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REGIUNEA EXTINS A MRII NEGRE
- Interese i strategii fundamentale pentru regiunea Mrii Negre OGNYAN MINCHEV 5

SUMAR

SECURITATEA ENERGETIC
- GUAM and OSCE the Role of Multilateral Institutions in Dealing with the Security of the Greater Black Sea Area VLADIMIR SOCOR - Cooperarea UE-Rusia i sigurana aprovizionrii cu petrol i gaze naturale MAIOR STELIAN FIZEAN 31

36

PERSPECTIVE ASUPRA PROCESULUI DE EXTINDERE A UE

- Norway and an Enlarged European Union H.E. LEIF ARNE ULLAND 51

RZBOIUL RECE
- Descurajarea i balana ofensiv-defensiv MIHAI ZODIAN 61

LUPTA MPOTRIVA TERORISMULUI INTERNAIONAL

- People Human Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Matrixes VLADIMIR LUKOV 77

GEOPOLITIC
- The Rebirth of Romanian Geopolitics after the Cold War ERBAN F. CIOCULESCU 89

ORIENTUL MIJLOCIU
- Turkeys Middle East Policy between Domestic Politics

ISPAIM monitor strategic 3-4 / 2006

and International Requirements BEZEN BALAMIR COSKUN

109

STRATEGII DE SECURITATE
- Conictele de mic intensitate. Implicaii de ordin politico-militar DRAGO BNESCU - Strategii de securitate post-Rzboi Rece BOGDAN SGRCITU 119 126

DOCUMENTAR
- Romanian Armed Forces participation in post-conict military actions. Case study: Afghanistan LTC CRISTIAN DUMITRU 141

AGEND TIINIFIC
- Din agenda tiinic a Institutului pentru Studii Politice de Aprare i Istorie Militar MAIOR STELIAN FIZEAN 151

RECENZII
- Liviu C. ru, ntre Washington i Moscova: Romnia 1945-1965 CERASELA MOLDOVEANU 159

Redactori: erban Filip Cioculescu Cristina Romila Mircea Soreanu Alexandru Voicu Cpitan Darie-Mircea Dau Grafic i DTP: Mdlina Di Operaiile tehnice, editoriale i tiparul au fost executate la Centrul Tehnic Editorial al Armatei sub comanda nr.
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REGIUNEA EXTINS A MRII NEGRE

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CUPRINS

I. Interesele occidentale n Zona Mrii Negre 1. Perspectiva strategic a SUA fa de regiunea Mrii Negre 2. Europa Unit i Marea Neagr II. Puterile de statu-quo de la Marea Neagr 1. Rusia i Marea Neagr 2. Turcia i Marea Neagr III. Comunitatea aspiranilor: rile post-comuniste din regiunea Mrii Negre IV. Opiuni strategice alternative pentru securitatea i dezvoltarea Mrii Negre pe termen scurt i mediu

Note

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Interese i strategii fundamentale pentru regiunea Mrii Negre

Ognyan Minchev
Exist trei categorii de interese fundamentale care se regsesc astzi n regiunea Mrii Negre. n primul rnd, exist interesele Vestului, mprite aproape explicit ntre SUA i poziiile marilor state europene continentale. Att Washingtonul ct i rile membre ale UE pun n practic strategii de transformare i modicare a regiunii Mrii Negre, pe baza unei agende politice diferite care coincid doar parial. n al doilea rnd, interesele Rusiei post-sovietice i ale Turciei se apropie din ce n ce mai mult ntrun bloc al puterilor statu-quo de la Marea Neagr. n al treilea rnd, remarcm interesele statelor mici de la Marea Neagr (includem i Ucraina n aceast categorie, dei dimensiunea acesteia nu corespunde deniiei de stat mic). Aceste mici state sunt destul de deosebite ntre ele i au agende politice diferite. Bulgaria i Romnia sunt membre ale NATO i este probabil s devin i membre ale UE de la 1 ianuarie 2007. Ucraina, Georgia i Moldova se lupt ecare dintre aceste ri n contextul su specic pentru independena fa de tendinele neo-imperiale ale Rusiei, pentru integrare naional i pentru reform i succesul modernizrii. Armenia i urmrete propria agend strategic, dominat de conictul din Nagorno-Karabah cu Azerbaidjan i blocada efectiv impus de Turcia n baza mai multor dispute bilaterale existente, inclusiv Karabah. Nu n cele din urm, Azerbaidjanul este prezent de la distan n zona Mrii Negre, prin intensicarea uxurilor de petrol azer ce trec prin Caucaz i Marea Neagr (conducta Baku-Tbilini-Ceyhan BTC), i cu prezena sa integral n balana strategic a Caucazului de Sud i n contextul post-sovietic mai larg1 . I. INTERESELE OCCIDENTALE N ZONA MRII NEGRE Marea Neagr a fost o frontier a Rzboiului Rece, continund o motenire de rivalitate imperial intens ntre Rusia i Imperiul Otoman, de-a lungul a cinci secole, cu o scurt pauz n perioada interbelic, naintea formrii unei lumi bipolare la sfritul anilor 1940. Dup 1989, regiunea s-a plasat n partea rsritean a zonei ntre Rusia postsovietic i Aliana occidental victorioas. Transformarea complex a Europei Centrale i Rsritene (CEE) de-a lungul anilor 90 incluznd criza post-iugoslav) a ocupat atenia i resursele Occidentului, sitund problemele Mrii Negre ca prioritate secundar pe agenda strategic occidental. n acelai timp, din motive importante, planicatorii i decidenii occidentali au acordat totdeauna atenie evenimentelor i evoluiilor din i din jurul zonei Mrii Negre. Regiunea a fost dintotdeauna o potenial prioritate pentru Occident, ateptnd momentul intrrii n prim planul ateniei. Dup ultima etap de extindere a NATO Big Bang-ul primirii Grupului de la Vilnius agenda transformrii post-sovietice a Mrii Negre a penetrat treptat agenda politic att a UE ct i a SUA. n orice caz, interesele strategice ale ambilor mari juctori ai Vestului trebuie s e denite separat, chiar dac sunt parial interconectate2. 1. Perspectiva strategic a SUA asupra regiunii Mrii Negre Pentru SUA, Marea Neagr este un coridor strategic, n serviciul a trei cauze
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strategice fundamentale legate ntre ele. n primul rnd, Marea Neagr leag Europa de Asia Central prin Caucaz, centrul de interes ind Asia Central, locul de situare a unei balane geostrategice ntre China i Vest n secolul XXI. Nivelul de inuen i de control pe care singura superputere existent l-ar putea exersa n Asia Central va determina n mare msur precondiiile pentru competiia global existent deja ntre Washington i Beijing. Nivelul de control occidental asupra Asiei Centrale joac de asemenea un rol central n structurarea alegerilor strategice ale Rusiei ntre China i Vest. n al doilea rnd, Marea Neagr reprezint o poart de acces ctre Orientul Mijlociu Extins. Oportunitatea de a modela i a controla agenda Mrii Negre i a Caucazului ofer SUA posibilitatea de a integra ambele puteri regionale Rusia i Turcia n Aliana occidental. Pe de alt parte, un eventual eec al Washington-ului n a domina agenda Mrii Negre ofer Moscovei i Ankarei resurse substaniale pentru a desfura jocuri strategice autonome i de a domina regiunea3 . n al treilea rnd, Marea Neagr este o important rut comercial i coridor energetic, cu potenialul de a oferi Europei resurse de petrol i gaze, n acest fel reducnd dependena btrnului continent de resursele din Orientul Mijlociu i Rusia. Astfel, ea acioneaz ca un instrument de echilibrare a accesului la resurse. Scopul fundamental al strategiei SUA referitoare la Zona Mrii Negre este acela de a ancora societile post-comuniste i mai ales post-sovietice n spaiul euroatlantic de securitate, de a sprijini reformele democratice i cele ale pieei n aceste ri i de a milita pentru integrarea lor rapid n UE. Pentru a realiza aceste scopuri, Washingtonul este aliat n primul rnd cu elitele reformiste democratice ale societilor post-comuniste i post-sovietice. Principalii opozani ai strategiei SUA sunt elementele naionale ale vechii nomenclaturi sovietice i ale KGB transformate n elite naionale corupte i criminale din aanumitele noi state independente. Rusia, cu instinctele sale imperiale renscute, este principalul sprijinitor al acestor elite, ind, astfel, principalul rival al strategiei SUA n regiune. Spre a obine un succes satisfctor al strategiei sale regionale la Marea Neagr, guvernul SUA are neaprat nevoie s obin rezultate deosebite spre a se asigura de ireversibilitatea procesului de reform n state ca Ucraina, Georgia i Moldova4. Piedicile existente n calea acestei sarcini fundamentale sunt att interne afectnd statele aate n tranziie, ct i externe referitoare la agenda strategic global a singurei superputeri. Piedicile interne aate n calea strategiei SUA se manifest mai ales n slbiciunea structural a micrilor reformiste din societile post-sovietice ale zonei Mrii Negre. SUA i occidentul, n general, au acumulat experien semnicativ n procesul de transformare controversat i dicil a Balcanilor n anii 1990, unde cel puin Bulgaria i Romnia au demonstrat n cele din urm c sunt poveti de succes ale reformei societale i ale integrrii euro-atlantice. Cazul Ucrainei i al Caucazului de Sud sunt ns surse de complicaii i de rezisten la schimbare. O tradiie societal a dependenei totale fa de Rusia arist, i ulterior fa de modelul bolevic, lipsa unei tradiii a stilului occidental de modernizare (fr a mai vorbi de democratizare), cultura solid a nrudirii i sincretism parohial toate acestea sunt principalii factori ai slbiciunii structurale a modernizrii elitelor, pturilor urbane i clasei de mijloc profesionale din aceste societi. Dominaia rus direct i ambigu asupra economiilor naionale, sistemelor de securitate i asupra domeniilor intelectual-culturale (n particular n Ucraina) este impus ecient. Dac potenialul naional pentru schimbare este mai mult sau mai puin mobilizat cu

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succes ca n cazul Georgiei atunci este introdus n aciune un scenariu care cuprinde conicte etnice. Avem o serie de conicte ngheate i n curs de dezgheare dea lungul spaiului post-sovietic, indicnd eforturile sistematice ale Rusiei de a pune n pericol succesul procesului de construcie naional (nation building) pe baze moderne i democratice Abhazia, Osetia, Transnistria. Conictul din Nagorno Karabah care are rdcini cauzale de natur mai special i autonom decurgnd din relaia azero-armean este utilizat de Rusia, de asemenea, pentru a menine controlul asupra Caucazului de Sud. Elitele reformatoare fragile i neexperimentate tind s produc coaliii politice febrile, uor de blocat n guvern, presate de animoziti i discordii interpersonale. Ultimele evoluii din Ucraina, unde patru luni de blocaj post-electoral au sfrit prin revenirea victorioas n guvern a Partidului Regiunilor, partid pro-rus i cu baze oligarhice, sunt un exemplu n acest sens. Obstacolele externe ale strategiei Statelor Unite pentru integrarea euro-atlantic a regiunii Mrii Negre au trei dimensiuni de baz. n primul rnd, realitile legate de mediul strategic de dup 11 septembrie. Strategia Statelor Unite privind Marea Neagr a fost o component succesiv a unui proces mai larg de extindere a spaiului strategic euro-atlantic, care a primit un puternic impuls odat cu prbuirea conducerii comuniste sovietice. Societile din Europa Central i de Est, eliberate de oprimarea sovietic, au ales cu entuziasm modelul de integrare european pentru dezvoltare i garaniile de securitate ale sistemului euro-atlantic. Mai mult dect att noile guverne democratice s-au concentrat asupra unui intens lobby ndreptat ctre Washington i capitalele europene pentru o mai rapid accedere n sistemul internaional i n organizaiile occidentale. Opiunea democratic a acestor state europene post-comuniste a coincis cu agenda strategic a Statelor Unite, de extindere a frontierelor spaiului euro-atlantic ctre est, mai aproape de liniile de separare cu lumea Islamului i China. n perioada 1998-2002 toi sateliii ex-sovietici din Europa, inclusiv cele trei state baltice ex-sovietice, s-au alturat NATO. Aliana a atins frontierele spaiului post-sovietic, i n special spaiul Mrii Negre. Urmtorul pas de dezvoltare cu succes a unei strategii occidentale pentru integrare ar trebuit s se ndrepte ctre Ucraina, plus Georgia i majoritatea zonei Caucazului de Sud ancorat i inclus n curentul dominant euro-atlantic. Atunci au survenit evenimentele de la 11 septembrie. Rzboiul mpotriva terorismului a remodelat fundamental perspectiva strategic global a Statelor Unite. De la o doctrin strategic multi-prioritar, inuen global echilibrat i control asupra tendinelor-cheie de dezvoltare la nivel mondial, guvernul Statelor Unite s-a orientat ctre o strategie uni-dimensional, concentrat asupra urmririi i distrugerii reelei diversicate de celule islamiste radicale din ntreaga lume, cu scopul de a mpiedica capacitatea lor de a organiza i lovi inte de pe teritoriul Statelor Unite. Rzboiul din Irak o ncercare destul de ciudat, chiar i din ngusta perspectiv a rzboiului mpotriva terorismului, a redus i mai mult abordarea strategic a unicei superputeri n ceea ce privete realitile i provocrile globale. O consecin special a acestei stri de fapt a constat n ntrzierea relativ i n slbirea strategiei Washingtonului privind Marea Neagr. Al doilea obstacol extern n calea dezvoltrii eciente a unei strategii a Statelor Unite privind Marea Neagr este strns legat de primul. Simind relativa slbire a puterii americane n regiune, Rusia i ntr-o mai mic msur Turcia a rectigat iniiativa
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strategic n regiune. Analiza detaliat a strategiilor celor dou puteri regionale urmeaz n capitolul urmtor, totui trebuie menionate cteva fenomene-cheie, decurgnd din echilibrul strategic n schimbare n regiune. Evoluiile controversate din Ucraina i eforturile concentrate ale Kremlinului de a amenina opiunea guvernamental a coaliiei Portocalii dup alegerile din martie au constituit primul exemplu: dezertarea liderului socialist A. Moroz i a unui numr de membri ai parlamentului din coaliia Portocalie nu a fost ntmpltoare. Stagnarea statu-quo-ului conictelor ngheate n Georgia n ultimii 2-3 ani este un al doilea exemplu n acest caz 5. Moscova a protat, de asemenea, de disensiunile dintre Washington i regimuri cheie din Asia Central Uzbekistan i Krgzstan pentru a elimina i marginaliza prezena militar i inuena politic american din regiune. Condamnarea de ctre Statele Unite a masacrului de la Andijon a convins total pe preedintele uzbec Karimov de faptul c Moscova este mult mai prieten liderilor autoritari dect Occidentul sau Washingtonul n special6. Al treilea obstacol extern pentru strategia american privind Marea Neagr este reprezentat de nenelegerile dintre Washington i statele mari ale Europei continentale prpastia strategic de cele dou pri ale Atlanticului s-a accentuat n special dup 2002, n contextul disputei privind intervenia n Irak7. n prezent, abia dac putem vorbi despre o compatibilitate ct de ct substanial ntre politicile Statelor Unite i ale UE privind spaiul ex-sovietic al Mrii Negre. Nenelegerile pot schiate dea lungul urmtoarelor linii. Prima, atitudinile fa de Rusia. n timp ce Washingtonul percepe Moscova ca ind un oponent, dac nu chiar un rival n problemele din agenda privind democratizarea i reformarea regiunii Mrii Negre, Berlinul i Parisul mprtesc i neleg dreptul legitim al Rusiei de a-i menine propria sfer de inuen n jurul frontierelor sale pentru a contrabalansa extinderea Alianei ctre est. Avnd ca punct de plecare aceast presupunere, marile capitale europene pstreaz o atitudine precaut fa de eforturile Georgiei de a-i transforma poziiile sale dintr-un satelit al Rusiei ntr-un aliat al Occidentului, de a se transforma dintr-un dominion al Moscovei ntr-un partener reformat al Vestului. Aceiai lideri europeni nu au fost foarte ncntai s urmreasc revoluia portocalie de la Kiev, care a ncercat transformarea Ucrainei dintro amorf zon tampon ntre Rusia i Europa ntr-un candidat reformist pentru includerea n NATO i UE8. Cea de-a doua linie de dezacord ntre Statele Unite i Europa n privina regiunii Mrii Negre se leag direct de dilema lrgirii UE. Cu ct lrgirea UE ctre est este mai rapid, cu att mai bine, este de prere Washingtonul. Lrgirea UE imprim stabilitate economic i social regiunilor integrate n spaiul de securitate euro-atlantic prin lrgirea NATO. Acesta a fost modelul de interdependen dintre NATO i UE pentru statele ex-comuniste din Europa Central i de Est aderarea la NATO a deschis ua pentru aderarea la UE. Acest model de interdependen nu mai funcioneaz n prezent. Exist o revolt deschis la Bruxelles un refuz de a urma calea angajamentelor privind lrgirea dup acel Big Bang de zece noi membri n 2004, plus Bulgaria i Romnia n perspectiva datei de 1 ianuarie 2007, plus Croaia ateptnd extinderea n 2009, i continund cu Turcia. Denirea acestei rebeliuni din punct de vedere politically corect este acea de uzur a extinderii (enlargement fatigue). Totui, exist un consens tacit al multor lideri i ceteni europeni conform cruia Statele Unite urmresc o agend secret de punere n pericol a unitii europene i a integrrii

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politice prin intermediul unui proces rapid de lrgire, toate acestea cu scopul de a mpiedica Europa s devin un competitor internaional al puterii americane. Oricare ar argumentele din spatele expresiei enlargement fatigue, un lucru este sigur cel puin n urmtorul deceniu, nu va avea loc nici un proces de lrgire a UE n spaiul post-sovietic al Mrii Negre. Dac UE va susine strategia Statelor Unite privind Marea Neagr, atunci n nici un caz extinderea Uniunii nu va un instrument pentru susinerea acestei strategii. Fcnd un sumar al impedimentelor de natur extern n calea strategiei Washingtonului privind Marea Neagr dintr-o perspectiv pe termen mediu, avem de-a face cu un cadru nefavorabil pentru transformarea cu succes a regiunii din perspectiva interesului Statelor Unite pe termen lung. Regiunea Mrii Negre este atras ntr-un vrtej global de nrutire a mediului strategic pentru interesele Statelor Unite. Renaterea geopolitic a Rusiei, bazat pe creterea tarifelor n domeniul energiei, inuena crescnd a Iranului, bazat pe dispariia rolului echilibrator al Irakului n Orientul Mijlociu, creterea riscului unui rzboi civil n Irak, creterea nemulumirii Turciei fa de politica Statelor Unite i ncercrile clare ale Ankarei de a-i juca propriul rol n regiune, bazat pe aliane exibile cu adversarii Statelor Unite toi aceti factori converg i inter-relaioneaz ntr-un mediu de slbire a potenialului strategic al Statelor Unite de a inuena transformarea i integrarea euroatlantic a regiunii Mrii Negre. n loc de o regiune integrat n curentul occidental, se proleaz o regiune cu serioase linii de diviziune i poteniale ruperi de falie. Dac Statele unite nu vor reui s inverseze acest trend, atunci strategia general de deschidere a unor coridoare sigure ctre Asia Central i Orientul Mijlociu lrgit cu scopul de a face fa provocrilor geostrategice n secolul al XXI-lea ar putea sortit eecului. 2. Europa unit i Marea Neagr Este mai potrivit a vorbi despre o strategie cuprinztoare a UE legat de Marea Neagr n viitor, dect folosindu-ne de timpul trecut sau prezent9. Prezena european n Ucraina i Caucazul de Sud dup 1991 se rezum mai ales la activitile unor organizaii precum OSCE, Consiliul Europei i prin programele de asisten pentru dezvoltare ale UE, cum ar , de exemplu, TACIS. A existat o nensemnat cooperare ntre Bruxelles i BSEC singura instituie multilateral de parteneriat politic i economic din regiunea Mrii Negre. Fiind copleit de ctre propria evoluie instituional de dup Maastricht, prin acordarea prioritii programelor de asisten statelor din Europa Central i de Est, i mai ales datorit aranjamentelor postconict din Balcani, UE a putut aloca resurse foarte puine procesului de transformare i reform din regiunea Mrii Negre. Unele state mari europene au fost active n ncercarea de mediere a unor conicte din spaiul postsovietic al Mrii Negre, ns abordarea lor a fost una foarte precaut pentru a nu deranja fostul stpn imperial i actuala superputere a regiunii Rusia. Regiunea Mrii Negre a aprut pe radarul Bruxelles-ului odat cu accederea statelor din Europa Central i de Est n 2004, i mai ales odat cu ateptata aderare a Bulgariei i Romniei, ambele state din bazinul Mrii Negre. Intenia de aderare la UE a Turciei, chiar dac se va produce n cel mai bun caz n 10-15 ani, a motivat, de asemenea, planicatorii strategici de la Bruxelles s ia n considerare agenda regiunii ca parte a vecintii imediate a UE. Interesul membrilor UE fa de regiunea Mrii Negre este inegal. Polonia, republicile baltice i Slovacia acioneaz intens n favoarea proceselor de reform din Ucraina, pentru asistarea guvernelor democratice din jurul Mrii Negre
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pentru a rezista presiunii Rusiei i pentru a-i completa cu succes agenda de democratizare i nation-building. Sprijinul pentru statele membre ale GUAM, implicarea noilor membri ai UE din Europa Central i de Est n iniiative precum CDC (Commonwealth for Democratic Choice), Forumul Mrii Negre (organizat de Romnia), grupul celor ase state Prietene ale Georgiei, grup ninat n 2004 acestea sunt numai cele mai nsemnate exemple de sprijin ale statelor membre UE din Europa Central i de Est pentru transformarea statelor ex-sovietice din regiunea Mrii Negre. Interesele statelor mai mari membre UE din regiunea Mrii Negre sunt structurate mai ales innd cont de relaiile lor cu Rusia. Atitudinile n general pozitive ale Parisului i Berlinului fa de Rusia conduc la o atitudine precaut a acestor state atunci cnd intervin n probleme ce in de politicile arbitrare ale Rusiei fa de fragilele i neajutoratele republici ex-sovietice conicte etnice, separatism teritorial, regimuri marionet bazate pe criminalitate, ninate sau susinute de Moscova. Pericolul de a implicat profund n labirintul conictelor ireconciliabile, n regiuni cu conicte de tip tribal precum cele din Caucazul de Sud, mpiedic majoritatea capitalelor europene s adopte o poziie clar i ecient pe agenda regional. Exist nc un motiv pentru care Bruxelles-ul a adoptat o poziie precaut modelul UE de rezolvare a problemelor este prin stabilizare asociere, integrare i aderare. De-a lungul perioadei de dup 1990, Statele Unite, mpreun cu noile democraii din Europa Central i de Est, au susinut puternic extinderea UE spre est, ct mai mult posibil. Pn acum, cea mai puternic arm de intervenie european a fost integrarea i aderarea ulterioar. Problemele de capacitate de absorbie pe care UE le are dup Big Bang-ul din 20042007 fac imposibil includerea statelor postsovietice din regiunea Mrii Negre pe agenda unei poteniale extinderi n viitorul previzibil. UE a trebuit s inventeze Noua Vecintate10. Politica European de Vecintate (PEV) este un concept construit pentru a rspunde unei dileme strategice eseniale a UE. Pe de o parte, UE i-a consumat capacitatea sa de a inter-relaiona i coopera cu vecinii si pe baza prezumiei extinderii conform creia un proces ecient de cooperare cu un stat conduce automat ctre aderare11. Extinderea nu este posibil n viitorul previzibil nici din perspectiva capacitii instituionale (dup ce Constituia UE a euat odat cu referendumurile din Frana i Olanda, n 2005), nici din punctul de vedere al opiniei publice europene. Pe de alt parte, Europa trebuie s ia n considerare serios interesele sale i obligaia de a inuena i sprijini procesele reformiste i democratice de nation-building din periferia estic, inclusiv din regiunea Mrii Negre. Este imposibil pentru Bruxelles sau pentru statele membre ale UE s ignore regimul dictatorial din Belarus, s tolereze junta neo-comunist transnistrean de la Tiraspol, s neglijeze inuenele unei vecinti cu o reea de guverne marionet organizate pe principii maote din zone fragmentate i conictuale precum Caucazul, Balcanii de Vest i altele. De asemenea, nu este n interesul Europei s neglijeze prbuirea elitelor modern-reformiste n societile islamice din vecintate, n favoarea unui radicalism religios i fundamentalism. Este foarte important pentru Europa s susin i s extind potenialul sau de inuen pentru reform democratic, dezvoltare economic i instituional, s sprijine capacitatea naiunilor vecine de a lupta mpotriva corupiei, crimei organizate, intoleranei intra-societale i fragmentrii de tip tribal. PEV este un instrument desemnat pentru dezvoltarea politicilor europene de sprijin i asisten pentru naiunile vecine n afara

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procesului instituional al negocierilor de aderare. Instituiile europene au deinut trei niveluri de inuenare a politicilor reformiste i de transformare dup 1989. Primul nivel reprezint pragul impus de statutul de membru al Consiliului Europei. Criteriul general pentru respectarea drepturilor omului i guvernare democratic se aplic aici, iar accederea este relativ facil12. Al doilea nivel se aplic procesului de aderare la UE13. Chiar dac membrul asociat deschide o clar perspectiv de viitor pentru o aderare integral atunci cnd respectivul stat este pregtit, totui inuena UE asupra evoluiilor interne rmne mai degrab general i cu un caracter consultativ. Numai cel de-al treilea nivel de negocieri pentru aderarea complet, care ofer Bruxellesului instrumente exacte de inuen, poate presa n direcia reformelor adecvate i spre transformarea rii candidate, cu scopul de a ndeplini criteriile acquis-ului comunitar. Principalul obiectiv al PEV este s dezvolte instrumente puternice de inuen i cooperare cu statele vecine Uniunii, pentru a sprijini cu succes strategiile lor de dezvoltare i modernizare pe un fundament bilateral. Bineneles, principalul obiectiv se aplic numai statelor care vor s se modernizeze i s se dezvolte conform modelului european. Obiectivul nu poate aplicat fr ndoial statelor i regimurilor care au ales alte ci de dezvoltare. Dac revenim la contextul Mrii Negre, este foarte important s observm strategia pe care PEV o implic, aplicat statelor reformiste post-sovietice din regiune. Formatul bilateral al PEV cuprinde cerine care se adreseaz diferitelor chestiuni din medii naionale i regionale diferite din Ucraina, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidjan. O cooperare de succes n cadrul formatului PEV ar putea oferi statelor vecine UE un volum substanial de resurse, asisten tehnic, acces pe piee i suport instituional, toate acestea ind garantate la scar integral statelor recent aderate i membrilor subdezvoltai ai UE. n afar de PEV, ca instrument bilateral de implementare a strategiei UE privind Noua Vecintate, mai exist i alte instrumente cu mai larg deschidere care ar putea utile statelor vecine care doresc s se dezvolte conform modelului european. O abordare multilateral ar putea contribui la stabilirea unei comuniti de state nu n mod necesar toate s e state europene din punct de vedere al localizrii teritoriale i al identitii culturale care mprtesc aceleai valori, principii, obiective strategice ca i cele ale Europei unite ntr-o lume globalizat. O astfel de Comunitate European a Naiunilor s-ar putea dezvolta ca un cerc exterior, lejer, al integrrii europene, complementar nsei Uniunii Europene. UE ar putea dezvolta un spaiu de state prietene, nconjurnd comunitatea membrilor cu drepturi depline prin meninerea acelui tip de cadru relaxat de parteneriat instituional. Includerea statelor din regiunea Mrii Negre n acest format de commonwealth al UE s-ar putea dovedi un impuls n direcia asigurrii succesului procesului de stabilizare i reform n regiune. Un astfel proiect ar crea o baz solid pentru o mai puternic relaie UE-Rusia pe termen lung. Ar dezvolta, de asemenea, rolul strategic al UE ca actor regional legitim ntr-o regiune pe care Rusia i Turcia au tendina s o considere domeniul lor natural de hegemonie. Eciena strategiei UE legat de regiunea Mrii Negre ca parte a Noii Vecinti a Europei este subiect al inuenei mai multor factori. Primul este factorul dezvoltrii cu succes a Politicii Externe i de Securitate Comune a UE i sintetizarea poziiilor politicilor integrate n rndul statelor membre. Diferenele eseniale dintre noua i vechea Europ, precum i poziiile de stnga sau de centru-dreapta
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ale Europei Occidentale fa de Rusia, de politicile de parteneriat atlantic, politicile privind securitatea energetic n Europa etc., vor inuena mai mult sau mai puin capacitatea UE de a participa cu o autoritate nsemnat n cadrul echilibrelor de putere din regiunea Mrii Negre. Al doilea factor este acela conform cruia politicile UE privind regiunea Mrii Negre au nevoie de o mai detaliat evaluare a intereselor europene n regiune, n cadrul contextului economic european mai larg, al strategiei politice i de dezvoltare. Din aceast perspectiv, iniiativa Cancelarului german Angela Merkel pentru un proiect cuprinztor european din perspectiva viitoarei preedinii germane a UE este un element pozitiv. n al treilea rnd, eciena unei strategii UE privind Marea Neagr depinde de iniiativa statelor membre care nconjoar aceast regiune, referindu-ne n primul rnd la Romnia i Bulgaria (care vor deveni membre dup 1 ianuarie 2007) i capacitatea lor de a promova la Bruxelles o viziune asupra problemelor specice regiunii, asupra provocrilor i oportunitilor. Nu n ultimul rnd, o strategie european de succes n privina Mrii Negre depinde de capacitatea Bruxellesului i Washingtonului de a-i coordona viziunile i prioritile pentru aceast regiune i pentru un context mai larg. Dup 2002, puini erau cei care credeau n posibilitatea de a reface o structur integrat a intereselor Alianei occidentale. Totui, identicarea cauzelor i intereselor comune de ctre partenerii trans-atlantici rmne crucial pentru denirea unui spaiu comun de securitate i a stabilitii occidentului ntr-o lume greu predictibil caracterizat prin transformare la nivel global. Lumea multi-polaritii, care se structureaz dup mediul global post-Irak, va obliga Europa i Statele Unite s recunoasc mai din timp elementele comune, mai degrab dect diversitatea intereselor dintre ele. II. PUTERILE DE STATU-QUO ALE MRII NEGRE Ambele mari puteri ale Mrii Negre Rusia i Turcia au tendina s se opun (ecare n felul su) penetrrii infrastructurii de securitate i dezvoltare de ctre Occident n regiune, ceea ce a fost cel puin n ultimele cinci secole domeniul de concuren bilateral i echilibru de putere dintre cele dou state. Un lucru este sigur Rusia i Turcia vor continua s se ae n competiie pentru inuen i control asupra naiunilor mai mici i comunitilor etnice din arealul Mrii Negre. Este o chestiune ce ine de interesele lor vitale, i anume aceea de a mpiedica actorii externi s intervin n ecuaia lor bilateral de putere n regiune. Ambele state mprtesc elemente comune ale strategiei de a mpiedica i respinge interferenele militare, navale i politice occidentale n Marea Neagr. Ambele state au dezvoltat strategii intense de cooperare economic i politic reciproc14. Totui, ecare dintre cele dou state dezvolt o abordare strategic specic pentru aprarea i extinderea propriei inuene asupra Mrii Negre. Rusia este o fost superputere, redus la un rol secundar n afacerile globale dup 1991, dar pstrnd nc puternice ambiii de a reveni n rndul puterilor globale de linia nti. Am putut observa nceputul implementrii acestor ambiii n ultimul an, odat cu apariia unei politici energetice concentrate, combinat cu eforturi diplomatice susinute pentru a construi aliane anti-occidentale, ceea cea adus Rusia n prima linie a politicii mondiale n contextul afundrii Statelor Unite n problema irakian i n disputa nuclear iranian. Turcia este un membru-cheie al Alianei Nord-Atlantice, deinnd un rol esenial n ancul sud-estic al spaiului strategic occidental. Totui, Ankara se detaeaz vizibil de strategia american privind Orientul

