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Iran- U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses - CRS Report - March 2012

Iran- U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses - CRS Report - March 2012

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CRS Report for Congress
 Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern AffairsMarch 2, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700www.crs.govRL32048
 
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy ResponsesCongressional Research Service
Summary
The Obama Administration identifies Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests.This perception is generated by suspicions of Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program— heightened by a November 8, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report—as wellas by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S.officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular oppositionmovement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S.government of Bahrain. Tensions have been particularly elevated since Iran’s late December 2011threat to try to choke off much of the world’s oil supplies by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz—a reaction to the imposition of significant sanctions against Iran’s vital exports of oil.The sense of imminent crisis with Iran—much of which has been brought on by Israeli threats to buck U.S. advice by acting militarily against Iran’s nuclear program—follows three years inwhich the Obama Administration has assembled a broad international coalition to pressure Iranthrough economic sanctions—while also offering sustained engagement with Iran. None of the pressure has, to date, altered Iran’s pursuit of its nuclear program: Iran attended December 2010and January 2011 talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no progress was reported atany of these meetings. However, since the beginning of 2012, as significant multilateral sanctionshave been added on Iran’s oil exports—including an oil purchase embargo by the EuropeanUnion to go into full effect by July 1, 2012—there are growing indications that the regime feelseconomic pressure. Iran’s leaders have responded not only with threats to commerce in the Straitof Hormuz, but also stated a willingness to enter into new nuclear talks without preconditions. Atthe same time, it has begun uranium enrichment at a deep underground facility near Qom. TheAdministration uses indicators such as Iran’s economic deterioration and its willingness to engagein new talks as evidence that policy is starting to work and should be given more time before anyconsideration of U.S. or other country military options.The Administration also perceives that the legitimacy and popularity of Iran’s regime is indecline, although not to the point where the perceived threat from Iran is likely to end in the near future. The regime has sought to parry the perception that it is increasingly isolated—a perceptionthat might color the outcome of March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections. In advance of the vote,the regime arrested activists whom they suspect might try to spark unrest during the electioncampaign—a fear heightened by the boycott of the poll by reformist groups. Over the past twoyears, the United States has increased public criticism of Iran’s human rights record, an effort broadly supported in the international community. Some in the 112
th
Congress, aside fromsupporting additional economic sanctions against Iran, believe the United States should provideadditional vocal and material support to the democracy movement in Iran, despite the relativequiescence of the opposition “Green Movement” since early 2010. The Administration argues thatit has supported the opposition through civil society and other programs, and by using recentauthorities to sanction Iranian officials who suppress human rights in Iran and help Syria represshuman rights. For further information, including pending Iran sanctions legislation, see CRSReport RS20871,
 Iran Sanctions
; and CRS Report R40094,
 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’sCompliance with International Obligations
, by Paul K. Kerr 
 
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy ResponsesCongressional Research Service
Contents
Political History...............................................................................................................................1
 
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition....................................................................................2
 
Unelected Governing Institutions: The Supreme Leader, His Powers, and Other Ruling Councils......................................................................................................................2
 
Council of Guardians and Expediency Council..................................................................3
 
Elected Institutions: The Presidency, the Majles (Parliament), the Assembly of Experts, and Recent Elections................................................................................................8
 
The Presidency....................................................................................................................8
 
The Majles...........................................................................................................................8
 
The Assembly of Experts....................................................................................................9
 
Recent Presidential Elections: First Ahmadinejad Election in 2005...................................9
 
Ahmadinejad (Disputed) Reelection on June 12, 2009: Protests Erupt............................10
 
Ahmadinejad’s Second Term: Divisions Within the Regime Increase WithPopular Unrest and Arab Uprisings As Backdrop..........................................................11
 
March 2, 2012, Majles Elections: Reformists Boycott, Hardliners Run AgainstEach Other......................................................................................................................13
 
The Opposition........................................................................................................................14
 
The Green Movement........................................................................................................14
 
Green Movement Allies and Other U.S.-Based Activists..................................................15
 
Exiled Opposition Factions: People’s Mojahedin and Others...........................................17
 
Pro-Monarchy Radical Groups..........................................................................................20
 
Ethnic or Religiously Based Armed Groups.....................................................................20
 
Other Human Rights Practices.......................................................................................................21
 
Criticism of Iran’s Record in U.N. Bodies..............................................................................21
 
Special U.N. Rapporteur Reestablished............................................................................22
 
Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs...................................24
 
Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force.......................................................24
 
 Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy..........................................................28
 
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and the November 8, 2011, IAEA Report.................................28
 
Iran’s Position and Counter-Arguments............................................................................29
 
 Nuclear Weapons Time Frame Estimates..........................................................................29
 
Status of Enrichment.........................................................................................................30
 
The International Response and Policies...........................................................................31
 
The International Response Under the Obama Administration.........................................34
 
Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons, and Missiles..........................................................39
 
Ballistic Missiles/Warheads..............................................................................................39
 
Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups..........................................................................41
 
Support for International Terrorism.........................................................................................42
 
Foreign Policy: Relations with the Persian Gulf States...........................................................43
 
Iranian Policy in Iraq...............................................................................................................46
 
Supporting Palestinian Militant Groups..................................................................................47
 
Iran and Hamas..................................................................................................................47
 
Lebanese Hezbollah and Syria................................................................................................48
 
Syria..................................................................................................................................49
 
Central Asia and the Caspian...................................................................................................50
 
South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India..........................................................................51
 

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