depth (in the case of aviation, accordance with the concept of the combat operations or maneuver.
3-6. ENDNOTES.
SREDSTV) (echeloning Deployment of units, or strategic formations also by altitude), in plan f o r the impending
Radziyevskiy, Dictionarx, p. 230. Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p v. . 3William J. Lewis and ?riedrich Wiener, The Warsaw Pact Armies. (Vienna: Carl Uberreuter Publishers, nm, p. 62. (Cited hereafter as Lewis and Wiener, WF Armies.) 4Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p. 10-11. 5Lewis and Wiener, WP Armies, p. 60-61. 6Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p. 68-69.
3-28
4-1. GENERAL.
Chapter 2 establishes the basis for considering the meeting engagement as a separate form of combat. The
Soviets view the meeting engagement as the predominant form of combat on the modern battlefield. "Therefore, the
encounter battle is the most frequently used form of combat, particularly for tank sub-units."' Widely dispersed forces
in a rapidly changing combat environment will facilitate meeting engagements at various stages of the overall battle. In a nuclear environment the meeting engagement takes on additional importance due to the large number of gape which will probably be created in defensive positions. Chapter 2
also describes various conditions under which the Soviets feel a meeting engagement can be anticipated. In antici-
pation of a meeting engagement, the Soviet6 will array their forces in such a manner to be able to take advantage of the situation.
A reduction of the organization time for destroying an enemy in the meeting engagement can be achieved by the decision of a number of questions ahead of time. Thus, when organizing a march in the expectation of a meeting engagement, the commander, on the basis of available data about the situation, can determine possible points of encounter with enemy and conditions for troop maneuver during deployment and in the course of the
4- 1
f i g h t , and, proceeding from t h i s , o u t l i n e a c t i o n d u r i n g t h e encounter w i t h t h e enemy a t one p o i n t or another and t h e corresponding formation of t h e march order.2
Detailed planning is u s u a l l y n o t a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of
t h e meeting engagement.
The S o v i e t s a l s o f e e l
of s u p e r i o r forces."4
It
w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o maintain an exact p i c t u r e of w h a t i s
4- 2
f e r e n c e i s i n t h e l e v e l of o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r execution. Regiments and D i v i s i o n s conduct meeting engagements a t t h e tactical level. Armies conduct meeting encounters a t t h e
t a c t i c a l execution of t h e meeting engagement by a r e g i mental s i z e f o r c e . The essence of t h e meeting engagement i s when two opposing f o r c e s are t r y i n g simultaneously t o f u l f i l l t h e i r own o b j e c t i v e s and e n t e r i n t o b a t t l e w i t h each o t h e r . The
meeting engagement ends, from t h e S o v i e t p e r s p e c t i v e , when one of t h e opposing f o r c e s assumes a n o t h e r form o f combat, such as defending o r withdrawing.
I f t h e i r opponent does
t h i s t h e S o v i e t s w i l l t h e n execute a n a t t a c k , a p u r s u i t , o r
a withdrawal.
T h e i r a c t i o n w i l l be based on t h e p r e v i o u s l y
mentioned f a c t o r s of METTT. The outcome of t h e f i g h t f o r t h e i n i t i a t i v e determines t h e f i n a l r e s u l t of t h e e n t i r e b a t t l e . As soon as one enemy g i v e s up t h e i n i t i a t i v e and changes t o defense o r begins t o w i t h d r a w , t h e meeti n g engagement immediately l o s e e i t s s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r and grows i n t o o t h e r forms of combat action i n t o defense f o r one s i d e a n d o f f e n s e a g a i n s t t h e defending t r o o p s f o r t h e o t h e r , o r i n t o w i hdrawal f o r one and p u r s u i t f o r t h e o t h e r side.
4-2. CONDUCT.
T h e e x a c t formation of t r o o p s a t t h e i n i t i a t i o n o f
4-3
vision has been assigned the mission of being an advance guard for the division in an advance to contact. To assist
the regimental commander in the execution of his mission the division commander reinforced the regiment with a tank battalion from the division's tank regiment, one battalion of self-propelled l52mm howitzers, one battery of SA-6 air defense artillery SAMs, one bridging company from Army assets, one engineer company, one motor transport company, and one chemical defense company. Figure 6 is a diagram of a Motorized Rifle Regiment. l.'igure 7 is a diagram of a Tank Regiment, which is also capable of conducting the same mission, but would have to be reinforced with motorized rifle assets. Be sure to
check approved TOEs in the scenario to ensure the proper unit organization and equipment are portrayed in the wargame The following listing of equipment is considered to be representative of several Warsaw Pact armies. The regimental commander received copies of the division's operation and reconnaissance plans. He gathered his
staff together and posted the division's boundaries on the map and plotted the reconnaissance zones and routes planned for the division's reconnaissance battalion. He noted the
I I r
b.OT'GR1 ZED
RIPLE REGIXEN?
FIGURE 6
4- 5
4-6
reconnaissance detachments, each r e i n f o r c e d w i t h engineers and chemical reconnaissance elements, t o proceed along t h r e e main r o u t e s i n t h e d i v i s i o n ' s zone of a c t i o n . Along each reconnaissance r o u t e t h e r e were points of i n t e r e s t w h i c h would have t o be reconnoitered by reconnaissance p a t r o l s from t h e r e s p e c t i v e detachments. The o p e r a t i o n p l a n i n d i c a t e d a s u r p r i s e attack a c r o s s
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l boundary a t H-hour, D-day.
The i n t e l l i -
gence s i t u a t i o n was vague,and t h e exact l o c a t i o n of t h e enemy's main b a t t l e area could not be determined.
The regimental commander hoped he could proceed r a p i d l y through
t h e enemy's covering f o r c e area before t h e y could occupy
b a t t l e p o s i t i o n s and b a t t l e areas.
concurred i n t h e a n a l y s i s of t h r e e major r o u t e s w i t h i n t h e d i v i s i o n ' s zone of a c t i o n , b u t was concerned over areas between t h e reconnaissance r o u t e s which o f f e r e d many s u i t a b l e l o c a t i o n s f o r platoon and company s i z e b a t t l e p o s i t i o n s .
i n t e r e s t were t h e numerous small v i l l a g e s and many b r i d g e s a c r o s s minor and major waterways. easy one. Properly covered by f i r e and w i t h t h e b r i d g e s destroyed h i s mission would not be an
H e a l s o noted i n t h e o p e r a t i o n p l a n t h e d i v i s i o n
Front.
4-7
22 t o 26 kilometers i n w i d t h .
He a l s o noted t h e d i v i s i o n
s i o n commander had formed a DAG t o f i r e p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e s and provide long range f i r e s t o support h i s regiment. noted t h e DAG included two b a t t a l i o n s of 122mm MRL, one b a t t a l i o n of l 3 O m m M-46 f i e l d guns, and two b a t t a l i o n s o f
152mm howitzers.
He
The d i v i s i o n commander
t a r g e t i n g s u i t a b l e items f o r d e s t r u c t i o n by t h e f i g h t e r bombers.
He e s p e c i a l l y wanted t o d e s t r o y any enemy n u c l e a r
d e l i v e r y means or s t o c k p i l e s of n u c l e a r munitions.
He a l s o
lack of intelligence.
tactical reconnaissance and march security for all elements. He then called on his reconnaissance company commander and informed him of his plans for the company to conduct a zone reconnaissance with emphasis on locating any enemy units between routes reconnoitered by division elements. He also
told the reconnaissance chief he would receive an engineer platoon and a chemical reconnaissance platoon to aid in accomplishing his mission. He informed the company commander
80
stealth
would have to be employed in gathering terrain reconnaissance. He told the company commander to organize his forces for the mission and to operate no more than twenty to thirty minutes in front of the regiments leading elements. He
was to maintain contact with division reconnaissance elements and stay about 10 to 20 kilometers behind them. The reconnaissance leader annotated his map and decided to establish one reconnaissance detachment and one reconnaissance patrol. He constructed the elements as shown below:
Reconnaislrance Patrol Reconnaissance Detachment 1-BMP-R 1-BRDM-2U (Command) 1-BRDM-2 2-BMP-R 1-Motorcycle 2-BRDM- 2 1-BRDM-Rkh (Chemical 2-Motorcycles Recon) 2-i3RDM-Rkh 1-6TR-152 (Engineer) 2-BTR-152 The reconnaissance company commander then briefed his subordinate officers on the concept of the operation and
4- 9
began p r e p a r a t i o n o f h i s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n .
Ye i n s t r u c t e d
await f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s .
He noted t h e r e would be a
near any p r e p l a n n e d f i r e s .
The r e g i m e n t a l commander t h e n c a l l e d i n h i s a r t i l l e r y
!.'e i n s t r u c t e d t h e
He p i c t u r e d t h e r e g i m e n t a l march
Ee p r o v i d e d a p p r o p r i a t e r e i n -
column t o l o o k l i k e F i g u r e 8.
f o r c e m e n t s t o t h e b a t t a l i o n s and h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n i s shown
a t F i g u r e 9.
He i n s t r u c t e d t h e 1st b a t t a l i o n commander t o
4-10
of k a r c h
-~
Regimental Reconnaissance
I
1
I
:.lank security
I
1
I
Ad vanc e
Farty
Advance Guard
1
be c u r it y Oetachment
REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION FOR COM3AT Combat Reconnaissance Patrol 1-Motorized Rifle Platoon 2-Tanks Advance Party 1-Xotorixed Rifle Company (minus one platoon) 1-Tank Platoon (minus two tanks) 1-Engineer Squad 1-Chemical Reconnaissance Squad 1-Mortar Battery 1-SP Artillery dattery (with observers) 1-Antitank Platoon 1-Air Defense Section (2-ZSU-23-4) Advance Guard 1-Motorized Rifle aattalion (minus one company) 1-Tank Company (minus one platoon) 1-Engineer Platoon (minus one squad) 1-Chemical Reconnaissance Platoon (minus one squad) 1-SP Artillery Battalion (minus one battery) 1-Antitank ijattery (minus one platoon) 1-Air Defense Platoon (minus one section) 1-aridging Company 1-Transportation Platoon 1-hiaintenance Platoon I-Medical Platoon Main Body Remaining elements of regiment (minus Flank Security Detachments and Rear Guard) ?lank Security Detachment (two) 1-Motorized Rifle Platoon 2-Tanks Rear Guard 1-Motorized Rifle Platoon
FIGURE 9
4-12
advantages of moving along m u l t i p l e r o u t e s i n a broad advance t o c o n t a c t , but d e c i d e d t h e c e n t e r r o u t e i n t h e d i v i s i o n zone o f f e r e d t h e b e s t cover, concealment, and p o t e n t i a l f o r
a r a p i d r a t e of advance.
He coordinated w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n
commander,and it was decided t h e advance guards of t h e followi n g two motorized r i f l e regiments would be on t h e extreme
r a p i d l y react t o t h e s i t u a t i o n as it developed.
a l l preliminary p l a n s had been formulated.
I n less than
H was e
b a t t a l i o n for t h e advance guard and would l e a p f r o g t h e remaining b a t t a l i o n along t h e regimental march r o u t e i n o r d e r t o provide continuoua i n d i r e c t f i r e coverage f o r t h e regiment.
He had h i s bridge assets w e l l forward i n t h e main body t o
r a p i d l y assist elements which would need t h e i r h e l p .
He had
along t h e march r o u t e .
He had t h e ZSU-22-49 w e l l f o r w a r d
i n t h e column t o provide l e a d i n g elements as much a i r def e n s e coverage as p o s s i b l e . 3e a l s o had provided supply, maintenance, medical and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n support t o l e a d i n g elements. He was s a t i s f i e d w i t h h i s plan and looked a t t h e
The following morning should s e e
l a t e s t weather f o r e c a s t .
If t h e f o r e c a s t h e l d t r u e i t would h e l p
him i n h i s mission.
returned and b r i e f e d him o n t h e i r plans t o implement t h e operation. He was pleased w i t h t h e i r plans and t o l d t h e 4 t h b a t t a l i o n commander t o accompany him w i t h o t h e r command post u n i t s t o a d v i s e and a s s i s t him, as a l l of t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n had been used t o r e i n f o r c e t h e t h r e e motorized
rifle battalions.
A t t h e conclusion of t h e p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e s t h e r e g i -
He advised t h e
reconnaissance c h i e f of two l o c a t i o n s where long range p a t r o l s from d i v i s i o n had enemy b a t t a l i o n s under observation. He
S i x hours p r i o r t o BMNT t h e d i v i s i o n reconnaissance elements crossed t h e border and began t h e i r work. They
first enemy c a v a l r y u n i t s .
Three
s p o t t e d a n enemy p l a t o o n a s t r i d e t h e r e g i m e n t a l march r o u t e
which had been emplaced s i n c e t h e passage of t h e d i v i s i o n a l
reconnaissance elements.
t o t h e a r t i l l e r y personnel f o r t a r g e t i n g and a n o b s e r v a t i o n
commander i n s t r u c t e d h i s a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r y commander t o
prepare t o f i r e i n s u p p o r t of an a t t a c k from t h e march.
He
4-15
They
lie c a l l e d
guard commander.
The d i v i s i o n ' s
b i l i t y of a n o t h e r s k i r m i s h .
The combat reconnaissance p a t r o l r e p o r t e d t h e y had
bypassed.
p a r t y was n o t s t r o n g enough t o t a c k l e t h i s f o r c e , so h e
4-16
l a t e r t h e b a t t l e started,and t h e advance guard was successful. However, they had taken heavy c a s u a l t i e s and had l o s t
1 0 tanks and
13 BMPs.
t h e regimental reconnaissance commander c a l l e d back and s t a t e d they had been bypassed by an enemy f o r c e . He d i d
not know t h e s i z e , b u t estimated it t o be a t l e a s t a b a t t a l ion. The regiment s t a r t e d t o move again, and t h e commander informed a l l subordinates about t h e approaching enemy f o r c e . Suddenly, t h e combat reconnaissance p a t r o l commander c a l l e d t o say he had been taken under f i r e by an enemy force,and he had l o a t h a l f of h i s element. He could s e e enemy recon-
naissance elements moving towards h i s l o c a t i o n , b u t he no longer had any long range d i r e c t f i r e weapons systems t o engage them. The a r t i l l e r y u n i t s took n o t i c e , began t h e i r The advance guard complanning sequence, and t h e mortars responded w i t h smoke t o p r o t e c t t h e remnants of t h e p a t r o l . mander t o l d t h e advance p a r t y t o go o f f of t h e march r o u t e
and attempt t o f i n d o u t t h e depth and w i d t h of t h e approach-
i n g enemy f o r c e .
4-17
employment.
i n prepared p o s i t i o n s blocking
About twenty minutes a f t e r t h e p a t r o l had r e p o r t e d cont a c t , t h e advance p a r t y passed t o t h e i r s o u t h and began t o r e c o n n o i t e r t h e enemy f o r c e . which were q u i c k l y destroyed. They had s e e n two enemy APCs They assumed p o s i t i o n s on a
enemy a c t i v i t y .
on t h e h i l l , r e i n f o r c e t h e p a t r o l w i t h t h e advance guard,
and send h i s remaining r e i n f o r c e d motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n
t o t h e n o r t h t o h i t t h e enemy f o r c e on t h e f l a n k .