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Mijlociu i rzboiul mpotriva terorismului. Turcia refuz s coopereze cu Statele Unite n privina extinderii controlului internaional naval i militar al Mrii Negre, pretinznd protejarea monopolului i privilegiilor navale bazate pe Convenia de la Montreux, din 1936. O combinaie de orientri revizioniste renscute, specice unei mari puteri, i o adnc frustrare, cauzat de tratamentul controversat aplicat de ctre Vest Turciei (de ctre Statele Unite n cazul rzboiului din Irak i de ctre UE prin controversele legate de aderarea Turciei) mping Turcia ntr-un joc strategic propriu, incluznd agenda chestiunii Mrii Negre. 1. Rusia i Marea Neagr Raportat la Marea Neagr, concepia strategic global a Rusiei este reectat prin dou dimensiuni strategice eseniale: dimensiunea pasiv de rezisten, i cea activ, de puternic renatere geopolitic prin intermediul politicilor n domeniul energiei. Dimensiunea pasiv a strategiei Rusiei privind marea Neagr se refer la politicile de meninere pe ct posibil a statu-quo-ului, politici motenite din perioada Rzboiului Rece. Odat cu aderarea la NATO a Bulgariei i Romniei, statu-quo-ul teritorial din era sovietic nu a mai putut meninut. Prezena Alianei la rmurile Mrii Negre a devenit o realitate. Reducerea acestui fapt la valori strategice ct mai mici posibile reprezint punctul central al politicilor Rusiei n regiune. Dat ind faptul c Marea Neagr are valoarea unui coridor strategic care leag Europa de Caucaz, regiunea Caspic i Asia Central, cel mai important lucru este s se nfunde, s se blocheze acest coridor, pentru a pune n impas infrastructura de dezvoltare i de securitate a Europei Occidentale. Sabotarea demersurilor politice ale Ucrainei i Georgiei de aderare la NATO reprezint un posibil instrument pentru atingerea acestui obiectiv. Pornirea i ntreinerea unor conicte de mic intensitate n zonele sensibile ale regiunii Mrii Negre precum cea a Caucazul de Sud reprezint un alt instrument utilizat de ctre Rusia. Disensiunile etnico-naionale fragmenteaz efectiv structurile naionale fragile ale republicilor post-sovietice, punnd n pericol elementul-cheie pentru ca acele state s adere la NATO stabilitate instituional, transparen i respectarea legilor. nelegerea strategiei Rusiei privind Marea Neagr presupune analizarea a dou paradoxuri din trecut ale puterii Kremlinului. n primul rnd, pentru o societate precum cea a Rusiei post-sovietice, zdruncinat de profunde crize de identitate, economice, democratice i de bunstare social, atenia pe reform intern i relansare pare a singura abordare reasc i rezonabil n special dup ce programul preedintelui Putin de reconstrucie a Rusiei a fost pus n aplicare. Paradoxal, Rusia post-sovietic a cheltuit o mare parte a resurselor sale pentru a ntri i susine regimuri marionet represive n periferia spaiului ex-sovietic. Numai n Georgia, Moscova a instalat i susinut regimurile separatiste din Adjaria15, Abhazia i Osetia de Sud, conduse de infractori locali i/sau oeri KGB. n Moldova, Rusia susine junta neo-comunist a regiunii Transnistria. Regimul Lukashenko din Belarus se bucur, de asemenea, de sprijin din partea Rusiei. Amestecul Rusiei n alegerile din Ucraina a fost parte integrant a aceluiai fenomen conform cruia Rusia post-sovietic este copleit mai degrab din cauza evoluiilor din vecintatea apropiat dect de provocrile interne presante, precum srcie, demograe i sistemul de sntate, crim organizat i inecien instituional (doar pentru a cita cteva). n al doilea rnd, n termeni internaionali, Rusia post-sovietic este supus presiunii a dou fenomene care au capacitatea s
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modeleze pe termen lung posibilitile de supravieuire i dezvoltare ale statului ca factor internaional important16. Aceste dou fenomene sunt expansiunea islamismului radical din sud i transformarea Chinei ntr-o superputere a secolului al XXI-lea n est. Expansiunea demograc a comunitii musulmane din Rusia, coroborat cu penetrarea islamist n zona de sud a periferiei Rusiei, separatismul, terorismul i degradarea controlului guvernamental sunt probleme greu de rezolvat pentru guvernul rus la momentul actual i pe viitor. Creterea Chinei, cu o populaie de 1,3 miliarde, n apropierea slab-populatei Siberii, s-ar putea dovedi a un pericol mai mare dect islamismul pentru independena i integritatea teritorial a Rusiei, n perspectiva deceniilor urmtoare. Paradoxal, armaiile ociale i doctrinele din ultimul deceniu ale Moscovei se concentreaz n special asupra pericolului ... lrgirii NATO n Europa Central i de Sud i ambiiei Vestului de a dezmembra Rusia i a o cuceri. Care este logica ignorrii provocrilor evidente pe termen lung la adresa securitii i bunstrii Rusiei n favoarea sublinierii ameninrii generate de statutul de membre NATO al statelor baltice, Poloniei, sau al unei Georgii independente? A exporta presiunile interne pentru cucerirea n exterior este, probabil, unul din principiile fundamentale ale politicii imperiale din istoria umanitii, inclusiv a istoriei imperialiste ruse. Astzi, ca de multe ori n trecut, echipa de la Kremlin resimte reducerea drastic a oportunitilor prin care s fac fa imensului spectru de probleme interne din cadrul unei gigantice proximiti teritoriale i unei la fel de importante diversiti la nivelul comunitilor. Succesul expansiunii n afara granielor este instrumentul cel mai ieftin pentru realizarea consolidrii interne i a ncrederii n sine. Astfel se explic c aciunile de fragmentare i de nghiire a unor pri neglijabile (prin raportare la magnitudinea teritorial a Rusiei) din state vecine precum Georgia i Moldova au devenit foarte atractive pentru Kremlin. Vestea nu tocmai bun pentru micile state vecine const n nevoia Moscovei de a aplica acest instrument i pe viitor, pentru a menine intacte prestigiul i integritatea la nivel intern. Astfel se explic de ce lrgirea NATO devine o ameninare, iar periferia euro-atlantic a Europei Centrale i de Sud, panic, devine o int favorit a ambiiei Rusiei de revenire geopolitic pe scena global. Politicile nefavorabile privitoare la vecintatea Rusiei servesc, de asemenea, un alt considerent important, n afar de cel de proiectare a presiunii interne n vecintatea apropiat. Toi politicienii i experii de la Moscova neleg perfect logica de netgduit a alinierii Rusiei la Occident cu scopul de a putea face fa provocrilor geopolitice ale secolului al XXI-lea. Nu exist nici o comunitate de interese pe termen lung ntre Rusia i lumea islamic, nici ntre Rusia i China, ca super putere. Dilema Rusiei nu const n a se ntreba dac s se alinieze Vestului sau nu. Dilema se refer la preul pe care Vestul ar trebui s l plteasc pentru alinierea cu Rusia, i care este preul atragerii Rusiei n familia aliatului vestic? Dac Ucraina va deveni un stat independent i democratic membru al NATO i UE, n cazul n care Caucazul de Sud i Asia Central vor evolua ca rute comerciale deschise, precum i ca teritorii strategice uor accesibile ctre Europa Occidental, atunci Rusia ar putea redus la statutul de mare i important actor, chiar dac membru obinuit al Alianei occidentale. Dac Ucraina este meninut sub inuena Kremlinului, iar Caucazul de Sud este blocat prin numeroase i nesfrite conicte etnico-tribale, dac Asia Central este inut sub autoritatea despotismului local, a regimurilor de tip feudal prietene ale

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Moscovei, iar Europa de Est este zdruncinat frecvent de ameninarea blocadei energetice atunci preul ctigrii Rusiei ca partener i aliat crete foarte mult. Nu are importan dac aceast presupunere este considerat ca avnd valabilitate de ctre decidenii de la Washington sau Bruxelles. Ceea ce conteaz este c aceast presupunere este valabil i de ncredere pentru Moscova. Imperiul vinde cel mai bine. Un important factor psihologico-cultural al sistemului cu valoare identitar i politic a elitelor ruse este susintoare a strategiei rezistenei pasive a Moscovei fa de partenerii si occidentali pe termen lung, concomitent cu alierea Rusiei cu cei mai periculoi rivali din est i sud (i anume, China i Iran). Acest factor ar putea denit ca tentaie autoritarist17. Liderii post-sovietici pstreaz un puternic sentiment de nelinite fa de Vest, adnc nrdcinat n mentalul lor (nfrngerea n Rzboiul Rece este unul dintre motive). Acest sentiment este combinat cu un uor i ascuns dispre i dezgust pentru democraia occidental cu restrictivele sale prghii de control asupra echilibrului de putere. Procesul de liberalizare din anii 90, proiectat dup modelul democraiei vestice, este blamat pentru loviturile la adresa ideii ruseti despre statalitate. Despotismul de tip chinez sau islamic este mult mai apropiat i uor de neles pentru actuala elit postsovietic, care i are originea, n mare parte, n ierarhia KGB-ist. Autoritari din toate rile unite unii-v, ar putea logo-ul ascuns al acestei aniti ntre Beijing, Teheran i Moscova din spatele scopului ocial al alianei lor acela de a promova o ordine mondial multipolar. Fragmentarea produs de conictele de mic intensitate din regiuni precum cea a Caucazului de Sud servete, de asemenea, ca instrument de legitimare pentru staionarea trupelor ruseti n zonele-cheie de importan geopolitic pentru Moscova, trupe care sunt, ocial, implicate n operaiuni de meninere a pcii de-a lungul liniilor de diviziune dintre comunitile aate n conict. Prezena militar a Rusiei n astfel de regiuni nu servete n mod necesar numai ca o barier n calea amestecului Occidentului la fel de bine, poate un scut pentru vechile frontiere geopolitice, precum cea cu Imperiul Otoman (i mai trziu cu Republica Turcia), un scut care strbate frontiera dintre Turcia i Armenia. Din perspectiva dreptului internaional, sunt dicil de explicat rolurile multiple pe care Rusia le joac n conicte precum cel din Abhazia i Osetia de Sud, acolo unde trupele ruseti au iniiat i organizat conictele, au sprijinit autoritile separatiste n lupta lor mpotriva guvernului georgian legitim i au organizat operaiuni de meninere a pcii ntre forele georgiene i cele separatiste, n timp ce diplomaia de la Kremlin mediaz ntre prile aate n conict. Un alt instrument al Rusiei vizat pentru a menine statu-quo-ul regional i pentru a preveni amestecul occidental este sprijinul Moscovei acordat Turciei pentru angajamentul ferm al acesteia de a proteja clauzele Conveniei de la Montreux care prevd acceptarea forelor navale strine pentru o perioad care s nu depeasc 21 de zile18. Att Turcia, ct i Rusia insist asupra cooperrii navale ntre statele litorale prin intermediul formatelor de tipul Black Sea Force i Black Sea Harmony, refuznd s primeasc navele altor membri NATO n bazinul Mrii Negre. Rusia este, de asemenea, aliat a Turciei n susinerea BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) ca unic form legitim cu format multilateral pentru cooperare economic i politic la Marea Neagr. Exceptnd statele care nu au ieire
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la Marea Neagr, precum Grecia, Serbia i Azerbaidjan, marile state din Europa i Statele Unite au acces la infrastructura BSEC doar din poziia de observatori. Fr a aduce prea multe benecii membrilor si n ultimii 15 ani, din cauza structurii dezorganizate i a inexibilitii birocratice, BSEC a meninut, practic, hegemonia ruso-turc n dezbaterea letargic privind cooperarea politic i economic n arealul Mrii Negre19. Dimensiunea activ a politicii Rusiei pentru controlul geopolitic al Mrii Negre este concentrat pe utilizarea uxurilor energetice i de exporturi n scopuri politicostrategice. nc de la nceputul anilor 90, gazele i, ntr-o mai mic msur, exporturile de petrol au reprezentat resursa-cheie pentru supravieuirea economic i pentru pstrarea inuenei geopolitice a Rusiei postsovietice. Gazprom a fost unicul sistem care s funcioneze pe ntreg giganticul teritoriu al Rusiei ntr-o perioad n care statul ncepuse s se mpart n mai multe regiuni pe considerente economice i instituionaladministrative. Din punct de vedere istoric, principiul-cheie al statalitii Rusiei a fost dintotdeauna centralizarea ntrit, iar n perioada lui Eln Gazprom i-a jucat rolul su n restaurarea controlul guvernului central asupra Rusiei. Gazprom este nvestit cu un rol similar n domeniul politicii externe, ind principalul instrument de expansiune al Rusiei. n acest caz, principiul-cheie al exporturilor energetice i comerciale ale Rusiei este monopolul, dependena direct total i sprijinul Moscovei pentru furnizarea de energie. n anii 90, Gazprom a avut mai multe ncercri de a cumpra i concentra controlul asupra infrastructurii de gazoducte de pe teritoriul sateliilor ex-sovietici din Europa Central i de Est i din republicile exsovietice, cu scopul de instaura monopolul n procesul de luare a deciziilor asupra rezervelor i transportului de gaze prin regiunea din afara Europei. Au existat guverne care au fost afectate i nlturate de la putere datorit refuzului lor de a accepta renunarea la gazoductele de pe teritoriul lor. Refuzul Bulgariei i Romniei de a vinde infrastructura de gazoducte ctre Gazprom a dus la construirea conductei Blue Stream pe fundul Mrii Negre, conduct ce leag teritoriile Rusiei i al Turciei21. Exporturile de petrol ale Rusiei au urmat acelai model (totui, cu mai puin succes dect n cazul gazului) de a nchide ciclul tehnologic i al proprietii ntr-un sistem de monopol total al companiilor ruseti, i care presupunea cumprarea ranriilor de petrol, a reelelor de staii de gaz i eliminarea alternativei sursele de petrol brut i rezervele de gaze din regiunea Orientului Mjlociu. Rusia sa luptat mult, dei fr succes, s pun n pericol rutele alternative pentru exporturile de petrol caspic spre Occident conducta BTC reprezint prima rut independent de Rusia pentru exportul combustibililor minerali dinspre teritoriul ex-sovietic ctre vest. Odat cu orientarea autoritar semnicativ a celui de-al doilea mandat al lui Putin, ambiiile Rusiei de a utiliza exporturile de energie n importante scopuri geo-strategice au crescut colosal. Spre sfritul anului 2005, folosindu-se de contextul favorabil n care Statele Unite erau preocupate i hipnotizate de problema irakian i rzboiul mpotriva terorismului, echipa domnului Putin a pus n aplicare o excelent operaiune la scar mare de puternic revenire geopolitic a Rusiei pe scena global. Aceast operaiune a inclus urmtoarele elemente: primul, acordul ncheiat cu cancelarul german pentru construirea gazoductului baltic care scurta legtura dintre teritoriul Rusiei i cel

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al Germaniei, ocolind Polonia, Ucraina i republicile baltice i infrastructura lor de transport a gazelor. Acest traseu scurtat este replica nordic la proiectul Blue Stream. n al doilea rnd, cererile urgente i neateptate de cretere a preurilor la gaz conform pieei mondiale naintate de Gazprom Ucrainei, Georgiei i celorlalte state din CSI. Dezordinea politic a fost neateptat, foarte dureroas i destabilizatoare pentru toate guvernele prooccidentale din regiune. n al treilea rnd, Moscova a negociat acorduri cu Turkmenistan, Iran i Algeria pentru construirea unui cartel total pe piaa european a gazului22. n al patrulea rnd, seria de acorduri speciale este realizat de Moscova pentru dublarea infrastructurii de transport de gaz sub controlul Gazprom23. Scopul de baz al acestei dublri este concentrarea tuturor rutelor posibile (n special de gaze), de diversicare energetic n minile Moscovei i, n acest fel, punerea n pericol a oportunitilor privind uxurile echilibrate de energie n Europa. n al cincilea rnd, proiectele la scar larg ale investiiilor i dezvoltrii sistemelor energetice n numeroase state europene au fost preluate pentru a reduce pe viitor sursele de uxuri de energie de pe teritoriul european care nu sunt sub control rusesc. Creterile preurilor la petrol, reectate prin creterea PIB-ului Rusiei, au sprijinit implementarea acestor proiecte de investiii24. Rezultatele planului Kremlinului pentru monopol energetic au fost mai mult sau mai puin spectaculoase, n special n Europa, unde toate dezbaterile privind diversicarea energetic las impresia neputinei i a dezacordului. Rusia, care n 2004 era o ar cu PIB-ul egal cu cel al Olandei, a reuit s implementeze o strategie de subordonare a btrnului continent intereselor sale prin stabilirea monopolului asupra uxurilor de energie n special n Europa Central i de Est. n privina Mrii Negre, efectele monopolului energetic rusesc vor chiar mai directe i imediate att n termeni de echilibru economic i cooperare, ct i n termeni ai impactului geo-strategic. Prbuirea coaliiei Portocalii din Ucraina i apariia guvernului portocaliu-albastru, ameninarea la adresa anselor de transfer al operaiunii Active Endeavor n Marea Neagr, stagnarea strategiei euro-atlantice privind Marea Neagr, toate acestea sunt primele indicii ale unui echilibru strategic schimbat n favoarea Rusiei i a puterilor de statu-quo din regiune, n general. Este greu de apreciat ct timp va dura revigorarea geopolitic a Rusiei, bazat pe avantajul monopolului energetic. Cel mai probabil, preurile la petrol vor continua s creasc i pe viitor. Europa va continua s e dependent la niveluri disproporionate de uxurile energetice ale Rusiei. Implicarea strategic a Statelor Unite n punctele erbini din afara Europei i din Marea Neagr se va accentua n mod evident, ceea ce ar putea ngreuna suplimentar dinamica strategiei euro-atlantice privind Marea Neagr. Dup recuperarea parial a inuenei n zona periferiei ex-sovietice, Rusia ar putea ncerca extinderea inuenei sale strategice i n pntecul moale al Europei n Balcani, acolo unde aranjamentele controversate postconict par s eueze n a produce efecte semnicative. Totui, succesul strategiei ruseti, bazat pe monopolul energetic, este nesigur. n primul rnd, sunt puine elemente care s indice posibilitatea de reinvestire cu succes a banilor provenii din petrol n economia rus i n infrastructura de dezvoltare. Industria high-tech i dezvoltarea tehnologic modern ocup un loc marginal n Rusia de azi. Exist o evident absen a infrastructurii administrative, a mecanismelor politice i de pia care s se
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poat adresa problemelor i provocrilor legate de demograe, bunstare, sntate i educaie. Echipa de guvernare de la Kremlin administreaz un nivel nalt de caliti pentru planicarea strategic i capacitile operaionale, dar deine insuciente resurse pentru a inuena dezvoltarea social, economic i uman. Aceasta determin apariia dicultilor Rusiei n a investi din punct de vedere strategic cu succes i pe termen lung. 2. Turcia i Marea Neagr Este foarte interesant de analizat logica transformrii Turciei din cel mai devotat partener euro-atlantic n timpul Rzboiului Rece ntr-o putere de statu-quo n regiunea Mrii Negre. Turcia are o complex istorie a relaiilor cu Rusia. Imperiul Otoman a reprezentat principalul rival i obstacol al strategiei imperiale a Rusiei de cucerire a Strmtorilor i de ajungere la rmurile mrilor calde din sud. Ambele imperii sau luptat pentru ecare metru din teritoriul litoralului Mrii Negre i pentru controlul asupra ambelor regiuni cu importan strategic pentru rivalitatea ruso-otoman Balcanii i Caucazul. Dup revoluia bolevic odat cu instaurarea unui guvernmnt republican n Turcia regimul sovietic s-a dovedit cel mai nfocat suporter al lui Mustafa Kemal Ataturk i al proiectului su republican. Inuene ideologice, politice i organizaionale ale bolevicilor lui Lenin au contribuit semnicativ la constituirea Republicii independente a Turciei. n timpul Rzboiului Rece, Turcia a fost absorbit complet n agenda strategic a comunitii Atlantice dintr-un singur motiv: puterea sovietic presa ara din nord i din sud, prin atragerea Siriei i a altor pri ale Orientul Mijlociu n sfera ei strategic de inuen. Prin aciunile sale, Kremlinul a mpins, de fapt, Ankara n direcia unei cooperri mai strnse cu Occidentul, vzut ca un garant colectiv al independenei Turciei. Ideologia pro-european i pro-occidental a kemalismului a sprijinit integrarea Ankarei n Aliana Atlantic. Prbuirea comunismului de tip sovietic a coincis cu sfritul deceniului de aur al dezvoltrii economice i politice a Turciei. Aprnd din lovitura militar a anului 1980, guvernul lui Turgut Ozal a reuit s transforme gradual motenirea ideologic i economic a Turciei. Sistemul economic etatist a cedat n faa neo-liberalismului, iar monolitul politic i ideologic kemalist a fost slbit i diversicat n mod prudent, dar cu insisten. Alturi de secularismul ferm, kemalismul a adoptat i doctrina neintervenionist n politica extern Pace n Turcia Pace n lume. Ozal a pus accentul pe nevoia de reconciliere cu motenirea islamic a rii i pe mndria de trecutul otoman, vzut ca o expresie a turcismului. Noua for politic i economic a rii a impulsionat sentimentele i ambiiile pan-turceti chiar n momentul prbuirii superputerii sovietice un numr de republici cu populaie turc declarndu-i independena25. Turcia a iniiat dou proiecte majore pentru a-i arta noua for i importan regional unul cu scopul de a integra republicile turcice post-sovietice n viziunile pan-turceti ale Ankarei (turcii triesc de la Adriatic pn la Marele Zid Chinezesc), iar cellalt cu scopul de a transforma Turcia ntr-o putere majora la Marea Neagr. Cadrul instituional al celui de-al doilea proiect a fost dezvoltat prin intermediul iniiativei BSEC. Totui, a devenit clar din prima jumtate a anilor 90 ca populaiile turcice din Caucaz i Asia Central nu pot integrate ntr-un proiect politic al Turciei Mari. O serie de factori culturali, economici, politici i strategici au blocat ncercarea Ankarei de a

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fructica sentimentele pan-turceti n putere geopolitic i supremaie. Resursele Turciei s-au dovedit insuciente pentru a face fa unei asemenea ncercri, iar zvonurile privind colapsul total al Rusiei i comunismului au fost cu mult exagerate. n loc s se bucure de noile posibiliti din Asia i Caucaz, Ankara a trebuit sa fac fa rebeliunii PKK de pe propriul teritoriu. Turcia s-a bucurat de rezultate mai bune n ceea ce privete Marea Neagr26. BSEC nu a reprezentat chiar un instrument potrivit pentru extinderea intereselor politice i economice ale Turciei n domeniul cooperrii regionale. Colapsul economic i dezintegrarea instituional prin care au trecut multe ri post-comuniste din regiune au produs guverne slabe, incapabile s-i respecte obligaiile acceptate n formatul multilateral al BSECului. Totui, demersul Turciei din cadrul BSEC s-a dovedit unul de succes pe termen lung din doua puncte de vedere. n primul rnd, a creat un format regional al parteneriatului politic i economic, unde Turcia se bucur de poziia unei superputeri. n al doilea rnd, cealalt superputere a regiunii Rusia a fost, n mod neateptat, atras n BSEC. Cele dou rivale Rusia i Turcia au pus bazele unui cadru instituional de cooperare prin care i mpart hegemonia asupra regiunii Mrii Negre. BSEC nu a nsemnat mult pentru rile mai mici din regiune, dar a avut un rol important n ntrirea cooperrii economice, comerciale i politice dintre Moscova i Ankara, ridicnd nivelul de ncredere dintre ele. Pas cu pas, an dup an, parteneriatul economic i cooperarea politic vor crea att o comunitate de interes strategic, ct i anitate pe termen lung n ceea ce privete regiunea i lumea. De-a lungul anilor 90, Turcia a rmas un aliat de ncredere al comunitii Atlantice, pstrnd tradiionalele relaii speciale cu Statele Unite pe baza poziiei sale de avanpost al Occidentului n Orientul Mijlociu. ndeprtarea Turciei de principalul ei partener din Occident s-a produs la nceputul anilor 2000, odat cu cele dou mari transformri ale strategiei globale a Statelor Unite. Prima din ele se refer n mod direct la evenimentele de la 11 septembrie i la rzboiul declanat de America mpotriva terorismului. Accentul pus de administraia Bush pe Orientul Mijlociu, vzut ca o coloan vertebral n strategia rzboiului mpotriva terorismului, a afectat direct viziunea i practicile Turciei n ceea ce privete securitatea naional. Rzboiul din Irak le-a oferit kurzilor din nord o mai mare autonomie, de unde i repercusiunile asupra rzboiului intern al Turciei cu PKK i asupra problemei kurzilor, n general. Rutele comerciale ale Turciei cu lumea arab au fost complicate sau chiar desinate. Noile izbucniri de anti-americanism i anti-semitism din lumea islamic au pus Turcia, n calitatea ei de partener atlantic guvernat ind de partidul islamist AK , n faa unor relaii extrem de tensionate cu lumea islamic. Dincolo de problema kurd i de plasarea Ankarei n prima linie dintre partenerul ei Atlantic i lumea islamic, criza nuclear declanat de Iran ar putea compromite i mai mult securitatea naional a Turciei. A doua transformare a strategiei globale atlantice se refer la creterea importanei Mrii Negre, care a avut loc dup integrarea rilor din Europa Central i de Est ca membri deplini ai NATO. Turcia a sprijinit lrgirea NATO de la Tallin la Burgas, dar acum ezit sa vad regiunea Mrii Negre integrat deplin n comunitatea euro-atlantic. Doctrina naional a Turciei precum cea a Rusiei adpostete o viziune tradiional naionalist-imperialist de secol XIX. Lumea este compus din mari puteri i sferele lor de hegemonie care controleaz puterile mai mici, iar balana de puteri produce un sistem internaional viabil.
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Pentru Ankara (dar i pentru Moscova), Marea Neagr este un lac ruso-turc. America i Europa sunt binevenite s se ngrijeasc de identitatea strategic a Mrii Negre, dar numai prin parteneriat i prin medierea puterilor hegemonice ale regiunii. Occidentul are n Turcia un aliat de ce-ar interveni America n regiune? Dou rspunsuri sunt posibile nencredere sau arogan , ambele foarte jignitoare pentru mndria turc Acest tip de logic se manifest explicit n refuzul categoric al Turciei de a gsi un compromis n chestiunea Conveniei de la Montreux i de a permite accesul vaselor (chiar i celor aliate sub pavilion NATO) pentru mai mult de 21 de zile (aa cum stipuleaz articolul 18/2 al Conveniei)27. Poziia ocial a Turciei privind extinderea Operaiunii Active Endeavor pn la Marea Neagr este una de refuz, motivnd ca statele riverane adic Federaia Rus se vor opune28. Urmrind aceasta logic, puterile riverane au ntietate n faa aliailor din NATO. Securitatea colectiv aa cum este neleas n doctrinele strategice din Europa i State Unite este un concept recunoscut de Ankara numai n cazul n care Turcia are de ctigat: de exemplu, luarea deciziilor ntr-un mod consensual n NATO fa de problemele care nu afecteaz interesele majore naionale i de securitate ale Turciei. ndat ce interesele regionalteritoriale i de securitate naional sunt lezate (precum n cazul regimului naval din Marea Neagr), paradigma modului colectiv de luare a deciziilor se transform imediat ntr-o abordare de secol XIX a Concertului European de puteri ce e al meu e al meu, ce e al tu e al nostru. Rolul i interesele Turciei la Marea Neagr se vor transforma semnicativ odat cu integrarea rii n Uniunea European. Dei nimeni nu tie cu precizie cnd va avea loc aceast extindere, efectele acceptrii sau respingerii Turciei sunt destul de clare. Pentru a deveni membru al Uniunii, Ankara trebuie s-i adapteze politicile la normele i regulile Uniunii Europene. Cteva obstacole n calea integrrii pot menionate. n primul rnd, UE este o comunitate cu un caracter post-naional(ist) care nu este dispus s accepte naionalismul i conictele etnice cauzate de nerespectarea drepturilor minoritilor. Turcia este o comunitate de stat i societate puternic ataate identitii i mndriei naionaliste, unde orice demers pentru autonomie etnic sau religioas este n general tratat drept trdare. n al doilea rnd, doctrina naionalist a Turciei ntr n conict cu micrile etnocentriste precum cea a kurzilor, care cer autonomie cultural i comunal, aa cum multe ri europene le-au acordat propriilor minoriti. Aceast doctrin a mpins Turcia n impasul legat de problema masacrrii armenilor la nceputul secolului XX, deoarece Turcia nu recunoate drept genocid uciderea a peste 1 milion de armeni. n al treilea rnd, identitatea politic a Turciei se adapteaz foarte greu la standardele UE att din cauza practicilor seculare, ct i din cauza politizrii Islamului. Caracterul secular al statului turc este nc garantat de Consiliul Securitii Naionale, controlat de armat, iar prezena Islamului politic n guvern nc tinde s produc precedente inacceptabile pentru regulile UE precum, de exemplu, disputa privind caracterul penal al adulterului29. n cele din urm, problema Ciprului pare a o linie de netrecut ntre Ankara i Bruxelles. Dac Turcia se va dovedi capabil s implementeze reformele politice necesare (sau dac Bruxellesul va decide s accepte tacit statu-quo-ul, nvluit n adoptarea nominal a acquis-ului de ctre Ankara), statutul de membru va indiscutabil dobndit. Integrarea Turciei n UE va avea urmri dramatice pentru regiunea Mrii Negre. n primul rnd, statutul de membru

