Findings of International Campaign to Ban Landmines Advocacy Mission to Colombia 9 15 October 2011

Executive Summary: Between 9-15 October 2011, at the invitation of the Colombia Campaign Against Landmines (CCCM), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) carried out an advocacy mission in Colombia. A central purpose of the mission was to gather information about the high casualty rate from landmines among manual coca eradicators in order to determine the role of the ICBL, in cooperation with CCCM, in addressing this issue. The advocacy mission included a total of three days in Bogota visiting with government officials and representatives of non-governmental and international organizations.1 Interviews included visits to the Colombian Mine Action authority (PAICMA), the Public Defenders Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police unit responsible for Manual Eradication, the Organization of American States Mine Action Program (OAS AICMA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Mine Action Team (UNMAT) for Colombia and the Narcotics Affairs Section of the United States Embassy. The ICBL consultant also traveled to two other departments of Colombia, Caldas and Magdalena, to meet with coca eradicators who are survivors of landmine accidents that occurred during the manual eradication process. Based on the findings of this mission, the ICBL has concluded that the Colombian manual eradication program puts civilians at risk of mines and that, thus far, the government has not been able to effectively protect citizens from this risk. In addition, the ICBL has been unable to identify any means to effectively protect citizens under the current conditions of the manual eradication program. Therefore, it is the position of the ICBL that civilians should not be

Multiple attempts to meet with representatives of the Colombia Program for Illicit Crops (PCI) were unsuccessful.

recruited to take part in the Colombian manual eradication program. The ICBL calls on the Colombian government to end the involvement of civilians in this program. The ICBL has no position on the manual eradication program itself. Prior to the recruitment of civilians, security forces carried out eradication and this is still seen as a viable alternative due to the greater protection and training that security forces receive. In addition, there remain coca eradicator survivors who have not been able to access the assistance to which they are entitled. In order to ensure expedient access to a full range of victim assistance, the government must redouble its efforts to recognize and certify coca eradicator survivors as mine victims. While national and international organizations should continue to support this effort, the government has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that all Colombian mine victims have access to all of their rights. Illicit Crop Eradication and Landmines Improvised explosive devices are systematically used by non-state armed actors/groups (NSAG) to protect coca and other illicit crops targeted by Colombias forced2 manual illicit crop eradication program (PCI).3 These devices, laid by non state armed actors, are mostly victimactivated and designed to function as antipersonnel landmines.4 Between 2006 and August 2011, 266 manual coca eradicators were killed or injured by improvised explosive devices acting as antipersonnel mines while manually eradicating coca.5 These incidents have occurred on coca plantations in 33 municipalities across 12 departments.6 Manual coca eradicators are civilians that are accompanied by security forces, either the police or the military.7 While the number of civilian casualties in Colombia declined overall from 2009 to 2010, the number of civilian adult casualties who were manual illicit crop eradicators
2

Here, the word forced relates to whether or not farmers agree to the eradication of their crops and has nothing to do with the labor conditions of eradicators who are voluntary laborers. 3 The eradication program includes aerial fumigation of illicit crops, forced manual eradication and voluntary manual eradication where farmers agree to eradicate their own crops in exchange for some financial incentive. 4 According to the National Police, Illicit Crops Eradication Department, most mines are victim-activated, and are designed to be activated either through direct pressure or through tension via a tripwire. In some cases, mines are command detonated but this is very rare. At times, the use of mines is accompanied by shooting to increase confusion. Representatives of PAICMA concurred with this description regarding the type of explosive devices being used to protect illicit crops. 5 In addition to manual eradicators, numerous members of the security forces have been involved in mine incidents in relation to coca eradication. While these statistics are included within Colombias total number of mine incidents, neither PAICMA nor the national police was able to provide me with casualty figures for security forces in eradicating operations. Source: Presidential Program for Mine Action (PAICMA). 6 Ulrich Tietze, European Union Technical Advisor to the Colombia Mine Action Program, Manual eradication of illicit crops, Bogota, 31 May 2011, document provided to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. 7 In Colombia, the police are a branch of the armed forces, not a civilian department. The police accompany eradicators where they have jurisdiction. In National parks, which are outside of the jurisdiction of the police, eradicators are accompanied by the army.

increased from 54 to 58 persons and the percentage of all civilian casualties almost doubled to 43% in 2010 from 23% in 2009.8 Protection of Civilians As a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia has a legal obligation under Article 5.2 to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from all areas where antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.9 The rising number of mine casualties indicates that, to date, Colombia, despite having taken action, has not been successful in excluding manual coca eradicators from such areas. Risk Education Beginning in 2010, upon the request of the Ministry of Social Action, which includes the Program for Illicit Crops (PCI), PAICMA began producing mine risk education materials for use with manual coca eradicators. MRE workshops were carried out at first as a pilot project and then expanded in 2011. MRE for manual eradicators is funded by the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Other risk education operators, such as UNICEF and various Colombian NGOs, including the CCCM, have refused to provide risk education to coca eradicators on the grounds that it could not possibly be effective and would only serve to legitimate the use of civilians in the manual eradication program. The main reasons given for why risk education is ineffective: The key message of any MRE program is that people should not enter areas that they suspect are mined. However, coca eradicators are obliged to enter areas where they believe there may be mines because it is their job. PAICMA MRE materials are designed to tell eradicators what to avoid. However, the materials make it clear that the design of the non-factory made mines that are most commonly used and the tactics used to disguise them make avoidance nearly impossible. NSAGs use a variety of different tactics to disguise mines, including planting them very deep and just exposing a small trip wire or connecting a trip wire to the roots