In this
Artillery
3d b a t t a l i o n was
The enemy f o r c e h a l t e d
4-18
following
t h e enemy began t o w i t h d r a w .
The r e g i m e n t a l com-
Chemical (NBC) environment, t h e commander would have t o cons i d e r measures f o r p r o t e c t i o n from weapons of maes d e a t r u c -
tion.
He
bined arms elements t o accomplish t h e mission. Not covered i n t h e s c e n a r i o , but a c r u c i a l p a r t of any o p e r a t i o n , is t h e u s e o f camouflage by a l l elements. Some S o v i e t v e h i c l e s have been s e e n w i t h camouflage p a i n t p a t t e r n s , and t h e y w i l l make a l l attempts t o maximize t h e use of l o c a l v e g e t a t i o n . Camouflage n e t s w i l l a l s o be used
4-19
f o r h a l t e d u n i t s , e s p e c i a l l y a r t i l l e r y f i r i n g s i t e s , command p o s t s , and r e a r u n i t s . The s c e n a r i o w i l l have t o be c a r e f u l l y evaluated and measures t a k e n t o ensure t h a t mutually s u p p o r t i v e measures a r e taken t o p l a n f o r a s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n .
A lot of
The pre-
have t o be formulated and t h e t r a f f i c c o n t r o l elements from w i t h i n t h e d i v i s i o n and regiment would be u t i l i z e d extensively. The use of t r a f f i c c o n t r o l t r o o p s and march planning Highway t r o o p s
would only be used by elements h i g h e r t h a n regiment and w i l l not be included i n t h i s paper. Communication t r o o p s could
1 AVANGNiD (advanced g u a r d ) A detachment preceeding a t a f i x e d d i s t a n c e ahead of t h e main body of a marching f o r mation ( u n i t ) i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t t h e t r o o p s making t h e march, t o safeguard them from s u r p r i s e a t t a c k by h o s t i l e
95 AFt'YERGARD ( r e a r guard) March p r o t e c t i o n element, i n tended t o safeguard t r o o p s moving from t h e f r o n t t o t h e r e a r . The s t r e n g t h , composition, missions and distance o f a r e a r guard (from t h e main body) w i l l depend on t h e s i z e of t h e main body column being guarded and on t h e s i t u a t i o n .
99 ATAKA ( a t t a c k ) The most important element i n t h e t a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of a i r , naval and ground f o r c e s , c o n s t i t u t i n g a combination of s w i f t maneuver and f i r e ( s t r i k e ) aimed a t enemy personnel and weapons f o r t h e purpose of t h e i r annihil a t i o n . An attack by ground f o r c e s is carried o u t immedi a t e l y following nuclear and conventional weapons s t r i k e s , and i s culminated by t h e u t t e r defeat of t h e enemy and by capture of h i s defensive areas and s t r u c t u r e s . An a i r attack i s a r a p i d a c t i o n by a i r c r a f t a g a i n s t t h e enemy f o r t h e purpose of f i r i n g or s t r i k i n g a t c l o s e range. Annihil a t i o n of h o s t i l e a i r c r a f t i n t h e a i r d u r i n g an a i r attack i s accomplished by f i g h t e r a v i a t i o n . A torpedo ( m i s s i l e ) attack i s t h e maneuvering of a w a r s h i p ( a i r c r a f t ) f o r t h e purpose of assuming a f a v o r a b l e p o s i t i o n and f i r i n g t o r pedoes (missi1es)at t h e t a r g e t .
832 MANEVR (maneuver) A transfer of t r o o p s or naval f o r c e s , o r a r e d i r e c t i o n of weapons ( r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of material and technical f a c i l i t i e s ) , f o r t h e purpose of gaining an advantage over t h e enemy under c o n d i t i o n s f o r conducting m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . As a r e s u l t of a maneuver, a f a v o r a b l e groupi n g of men and equipment i s created in a given s e c t o r or theater of o p e r a t i o n s . According t o i t s scale, a maneuver may be strategic, o p e r a t i o n a l , o r t a c t i c a l . 954 OBESPECHENIYE FLANGOV (STYKOV) ( s e c u r i t y of f l a n k s (or of l i m i t i n g p o i n t s ) ) Operational (or t a c t i c a l ) measures t o f o r e s t a l l s u r p r i s e s t r i k e s by t h e enemy on open f l a n k s ( o r l i m i t i n g p o i n t s ) , and t o ensure s u c c e s s f u l repulse of these s t r i k e s i n t h e course of accomplishing t h e main mission. P l a n k s e c u r i t y is achieved by conducting unint e r r u p t e d reconnaissance, and by maintaining t h e f o r c e s and weapons assigned f o r t h i s purpose i n a c o n s t a n t s t a t e
of r e a d i n e s s .
1047 OTRYAD ((I.) & (2) detachment; (3) f l i g h t ) (1) A temporary u n i f i c a t i o n of ground t r o o p ( o r n a v a l ) u n i t s o r subu n i t s (sometimes even i n d i v i d u a l servicemen) f o r completion
4-21
A type o f support f o r combat o p e r a t i o n s o f t r o o p s ( o r naval f o r c e s ) , e f f e c t e d i n o r d e r t o f o r e s t a l l s u r p r i s e enemy a t t a c k s , and t o prevent enemy reconnaissance from p e n e t r a t i n g a r e a s occupied by f r i e n d l y t r o o p s ( o r naval f o r c e s ) . S e c u r i t y a l s o e n s u r e s f r i e n d l y t r o o p s time and advantageous c o n d i t i o n s f o r deployment and e n t e r i n g b a t t l e . S e c u r i t y on t h e march, a t t h e h a l t , and i n b a t t l e , a r e c a l l e d : "march s e c u r i t y , I' "bivouac s e c u r i t y , " and "combat s e c u r i t y , r e s p e c t i v e l y .
'I
1060 O M R A N E N I Y E ( s e c u r i t y )
1087 PEREDOVOY OTRYAD (forward detachment) (1) A detachment of t r o o p s c o n s i s t i n g o f a tank (or motorized i n f a n t r y ) s u b u n i t ( o r u n i t ) , r e i n f o r c e d by s u b u n i t s of s p e c i a l t r o o p s . I n o f f e n s i v e combat, a forward detachment is put o u t ahead of a combined-arms u n i t ( o r formation) t o s e i z e and hold important l i n e s and o b j e c t i v e s , major road j u n c t i o n s , mountain p a s s e s , bridgeheads on t h e o p p o s i t e bank of a r i v e r , pending a r r i v a l of t h e main body. In d e f e n s i v e combat, a forward detachment is s e n t o u t t o conduct def e n s i v e a c t i o n s i n t h e s e c u r i t y zone. ( 2 ) P a r t of an amphibious a s s a u l t f o r c e used t o s e i z e a beachhead on t h e enemy c o a s t and t o support t h e c o n t i n u i n g landing. The forward detachment of an amphibious assault f o r c e is u s u a l l y subdivided i n t o t h e f o r c e s making t h e first a s s a u l t and t h e main body o f t h e forward detachment.
1104 PLAN RAZVEJIKI (reconnaissance p l a n ) - A staff working document, s e t t i n g o u t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of reconnaissance for a d e f i n i t e period o f time. A reconnaissance plan i s a component p a r t of an o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) p l a n , and i s s e t o u t i n w r i t i n g o r g r a p h i c a l l y (on a map). Reflected i n a reconnaissance plan a r e t h e g o a l and missions of reconnaissance, who i s t o c a r r y i t o u t , and time limits f o r completion of t h e missions, t h e d e a d l i n e s and procedures f o r r e n d e r i n g reconnaissance r e p o r t s ( t h e data o b t a i n e d ) , and t h e r e s e r v e of reconnaissance f o r c e s and f a c i l i t i e s .
4-22
When necessary, reconnaissance p l a n s i n d i c a t e t h e methods t o be used t o complete reconnaissance missions, and t h e procedure f o r p r e p a r i n g reconnaissance elements and supporting t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . 1169 POLOSA RAZVEDKI (reconnaissance zone) - A zone of t e r r a i n a t t h e d i s p o s a l of t h e enemy, bounded t o t h e r i g h t and t o t h e l e f t by h y p o t h e t i c a l demarcation l i n e s w i t h i n which reconnaissance must be conducted by t h e f o r c e s and f a c i l i t i e s of a major f i e l d f o r c e (formation, u n i t ) . I t i s u s u a l l y t o a s s i g n a reconnaissance zone which i s wider t h a n t h e zone of a c t i o n of t h e e n t i r e major f i e l d f o r c e (formation, u n i t ) , and no less deep t h a n t h e depth of t h e o p e r a t i o n a l (or combat) mission of t h e major f i e l d f o r c e (formation, u n i t ) . 1185 POICHODNAYA ZASSTAVA (march s e c u r i t y p a t r o l ) - A element n of march s e c u r i t y . The march s e c u r i t y p a t r o l i s d e t a i l e d from t h e advance guard, or d i r e c t l y from s u b u n i t s ( o r u n i t s ) f o r which s e c u r . i t y i s provided. A march s e c u r i t y p a t r o l may be i n t h e forward or f l a n k c a t e g o r y . 1186 POKHODNOYE OKHRANENIYE ( ( 1 ) march s e c u r i t y ! ( 2 ) screen(1) The safeguarding of t r o o p s i n g of s h i p s i n passage) on t h e march, t h i s being accomplished by advance guards, r e a r guards, detachments, o u t p o s t s , and p a t r o l s . ( 2 ) The s c r e e n i n g of s h i p s d u r i n g passage by s e a , e i t h e r s i n g l y o r i n formation, such p r o t e c t i o n being organized t o i n c l u d e timely d e t e c t i o n of enemy presence! a p p r o p r i a t e warning of t h e e s c o r t e d s h i p s 1 r e p u l s i n g enemy a t t a c k s 1 and t h e use of reconnaissance counter-measures, The s c r e e n i n g f o r c e is a component p a r t of t h e c r u i s i n g formation and may c o n s i s t of s e v e r a l s c r e e n s 1 an o u t e r one, f o r warning, and i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h enemy f o r c e e l and an i n n e r one, f o r r e p u l s i n g attacks by enemy f o r c e s which have p e n e t r a t e d t h e o u t e r screen.
1187 POKHODNYY PORYADOK ( ( 1 ) march formation! ( 2 ) t a c t i c a l formation (of w a r s h i p s ) ) (1) A t r o o p formation, c o n s i s t i n g of columns, f o r use on a march. I t must ensure t h e f o l l o w i n g i high speed of advance and maneuver! r a p i d deployment f o r combat; t h e l e a s t p o s s i b l e v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o t h e e f f e c t s of enemy weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n i cons e r v a t i o n of s t r e n g t h of personnel and v e h i c l e e l and e a s e of t r o o p c o n t r o l . ( 2 ) The mutual p o s i t i o n i n g o f w a r s h i p s i n passage, a s a group, by s e a , ensuring t h e i r s a f e t y , r a p i d reformini: i n t o a b a t t l e formation, and ease i n cont r o l l i n g forces.
location, grouping, composition, numbering, armament, combat capability, and intentions of the enemy, as well as the nature of his activities with respect to an operation (or battle).
- Keasures taken to study the roads (cross-country routes) in a zone o f impending action, and to determine their state, traffic capacity, vulnerable sectors, comouflage conditions, degree of demolition and contamination, and the availability of materials for road and bridge repair, so as to ensure the movement of troops, and combat and other materiel.
1299 RAZVEDKA U R S H R U T O V (route reconnaissance)
1300 RAZVEDKA M E S T N O S T I (terrain reconnaissance and intelligence) Measures taken f o r the collection and refinement of information on the character and peculiarities of the relief, hydrography, built-up areas, roads, soil, and plant cover, and the degree to which these conditions affect the arrangement and combat operations of friendly and enemy troops; on the presence and character of natural cover and obstacles; on the protective features and passability of the terrain; on conditions for orientation, camouflage, and observation; etc.
1304 RAZVEDYVATEL'NAYA GRUPPA (reconnaissance group) - An element of troop reconnaissance sent out by formations or units to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain in mobile types of combat, on the march, and in a defensive situation when there is no contact with the enemy.
1308 RAZVEDYVATEL'NYY DOZOR (reconnaissance patrol) A reconnaissance element which is sent out from a reconnaissance detachment to the front, to the flanks, or to the rear, for the purpose of conducting reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain.
1309 RAZVEDYVATEL'NYY OTRYN) (reconnaissance detachment) An element of troop-unit reconnaissance sent out by formations and major field forces or strategic formations to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain in mobile types of combat, on the march, and also in defence. A reconnaissance detachment is made up of reconnaissance subunits or motor rifle (or tank) subunits, from company to battalion strength, and reinforced by artillery, tanks, field engineer subunits, and chemical subunits. A reconnaissance detachment is assigned a reconnaissance zone or axis.
1512 TAKTICKESKAYA RAZVEDKA (tactical reconnaissance) A component part of military reconnaissance. It obtains such information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and the
4- 24
area of impending a c t i o n as is needed t o support t h e combat o p e r a t i o n s o f t r o o p s . Tactical reconnaissance is organized by t h e commanders and staffs of formations, u n i t s , ( s u b u n i t s ) of a l l s e r v i c e branches t o t h e depth of t h e i r own combat missl.on, o r t o t h e depth of t h e e n t i r e d i s p o s i t i o n of enemy combat formations.
4-6.
ENDNOTES,
'I<onoplya,
m, 3 ,
4, 5, p. 33.
?oreign Science and Technology Center. ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e r 1972)s Ps 18. 5Reznichenko, Tactics, p . 133.
4-25
CHAPTER 5
THE OFFENSE KASTUPLENIYE ( o f f e n s i v e ) A b a s i c t y p e of combat o p e r a t i o n , o f d e c i s i v e i m p o r t a n c e i n a t t a i n i n g v i c t o r y o v e r t h e enemy. An o f f e n s i v e i s conducted i n o r d e r t o s e c u r e t h e prompt and u t t e r d e f e a t of a n enemy occupying d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s , and i n o r d e r t o t a k e i m p o r t a n t areas ( o r o b j e c t i v e s ) . T h i s i s achieved by b r e a k i n g up enemy main g r o u p i n g s and weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n 5y u s i n g n u c l e a r and c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons, e n e r g e t i c a t t a c k s by ground f o r c e s w i t h h i g h speed and t o great d e p t h , c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h a v i a t i o n and a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t f o r c e s , bold movement by t h e l a t t e r o n t o enemy f l a n k s and r e a r , and d e s t r o y i n g h i m p i e c e by p i e c e . 1
5-1 * GEMERAL.
Kost w r i t e r s of S o v i e t t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e claim t h e o f f e n s i v e i s t h e o n l y way t o a c h i e v e a d e c i s i v e v i c t o r y .