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va legitima Turcia ca putere regional n Balcani n termeni economici, demograci i politici. Nu exist nici o alt ar sau un grup de ri n UE care ar putea s contrabalanseze potenialul Turciei n termeni economici i demograci. Rolul pe care Turcia i-l arog n mod insistent acela de patron al tuturor minoritilor turce i musulmane din rile balcanice sau chiar mai departe va furniza Ankarei resursele necesare sprijinirii i arbitrrii disputelor inter-comunale din rile balcanice n favoarea statutului ei de superputere regional31. n al doilea rnd, n calitate de membru al UE, Turcia va avea responsabilitatea s iniieze i s coordoneze politicile Europei unite n ceea ce privete vecintatea de est i de sud-est. Aceasta va transforma Turcia ntr-un puternic factor de inuen (mult mai puternic dect astzi) n direcia Caucazului i Orientului Mijlociu. n al treilea rnd, statutul de membru al UE va mri i mai mult autonomia Turciei fa de Statele Unite i va redeschide ntrecerea pentru hegemonie cu Rusia. Este discutabil, totui, dac UE va capabil s funcioneze la nivelul actual de integrare politic i instituional cu un membru puternic cu o agend naionalist, aa cum este Turcia. Unele din rspunsurile la aceast ntrebare vor veni n urmtorul deceniu. Dac intrarea Turciei va amnat, sau chiar respins, presiunile interne pentru schimbarea identitii politice se vor acumula. Pentru prima oar n istoria modern a Turciei, ntlnim o viziune puternic mprtit de cercuri inuente din Ankara care pune accentul pe identitatea eurasiatic a Turciei. Ideologia eurasiatic este un exemplu al unei aniti crescnde ntre Turcia i Rusia n perioada post Rzboi Rece, care semnic lrgirea preocuprilor, oportunitilor i intereselor comune. Att Moscova, ct i Ankara sunt suspicioase la adresa exerciiilor postmoderne ale Europei, precum multiculturalismul, descentralizarea puterii statului, cultura liberal a diversitii i metodologiile pacist-constructiviste ale interdependenei ca baze ale securitii. Naionalismul autoritar tradiional se vinde mult mai bine pe piaa politic ruso-turc, mpingnd cele dou ri mai aproape ca niciodat n lunga lor istorie. Dac aceast anitate va cpta un cadru instituional, vom avea o regiune a Mrii Negre dominat de interesele ruso-turce, unde Europa i Statele Unite vor nevoite sa-i negocieze interesele dintr-o poziie inferioar sau s confrunte hegemonia ruso-turc i statu-quo-ul 32. rile mai mici riverane Mrii Negre e vor absorbite n axa turco-rus, ca satelii, e vor nevoite s adopte dicila poziie de a reprezenta frontierele Occidentului n faa puternicei hegemonii bilaterale din regiune. III. COMUNITATEA ASPIRANILOR: RILE POST-COMUNISTE DIN REGIUNEA MRII NEGRE Exceptnd Rusia i Turcia, celelalte ri din regiunea Mrii Negre mprtesc mai multe interese i trsturi comune. n primul rnd, toate reprezint societi post-comuniste i, cu excepia Bulgariei i Romniei, toate sunt republici post-sovietice. Construcia naional, modernizarea, transformarea instituional, democraia i economia de pia constituie agenda lor comun pentru moment i pentru cele mai multe pentru viitorul previzibil. n al doilea rnd, toate aceste ri au fcut parte din unul sau ambele imperii din regiune cel rus i cel otoman pentru perioade lungi ale istoriei lor, daca nu de-a lungul ntregii istorii. Identitatea lor naional a luat in prin numeroase lupte pentru emancipare i independen. n al treilea rnd, majoritatea acestor ri (sau cel puin mari segmente din elite i din populaie,
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n general), daca nu chiar toate, doresc s e membre ale instituiilor de securitate i dezvoltare ale Occidentului, adic NATO i UE. Este esenial pentru ele s implice Occidentul n ecuaia securitii i dezvoltrii lor ca element cheie pentru ieirea din cercul vicios al repetrii, pe viitor, a dependenelor imperiale ale trecutului. Aadar, toate aceste ri reprezint aliai naturali ai strategiei occidentale de transformare i integrare a regiunii Mrii Negre n comunitatea euro-atlantic. n prezent, aceste interese comune ale rilor post-comuniste din regiunea Mrii Negre au mai degrab un caracter potenial. Spre deosebire de Mediteran, Marea Neagr nu a reprezentat o regiune unitar nici n termeni culturali, nici n termeni economicicomerciali i politici. Cele dou sub-regiuni majore de-a lungul coastei Mrii Negre Balcanii i Caucazul mprtesc agende similare de dezvoltare de-a lungul istoriei, dar ntotdeauna au fost realiti paralele, cu foarte puine, sau chiar fr, precedente de interdependen sau inuen reciproc. Ucraina a fost parte integrant din Rusia i URSS, iar primii pai spre o existen independent i-a fcut dup 1991. Localizarea geograc i motenirea post-sovietic conteaz foarte mult n denirea diversitii printre rile Mrii Negre. Bulgaria i Romnia, situate n ancul vestic al regiunii, au fost mai repede absorbite de procesul de integrare n NATO si UE. Au fcut parte din blocul sovietic, dar nu i din Uniunea Sovietic, ceea ce le-a permis s fac mai uor fa i s depeasc motenirea comunist (dei acest proces de transformare nu s-a ncheiat, nc). rile din sudul Caucazului trec printr-un proces dicil de construcie naional, ntmpinnd o varietate de factori ostili i obstacole. Unele dintre acestea apar dintro oarecare slbiciune (sau chiar absen) a unei tradiii moderne de dezvoltare social, ceea ce face dicil depirea identitilor tribale sau a conictelor, napoierii economice i fragmentrii politice specice mediului de tranziie din statele post-sovietice. Bariere suplimentare n calea dezvoltrii i reconcilierii au aprut n urma conictelor regionale i disputelor dintre naiuni majore i comuniti din regiune armeni i azeri, de exemplu. Interferenele Rusiei n regiune, considerat de Moscova ca parte integrant a sferei sale de interes, au dus la apariia mai multor conicte majore, n special pe teritoriul Georgiei. Aceste conicte nu pot soluionate fr bunvoina Kremlinului sau n absena unui cadru lrgit internaional care s aplice legea internaional n cazuri precum Abhazia i Osetia de Sud. ntr-o situaie similar se a i Transnistria, chiar dac e departe de Caucaz. Este important, de asemenea, ca Turcia i Armenia sa nceap un proces de reconciliere, care ar duce la ridicarea blocadei turceti mpotriva Armeniei i la deschiderea granielor turco-armene. Ucraina reprezint cazul tipic de ar post-sovietic care i caut identitatea i balana cultural printr-un proces complex de construcie naional i transformare politic. ri precum Ucraina, care au o dubl identitate, ar putea servi att ca puni, ct i ca linii de demarcaie dintre civilizaiile majore sau delimitrile geopolitice. Revoluia portocalie este un bun exemplu n acest sens. Poporul ucrainean are nevoie de timp pentru a-i decide viitorul i este important ca Europa, Statele Unite i Rusia s creeze i s pstreze un mediu propice pentru eforturile Ucrainei de a se constitui ca naiune independent i de succes. Ucraina, pentru dimensiunile, aezarea i potenialul economic i social, reprezint un partener cheie n procesul de cooperare la Marea Neagr. Cele mai multe iniiative pentru un parteneriat democratic GUAM, CDC i Forumul Mrii Negre nu ar avea valoare fr participarea activ a Ucrainei.

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Se poate observa c atitudinile i politicile statelor post-sovietice/post-comuniste n ceea ce privete procesele de integrare euroatlantic i european sunt foarte variate. Pentru Georgia, integrarea n NATO reprezint o precondiie vital pentru independena i integritatea teritorial a rii, ameninate de politica Rusiei33. Pentru Armenia, prins ntr-un conict ndelungat n NagornoKarabah, parteneriatul cu Rusia i prezena militar rus reprezint un factor cheie pentru meninerea ctigurilor teritoriale i garantarea independenei armenilor din Karabah. Iranul, pe de alt parte, este un partener important pentru Erevan n mod special pentru resursele de energie i pentru piaa de export att de important pentru mica republic aat sub blocad. Aceast dubl dependen a Armeniei fa de Rusia i Iran nu presupune entuziasmul populaiei fa de aderarea la NATO, dar guvernul armean s-a artat interesat n parteneriate NATO precum IPAP. Armenii att cei din ar, ct i cei din diaspora vd viitorul rii n contextul european i euro-atlantic. Azerbaidjanul ezit, de asemenea, s se arate n mod deschis interesat de integrarea n comunitatea euro-atlantic, dintr-un numr de considerente. Relaiile cu Rusia sunt complicate, att din cauza problemei Karabah, ct i din cauza politicilor de export al energiei. Moscova a limitat exportul de petrol azer la o singur rut pe teritoriul rusesc pn cnd conducta BTC a deschis o rut alternativ ctre coasta Mediteranei. Azerbaidjan are relaii complicate i cu Iran, unde populaia azer este mai numeroas dect cea din Azerbaidjanul independent. Nici pstrarea unui sistem autoritar (puterea a fost transferat de la Aliev tatl ctre Aliev ul, iar procedurile electorale au fost grav violate) nu aduce Azerbaidjanul mai aproape de parteneriatul Atlantic. Pentru toate republicile post-sovietice, statul de membru al UE este unul dezirabil, dar aproape imposibil de obinut n viitorul previzibil. Capacitatea de absorbie a UE, complexitatea relaiilor dintre Rusia i UE, conictele i reformele politice controversate sunt obstacole greu de depit. Diferenierea dintre statutul de membru al NATO i cel de membru al UE, care a stimulat reformele democratice din Europa centrala i de est, se dovedete acum a un impediment n calea reformelor din spaiul post-sovietic. Este n interesul Europei i responsabilitatea Uniunii Europene s dezvolte politici de vecintate ntr-un format care ar putea sprijini, pe termen lung, deplina integrare a periferiei post-sovietice n comunitatea european34. Bulgaria i Romnia, care aproape iau nalizat eforturile de integrare n cele dou instituii ale Occidentului NATO i UE au responsabilitatea s iniieze i s promoveze integrarea rilor Mrii Negre n comunitatea european i atlantic. Ambele ri reprezint frontiera Occidentului la Marea Neagr i este n interesul ambelor s extind aceste frontiere ctre est. Soa i Bucuretiul au avut politici foarte diferite n zona Mrii Negre n aceti ultimi ani, conform motenirii lor specice i agendei politice actuale. n ultima vreme, Bucuretiul a fost mai activ dect Soa n ceea ce privete politicile regionale de la Marea Neagr. Din aceast perspectiv, auto-perceperea romnilor drept o insul de latinitate ntr-o mare slav i-a plasat ntro postur mai explicit pro-atlantic i antirus. De asemenea, Bucuretiul are ambiia de a conduce procesul de cooperare la Marea Neagr de pe poziiile comunitii atlantice, ceea ce declaneaz reacii de mnie la Moscova i Ankara. Bulgaria, cu anitatea ei istoric fa de Rusia i cu o minoritate turc destul de numeroas, supra-reprezentat n guvernul bulgar are un spaiu mai restrns
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de a iniia politici pro-occidentale la Marea Neagr. Totui, toate documentele ociale ale guvernelor bulgare succesive conrm interesul i responsabilitatea rii la Marea Neagr din perspectiva apartenenei la instituiile Occidentului. Att Soa, ct i Bucuretiul vor trebui s-i transforme n scurt timp actualele poziii n propuneri concrete pentru o strategie comun european la Marea Neagr35. Cu toat delicateea politicilor lor la Marea Neagr n comparaie cu cele ale superputerilor regionale, Rusia i Turcia , Bulgaria i Romnia au sprijinit, pn n ultimul moment, extinderea operaiunii Active Endeavor a NATO din Mediteran n Marea Neagr. Soa i Bucuretiul nu au obinut aceast extindere, dar reuita Turciei cu sprijin rusesc de a ine Marea Neagr nchis precum un lac ridic mari semne de ntrebare i cere o dezbatere de principiu. rile NATO incluznd Bulgaria i Romnia au ales s e membre n Alian pentru a se bucura de privilegiul securitii comune. Care este valoarea statutului de membre NATO pentru Romnia i Bulgaria dac Turcia i Rusia vor ine doar pentru ele dreptul exclusiv la hegemonie maritim n Marea Neagr36? n ciuda diversitii intereselor, agenda politic a rilor post-comuniste din zona Mrii Negre graviteaz n jurul unei singure prioriti s sprijine i s promoveze strategiile de integrare a regiunii Mrii Negre n comunitatea euro-atlantic. Numai perspectiva euro-atlantic ar putea ajuta regiunea s scape de motenirea ei de zon disputat de imperii, de fragmentarea i de izolarea autarhic reproduse timp de secole de marile puteri ale Mrii Negre. Cel mai ru scenariu pentru regiunea Mrii Negre ar un nou statu-quo care s-ar traduce printr-o balan de putere a marilor juctori internaionali Statele Unite, Europa, Turcia i Rusia i care ar duce la fragmentarea regiunii n zone rivale. Trebuie s mpingem delimitrile geopolitice i rivalitile dac sunt de nedepit ct mai la est posibil. Cel mai bun scenariu consta n integrarea geopolitic omogen a regiunii n Occident. IV. OPIUNI STRATEGICE ALTERNATIVE PENTRU SECURITATEA I DEZVOLTAREA MRII NEGRE PE TERMEN SCURT I MEDIU Opiunile alternative pentru implementarea strategiei euro-atlantice pentru Marea Neagr n urmtorii 3-5 ani ar trebui analizate cu o anumit doz de optimism, pesimism i realism din perspectiva anselor de a duce la bun sfrit urmtoarele obiective. Primul vizeaz extinderea NATO n regiunea Mrii Negre. Pentru a considera lrgirea NATO ca ind de succes, trebuie s existe un plan clar pentru primirea Georgiei, Ucrainei i posibil a Moldovei la summit-ul din 2008. Georgia este singura ar unde precondiiile politice pentru a deveni membru NATO adic voin, reform instituional i a sectorului de aprare s-ar putea dovedi suciente pentru stabilirea unui calendar al integrrii. Cu domnul Ianukovici ca prim-ministru, este puin probabil ca Ucraina s aib voina politic necesar integrrii n NATO n urmtorii 2-3 ani. De asemenea, n Moldova avem un amestec ntre o anumit determinare politic n direcia continurii reformelor democratice, o agend controversat de administrare a conictului transnistrean i o fragilitate instituional care blocheaz reforma n sectorul de securitate. Puternica opoziie i eforturile concertate ale Rusiei de a bloca extinderea NATO n vecintatea sa apropiat reduc i mai mult ansele unei proces rapid de extindere n spaiul post-sovietic al Mrii Negre. Cel mai probabil, NATO se va concentra pe programe de parteneriat n ateptarea unui mediu politic mai favorabil pentru efortul de extindere.

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Al doilea obiectiv strategic de pe agenda atlantic este soluionarea conictelor ngheate. mbuntirea situaiei este parial posibil prin avansarea procesului de soluionare, precum n cazul deleului Kodori37 din Abhazia sau al soluionrii chestiunii Nagorno-Karabah printr-o serie de msuri consecutive din care rezult ndeplinirea parial a obiectivelor stabilite38. Ar lipsit de realism, totui, s lum n calcul soluionarea nal a conictelor ngheate n absena unei nelegeri dintre Rusia i Statele Unite n ceea ce privete relaiile strategice, n general, i regiunea Mrii Negre, n special. Zonele conictelor ngheate sunt ostaticele jocurilor strategice ale Rusiei cu superputerea american n cadrul general al relaiilor lor bilaterale. Cu greu se poate imagina orice mbuntire de substan a agendei conictelor ngheate naintea rezolvrii chestiunilor din acest cadru. n al treilea rnd, dup reuita Moscovei n a-i consolida strategia de export de energie i monopolul asupra exporturilor de gaz n special n estul Europei , succesul strategiei euro-atlantice pentru Marea Neagr va msurat i prin gradul de diversicare a surselor de energie pentru regiune. nelegerile fragile dintre Georgia i Azerbaidjan i dintre Armenia i Iran pentru importurile de gaz care ocolesc Gazpromul sunt departe a o obine o adevrata diversicare, cu att mai puin independena fa de resursele ruseti. Mozaicul de interese (ale Turciei, Iranului, Kazahstanului, Europei i ale altor juctori statali sau economici) determin, de fapt, creterea dependenei energetice fa de Rusia a Europei de Est, n general, i a Mrii Negre, n special. Singurul proiect realist pentru diversicarea surselor de energie conducta Nabuco depinde de gazul turkmen i iranian. Gazprom ncearc s contracareze Nabuco cu un proiect rusoungar de re-exportare ctre Europa de vest a gazului turcesc care ajunge n Ungaria prin Blue Stream, trecnd prin teritoriile Bulgariei i Romniei. Va nevoie de mult timp i de o consolidare a resurselor pn cnd o strategie realist de diversicare a surselor de energie pentru a contracara monopolul rusesc va putea creat. Al patrulea obiectiv strategic pe termen mediu este ca strategia euroatlantic pentru Marea Neagr s se bucure de o prioritate ridicat pe lista obiectivelor strategice ale Washingtonului i Bruxelles-ului. n mod categoric, UE se va concentra pe alte prioriti n urmtorul deceniu mai mult dect pe Marea Neagr iar motivele au fost deja claricate n capitolul I/2. Aceast stare de fapt nu va produce schimbri majore, innd cont de slabul interes al UE n ceea ce privete aceast regiune pe tot parcursul perioadei de dup 198939. ncetinirea implicrii Statelor Unite n regiune va avea efecte adnci asupra ntregului proces de transformare i reform i implementrii strategiei pentru Marea Neagr. Concentrndu-se aproape exclusiv asupra logicii unidimensionale a rzboiului mpotriva terorii, este foarte posibil ca Washingtonul s se ndeprteze de problemele Mrii Negre i s joace un rol defensiv prin pstrarea poziiilor fa de Rusia i Turcia. Timpul ne va arta ct succes va avea un astfel de joc. Nu n cele din urm, un succes relativ al strategiei pentru Marea Neagr ar putea fi obinut printr-un plan de aciune concertat al Occidentului n domeniile securitii i dezvoltrii n regiune. Separarea dintre Europa i Washington n contextul rzboiului din Irak a semnalat un proces mai adnc de ruptur dintre paradigmele de securitate ale celor dou pri, ruptur care a avut loc odat cu sfritul Rzboiului Rece. n timp ce Statele Unite sub administraia Bush
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s-au ntors la politicile puterii tradiionale (n sens de putere militar) ale secolelor XIX i XX, Europa de Vest a trecut la cellalt pol, acela al paradigmei de securitate bazat pe constructivism i interdependen. A venit, probabil, timpul reevalurii pentru ambele pri, cnd e clar c Statele Unite au euat s ndeplineasc obiectivele propuse n Irak, iar Europa nu prea se poate luda cu vreun succes n jocul interdependenei n faa provocrilor noi i neconvenionale la adresa securitii, precum Islamul radical. O asemenea reevaluare ar putea aduce mai aproape cele dou viziuni strategice, n armonie cu interesele comune ale celor dou maluri ale Atlanticului, care reprezint cele dou mari pri ale Occidentului n faa unei lumi tot mai diverse i mai multipolare. La nal, innd cont de ntreaga condiionalitate a analizei multi-factor i de realitile complexe, putem s prevedem o perioad de relativ ncetinire i de rearanjare a elementelor din strategia euro-atlantic pentru regiunea Mrii Negre. Balana de putere de pn n 2005 va greu de meninut, iar transferul de iniiative strategice n minile puterilor concurente va greu de evitat. Contextul strategic mai larg al lumii globale va avea nevoie n curnd de decizii mai tranante n ceea ce privete dezvoltarea ulterioar a strategiei Occidentului pentru Marea Neagr i rectigarea iniiativei. Note:
1 Cf. J. Sperling (ed.), Limiting Institutions: The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance, Manchester University Press, 2003. 2 Pentru mai multe informaii, vezi: R. Rasmus., B. Jackson, The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom, Policy Review Online (http://www. policyreview.org/jun04/asmus.html) 3 Eforturile Turciei de a periclita extinderea operaiunii Active Endeavor a NATO din Mediteran n Marea Neagr reprezint un bun exemplu n acest sens. Forele navele turceti controleaz Marea Neagr alturi de rmiele flotei ruse, mpotriva dorinelor i intereselor celorlalte ri riverane. 4

naiunilor din zona Mrii Negre aflate n tranziie i trebuie sprijinit pentru a-i duce la bun sfrit reformele.
5

Forele speciale georgiene au organizat o operaiune n defileul Kodori n nordul Abhaziei n aceast var, rectignd iniiativa strategic pentru stingerea conflictului cu regiunea separatist Sukhumi. Pentru o prezentare mai detaliat a cazului defileului Kodori, vezi: http://jamestown. org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371395
6

Vezi i E. B. Rumer, Collision Avoidance: USRussian Bilateral Relations and Former Soviet States, Strategic Forum No 27, April 2004 (http:// www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF207/sf207.htm)

Pentru o analiz privind aceast divizare, vezi Ronald D. Asmus, Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance n Foreign Affairs, Septembrie/Octombrie 2003, disponibil la http://www.gmfus.org/publications/ article.cfm?id=69

8 Totui, UE i-a mobilizat cu succes eforturile de mediere diplomatic pentru o reluare a alegerilor prezideniale din Ucraina de la sfritul lui 2004. 9

Vezi de asemenea: M. Vahl, The EU and Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Some Challenges for BSEC, Aprilie 2005 (http://www.ceps.be/Article. php?article_id=420)

10

Documentele de baz privind Politica European de Vecintate pot fi accesate la adresa: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

11 Prezumia extinderii se aplic mai ales relaiei Uniunii Europene cu statele ex-comuniste din Europa de Est. PEV (ENP) a fost iniial proiectat pentru a servi politicii Bruxelles-ului fa de statele mediteraneene ne-membre UE i rile nordafricane, care nu s-au bucurat niciodat de anse reale de integrare. Aplicarea ulterioar a PEV i vecinilor estici a provocat o re-evaluare n domeniul planificrii politicilor, ceea ce este foarte posibil s continue i s transforme nsi noiunea de vecintate european. 12 Doar Belarusul i Serbia din timpul lui Miloevici au fost meninute n afara Consiliului Europei, din cauza nendeplinirii criteriilor pentru a deveni membru. Rusia a fost acceptat i este nc acceptat, neinndu-se cont de orientrile de tip autoritar din ultimii ani.

n cazul Balcanilor de Vest, politicile de asociere au fost transformate ntr-un proces de constituire a unor Acorduri de Asociere i Stabilizare pentru a face fa agendei de reconciliere i reconstrucie post-conflict.
14 Vezi analiza cuprinztoare asupra relaiilor bilaterale ruso-turce i parteneriat al dr. Suat Kiniklioglu n The Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations. (http://www.brookings.edu)

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Importana strategic a Moldovei este mic, comparat cu cea a Ucrainei sau a Georgiei, dar Moldova este un partener responsabil al comunitii
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nlturat de autoritile georgiene n 2004.

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Pentru o istorie detaliat a politicii externe a Rusiei post-sovietice, vezi: B. Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

17 Este uor de perceput vigoarea tentaiei autoritariste a Rusiei n cartea lui Igor Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy. Aici el afirm c decidenii rui din era post-sovietic ncearc s aib cele mai bune caliti ale predecesorilor lor din perioada arist i sovietic. (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/culture/ articles/eav012403.shtml) 18

Resursele de gaz ale Turkmenistanului i ale Iranului sunt singura oportunitate a fezabilitii economice a proiectului Nabuco o conduct ntinzndu-se pe teritoriul Iranului, Turciei, i alimentnd rezervele de gaz alternative ale Europei la rezervele Gazprom. Exercitnd presiuni asupra liderului turkmen Niyazov i atrgnd Iranul prin recompense politice n privina programului nuclear, Moscova slbete ansele de implementare a proiectului Nabuco. Gazprom a cumprat, de asemenea, resursele de gaz i infrastructura necesar din Algeria, principalul exportator de gaz lichid ctre Europa. n acest caz, numai rezervele de gaz rmase n Marea Nordului rmn n afara controlului rusesc.

Nilufer Oral de la Universitatea Bilgi din Turcia afirm: Convenia de la Montreux nu transform strmtorile turceti n ape internaionale. Ele sunt deschise navigaiei internaionale, dar nu sunt sub administrare internaional. Turcia deine controlul legal asupra Strmtorilor. ( h t t p : / / w w w. p l a t t s . c o m / O i l / R e s o u r c e s / News%20Features/Bosphorus%20Traffic/ table.xml) Vezi de asemenea: Z. Gurcanli, The Montreux Dilemma, The New Anatolian, 13 aprilie 2006 (http://www.thenewanatolian.com/tna-4689.html) Vezi i: P. Manoli, The Black Sea Economic Cooperation: What Contribution to Regional Security, n Limiting Institutions?: The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance, editat de J. Sperling, Manchester University Press, 2003. Pentru o analiz de ansamblu a proiectelor ruse de gazoducte i conducte de petrol, vezi: (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia_ pipelines.html)

Actuala infrastructur a Gazprom alimenteaz regiunile vestice dinspre sud, i pe cele sudice dinspre nord. Acorduri speciale cu Ungaria, Turcia i Bulgaria ar putea conduce ctre o inversare a rutelor pentru fiecare infrastructur de conducte deja existent. Actualmente, Bulgaria transfer gaze Turciei i Greciei, dar acum este planificat o conduct dinspre Turcia ctre Ungaria (peste traseul proiectului Nabuco) pentru a alimenta conducta Blue Stream dinspre Turcia ctre nordul continentului.
24 n data de 4 septembrie 2006, ntr-o ntlnire la Atena a preedintelui Putin, preedintelui bulgar Prvanov i a primului-ministru grec Karamanlis, s-a dat und verde construirii mult-amnatului proiect al conductei de petrol Burgas Alexandroupolis, care are scopul de a ocoli Strmtorile, n ncercarea Rusiei de a trimite petrol pe pieele mediteraneene. 25

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n 1995, Gazprom a creat compania Topenergy mpreun cu corporaia bulgar Multigrup- un grup din umbr, avnd legturi cu serviciile de securitate ale Bulgariei comuniste i conexiunile lor sovietice. Topenergy a fost creat de ctre Gazprom i de ctre ex-comunistul prim-ministru bulgar A. Lukanov pentru a pstra controlul asupra infrastructurii de conducte din Bulgaria, lipsind astfel Bulgaria de beneficiile monopolului su natural asupra exportului de gaze ctre alte state balcanice. Guvernul bulgar condus de Z. Videnov a refuzat vnzarea conductelor ctre Topenergy. Un an mai trziu, Videnov a fost nlturat de la putere prin intermediul sprijinului financiar i logistic puternic venit din partea Gazprom i Multigrup. Ulterioarele guverne bulgare au suferit presiuni intense de a vinde conductele, ns fr rezultate pentru Gazprom. Presiunile din partea Moscovei continu chiar i azi, 10 ani mai trziu.

Pentru un studiu mai detaliat, vezi: A. Nachmani, Turkey: Facing a New Millennium / Coping with Intertwined Conflicts, Manchester University Press, 2003. De asemenea: K. Rygiel, Stabilizing Borders: The Geopolitics of National Identity Construction in Turkey, n Rethinking Geopolitics, ed. S. Dalby, Routledge, 1998. A. Kulebi, Eurasian Energy Lines and Turkey, The New Anatolian, 16 martie 2006 (http://www. thenewanatolian.com/opinion-2799.html) O traducere n limba englez a textului conveniei poate fi gsit la http://www.turkishpilots.org.tr/ ingilizcedernek/DOCUMENTS/montro.html S. Caglayan, Turkey Sees No Need for NATO Operation in Black Sea, The New Anatolian, 2 martie 2006 (http://www.thenewanatolian.com/tna1926.html)

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Vezi: K. Rygiel, Stabilizing Borders: The Geopolitics of National Identity Construction in Turkey, n: Rethinking Geopolitics, ed. S. Dalby, Routledge, 1998.
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Turcia i-a formulat revendicrile n faa Consiliului Europei. Sprijinirea musulmanilor din Europa are un potenial politic enorm pentru Ankara, pe care l-a folosit deja cu succes n comunitile turcilor din vestul Europei.
31 De peste un deceniu, Ankara i-a testat intens viitorul model de control etno-comunal din Balcani pe minoritatea turc din Bulgaria. Partidul minoritii turce din Bulgaria Micarea pentru Drepturi i Liberti (MRF) a monopolizat cu succes reprezentarea politic, potenialul economic i viaa comunal din toate regiunile Bulgariei populate de turci sau alte minoriti slave musulmane. MRF practic un control autoritar asupra acelor regiuni i comuniti, separndu-le, practic, de sistemul instituional bulgar i de instrumentele de control public. Unii critici ai comportamentului MRF susin c Micarea a creat un stat n stat prin exploatarea slbiciunilor guvernmntului bulgar democrat post-comunist. 32 30

(http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/ be7f7673-9e6b-4fcd-b817-e07323b1fa29.html)
34

Vezi: C. Ciobanu, NATO/EU Enlargement: Moldova and the Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts in Post-Soviet States, USIP, iulie 2004. (http://www. ipp.md/public/biblioteca/74/en/Report%20July%20 25,%20revised.doc)

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Vezi: Fr. Bordonaro, Bulgaria, Romania and the Changing Structure of Black Seas Geopolitics; Power and Interests News Report (http://www.pinr. com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=302) Hegemonia maritim a Turciei i, la un nivel mai mic, a Rusiei n Marea Neagr este o realitate palpabil, cu att mai mult cu ct forele navale ale celorlalte state riverane sunt neglijabile, cu posibila excepie a Ucrainei.

36

Pentru o mrturie privind antanta ruso-turc n Marea Neagr, vezi dr. Jeffrey Simon, Black Sea Regional Security Cooperation: Building Bridges and Barriers, NDU, lucrare disponibil la http://harvard-bssp.org/publications/?id=210 i Testimony of Bruce Pitcairn Jackson Before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, n The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Region, 8 martie 2005, disponibil la http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2005/ JacksonTestimony050308.pdf#search=%22Bruce %20Jackson%20testimony%20on%20the%20 Black%20Sea%22

37 La sfritul lunii iulie 2006, o operaiune a forelor de securitate georgiene a dus la preluarea controlului de ctre guvernul georgian asupra unei pri de importan strategic a Abhaziei defileul Kodori , ceea ce va permite transformarea procesului de gestionare a conflictului din negocieri ntre Tbilisi i Suhumi n negocieri ntre chiar comunitile din Abhazia.

ansele sunt tot mai mari pentru retragerea parial a forelor armene din unele provincii azere, inute sub control armean, n schimbul stabilirii unui plan pe termen lung care prevede inerea unui referendum i definirea statutului regiunii.
39

38

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Vezi: L. Fuller, Georgia: Is Tbilisi Moving Toward NATO Membership?, RFE/RL, 2 iunie 2006,

Vezi: F. Tassinari, A Synergy for Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Guidelines for an EU Initiative, CEPS Policy Brief Nr.105/ Iunie 2006.

SUMMARY
The article of Ognyan Minchev consists in an objective and well-documented analysis of the interests, strategies and security issues from the Black Sea area. Caught in a major process of transformation, the Black Sea area is still a heterogeneous space, dominated by divergent interests and historical rivalries. The realities within this area are only apparently similar, which creates the need for a specic approach in each particular case. Beyond the almost exhaustive presentation of the Black Sea area security environment, Ognyan Minchev creates several future scenarios starting from the present trends. The conclusion is that the issue of the Black Sea area does not represent a priority on the Euro-Atlantic agenda and that the West will soon need a clearer vision if it wants to regain initiative in this part of the world.

Ognyan Minchev is Director of the Soa-based Institute for Regional and International Studies (IRIS), an independent public policy and research institution associated with the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the St. Kliment Ohridski University of Soa. Since April 1998, Dr. Minchev has also been the Chairman of the Department of Political Science of the University of Soa.