No statistic was available as to what percentage of coca eradicators have been involved in incidents with landmines. Because coca eradicators work on short term contracts, it is difficult to determine the total number of eradicators working within a calendar year with the annual casualty rate. 9 This provision has no bearing on the ability of properly trained and accredited civilian deminers to enter such areas in connection with mine action activities. Such activities are often central to a states ability to carry out its demining duties under the convention, though they should be governed by national laws and policies. Article 5.2: Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed.

of the coca plants to be eradicated. Mines are also hidden within other objects such as rusty cans. Other efforts made to exclude civilian coca eradicators from mined areas While coca fields due to be eradicated are not included within the Colombian database of suspected hazard areas until an incident occurs, policies and actions designed to protect eradicators make it clear that the government institutions involved in the eradication program, such as the PCI and the Police Crop Eradication Unit, expect that at least some fields due to be eradicated will be, or are already, mined. Precautionary policies and actions include requiring eradicators to sign a contract stating that there are risks of mines, using the surprise arrivals of a team of eradicators to prevent NSAGs from having time to mine an area, having emergency deminers accompany eradicators, and changing approach paths to avoid potentially mined pathways. To date, none of the responses to the growing number of mine casualties listed, including providing mine risk education materials to eradicators, have proven themselves to be effective in protecting eradicators. Instead, despite knowledge of the risks, civilians are not being excluded from suspected areas but rather are being hired to enter these areas. In addition, it is understood that when accidents have occurred, not all eradication operations in the area are suspended. PCI supervisors only suspend the work of the one eradication group that has been affected, despite the proximity of other groups and the potential risk for them. As of October 2011, the Colombian National Public Defenders Office had already advised the government that the recruitment of civilians for the manual eradication program should be suspended.10 In September 2010, the departmental court in Meta ruled against the State, in favor of the family of an eradicator who was killed by a landmine. The courts decision held the State responsible for his death for having put him in exceptional risk. Numerous other court cases are underway or are being developed based on the claim that the State is guilty of having placed civilians at exceptional risk. Victim Assistance Eradicators killed or injured by landmines in 2006 received no benefits or victim assistance at the time due to the informal nature of their employment contracts. Since then, some improvements have provided coca eradicators with insurance and other coverage related to their employment contracts. However, various bureaucratic challenges have prevented many eradicator survivors or family members of eradicators who have been killed from accessing
10

As of December 2011, the National Public Defenders Office indicated that a public report of its opinion on the use of civilians in coca eradication was in process but was not yet available.

those benefits to which they are entitled. For example, when some survivors have contacted the national insurance company for benefits, their claims have been denied because there is no labor category for illicit crop eradication. In other cases, benefits are denied because the place of the accident, the place of treatment and the place of residence of the survivor all differ. This is because survivors are evacuated outside the department for emergency treatment and then, once stabilized, sent home to a third department. PAICMA and PCI have both recognized the problem and have determined that all eradicator survivors should be registered as mine victims, like any other mine victim in the country, which would then entitle them to benefits. PAICMA was unable to say how many coca eradicators had been successfully registered. In the case of the survivors in Magdalena, several attempted to register and were told that they would have to travel back to the place where the accident occurred (Sur de Bolivar) to get a certification of the accident. However, since local authorities were not informed about the accident, they know it will be impossible to get this paperwork. PAICMA has confirmed that it is working to help eradicators to register without the usual paperwork. Results thus far indicate that this is a very slow process and, in the meantime, Handicap International and other international organizations, as well as the CCCM all reported that they had provided monetary, legal and other assistance to eradicator survivors who were unable to receive benefits to which the government says they are entitled. A redoubled effort by all government institutions involved to certify eradicator survivors as quickly as possible is the best way to guarantee that rights of all survivors are upheld. Conclusion The ICBL has the following recommendations: The Colombian government should cease to recruit civilians to take part in the Colombian manual eradication program. The government should redouble its efforts to recognize and certify coca eradicator survivors as mine victims to ensure access to a full range of victim assistance.

The ICBL will continue to monitor the governments efforts and will offer assistance where it can to expedite the certification of coca eradicator survivors as mine victims.

Annex 1: List of Interviews conducted while in Colombia

Presidential Program for Comprehensive Action against Anti-personnel Landmines (PAICMA) Ministry of Foreign Relations National Public Defenders Office Aviation Support for Illicit Crop Eradication Program, National Police Manual Eradication Program, National Police Organization of American States OAS. Former OAS Field Workers Coca Eradicator Survivors United Nations Mine Action Team: Representatives of the Department of Security, UNMAS , OCHA, UNDP, IOM, UNICEF Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Colombia CCCM Regional Coordinator, Caldas CCCM Regional Coordinator, Magdalena Handicap International, Colombia Mercy Corps, Colombia Narcotics Affairs Section, US Embassy