COL A . A . S i d o r e n k o states1
The o f f e n s i v e i s t h e o n l y t y p e
of combat a c t i o n s of t h e t r o o p s , t h e employment of w h i c h
a t t a i n s t h e complete r o u t of t h e enemy and t h e s e i z u r e o f i m p o r t a n t o b j e c t i v e s and areas.*I2 I n o t h e r words, t h e d e f e n s e may be used when i t i s a d v a n t a g e o u s , b u t t h e o f f e n s i v e a s s u r e s a r a p i d and thorough d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e enemy. i d e a l l y , i.n a n o f f e n s i v e , t h e a d v a n c i n g t r o o p s w i l l byp a s s h e a v i l y defended areas and s e e k gaps between enemy u n i t s o r conduct a t t a c k s from t h e march a g a i n s t weakly defended p o s i t i o n s t o proceed i n t o t h e enemy rear. 2owever, t h e
S o v i e t commander may be f o r c e d i n t o c o n d u c t i n g a b r e a k t h r o u g h .
a r u p t u r e of enemy p o s i t i o n s .
I n t h e r e m a i n d e r of
w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o as a r u p t u r e of enemy d e f e n s e s .
The b r e a k t h r o u g h is t h e most d i s c u s s e d form of S o v i e t o f f e n s e w i t h i n US Army d o c t r i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n s , b u t i t i s p r o b a b l y t h e l e a s t understood form of S o v i e t t a c t i c s . The
The i n t r o d u c t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons a l t e r e d
ophy t h e b e s t s i n t h e p e r i o d of World W r iI, e s s e n t i a l l y a t h e o n l y method f o r i n t e n s i f y i n g t h e e f f o r t s of t h e first e c h e l o n was t h e commitment and engagement of r i f l e and armored c h a s t i and s o e d i n e n i a o f t h e second e c h e l o n s o r r e s e r v e s , o - % + r by I maneuver o f t r o o p s from o t h e r axes s u p p o r t e d by a r t i l l e r y and a v i a t i o n . T h i s a t t a i n e d t h e c r e a t i o n of h i g h d e n s i t i e s , a n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e enemy i n men and m a t e r i e l , and s u c c e s s f u l development o.f the a t t a c k i n t o t h e d e p t h . Under modern c o n d i t i o n s n u c l e a r weapons a r e t h e c h i e f means of d e s t r u c t i o n . The means f o r t h e i r d e l i v e r y p o s s e s s w i d e c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r maneuver and can d e l i v e r powerful s t r i k e s where and when i t is n e c e s s a r y and a d v i s a b l e . dy employing
5-2
n u c l e a r weapons one can i n a s h o r t time achieve t h e e f f e c t i v e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e enemy and rapi d l y change t h e r a t i o o f men and materiel, t h u s changing t h e s i t u a t i o n i n one's f a v o r . T h i s w i l l ensure t h e s u c c e s s f u l development of t h e a t t a c k by t h e first echelon a t h i g h e r r a t e s . Moreover, t h e d e l i v e r y of n u c l e a r s t r i k e s p e r m i t s one t o avoid a dangerous c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t r o o p s and an i n e v i t a b l e compacting of combat formations i n volved w i t h t h e commitment of f r e s h f o r c e s from t h e d e p t h and t h e i r e x e c u t i o n of maneuver under d i f f i c u l t c o n d i t i o n s of t h e ground s i t u a t i o n . 3 Soyedineniye Formation. The h i g h e s t l e v e l o f m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n 1 Corps, D i v i s i o n , o r J r i g a d e l e v e l e q u i v a l e n t . I t may be formed from a s i n g l e branch of variousqbranches and S e r v i c e s , i n c l u d i n g naval squadrons.
C h a s t ' - Unit. Any a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , l i n e , o r housekeeping u n i t of r e g i m e n t a l s i z e o r smalle r t h a t i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y s e l f - c o n t a i n e d and h a s i t s own d e s i g n a t i o n , number, and banner. It is t h e basic t a c t i c a l (combat) and independent o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t up t o , and i n c l u d i n g t h e regiment. Each c o n s i s t s o f s u b u n i t s . 5
ie a p p l i c a b l e i n e i t h e r n u c l e a r o r non-nuclear warfare.
The p u r s u i t is t h e f i n a l form of o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n and
has one g o a l , t h e u l t i m a t e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e enemy f o r c e .
Troops a t t a c k i n g i n a d i f f e r e n t way w i l l overcome t h e enemy's defense, not by "gnawing through" on narrow s e c t o r s and s o l i d f r o n t , as was t h e c a s e i n past wars, but simultaneously across a broad f r o n t , along axes, f r o m t h e march, a t h i g h tempos, r i g h t a f t e r n u c l e a r
5-3
s t r i k e s , t a k i n g advantage of breaches, i n t e r v a l s , and gaps i n t h e enemy's comb t deployment, and by wide employment of maneuver. 8
5-2. CONDUCT.
There a r e two methods o f t r a n s f e r t o t h e o f f e n s i v e , e i t h e r from t h e march o r from a p o s i t i o n i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy.
If t h e s e methods f a i l t o r u p t u r e t h e enemy's p o s i -
t i o n s , o r i f t h e enemy has c o n s t r u c t e d a formidable, i n depth defense which cannot be r e a d i l y bypassed, a breakthrough must be conducted t o f o r c e a gap i n t h e enemy's formation. S u c c e s s f u l l y breaking through t h e enemy's deAssuming t h e defense as p a r t
f e n s e s may l e a d t o a p u r s u i t .
of an o f f e n s i v e is a v i a b l e t a c t i c and i s u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d
t o as t h e h a s t y defense.
T h i s p o r t i o n of d e f e n s i v e combat
w i l l be covered i n t h e next c h a p t e r .
a.
3rom t h e March.
An advance t o c o n t a c t i s conducted i n march column and may r e s u l t i n a meeting engagement o r an a t t a c k from t h e march.
A
i n t h e previous c h a p t e r .
column w i l l vary depending upon t h e mission and t h e t r o o p s available. Xowever, t h e p r e v i o u s l y discussed regimental
march column i s considered t o be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . The s c e n a r i o w i t h i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r d e s c r i b e s a r e g i ment which made two a t t a c k s f r o m t h e march p r i o r t o conducti n g a meeting engagement. A enemy l o c a t i o n i s chosen f o r n
5-4
an attack e i t h e r p r i o r t o o r d u r i n g t h e march.
The l e a d i n g
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e elements a t t e m p t t o l o c a t e enemy f o r c e s a n d
bypass s t r o n g p o i n t s of enemy r e s i s t a n c e .
When a p o s i t i o n
o b s e r v e t h e p o s i t i o n t o r e p o r t any changes i n s t a t u s .
assault.
ceed i n t o t h e enemy r e a r .
A t a predetermined d i s t a n c e from t h e o b j e c t i v e , t h e
r e g i m e n t a l march column w i l l b r e a k i n t o b a t t a l i o n march columns, t h e n company march columns, t h e n p l a t o o n march columns and f i n a l l y i n t o an a s s a u l t l i n e . The r e g i m e n t a l
The a s s a u l t p o s i t i o n l i n e from w h i c h t h e
r e g i m e n t ' s s u b o r d i n a t e elements a s s a u l t t h e o b j e c t i v e i s u s u a l l y no more t h a n one t o two k i l o m e t e r s from t h e o b j e c t i v e and i t normalljr w i l l be t h e l a s t covered and concealed a r e a nearest the objective. I n wide open t e r r a i n smoke w i l l be
5-5
c o v e r i n g b a t t a l i o n and company t a c t i c s .
A r t i l l e r y organi-
i n depth.
-i e t Sov
X i l i t a r y Reviex, is
a n o t h e r p e r i o d i c a l which f r e q u e n t l y d i s c u s s e s f i e l d problems
and shows t h e means applied by S o v i e t commanders t o s o l v e
t r a i n i n g problems.
The magazine i s w r i t t e n f o r u s e by p e r s o n s
ganda than does Voyenni V e s t n i k . The S o v i e t s employ two t y p e s o f r e s e r v e s , combined arms and s p e c i a l i z e d . Examples o f t h e l a t t e r m i g h t b e a n e n g i n e e r
The s i z e o f a r e s e r v e v a r i e s
r e s e r v e o r an a n t i t a n k reserve.
w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n , b u t a combined arms r e s e r v e o f a p l a t o o n
a t d i v i s i o n , t h e a n t i t a n k b a t t e r y a t r e g i m e n t , and i n 3TR
equipped u n i t s t h e a n t i t a n k p l a t o o n a t b a t t a l i o n l e v e l , a r e
well s u i t e d f o r a n t i t a n k r e s e r v e s .
I n t h e s c e n a r i o :For t h e
stances.
i i a t t a l i o n j.s t h e l o w e s t l e v e l w h i c h may r e t a i n a r e s e r v e
o r a t t a c k w i t h two e c h e l o n s .
a r e a l m o s t always conducted w i t h o u t a r e s e r v e .
c a n v a r y from f i v e t o e i g h t k i l o m e t e r s i n a main a t t a c k t o
1 0 t o 15 k i l o m e t e r s i n a secondary a t t a c k .
The regiment
Whether t h e r e g i m e n t e v e n t u a l l y attacks w i t h t h r e e r e i n f o r c e d b a t t a l i o n s abreast, o r two up and one b a c k , depends on t h e w i d t h of t h e a s s i g n e d zone, t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e a t t a c k i n g and d e f e n d i n g u n i t s , and i f t h e commander d e s i r e s d e p t h t o h i s attack. Again, n u c l e a r w a r f a r e w i l l s t r e t c h t h e s e
5-7
strike.
assigned a similar mission. The formation of a r e g i m e n t a l a r t i l l e r y group ( R A G ) i s based on t h e amount of a r t i l l e r y made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r e g i mental commander, o r upon d i r e c t i o n o f t h e d i v i s i o n commander. E s u a l l y a RAG w i l l be formed f r o m two t o f o u r b a t t a l i o n s of a r t i l l e r y t o provide c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l f o r a s p e c i f i e d period o r t o perform a s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n , then t h e RAG w i l l be d i s s o l v e d and u n i t s r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r normal h e a d q u a r t e r s . Kotorized r i f l e regiments have an organic a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n and each s u b o r d i n a t e motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n has a mortar battery.
Tank regiments do n o t have t h i s c a p a b i l i t y , b u t
About f i f t y
gunners o r dismounted t r o o p s .
or
the
Also, S o v i e t a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s possess an a n t i t a n k
Most of t h e s e a n t i t a n k
The gun/howitzer c a l i b e r . The gun-target range. The type of t a r g e t . The s i z e o f t h e t a r g e t . The degree .of damage d e s i r e d .
2.
3.
4.
5.
The S o v i e t s have c h a r t s which l i s t how many rounds of w h a t type have t o be! f i r e d i n t o each h e c t a r e of t h e t a r g e t t o achieve s p e c i f i e d r e s u l t s . There a r e many d i f f e r e n t ways
t i o n s a r e included a t t h e end of t h i s c h a p t e r .
So, an
a n a l y s i s of t h e t a r g e t and t h e a v a i l a b l e a r t i l l e r y i s necessary prior t o f i r i n g a t a target. The Sovie'ts s e e t h e a t t a c k from t h e march t o be t h e predominant form o f o f f e n s i v e combat. The march column is
5- 9
b.
i:rom Direct C o n t a c t .
s t a l l e d and t h e o f f e n s i v e is being resumed, o r when a b a t t l e s t a r t e d i n a d e f e n s i v e mode and t h e d e c i s i o n h a s been made t o assume a n o f f e n s i v e p o s t u r e . I t w i l l be u n d e r t a k e n t o r u p t u r e t h e enemys f o r m a t i o n and e n t e r h i s r e a r a r e a .
It
behind o r a d j a c e n t t o t h e i n i t i a l d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .
from w i t h i n t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s c a n s u p p o r t t h e a t t a c k e r s
w i t h d i r e c t fire. The a t t a c k i n g t r o o p s a r e marshaled i n
a t t a c k p o s i t i o n s near t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n .
The a t t a c k
S i n c e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e 9PW
5-10
1.
iihen t h e r e a r e o b s t a c l e s which c a n n o t be c l e a r e d
by mechanical means.
2.
n o t been s u f f i c i e n t l y n e u t r a l i z e d by i n d i r e c t f i r e .
3.
4.
:Tien t h e r e a r e e n t r e n c n e d enemy i n f a n t r y on t h e
a following f o r c e .
5.
as t h e u s e o r hand g r e n a d e s and f l a m e t h r o w e r s .
Another c o n s i d e r a t i o n when p l a n n i n g t h e a t t a c k i s what t y p e s o f maneuver tne a t t a c k i n g r'orce w i l l u s e .
A the t
t a c t i c a l l e v e l t h e ways t o conduct t h e a t t a c k a r e , f r o n t a l l y ,
from t h e f l a n k , o r by u s e of a n envelopment.
lhe flank
a t t a c k and envelopment c a n b e combined t o make a f o u r t h form o f maneuver. 'The f r o n t a l a t t a c k i s r a r e l y used due xiowever, i t s h o u l d n o t be
v u l n e r a b l e ?ram t h e f r o n t .
c. jreakthrough.
i n t r o d u c t i o n O C n u c l e a r weapons.
The a d v a n t a g e o f u s i n g a
5-11
obvious.
c o n t r o l l e d by Army elements o r h i g h e r .
l e r y a v a i l a b l e f o r a n Army t o s u p p o r t one b r e a k t h r o u g h i n
i t s zone.
I d e a l l y , t h e S o v i e t s would l i k e t o have a n a r t i l -
of f o r c e measures i n t h e r e s t o f t h e zone.
The attacking
Once t h e
f o r c e s had succeeded i n b r e a k i n g through t h e enemy's d e f e n s e and i n t o h i s r e a r a r e a t h o u g h t s would be g i v e n t o commencing pursuit operations. Creating a s u f f i c i e n t d e n s i t y of a r t i l l e r y f o r breakthrough o p e r a t i o n s is a r e l a t i v e l y easy t a s k .
A l l mortars
w i t h i n motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n s a r e c o n s i d e r e d a r t i l l e r y 5-12
T h i s p a ra g rap h
army.
in t h e first e c h e l o n and a t a n k d i v i s i o n i n t h e second echelon. Wi t hi n t h e d i v i s i o n t h e r e would be 54 120mm mortars The o r g a n i c a r t i l l e r y r e g i m e n t h a s 36 122mm The t h r e e motorized r i f l e The F r o n t
available.
h o w i t z e r s and 18 152mm h o w i t z e r s .
54 a d d i t i o n a l a r t i l l e r y
p i e c e s , p r o b a b l y 36 l 3 O m m f i e l d guns and 18 l52mm h o w i t z e r s . The Army commander c o u l d a d d 18 l 3 O m m guns and 18 l52mm h o w i t z e r s from h i s a r t i l l e r y r e g i m e n t , or a d d i t i o n a l p i e c e s
i f more t h a n one regiment was a v a i l a b l e .
coul d a l s o p r o v i d e 72 122mm h o w i t z e r s from t h e second e c h e l o n t a n k d i v i s i o n , 54 from t h e a r t i l l e r y r e g i m e n t and 1 8 from t h e motorized r i f l e regiment, and a d d i t i o n a l mortars.
Mor-
80 a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s p e r k i l o m e t e r .