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GUAM and OSCE the Role of Multilateral Institutions in Dealing with the Security of the Greater Black Sea Area
Vladimir Socor

1. Two Meetings, Two Tones in GUAM October 20, 2006 Delegates of the GUAM member countries Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova held a meeting of their own during the October 17 Minsk session of the Commonwealth of Independent States Council of Foreign Ministers (see EDM, October 18). This informal GUAM meeting issued a rm statement of support for Georgia in connection with Russias economic and political assault on that country. Read out by Ukraines First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Volodymyr Ohryzko, the GUAM statement calls for renouncing unilateral actions toward Georgia such as interruption of economic, humanitarian, and other inter-state relations. The existing problems, including conict-settlement, must be solved through negotiations in line with internationally valid norms and international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders. While welcoming Russias commitment to close its bases in Georgia (Batumi and Akhalkalaki) by 2008, the GUAM countries support Georgias initiatives to resolve the conicts on its territory, specically its proposals to internationalize the peacekeeping operations and

negotiating formats. GUAM countries call on other CIS member countries to support common efforts toward overcoming the crisis in Russia-Georgia relations (InterfaxUkraine, October 17). Within the deeply divided Ukrainian government, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Borys Tarasyuk champions a Western orientation and active regional role, and Ohryzko is a Tarasyuk condant. By contrast, the Ukrainian delegation to the GUAM Parliamentary Assemblys autumn session in Chisinau on October 14-15 was partly responsible for the failure to issue a statement of support for Georgia. The Communist vice-chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Adam Martynyuk, led that delegation and openly rebuffed the Georgian Parliaments chairwoman, Nino Burjanadze, during the proceedings. The Radas chairman and Socialist Party leader, Oleksandr Moroz, did not attend the Assemblys session and sniped at it from Kyiv. At the session, Burjanadze pleaded for support from countries that share broadly similar problems with Russia: I am calling on the GUAM member states to support Georgia and to contribute to solving the current crisis. A joint position by the GUAM countries in support of Georgia would ensure that tomorrow Russia will not take similar actions against other
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countries where it wishes to maintain its inuence (Interfax, October 15). The other two chairmen of parliaments Marian Lupu of Moldova and Oktai Asadov of Azerbaijan argued that GUAM countries should rst and foremost concentrate on stepping up mutual trade and economic relations, rather than on political issues. Lupu made his own plea to Georgia to understand Moldovas position: I am speaking from the bottom of my heart: We are with you. But now, with winter drawing closer and in a difcult economic situation, we should focus on solving economic problems and boosting cooperation, rather than adopting declarative documents (Interfax, October 15). Ultimately the Georgian delegation had to withdraw its request, and the sessions nal resolution merely called for conict-resolution exclusively through peaceful means. Both on the eve and on the morrow of the Assemblys session, the Moldovan parliament declined to include in its agenda a proposal by several opposition deputies to draft and adopt a resolution of support for Georgia. With such reticence, the Moldovan Parliament seems to be forgetting the support that Burjanadze personally and other Georgian parliamentarians more generally had extended to Moldova within OSCE, GUAM, and other international forums in recent years. In Chisinau, most decisions on the parliaments positions on foreign policy issues are made at the presidential level. Thus, the failure to support Georgia at this session is not imputable to Lupu. In their bilateral meeting, Burjanadze and Lupu jointly called for internationalizing the peacekeeping operations and negotiation formats for conict-settlement. The Moldovan media greeted Burjanadze with reticence. It was mainly the Christian-Democrat Peoples Party daily Flux the top-circulation political daily that gave Burjanadzes viewpoint due space and attention (Flux, October 16). GUAMs Kyiv summit in May had tasked the Parliamentary Assemblys Policy Committee to present in Chisinau a set of proposals for joint steps toward settling the frozen conicts. At the Chisinau session, however, the Committee requested additional time to work out such proposals for presentation at the Assemblys Baku session in spring 2007. However, the Committee issued a proposal to the GUAM Council of Foreign Ministers to create a GUAM peacekeeping unit and to apply for a UN or an OSCE mandate to conduct peacekeeping operations. Some preliminary consultations were held in recent months on that issue. At a key meeting in Baku by Defense Ministry experts, however, Moldova was absent and no decisions were taken. For the time being, this issue seems to have been relegated from the executive-branch level to the symbolic, parliamentary level. In Kyiv during the Assemblys Chisinau session, Moroz declared that the recently held referendum in Transnistria had expressed the peoples view, which must be respected but also balanced against international law, the indivisibility of territory, and the inviolability of borders. Ukraine should take the same position regarding the upcoming referendum in South Ossetia, Moroz claimed (InterfaxUkraine, October 17). This comment closely follows Moscows latest ofcial statements on this issue. Moroz had made a similar

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statement during his October 12-13 visit to Moscow. Specically opposing any involvement of GUAM in conict-resolution issues, Moroz called for leaving such issues to the OSCE and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Interfax-Ukraine, October 13). Ultimately, GUAMs joint position on these and other issues will in large measure be determined by the outcome of the ongoing contest over Ukraines foreign policy, as well as by the evolution of bilateral relations between each GUAM member country and Russia. Given Russias ability at present to cast a shadow over Ukraines political processes, intimidate Moldova, and play its cards in Azerbaijan, GUAM is experiencing difculty in groping for a common voice and role. Published on: http://www.jamestown.org/edm/ article.php?article_id=2371564 2. OSCEs Year-End Draft Declaration Yields to Russia on Istanbul Commitments November 27, 2006 With barely ten days remaining until the OSCEs year-end conference in Brussels, the draft ministerial declaration (the centerpiece of the conference documents) would weaken the Wests hand and strengthen Moscows on the most salient hard-security issue in Europe: Russias 1999 commitments to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. Moscow has repeatedly tried to decouple this issue from the 1999-adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), so as to bring this treaty into force on the territories of the three Baltic states and to place the Baltic states under treaty limitations. Those commitments, as well as that treaty, were approved as a package at the OSCEs Istanbul summit in 1999. Consequently, the NATO and European Union member countries have taken the position all along that the Russia-desired ratication of the adapted CFE treaty is linked with (that is, conditional on) Russias complete fulllment of its Istanbul Commitments. In 2005-2006 Russia made signicant progress toward withdrawing its forces from the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases in Georgia on a timetable running until 2008 a fact welcomed in the 2006 draft ministerial declaration. Apart from that promising step, however, Moscow has continued to breach its 1999 Commitments and CFE treaty principles on multiple counts during 2006. The relevant text in the OSCEs 2006 year-end draft declaration would if adopted loosen the linkage policy, relegate major elements in Russias Istanbul Commitments to oblivion, and bring the adapted CFE treatys ratication much closer. The treatys entry into force would in turn trigger a procedure to extend its applicability to the three Baltic states territories and negotiate with Russia about setting limits to any possible allied deployments there. Drafted largely by this years Belgian chairmanship and reecting some of Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel de Guchts publicly stated views, the OSCE declarations relevant text reads: We urge State Parties to the CFE Treaty to fulll the outstanding commitments undertaken at the 1999 Istanbul Summit. We
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welcome the [Russia-Georgia] agreements that have led to substantial progress on the ground. We call for completion of this process. As regards Moldova, no progress could be registered in 2006. We call on the Russian Federation and parties concerned to allow the process of withdrawal of ammunition and related military personnel to resume expeditiously. We reafrm our shared determination to promote the entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty (OSCE Ministerial Council, Belgian Chairmanship, MC.DD/2306, November 23). The paragraph on Moldova is phrased in a way that could all but liquidate the remaining Istanbul Commitments there. It only mentions withdrawal of ammunition, omitting the troops, although the Istanbul Commitments require the complete withdrawal of Russian forces, a term that focuses on the troops. From 2002 to date, the United States and European allies as well as Moldova have consistently focused on the Russian troops when calling for fulllment of Russias Istanbul Commitments. Earlier this year, however, De Gucht repeatedly called for withdrawal of Russian ammunition only, omitting the troops. And earlier this month, Belgiums ambassador to the OSCE in Vienna, Bernard de Combrugghe, heading a factnding delegation to Chisinau and Tiraspol, similarly declared in both places that the OSCE sought the withdrawal of ammunition, failing to mention the troops (Basapress, Infotag, Regnum, November 12-14). The reference to ammunition-related personnel is an innovation. In the course of that visit to Transnistria, the OSCE group was told by the Russian command that only about 100 Russian personnel (sotrudniki), not army troops but a militarized protection service (voyennizirovanaya okhrana), are guarding the vast Russian ammunition stockpile there (Regnum, Infotag, November 13). Thus, it appears that the ministerial declarations drafters would be content to see just those 100 Russian personnel withdraw along with the ammunition. While de Combrugghe did mention in Tiraspol the known fact that one of the sides (Chisinau) does not accept the Russian peacekeeping operation, that point remains academic if the OSCE releases Russia from the Istanbul Commitments on troop withdrawal. The documents call on Russia and parties concerned to allow ammunition withdrawal to proceed is a further innovation to accommodate Moscow. Responsibility for the unlawful stationing of Russian forces in Moldova has all along been Russias liability and no one elses. The Istanbul Commitments also hold Russia alone liable for the unconditional withdrawal of its forces. However, Moscow has attempted to ofoad those responsibilities onto other parties, thereby dividing its own political liability and setting thirdparty preconditions to fullling what are Moscows unconditional obligations. In the last few years, Moscow has falsely claimed that Tiraspols authorities do not allow Moscow to withdraw the ammunition, let alone the troops. Occasionally, Moscow has also alleged difculties with Moldovan railroads and rolling stock or Ukrainian safety concerns about the transport of old and dangerous ammunition, although the Tiraspol authorities (its appointees) provide Moscows main alibi for blocking the withdrawal.

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The OSCEs draft declaration plays along with Moscows tactics by asking unnamed other parties to unblock Russias withdrawal. In its nely nuanced, trademark OSCE phrasing, the document calls for the ammunition withdrawal merely to resume, as an open-ended process, rather than asking for it to be completed within a certain timeline. With Russia having breached several actual deadlines in succession, the OSCE at its year-end 2003 Maastricht conference gave up setting any deadlines or timelines, realizing that Russias persistent noncompliance was exposing the organizations ineffectiveness. The documents pledge to promote the adapted CFE treatys ratication is not accompanied by a conditional clause that would have referenced a linkage with Russias Istanbul Commitments. Nor is any reference made to Moscows breaches of both the original 1990 and the 1999-adapted treaties. The unfullled commitments and ongoing treaty breaches include: Russias retention of the Gudauta base in Georgia, which was due for closure in 2001; deployment of treaty-banned combat hardware with secessionist forces in Abkhazia, Karabakh, and Transnistria; and stationing of peacekeeping and other Russian troops in conict areas without host-country-consent, although such consent is a central principle of both existing and unratied CFE treaties. Adopting this section of the OSCEs ministerial declaration for 2006 in this form could at one stroke erase most of Russias outstanding Istanbul Commitments by the custodial organization itself. Such a development, should it come to pass, would mark a high point of Russian clout within the OSCE. Published on: http://www.jamestown.org/edm/ article.php?article_id=2371674

SUMMARY
The Greater Black Sea Area is a security complex which is heavily dominated by Russian strategy of controlling its direct neighborhood. In order to encourage multilateralism and the involvement of the Western powers in the region, the local states are using the existing international/regional organizations. At the last GUAM informal summit, in October 2006, the member states supported Georgia in its conict with Russia and called on other CIS member countries to support common efforts toward overcoming the crisis in Russia-Georgia relations. In December, at the OSCE summit, Russia will try again to decouple the issue of withdrawing from Moldova and Georgia, as it committed itself to do at the 1999 Istanbul Summit, from the request that NATO Baltic states sign the adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The OSCE European members should resist attempts by Russia to make the organization endorse the non-fulllment of Russian commitments.

Vladimir Socor, a senior fellow and long-time senior analyst with the Jamestown Foundation, formerly a senior research analyst with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich, is a specialist in the non-Russian former republics of the USSR, CIS affairs and ethnic conicts.

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Cooperarea UE-Rusia i sigurana aprovizionrii cu petrol i gaze naturale

Maior Stelian Fizean
Summitul informal de la Lahti La 20 octombrie a.c., Finlanda, care deine preedinia n exerciiu a Uniunii Europene, a organizat la Lahti o ntlnire informal a elor de state sau de guverne din rile UE i statele candidate, Romnia i Bulgaria. La baza discuiilor au stat dou puncte de vedere privind politica de inovaii i, respectiv, securitatea energetic1, precum i un comunicat al Comisiei Europene2 privind relaiile externe n domeniul energetic. Au mai fost, de asemenea, discutate politica de imigraie i situaia din Darfur (Sudan). Problema nclzirii globale i promovarea unor politici eciente n domeniul emisiilor de bioxid de carbon au fcut, de asemenea, obiectul discuiilor reuniunii. Dup reuniunea informal, ei de state i de guverne s-au ntlnit la o cina de lucru cu preedintele Federaiei Ruse, Vladimir Putin, cu care au discutat despre dezvoltarea parteneriatului strategic dintre UE i Rusia, inclusiv cooperarea n domeniul energiei3, despre relaiile tensionate ruso-georgiene i cazul uciderii jurnalistei Anna Politkovskaia. Romnia i Bulgaria se vor altura de la 1 ianuarie 2006 celor 25 de state membre ale Uniunii Europene, mbogind astfel zestrea cultural i spiritual a continentului. Relaiile economice ale Romniei cu Federaia Rus s-au mbuntit semnicativ n ultima perioad, la reuniunea de la Lahti preedintele Vladimir Putin calicnd cooperarea cu Romnia ca ind tradiional4. Cooperarea UE-Rusia i perspective de dezvoltare a acesteia n ultimii ani, cooperarea Rusiei cu Uniunea European a cptat un caracter mai structurat i mai matur. UE a rmas pentru Federaia Rus unul din partenerii economici cei mai importani, ceea ce nu exclude concurena, reasc de altfel, ntre cei doi parteneri. Volumul comerului exterior al Rusiei a ajuns la 52% n relaia cu UE5. Produsele energetice reprezint peste 60% din exporturile ruseti ctre UE, 60% din exporturile de petrol din Rusia au ca destinaie ri din UE (25% din consumul European de petrol). De asemenea, 50% din exporturile ruseti de gaze naturale ajung n UE (peste 25% din consumul european de gaz). Dialogul n domeniul energiei dintre Rusia i UE, iniiat n anul 2000 ca forum de discuii i cooperare, rmne, n prezent i n perspectiv, un instrument util de negociere a poziiilor celor dou pri, i de elaborare a unor decizii comune n acest domeniu sensibil. Sp re deosebire de statele sud-caucaziene, Republica Moldova, Ucraina i Belarus, Rusia nu este inclus n Politica de Vecintate a UE, dar dezvolt totui, cu aceasta, un parteneriat unic i dialogul n domeniile: economic; al libertii, justiiei i afacerilor interne; securitii externe; nvmntului, tiinei i culturii (aa-numitele spaii de cooperare). Experii consider c UE i Rusia ar trebui s xeze un nou cadru juridic de colaborare, deoarece n anul 2007 expir termenul de

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valabilitate al Acordului de Parteneriat i Cooperare dintre acestea, n vigoare de la 1 decembrie 1997. Documentul poate , totui, rennoit pe termene de cte un an, n mod tacit, prin acordul prilor, fr a invocat vidul legislativ6. Actualmente, n baza acordului dintre UE i Rusia au loc ntlniri la nivel de e de stat/guvern, la nivel de minitri i ali ociali i experi, exist un dialog politic i consultri n domeniul drepturilor omului, o cooperare interparlamentar i alte forme de colaborare. La 24 noiembrie a.c. se ntrunete la Helsinki summitul UE-Rusia, la care s-ar putea decide nceperea procesului de negocieri pentru un nou Acord nc din acest an, cu etapa principal de desfurare a acestuia, probabil sub preedinia german a UE, ncepnd cu 1 ianuarie 2007. Acordul ar urma s cuprind chestiuni generale de comer i politic energetic7. Partea rus dorete ca noul document s poarte denumirea de Acord de Parteneriat Strategic i s cuprind i aspecte privind cooperarea n domeniul energiei. Premierul nlandez Vanhanen consider c n privina sectorului energiei exist o nelegere deplin ntre statele membre asupra principiilor care s e aplicate n noul document; acestea ar trebui s acopere n special regulile de baz ale pieei, deschiderea acesteia, accesul nediscriminatoriu la reelele de tranzit al resurselor energetice i reciprocitatea n investiii. La 13 noiembrie, la reuniunea minitrilor afacerilor externe din rile UE, Polonia s-a opus ns adoptrii de ctre UE a unei poziii comune pentru nceperea negocierii acordului bilateral, datorit faptului c Federaia Rus nu a raticat nc Tratatul privind Carta Energetic (1991) i nu a semnat Protocolul de Tranzit. n prezent, UE este n mod deosebit interesat de situaia drepturilor omului n Rusia, n special n Cecenia, de libertatea mass-media, situaia ONG-urilor, implementarea legii privind contracararea activitilor extremiste i, n general, de respectarea legii n aceast ar. Pe lng aceste aspecte, n cadrul procesului de negociere a unui document de colaborare pe termen lung ntre cele dou pri s-ar putea ine seama de unele tendine n ce privete ritmul proceselor de integrare intern din cadrul UE i rezolvarea unor probleme instituionale, de chestiunea extinderii (capacitatea de integrare) acesteia, de posibilitatea intensicrii cooperrii cu statele incluse n Politica European de Vecintate, n special cu Republica Moldova, Georgia i Ucraina ca subieci recunoscui de drept internaional precum i de interesele rezultate din parteneriatele fundamentale dintre UE-NATO, UE-SUA i UE-Canada. Tendine pe piaa global a energiei n urmtorii 20-25 de ani. Cererea de energie va continua s creasc constant n urmtorii 20-25 de ani. Potrivit unor previziuni ale experilor Ageniei Internaionale pentru Energie, necesarul de energie n lume va cu 50% mai mare n 2030 dect n prezent, n situaia unei creteri economice anuale n medie cu 1,6%. Combustibilii fosili vor constitui peste 80% din necesitile energetice primare, conform acestui scenariu. Consumul de petrol va crete, 2/3 din acesta provenind de la sectorul transporturi (92 mb/zi n 2010 i 115 mb/zi n 2030). Se estimeaz c necesarul de gaze naturale va crete, de asemenea, acestea devenind cea de-a doua resurs energetic primar ca utilizare, naintea crbunelui, pn n 2015. Cererea de crbune va mai scdea, aceasta provenind n special din China i India. Cota de energie produs n centralele nucleare se va
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mai diminua de asemenea, n timp ce procentul de energie produs n hidrocentrale va rmne constant. n nal, cota de energie produs din resurse regenerabile (mai puin hidro-) va rmne constant, la aproximativ 11%. Diversicarea resurselor, a rutelor de transport al acestora i a furnizorilor va crucial, odat cu creterea vulnerabilitii rilor consumatoare n faa unor posibile ntreruperi n aprovizionare din cauza riscului ca unele ri productoare (n special din Orientul Mijlociu) s-i foloseasc poziia dominant pe pia din motive politice sau pur i simplu pentru a crete preul. Pn n 2030 va crete gradul de incertitudine i riscul de ntrerupere n aprovizionarea cu petrol i gaze naturale, principalele cauze ind terorismul, accidentele, dezastrele naturale, tensiunile (geo)politice sau rzboiul. Aprofundarea dialogului ntre productorii i consumatorii de petrol i gaze va ajuta pe toi actorii de pe piaa energiei s depeasc aceast incertitudine i s mobilizeze investiiile necesare pentru restructurarea acestor sectoare8. Rusia i tentaia hegemoniei energetice Singurele ri europene exportatoare de gaze naturale sunt Marea Britanie, Olanda i, ntr-o mai mic msur, Danemarca, iar din afara UE, Norvegia. Odat cu creterea cererii de energie n plan global i cu dorina UE de a-i asigura securitatea aprovizionrii cu resursele energetice necesare, n mare parte din Federaia Rus, piaa international a energiei s-a transformat n favoarea productorilor, iar preul la iei i, ulterior, la gaze a crescut. Au existat voci ale unor ociali americani, care au acuzat Rusia de ncercri de intimidare i antaj energetic n relaia cu vecinii (Lituania, Ucraina). Unii analiti sunt de prere c zidul Berlinului, drmat n urm cu 17 ani, a fost nlocuit deja de Moscova cu altul, cel al petroautoritarismului, care are un efect de ncetinire a instaurrii economiei de pia i a libertilor ceteneti n Rusia9. Creterea preurilor la gaze naturale n 2004 i 2005 s-a datorat, n principal, creterii preurilor la petrol i produse petroliere derivate, n ntreaga lume, iar pe teritoriul CSI i al rilor baltice a avut drept cauz i creterea preului de tranzitare. Totodat, n Europa, preul la electricitate a reectat preul crescut la gazele naturale. Dup aprecierile experilor din Federaia Rus, aproximativ o treime din rezervele mondiale de gaze naturale se a n aceast ar. Rusia, care nu este membr a OPEC este, n acelai timp, al doilea productor mondial de iei. Aproximativ 60% din rezervele ruseti de gaze sunt controlate de Societatea Gazprom i liala acesteia Gazeksport, care dein, practic, monopolul exporturilor de gaze, n detrimentul unor productori independeni. Gazprom este pe locul I n lume n ce privete producia i exportul acestei resurse energetice. Primele livrri de gaze naturale ruseti n Europa au nceput dup anul 1945 (n Polonia), iar apoi acestea au fost exportate i pe pieele din Europa Occidental, de atunci datnd primele contracte de livrare pe termen lung. n anul 2005, gazul rusesc era exportat n urmtoarele ri: Belarus, Germania, Ucraina, Armenia, Italia, Turcia, Frana, Cehia, Slovacia, Polonia, Austria, Finlanda, Bulgaria, Romnia, Serbia i Muntenegru, Croaia, Slovenia, Grecia, Elveia, Olanda, Bosnia i Heregovina, FRI a Macedoniei, Belgia, Marea Britanie, rile baltice i Republica Moldova. n prezent exist ns unele limitri de natur logistic, datorate infrastructurii nvechite de tranzit al petrolului i gazelor spre Europa, dar i problema caracterului nchis al pieei continentale europene i a tracului limitat al tancurilor petroliere prin strmtorile daneze, Bosfor i Dardanele i prin Marea Egee10.

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Datorit siturii relativ ndeprtate a zcmintelor de gaze fa de pieele europene, a creterii concurenei pe piaa gazului, Gazprom prefer ncheierea unor contracte pe termen lung, posibilitate prevzut i n Directiva 2004/67/EC din aprilie 2004 (Long Term Gas Supply). Se estimeaz c Europa va rmne, n urmtorii 15-20 de ani, principala pia de desfacere pentru gazul rusesc11. Rusia a semnat n 1991 Acordul privind Carta Energetic, document care servete drept baz juridic pentru cooperarea internaional n domeniul energiei, dar Duma de Stat a Federaiei Ruse nu l-a raticat. Gazprom consider c aplicarea prevederilor acestui document ar nlesni accesul companiilor strine la piaa resuselor energetice i accesul unor tere pri la gazoductele care aparin companiei, inclusiv la magistralele de tranzit spre pieele europene din rile Asiei Centrale12. Att statele care furnizeaz petrol i gaze, ct i cele de tranzit sunt, ntr-o anumit msur, nesigure. n ultimii ani, ntre 75 i 85% din gazul rusesc tranzitat spre Europa a trecut prin Ucraina, iar o cantitate mai mic prin Belarus i Republica Moldova. Printro perioad de criz a trecut att Kievul, la nceputul anului (rzboiul gazului cu Federaia Rus), ct i Tbilisi, n iarna trecut, cnd pe poriunea rus a gazoductului nspre Georgia au avut loc explozii, iar aprovizionarea cu gaz pentru aceast ar a fost ntrerupt timp de dou sptmni. Astfel de evenimente i consecinele care le-au urmat au dus la concluzia c n unele situaii, politica extern a ajuns s e dependent de securitatea energetic13. Ocialii europeni au subliniat n repetate rnduri c este necesar un tratament nediscriminatoriu i transparen n stabilirea de ctre Federaia Rus a preurilor la gazele naturale pentru statele beneciare. Dac, pn nu demult, preurile la gaze n CSI erau la un nivel sczut n comparaie cu rile europene, iar preurile de cost la productor nu depeau 20 de dolari pe mia de metri cubi, n prezent societatea rus Gazprom achiziioneaz mia de metri cubi cu 120 de dolari din Kazahstan i cu 100 de dolari din Turkmenistan, punnd rile importatoare ntr-o poziie dicil. Aceasta, n condiiile n care pe piaa intern din Rusia gazul este cel mai ieftin combustibil, ind vndut, de exemplu, ctre populaie cu preuri variind ntre 25 i 48 de dolari14. n momentul de fa, n cazul apariiei unei crize, Rusia poate pur i simplu s opreasc exportul de gaze spre Europa. Semnalul de alarm era tras la nceputul anului, cnd avea loc disputa privind preul de livrare al gazelor ctre Ucraina, iar Rusia ntrerupea livrrile de gaz ctre aceast ar, n urma neajungerii la o nelegere. La nceputul lunii august 2006, a strnit ngrijorare n Uniunea European anunul privind ncheierea unui acord ntre Gazprom i productorul algerian de gaz, Sonatrac. tirea l-a fcut pe primul ministru italian, Romano Prodi, fost ef al Comisiei Europene, s declare c suspecteaz ncercarea de creare a unui cartel mondial la gaz, de tipul celui petrolier, OPEC. Gazprom, cel mai mare furnizor de gaz pentru UE, cu 125 mld.mc, este urmat de compania algerian, cu 61 mld.mc15. Pe de alt parte, recent, unele companii occidentale i multinaionale care opereaz pe piaa energiei din Rusia au ntmpinat greuti deosebite n proiectele de exploatare a zcmintelor de petrol i gaze din aceast ar, n favoarea companiilor ruse de stat Gazprom i Rosneft. A fost cazul platformelor Sahalin-1 i Sahalin-2 din estul Rusiei, al unor exploatri din Siberia i din zona polar. Partea rus a motivat blocarea activitii acestora prin nerespectarea contractelor de ctre nsei rmele strine respective. Dac mai existau ndoieli n ce privete aplicarea de ctre Rusia a noii sale politici energetice
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naionale din ultimii 2-3 ani, de meninere i ntrire a centralizrii conducerii n companiile energetice ruse i mrirea participaiilor statului n cadrul acestora, la nceputul lunii octombrie a.c., preedintele Consiliului de administraie al Gazprom, Aleksei Miller, a anunat c aceast companie va ncepe singur exploatarea zcmintelor de gaze de la tokman, considerate ca ind al treilea ca mrime din lume. Deschiderea acestei exploatri, aate la 500 km nord de oraul Murmansk, va necesar, conform opiniei unor experi, n perspectiva epuizrii unor rezerve i a scderii produciei de gaze din Rusia de la 600 mld. mc, la 120 mld. mc n anul 2020 16. Dup prerea unor specialiti n piaa resurselor energetice, Rusia i Uniunea European sunt sortite s coopereze n acest domeniu. Principalele alternative la importurile de gaz rusesc sunt, dup prerea acestora, folosirea crbunelui, centralele nucleare i importul de gaz licheat din Africa de Nord i Orientul Mijlociu. Toate trei posibilitile prezint unele dezavantaje: arderea crbunelui crete cantitatea de CO2 eliberat n atmosfer de dou ori mai mult dect n cazul gazelor naturale; construirea de centrale nucleare (destul de nepopulare n Occident) de o nou generaie ar mai dura civa ani; importul de gaz licheat n Europa din Orientul Mijlociu ar costa mai mult i ar concura i cu alte piee de desfacere mai rentabile, cum este cea american. Dup calculele specialitilor, satisfacerea necesitilor sale energetice din alte surse dect cele ruse ar costa UE cu 40-60 mld. $ mai mult dect la preurile actuale. De asemenea, redirecionarea livrrilor de gaze din Siberia de Vest spre alte piee dect cea european ar pgubi Federaia Rus cu 50-70 mld.$.17 De altfel, China, a crei pia este vizat de Rusia, nu ofer un pre bun la gazele naturale de import, aa cum ofer UE. n plus, n producerea de energie, n China este folosit pe scar larg crbunele (peste 80%), existent n abunden. n viitor, China nu-i va mri importurile de gaze n mod semnicativ, ci pe cele de petrol; se preconizeaz c n 2010 volumul de gaze importate de aceast ar va de 10 mld.mc/an, iar n 2030, de 40 mld.mc/an. n plus, China i exploateaz propriile rezerve de gaz 18. Piaa european se dovedete, dup prerea specialitilor citai, cea mai avantajoas pentru exportul rusesc de gaze, iar rmele occidentale pot oferi tehnologii avansate i investi n noi exploatri i n infrastructura de exploatare19 i tranzit din Rusia. Pentru aceasta Rusia i UE sunt nevoite s coopereze n vederea diminurii incertitudinii i a riscurilor din relaiile lor i ale companiilor, n domeniul energiei, prin: reglementri clare i precise ntre statele membre n legtur cu obiectivele de infrastructur i tranzit (conducte transfrontaliere, capaciti de stocare); crearea de ctre statele membre a unor rezerve strategice proprii, care s contribuie la diminuarea preurilor la gaze; respectarea de ctre Rusia a tuturor regulilor de comer internaional i garantarea respectrii contractelor; liberalizarea n continuare, de ctre Rusia, a pieei i diminuarea subsidiilor la preul gazelor, transparen n legtur cu volumul livrrilor, capacitatea de transport, infrastructura, dinamica cererii de gaz20. De asemenea, UE ca parte a viitoarei sale politici n domeniul energiei i Rusia, ar putea sprijini Iniiativa pentru Transparen n Industriile Extractive (EITI), lansat n 2002, care promoveaz declararea veniturilor ncasate de industriile petrolului, gazelor i minier; o mai mare transparen n nregistrarea veniturilor permite cetenilor s urmreasc cota veniturilor la bugetele naionale, reducndu-se astfel riscul corupiei i promovndu-se dezbaterea public pentru utilizarea cea mai ecient a banilor publici21.