T h i s d e n s i t y could be
The
i n c r e a s e d by a d d i n g a d d i t i o n a l F r o n t o r Army a r t i l l e r y .
a r t i l l e r y would remain d i s p e r s e d and would mass t h e i r f i r e s i n t o t h e br eakt hr ough area. I d e a l l y , when t h e a s s a u l t began
converge i n t o t h e designated a r e a , arrayed i n depth t o sust a i n t h e momentum, and proceed w i t h t h e a s s a u l t . Once t h e breakthrough has met w i t h i n i t i a l s u c c e s s , u n i t s w i l l hold t h e s h o u l d e r s of t h e p e n e t r a t i o n and each f o l l o w i n g u n i t w i l l attempt t o widen t h e gap. The l e a d i n g
w i t h d r a w s p u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s must a l s o be considered.
o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s and w i l l be undertaken only when o t h e r means have f a i l e d t o c r e a t e a r u p t u r e i n t h e d e f e n s e , and when t h e enemy's defense h a s c r e a t e d a l i n e a r element w h i c h cannot be bypassed. n o t occur t h a t o f t e n .
d.
I t i s t h e worst c a s e f o r u s , b u t w i l l
Pursuit.
suit.
A p u r s u i t i s a v i a b l e o p t i o n i f .the enemy w i t h d r a w s
5-14.
The remainder of t h i s
frontal, parallel,
The f r o n t a l p u r s u i t i s f r e q u e n t l y c a l l e d t h e
pursuing f o r c e t r a v e l s on r o u t e s p a r a l l e l t o t h e withdrawing enemy f o r c e , o u t d i s t a n c e s p a r t of h i s f o r c e s , c u t s off a p o r t i o n of t h e f o r c e from t h e f l a n k and d e f e a t s i t i n d e t a i l . Combined p u r s u i t is no more t h a n u s i n g a p o r t i o n o f t h e purs u i n g f o r c e t o maintain p r e s s u r e on t h e r e a r o f t h e w i t h drawing enemy, while a l a r g e r p o r t i o n of t h e f o r c e conducts
a parallel pursuit.
suing force.
s e c u r i t y f o r c e s p l a y a key r o l e .
P u r s u i n g f o r c e s must be
a l e r t f o r p o t e n t i a l enemy c o u n t e r a t t a c k s .
The p u r s u i t should be stopped when one o r more of t h e
D e s t r u c t i o n of t h e enemy i s completed.
The enemy h a s r e c o n s t i t u t e d a s t r o n g d e f e n s e .
The p u r s u e r s have o u t d i s t a n c e d e s s e n t i a l s u p p o r t . The p u r s u i n g f o r c e has p e n e t r a t e d q u i t e d e e p l y
2.
3.
4.
and h a s become v u l n e r a b l e t o d e s t r u c t i o n .
5.
p u r s u e r s p o s s e s s a marked advantage. The a u t h o r i t y t o s t o p a p u r s u i t must come from h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s , b u t t h e p u r s u i n g commander may recommend t e r m i n a t i o n a t any time.
i n t h e first e c h e l o n of t h e r e g i m e n t .
t h i r d motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n .
T h e remaining tank
The motorized
r i f l e b a t t a l i o n s u s u a l l y p r o v i d e a tank p l a t o o n t o each
rirst
as d i s c u s s e d f o r t h e meeting engagement.
Attack a g a i n s t a
f o r c e i n c o n t a c t r e q u i r e s c a r e f u l p l a n n i n g and s e l e c t i o n of
a t t a c k position:;:.
or around d e f e n d i n g f o r c e s i s a l s o c r i t i c a l .
mag be n e c e s s a r y t o overcome f r i e n d l y o b s t a c l e s .
I n t h e breakthrough i t i s c r i t i c a l t o p r o v i d e enough a r t i l l e r y and ammunition t o accomplish t h e j o b . Assembly
It
f o r t h e p u r s u i , t and a l l o w t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n t o r e g r o u p .
e n s u r i n g t h e p r o p e r amounts oi^ PCL and ammunition a r e made available. The breakthrough would c a u s e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
5-17
would be t r u e d u r i n g a p u r s u i t .
A f a s t moving regiment
in
e s s e n t i a l f o r any march formation t o avoid t r a f f i c jams and t o ensure t h e march plan proceeded according t o s c h e d u l e . The r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l t r o o p s can provide i n t e l l i g e n c e t o a s s i s t t h e commander, and chemical t r o o p s can be i n v a l u a b l e i n an NBC environment.
A l l of these f a c t o r s must be con-
5-5. DEFINITIONS.
be accomplished.
689 ISKHODNYY RAYON ( a t t a c k p o s i t i o n ) - An a r e a of t e r r a i n a l l o c a t e d t o troops f o r occupation by them p r i o r t o going over t o t h e a t t a c k from a p o s i t i o n of c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy. An a t t a c k p o s i t i o n i s prepared i n accordance w i t h t h e concept of t h e o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) and t h e o p e r a t i o n a l formation ( o r o r d e r of b a t t l e ) o f t h e a t t a c k i n g t r o o p s , and is organized i n t h e e n g i n e e r i n g s e n s e s o as t o conceal t h e i r presence, t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r deployment and t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e a t t a c k , and t o p r o t e c t them f r o m a l l the weapons a t t h e enemy's d i s p o s a l .
690 ISKFIODNYY RUBEZH ( a s s a u l t l i n e ; l i n e of d e p a r t u r e ) A prearranged l i n e from which a u n i t o r formation proceeds t o f u l f i l l a combat mission ( a march, an a t t a c k , e t c . ) . An a s s a u l t l i n e o r l i n e of d e p a r t u r e i s defined by c l e a r l y v i s i b l e landmarks (on t h e t e r r a i n o r on a map).
5-18
t h e most important enemy grouping o r o b j e c t i v e f o r t h e purpoee of i n f l h t i n g considerable damage upon t h e enemy i n t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e time.
866 METODICHESKIY OGON' ( d e l i b e r a t e f i r e ) P i r e conducted with a c o n s t a n t time i n t e r v a l between rounds. The purpose of d e l i b e r a t e f i r e is t o hold t h e t a r g e t i n a suppressed state between f i r e onslaughts, o r t o maintain t h e necessary smoke concentration a f t e r f i r e onslaughts when f i r i n g smoke p r o j e c t i l e s . D e l i b e r a t e f i r e may a l s o be conducted independ e n t l y f o r t h e purpose of exhausting t h e enemy.
927 NASTUPATEL'NAYA OPERATSIYA ( o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n ) The aggregate of n u c l e a r s t r i k e s , coordinated and i n t e r r e l a t e d w i t h regard t o , t a r g e t , time, and place, and t h e vigorous, o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s o f t h e t r o o p s of a f r o n t ( o r an army), accomplished i n accordance w i t h a u n i f i e d concept f o r t h e attainment of o p e r a t i o n a l o r s t r a t e g i c goals. The general purpose of an o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n is t o d e s t r o y enemy means of nuclear a t t a c k , break up enemy main groupings, and s e i z e regions of o p e r a t i o n a l o r s t r a t e g i c importance. According t o i t s s c a l e and t h e f o r c e s and weapons involved, an offens i v e o p e r a t i o n may be an army o p e r a t i o n o r a f r o n t operation, but i n e i t h e r case it will be conducted by ground troops i n coordination w i t h the other Services.
967 OBKHOD (deep envelopment) A t r o o p maneuver i n d e p t h which is performed in t a c t i c a l ( o r o p e r a t i o n a l ) coordinated a c t i o n w i t h troops advancing from t h e f r o n t . Deep envelopment i0 used f o r t h e purpose of i n f l i c t i n g d e c i s i v e , aurp r i s e s t r i k e s on enemy f l a n k s ( o r f l a n k ) and r e a r .
976 OGNEVAYA PODGOTOVKA ((1) p r e p a r a t i o n f i r e ( s o f t e n i n g up) I ( 2 ) weapons t r a i n i n g ) (1) Powerful prepared s t r i k e s w i t h a r t i l l e r y and a v i a t i o n d e l i v e r e d p r i o r t o t h e start of an attack, f o r t h e purpose of n e u t r a l i z i n g and deatroyi n g t h e most important enemy i n s t a l l a t i o n e which a r e not t o be destroyed by n u c l e a r weapons, and f o r t h e purpose of r e n d e r i n g t h e enemy incapable o f o f f e r i n g organized r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e advancing t r o o p s ; ( 2 ) a s u b j e c t i n t h e t r a i n i n g curriculum f o r personnel of subunita and u n i t s of t h e armed f o r c e s .
980 OGNEVOYE NABLYUDENIYE ( n e u t r a l i z a t i o n f i r e ) F i r e by s i n g l e rounds o r b u r a t s a t w i l l , conducted d u r i n g t h e i n t e r v a l s between concentrated f i r e a g a i n s t t h e same t a r g e t , b u t w i t h considerably l e s s d e n s i t y . The purpose of f i r e observ a t i o n is t o keep t h e t a r g e t n e u t r a l i z e d . 981 OGNEVOY VA:L ( r o l l i n g b a r r a g e ) A method of a r t i l l e r y support f o r troops on t h e o f f e n s i v e , c o n s i s t i n g o f success i v e s h i f t s of high-density f i r e from one f i r i n g l i n e t o 5-19
A r o l l i n g barrage may be s i n g l e
982 OGNEVOY NALET (concentrated f i r e ) Method of conducting a r t i l l e r y f i r e f o r t h e purpose of d e s t r o y i n g enemy personnel, weapons, and combat materiel, envisaging a high d e n s i t y of f i r e d u r i n g a s h o r t i n t e r v a l of time. A s a r u l e , concentrated f i r e begins with f i r e from more than one weapon, w i t h a subsequent t r a n s i t i o n t o d e l i b e r a t e f i r e , reckoned on t h e basis of expending t h e assigned amount of ammunition i n a predetermined period of time.
1058 OKHVAT ( c l o s e envelopment) A t r o o p maneuver accomplished i n t a c t i c a l a n d f i r e c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h t h e t r o o p s
acting from t h e f r o n t . Close envelopment i s used f o r t h e purpose of i n f l i c t i n g d e c i s i v e and sudden s t r i k e s on enemy f l a n k s ( o r f l a n k ) and r e a r .
1 56 POLKOVAYA ARTILLERIYSKAYA GRUPPA ( P A G ) (regimental 1 a r t i l l e r y group) A r t i l l e r y c o n s i s t i n g of more t h a n one a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n , a t t h e d i r e c t d i s p o s a l of a regimental commander, assigned a t t h e time of a b a t t l e t o c a r r y o u t missions on behalf of t h e regiment, and u n i f i e d by a common command.
1200 PRESLEDOVANIYE ( p u r s u i t ) An a t t a c k on a withdrawing enemy, undertaken i n t h e course o f an o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) f o r t h e purpose of f i n a l l y d e s t r o y i n g o r c a p t u r i n g h i s f o r c e s . D e s t r u c t i o n of a withdrawing enemy is achieved by h i t t i n g h i s main body w i t h s t r i k e s from m i s s i l e u n i t s and a i r c r a f t ; by a r t i l l e r y f i r e r by r e l e n t l e s s and e n e r g e t i c p a r a l l e l o r f r o n t a l p u r s u i t 1 by s t r a d d l i n g h i s withdrawal route8 and by t h e pursuing t r o o p s a t t a c k i n g h i s f l a n k and r e a r . P u r s u i t i s conducted i n march o r approach-march formation (or i n combat f o r m a t i o n ) . For deep p e n e t r a t i o n i n t o t h e enemy's w i t h d r a w a l r o u t e , tank troops a r e used i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , b u t a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t f o r c e s may a l s o be employed. 1212 PRORYV (breakthrough) A method of o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n used when conducting; an o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n (or b a t t l e ) , d i r e c t e d toward p e n e t r a t i n g a continuous f r o n t , which i s prepared i n t h e engineering sense, echeloned, and occupied by enemy defense t r o o p s , by making breaches (gaps) i n i t f o r t h e purpose of subsequent maneuver i n t o t h e depth or toward t h e f l a n k s .
1336 RASKHOD BOYEPRIPASOV (ammunition expenditure) The number of p r o j e c t i l e s (or bombe, mortar rounds, b u l l e t s ) a l l o t t e d f o r , or a c t u a l l y expended on, t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of a p a r t i c u l a r f i r e mission. However, f o r a considerable
5-20
number of f i r e missions performed d u r i n g a s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d of time ( f o r example, i n t h e course of a n a i r bombardment, i n p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e , i n a day of combat), ammunition exp e n d i t u r e i s expressed i n units of f i r e .
1364 RUBEZH RAZVERTYVANIYA (deployment l i n e ) The s e c t o r of t e r r a i n on which t r o o p s deploy from march formation, or approach-march formation, i n t o combat formation.
1365 RUBEZHI REGULIROVANIYA ( c o n t r o l l i n e s ) T e r r a i n l i n e s , designated i n advance by t h e s e n i o r commander, which t h e t r o o p s must r e a c h o r go through a t a c e r t a i n time and i n a c e r t a i n formation.
An a t t a c k d i r e c t e d a t 1581 X A N G O V Y Y UDAR ( f l a n k a t t a c k ) t h e f l a n k of an o p e r a t i o n a l (or combat) or march formation o f t r o o p s . A flank attack is one of t h e types (methods) of maneuver.
5-6
ENDNOTES.
'Radziyekakiy,
D i c t i o n a r y , p. 132.
2A. A. Sidorenko, The Offeneive. T r a n s l a t e d by t h e United S t a t e s A i r Force. (Washington1 GPO 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 1. (Cited h e r e a f t e r as Sidorenko, Offensive.
31bid -*
* p. 148-149.
V.
4Radziyevskiy, D i c t i o n a x , p.
51bid.
p. 8.
'A. N . Latukhin, Modern A r t i l l e r x . Translated by t h e A s s i s t a n t Chief of S t a f f f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e , Department of t h e Army, f o r t h e r'oreign Science and Technology Center. ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e l PSTC, l g ' l l ) , p. 16 and p. 111.
5-21
CHAPTER 6
THE DEFENSE
OBORON ( d e f e n s e ) A type of coe-at opera t i o n conducted for t h e purpose of r e p u l s i n g an attack mounted by s u p e r i o r enemy f o r c e s , causing heavy c a s u a l t i e s , r e t a i n i n g important r e g i o n s of t h e t e r r a i n , and c r e a t i n g f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r going over t o a d e c i s i v e o f f e n s i v e . Defense is based on s t r i k e s by n u c l e a r and a l l o t h e r types of weapons; on extensive maneuver w i t h f i r e , f o r c e s and weapons ; on c o u n t e r a t t a c k a (or c o u n t e r s t r i k e a f w i t h simultaneous stubborn r e t e n t i o n of important r e g i o n s whi.ch i n t e r c e p t t h e enemy d i r e c t i o n of advance; and a l s o on t h e extensive use of v a r i o u s o b s t a c l e s . Defense makes it p o s s i b l e t o g a i n time and t o e f f e c t an economy i n forces and weapons i n some s e c t o r s , thereby c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s for an offensive i n others.
6-1. GENERAL.
The defense may be assumed by t h e S o v i e t s a t any time
it would be advantageous f o r them, o r they may be forced
i n t o it a s a r e s u l t of offensive action.
l o s i n g a meeting engagement or an
p o s i t i o n s and t o c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r a n s i t i o n t o the offensive derived from the f a c t o r of ine q u a l i t y of f o r c e s . The defendere t r y t o make up for a l a c k of f o r c e s and means by s e l e c t i n g 2 t a c t i c a l l y s u i t a b l e t e r r a i n and f o r t i f y i n g i t .
examples of c l a s s i c d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s .
The b a t t l e s of
Any form of defense should be viewed as an expedient u n t i l o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s can be resumed. Recognizing t h e a t t a c k t o be t h e b a s i c and d e c i s i v e form of armed c o n f l i c t , Lenin a l s o devoted much a t t e n t i o n t o t h e defense, but he viewed i t n o t as a g o a l i n i t s e l f , but a8 temporary a c t i o n s forced by t h e s i t u a t i o n a n d s u b j e c t t o t h e o v e r a l l i n t e r e s t s of d e f e a t o f t h e enemy.
M. V. Prunze noted t h a t o n l y t h e one who f i n d s w i t h i n himself t h e r e s o l v e t o a t t a c k w i l l win. A s i d e w hich o n l y defends i s i n e v i t a b l y A t t h e same time, doomed t o d e f e a t . Frunze recognized t h e p o s s i b i l i t y , under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , of s h i f t i n g t o t h e defense, and sometimes t o a w i t h d r a w a l , viewing i t as one o f t h e a s p e c t s of a f u t u r e a t t a c k . 3
...
...
A d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n should n o t b e viewed as a l e t h a r g i c
e f f o r t designed s o l e l y t o s t o p an invading f o r c e .
I t is a
dynamic o p e r a t i o n f i l l e d w i t h counterblows, c o u n t e r a t t a c k s ,
and c o u n t e r p r e p a r a t i o n a r t i l l e r y f i r e s .
Here t h e combat s i t u a t i o n can change even more o f t e n and more a b r u p t l y than e a r l i e r i n f a v o r of now one, and now t h e o t h e r s i d e . A s a r e s u l t , none of them a r e guaranteed t h a t t h e y w i l l n o t be forced n o t only t o e x p l o i t b u t a l s o t o c o n s o l i d a t e 8uccess, n o t only t o i n f l i c t blows, b u t a l s o t o p a r r y t h e enemy's b l o w s . And t h i s presupposes, depending on t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h e use of v a r i o u s t y p e s of combat o p e r a t i o n s , s w i t c h i n g from one t o t h e o t h e r , f o r example, from t e o f f e n s i v e t o t h e d e f e n s i v e , and v i c e v e r s a .
12
6-2
A first echelon b a t t a l i o n may r e c e i v e a s i n g l e mission t o hold t h e area of defense; a second echelon tank b a t t a l i o n , however, may be assigned
o t h e r t a s k a , i n a d d i t i o n t o i t s basic mission f o r t h e defence of a p o s i t i o n i n depth, such as t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of c o u n t e r a t t a c k s i n two o r t h r e e s e c t o r s , i n cooperation w i t h a d j a c e n t u n i t s , f o r t h e purpose of d e f e a t i n g enemy f o r c e s t h a t have penetrated i n t o t h e defence, and t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of one o r two f i r i n g l i n e s f o r t h e r e p u l s e of an a t t a c k by i n f i l t r a t i n g enemy tanks.5
T h i s paper w i l l , as has been done i n previous
i n nature.
6-2. CONDUCT.
a.
Hasty.
If a combat a c t i o n has ended unfavorably, there are
To d e e t r o y c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g f o r c e s from impor-
t a n t t e r r a i n positions.
2.
at r i v e r c r o s s h g s or t o clear obstacles.
3.
4.
To g a i n time.
To hold p o s i t i o n s .
*The
6-3
5.
offensive,
To secure c o n d i t i o n s f a v o r a b l e f o r a d e c i s i v e
6. To regroup a f t e r r e c e i v i n g e f f e c t i v e N Y C ,
a r t i l l e r y , o r air strikes.
If t h e defense has been assumed as an adverse r e s u l t
of e i t h e r an o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n o r a meeting engagement t h e form of t h e defense cannot be predicted. Troops would d i s mount t h e i r i n f a n t r y carriers and provide cover f o r t h e w i t h drawal of t h e i r v e h i c l e s t o d e f i l a d e p o s i t i o n s .
Tanks would
b e s t he could and attempt t o b r i n g some cohesion t o t h e defense. t h e more t h e p o s i t i o n would resemble a d e l i b e r a t e defense. The d i f f e r e n c e between t h e l a t t e r s t a g e s of a h a s t y defense and t h e beginning of a d e l i b e r a t e defense is a matter of degree, r a t h e r than design.
The more time given t o t h e de-
fenders, t h e more o b s t a c l e s and mines would be emplaced. Given s u f f i c i e n t time t h e troops would be dug-in and v e h i c l e s provided w i t h cover and camouflage. The key f a c t o r i n t h e Another f a c t o r
6-4
Assuming a defense as p a r t of an o f f e n s i v e w i l l be characteri.zed by p r i o r planning and a cohesive s t r u c t u r e , I n f a n t r y t r o o p s w i l l be i n t r e n c h e s o r bunkers i n f r o n t of t h e i r c a r r i e r s and tanks w i l l be i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e a n t i tank defense, f i r i n g from concealed p o s i t i o n s .
Based on t h e
i n a d i r e c t f i r e antitank role.
Antitank a r t i l l e r y and
Defensive a r t i l l e r y b a r r a g e s and
and t h e t r o o p s themselves.
Engineers p 1 a y . a key r o l e i n t h e defense.
t o a i d i n creat.lng t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .
Soviet divi-
Cam-
The
of t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .
I f e s t a b l i s h e d , p l a t o o n and
Also,
may be used throughout t h e s e c u r i t y zone t o confuse t h e enemy and kill him. About t h r e e t o f i v e kilometers i n f r o n t of
t h e main defense b e l t , forward p o s i t i o n s w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d . These w i l l be platoon and company size p o s i t i o n s designed t o confuse t h e enemy as t o t h e a c t u a l l o c a t i o n o f t h e defense, cause him t o deploy prematurely, t o d e t e c t t h e main e f f o r t of t h e enemy, t o k i l l h i m , and t o e l i m i n a t e any reconnaissance i n force. These p o s i t i o n s a r e u s u a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d by second
The
s e c u r i t y zone may eqtend o u t as f a r as 30 kilometers i n f r o n t of t h e main defense b e l t . The main defense b e l t is occupied by first echelon d i v i s i o n s of t h e f i r s t echelon armies and can be up to 15 kilometers i n depth. Usually, a d i v i s i o n defends w i t h two r e i n f o r c e d regiments i n t h e f i r s t echelon, each having a s e c t o r o f 1 0 t o 15 kilometers i n w i d t h , and a r e i n f o r c e d regiment i n t h e second echelon occupying defensive p o s i t i o n s a c r o s s t h e w i d t h of t h e d i v i s i o n ' s assigned s e c t o r . Based
on t h e w i d t h of t h e s e c t o r , t h e troops a v a i l a b l e , and t h e t e r r a i n , a f i r s t echelon regiment could defend i n a s i n g l e echelon. Regiment makes p r o v i s i o n s f o r combined a r m 8 and Assuming t h e defense a s p a r t o f an
antitank reserves.
6-6
o f f e n s i v e is not as e l a b o r a t e as a d e l i b e r a t e or preplanned defense and t h e p r i n c i p l e f a c t o r s d r i v i n g t h e p r e p a r a t i o n and s t r u c t u r e of t h e defense a r e t h e time and support a v a i l able t o construct the positions.
b.
A d e l i b e r a t e defense is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by extensive
t h e p r e p a r a t i o n , t h e more d i f f i c u l t i t w i l l be t o overcome t h e defense. The S o v i e t s f e e l an outnumbered f o r c e , given The array of such a defense i s s u f f i c i e n t time t o prepare i t s p o s i t i o n s , can d e f e a t a v a s t l y superior attacking force. t h e same as described i n t h e previous s e c t i o n .
More time i s u s u a l l y a l l o c a t e d t o t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of
a d e l i b e r a t e defense than is a l l o c a t e d t o assuming a def e n s e a s p a r t of an o f f e n s i v e . Such a defense w i l l be well The S o v i e t s w i l l They s t r u c t u r e d and s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of a n t i t a n k and a n t i personnel o b s t a c l e s w i l l be encountered.
w i l l t r y t o c r e a t e f i r e pockets or f i r e sacks w i t h i n t h e
These a r e a s w i l l be gaps or s a l i e n t s
t h e f l a n k of t h e dummy p o s i t i o n .
The defending u n i t w i l l
direct fires.
and i n s u p p o r t of a d j a c e n t p o s i t i o n s . The mission of t h e first echelon b a t t a l i o n s of t h e r e g i ment is t o h a l t any enemy f o r c e , and i f necessary t o r e s t o r e p o s i t i o n s w i t h a counterblow. The second echelon b a t t a l i o n
o r i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e r e s e r v e s , t o e j e c t any enemy
be s e t up by t a n k p l a t o o n s a d j a c e n t t o r o u t e s i n t o t h e de-
fensive positions.
S o , an a t t a c k e r may be s u b j e c t e d t o
6-8
6 - 3 . OPERATIONAL SUPPORT.
The s e l e c t i o n of t e r r a i n f o r t h e defense i s of extreme
importance t o t h e defender.
make extensive use of map and personal reconnaissance t o pick t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e l o c a t i o n from which t o defend.
t a n k weapons may be s i t e d i n d i v i d u a l l y , b u t as an i n t e g r a l
p a r t of t h e a n t i t a n k defense.
T a n k s may be s i t e d i n d i v i d -
u a l l y w i t h i n t h e scheme of t h e defense o r a8 small u n i t s t o provide f l a n k i n g o r ambush f i r e s . Gaps and f i r e pockets o r f i r e sacks w i l l be covered by d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t f i r e .
The defenders w i l l need extensive amounts of ammunition and
a l o t of i t may be pre-stocked near defensive p o s i t i o n s .
Highly mobile a n t i t a n k and combined arms r e s e r v e s must be l o c a t e d i n a r e a s where they can proceed r a p i d l y t o p o t e n t i a l
areas of employment.
SUCCBBB
of t h e o p e r a t i o n
and may need a d d i t i o n a l support f o r emplacement o f mines I n d i v i d u a l u n i t s w i l l perform a l o t of engineer p r e p a r a t i o n themselves, b u t mechanical
a i d s should be made a v a i l a b l e wherever p o s s i b l e t o speed up
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e defense.
attacks.
6-9
viously.
f o r s e c u r i t y and c o n t i n u i t y r e a s o n s .
t r o o p s can a i d t h e commander i f t h e y can determine t h e a r e a of t h e enemys main e f f o r t o r d i s r u p t t h e enemys command and c o n t r o l by jamming. Radio-electronic combat can be
e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l i n t h e defense.
562 ZAGRADITELNYY OGON ( b a r r a g e f i r e ) - A type of a r t i l l e r y f i r e consisting i n laying a f i r e barrage ( f r o n t a l o r f l a n k ) on a p r e s e l e c t e d l i n e ( o r l i n e s ) i n o r d e r t o i n t e r d i c t movement by enemy i n f a n t r y o r t a n k s . Barrage f i r e i s arranged beforehand, and i s conducted a t a d e f i n i t e r a t e f o r a c e r t a i n period o f time.
585 ZASTAVA ( o u t p o s t ) ( 1 ) The means o f guarding t r o o p s o n tine march (march s e c u r i t y detachment) and i n s t a t i c deploy-
742 KONTRATAKA ( c o u n t e r a t t a c k ) An a t t a c k undertaken by defending t r o o p s a g a i n s t an a t t a c k i n g enemy f o r t h e purpose of p u t t i n g him t o r o u t ( o r d e s t r o y i n g h i m ) and a c h i e v i n g complete o r p a r t i a l r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e p o s i t i o n l o s t by t h e defending t r o o p s . A c o u n t e r a t t a c k i s u s u a l l y mounted by t h e second echelons and r e s e r v e s of u n i t s and formations, and a l s o by p a r t of t h e f o r c e s of t h e S i r s t echelon from s e c t o r s not under a t t a c k .
823 LOZHNYY RAYON OBORONY (dummy defense r e g i o n ) An a r e a of t e r r a i n p a r t i a l l y equipped w i t h dummy defensive s t r u c t u r e s , but not occupied by t r o o p s .
960 OBORONITEL'NAYA OPERATSIYA (defensive o p e r a t i o n ) The aggregate of b a t t l e s fought i n i n d i v i d u a l s e c t o r s f o r t h e purpose of d i s r u p t i n g an enemy o f f e n s i v e s t i l l i n prepara t i o n o r already begun, and a l s o f o r t h e purpoae o f gaining time, and c r e a t i n g favorable c o n d i t i o n s f o r going over t o t h e attack. A contemporary d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n is baaed on t h e use of n u c l e a r s t r i k e s and s t r i k e s w i t h a l l o t h e r types of Weapons, on t h e extensive use of maneuver w i t h f i r e , f o r c e s and weapona, and on c o u n t e r a t t a c k s , imparting an aggreasive and d e c i s i v e c h a r a c t e r t o t h e defense.
961 OBORONTIEL'NAYA POZITSIYA ( d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n ) A s e c t o r o f t e r r a i n intended f o r conducting a defensive b a t t l e by motorized r i f l e and tank s u b u n i t s ( o r u n i t s ) . Defensive p o s i t i o n 6 have s t r o n g p o i n t s prepared by engineers, disposed a t i n t e r v a l s of 1-1.5 kilometers, w i t h f i r i n g l i n e s for tank s u b u n i t s and a n t i t a n k weapons, t r e n c h e s f o r v a r i o u s weapons, s h e l t e r s f o r personnel, and w i t h o t h e r defensive s t r u c t u r e s . Various o b s t a c l e s and dummy o b j e c t s may a l s o be s e t up a t defensive p o s i t i o n s .
s e c t o r s f o r t h e purpose of misleading t h e enemy concerning t h e t r u e l o c a t i o n of t h e forward edge of t h e defense, t o safeguaxd u n i t s ( o r a u b u n i t s ) of t h e first echelon from s u r p r i s e a t t a c k , t o r e p u l s e enemy reconnaissance i n f o r c e , and compel him t o deploy h i s main body prematurely. Subu n i t s from regiments of t h e first echelon a r e u s u a l l y assigned t o defend forward p o s i t i o n s .
1121 PODVIZHNYY ZAGRADITEL'NYY OGON' (PZO) ( r o l l i n g b a r r a g e ) A type of a r t i l l e r y f i r e used i n defense. A r o l l i n g barrage c o n s i s t s i n successive s h i f t s o f a powerful c u r t a i n
6-11
occupied by troops. I t i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e following f e a t u r e s 1 an organized f i r e plan, based on n u c l e a r - m i s s i l e s t r i k e s , supplemented by a i r s t r i k e s and a r t i l l e r y f i r e 1 thoroughly-organized c o o r d i n a t i o n between f o r c e s and weapons; and s t a b l e c o n t r o l .
1144 POZITSIYA ( p o s i t i o n ) - A s e c t o r of t e r r a i n e i t h e r organized o r n o t i n t h e engineering s e n s e f o r occupation by troops. P o s i t i o n s occur i n t h e following c a t e g o r i e s : forward, primary, switch, assembly, launching, f i r i n g , temporary, a l t e r n a t e , dummy, e t c .