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Exist posibiliti de contracarare a efectului de monopol la importurile din surs unic. Aceasta se poate face prin diversicarea surselor de aprovizionare cu energie i prin solidarizarea statelor, inclusiv a celor de tranzit, atunci cnd unele dintre ele ntmpin diculti22. Statele membre ale UE caut n prezent s gseasc poziii unice care s le reprezinte interesele pe piaa global a resurselor energetice, n acest sens discutndu-se de mai mult timp despre necesitatea elaborrii unei strategii energetice pentru Comunitatea European23. n general, n UE exist opinia c interdependena cu Rusia n privina energiei este n beneciul Europei doar dac aceasta este unit i nu vorbete pe 27 de voci diferite24. De aceea, Comisia European a lansat, la 8 martie 2006, Carta Verde intitulat A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, document care xeaz cadrul unei posibile viitoare politici n domeniul energiei, iar la 19 octombrie 2006, Comisia a elaborat un Plan de Aciune pentru eciena energetic. Acesta cuprinde 10 aciuni prioritare de reducere a consumului de energie n rile UE cu pn la 20%, pn n anul 202025. De asemenea, se intenioneaz extinderea principiilor pieei interne a energiei la vecintate26. Se estimeaz c dac energia de pe piaa proprie nu va mai competitiv, n urmtorii 20-30 de ani, aproximativ 70% din necesarul de energie al UE, fa de 50% astzi, vor asigurate din regiuni ameninate de insecuritate. n perspectiv, se pune un accent tot mai mare pe importul de pe pieele internaionale al gazului natural licheat GNL (n prezent 25%). Piaa gazelor transportate prin conducte crete n medie cu 2-3% pe an, iar cea a gazului licheat, cu 7-8%. Conform prognozelor Ageniei Internaionale a Energiei, n urmtorii 25-30 de ani cota acestuia pe pia va depi 50%. Avantajul achiziionrii de gaz licheat const n faptul c acesta nu leag cumprtorul de vnztor, teoretic poate transportat cu vasul oriunde n lume, ca i pe piaa petrolului (i probabil c n viitor va putea achiziionat mai ieftin), spre deosebire de modul de transport, tradiional, prin conducte (de preferat, prin contracte pe termen lung) al gazului natural27. Dezavantajul l constituie faptul c gazul natural licheat cost mai mult i c la destinaie sunt necesare terminale de regazeicare. Actualmente, unele ri din UE achiziioneaz gaz natural licheat din Algeria, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar i alte state, tendina ind de cretere a importurilor. GNL nu este nc produs la scar mare n Rusia, dar exist proiecte de construcie a unor ntreprinderi, cel mai avansat ind proiectul Sahalin-2. Diversicarea surselor de aprovizionare trebuie, de asemenea, nsoit de cea a coridoarelor de tranzit i a cilor de transport (de exemplu coridorul TRACECA, reeaua de Ci Ferate Transasiatice Trans-Asian Railway Network)28. Pe de alt parte, securitatea energetic a coridoarelor i a conductelor trebuie s in seama de stabilitatea din regiunile pe care acestea le traverseaz. Caucazul de Sud i regiunea Mrii Caspice sunt zone nc nesigure, ca urmare a existenei conictelor ngheate din Abhazia, Osetia de Sud i Nagorno-Karabah, la acestea adaugndu-se i situaia incert din regiune cauzat de programul nuclear controversat al Iranului. O alt metod de mbuntire a nivelului securitii energetice i, totodat, de reducere a emisiilor poluante, o reprezint creterea numrului proiectelor de energie regenerabil (hidroenergie, energie solar, eolian, geotermal, biomas, bioetanol .a.), Romnia devenind membr a Parteneriatului pentru Energie Regenerabil i Ecien Energetic (REEEP) la 27 octombrie a.c.29. Obiectivul strategic propus deja de Carta Alb pentru o Strategie Comunitar i Planul
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de Aciune aferent: Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy (noiembrie 1997) este dublarea, pn n 2010, n medie la 12%, a aportului surselor regenerabile de energie n Comunitatea European. Situaia n rile de tranzit ntre vecintatea apropiat i Politica de Vecintate a UE Unii comentatori rui consider c drumul Ucrainei spre Europa trebuie s se fac prin crearea unei uniuni economice cu Rusia, eventual a unui spaiu economic unic cu Rusia, Belarus i Kazahstan. Aceasta ar calea raional, se arm n primul scenariu, adic realizarea mai nti a unei uniuni economice Ucraina Rusia i, ulterior, adaptarea la normele UE privind nivelul de trai i al instituiilor, respectiv crearea spaiului economic unic ntre acest bloc emergent est-european i UE, n cadrul cruia s-ar asigura libertatea de micare a oamenilor, a capitalurilor i ideilor. Potrivit celui de-al doilea scenariu, Ucraina ar ocupa o poziie de neutralitate, pstrnd relaii bune att cu Occidentul, ct i cu Rusia (un fel de off-shore geopolitic), de teritoriu de tranzit al resurselor energetice ruseti spre Europa. Potrivit celui de-al treilea scenariu (scenariul integrrii spre Vest), sunt vehiculate dou variante: una idealist, conform creia Ucraina va primit n UE, i varianta geopolitic, prin care se presupune c aceast ar va adera la NATO30.

Belarus
n prezent, Minskul pltete pe mia de metri cubi de gaz rusesc 47$, dar au loc negocieri pentru stabilirea unui nou pre. n schimbul unor aciuni la reeaua de gazoducte i la ranrii din Belarus, Gazprom ar putea menine un pre preferenial pentru gazele livrate acestui stat. De tranzitul gazelor prin aceast ar depinde i aprovizionarea Poloniei i a rilor baltice. De asemenea, prin Belarus trece oleoductul ce furnizeaz petrol singurei ranrii lituaniene, Mazeikiu Nafta, aat n proces de achiziionare de ctre concernul polonez PKN Orlen (ctigtor n faa Gazprom). Belarusul rmne unul din cei mai deli aliai ai Moscovei, datorit multitudinii de iniiative la care particip mpreun cu aceasta n spaiul postsovietic: CSI, Uniunea Rusia-Belarus, Comunitatea Economica EuroAsiatica, Organizaia Tratatului de Aprare Colectiv. Rusia deine baze militare n Belarus, dislocate conform unor acorduri pe termen lung: o staie de radiolocaie, un punct zonal de comunicaii, divizioane de rachete antiaeriene S-300 etc.

Caucazul de Sud
Persistena, la aproape 15 ani de la destrmarea Uniunii Sovietice, a conictelor ngheate este principala cauz a existenei unei situaii politico-militare tensionate, a unor crize sociale i economice, a decitului democratic i a inecienei unor instituii de stat n rile din Caucazul de Sud. La acestea se adaug i conictele i tensiunile din Cecenia i alte republici caucaziene din Federaia Rus. La ora actual, ONU i OSCE sunt organizaiile cele mai implicate n reglementarea situaiei din zon. Karel De Gucht, ministrul Afacerilor Externe al Belgiei (ara care asigur preedinia n exerciiu a OSCE), a declarat c, cu toate eforturile depuse de comunitatea internaional, n anul n curs

Trei scenarii ruseti pentru Ucraina

La summitul informal de la Lahti, naltul reprezentant pentru Politica Extern i de Securitate Comun, Javier Solana, a atras atenia c 80% din gazele naturale care sunt furnizate de Rusia ctre UE, tranziteaz Ucraina.

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nu s-au nregistrat progrese n reglementarea conictului din Nagorno-Karabah. Azerbaidjanul este un partener cheie pentru Uniunea European n regiunea Caucazului de Sud, n principal, datorit locaiei sale geo-strategice i resurselor de petrol i gaze naturale. Din acest motiv, UE a inclus, n iunie 2004, Azerbaidjanul, mpreun cu Armenia i Georgia n Politica sa de Vecintate. Acest fapt, ca i implementarea Acordurilor de Parteneriat i Cooperare i a Planurilor de Aciune cu aceste ri, va contribui n continuare la ntrirea relaiilor dintre pri. Semnarea de ctre UE i Azerbaidjan, la 7 noiembrie a.c., a unui Memorandum de nelegere pentru parteneriat energetic, face parte din aciunile de consolidare a relaiilor UE n domeniul energiei cu furnizorii de resurse i rile de tranzit, i de extindere a principiilor pieei interne la statele ce fac obiectul Politicii Europene de Vecintate. Azerbaidjanul i Georgia nu doresc s se integreze n spaiul economic al CSI, iar relaiile acestora cu NATO i UE sunt foarte bune. Georgia a primit recent und verde pentru intensicarea cooperrii cu Aliana Nord-Atlantic i declar c este preocupat de refacerea integritii sale teritoriale prin rezolvarea panic a conictelor separatiste din Osetia de Sud i Abhazia, i de retragerea bazelor militare ruse de pe teritoriul su. Au existat semnale c Georgia, Ucraina i R. Moldova, membre ale Organizaiei pentru democraie i dezvoltare economic GUAM, i pun problema avantajelor rmnerii, n continuare, n Comunitatea Statelor Independente (CSI). n urma unui conict armat, Armenia i Azerbaidjanul au ncheiat n mai 1994 un armistiiu, nclcat de multe ori de ambele pri. Dezvoltarea n ultimii ani a sectorului petrolier i al gazelor n Azerbaidjan a condus la o cretere important a veniturilor acestui stat i a cheltuielilor n domeniul militar, fapt ce poate complica i mai mult procesul de rezolvare a conictului din NagornoKarabah31. Azerbaidjanul intenioneaz s declaneze o ofensiv economic pentru recuperarea teritoriilor pierdute i pentru revenirea refugiailor azeri n locurile pe care au fost forai s le prseasc. Armenia, partener strategic al Federaiei Ruse, a rmas n afara unor proiecte economice regionale importante: oleoductul Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, viitorul gazoduct BakuTbilisi-Erzurum i proiectul cii ferate BakuTbilisi-Kars. Este n faz nal de construcie gazoductul Armenia-Iran. Conform unor aprecieri, aproximativ 80% din obiectivele sistemului energetic al Armeniei sunt n proprietatea unor rme din Rusia. n aceast perioad, n care se manifest tensiuni n relaiile dintre Moscova i Tbilisi, n Armenia, care import gazul rusesc prin Georgia, se intensic sentimentele pro-georgiene32. Potrivit declaraiilor unor ociali azeri, n anul 2007, ntregul buget al Armeniei va egal cu bugetul militar al Azerbaidjanului33. Dup Georgia (iulie 2005), Azerbaidjanul i va elabora, probabil n acest an, propria concepie de securitate i, pe baza ei, noua doctrin militar ce va asigura planicarea n domeniul aprrii pe termen mediu i lung, n timp ce Armenia intenioneaz publicarea acestor documente n 200734. Deocamdat ns, regiunea Caucazului rmne una din cele mai militarizate din lume35. n Armenia este dislocat o baz militar rus, care este ntrit cu efective de la bazele ruse redislocate din Georgia, ceea ce strnete ngrijorare la Baku. Armenia este, de asemenea, ar participant la Organizaia Tratatului de Aprare Colectiv (Tratatul de la Takent). n poda apropierii de Rusia, Armenia nu ignor, de asemenea, NATO, existnd politicieni care doresc mbuntirea relaiilor cu Aliana Nord-Atlantic. Totui, aceast ar este mai interesat de UE i nu privete NATO ca un partener apropiat36.
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Republica Moldova
Republica Moldova a aderat la programul Parteneriatului pentru Pace lansat de NATO n 1994, dar i pstreaz un statut de neutralitate. Dup respingerea de ctre R. Moldova a Planului rus de federalizare a republicii (Memorandumul Kozak) n 2003, procesul de reglementare a diferendului transnistrean a nregistrat o stagnare, dei ulterior, ind parte a procesului de negocieri, conducerea actual a statului moldovean a acordat, unilateral, cele mai mari concesii privind statutul entitii separatiste. Oferte importante n deblocarea negocierilor au venit din partea Romniei i a Ucrainei (Planul Iucenko). Dup o perioad rece n relaiile romno-moldovene, urmare a liniei politice promovate de preedintele Voronin, n ianuarie 2005 au fost relansate relaiile bilaterale, prin vizita preedintelui Traian Bsescu la Chiinu. Aceast vizit rearm caracterul special al relaiei prin istoria i limba comun a celor dou state i prin dimensiunea european obiectivul ambelor ri de integrare n UE. O importan deosebit n controlul infracionalitii din regiunea separatist a avut-o deschiderea misiunii UE la frontiera dintre R. Moldova i Ucraina (EUBAM) i msura de blocare vamal a agenilor economici transnistreni nenregistrai la Chiinu. n luna septembrie a.c., regimul Smirnov, susinut de diveri actori politici rui, a organizat un referendum privind statutul i viitorul Transnistriei37, nerecunoscut n plan internaional. Odat cu includerea n formatul de negocieri a SUA i UE ca observatori (5+2), se sper relansarea procesului de reglementare a diferendului. Persist ocial teoria existenei unei limbi moldoveneti, diferit de cea romn, i s-a dispus, din aceast toamn, nceperea predrii integrate a istoriei, care rupe articial istoria Basarabiei de cea a poporului romn. Concluzii Cooperarea dintre UE i Rusia n domeniul energiei care s e prevzut inclusiv n cadrul unui nou document-cadru de cooperare bilateral, i care s conrme principiile economiei de pia i pe cele ale Tratatului privind Carta Energetic este perceput ca ind tot mai necesar n contextul liberalizrii pieei mondiale a energiei. ei de state sau de guverne ai statelor din G8 reunii n iulie a.c. la Skt. Petersburg au fost de acord c este necesar intensicarea eforturilor de adoptare a unor msuri fezabile din punct de vedere tehnic i justicate economic, pentru eliminarea tensiunilor de pe pieele energiei. Acetia au subliniat i nevoia de responsabilitate colectiv n abordarea provocrilor energetice ale lumii, inclusiv ntreruperile n aprovizionarea cu resurse, printr-o coordonare mai strns a politicilor energetice. Cooperarea UE n domeniul energiei cu alte ri rmne o prioritate, independent de relaiile UE-Rusia.rile membre sprijin n general parteneriatele de cooperare cu diveri actori n domeniul energiei (zona Mediteranei, Mrii Negre i Mrii Caspice, Orientul Mijlociu i Golful Persic, Norvegia, OPEC, America Latin), ca i cu marii consumatori de energie (SUA, China, India). De asemenea, UE urmrete extinderea gradual a principiilor unei piee energetice unice, inclusiv prin Politica European de Vecintate. Tratatul privind Comunitatea Energetic, semnat la Atena la 25 octombrie 2005 i intrat n vigoare la 1 iulie a.c., urmrete extinderea pieei interne a energiei a UE ctre regiunea Europei de Sud-Est. Ca arie de proximitate geograc, Europa de Sud-Est, Caucazul de Sud i Asia Central sunt regiuni cu rol crucial n asigurarea unei aprovizionri sigure i diversicate cu resurse de energie nspre statele Uniunii Europene,

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iar progresele n domeniul dialogului energetic cu rile din aceste zone pot contribui n mod semnicativ la consolidarea securitii energetice globale, la creterea economic i la realizarea unui mediu inconjurtor mai curat. Not: Summitul bianual UE-Rusia din 24 noiembrie a.c. s-a concentrat asupra mbuntirii cooperrii n domeniile energetic, relaiilor comerciale i economice, vizelor, migraiei i afacerilor externe, dar s-a ncheiat fr decizia de ncepere a negocierilor pentru un nou acord de parteneriat ntre cele dou pri, din cauza meninerii rezervelor anterioare ale Poloniei. NOTE
1 6

Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part, www.ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/pca/ pca_russia.pdf

www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/press_ releases/vko46/en_GB/174185/ Fatih Birol, World Energy Prospects and Challenges, www.iea.org/Textbase/publications/ free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=1696, 09 noiembrie 2006.
9 8

Thomas L. Friedman, The Really Cold War, The New York Times, 25 October 2006, www.inosmi.ru.

10

Vladimir Milov, Ivan Selivahin, Problemy energeticheskoj politiki, Rabochie materialy, No. 4/2005, Moskva, Moskovskij Centr Karnegi.

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. do?reference=IP/06/1367& format = HTML & aged =0& language=EN&guiLanguage=en

11 I.N. Glucenko Sostojanie i perspektivy sotrudnichestva Rossii i ES v gazovoj sfere, n Politika v XXI veke: Vyzovy i realii, No. 4 (14), Moskva, 2005, Rossijskij Institut Strategicheskih Issledovanij, p.31. 12

2 Communication from the Commission to the European Council. External energy relations from principles to action, Bruxelles, Informal European Council, Lahti, 20 October 2006. http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/lahti%20 energy_tcm29-158793.doc 3

Ibidem.

http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/ press_releases/vko41/en_GB/170989/

13 Javier Solana, Transcript of the first press conference for the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government, Lahti, 20 October 2006 http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/ other_documents/vko42/en_GB/1161368914040/ 14

Putin (through interpreter): [] So, we have just completed our summit. The informal nature of our summit has enabled us to hold completely open and a free exchange of views in a relaxed atmosphere. I would point out the fact that attending this summit where all EU Heads of State including Candidate Countries, Bulgaria and Romania, and the European Commission. I have mentioned Bulgaria and Romania not only because they are candidates, candidates to new membership, [but] because they are traditional partners to Russia.[]. - Transcript of the second press conference for the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government, Lahti, Finland, 21 October 2006, http://www.eu2006. fi/news_and_documents/other_documents/vko42/ en_GB/1161383205709/
5

V.A. Chizhov, Vseobemljushchee strategicheskoe partnjorstvo kak cel, www.ng.ru/courier/2006-1023/13_partners.html, accesat 23 oct. 2006.

rile baltice cumpr gazul cu 220 dolari mia de metri cubi, cu perspectiva de a ajunge la 260$, rilor din Caucazul de Sud li se propune un pre de 220$, Moldova pltete 160$ n prezent i cu o posibil cretere n 2007. Azerbaidjanul import n prezent gaz din Rusia i export, n schimb, pcur, dar intenioneaz s-i sporeasc producia proprie pe anul 2007-2008 cu 2,5 mld metri cubi, fa de producia actual de 4 mld. metri cubi, prin darea n exploatare a zcmintelor de la ah-Deniz i a gazoductului Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum n acest an. (F. Alizade, Strasti po cene na prirodnyj gaz, 14 oct. 2006, www.zerkalo.az).Ucraina are nevoie de o perioad de tranziie de 3 ani pentru a plti la preuri europene, timp n care intenioneaz s cumpere gaz direct din Asia Central, ceea ce nu a mpiedicat-o s ncheie la 24 octombrie a.c. un acord cu partea rus prin care urmeaz s-i creasc preul de achiziie de la 95 la doar 130$ pe mia de metri cubi (unii analiti vorbesc de preul politic pltit pentru aceast tranzacie).
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Zoran Cviji, Energetska hegemonija zabrinjava Brisel, www.danas.co.yu/20060811/evropa1.html
16 15

Oliver Morgan, Oil and gas rights: the weapons of a new Cold War, The Observer, 15 October 2006, http:// business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,,1922663,00.html
17

Ivo J. H. Bozon, Warren J. Campbell, and Thomas Vahlenkamp, Europe and Russia: Charting an energy alliance, The McQuinsey Quarterly, 2006, No.4, http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_page. aspx?ar=1852&l2=3&l3=49&srid=7&gp=1
18

secretarului de stat american pentru Caucaz i Europa de Sud, Matthew Bryza. Oficialul american a declarat, ntr-un interviu pentru Financial Times, c diversificarea aprovizionrii presupune evitarea aceluiai furnizor i c aceast conduct, care va ocoli Polonia, va crete dependena Europei de gazul rusesc n loc s-o micoreze, impunndu-se, deci, o cooperare mai strns cu rile din zona Mrii Caspice, n principal cu Azerbaidjanul. (US criticises Russia-Germany gas deal, www.ft.com/cms/ s/50e6faec-6779-11db-8ea5-0000779e2340.html)
24

V. Rijkov, V. Milov, - V zalozhnikah u truby, www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=714906, 20.10.2006.

Jos Manuel Duro Barroso, A European Strategy for Energy: Closing Speech, Lisboa, 30 de Outubro 2006.
25

De exemplu, n lipsa unor tehnologii moderne, cantiti importante de gaze se pierd la staiile de compresare i pe conductele magistrale i un volum semnificativ de gaze de sond sunt arse i pierdute la exploatarea petrolului.
20

19

Commission of the European Communities, Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/action_plan_ energy_efficiency/index_en.htm, 01.11.2006.

Ivo J. H. Bozon, Warren J. Campbell, Thomas Vahlenkamp, op.cit. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Time to go global, Press Release, 16-10-2006, http:// www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2. php?id=384 , accesat 27 oct. 2006. n patru ani de la lansare, 21 de ri bogate n resurse naturale au aderat la iniiativ, dar numai dou Azerbaidjan i Nigeria au publicat rapoarte complete. Solidarizarea a fost nlocuit, totui, de pragmatism, la summitul Adunrii Parlamentare a GUAM de la Chiinu de la jumatatea lunii octombrie a.c., cnd Ucraina i R. Moldova nu au sprijinit poziia autoritilor de la Tbilisi, care au cerut condamnarea aciunilor de boicot ale Federaiei Ruse fa de Georgia. Ucraina i R. Moldova depind de preurile la gazul rusesc, iar negocierile pentru stabilirea acestora pentru anul 2007 nc nu se ncheiaser. Totui, reprezentanii rilor GUAM au convenit c este necesar schimbarea actualului format al trupelor de meninere a pcii (militari rui) din regiunile conflictelor nereglementate i nlocuirea lor cu fore de meninere a pcii din statele GUAM, sub mandat ONU sau OSCE. Despre interesele naionale n domeniul energiei st mrturie acordul dintre Germania i Federaia Rus, prin care va fi construit un gazoduct nordeuropean pe fundul Marii Baltice. Acesta a provocat reacia Poloniei i a statelor baltice, ca i a adjunctului
23 22 21

Matti Vanhanen, Transcript of the first press conference for the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government, Lahti, 20 Oct 2006 http:// www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/other_ documents/vko42/en_GB/1161368914040/
27 Gazozavisimost, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc. html?DocID=712004, 11.10.2006.

26

Vezi i darea n exploatare a oleoductului Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan n 2005 i a gazoductului Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, pn la sfritul acestui an, precum i alte proiecte (ConstanaTrieste, construcia de conducte transcaspice, Nabucco dinspre Iran, prin Turcia, Bulgaria, Romnia, n Europa Central). n Romnia, ponderea energiei electrice produse din resurse regenerabile de energie, fa de consumul naional brut de energie electric, trebuie s ajung la 33% pn n 2010. (euROpeanul, nr.3, 3-17 noiembrie 2006, p.2, www.mie.ro ).
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28

Serghei Markov, Kievskie batalii, www.ng.ru/ courier/2006-10-23/19_ukrain.html

De fapt, cu toate eforturile comunitii internaionale i ale Grupului OSCE de la Minsk, sub al crui patronaj se desfoar negocierile, este greu de crezut c acest conflict interstatal dintre Azerbaidjan i Armenia, precum i conflictele etnoteritoriale din provinciile separatiste georgiene Abhazia i Osetia de Sud din proximitatea direct cu Rusia, ar putea fi rezolvate mai rapid dect diferendul transnistrean din apropierea imediat a NATO i a UE.

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32

V Armenii obespokoeny poterej energeticheskoj nezavisimosti, www.analitika.az, 07.11.2006. http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2006-10-27/2_baku.html.

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R. Orudjev, Ranshe armjanskoj pojavitsja voennaja doktrina Azerbajdzhana, www.echoaz.com , No. 202 (1191), 21 Okt. 2005.
35

Faptul rezult dintr-o prezentare la masa rotund cu tema Procese politice n Caucaz i probleme ale securitii Armeniei, organizat de Centrul armean de cercetri strategice i naionale. Potrivit documentului, la mia de locuitori, n Caucaz exist 15 soldai, n timp ce n Turcia 8, n Iran 12, n Rusia 7. n Caucazul de Sud, fiecrui milion de ceteni i revin 75 de tancuri, Turciei 48, Iranului 12, Rusiei 46. La piese de artilerie: n Caucaz 85, Turcia 26, Iran 38, Rusia - 44. O alt trstur este prezena unor contingente militare strine n rile din regiune. De asemenea, la o cretere economic de 5-10% n ultimii 5 ani, bugetul militar al Armeniei s-a mrit de 3,5 ori, al Azerbaidjanului de 5 ori, iar al Georgiei de peste 2 ori (www.analitika.az).

La 19 septembrie 2006, Consiliul UE a emis urmtoarea declaraie privind Transnistria: The European Union is aware that a referendum in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova has taken place on 17 September 2006. This referendum contradicts the internationally recognized sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. The EU considers that the situation in Transnistria does not allow the free expression of popular will. The EU reiterates that it recognizes neither the referendum nor its outcome. The European Union calls upon the mediators and observers in the OSCE-led 5+2 talks to make public statements to the same effect. The European Union fully supports Moldovas territorial integrity and calls on both parties to the conflict to return immediately to the negotiating table in the 5+2 format and work towards a speedy and transparent solution of the Transnistria conflict. Nici alte organizaii internaionale nu au recunoscut referendumul din regiunea separatist i rezultatele acestuia.

36 Sohbet Mamedov, NATO osvaivaet Juzhnyj Kavkaz,www.ng.ru, 20.10.2006.

SUMMARY
Cooperation between Russia and EU in the eld of energy is being perceived as one of the priorities of a new framework document to be negotiated by the two sides, given the fact that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in force will expire next year. This new document should conrm, among others, the principles of the market economy and those of Treaty for Energetic Charter, signed by Russia in 1991, but not yet ratied by the Duma. Irrespective of the relations with Russia, EU countries will extend gradually the principles of a single energy market to their neighborhood and enhance their cooperation with other rich-oil and gas countries, in order to diversify the supplies from other energetic markets and through different transit corridors.

Major Stelian Fizean is an Army ofcer, researcher in the Security Studies Directorate within the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History. He studies security organizations at regional, European and International levels and his interests consist in monitoring the developments in Western Balkans, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.

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, 20.10.2006. La 19 septembrie 2006, Consiliul UE a emis urmtoarea declaraie privind Transnistria: The European Union is aware that a referendum in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova has taken place on 17 September 2006. This referendum contradicts the internationally recognized sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. The EU considers that the situation in Transnistria does not allow the free expression of popular will. The EU reiterates that it recognizes neither the referendum nor its outcome. The European Union calls upon the mediators and observers in the OSCE-led 5+2 talks to make public statements to the same effect. The European Union fully supports Moldovas territorial integrity and calls on both parties to the conflict to return immediately to the negotiating table in the 5+2 format and work towards a speedy and transparent solution of the Transnistria conflict. Nici alte organizaii internaionale nu au recunoscut referendumul din regiunea separatist i rezultatele acestuia.
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Norway and an Enlarged European Union*

H.E. Leif Arne Ulland
Im very grateful for ADIRIs invitation to address you this morning. Non-EU countries are becoming a rare breed in Europe, and I hope you will appreciate the company of a representative of this species. I shall try to offer a short retrospective glimpse of Norways relations with the EU, followed by an overview of our relationship today, concluding with some remarks on EU enlargement and the future. Territorially, politically, economically and culturally Norway is part of Europe, but it is not an EU member, despite efforts to the contrary. As a consequence, our relationship with the Union is based on other forms of close contact and co-operation. This cooperation enables Norway to maintain a very high level of economic integration, and political co-operation, with the EU and its Member States. This co-operation is so close that we are sometimes humorously referred to as half member or the 16th member or shadow member. Perhaps this is one reason why there is some confusion about our status among the general public in many countries in Europe. After the six had established the European Economic Community (EEC) through the Treaties of Rome in 1957 and Euratom, Norway was among the so-called outer seven that founded EFTA in January 1960. At this time there was a generally positive attitude to the EEC in Norway, and the Norwegian Labour government submitted our rst application for membership in 1962, shortly after Ireland, the UK and Denmark had done the same. As is well known, president de Gaulle vetoed Britains EEC application and negotiations ended in 1963. The four countries applied for the second time in 1967, but negotiations were suspended after a second veto. In 1969, negotiations with the EEC resumed and were later concluded for all four countries. The Norwegian government put the result of the negotiations to a national referendum, and, in September 1972, 53.5% of Norwegians voted against accession. The three others joined, Denmark becoming the rst Nordic member of the EC. The next important development came with the establishment of an EU internal market. In 1989, Commission president Jacques Delors proposed a new form of partnership between EFTA and the EC, which was to become the Agreement on the European Economic Area (the EEA Agreement). After applications to join the EU from EFTA members Austria, Finland and Sweden, Norway presented its third application in 1992 and negotiated an accession treaty. In November 1994, a majority of Norwegian voters (52.2%) rejected membership of the EU for a second time, whereas Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the Union.

Short history
Coming out of ve years of foreign occupation in 1945, Norway was very keen to contribute to international and European cooperation. We became a founding member of NATO, the Council of Europe, the OECD and a Norwegian became the rst Secretary General of the United Nations.
* Text basis for presentation to ADIRI audience, Titulescu House, Friday 7 July 2006.

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The year before our second referendum, both the EUs Internal Market and the EEA Agreement had entered into force. Switzerland had voted in a referendum not to join the EEA, but remained a member of EFTA. In 1996, Norway signed a Schengen association agreement, and this came into force (for all the Nordic countries) in 2001, thus abolishing passport controls between Norway and the fourteen Schengen countries and giving Norway an EU external border to Russia in the Schengen sense. When the European Union was enlarged with the ten new Member States in 2004, Norway was associated with the EU enlargement through the parallel enlargement of the European Economic Area (EEA). A similar enlargement of the EEA is expected to take place when Romania and Bulgaria hopefully join the Union in January next year, and negotiations on this have recently started. a tradition of individualism and of scepticism and opposition to what emanates from the political centre. It is a country of distances. What we have seen is that rural Norway is generally more against EU membership and that opposition increases with the distance from the capital. People tend to feel that even Oslo is something remote, and that a decision-making centre in Brussels would be even worse. The European perspective: All through our history, Norwegians have been seafarers, traders and travellers, and we continue to be an internationally minded nation. Our involvement today in places like the Middle East, Sudan and Sri Lanka has not just popped out of the blue. We are strong supporters of international organisations and co-operation and of European integration as a means to secure a peace and a larger degree of social solidarity and prosperity. We have consistently supported the enlargement of NATO and the EU. But, at the same time, many Norwegians are rather sceptical to a development in the direction of the united states of Europe or a European superstate, and to give away decision-making powers to Brussels. The economic perspective, way of life, and main issues involved, sheries, energy and agriculture: History, geography and national character play a role, but at the end of the day material concerns may also be among the most important issues for Norwegians. In 1972, sheries represented the dominant issue, the coastal population voting massively against accession on the basis of what was seen as a bad negotiation result for this sector. Agriculture and regional development are also important factors: Norwegians are close to the soil and the sea and want to continue to live on the islands, along the ords and in the valleys. Shifting governments have

Reasons for No and arguments in the EU debate in Norway

Few questions are asked more often to us as diplomatic representatives of Norway than why Norway voted against membership, or why it continues to be a non-member. Few questions are more complicated to answer, but let me try to give you some personal elements. The historical perspective: Norway regained its independence in 1905 after four centuries of Danish rule and almost one hundred years of union with Sweden. The very word union has a negative connotation in our country. This sentiment was strengthened by ve years of Nazi occupation. In short the struggle for independence has created a strong belief in national self-determination. Geography and national character: Norway is also a very egalitarian country, with

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agreed with them, and we have developed an extensive system of agricultural subsidies and regional development assistance to make it possible. Many believe that Norwegian agriculture would suffer from EU membership, and that this would lead to centralisation pressures and changes in our way of life, as the argument often goes. It is difcult to estimate the role oil and gas have played in inuencing the outcome of the two referenda. Personally I believe that energy may have become an important factor over time in the sense that the substantial national income from oil and gas has tended to make many Norwegians condent that there are no strong economic reasons for joining the Union, especially since the EEA agreement caters to vital interests. The main arguments today in favour are political ones: the EU is our family, there is a widening and deepening of scope in EU cooperation not covered by the EEA agreement, and we should be present around the table where decisions affecting us are taken. The history of EU referenda shows that many countries are divided on European issues. Norway is not very different from other European countries. A swing of 3-4 percent in the vote in the direction of yes in the 1972 or 1994 referenda would have meant that I would not have been talking to you today on this topic. Party, support membership. Opposition to membership has traditionally been strongest in the Centre party with close links to rural Norway, and in the Socialist Left Party. Also, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals have so far been against membership. The second biggest party today, the Progress Party on the right, believe the issue should be decided by the people, and do not take a stand in their party platform. All the three Norwegian applications for membership have been submitted by a single party Labour Government. The two main supporters of membership, Labour and the Conservatives, are historical adversaries, and they have not been in the same government. Norway has in recent years been ruled either by Labour Party minority governments, by minority centre-right coalitions or, as is now the case for the rst time, by a majority centre-left coalition. Both the present coalition government and its predecessor, a three-party coalition of Conservatives, Liberals and Christian Democrats, have thus been composed of parties both for and against membership. In fact there has been an implicit suicide clause in the formation of these governments in the sense that the coalitions would break up the moment the Labour Party or the Conservative Party in a coalition government would decide to go for a new application to join the EU.