1164 POLOSA OBESPECHENIYA ( s e c u r i t y zone) - A zone created ahead of t h e forward edge of defending troops. A s e c u r i t y zone i s c r e a t e d when t h e r e i s no c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy, and u s u a l l y c o n s i s t s of s e v e r a l p o s i t i o n s , covered by o b s t a c l e s and defended by t h e troops i n a c t i o n i n t h e s e c u r i t y zone. The depth of a s e c u r i t y zone depends on t h e concept of t h e defense, t h e n a t u r e of t h e t e r r a i n , and t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of time f o r i t s p r e p a r a t i o n .
1182 POSPESHNO ZANYATAYA ObORONA (hasty d e f e n s e ) A defense created by troops i n t h e course of combat o p e r a t i o n s . A t t h e beginning o f i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n , such a defense is chara c t e r i z e d by8 incomplete r e a d i n e s s and consequent reduced s t a b i l i t y ; an i n s u f f i c i e n t l y developed and organized f i r e plant hurriedly-organized coordination1 i n s u f f i c i e n t development of t h e system of engineer s t r u c t u r e s ; weak e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e t e r r a i n ; and i n s u f f i c i e n t l y s t a b l e c o n t r o l . A h a s t y t r a n s i t i o n t o defense, under modern c o n d i t i o n s , may stem from t h e need t o r e p u l s e c o u n t e r s t r i k e s by s u p e r i o r enemy f o r c e s i n t h e c a u r ~ e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s as a r e s u l t of of a n unsuccessful meeting engagement ( o r b a t t l e ) 1 t h e e f f o r t s of a defender t o h a l t , w i t h h i s r e s e r v e s , f u r t h e r advance of enemy troops which have broken through an some i n t e r m e d i a t e l i n e ; and a l s o , i n a w i t h d r a w a l , when t h e r e t r e a t i n g s i d e , defended by rear-guard elements on an i n t e r m e d i a t e l i n s , t r i e s t o e x t r i c a t e t h e main body under attack.
1184 FOSTROYENIYE OBORONY ( s t r u c t u r e of a d e f e n s e ) - A t r o o p s t r u c t u r e , a f i r e plan, and engineer o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e t e r r a i n . The s t r u c t u r e of a defense must be i n accord w i t h t h e concept of t h e o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) and t h e p l a n o f conducting i t . The o r g a n i z a t i o n of a defense must be deeply echeloned, ensuring wide maneuver of forces and f a c i l i t i e s ,
6-12
both f r o n t a l l y arid i n depth, e n s u r i n g concentrated and e f f e c t i v e use of n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s and o t h e r weapons a g a i n s t t h e most important groupings of t h e a t t a c k i n g enemy, and d e l i v e r y of c o u n t e r s t r i k e s ( o r conduct of c o u n t e r a t t a c k s ) by second echelons and r e s e r v e s .
1225 PROTIVOPEKHOTNYYE ZAGRAZHDENIYA ( a n t i - p e r s o n n e l obstacles) A r t i f i c i a l o b s t a c l e s e r e c t e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , mainly i n s e c t o r s of t h e t e r r a i n which a r e not t r a v e r s i b l e by t a n k s , f o r t h e purpose of impeding movement by enemy i n f a n t r y , and i n f l i c t i n g c a s u a l t i e s . Anti-personnel obstac l e s i n c l u d e mine f i e l d s , barbed-wire, hidden o b s t a c l e s , c o n c e r t i n a w i r e , l o g o b s t a c l e s i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h barbed-wire, and strengthened w i t h land mines, e t c .
1231 PROTIVOTANKOVAYA OSORONA (PTO) ( a n t i - t a n k d e f e n s e ) The sum t o t a l of measures used t o ensure success i n combati n g t a n k s , i n c l u d i n g a f i r e p l a n conducted by a n t i - t a n k weapons, used i n conjunction w i t h o b s t a c l e s f o r t h e purpose of r e p e l l i n g enemy tank a t t a c k s i n a d e f e n s e . Anti-tank defense i s organized throughout t h e e n t i r e depth of an o p e r a t i o n a l defense, p r i m a r i l y i n t h e s e c t o r s of probable tank approach. An a n t i - t a n k p l a n i n c l u d e s company s t r o n g p o i n t s c o n t a i n i n g a n t i - t a n k weapons1 tank ambushes! f i r i n g l i n e s prepared f o r occupation by tank t r o o p s and by a n t i - t a n k r e s e r v e s 1 t a n k s of second echelons and of r e s e r v e s , ( a n t i tank r e s e r v e s ) ; a r t i l l e r y l o c a t e d i n s e c t o r s of probable t a n k approach; and a n t i - t a n k o b s t a c l e s .
1233 PROTIVOTANKOVYYE ZAGRAZHDENIYA ( a n t i - t a n k o b s t a c l e s ) A r t i f i c i a l o b s t a c l e s s e t up on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d f o r t h e p u r pose of s t o p p i n g o r slowing an advance by enemy t a n k s , and r e n d e r i n g them u n s e r v i c e a b l e . Anti-tank o b s t a c l e s make i t e a s i e r t o i n f l i . c t s t r i k e s on enemy t a n k s w i t h a r t i l l e r y f i r e and o t h e r a n t i - t a n k weapons. The main types of a n t i t a n k o b s t a c l e s are t h e mine f i e l d and t h e fougasse. Also used a r e d i t c h e s , escarpments, c o u n t e r - s c a r p s , (steel-beam) p o s t o b s t a c l e s , abatis, l a n d s l i d e s , and flooded o r marshy t e r r a i n s and i n wintertime, b e s i d e s , snow banks and i c y s l o p e s . A s a r u l e , a n t i - t a n k o b s t a c l e s a r e covered by a r t i l l e r y , mortar, and machine-gun f i r e .
1397 SISTEMA ZAGRAZHDENIY ( o b s t a c l e p l a n ) The aggregate of v a r i o u s engineering o b s t a c l e s (mine f i e l d s , mined s e c t o r s of r o a d s , i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t s prepared f o r d e m o l i t i o n , o b s t a c l e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s , o b s t a c l e zones, e t c . ) , c r e a t e d f o r t h e purpose of h i n d e r i n g enemy advance, d e l a y i n g him while r e p u l s i n g h i s c o u n t e r s t r i k e , i n f l i c t i n g l o s s e s on him, and c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r d e f e a t i n g h i s t r o o p s w i t h n u c l e a r and o t h e r weapons.
6-13
1401 SISTEMA OGNYA V OSORONE ( d e f e n s i v e f i r e plan) A comb i n a t i o n of pre-arranged f i r e s t r i k e s on t h e approaches t a a defense, and t h e c r e a t i o n of zones of continuous multit i e r e d f i r e of a l l types ahead of t h e forward edge, on t h e f l a n k s , and i n t h e depth, of t h e defense, and a l s o concent r a t i o n of f i r e , i n b r i e f periods of time, on any threatened a x i s o r s e c t o r . A defensive f i r e plan is formulated i n accordance w i t h t h e concept of t h e o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) , t a k i n g i n t o account n u c l e a r and chemical attacks, and env i s a g i n g c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n of f i r e from a l l t y p e s of weapons and a i r s u p p o r t , i n conjunction w i t h o b s t a c l e p l a n s , and natural. b a r r i e r s . 1508 TAKTICHESKAYA GLUBINA OaORONY ( t a c t i c a l depth of a d e f e n s e ) - The s t r i p o f t e r r a i n which i s occupied and defended by d i v i s i o n s of t h e first echelon of an army.
6-6. ENDNOTES.
Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p. 135. 2Reznichenko, Tactics, p. 207. 3Savkin, P r i n c i p l e s , p. 241-242.
V, M. Pedulov,and V. V. Turchenko, Defensive Operations DurinP An Offensive. Translated by Leo Kanner Associates f o r The rorei n Science and Technology Center. ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e : ?STCe 197 )I Po 13.
6-14
CHAPTER 7
THE WITIiDRAWAL
7-1 GENERAL.
Chapter 2 e s t a b l i s h e s t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a separate
phrase from Generalissimo A . V. Suvorov, which i l l u s t r a t e s t h e h i s t o r i c s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e withdrawal: Suvorov wrote t o Baron Kray t h a t " t h e r e is no shame t o concede a p o s t t o an enemy s u p e r i o r i n numbers. On t h e c o n t r a r y , h e r e i n l i e s t h e m i l i t a r y art of withdrawing i n time without l o s s e s . A stubborn r e s i s t a n c e t o hold any p o s t would c o s t d e a r l y , while subsequently i t would s t i l l have t o be given up t o a s u p e r i o r enemy. A p o s t which has been conceded c a n be occupied a g a i n , while t h e loss i n personnel i s i r r e v e r s i b l e . Oftenlone man is more c o s t l y t h a n t h e p o s t itself.
COL Sidorenko s t r e s s e s t h e multi-faceted n a t u r e of t h e
withdrawall
I t j.s believed t h a t withdrawal o p e r a t i o n s may be conducted for v a r i o u s purposes: t o exhaust a t t a c k i n g enemy t r o o p s and i n f l i c t l o s s e s on themi t o avoid combat under unfavorable c o n d i t i o n s and p l a c e t h e enemy i n a disadvantageous p o s i t i o n i t o c r e a t e t h e opportunity t o t a k e advantage of one's own f o r c e s o r a p o r t i o n of them on o t h e r s e c t o r s of t h e f r o n t ! t o win time f o r b r i n g i n g up addit i o n a l f o r c e s from t h e depth, organize d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s i n t h e r e a r , regroup t r o o p s , and prepare
an a t t a c k 1 and t o d raw t h e enemy i n t o c e r t a i n a r e a s where he can be destroyed by n u c l e a r weapons and c o u n t e r a t t a c k s . 2 The withdrawal and t h e h a s t y defense a r e t h e o n l y forms of combat which may be used a f t e r a n u n s u c c e s s f u l meeting engagement. Deception o p e r a t i o n s could i n c o r p o r a t e a w i t h -
operations.
U Army a n a l y t i c a l e f f o r t s seldom use a withdrawal by S
Therefore, a
d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n on how t o conduct a withdrawal has not been included i n t h i s paper. The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n provides
coNnucT.
"Organization of a w i t h d r a w a l begins only a f t e r r e c e i p t
When
f o r t h e w i t h d r a w a l , is t o break c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy. Contact w i t h t h e enemy s h o u l d be broken d u r i n g p e r i o d s of l i m i t e d v i s i b i l i t y t o minimize d e t e c t i o n o f t h e w i t h drawal. #hen breaking c o n t a c t a r t i l l e r y f i r e and smoke may preclude o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e f r i e n d l y u n i t s . Sev-
b e used t o
7-2
a withdrawal.
w i l l be formed t o p r o t e c t t h e withdrawing f o r c e .
7-3. ENDNOTES.
lSavkin, z r i n c i u l e s , p . 245. 2Sidorenko, Offensive, p. 167. 3Reznichenko, T a c t i c s , p. 242
a
7-3
CHAPTER
CONCLUSIONS
t h e meeting engagement, t h e o f f e n s e , t h e d e f e n s e ,
The meeting engagement or t h e w i t h -
and t h e w i t h d r a w a l .
operations.
u n s u c c e s s f u l meeting engagement.
The S o v i e t s c o n s i d e r t h e e v o l u t i o n of t a c t i c s t o be a
The refinement of S o v i e t
8-1
Changes i n technology have also impacted on S o v i e t Army o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . The dismounted infantryman Today,
t h e S o v i e t Army i s a h i g h l y mechanized f o r c e capable of cond u c t i n g armored warfare i n s e v e r a l p a r t s o f t h e world. Improved technology h a s caused changes i n S o v i e t t a c t i c s i n t h e past, as s t a t e d by General-Major Reznichenko: Examination o f b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s o f contemporary t a c t i c s shows t h a t they d i f f e r from t a c t i c s of past wars, i n c l u d i n g t a c t i c s of t h e period of t h e Great P a t r i o t i c War. I n t h e development of t a c t i c s , j u s t as i n o p e r a t i o n a l a r t and s t r a t e g y , t h e r e has indeed occurred a r e v o l u t i o n which was caused by t h e wide a p p l i c a t i o n o f n u c l e a r weapons and means of t h e i r d e l i v e r y and a l s o by t h e uae of o t h e r o f t h e l a t e s t achievements i n s c i e n c e and technology i n m i l i t a r y affairs.2 Thus, one must s t a y attuned t o developments i n m i l i t a r y weaponry which impact on t h e e v o l u t i o n o f S o v i e t tactics. 8-3- ENDNOTES. 'Savkin, P r i n c i p l e s , p. 278. T a c t i c s , p. 252.
'Reznichenko,
8-2
APPENDIX A
31BLIOGRAPXY
U GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS S
A.
Appendixes t o Notes on t h e S o v i e t Ground l o r c e s . (SupR 69720) U Army I n t e l l i g e n c e C e n t e r and S c h o o l , Department of S t h e A r m y . IJSAINTS, 7 e b r u a r y 1976. Handbook on S o v i e t Ground F o r c e s . (ZM 30-40) Headquarters, Department of t h e Army. DA, 30 June 1975. H i s t o r i c a l S t u d y German Defense Tactics A g a i n s t Russian d r e a k t h r o u g h s . (DA Pam 20-233) H e a d q u a r t e r s , D e p z t m e n t of t h e Army. DA, October 1951. O r g a n i z a t i o n and Equipment of t h e S o v i e t A r m x . (HE( 550-2) Threats D i i d Literature D i r e c t o r a t e , U Army Combined A r m s Combat Developments S A c t i v i t y , Department of t h e Army. CACDA, 31 J u l y 1978. Range and L e t h a l i t y of U and S o v i e t Anti-Armor Weapons. S (TRADOC B u l l e t i n 1U) U Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e S Command, Department of t h e Army. TRADOC, 30 September 1975. S e l e c t e d S o v i e t M i l i t a r y W r i t i n g s We-May 1 2. ( R 8 30-5, Vol I ) U A r m y Command and G e n e r a l S t a S College, Oepartment of t h e Army. CGSC, 4 August 1975.
S e l e c t e d US and S o v i e t Weapons and Equipment. (RE 30-2) U Army Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , Department S of t h e Army. CGSC, J u l y 1975. S o v i e t Artillery. (SupR 66230 ( D / N R I ) ) US Army I n t e l l i g e n c e C e n t e r and S c h o o l , Department of t h e A r m y . USAINTS, November 1967 S o v i e t A r t i l l e r y D o c t r i n e . (Ri3 30-3) U Army Command and S General S t a f f C o l l e g e , Department of t h e Army. C G S C , May 1976.
SOVIET ATGMs:
C a p a b i l i t i e s and Countermeasures. (TRADOC B u l l e t i n 2U) US Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command. Department of t h e Army. TRADCC, A p r i l 1975.
A- 1
S o v i e t Commander's T a c t i c a l Planning Worksheet. (9L8-1337) S Department o f Command, U Army Command and General S t a f f College, Department of t h e Army. CGSC, J u l y 1978. S o v i e t L o g i s t i c s . (XI! 550-3) Threats D i v i s i o n , Concepts and Force Design D i r e c t o r a t e , U Army Combined A r m s Combat S Developments A c t i v i t y , Department of t h e Army. CACDA, 1 August 1977. S o v i e t RPG-7 Antitank Grenade Launcher. (TRADOC B u l l e t i n 3lJ) U Army T r a i n i n g and Doctrine Command, Department S of t h e Army. TRADOC, November 1976. S o v i e t T a c t i c s A r t i l l e r y Organization and Employment. (PT 100-3, Vol 111) U Army Command and General S t a f f S College, Department o f - t h e Army. CGSC, July 1978. S o v i e t T a c t i c s i n t h e Defense. (PT 100-3, Vol V ) U Army S Command and General S t a f f Colleae. - Deaartment of t h e - . * Army. CGSC, J u l y 1978. S o v i e t T a c t i c s i n t h e Offense. (PT 100-3, Vol I V ) U Army S Command and General S t a f f College. Deaartment o f t h e - . A r m y . C G S C , J u l y 1978. S o v i e t T a c t i c s Organization o f S o v i e t D i v i s i o n s . ( p T 100-3, Vol 11) U Army Command and General S t a f f College, S Department of t h e Army. CGSC, J u l y 1978. S o v i e t T a c t i c s Organization of S o v i e t Front and A r m
&
.College, (PT
TXE BMPI
C a p a b i l i t i e s and L i m i t a t i o n s . (TRADOC B u l l e t i n 7 ) U Army T r a i n i n g and Doctrine Command, Department of S t h e Army. TRADOC, 30 June 1977.
The Enemy Force. (RB 30-1) U Army Command and General S t a f f S College, Department of t h e A r m y . CGSC, 1 J u l y 1975. The Leavenworth Assessment of t h e Warsaw Pact Threat i n C e n t r a l Europe. ( H B 550 1 ) Thr e a t s D i v i s i o n , Concepts and Force Design D i r e c t o r a t e , U Army Combined A r m s S Combat Developments A c t i v i t y , Department of t h e Army. CACDA, 1 J u l y 1976.
The Motorized R i f l e RePiment. (TC 30-4) U Army I n t e l l i g e n c e S Center and School, Department of t h e Army. DA, 15 June 1975.
S The T ! m . ( T C 6-4-1) U Army Yield A r t i l l e r y School, Cepartment of t h e Army. USAFAS, May 1976.
A- 2
S M a t e r i a l (SC.05804), Command and S t a f f Department, U Army Armor S c h o o l , Department o f t h e Army. USAARK, August 1976.
,Threat Force Guidance. Deputy C h i e f of S t a f f f o r O p e r a t i o n s , S Readiness and I n t e l l i g e n c e , U Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command, Department of t h e Army. TRADOC L e t t e r , 27 Febr u a r y 1976, Threat Force Guidance. Deputy Chief of S t a f f f o r O p e r a t i o n s , Readiness and I n t e l l i g e n c e , U Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e S Command, Department of t h e Army. TRADOC L e t t e r , 14 May
1976 *
T h r e a t Force Guidance. Deputy Chief of S t a f f f o r O p e r a t i o n s , S Readiness and K n t e l l i g e n c e , U Army 'Training and D o c t r i n e Command, Department of t h e Army. TRADOC L e t t e r , 30 August
I976
T!!REAT
MONOGRAPH A Comparison of Selected NATO and Warsaw Pact E n g i n e e r O r g a n i z a t i o n s and Equipment. Office of t h e Engineer/Deputy Chief o f S t a f f f o r O p e r a t i o n s , Readiness and I n t e l l i g e n c e , U Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command, S Department of t h e Army. TRADOC, 9 December 1977.
Y. T r a n s l a t i o n s
Ashkerov, V. P. A n t i a i r c r a f t M i s s i l e Troops and A n t i a i r c r a f t A r t i l l e r y . Translated by T e c h t r a n C o r p o r a t i o n .for t h e F o r e i g n S c i e n c e and Technology C e n t e r , DDC AD696188. FSTC, 12 September 1969. oabdzhanyan, A . Kh., ed. Tanks and Armored Troops. Transl a t e d by Gaylord F u b l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e US Army TankAutomotive Command, DDC AD762558. Warren, 1970. 2az, I . S., Koxlov, S . N., S i d o r o v , P. A , , and Smirnov, M. V. M i l i t a r y S c i e n c e . T r a n s l a t e d by F'oreign Technology D i v i s i o n , U A i r F o r c e , DDC An660949. W r i g h t S P a t t e r s o n A:%, 20 A p r i l 1967. ijeketov, A. A . , irelokon, A . P., and Chermashentsev. Camouf l a g e of t h e A c t i o n s of t h e S u b u n i t s of Land F o r c e s . S T r a n s l a t e d by F o r e i g n Technology D i v i s i o n , U A i r ; o r c e , DDC AD3021822L. W r i g h t - P a t t e r s o n A?B, 17 J a n u a r y 1977. delokon, A . P. EnPineer O r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e R i f l e Company's Defense Area. T r a n s l a t e d by Techtran C o r p o r a t i o n f o r t h e F o r e i g n S c i e n c e and Technology C e n t e r , DDC AD709615 ?STC , 4 June 1970.
A-
Belokon, A. P. and Korneychuk, V. T. EnRineering Support f o r t h e Motorized R i f l e (Tank) -tB a Translated by Leo Kanner Associates for t h e Foreign Science and $ethnology Center, DDC AD748870. FSTE, 7 August 1972. Belykh, G. A. WeaDons of Mass D e s t r u c t i o n and P r o t e c t i o n AQainSt Them. Translated by T r a n s l a t i o n Division, Naval I n t e l l i g e n c e Support Center, Department of t h e Navy, __ DDC ADA626539. Washington, 3 June 1976. Chistov, A. A , , Chulkov, G. S. and Zelenskiy, V. D. Techn i c a l Supply of Tank and Motorized R i f l e Units i n Modern Combat. Translated by Leo Kanner Associates f o r t h e 2'oreign Science and Technology Center, DDC ADA012981. E'STC, 13 December 1974. Dudarev, S. N. and Shipov, B. V. A r t i l l e r y I n Special Cond i t i o n s . Translated by A s s i s t a n t Chief of S taff f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e for t h e Foreign Science and Technology Center, DDC AD740120. FSTC, 27 January 1972. Fedulov, M. V. and Turchenko, V. V. Defensive Operations During an Offensive. Translated by Leo Kanner Associates f o r t h e Foreign Science and Technology Center, _. DDC ADA005485. FSTC; 27 November 1974.
Perri, A l b e r t Jr., ed. S e l e c t i o n s From t h e S o v i e t Militar Press, 1968-1971. Translated and prepared by Strategi:
S t u d i e s Center f o r t h e O f f i c e , Chief of Research and S Development, U Army, DDC AD759961. Washington, May 1973.
F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Commander's Handbook. Translated by Techtran Coruoration f o r t h e P o r e i m Science and Technolokv -Center, DDC AD912561L. FSTC, 19 June 1973.
Gamezo, M. V.,
and Govorukhin, A. M. Officers' Handbook on M i l i t a r y Tonopraph 3rd ed. Translated by T r a n s l a t i o n Consultants L t d . , f o r Redstone Arsenal and t h e Foreign Science and Technology Center, FSTC-HT-23-119-73. FSTC, 28 J u l y 1972.
Garbuz, G. I . , Loza, D. F . , and Sazonov, I . P . The Motorized R i f l e B a t t a l i o n i n B a t t l e , 2d ed. T r a n s l a t e a by t h e A s s i s t a n t Chief of Staff f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e , K-6080. A C S I , 18 January 1978.
Garbuz, G. I . , Loza, D. F., and Sazonov, I . F. The Motorized R i f l e B a t t a l i o n i n Modern Combat. Translated by Transl a t i o n Consultants L t d . . f o r Redstone Arsenal and t h e Foreign Science and Technology Center, DDC AD748873. FSTC, 1 0 August 1972.
A-4
Gatsolayev, V. A . A i r Defense S u b u n i t s i n Combat. T r a n s l a t e d by J o i n t P u b l i c a t i o n Research S e r v i c e , JPRS 65750. JPRS, 24 September 1975. Gordon, Yu. A. and Khorenkov. A r t i l l e r y Reconnaissance, Translated by r'oreign Technology D i v i s i o n , US A i r F o r c e , DDC AD756987. Wright-Patterson A F 3 , 21 ?ebruary 1973. Gribanov, I. V., Kamyshanov, I . G . , and Kushch, I . I . Rear SupDort of S u b u n i t s i n Combat. T r a n s l a t e d by Leo Kanner Associates f o r t h e T o r e i g n Science and Technology C e n t e r , DDC ADLi00340:jL. FSTC, I0 January 1975. Grechko, A. A . T,ie Armed Forces of t h e S o v i e t S t a t e . Transl a t e d by t h e United S t a t e s A i r Force, 000-070-00379-1. U Government P r i n t i n g Office, 1977. S Karpenko, p. I . and Lyndin, V. S . Tanks Under Water. Transl a t e d by t h e A s s i s t a n t Chief of S t a f f f or I n t e l l i g e n c e for the ? o r e i g n Science and Technology Center, DDC AD74.1049. E'STC, 28 December 1971. Kazakov, 1C. P. Always W i t h t h e I n f a n t r y , Always W i t h t h e T a n k s . Translated by Leo Kanner A s s o c i a t e s f o r t h e ? o r e i g n S c i e n c e and Technology C e n t e r , DDC ADi3002022L. FSTC ,-5 ?ebruary 1975, Kobozov, A . I . , Ignatenko, V. V., and Yermolayev, A . D. M i l i t a r y Topopraphy-Tank Troopers Manual. Translated by t h e Assistant Chief of S t a f f f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e , 5-7995. ACSI, 27 March 1970. Konoplya, E. I . , and Maykov, N. A . The Tank S a t t a l i o n i n Combat, Chapters 1 and 2. Translated by t h e D G I S Multil i n g u a l Services D i v i s i o n , T r a n s l a t i o n Bureau, S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Department, Ottawa, DGIS TRS L i b r a r y N O . 755A. DGIS, 20 August 1974. Konoplya, P. I . , and Maykov, N . A . The Tank B a t t a l i o n i n Combat, Chapters 3 , 4, and 5 . T r a n s l a t e d by t h e DCIS 3 l u l t i l i n g u a l S e r v i c e s D i v i s i o n , T r a n s l a t i o n Bureau, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Department, Ottawa, DGIS TRS L i b r a r y No. 755B. DGIS, 9 October 1974. Konoplya, P . I . , and Maykov, N . A. The Tank Y a t t a l i o n i n Combat, Chapters 6 , 7, 8, and 9 . T r a n s l ' f G I S 9 1 u l t i l i n g u a lS e r v i c e s D i v i s i o n , T r a n s l a t i o n Bureau, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Department, Ottawa, DGIS L i b r a r y NO. 7592: D G I S , 11 October 1974.
A-
Korolev, K. Learning t o Use T e r r a i n S k i l l f u l l y . Translated by Techtran Corporation f o r t h e Foreign Science and Technology Center, DDC ~ ~ 6 9 5 5 1 8 . FSTC, 18 September 1969. Kozlov, S . N . , ed. The O f f i c e r ' s :andbook. Translated by t h e DGIS K u l t i l h g u a l S e c t i o n , T r a n s l a t i o n bureau, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Department, Ottawa, 008-070-00396-1. U Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1977. S Latukhin, A. N. Modern A r t i l l e r y . Translated by t h e A s s i s t a n t Chief of S t a f f f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e , Department of t h e Army, f o r t h e Foreign Science and Technology Center, DDC AD739350. FSTC, November 1971.
Lisov, I . I . S o v i e t Airborne Forces. Translated by Techtran
Corporation f o r t h e Toreign Science and Technoloty Center, DDC AD851494. FSTC, 9 A p r i l 1969.
Lomov, N . A:, ed. S c i e n t i f i c - T e c h n i c a l Progress and t h e Revolution i n Military Affairs. Translated by t h e United S S t a t e s A i r Force, 008-070-0034 0-6. U Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1977. Lysukhin, I . F . Engineer Support o f River Crossinm3. Transl a t e d by Techtran Corporation f o r t h e Foreign Science and Technology Center, DDC m697359. FSTC, 29 October 1969. Lysukhin, I. F., Plyaskin, V. Ya. and Ruvinskiy, V. A. EnEineer Support of Combined A r m s Combat. Translated f l and Science Technology Center, DDC 110786832, FSTC, 29 September 1973. Malinovskiy, R. Combined-Arms Regulations of t h e USSR Armed Forces1 D r i l l Manual of t h e USSR Armed Forces. Trans2 f Staff f o r Intelligence, T-2497. A C S I , 22 April 1975. Radziyevskiy, A . I . , ed. The D i c t i o n a r y o f Basic Militarx Terms. Translated by t h e DGIS M u l t i l i n g u a l S e c t i o n , T r a n s l a t i o n aureau, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Department, Ottawa, 008-070-00360-1. US Government P r i n t i n g Office,
1976
Reznichenko, V. G., ed. T a c t i c s . Translated by Foreign Technology Division, U S A i r Force, DDC AD659928. Wright-Patterson AFB, 4 October 1967. Reznichenko, V . G.,ed. T a c t i c s , a s analyzed by Oleg Hoeffding i n Troop Movements i n S o v i e t T a c t i c a l Doctrine! An Annotated T r a n s l a t i o n , DDC AD738289. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, November 1971. A-6
R o s s a l , N . A . , etl. m i f i c a t i o n of F i r e P o s i t i o n s . 'Pransl a t e d by t h e A s s i s t a n m o f f ? ? o r i n t e l l i g e n c e f o r t h e F o reig n S c i e n c e and Technology C e n t e r , DDC AD695521. TSTC, 18 September 1969.
S a v k i n , V. Ye. The i3asic P r i n c i p l e s of Operational Art and T a c t i c s . T r a n s l a t e d by t h e United S t a t e s A i r ? o r c e , 068-070-00342-2. U Government P r i n t i n g Office, 1976. S S c o t t , William F., ed. S e l e c t e d S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Writings 1970-1975. T r a n s l a t e d by t h e United S t a t e s A i r F o r c e , 008-070-00392-9. US Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1977. S i d o r e n k o , A . A. The Offensive. T r a n s l a t e d by t h e United S t a t e s A i r ? o r c e , 008-070-00329-5. US Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1976. S i n y a y e v , A. D . Reconnaissance i n Mountain Terrain. Transl a t e d by t h e A s s i s t a n t Chief of S t a f f f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e , Department of t h e Army, f o r t h e F o r e i g n S c i e n c e and Technology Center, DDC AD78124-2. FSTC, 5 A p r i l 1974. S o b i k , E r i c h . The Concept of A r t i l l e r y U t i l i z a t i o n and A r t i l l e r y F i r e i n t h e S o v i e t Land F o r c e s . T r a n s l a t e d by Leo Iianner Associates f o r t h e F o r e i g n S c i e n c e and Technology C e n t e r , DDC ADB007856. FSTC, 24 August 1975. T a c t i c e and O r g a n i z a t i o n o f S o v i e t Ground P o r c e s D i f f e r e n t P a r t s . T r a n s l a t e d by R . Lagerwerff f o r t h e F o r e i g n S c i e n c e and Technology Center, DDC ADU00190lL. FSTC, 20 November 1974. Zemskov, V. I . Types of Armed F o r c e s and Branches of t h e S e r v i c e . T r a n s l a t e d by SCITRAN f o r t h e F o r e i g n S c i e n c e and Technology Center, DDC ADB018906L. FSTC, 11 J a n u a r y
1977
C.