The political context

Since the debate leading up to our rst referendum in 1972, Norway has been fairly equally split in two camps on the question of joining the EU. Opinion polls show that this is still the case. The split is reected in the political landscape. Two of our main political parties, the Labour party and the Conservative

Norway and the EU today. Cooperation instruments and areas The EEA Agreement is by far the single most important agreement regulating the relationship between Norway and the European Union. Through this agreement Norway and the other two EEA EFTA members, Iceland and Lichtenstein, are part of the EUs internal market with its four freedoms (free movement of goods, services, capital and

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persons). The EEA EFTA pillar represents the only arena where Norway is a superpower. Through the EEA Agreement, the three EEA EFTA States have taken on the obligation to implement all EU legislation relevant to the functioning of the internal market. An EEA Committee with Commission participation makes decisions on whether new Community legislation is of EEA relevance. Experts from EEA EFTA States also have some access to preparatory work on new legislation. A special body, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) has been set up to monitor compliance with EU legislation in EEA EFTA States, and an EFTA Court has been established. New EU members must also join the EEA. Most of the elements of an EEA Enlargement Agreement are technical adaptations, but one of the major substantial results of the enlargement negotiations for the 10 new members in 2004 was a ten-fold increase in the nancial contribution of the EEA EFTA States to social and economic cohesion in the new member states. The total contribution is 1.17 Billion over ve years in two separate programmes, one EEA and one Norwegian nancial mechanism. Norways contribution is around 1.1 billion EURO or around EUR 227 million a year. So you see what it means to be a superpower in the EEA! The operational objectives of EU funds and the EEA nancial mechanisms are basically the same, i.e. to provide nancial incentives for development. The beneciary states are responsible for developing, proposing and implementing projects and programmes, and for ensuring adequate monitoring and control throughout programme and project cycles. The EEA agreement also provides for co-operation in other areas, including programme co-operation in research, education, environmental protection, consumer policy, information technology, culture, social policy, gender equality, tourism and SME policy.

Schengen and Justice and Home Affairs. Norway is associated with the Schengen Agreement, and is thus participating in the co-operation on common passport and border control, as well as several other issues within the EU policy area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
This means that Norway, Iceland and 13 EU countries have a common border control regime, and that Norwegian nationals may travel throughout the Schengen area without a passport. It means that Norway participates in the EU co-operation on border controls between police and immigration authorities. Norway has concluded an agreement to apply the EUs Dublin II Regulation on handling asylum seekers, we have a cooperation agreement with Europol and with Eurojust, the EU co-operation body set up to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border and organised crime.

Foreign and Security Policy. Norway is of course not part of the EUs Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but we have a very close co-operation in this area and frequently join EU positions. As a NATOcountry, Norway has signed up to the Berlin+ accord on cooperation between EU and NATO on deployment of resources and development of policies. Our co-operation includes:
Political dialogue at foreign minister level biannual EEA Council meetings and half-yearly bilateral meetings with the EU presidency Frequent meetings and contacts with EUs CSFP working groups and with EU Member States Force contributions to the EU force catalogue (3500 to Rapid Reaction Force), to EU led military operations (Macedonia

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Concordia and Bosnia Althea after KFOR), police missions (Proxima in Macedonia), EU battle groups (150 personnel). Other areas. Norway is part of the internal energy market through the EEA agreement and we have a close co-operation with the EU on many energy issues. Norway is today the worlds third largest exporter of natural gas and in third place among the leading net oil exporters in the world. Eighty percent of our oil production is sold in the EU/EEA market and almost all our gas is delivered through ve pipelines to mainland Europe. Important areas such as sheries and agriculture are not covered by the EEA agreement with some exceptions like trade in sh and sh products and veterinary measures. Norway is the worlds single largest exporter of sh and sh products, with the EU and Japan as the largest markets. At the same time, the sheries sector has been the area which most often has given rise to some friction between Norway and the EU. Europe and taking on our share of the continents responsibilities. It involves ensuring that we can exert inuence in areas that are important to us. It involves setting priorities and putting forward clear policy aims and views. It also involves awareness-raising and greater efforts in Norway in the form of an active debate on Europe. The EU affects every part of our society. We need to leave behind the trenches from 1972 and 1994. The pace of change in Europe recently has been very high. It is therefore not surprising that there is a certain amount of fatigue and frustration related to the way ahead for the EU. It is important for Norway that things go well for the EU. This includes economic growth, effective ways of ghting unemployment, and an efcient system of governance that has widespread public support. And it includes enlargement. The latest EU enlargement from 15 to 25 has changed the face of Europe. And Romania and Bulgaria are set to join in January next year. Norway has consistently supported EU enlargement. We support Romanias and Bulgarias membership and would hope to see it happen as foreseen. We believe that enlargement has promoted the growth of democracy and helped to make Europe a safer and more stable place. We admire the resolve shown by the EU and its member countries in taking on such a major task, with considerable nancial assistance and opportunities for development created in the new member countries. Promoting social and economic cohesion and reducing disparities in Europe is in our interest and will be a long-term endeavour. We are taking our share of this responsibility.

Norway and the EU tomorrow

It is obvious that the EU is very important for Norway and for Norwegians. Here we have our closest allies, neighbours and longstanding friends and our most important economic partners. The EU is a huge meeting place also for Norwegian politicians, researchers, the business community, artists and students. But we cannot be expected to join the EU in the coming years. In a recent white paper to Parliament, the Norwegian government states that its policy is to pursue a proactive European policy for an inclusive and peaceful society in Europe based on the existing agreements with the EU in areas I have mentioned. A proactive European policy for a nonmember involves seizing opportunities in

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I mentioned Norways considerable contribution of 1.1 billion Euro over ve years through the EEA Financial Mechanisms. In addition, the Norwegian government has had a separate action program for assisting the integration of new EU members already at the stage when they were candidates. In Romania we have had around 30 projects in elds such as justice and home affairs, environment, agriculture, health and so on. New EU members will also join the EEA Agreement and the EEA accession agreement must be ratied by all EU and EEA countries. Negotiations on EEA enlargement will be an important issue for Norway in the time ahead. It is our aim that enlargement of the EU and the EEA take place at the same time on 1 January next year. Negotiations on Romanias and Bulgarias accession to the EEA started in Brussels just a few days ago. Norway is prepared to contribute to economic and social cohesion in an EEA nancial mechanism also for Romania and Bulgaria. We expect that these negotiations will lead to the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in an EEA nancial mechanism. This will be a very important development and a major asset in our relations with Romania. Let me approach my conclusion by taking you a long step to the High North and to a central theme of Norways foreign policy and European policy in the years to come. When we pass the Arctic Circle, then we enter the vast Barents region. One third of mainland Norway lies north of the Circle. Norwegian jurisdiction in the Arctic and Barents Seas covers an area six times the size of mainland Norway, that is almost the size of the entire European Union. This is where Norway and Russia meet, on land and in the Barents Sea. For decades this was a frozen region, literally and politically. The strategic position of the area is gradually shifting from a military security perspective to a perspective more marked by energy security and sustainable resource management. The Barents Sea contains vast natural resources renewable and non-renewable. It is Europes largest sh pond. The Barents Sea will also become an important source of energy supply to Europe and North America. Perhaps as much as a quarter of the worlds undiscovered petroleum reserves may be located in the Arctic. Politically this is a stable region. In the years to come, Europe may well be looking to the High North for additional supplies of oil and gas. Large deposits have already been discovered on both the Norwegian and Russian shelves. The Russian Shtokman gas eld contains more than the worlds annual gas consumption, or 50 per cent of Germanys gas consumption over the next 50 years. Thus the issues of energy supply from the Arctic region and resource management in the North are replacing the old cold war military agenda. Herein lays a set of huge challenges and opportunities for Norway, Russia, Europe and the United States. You can expect Norway to devote a lot of attention to the High North in the years to come. We want to engage with Russia and our European and American partners and make the High North into a region of stability, prosperity and high environmental awareness. This topic in fact needs a speech by its own. Today I just wanted to put its importance on your mental screen as one of our priorities vis--vis the Union in the years to come.

Will we be members? And when? I have tried to show you how Norway and the EU today interact in almost every possible eld of policy and society. It is

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simple: Norways security, Norways welfare and Norways development depend directly on developments in Europe. There is almost full agreement in Norway that we should pursue an active European policy. On to the nal question: Will there be a fourth application and when? When Norwegians are asked in opinion polls today about EU membership, the majority still answer no. When the question is about whether or not Norway will become a member in the future, the majority answer yes! In the period 2004-2005, we had for the rst time a majority in favour of membership in the polls for a longer period of time. The fate of the EU constitution and the referenda in France and the Netherlands changed that. Norwegian opinion polls went back to normal. Those political parties and forces which are in favour of Norwegian membership will not launch a third attempt unless there is a high hope of success. Today there is also uncertainty about what kind of Union we will have in the future. This makes it unlikely that the membership issue will be on the table again on this side of Parliamentary elections in 2009. Beyond that, I believe I have to resort to the Danish saying it is very difcult to make predictions, especially about the future.

SUMMARY
In his presentation, H.E. Leif Arne Ulland brings a fresh perspective on the way the EU is perceived in Norway, one of the few non-EU countries from the European continent. The author tries to shed some light on the exceptionality of the Norwegian case (from a historical, cultural and political approach) and on the level of interaction and cooperation between his home country and the EU. We nd out that the 16th member of the EU, as Norway is humorously referred to, interacts with the EU in almost every possible way. While the majority of Norwegians still oppose EU membership, most of them believe that their country will become a member in the future. The article successfully introduces the reader to the background and paradoxes that led to the present and somewhat unusual relation between Norway and the EU, in an insightful and well-documented manner.

H.E. Leif Arne Ulland is Ambassador of Norway to Romania and Moldova.

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Descurajarea i balana ofensiv-defensiv

Mihai Zodian
Importana armelor de nimicire n mas i impactul lor asupra desfurrii relaiilor internaionale sunt nc subiecte de controvers n literatura de specialitate i nu numai. Este sucient numai s ne uitm la recentele buletine de tiri referitoare la testele nucleare ale Coreei de Nord. Urmndu-l pe Bernard Brodie, diveri autori consider c acestea anuleaz deniia clausewitzian a rzboiului ca o continuare a politicii, mergnd chiar pn la a le considera irelevante, n timp ce criticii lor sar n aprarea doctrinei clasice1. Subiectul a trecut pe un plan secund dup prbuirea Uniunii Sovietice, dar atentatele din 11 septembrie 2001 au adus nc o dat n atenia publicului larg problematica nuclear, mai ales n legtur cu fenomenul terorist i proliferarea tehnologic. Scopul acestei lucrri este de a investiga dac strategia descurajrii mai este valabil dup ncheierea Rzboiului Rece i dac da, n ce form. Perspectiva avut n vedere va una dintre variantele realismului defensiv, care ncearc s conecteze consecinele dezvoltrii tehnologiei militare cu probabilitatea declanrii conictelor armate dintre state i structura politic. Premisa este c deinerea de arsenale nucleare masive reduce ansele manifestrii unor politici militare ofensive, cel puin ntre principalii deintori. Se ridic atunci ntrebarea ce impact pot avea recentele dezvoltri tehnologice i politice asupra acestor factori? Dar mai nti, o scurt detaliere a principalelor abordri teoretice. Nu este exagerat de susinut c dezvoltarea arsenalelor atomice a impulsionat tentativele de descoperire de soluii, e i pariale, ale problemelor centrale din domeniul relaiilor internaionale: rzboiul i pacea. Un potenial conict nuclear ar provocat zeci de milioane de mori2. Dar, dincolo de consensul referitor la capacitatea de distrugere a acestui tip de tehnologie, avem de-a face cu interpretri diferite. Realitii au susinut c respectivul context nu face dect s conrme, din nou, prediciile modelelor lor conceptuale. Astfel, am asistat la instituirea unei variante a echilibrului de putere, balana terorii, fundamentat pe descurajarea reciproc, care a fost nsoit de o perioad prelungit de pace. n varianta waltzian, se consider c armele au avut un rol stabilizator, alturi de structura bipolar a sistemului internaional3. n acelai timp, s-a dezvoltat un sistem complicat de control a cursei narmrilor, pornind de la acorduri tacite, ca suspendarea unilateral a testelor, pn la tratatele i acordurile de limitare i reducere a armamentelor. Nu este clar dac pentru neorealiti tehnologia singur a determinat nghearea ciclului rzboaielor hegemonice, sau dac nu cumva au fost cel puin la fel de importante deciziile politice, interaciunile dintre Statele Unite i fosta Uniune Sovietic, considerentele ideologice, sau contientizarea faptului c un nou conict mondial ar fost extrem de costisitor4. Autori ca Waltz i-au supralicitat cazul, argumentnd c proliferarea nuclear este o soluie pentru dilemele lumii de dup prbuirea comunismului*. De exemplu, Morgenthau argumenta c esena descurajrii este psihologic i politic, nu pur i simplu tehnologic. Multiplicarea deintorilor de
*Vezi i dezbaterea dintre S. Sagan i K Waltz n Scott Sagan, Nuclear Instability in South Asia, Kenneth Waltz, Nuclear Stability in South Asia, n Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, International Politics, Pearson, 2005.
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armament ar crete riscul unor calcule eronate i implicit al unei confruntri ntre posesorii tehnologiilor nucleare5. Liberalii sau pluralitii consider c armamentul nuclear este exact tipul de problem care ar face necesar dezvoltarea de structuri cooperative ntre state i c dezvoltarea acestuia a stat la originea apariiei interdependenei complexe, alturi de alte cauze6. Cu toate acestea, ns, structura politic interstatal a rmas aceeai, la peste 50 de ani de la utilizarea primei bombe. Colaborarea ar trebui instituionalizat prin intermediul unei organizaii internaionale. Regimurile joac un rol important n medierea ntre structura capabilitilor i rezultatele aciunilor statelor7. ntr-un studiu clasic, Robert Axelrod a argumentat c, dac am privi relaiile internaionale ca o dilem a prizonierilor (un model teoretic n care dei interesul comun este s coopereze, participanii aleg, n mod raional, o alternativ obstrucionist, deoarece altminteri oponentul ar obine majoritatea ctigurilor) repetat cu un nal indenit (sau innit), ar posibil aplicarea unei strategii care s deschid drumul formrii unor structuri de cooperare8. n replic realitii au susinut c acest model ignor importana poziiilor de putere i a ctigurilor relative, reectnd, astfel, valorile clasice ale liberalilor, care pornesc de la premisa posibilitii armonizrii intereselor ntr-o societate compus din actori raionali egoiti (celebra mn invizibil)9. Constructivitii susin c valoarea armamentului de nimicire n mas este dependent, n mare msur, de percepiile, ideile i credinele actorilor10. i aici, am avea de-a face cu un caz n care legtura dintre caracteristicile obiective ale armelor nucleare i reprezentri este un produs al istoriei i al conveniilor. Este criticat presupusul materialism al realismului. Adepii curentului ntmpin, ns, diculti n a explica n ntregime legtura dintre idei i realitate, riscnd s nege n ntregime importana factorilor materiali. n realitate, puini realiti elimin total impactul ideologiilor i al curentelor de gndire. n Cooperation Under the Security

Dilemma, Robert Jervis a relansat teza impactului relaiei dintre ofensiv i defensiv i a distinciei ntre cele dou variabile, pentru a explica de ce n anumite contexte statele coopereaz, iar n altele nu11. Fiind o constant, lipsa unei autoriti unice n relaiile internaionale nu poate explica, de una singur, motivul pentru care nu asistm la un conict perpetuu, mai ales n contextul existenei armamentului nuclear, ci doar ncurajeaz comportamente care-i las pe toi actorii preocupai ntr-o situaie mai rea dect ar putut s e, chiar i n cazul extrem n care toate statele ar dori s nghee statu-quo-ul12.
Concepia poate utilizat ca o teorie de anvergur medie care s explice n ce circumstane este mai probabil meninerea securitii, n completarea celei de mai mare anvergur a lui K. Waltz despre consecinele structurii anarhice. Jervis analizeaz efectele structurii anarhice, utiliznd jocuri ca vntoarea cerbului sau dilema prizonierilor. Cooperarea ar stimulat dac ar scdea costurile defectrii/exploatrii, sau dac ar crete beneciile colaborrii ntre cei doi juctori13. Astfel, s-ar ameliora consecinele dilemei securitii, conform creia narmarea unui agent este perceput de ceilali ca o potenial ameninare, rezultnd o spiral a narmrilor n urma creia, n loc s creasc, securitatea tuturor scade. Aici intervine i relaia ntre ofensiv i defensiv, ultima neleas n sens restrns, determinat de geograe, trsturile tehnologiei i de concepiile liderilor despre acestea.

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Avem de-a face cu patru posibiliti, sortate dup gradul cresctor de risc. Dac tehnic exist o deosebire clar ntre cele dou i defensiva este superioar ofensivei iar contextul este perceput corect de decideni, atunci sunt anse mari ca declanarea unui conict s e puin probabil, limitndu-se implicaiile negative ale structurii anarhice a sistemului internaional, evideniate n jocurile de mai sus. Dac expansiunea devine mai puin costisitoare, puterile care sprijin statu-quo-ul trebuie atunci s se comporte ca nite agresori14. n condiiile n care distincia nu este clar, iar avantajul revine defensivei, avem de-a face cu o dilem ameliorat a securitii. Cea mai periculoas situaie presupune absena unei deosebiri clare ntre cele dou categorii de armament iar ofensiva se a n avantaj. ansele de rzboi cresc exponenial. Autorul greete, ns, atunci cnd susine c dilema securitii poate eliminat n prima situaie, deoarece i atunci s-ar pune problema ctigurilor relative, a poziiilor de putere ale statelor. Teoria a fost criticat, deoarece i-a propus s modereze unele concluzii ale modelului realist referitoare la incidena confruntrilor. De asemenea, autori ca J. Mearsheimer nu au fost mulumii de distincia dintre ofensiv i defensiv n era nuclear, argumentnd c marile puteri au redactat tot timpul planuri pentru ctigarea unui eventual rzboi mondial15. Sunt ns posibile dou rspunsuri: strategiile fceau parte din rutina militar iar nsi existena acestora oferea mai mult plauzibilitate politicii de intimidare nuclear16. n acest model, rolul armelor nucleare a dat natere unor ambiguiti. Existena unor arsenale masive i a capacitii de ripost a permis stabilizarea relaiei strategice dintre Statele Unite i URSS. Practic, distrugerea asigurat a fost echivalentul unei superioriti a defensivei fa de ofensiv i a stimulat diferenierea dintre cele dou tipuri de tehnologii i politici17. Recent, Jervis susinea c am intrat n cea mai bun dintre lumile descrise mai sus, n care relaiile dintre marile puteri vor , n general, panice i c acestea alctuiesc o comunitate de securitate18. Ideile sufer, ns, de inconsistene interne, revendicndu-se cte puin din toate cele trei curente importante din domeniul relaiilor internaionale, realismul, liberalismul i constructivismul. Este, totui, posibil de a pstra ideea principal a inuenei tehnologiei militare, ntr-o tradiie realist structural. Argumentul principal al articolului este c sfritul Rzboiului Rece i impactul mult discutatei revoluii n afaceri militare i al ideilor asociate acesteia au avut ca efect o tendin de cretere a avantajului ofensivei, dar c diferenierea dintre cele dou tipuri de aciuni este n continuare valid. n consecin, politicile de expansiune devin mai probabile, indiferent de dorinele actorilor, dar se pot controla conictele. Descurajare i credibilitate Inventarea armamentului nuclear, producerea n cantiti consistente de ctre cele dou superputeri n cursul Rzboiului Rece i contientizarea impactului politic i uman au forat factorii de decizie s inoveze din punct de vedere strategic. Aplicaie a principiului intimidrii, descurajarea este un set de msuri destinat s limiteze libertatea de alegere a unui oponent, prin creterea costului unor alternative pn la niveluri considerate drept inacceptabile19. Adoptarea strategiei a reprezentat i o modalitate de a evita o confruntare cald ntre superputeri. Thomas Schelling a accentuat importana utilizrii forei poteniale, nu a puterii brute ca atare20. Din deniia de mai sus rezult existena a dou criterii: un potenial nuclear sucient i credibilitatea ameninrii. Practic,
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descurajarea este inclus n tema mai larg a rolului forei n lumea contemporan. Robert Art deosebea patru funcii: aprarea, descurajarea, supunerea i demonstraia21. n general, se apreciaz c descurajarea este stabil, sub forma distrugerii reciproc asigurate, atunci cnd prile dispun de capacitatea de represalii, iar focoasele sunt instalate la bordul aviaiei strategice, pe rachetele balistice intercontinentale sau transportate de submarinele nucleare, considerate aproape invulnerabile. Problema este c o asemenea situaie devine dicil de tolerat pe termen lung, populaia ind ostatic22. n consecin, am asistat, n ultimele decenii, la perfecionarea armamentului dincolo de cerinele teoretice ale balanei terorii, prin MIRV-uri, rachete de croazier sau anti-balistice, alturi de cele tactice i intermediare, bombardiere invizibile etc. Jervis considera c descurajarea n sine reprezint echivalentul nuclear al aprrii clasice, n timp ce vehiculele multiple ghidate independent i armele anti-rachet au ntrebuinri ofensive, deoarece fac mai probabil o prim lovitur nuclear, n cadrul unei strategii de contrafor (primele sunt mai precise i pot lovi mai multe obiective simultan, iar aprarea poate folosit pentru a neutraliza rmiele forei de ripost)23. Rachetele intercontinentale pot ndeplini ambele roluri, iar submarinele sunt defensive. La nivel strategic, principala dicultate a descurajrii este cea a credibilitii. Eciena unei ameninri depinde de convingerea persoanei vizate c dac nu adopt un anumit comportament, atunci ameninarea va ndeplinit. Dar dac se recurge la for, remarca Thomas Schelling, ar rezulta c intimidarea a euat, rezultat ce trebuie din start evitat n epoca nuclear24. Trebuie atunci ca oponentul s e sincer convins de iminena sancionrii. Reiese, dup C. Gray, c descurajarea nuclear este ecient numai atunci cnd trebuie evitat un schimb nuclear sau o invazie convenional din partea inamicului25. Tema credibilitii a redeschis ns chestiunea conictelor limitate, ncepnd cu cel din Coreea. De unde a reieit c descurajarea trebuie dublat i cu deinerea unei capaciti convenionale impresionante. Dar o rezisten ecient putea implica trecerea n plan secundar a intimidrii. Concomitent, descurajarea nu funciona n mod automat pentru conicte de intensitate mic i medie, deoarece exista o disproporie prea mare ntre scopuri i mijloace. Descurajarea a fost criticat i indc se bazeaz pe prezumii negative, deoarece ar fost prea modest, unii decideni favoriznd preluarea iniiativei, n timp ce alii considerau c este prea ambiioas26. O alt slbiciune se refer la aproape insurmontabila dicultate de a stabili din punct de vedere logic eciena sa, deoarece absena unui conict nuclear cald se poate explica i prin ali factori i ar trebui demonstrat prin propoziii contrafactuale. Interpretarea proliferrii nucleare ridic o serie de probleme. Autori ca J. Mearsheimer i K. Waltz s-au centrat asupra capacitii de stabilizare a armelor nucleare, n condiiile n care statele posesoare au i fore de represalii. Cu toate acestea, este greu de explicat de ce un mecanism ce a funcionat numai cu doi ageni va garanta pacea pe termen lung. n cazuri ca relaia India-Pakistan, exist, ns, tentaia preempiunii. Din raiuni de resurse i geograe, multe state nu pot si construiasc o for de represalii, ceea ce nseamn c arsenalul nuclear deinut este vulnerabil n faa unui atac al adversarului. n consecin, n situaii de criz, ar tentant ca unul dintre actori s iniieze un schimb nuclear e pentru a obine o victorie decisiv, e pentru a mpiedica una.

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Distribuia de putere din cadrul sistemului internaional nu trebuie ignorat i considerat a un factor independent. ntr-un sistem unipolar, eciena descurajrii va mai mic dect ntr-unul multipolar, dar apariia celui de-al doilea tip de balan depinde de ansele unor state ca India i China de ascensiune la rangul de puteri mondiale. Momentan, numai Federaia Rus are la dispoziie un arsenal comparabil cu cel american, dar resursele sunt insuciente. Astfel, este probabil ca proliferarea s nchine balana n favoarea ofensivei, pe termen lung, att deoarece noile arsenale sunt mai vulnerabile, ct i din cauza dicultii controlrii unui numr mare de actori. Revenind la Jervis, armele nucleare nu numai c au favorizat defensiva, dar au modicat costurile necooperrii, astfel nct ecare superputere avea un interes n supravieuirea celeilalte27. Dac, ns, balana dintre aprare i ofensiv se schimb n dauna primei, ar trebui s asistm la o devalorizare a descurajrii i a conceptelor i strategiilor nrudite. Urmtoarele pri ale lucrrii vor dedicate explicrii funcionrii mecanismului descurajrii n timpul Rzboiului Rece i explorrii evoluiilor politice, militare i tehnologice de dup 1989, cnd armele nucleare au intrat, parial, ntr-un con de umbr, (exceptnd discuiile despre proliferare), datorat sfritului rivalitii dintre Statele Unite i Uniunea Sovietic.

Racheta american Trident II D 5 lansat de submarin (The Y-12 National Security Complex, http://www.y12 doe.gov/news/report/2_1/img/sp_img1.jpg)

Noua rachet ruseasc Topol M (DefesaNet, http://www. defesanet.com.br/imagens/russia/topol-m.jpg)

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Armele nucleare i Rzboiul Rece Sfritul celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial a fost urmat de ascensiunea Statelor Unite i a Uniunii Sovietice n poziia de puteri dominante. Vechiul sistem multipolar eurocentric era nlocuit cu unul bipolar. Europa a fost mprit n sfere de inuen i control de ctre cele dou superputeri. Structura politic internaional a fost strns legat de dezvoltarea arsenalelor nucleare de ctre Washington i Moscova. Pot deosebite mai multe etape. Din 1945 pn n 1949, SUA s-au bucurat de monopolul atomic, care a permis o masiv demobilizare dup nfrngerea Germaniei naziste. Uniunea Sovietic a demarat propriul program nuclear i a trecut la comunizarea statelor din Europa Central i de Est. Occidentalii au rspuns prin planul Marshall, de refacere a Vestului, prin doctrina Truman i politica de ndiguire i prin ninarea Alianei Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord28. Primul test nuclear sovietic a fost urmat de o curs a narmrii n domeniul nuclear i nu numai, care a luat locul conictului violent dintre superputeri, alturi de competiia ideologic i conictele prin interpui. nti s-a urmrit perfecionarea explozibilului, bomba nuclear cu siune ind depit de cea cu fuziune, sau termonuclear (bomba cu hidrogen), testat n 1952-1953. Statele Unite s-au bucurat de un avans numeric fa de Uniunea Sovietic, adernd la politica represaliilor masive, care-i propunea s descurajeze poteniale naintri sovietice. Intervenia sub egida ONU din Coreea a fost nsoit de o important dezbatere referitoare la utilizarea armamentului atomic mpotriva Chinei comuniste, solicitat de generalul Douglas MacArthur. Competiia s-a extins n scurt timp i asupra vectorilor purttori de focoase nucleare. Dup ce americanii au inovat cu submarinele nucleare, lansarea primului Sputnik n 1957 a adus n atenie rachetele balistice intercontinentale (ICBM) cu raza de pn la aproximativ 10.000 de kilometri, care pot lovi orice int de pe suprafaa Pmntului. n Statele Unite s-a lansat dezbaterea despre presupusul avantaj al sovieticilor, care a coincis cu o nou tensionare a relaiilor dintre superputeri. A doua criz a Berlinului a fost urmat poate de cel mai periculos moment al Rzboiului Rece, cnd se pare c lumea a fost aproape de un rzboi nuclear29. Liderul sovietic Nichita Hruciov a decis amplasarea de rachete n Cuba, n 1962, aparent pentru a reduce decalajul dintre SUA i URSS n ceea ce privete arsenalul strategic. Preedintele Statelor Unite, John F. Kennedy, a rspuns, solicitnd retragerea instalaiilor i instituind o carantin, practic o blocad naval. Dup unele friciuni, conducerea sovietic a demantelat facilitile din Cuba, n schimbul promisiunilor ca SUA s nu invadeze insula i s retrag rachetele Jupiter din Turcia30. n urmtoarea decad, Uniunea Sovietic a depus eforturi impresionante pentru a obine paritatea nuclear cu Statele Unite. La apogeul Rzboiului Rece, ecare superputere avea la dispoziie cel puin 20.000 de focoase nucleare amplasate pe avioane, rachete balistice, submarine, alturi de diferite tipuri de sisteme tactice31. n momentul n care URSS a reuit s asigure capacitatea de supravieuire a forei de represalii nucleare, ntre cele dou pri a funcionat aanumita distrugere reciproc asigurat, prin care cele dou superputeri se descurajau reciproc. Ocial, Statele Unite au nlocuit atunci principiul represaliilor masive cu cel al ripostei exibile32. Ulterior, au fost dezvoltate alternative, ca strategia contra-forei, care benecia de noua tehnologie MIRV. Balana terorii a fost nsoit de o serie de tentative pentru controlul cursei

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narmrilor i de o perioad de destindere, al crei apogeu a fost marcat de Actul Final de la Helsinki, din 1975. Au continuat s e realizate progrese n domeniul controlului armamentului. La sfritul deceniului, situaia s-a deteriorat, n contextul micrilor din Polonia i al interveniei sovietice din Afganistan, ncepnd din 1979. Preedinii americani Jimmy Carter i mai ales Ronald Reagan au ripostat, asistnd, n consecin, la o nou etap de amplicare a tensiunilor Est-Vest, pn la venirea la putere a lui Mihail Gorbaciov, ale crui reforme vor conduce la ncheierea conictului33. Epoca nuclear a adus, n condiiile rivalitii controlului bipolare, la o revalorizare una a armamentelor, dintre Descurajarea dup Rzboiul Rece Lumea bipolar a disprut odat cu Uniunea Sovietic, dar armele nucleare continu ns s existe. Colin Gray a identicat o a doua epoc nuclear, caracterizat prin dispariia ameninrii conictului mondial, doar cu provocri asimetrice la adresa securitii americane, provenite din partea unor mici puteri34. Autorul consider ca principale riscuri de securitate proliferarea nuclear i aciunile diverselor grupri teroriste care ar putea achiziiona armament de nimicire n mas. n acelai timp, armamentul nuclear continu s rmn n fundalul interaciunilor dintre marile puteri, n special Statele Unite i Federaia Rus care dein, n continuare, capacitatea de represalii35. , nceputul anilor 90 a fost marcat de brusca dispariie a URSS i de tentativele de a gestiona efectele acestei dramatice transformri. Probabilitatea conictului nuclear generalizat a sczut n mod dramatic. Nivelul focoaselor deinute de superputeri a fost redus de la aproximativ 50.000 la 20.000. O prim provocare a constituito fostul arsenal sovietic, treptat motenit de Moscova cu ncuviinarea comunitii internaionale. ri ca Ucraina i Kazahstanul au acceptat transferul de armament ctre Moscova, primind i ajutoare nanciare din partea Statelor Unite. Alte state, ca Africa de Sud, Coreea de Sud, Libia, Argentina sau Brazilia i-au abandonat programele nucleare de bun voie**.
** Este interesant recenta discuie referitoare la posibila instalare a unui primat american nuclear. Vezi Keir A. Lieber, Daryl G. Press, The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs, martie-aprilie 2006; Keir A. Lieber, Daryl G. Press, The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy, International Security, primvara 2006 i replicile din Foreign Affairs numrul din septembrieoctombrie 2006. i mulumesc lui Andrei Miroiu pentru sugestiile bibliograce.

metodele de reglementare a cursei narmrilor dintre superputeri. Criza rachetelor a fost urmat de eforturi deloc de neglijat, n acest sens, prin semnarea, n 1963, a tratatului pentru interzicerea parial a testelor nucleare, document urmat de negocierea i semnarea pachetului SALT 1, care a inclus i restrngerea drastic a rachetelor antirachet. Prile primeau dreptul de a menine o instalaie, potrivit acordului din 1972. De asemenea, Washingtonul i Moscova au obinut ncheierea Tratatului de Neproliferare Nuclear, prin care se ncerca controlarea rspndirii acestui tip de armament. Conictul din Afganistan a blocat raticarea de ctre Senatul american a documentului SALT II. Noi tensiuni au nsoit instalarea n paralel a rachetelor tactice sovietice SS 18 i a celor americane Pershing i de croazier. n 1983, preedintele american a lansat Iniiativa pentru Aprare Strategic, ndreptat mpotriva rachetelor balistice. Proiectul a contribuit la sfritul Rzboiului Rece, precum i la declanarea procesului de reform iniiat de Gorbaciov, proces culminat cu dispariia URSS.