Intelligence Reports
ilandbook on t h e S o v i e t Armed F o r c e s . Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Handbook DDB-2680-40-78. D I A , F e b r u a r y 1978. M i l i t a r y Gperations of t h e S o v i e t hrmy. U Army I n t e l l l s e n c e S T h r e a t A n a l y s i s Detachment , Department of t h e Army. iiep o r t No. 14-U-76. A C S I , 25 May 1976. Review of t h e S o v i e t Ground T o r c e s . Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense i n t e l l i g e n c e Report RSGF 1-77. D I A ,
A-7
Review o f t h e S o v i e t Ground Tortes. Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Report RSGF 2-77. D I A , October 1977. Review of t h e S o v i e t Ground Forces. Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Report RSGF 1-78. D t A , A p r i l 1978. S o v i e t and Warsaw Pact Exercise-1976 Kavkaz-Sever-Shchit-76. Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Rep o r t DDI-1100-159-77, D I A , A p r i l 1977. S o v i e t and Warsaw Pact River Crossing; Doctrine and Cauab i l i t i e s . Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense L n t e x l i gnece Report DDI-1150-13-77. D I A , May 1977. S o v i e t Army Ouerations. U Army I n t e l l i g e n c e and Threat S Analysis Center, U Army T n t e l l i g e n c e and S e c u r i t y S Command, Department o f t h e Army. Report No. IAG-134-78. A C S I , April 1978. S o v i e t Ground Forces, N i p h t Ouerations. Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Report DDI-1100-128-76. D I A , 1 Blarch 1976. S o v i e t ! M i l i t a r y Ouerations I n E u i l t Up A r e a s . Defense Int e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense i n t e l l i g e n c e Report DDI-1100155-77. D I A , J u l y 1977. S o v i e t Tactics8 The Meeting Engagement. Defense I n t e l l i gence Agency, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Report DDI-1100-14376. D I A , December 1976. S o v i e t Tank B a t t a l i o n T a c t i c s . Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Report DDI-1120-10-77. D I A , August
1977 *
S o v i e t Tank Comuany T a c t i c s . Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Report DDI-1120-129-76, D I A , May
1976
Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Force Camouflage and Concealment Techniaues. Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense Lnt e l l i g e n c e Report DDI-1100-161-78. D I A , January 1978. The S o v i e t Ground ?orces T r a i n i n g Program. Defense i n t e l l i gence Agency, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Report DD3-1100-20078. D I A , J u l y 1978. The S o v i e t Motorized R i f l e Comuany. Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Report ;GI-1100-77-76. D I A , October 1976.
A-a
airyukov, G. and Malnikov, G. Antitank Warfare. Moscow: Progress P u b l i s h e r s , 1973. aonds, Ray, ed. The SOVIET W a r Machine. New Yorkl Chartwell Yooks, I n c . , 1976. Crow, Duncan and i c k s , Robert J. Encyclopedia o f Tanks. Secaucus.1 C h a r t w e l l 3ooks, I n c . , 1975. Grove, E r i c . W l d W r I1 Tanks. New Yorkl Excalibur Books, a
1976
J o n e s , David R . , ed. S o v i e t Armed Forces Review Annual. Gulf d r e e z e : Academic I n t e r n a t i o n a l P r e s s , 1977. Lewis, William J . , and Wiener, F r i e d r i c h . The Warsaw Pact Armies. Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter P u b l i s h e r s , 1977. Lisov, I . Airborne Troops of t h e S o v i e t A r m Moscow: Novosti P r e s s Agency P u b l i s h i n g House, f 9 7 4 .
P a r r i s h , Michael.. S o v i e t Armed Forces Books i n English
1950-1967. 5
Sokolovskiy, V. D . , .ed. S o v i e t M i l i t a r y S t r a t e a , 3d ed. T r a n s l a t i o n , commentary and a n a l y s i s by H a r i e t F a s t S c o t t . New Yorkc Crane, Ruseak and Co., 1975. Weeks, John. Men Against Tanks. New York: Mason/Charter,
1975Wiener, F r i e d r i c h . The Armies of t h e Warsaw Pact Nations. Translated by William J. Lewis. Vienna8 Carl Ueberreuter F u b l i s h e r s , 1976. Windrow, Martin, ed. The S o v i e t Arq. New York: Hippocrene Jooks, I n c . , 1973. Wolfe, Thomas W. S o v i e t Power and more and Londoni The Johns
PERIODICALS ANIJ ARTICLES
Abramtsev, B "Use of Smoke i n t h e Offensive. " Voyenniy Vestnik, December 1976, pp. l l 5 - l Z O . Arnold, Joseph C . "The S o v i e t Army: B l i t z i n g , Brawling C h i l d o f Evolution." ARMY, May 1977, pp. 22-26.
A-9
Azhimov, V. "Through Obstacle and Cemolition Zones." S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, June 1977, pp. 16-17. 3 a k e r l J o h n D . , Jr. "Where t h e S o v i e t s Are Vulnerable." ARMY, August 1978, pp. 22-27.
S a r t l e t t , Charles M. "Soviet S e l f - F r o p e l l e d Cannon A r t i l l e r y . " r i i l i t a r y Review, June 1978, pp. 54-66. 5earden, Thomas E. "Soviet A i r Dei'ense Concevts. January-March 1976, pp, 6-11.
" A i r Defense,
s e t i t , Eugene D. "Soviet T a c t i c a l D o c t r i n e f o r Night Combat." Ml t a r y Review , August 1975, pp. 21 -33. ii J e t i t , Eugene D. "Soviet Technological P r e p a r a t i o n f o r Night Combat." K i l i t a r y Review, March 1975, pp. 89-93. Y e t i t , Eugene D . "Soviet T r a i n i n g for Night Warfare." M i l i t a r y Review, September 1975, pp, 80-86. S o r i s o v , G. "Technical Support i n Defence. Review, A p r i l 1974, pp. 34-35. S o v i e t Xilitarz
dubnov, O., and Kharitonov, V. "Ruler ?or C a l c u l a t i n Smoke S c r e e n s . ' Voyennig Vestnik, J u l y 1975, pp. 180-1 5 .
Chernikov, V . , Lobko, M., and Vaxenik, V . "The Use of 3MP's I n S a t t l e . " Voyenniy Vestnik, September 1975, pp. 55-57. Chuyko, L. "Tanks I n The S i g h t . " Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 June 1977, P * 1. Donnelly, C . N .
Donnelly, C . N. "Soviet Techniques f o r Combat i n d u i l t Up Areas." I n t e r n a t i o n a l Defense Review, No. 2, 1977, pp. 238-242. Erickson, John. "NATO Modernisation and S o v i e t Theatre Forces Soviet Military D i ~ e s ~ , November 1976, 61 pages,
."
Erickson, John. "'Shield-72' I Warsaw Pact M i l i t a r y Exerc i s e s . " RUSI J o u r n a l , December 1972, pp. 32-34. Erickson, John. "Soviet M i l i t a r y C a p a b i l i t i e s i n Europe." RUSI J o u r n a l , March 1975, pp. 65-69.
A-10
Erickson, John. "Soviet M i l i t a r y Posture and P o l i c y i n Europe." Arlington1 Stanford Research I n s t i t u t e , 1974, 38 pages. Erickson, John. "Soviet-Warsaw Pact Force Levels." Report 76-2, 1976, pp. 1-88.
USsI
23-36.
Erickson, John. "Trends i n t h e S o v i e t Combined-Arms Concept." Winter 1976, pp. 129-145. S t r a t e g i c Rv, eiIofmann, Gberst K. "An Analysis of S o v i e t A r t i l l e r y Development." I n t e r n a t i o n a l Defense Review, No. 6 , 1977, pp. 1057-1061. Karnenskiy, L. "The Use of BMP's I n B a t t l e . " Voyenniy Vestnik, August 1975, pp. 49-50.
Karber. P h i l l i p A . "The T a c t i c a l Revolution i n S o v i e t M i i i t a r y Doctrine P a r t Two. I' M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i g e n c e , January-March 1978, pp. 28-41.
Karber, P h i l l i p A. "The T a c t i c a l Revolution i n S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Doctrine - Part Three." M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i p e n c e , April-June 1978, pp. 14-20.
"'Karpaty' (The C a r p a t h i a n s ) M i l i t a r y T r a i n i n g E x e r c i s e . " Various s o u r c e s . various d a t e s . as translated i n T ranslatio ns on-USSR M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s , U J o i n t FubliS c a t i o n s Research S e r v i c e , Number 69709, 30 August 1977, Kushch, I:. 9 a t t a l i o n Lo i s t i c s Control." S o v i e t M i l i t a q Review, December 1978, pp. 22-24. rviatsulenko, V . "Breakthrough of Enemy Defences. M i l i t a r y Re , January 1974, pp. 54-56.
I '
Soviet
Meehan, John F. 111. "Soviet Maneuvers Summer 1971." M i l i t a r y Re , A p r i l 1972, pp. 14-21.
A-11
Xikhailov, L. "Tank S a t t a l i o n ?orces Water a a r r i e r . I' S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, January 1974, pp. 24-26. Molchanov, N. "Maneuvering of A n t i a i r c r a f t A r t i l l e r y Sub-
Soviet Military
Ryazantsev, D. "Vehicle Maintenance A f t e r E x e r c i s e s . " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, November 1977, pp. UNK. Saksonov, Y. "Roving Gun 3 a t t e r i e s and T h e i r N e u t r a l i s a t i o n . " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, November 1977, pp. 21-22. S a l i s b u r y , Thomas M. 111. "Kavkaz-76. June 1977, PP. 47-55.
I '
M i l i t a r y Review,
Samigulin, K. "Reconnaissance on t h e March. 'I S o v i e t Military Review, A p r i l 1977, pp. 15-17. Savkin, V. Ye. "Characteristics of Modern Warfare." M i l i t a r y Review, October 1974, pp. 30-35. Semyanovskiy, 2'. "Above t h e B a t t l e f i e l d . 26 August 1977, p . 1.
'I
Krasnaya Zvezda,
"'Shield-76 M i l i t a r y T r a i n i n g E x e r c i s e . Krasnaya Zvezda, v a r i o u s d a t e s , as t r a n s l a t e d i n T r a n s l a t i o n s on USSR N i l i t a r y A f f a i r s , U J o i n t F u b l i c a t i o n s Research S S e r v i c e , Number 68372, 16 December 1975, pp. 1 - 2 1 ,
'I
."
M i l i t a r y Review,
Sobik, C. E. "Warsaw Pact and S o v i e t Maneuvers." S o l d a t und T e c h n i k , Volume 1 0 , 1971, pp. 560-564, a s t r a n s l a t e d by O A C S I , DA, 25 October 1973. "Soviet A r m s I The G r i m Truth." Times (London), 8 3ebruary 1976, e d i t o r i a l by John Erickson. Subbotin, V. " A i r Defence of a Tactical A i r Landing Zone." S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, May 1977, pp. 22-23. "Target Reconnairisance." Znamenosets, Play 1977, pp. 10-11, T u r b i v i l l e , Graham H. "Invasion I n Europe-A S c e n a r i o . " ARMY, November 1976, pp. 16-21.
T u r b i v i l l e , Graham :!., S r . "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers - Recent Exercise P a t t e r n s and T h e i r I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r European S e c u r i t y . " M i l i t a r y Review, August 1978, pp. 19-35. T u r b i v i l l e , Graham H . , Jr. "Warsaw Pact Exercise Shield-72." M i l i t a r y Rev&, J u l y 1973, pp. 17-24. Tychkov, M. "Tank-Mounted Troops. November 1974, pp. 14-15.
'I
S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review,
Vorobyov, I . " P e c u l i a r i t i e s of Defence I n Mountains." S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, A p r i l 1974, pp. 21-23. Vorobyov, I . " P r i n c i p l e s of Modern A l l - A r m s Combat." S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, November 1973, pp. 24-25. Vorobyev, I . "Using All Firepower." Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 November 1977, pp. 2 ID.
'I
Wolfe, Thomas W. "Soviet M i l i t a r y C a p a b i l i t i e s and I n t e n t i o n s I n Europe." Santa Monica: RAND c o r p o r a t i o n , March 1974, 38 pages. Yelshin, N . "A Complex Exercise." S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, A p r i l 1977, pp. 20-21. Zherdeyev, A . "Assault Team." S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, November 1977, pp. 18-20.
A-13
Zhukov, V. "Manoeuvre as t h e Essence of T a c t i c s . " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, June 1977, pp. 11-13. Zhuravlyov, M. "How t o Ensure R e l i a b l e Operation." Sovie; M i l i t a r y Review, May 1977, pp. 16-17. Zyryanov, A. "Tank Offensive I n Mountains." S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Review, October 1973, pp. 13-14.
OTHER REFERENCES
Deane, Michael J. and Scharfen, John C . S o v i e t T a -- a l ctic Doctrine f o r Urban Warfare. S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s Center, Stanford Research I n s t i t u t e , DDC ADA022998. Arlington: December 1975. X a n n e r y , C . M . "Night Operations-The S o v i e t Approach. M A Thesis, US Army Command and General S t a f f College, MS 1978
'I
Kimball, John A.
"The S o v i e t Motorized R i f l e 3 a t t a l i o n i n t h e Meeting Engagement." M A Thesis, U Army Command MS S and General Staff College, 1977.
Kosevich, Richard S. The BMP-Equipped Motorized R i f l e j a t t a l i o n i n t h e Offense. Garmisch I US h r m y l ~ ~ t u t e f o r Advanced Russian and E a s t European S t u d i e s , 1977. S c o t t , X a r r i e t F a s t . S o v i e t M i l i t a r y C o c t r i n e : I t s Pormul a t i o n and Cissem'ination. S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s Center, Stanford Research I n s t i t u t e , DDC Nl743909. Arlington: 17 June 1971.
Shaw, Harry. Punctuate I t R i g h t l . New York, Evanston, and San Trancisco: 3arnes and Noble uooks, 1963.
Turabian, Kate L. A Manual for Writers o f Term Pa e r g , 'Theses. and D i s s e r t a t i o n s . 4 t h ed. Chicago; T e University of Chicago P r e s s , 1973. Roget, P e t e r M. Roget's I n t e r n a t i o n a l Thesaurus. 3 r d ed. Edited by L e s t e r V. 3errey. Tokyo1 Toppan Company L t d . , 1962. The American College D i c t i o n a r Edited by C . L. Rarnhart. New Y o r k l Random .iouse, 1!?%8.
A-14
APPENDIX
I K I T I A L D I S T R I B U T I O N LIST
C D R , T R A D O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CDR,PORSCOM
..
1 1 1
2
.................. D I R , TiCKG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D I R , TRASANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DiR,MSAA .................... C F I Ms. aru nsel C D R , 1st C a v Div . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CDR,USAAVNC ................... C F : COL Yurnett CDR,USAARMC . . C F I KAJ A l b r i g h t
C D R , V U Corps S C F I C O L Temperley
e .
1
1
1
1
.....................
1
1
1
2
3-1
AGENCY
D I R , D I A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CF: NAJ Frasche 'OACSi, DA
C F I L?'C Hope
COPIES
1
1
....................
C F I NAJ Siebert
Totall 22 Copies
5-2