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a) Proliferarea nuclear i rogue states
n ciuda evoluiilor mbucurtoare, proliferarea nuclear a continuat, iar progresele de la nceputul deceniului trecut au fost nlocuite cu unele semnale ngrijortoare. Dup atentatele din 11 septembrie 2001, s-a discutat mult despre spectrul hiperterorismului. Strategia de securitate american din septembrie 2002 punea accentul pe preempiune, considernd c descurajarea nu mai funcioneaz. Ocial, Statele Unite au modicat drastic poziia tradiional. Noile msuri au inclus declanarea unei campanii globale mpotriva terorismului islamic i adoptarea unei strategii de securitate care prevede construirea unei balane de putere care s favorizeze libertatea36 i recursul la atacul preemptiv/preventiv mpotriva forelor care amenin securitatea SUA prin intermediul armelor de nimicire n mas i al terorismului. Doctrina a fost aplicat n Irak i pleca de la premiza c descurajarea nu mai funcioneaz ca n timpul Rzboiului Rece i trebuie completat cu metode active. Aplicarea preempiunii era, ns, limitat la rogue states, care ar putut coopera cu gruprile teroriste, furnizndu-le tehnologie nuclear. Controversele legate de intervenia din Irak, de problema armelor de distrugere n mas din aceast ar i de disputele dintre europeni i americani arunc o umbr de ndoial asupra doctrinei, rearmat, totui, prin noua strategie de securitate a SUA din martie 200637. Documentul pare s ignore condiiile n care poate ecient descurajarea, menionate mai sus: prevenirea unui atac nuclear din partea unei superputeri sau a unei ofensive convenionale masive, dar i efectul dilemei securitii sau problema credibilitii. Momentan, rezultatele sunt cel mult incerte. Alte evoluii nu trebuie ignorate. nceput , n anii 70 (prim test n 1974, ngheat n scurt timp) i relansat dup sfritul Rzboiului Rece, programul nuclear indian a fost fcut public n mai 1998, pe fondul escaladrii tensiunilor cu Pakistanul (narmare balistic i nuclear, problema Kamirului). Islamabadul a ripostat prin msuri identice, test nuclear n Balucistan. Peste un an, a avut loc o confruntare n zona Kargil, trezind ndoieli asupra raionalitii prilor implicate, de teama unei escaladri a primului conict direct purtat ntre puteri nucleare, chiar dac de mic anvergur. Dup atentatele din 11 septembrie 2001, s-au exprimat dubii n ceea ce privete sigurana programului nuclear al Pakistanului. La rndul su, Iranul islamist a motenit de la ah proiectul centralei de la Busher, destinat iniial construirii armei nucleare. Dup 1979, noile autoriti au susinut i susin c cercetrile au drept obiectiv utilizarea panic a energiei atomice. n colaborare cu Federaia Rus, din 1995 a nceput reconstrucia i dezvoltarea reactorului 1 al centralei. Au fost descoperite faciliti de mbogire a uraniului la Natanz (centrifugi) i la Yazd, iar la Arak exist o fabric de ap grea38. Dup ani de negocieri, Iranul a decis s ignore semnalele transmise de partenerii de dialog din UE i s relanseze procesul de prelucrare. Dosarul a fost naintat Consiliului de Securitate spre discutare, de ctre Consiliul Ageniei Internaionale pentru Energia Atomic. Teheranul nu a respectat ultimatumul forumului suprem al Naiunilor Unite de a-i suspenda programul de mbogire a uraniului din august 2006, rezultatul nal al crizei ind nesigur. Nu n ultimul rnd, Coreea de Nord a anunat n 2002-2003 c se retrage din Tratatul de Neproliferare, denunnd i un acord ncheiat cu Statele Unite pentru nghearea programului nuclear din 1994. Evenimentele s-au desfurat n paralel cu intervenia coaliiei conduse de Statelor Unite n Irak. Capacitile nucleare ale regimului

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de la Phenian sunt greu de evaluat. Un nou acord a fost ncheiat n toamna anului trecut39. Criza a luat amploare n vara lui 2006, regimul comunist testnd o serie de rachete balistice, dup care, n octombrie, a surprins comunitatea internaional printr-un test nuclear. n replic, statele membre ale Consiliului de Securitate al ONU au adoptat o serie de sanciuni i au cerut reluarea discuiilor40. Nerezolvat, criza poate stimula alte state sdeze regimul internaional de neproliferare. Am putea spune c dup un nceput bun am asistat la o agravare a problemei proliferrii nucleare ca de exemplu, transferul tehnologiei nucleare ctre Moscova, reducerea masiv a arsenalelor, ntreruperea ctorva programe sau prelungirea indenit a tratatului de neproliferare n 1995. n acelai timp, persistena tensiunilor de securitate sau apariia unor probleme noi au agravat situaia. India i Pakistanul au ntreprins teste n 1998, Coreea de Nord n 2006, iar Iranul a sdat regulile internaionale n domeniu. Dup cum am menionat mai sus, proliferarea nuclear are potenialul de a schimba balana armamentului dinspre defensiv spre ofensiv i deci de a complica problemele de securitate internaionale. Statele Unite i Federaia Rus s-au angajat ntr-o controvers diplomatic n legtur cu proiectul, care a fost, ns, depit n mod aparent surprinztor prin semnarea Tratatului de la Moscova, din mai 2002, prin care ambele pri accept s-i reduc arsenalul la circa 1700-2000 de focoase strategice operaionale41. Nu exist un sistem de inspecie, reducerile pot puse n aplicare pn n momentul n care expir tratatul, n 2012, iar focoasele pot stocate***. Gray a apreciat c documentul recunoate supremaia nuclear a SUA42. Problema este c ambiiile programului sunt destul de modeste pe termen mediu i nu afecteaz balana strategic, dup cum vom vedea. n consecin, distrugerea mutual asigurat nu a fost nc depit. Dezvoltarea tehnologiilor anti-rachet a nceput n anii 50-60, dar actualul scut american reprezint continuarea Rzboiului Stelelor, programul lansat de preedintele Ronald Reagan n anii 80 pentru a oferi o aprare complet. Armele nucleare pot transportate cu ajutorul aviaiei, al rachetelor balistice lansate terestru sau maritim, sau al rachetelor de croazier. Dac obiectivele iniiale ar putut atinse, atunci clasicele ICBMuri nu ar mai reprezentat o ameninare, dar un stat ar fost vulnerabil n faa submarinelor nucleare, avioanelor invizibile, rachetelor de croazier, sau a celor balistice cu focoase multiple i independente. Cu toate acestea, sistemul ar inuenat echilibrul strategic central limitnd capacitatea de lovire a forei de represalii nucleare, implicit stimulnd ansele de reuit a strategiilor ofensive ndreptate mpotriva oraelor i obiectivelor economice sau a centrelor de comand i control i a forelor nucleare inamice. Din
*** Federaia Rus s-a retras, n paralel, din tratatul Start II, care interzicea MIRV-urile, meninnd n serviciu rachetele SS 18 Satan i SS 19 Stiletto, http://www. thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=ma06norris; RZBOIUL RECE

b) Aprarea anti-rachet i echilibrul central

Strns legat de proliferare, n SUA, subiectul aprrii anti-rachet a revenit n atenie, mai ales dup victoria republicanilor, n 2001. Aprtorii proiectului sper c acesta va reui s protejeze Statele Unite de atacuri din partea rogue states, dar nu este exclus ipoteza unei aprri mai cuprinztoare, pe termen lung, perspectiv ce trezete nemulumiri la Moscova i nu numai. nc de la lansarea sa, n 2000, programul de Aprare contra Rachetelor (NMD) a trezit rezerve din parte europenilor, dar i a canadienilor. UE s-a opus relansrii unei curse a narmrilor.

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acest motiv, dezvoltarea de sisteme antirachet a fost drastic limitat prin tratatul ABM din 1972, care permitea doar 100 de interceptoare, instalate n dou zone. Cercetrile au ncetinit dup prbuirea Uniunii Sovietice, dar nu au fost niciodat ntrerupte. Amplasarea unui scut a fost accelerat dup venirea la putere a administraiei conduse de George W. Bush. Este vorba, de fapt, de o serie de proiecte care acoper ameninrile strategice i pe cele tactice (cu raz scurt i medie de aciune), separate pe mai multe nivele, n funcie de cele trei faze de zbor ale unei rachete balistice (lansare, intermediar sau nal)43. Obiectivele sunt mult mai modeste, n principal protecia fa de rachetele lansate de rogue states, cu arsenale limitate i tehnologii depite. Principalele programe se refer la: un sistem terestru (GBMD); sistemul naval de teatru AEGIS i un laser aeropurtat, ambele cu un potenial strategic; noi tipuri de satelii; o variant ameliorat a sistemului Patriot44. Cel mai des discutat este cel terestru, singurul care poate lovi, momentan, rachete strategice intercontinentale. n teorie, dup identicarea atacului, un interceptor este lansat, apoi se separ un vehicul cinetic care trebuie s doboare ICBM-ul inamic n timpul fazei intermediare45. Testele s-au dovedit a furniza rezultate confuze. Ocial, au fost denite trei tipuri de capabiliti: n prima, pot doborte zeci de focoase, transportate de rachete simple, cu maximum 100 de interceptoare, iar n urmtoarele, criteriile devin mai realiste, ind inclus posibilitatea lansrii de momeli46. n 2004-2005, Pentagonul a planicat instalarea a 16 instalaii de interceptare a rachetelor balistice n Alaska i a alte patru n California47. Concomitent, SUA au nceput o serie de discuii cu statele est-europene pentru amplasarea de baterii i sisteme radar, ind vizate, n principal, Polonia, Cehia i Ungaria. Sistemul a fost declarat operaional anul acesta, un test din luna septembrie ind considerat reuit n mod ocial48. Aprarea poate contracarat cu momeli, lansri masive de rachete, lansri de MIRV-uri, noi tipuri de rachete, de armele lansate de pe submarine, din aer sau transportate de rachetele de croazier i nu afecteaz direct balana nuclear ntre Statele Unite i Uniunea Sovietic. Dup consultri, umbrela a fost extins i asupra aliailor Washingtonului. Programul nu a fost adoptat de NATO ca organizaie. Pentru aprarea anti-rachet, Aliana nu avea la dispoziie dect fora integrat de aviaie de recunoatere i avertizare timpurie. Frana a decis s-i dezvolte propriul sistem, SAMP/T (Aster). Germania i Italia au colaborat cu SUA n cadrul Medium Extended Air Defence Systems (MEADS), dar programul are dimensiuni i obiective modeste49. Totui, desfurrile americane au accentuat actualitatea chestiunii la nivelul NATO. ninat n 1999, un grup de studiu a fost nsrcinat cu realizarea unui raport despre fezabilitatea unui sistem anti-balistic al Alianei. La summitul alianei de la Istanbul din iunie 2004, s-a decis examinarea opiunilor pentru a face fa ameninrilor balistice50. Un program privind o aprare de teatru a fost antamat. Alte sisteme anti-rachet sunt instalate n jurul Moscovei i n Israel. Intitulat ocial A, 135, cel rusesc continu proiectele anilor 60, deoarece rachetele au focoase nucleare51. Exist dou tipuri de rachete pentru a lovi n fazele intermediar i nal. Sistemul sufer de vulnerabiliti similare celui american, crora li se adaug cele provocate de nvechirea unor echipamente. Cel israelian este de teatru i se bazeaz pe rachete Arrow, superioare celor Patriot, a cror performan n rzboiul din Golf purtat n 1990-1991 a fcut obiectul criticilor52.

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Se poate spune c, indiferent de miza de imagine, aprarea anti-rachet nu a afectat pn acum logica distrugerii mutual asigurate, ind destinate mai mult protejrii n faa unui numr redus de rachete. Pe termen lung, nu poate exclus dezvoltarea unui sistem complet, dar nu este clar dac noile tehnologii nu vor avantaja cel puin la fel de mult i armamentele ofensive. n consecin, se poate arma, c din perspectiva teoretic, n cel mai bun caz, un asemenea sistem maximal ar contribui la tergerea diferenelor dintre ofensiv i defensiv. Concluzii Am pornit de la o comparaie ntre principalele teorii din domeniul relaiilor internaionale pentru a sublinia complexitatea problematicii nucleare. Avantajul realismului defensiv n varianta prezentat const n tentativa de a conecta o concepie politic cu schimbrile ce au loc n domeniul tehnicii militare, dar i cu factorii geograci. Sistemul internaional anarhic poate reprezentat sub forma unuia dintre jocurile prezentate de Jervis: dilema vntorului sau a prizonierilor. De una singur, structura sistemului nu poate explica declanarea conictelor, n cel mai bun caz poate sugera una dintre condiiile necesare izbucnirii rzboaielor. Autorul a cutat rspunsul n tehnologie, considernd c transformarea armamentelor inueneaz structura de pli a jocului. Inventarea i rspndirea bombelor atomice i termonucleare au avut o inuen profund asupra regulilor de desfurare a relaiilor internaionale. Instaurarea bipolaritii dup al doilea rzboi mondial a fost strns legat de construirea de ctre SUA i URSS a unor arsenale impresionante, capabile de a aplica lovituri mortale, chiar daca ar fost mai nti atacate. Descurajarea nuclear a asigurat, din cte se pare, o perioad prelungit de stabilitate n Europa, dei o conrmare riguroas este dicil de obinut. Practic, balana s-a accentuat n favoarea armamentului cu utilizare defensiv, n timp ce schimbrile tehnologice au pus sub semnul ntrebrii aceast tendin ncepnd , din anii 70. Rzboiul a ncetat s e principalul mijloc de reglare a disputelor dintre marile puteri, care au cutat debuee n cursa armamentelor, n competiia ideologic, sau n rzboaiele limitate, purtate prin intermediari. Perioada de dup Rzboiul Rece este nc marcat de incertitudini. Transformrile armamentelor
RZBOIUL RECE

Rachet de interceptare naintea unui test (Departamentul American al Aprrii, www.defenselink.mil)

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fac nesigur, de pild, o evaluare a balanei dintre expansiune i aprare, dei se pare c prima este favorizat, cel puin pn acum. Spectrul conictului nuclear generalizat a trecut pe un plan secundar, ns nu a disprut total. Descurajarea pare s mai funcioneze, cel puin n ceea ce privete relaiile dintre superputerile nucleare i pentru prevenirea unei poteniale ofensive convenionale. Scutul anti-rachet este abia la nceput i nu este clar dac i cnd va reui un asemenea sistem s anihileze capacitatea de represalii. Se conrm ipoteza iniial referitoare la tendina de cretere a avantajului ofensivei i la meninerea diferenierii ntre aceasta i ofensiv. Sunt posibile creteri ale riscurilor de securitate, dar situaia nu trebuie dramatizat. Note Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, 1999. Vezi Raymond Aron, Paix et Guerre entre les Nations, Calman-Levy, 1984. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, 1979. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts, 5th ed.; New York: Longman, Addison-Wesley, 2005; pentru o opinie critic fa de rolul armelor nucleare n meninerea stabilitii dup al doilea rzboi mondial, vezi John Mueller, The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World, International Security, vol. 13, nr. 2. Hans Morgenthau, Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy, American Political Science Review, martie 1964. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984.
6 5 4 3 2 1

Stephen Krasner, Regimes and the limits of Realism, International Organization, primvara 1982; Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, International Organization, primvara 1982. Vezi Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York,1984. Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation, International Organization, vara 1988. A urmat o dezbatere formal despre rolul ctigurilor relative i a celor absolute, cu un rezultat incert. Vezi i Iulia Motoc, Teoria Politic a Relaiilor Internaionale, Sursele filosofiei morale i a dreptului, Paideia, Bucureti, 2001; John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security, iarna 1994/95. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states makes of it, n Robert Art, Robert Jervis, International Politics, Pearson, 2005. Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics nr. 30, 1978.
12 13 14 15 11 10 9 8

ibidem. op cit. ibidem.

John J. Mearsheimer, Tragedia politicii de for, Antet, 2001. Vezi i Stephen Van Evera, Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War, International Security, primvara 1998 i Charles L. Glaser i Chaim Kaufmann. What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It, International Security, primvara 1998, Keir A. Lieber, Grasping the Technological Peace, International Security, vara 2000; sau Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Haftel, Kevin Sweeney, Offense-Defense Theory, Journal of Conflict Resolution, februarie 2005. Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics nr. 30, 1978.
17 16

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Robert Jervis, Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace, Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2001, American Political Science Review, vol. 96. Edward Luttwak, Stuart L. Koehl, The Dictionary of Modern War, New York, HarperCollins, 1991. Thomas C. Schelling, Strategia Conflictului, Editura Integral, Bucureti, 2000. Robert Art, To What Ends Military Power, International Security, primvara 1980.
22 23 21 20 19 18

The American Political Science Review, vol. 63, nr. 3. Vezi i Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis, The University of Michigan Press, 2000. Vezi i Bernard Brodie, The Development of Nuclear Strategy, International Security, primvara 1978; Peter Calvocoressi, Politica mondial dup 1945, Allfa, ediia a VII-a, Bucureti, 2002; Henry Kissinger, Diplomaia, ALL, Bucureti, 2003; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers, Vintage Books, 1989; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Andr Kaspi, Histoire des relations internationales, Armand Colin, Paris, 2000; Andr Fontaine, Istoria Rzboiului Rece, Editura Militar, 1992, Bucureti; Andr Fontaine, Histoire de la dtente, Fayard, Paris, 1981. O discuie interesat a specificului descurajrii nucleare se regsete n George Quester, The Future of Nuclear Deterrence, Lexington Books, DC/ Lexington/Toronto, 1986. Problema purtrii unui conflict nuclear se regsete n Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory, International Security, vara 1979 i n Michael Howard, On Fighting a Nuclear War, International Security, vara 1981. Pentru o discuie a impactului diferitelor strategii, vezi Earl C. Ravenal, Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection, International Security, primvara 1982 sau Walter Slocombe, The Countervailing Strategy, International Security, primvara 1981. Ernest i Trevor Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, HarperCollins, New York, 1993. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, 1999; Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment Revisited, n Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, International Politics, Pearson, 2005. Vezi i Iulia Bdlu, Diplomaia nuclear ruso-american la cumpna mileniilor, Impact Strategic, nr. 3, 2006.
RZBOIUL RECE
35 34 33 32 31

idem.

Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics nr. 30, 1978; Robert Jervis, Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?, Journal of Cold War Studies, nr.1/ 2001. Thomas C. Schelling, Strategia Conflictului, Editura Integral, Bucureti, 2000. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, 1999; vezi i Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York, The Free Press, 1991.
26 27 25 24

idem.

Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics nr. 30, 1978.
28 Henry Kissinger, Diplomaia, ALL, Bucureti, 2003. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts, 5th ed.; New York: Longman, Addison-Wesley, 2005.

Ernest i Trevor Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, HarperCollins, New York, 1993. Jean-Louis Dufour, Crizele internaionale, de la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999), Bucureti, Corint, 2002. O conceptualizare clasic a crizelor, pornind de la cea din Cuba o regsim n Graham T. Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
30

29

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*** The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, 2006, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html;
37 38 36 46 47

Idem;

Idem;

BBC World on-line, Q&A: Irans nuclear programme,news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ middle_east/3148398.stm; BBC, Q&A: N Korea nuclear agreement, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asiapacific/2340405.stm; Warren Hoge, Security Council Supports Sanctions on North Korea, http://www.nytimes. com/2006/10/15/world/asia/15nations. html?_r=1&th&emc=th&oref=slogin; Documentul SORT, http://www.state. gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/10471.htm;
42 43 41 40 39

*** Labored, Not Layered, Missile Defense, August 25, 2003, http://www. armscontrolcenter.org/archives/000290.php; BBC, US considers Polish missile base, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/ 4445284.stm; Conferina de pres a generalului Obering, 1 septembrie 2006, http://www. defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript. aspx?TranscriptID=3710; ***Medium Extended Air Defense System, http://www.army-technology.com/ projects/meads; *** SAMP/T, http://www.gbad.org/gbad/ amd_SAMP_T.html; *** Missile defence, How did it evolve? http://www.nato.int/issues/missile_ defence/evolution.htm; Michael Jasinski, Russia: Strategic Early Warning, Command and Control, and Missile Defense Overview, http://www.nti.org/db/ nisprofs/russia/weapons/abmc3/c3abmovr. htm#abmsys; Vezi *** Arrow, http://www.missilethreat. com/systems/arrow_israel.html i Theodore A. Postol, Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot, International Security, iarna 1991-92.
52 51 50 49 48

idem;

Vezi ***, U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance, http://www.armscontrol.org/ factsheets/usmissiledefense.asp; Idem; Vezi *** Ground-based Midcourse Defense, http://www.missilethreat.com/systems/gmd_ usa.html, *** Ground Based Interceptor, http://www. fas.org/spp/starwars/program/gbi.htm i *** National Missile Defense, http://www. fas.org/spp/starwars/program/nmd/;
45 44

SUMMARY
The object of this article is to apply the model of offense-defense balance to study the impact of nuclear weapons after the Second World War and future trends, although the theory ignores the impact of relative gains in some situations. Contrary to Jervis, the conclusion is that we are facing a growing trend in the favor of offensive technologies and strategies, caused by nuclear proliferation and proactive policies. The new developments in military technologies also support this change.

Mihai Zodian is an expert in domestic and international politics, international relations and security studies. He holds on MA degree in international relations and European Integration and a BA in political science from the National School Studies and Public Administration (NSPSPA)

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People human intelligence & terrorism prevention matrixes1

Vladimir Lukov

Introduction Internet-educated Terrorism. General citizens could of

The State of Art of People Human Intelligence In Russia, there are many arguments in favour of Human Intelligence under the auspices of the Power Structures like FSB, MVD, military intelligence etc. This tendency is quite natural for these military professional communities. The point is that all Russian Power Structures have got used to paradigms of domestic and international security of the World War II and the Cold War period. For seven decades of industrial development Russia really needed the highly centralized management of the whole nation (in forms of the USSR, the Warsaw Pact etc. big communities). That is why institutes of civil society were included in spheres of security, defense and lawenforcement as subordinates. Nowadays, on the contrary, the postindustrial era has been based on multi-layers development processes. Thus new ideas of decentralized Human Intelligence against widely-spread threats of terrorists have been placed in focus of science and public opinion. Here is a list of recent publications on these issues. In the USA, for example, two main ideas of US Admiral John Pointdexter were widely and ercely discussed in 2003-2004: - The Information Awareness Ofce for general public; - Creating the Terrorism Futures Market (see a lot of discussion about People Human Intelligence at more than 20 web-sites with support and criticism on Pointdexter Condential initiatives).

become the rst responders to Global ineffectiveness traditional Military and Police tools of reactive measures against diffused terrorist attacks makes population to feel more and more unprotected. Civilians intelligence communities seem to appear on the scene of domestic policy and security in many countries. On the eve of the G-8 Summit in Saint-Petersburg (July 2006), this common trend of the post-industrial contemporary world has been taken for granted. Anyway, the people human intelligence, even based on innovative Internet technologies, is a useless job without computerized math matrixes. These matrixes help to screen massive non-structural data from citizens about terrorist treats and abnormal factors (social, ethnic, religious etc.). According to this world-wide trend we offer a scientic experiment with NGOs Internet-monitoring and math-screening which may help to form: 1. A Concept of Public Security; 2. Systems (networks) of Public Security in regions; 3. Standard matrixes of Public Security for a real time monitoring; 4. A Law draft on Federal/ Regional authorities & NGOs cooperation in the sphere of Public Security.

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Then all discussions on Pointdexters Condential initiatives disappeared in Internet forums. Instead of them there appeared a lot of Citizens Corps in the USA, since spring, 2004. By 2006, these Citizens Corps are considered as NGOs, not elements of the National Guard system. More over, they have been lavishly funded by the Department of Homeland Security through the system of state and other regional grants. The aim of these grants is to promote People Human Intelligence (PHI) activity by networking cooperation of NGOs with federal and state authorities. But in the USA there is a solid legal foundation for such a co-operation. Since 1978, when the Congress passed a law (under President Carter Administration) that carefully balanced the branches of government for a scheme that could provide authorizations when special services were eavesdropping on Americans in America. That scheme, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), has been updated 12 times at President Bush Administrations request since the 9/11 events. Now in Russia federal ofcials and power structures are in the same position, though there is no legal status like the American FISA which gives them permission to do a program with NGOs and civilians outside of the Law on Terrorism Prevention (February-March 2006). Thus there is an urgent need for more resources, either in forms of People Human Intelligence or more IT in hands of average NGOs to make (and adopt) a Public Security Law very soon and make it work properly and immediately. Such an act of the Federal Assembly and President of the Russian Victory of Matrixes in War on Terrorism The Public Security system is based on IT and Counter-Terrorism Matrixes. These mathematic models work at combined regional and local data taken from Democratic Control groups of civilians (or Public Security Committees). The main principle of PHI is anonymity to be transformed into a dataFederation is picking up steam before elections of 2007-2008. PHI Project in Russia Such a PHI Project in Russia could be fullled within a 18-months research program. Before the start of the Project it is important to conrm the necessity of the People Human Intelligence in the long-discussed Strategy of Terrorism Prevention not later than Autumn 2006. See also our draft on PHI for lawmakers in Russia and possibly for experts in NATO countries and the UN (see Appendix I). The People Human Intelligence will not be fully adequate to the Military Intelligence or supervised by it. It will be quite a new (at least, for Russia) model of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). There should be far more initiatives from civilians to prevent Terrorism than those ones all of us can see now. Some steps taken by Russian Prevention Terrorism Committees could be similar to US Civilians Corps or measures, planned by the Total Defense System in Sweden. Sooner or later all of them should be utilized under common regulations which must be adequate to interests of Russia and in full correspondence with peace-building principles of NATO and, of course the UN Security Council (the Counter-Terrorism Committee, in particular).

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warehouse. There will be no dossiers on people, companies, corporations, social movements or NGOs. Their data, given voluntarily, should be reviewed only through specialized mathematic matrixes into specialized software. No-human hands techniques of screening of very touchy information help impartially to identify certain anomalies in social/economic behavior of large quantities of people (including drugtrafcking, ssile material black-marketing etc.). Such mathematic matrixes could be lled with data from short and understandable questionnaires (no more than 30-40 points, even far less). Three main approaches to mathematical analysis are to help in identifying social anomalies that may lead to discovery of systemic terrorism in given regions or grey zones. As soon as wrong-doings are spotted in advance, they will then be scrutinized by local authorities and paramilitary personnel (for example, Cossacks in Russia) who will be given proper evidence of terrorism or other crimes before the rst explosion. All we need for a PHI Agency Project are: - computerizing of Public Security centers/ committees (PSCs) through web-sites and CD-ROMs distribution (emotional and organizational networks of counter-terrorists are the best and the cheapest solution to terrorist threats against civilians and even military personnel); - real time exchange of data on signs of Terrorism preparations or the lack of them; - mathematic modeling terrorist ambitions and inclinations; - making prognosis how to prevent Terrorism with non-military methods; - conducting workshops in regions and abroad to spread ideas of PHI; - law basis for the establishment of the PHI Agency (see Appendix II A Draft of an Act on Public Security). Some examples of PHI in action For the research programs success, newly-developed Internet technologies should be involved. There is also our knowhow, such as three mathematic models. They can be applied for: 1) lling in a 40points questionnaire on various aspects of possible terrorist attacks, including extremist, sabotage etc. inclinations of those who are connected with components of weaponry of mass destruction and data banking allow to construct a System of partial indexes. This system may be transformed then into an Integrated Index of signs of terrorist activities. Methods of computing of all these data are similar to the UN methodology for identifying potentials of Human Resources; 2) establishing ties between various regional Systems of partial indexes. It lets us construct data-ow graphs to see bottlenecks for authorities to prevent the rise of terrorist threats. At the same time, there will be models how to prevent these threats at the earliest stage and stabilize the situation in a region. The modeling is focused on construction of matrixes by experts to foresee signs of terrorism; 3) pin (-for-pin) compatibility of matrixes allows to recommend preventive measures of non-military, socio-economic nature to many partners in the Global War on Terrorism. The definition of new spheres of social influence of the Public Security Sector is the task of the research based on mathematic matrixes.

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How to Read Terrorists Minds?

Figure 1. An Interpretation Cycle of an AgentSpeak Program2

After SE has selected an event, the interpreter has to unify that event with triggering events in the heads of terrorists. This generates a set of all relevant plans. By checking whether the context part of the plans in that set follow from the agents beliefs, the interpreter determines a set of applicable plans (plans that can actually be used at that moment for handling the chosen event). Then SO chooses a single applicable plan from that set, which becomes the intended plan for handling that event, and either pushes that plan on the top of an existing intention (if the event was an internal one), or creates a new intention in the set of intentions (if the event was external, i.e. generated from a perception of the environment). All that remains to be done at this stage is to select a single intention to be executed

in that cycle. The SI function selects one of the agents intentions (i.e., one of the independent stacks of partially instantiated plans within the set of intentions). On the top of that stack there is a plan, and the formula in the beginning of its body is taken for execution. This implies that either a basic action is performed by the agent on its environment, an internal event is generated (in the case that the selected formula is an achievement goal), or a test goal is performed (which means that the set of beliefs has to be checked). In the case where a basic Counter-Terrorist action is selected, the necessary updating of the set of terrorists intentions is simply to remove that action from the intention (the interpreter informs to the agent effectors what action is required). When all formula

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in the body of a plan have been removed (i.e., have been executed), the whole plan is removed from the intention, and so is the achievement goal that generated it. This ends a cycle of execution, and everything is repeated all over again, initially checking the state of the environment after agents have acted upon it, then generating the relevant events, and so forth. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) with unied indicators (indexes) of Public Security can integrate Russia-NATO effort in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Vague but real perspectives for Internet-integrated M&E in GWOT Agents-based Public Security programs may and should replace traditional networkcentric Anti-Terrorist warfare with decisive operations against the population. Military strikes are provocative to many social strata which may form additional support to terrorist organizations, in future. The present day outcomes of old Arab-Israel conicts and military confrontations are vivid examples of provocative Anti-Terrorism with its sheer military tools. In the Global War on Terrorism the aim is to develop non-military capabilities that can rapidly break a terrorist adversary organizations will to ght and undermine the utility of asymmetric striking capabilities. The new concept of Public Security Strategy in GWOT can be called Agents-based operations (ABO). If its adopted by decisionmakers in Russia and NATO, it will encompass processes, tools, and organizations that focus on planning, executing, and assessing counter-terrorist activities for the effects produced rather than merely tallying the number of terrorists and innocent civilians destroyed in Anti-Terrorism actions. ABO practitioners draw on the full range of instruments of nation-wide power to anticipate, track, and understand the indirect, as well as direct, effects of Russia-NATO cooperation throughout the Global CounterTerrorism social, political, military, and economic systems. We prefer to concentrate only on social issues here. The ABO concept requires deep knowledge not of Terrorism alone but also of its friendly social capabilities and structures in and out the country. The current suite of analytic tools employed by the so called Power Ministries cannot support this approach to counter-terrorist operations. These tools were not designed to determine how the use of military force affects adversary strategic will, to model adaptive behavior, to represent unintended consequences, or to evaluate alternative courses of action that include other instruments of national power beyond military force. Approximate Structures of PHI Agencies Burning tasks of Terrorism prevention need far quicker reshaping of responsibility of the Armed Forces and Society. Under new challenges of Global Terrorism, NGOs have been obtaining quite unusual roles as creators and participants of Public Human Security Agencies (at least, in Russia see Appendix I). A set of People Human Intelligence Agencies in other countries is to allow Russian, American and European citizens not to become helpless victims of terrorists and other powerful external forces. Their PR-actions also formulate denitions of selfdefense of citizenship in the GWOT. The ITrelated population is the core of the People Human Intelligence and thus broaden Human resources for the Security Sector (as well as Military structures) in combating Terrorism.

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There should be structural PR-actions (see Appendix II) which are to: (a) Indicate how the results of the PHI Agencies will contribute to improved security in the participating GWOT countries; (b) Draw attention and nances of business circles to the PHI Agencies needs and plans. On the whole, results of the pilot PHI programs in countries-members of the Consortium in the sphere of National/Regional Security (research, training and practicing) are to prove that: 1) Public Data Mining on rst signs of Terrorism is not dangerous to innocent citizens. More over, they will feel safe with self-defense techniques thanks to Public Security committees; 2) Internet networking will help social workers and other advocates of the PHI to prove that data mining is only the most simple and the fastest way of gathering data that already exists in media and communication on the grass-root level. They will note that the Military and Police personnel, private guards and detectives can already trail suspects and search records to compile a prole of a suspected person. Data mining for identifying socio-economic roots of Terrorism is just the same process speededup and automated by new Information technologies. Not everyone will be a suspect, but real advocates of Global terrorism; 3) The Risk of Painting the Innocent as Suspect will be sharply reduced by matrixes of The People Human Intelligence; 4) it is time to create (for the Russian Military as it is done in US Civilian Corps or Swedish Total defense system) imaginary or visual battleelds with Terrorism. See, activities of The War-gaming Centre and virtual military maneuvers Viking in Sweden - http://www.mil. se/viking 03/. In Russia, lists of possible targets by unconventional terrorists and maps for the Military and Police are planned to be made in the Internet by civilians; 5) the population will be taught how to protect themselves from sudden terrorist attacks to shorten time for rendering active Military counter-attacks if they are in need. Conclusion A central concern of this report is that the current suite of analytic tools cannot represent all the aspects that interest Russia-NATO leaders and allow their actions to remain mutually supportive. The current tools can generate logistical and targeting plans that make the best use of available resources, but they cannot determine the degree to which a particular targeting non-military scheme will inuence the will of a terrorist organization adversary or the emergence of post-CounterTerrorism situations. Nor can the current tools generate insight into where and how a desired outcome can be achieved by using national civil capabilities other than military ones. Nor can they evaluate the probable results using differing mixtures of population support, enforcement potentials as a New Public Security paradigm. A pioneering set of analytical tools is required to support and implement new strategies of this kind. Thus monitoring and evaluation with shared indexes of Public Security can serve as a basic element of joint efforts of NGOs in social security, foreign and security policy of Russia and NATO countries; public demands for stronger integration of CounterTerrorism efforts could be satised far beyond traditional security and defense policy of the EU and Russia; there seem to be possible chances for a newly-formed Social Chamber Obshestvennay Palata and regional NGOs to become active and attractive in spheres of Intelligence and National Security. Russian NGOs have to answer some questions in the sphere of National/Regional Security to which federal ofcials and big businesses can not solve. By now the preparedness of the population in Russia to Public security and PHI Agencies is very low. Anyway, NGOs should help citizens to increase psychological stableness in front of

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growing terrorist threats and evident disability of power structures to do their job properly. See how to do it in Appendix III. For the rst time in Russian political and social policy efforts by PHI Agencies in regions are to be aimed at prevention of terrorism with a wider support of population. It will help to reduce military expenses and losses among the military personnel and civilians in terrorist attacks in cities and populated areas with critical infrastructures that can affect investors interests (from the NATO countries, as well). New formula of Public Security and PHI with corresponding matrixes may identify Human and Societal Dynamics in the GWOT. Results of this project will sure be of interest to the Russia-NATO Committee and the UN Committee on Counter-Terrorism and other national and international actors concerned with a rise of terrorist threats. NOTE
1

Kodolnyi Jnos University College academic papers; Initiating Peoples Human Intelligence in Counter-Terrorism, an article in the magazine Monitor Strategic of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Bucharest, Romania; Terrorism , an in article in Russian Counter Cyberspace (

, 2004 - www.planeta.ru),

and a collective work (in Russian) by .., .., .., c .., .., .., .., .., .. - :

, ( ) - . ., 2005 ., , 64 .; see some similar matters (in Russian) in a book Social and Mathematic Tools of Public Security Monitoring & Evaluation for Russian Regional Subjects, Moscow 2006, Ed. by Dmitriev M.G., Lukov V.V., Petrov A.P.
2

This

report

is

for

distribution

at

the

Conference in the International Conference Black Sea Caspian Dimension of European Security: Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democratic Control, June 12-13, 2006 (Alushta, Crimea) all copyrights reserved. In this connection see also two articles on so called civil-military cooperation or CIMIC. They were published in a magazine The NATO School POLARIS Quarterly, Autumn 2004, vol.1, Issue 3 (by Maj. Imre Porkolab Intelligence analysis in asymmetric warfare and LTC Jean-Jacques Pelletier The role of CIMIC within NATO operations). See also my reports and articles as follows: Ends and Means of Counter-Terrorism: New Human Intelligence, a report at the Euro Atlantic Security Study Group (EASSG) 19th Meeting, 1921 September 2004, Sifok (Hungary),

R. Machado and R.H. Bordini (2002), Running

AgentSpeak(L) agents on SIM_AGENT. In Meyer, J.-J. and Tambe, M., eds., Intelligent Agents VIII - Proceedings of the Eighth International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL-2001), August 1-3, 2001, Seattle, WA, number 2333 in Lecture Notes in Articial Intelligence, 158-174. Berlin: SpringerVerlag(http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/3/7.html# MachadoRASASA-LNAI). See also: Rafael H. Bordini, Antnio Carlos da Rocha Costa, Jomi F. Hbner, lvaro F. Moreira, Fabio Y. Okuyama and Renata Vieira (2005), MAS-SOC: a Social Simulation Platform Based on Agent-Oriented Programming, Journal of Articial Societies and Social Simulation, 8 (3) http://jasss.soc.surrey. ac.uk/8/3/7.html.

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Appendix I A draft act (law)

On a Public Security Act & Public Human Intelligence Agency

A Public Human Intelligence (PHI) Agency is to be established, when the Terrorism Prevention Act comes into force, to carry out the comprehensive tasks of intelligence activity and investigation and request for control to be imposed on subversive Public Law and order organizations as by the Act enacted. The Act Regarding the public control of NGOs which committed indiscriminate and Systematic Mass Murder, which will be enforced in 2006-2007. It will grant the Agency a duty to conduct public human intelligence activity and investigation and apply for controlling and regulating those organizations which committed indiscriminate and systematic mass murder. On a Public Security Act as a Part of the Terrorism Prevention Act The Terrorism Prevention Act aims to ensure the Public Security and everyday safety of citizens by preventing disruption of the Constitution that underlies Democracy and Free Market Economy from happenings by violent activities. Under the Russian Federation Constitution, which regards the Democracy as its basic principle, ones political position and claims should be expressed through speech and writing. But at times, the population of Russia sees some proto-terrorist groups and subversive Public Law and Order NGOs attempting to use violent means to achieve their own political goals without an avenue of speech. The Act provides for such necessary measures against those groups and organizations as restricting particular organizational activities, disbanding them and penalizing individuals who resort to act of social abnormities and terrorist violence. On a Sub-Act Regarding the State Cooperation with NGOs which prevent mass murder The Sub-Act Regarding the State cooperation with NGOs which prevent indiscriminate and systematic mass murder aims to enhance the Public Security by revealing the activities of those proto-terrorist groups and NGOs which have committed indiscriminate and systematic mass murder in the past and are still considered to have dangerous nature and by determining General Public control measures against such groups and organizations necessary to prevent the recurrence of the act of indiscriminate and systematic mass murder. The Sub-Act provides for citizens surveillance action which requires such groups and organizations to submit Internet reports and receive on-the-spot inspections by NGOs which prevent mass murder. These inspections serve for General Public regulations including demands to the State authorities such as banning proto-terrorist groups and organizations from obtaining or using facilities or accepting money and goods as donation, and for appropriate punishment to be imposed on those members who committed prohibited acts against the constitutional Law and Order or refused onthe-spot inspection.

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ORGANIZATION The Public Human Intelligence Agency is to be formed with internal departments, an Institute and regional bureaus. The internal departments comprise the General Public Security Department, the First Public Human Intelligence Department and the Second Public Human Intelligence Department. The Institute is to be called the Research & Training Institute against Global Terrorism, and the Regional Bureaus consist of 6 Public Security & Public Human Intelligence Bureaus in large border areas like the Far East and the South of Russia (including the Caucasus) and 3-5 Public Security Intelligence Ofces located in big cities inside the Russian Federation (Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Yekaterinburg etc.).

Appendix II

Structure of the Public Human Intelligence Agency in Russia (A Draft) FUNCTIONS Duties of PHI ofcers
The Public Human Intelligence Agency performs its duties based on the Public Security Act as an integral part of the Terrorism Prevention Act, which allows the Agency and its PHI ofcers to conduct open Internet-intelligence and other distant (nondirect) surveillance activity and investigation to those groups and NGOs which are likely to commit social abnormal and proto-terrorist activities by means of act of mass violence and widely-spread panics. Results of duties fulllment by PHI ofcers and their activists are to be evaluated by reports and requests on lack/existence of proto-terrorist activities in a given location/ city/region or the big area. Collected and screened by specic software programs data have to be available to the Public Chamber under President of the Russian Federation and the National Security Committee, as well as to governors, big cities majors etc. Mass media, investors and foreign tourists have the right to see some current results of duties fulllment by PHI ofcers and activists on the web-site of the PHI Agency. The Government of the Russian Federation has to establish an Examination Commission for the juridical and law-enforcement implementation of any terrorism prevention (control) measure such as imposing the restriction on such organizations prototerrorist activities or disbanding them, when considered to be necessary as results of the People Human Intelligence Agency real time investigations. Also, under the Sub-Act regarding the State cooperation with NGOs which prevent mass murder and panics among citizens and business communities, the PHI Agency may request the Public Security Examination Commission (inside the Public Chamber or the Government of the Russian Federation) for the decision to take the preventive surveillance action on those groups and NGOs which have committed indiscriminate and systematic mass murder in the past and are still considered to have dangerous nature or for the forced preventive measure to prevent the evident recurrence or planning of terrorist act. The surveillance action

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qualies the Agency to conduct on-the-spot inspections to the facilities that belong to the groups and NGOs under distant (indirect through Internet data collecting) control of PHI ofcers and activists. As for the implementation of the investigations, it is ruled that such indirect investigations should always be conducted with the permission of the suspected NGOs and other proto-terrorist groups in question. Any compulsory investigations such as forcible seizure of evidence or forced domiciliary search are beyond the scope of the PHI ofcers duties. Appendix III Providing

PHI data to relevant NGOs, Business Communities and State organizations

on National Security making its functions by sharing PHI data with other NGOs, business communities and governmental organizations concerned the information on terrorism prevention at any time, which was obtained through its distant Internetintelligence activity and indirect investigations to the proto-terrorist groups and subversive NGOs and other organizations which have committed indiscriminate and systemic mass murder and widely-spread panics. The Agencys effort to utilize collected and carefully screened information taken from open Internet resources and voluntarily sent by citizens also takes the form of the e-publication of a report.

The Public Human Intelligence Agency, as one of the non-governmental organizations, contributes to the Public Chamber surveillance over Public Security and Governments policy

SUMMARY
In his paper, Vladimir Lukov focuses on the latest trends in terrorism prevention that consist in the use of the information technology and of the so-called civilian intelligence communities. The author thoroughly discusses the concepts, algorithms and matrixes that are needed for the screening of massive non-structural data from citizens about terrorist treats and other abnormal factors.

Vladimir Lukov (PhD), A Corresponding Member of the Russian Federation Academy of Security, Defense and Law-Enforcement, General Director of the National Center for Prevention of Terrorism (Counter-Terrorism Center) vlukov@dol.ru.

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The Rebirth of Romanian Geopolitics after the Cold War*

erban Filip Cioculescu
Reinventing Geopolitics communist Romania in postscience and history. Therefore, geopolitics has initially been introduced into the research agenda of the security and strategic studies, as a division of the International Relations eld of study. The geopolitics progressively emerged in post-communist Romania and has been considered by some academic and strategic circles as a scientic discipline, in spite of the harsh debates concerning its scientic or pseudoscientic status. Anyway, many authors who study history, security, ethnic conict, regional economy etc. use the concept of geopolitics even when they do not resort to the instruments of this so-called science. They want to emphasize the emergence of some distinct regions and the interests of the foreign power poles in shaping the behavior of the local states and leadership. In 1992-1993, a rst step in the rehabilitation of the geopolitical inter-war authors and ideas was done, as the Ministry of National Defense supported Mircea Conciu to reprint and review a supplemented edition of the great atlas The Romanian Historic and Ethnic Space which had been published for the rst time in 1942**. Frequently, the geographic position of Romania was considered the main factor explaining the tragic destiny of the country, caught between the Western (free, democratic, prosperous states) and the Eastern (totalitarianism, oppression, poverty) spaces, since the creation of the Unied Romania in 1866. The rst attempts to legitimize this new eld of interest were made by those who were aware of the inter-war geopolitical tradition in
GEOPOLITIC

One should know that the end of the communist regime and the disintegration of the Soviet empire and its sphere of inuence was a historic opportunity for the Central and Eastern European states to develop their own foreign and security policies and take vigorous measures to nd support in the Western world. The proximity of the successful western organizations the EU and NATO, the perceptions on the Russian aggressive diplomacy towards its neighborhood and imperial dreams, the incontestable hegemony of the USA in the world affairs were the elements which pushed the newly independent countries to nd their own way on the international stage, in accordance with their national interests, values, and security priorities. In post-communist Romania, the experts in international relations, security and the journalists began to use frequently the word geopolitics when describing the state and evolutions of the world affairs, the regional politics and the situation of Romania*. The experts who eventually, in the middle of the 90s, formed the epistemic community of security and strategic studies belonged to different elds of activity: academic, military, intelligence, sociology, geography, political * Paper presented at the international conference of the working group on Geopolitics (Self-fulling Geopolitics. The revival of geopolitics thought in Europe after 1989), Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, June 5-6, 2006.

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Romania and some remarkable achievements that the Communist regime tried to obliterate on behalf of the working class need for a new perspective on world affairs. Geopolitics has been considered a bourgeois sociologic school of thought*** for near half a century. It was only within the military high-school that some geopolitical theories were studied with the discipline of strategy. The strong emergence of a realist geopolitical thinking is always a sign indicating a political and moral crisis of a nation, as it was the case in Wilhelm IIs imperial Germany which claimed its natural place in the sun, as a world power but was weakened by the domestic socioeconomic and ideological cleavages. Another example is post-Soviet Russia which suffered the trauma of losing an empire and inheriting a structurally weak state. Indeed, the political and economic situation of Romania was really critical at the beginning of the 90. The country had a poor economy, it was losing external markets, and the foreign material support was under the expectations. The leftist government of the FSN-FDSN (National Salvation Front which became Democratic National Salvation Front) had postponed between 1990 and 1996 the necessary political and economic reforms, therefore the country was laying behind Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia on its way leading to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, while the threat of the Russian new imperial tendencies was also present in many Romanian minds. At the same time, Romania had signicant domestic troubles with its ethnic and religious minorities: see the Romanian-Hungarian ethnic clash in Targu Mures (1990) and antiGypsy violent actions in Hadareni (1993), not to mention the latent conict between Orthodox and Greco-Catholic Christians from Transylvania, concerning the sharing of the patrimony conscated by the communist regime and given to the Orthodox Church. The academic agenda This sensitive situation seems to have called for a rebirth of geopolitics, as a science able to guide the political and military leadership of a country, based on the geographical, economic, security and demographic factors. The rst major book called The Geopolitics (Geopolitica) was published in 1994, by three editors: Emil Iamandi, Gheorghe Buzatu and Vasile Cucu, under the aegis of the Romanian Academy (Centre for History and European Civilization) and the University of Bucharest (Faculty of Geography Research Centre on Population Ecology of human settlements and political geography). This publication established the link with the inter-wars tradition of the Romanian geopolitics by introducing among the authors well-known names from the interwar period (Ion Conea, Simion Mehedini, Rdulescu Motru, Mircea Vulcnescu, A. D. Xenopol), contemporary historians (Gh. Buzatu, Petre Otu, Ioan Saizu), but also the western scientic agenda through the foreign academics (Christian Daudel, Franck Debi, Ira Glassner, W.R. Mead, Kurt Treptow) etc. The book is structured in two parts: 1. Restitutions and 2. New contributions in Geopolitics. The rst one is made up of debates on the features of this science and the connection with the national interests, the Topo-politics (Topopolitica the analyze of the position, physiognomy and conguration of state), the Demo-politics (Demopolitica the state seen as population living on the territory), the Krato-politics (Kratopolitica the state as form of government). The second one deals with the concepts and working tools used by Geopolitics, the regional and the integralist geopolitics. In their preface to the book, the three editors refer to the methodological difculties faced by geopolitics its scientic character is often denied even by the well-known Penguin

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Concise Columbia Encyclopedia (1987) and is called only a political analyze method focusing on the relevance of geographic elements in the international affairs****. Most of the analyses consider geopolitics as a branch of International Relations, even a sub-eld of security studies, to whom it is certainly related, as geography is put under the service of states survival and development, while localizing on map the risks, threats and opportunities which may arise. Both are sciences of the state or policyoriented disciplines, exactly as the founding fathers R. Kjellen, F. Ratzel conceived it. Geopolitics is a science which accomplish a new synthesis of history, of the territorial space, of the moral and physical resources of a community, which can thus nd its place in the hierarchy of powers*****, it is a middle way discipline combining social science (international relations, psycho-sociology, anthropology) with physical and human geography. In spite of some attempts to build up a unitary framework for geopolitics, or at least a multi-disciplinary but coherent one, it wasnt possible to do that because there were authors from various disciplines and different schools of thought. Therefore, one can discern within the Romanian geopolitics a sociological approach, a geographical approach, a historical-military one and an international relations theory-like method. The most conservative Romanian geopoliticians still try to dene and cultivate the national specicity as was the case between the world wars, when the focus was on geo-ethno-politic individuality of the Romanian people organically connected with the national territory (natural and organic ethno-geographic region) since the Geto-Dacians******. Worth to say that the authors of the Geopolitica (1994) seem to have been inspired by the collection of texts Geopolitica, a huge synthesis of Romanian inter-war theories, published in the collection Analele Academiei de Stiinte Morale si Politice (Annales of the Moral and Political Sciences Academy), Buletinul Societatii Regale Romane de Geograe (Bulletin of the Romanian Royal Geographic Society), in 1940*******. In 1995, two sociologists, Ilie Bdescu and Dan Dungaciu, from the University of Bucharest (Faculty of Sociology), edited a collective volume Sociology and Geopolitics of the Borders********. The rst volume is about the theories of borders and its meaning from the Roman Empire to modern Germany and American visions, which is the traditional perspective. They link globalization and national borders sociological, anthropological, biologic and political aspects, but also analyze the Christian borders and the Imperial idea of frontier till the break up of the Roman Empire. This book deals with one of the main subjects embraced by geopolitics, the borders/frontiers, and it is inspired by famous western texts********. The second volume is about the theories of European integration and the fate of nation-states and the nal chapter is dedicated to the role of elites The Eastern Border and the elite circulation in Romania (before and after 1989). The authors deplore the lack of valid and valuable elites in Romania after 1989, talking about the sociologic paradox of the elites phenomenon caused by the counter-selection strategy of the communist leadership********. Also in 1995, a good synthesis called Geopolitica (Geopolitics) was published by Sergiu Tma, an academic belonging to the traditional, conservative school of thought but more open to the analysis of the globalizations effects on the world order. The book summarizes the well-known theories of the Western authors ranging from R. Kjellen and F. Ratzel till the Cold Wars theoreticians, and a special focus is put on recent opposing theories of Samuel
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Huntington and Francis Fukuyama. Analyzing the situation of Romania, then a candidate to NATO and EU enlargement, Tma stated that Romanian decision-makers should use geopolitical lessons to anticipate the developments within the strategic environment in International Relations, so as Romania could keep playing its role of regional security and stability factor, while safeguarding its national unity and territorial integrity********. Some geopoliticians are heavily inuenced by the classical security studies paradigm (that is the pre-Copenhagen school********) and seem to dene geopolitics only as a set of tools that the decision-makers have to use in order to avoid serious imbalances of power, regional insecurity and persistent conicts, and to keep an easy access to natural resources, therefore a typical (neo-)realist state-centric paradigm********. Other authors, who are more open to the Copenhagen security paradigm, mixed geopolitics with pluralist security analysis, but they usually focus on the material factors which constitute the main assets and vulnerabilities for Romania as a nation-state: geographical location, population, economic potential, industry. The suggestion that Romania s value on the international stage is given by the views and interests of the great powers and institutions is embodied in the theory of the pivotal state. Starting from an article written in 1996 by Robert Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy (the latter being a notorious realist historian), Romania has been described by some analysts as a pivotal state, which is located at the crossroads of geopolitical regions Europe, Eurasia, CentralAsia, Middle East********. Those authors who want to identify material and objective factors from geography, economy, and demography, while accepting the increased role of information technology, economic globalization and transnational actors to explain their theories, usually cannot help resorting to traditional concepts formulated by Mackinder (heartland, geographical pivote), Spykman (rimland) etc. As an example, the Black Sea is often described as a buffer zone which waits for being taken into account by the great powers with conicting interests******** or dening strategic synapses. These concepts suggest that the value of the region is attributed by the external great powers which are present in this security complex********. On the contrary, few attention is dedicated to the propagation of norms, principles, ideas, across the borders, to the formation of a regional identity in this signicant area, therefore the preponderance of material factors seems indisputable. Regarding the transformation of the areas of conict and rivalry into zones of strategic conuence (meaning peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the interested actors), this is usually presented in a rationalist framework, as a rational behavior of the actors who consider that achieving absolute gains is more important than achieving relative ones. Again, the ideational factor and the sociological interaction among entities is obscured, in favor of strategic calculation based on material factors********. More recently, the inuence of globalization and regionalization on world affairs is analyzed by professor Ilie Bdescu and its colleagues in Geopolitics, globalization, integration, but there is very little concern for the psychological, non-material factors********, even if the book is not framed from a realist perspective, but from a sociological one. In fact, this is mere a compilation of western well-known theories on globalization and European integration. The geopolitical journalism has a relatively long tradition in Romania, being inspired by the foreign examples. The most famous

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specialized review of geopolitics, in the interwars period, was Geopolitica i Geoistoria (Geopolitics and Geohistory) which was edited in the years 40 of the previous century and beneted from the presence of the wellknown Romanian authors Ion Conea, Simion Mehedini, Gh. Brtianu, Anton Golopenia etc. Also the prestigious reviews Sociologie romneasc and Micarea contained articles on geopolitics. After the end of the Communist regime, it was only in 1997 that a review of this type appeared in Romania, whose name was EUXIN (Review of Sociology, Geopolitics and Geohistory), edited by an NGO called the Institute of Socio-Behavioral and Geopolitics studies (Institutul de Studii Sociocomportamentale si Geopolitice - ISOGEP). A long pause between 1944 and 1997 explained the dramatical fate of geopolitics as a discipline caught in the turbulence of state politics. EUXIN was dened as an open framework, an inter-disciplinary task group made up of sociologists, economists, historians and theologians Dorel Abraham, Ilie Bdescu, Septimiu Chelcea, Radu Baltaiu, Claudiu Degeratu, Dan Dungaciu, Cristinel Pantelimon, George Tibil etc. The name has been inspired by the fact that Christianity in Romania started on the sea coasts (the Euxin Pont meaning the Black Sea area), since the arrival of the holly apostle Andrew. The Christian spiritual life is coupled with the Latin origin of the Romanians and the GreekRoman synthesis in culture. The existence of Romanian people is linked to the struggle for access to the sea and the control of the mountains, the Black Sea being the essential pillar of the Romanian security space (Gh. Bratianu, 1941-1942)********. In the Preface (the program of the EUXIN group), the founding members explain that the review will be a forum of open dialogue and debates and argue that the usefulness of geopolitics and sociology should not be demonstrated, being axiomatic. The continuity with the inter-war period is openly claimed and it was paid homage to the great names Gheorghe Brtianu, Sabin Manuil, Mircea Vulcnescu, Ion Conea, Simion Mehedini, Anton Golopenia, C. Daicoviciu, Sextil Pucariu etc. The starting point for the development of geopolitics is assumed to be the inter-war period because it was a glorious time and it produced a golden generation of scientists in Romania. Thus, geopolitics is put in the same basket as sociology, because these experts who published Geopolitica i Geoistoria in the 40 were mostly sociologists and they had generally argued that geopolitics should be considered a social science (Golopenia)********. The same people who formed the EUXIN group gathered in 2000 and set up the Centre for Geopolitics and Visual Anthropology, within the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bucharest. Currently, the most well-known revue of geopolitics is called GeoPolitica (Revue of Political Geography, GeoPolitics and GeoStrategy) and it is edited by the Ion Conea Association of Geopolitics, through a scientic council made up of some appreciated professors, governmental experts, military ofcers and independent analysts********. They belong to different disciplines and traditions (geography, history, sociology, strategy, economy), therefore there is no common denominator for the revue, but there is a multi-disciplinary approach of the topics. Even if there is no realist dominance in these studies, the authors often face difculties in abandoning the old state/nation-centric paradigms. Fortunately, there is a younger generation who is more interested in the cultural phenomena Islam, civilizations, circulation of ideas, international organizations, minorities, diasporas and the issue of the societal security and non-military risks using the instruments of sociology and philosophy, and not the military history and
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strategy********. A parallel direction of study has been developed by the sociological school, especially the Centre for Geopolitics and Visual Anthropology (CGVA) of the University of Bucharest. In the journal published by the center, called Geopolitica, these mostly young authors are very enthusiastic in analyzing civilizations through the intellectual paradigms, the so-called noology the cultural spirituality, basic values and symbols of the peoples (noological spaces geopolitics could be seen as a noological discipline dealing with space********). Some of them reject Huntingtons thesis on the clash of civilizations, on the ground that the civilizations cannot even meet, and only the political projects starting from these civilizations can interact********. Professor Badescu initiated the academic campaign to legitimize the subeld noopolitics within sociology, being soon followed by his students from the Faculty of Sociology********. But the CGVA also focused on tendencies of regionalism and enclavization, as it was the case in April 2004, when it organized a round-table on this issue. The most debated problem was the situation of the Romanian population in the Transylvanian districts situated in central-Romania where the Hungarians are the majority and the area faces the question of societal insecurity. Geopolitics is often seen as a key-discipline for understanding the fate of Romania as a state and nation, during the passed centuries, the suggestion being that only the decision-makers who become fully aware of the geopolitical lessons could ensure their states survival in a dangerous world. This is, using the International Relations Theory concepts, a purely realist state of mind and it has behind a strong literature on war and competition in international relations. Henry Kissinger, John J. Mearsheimer, Z. Brzezinsky, K. Waltz are the most-quoted names and usually considered perfect gurus Embodying the classical historian-military tradition of geopolitics, the historian and military strategist Constantin Hlihors book History and Geopolitics in the Twentieth Century Europe (theories and methodology), published under the aegis of the Academy for Advanced Military Studies, offered a good synthesis of theories and practices in world affairs, analyzed through the lens of this discipline. The Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies of University of Bucharest also contributed to the publication of this volume. The author expresses his gratitude to the rector of the AAMS (currently the National Defense University) for having agreed to include the courses Geopolitics and History in the 20th Century and Geopolitics and Geostrategy in the 20th Century in the curriculum of undergraduates and graduates alike. The book is a synthesis of the ideas, hypotheses, methods of analysis that were debated with the students.******** Later, in 2005, Hlihor published another volume, Geopolitics and geo-strategy as reected in the analysis of the contemporary international relations, which is an attempt to offer International Relations specialists new perspectives of study and instruments. He chose a new perspective, known as critical geopolitics, which is situated within the international relations discipline, as opposed to the classical geopolitics based on geographical determinism and social Darwinism and being used by the expansionist states to legitimize their imperial strategies********. Hlihor tries to set up scientic and quantitativist bases for this discipline and makes a net distinction between the theory and the practice of geopolitics, suggesting that the theory should not embrace state propaganda, but it should keep a permanent contact with the social sciences as a whole. He acknowledges that classical geopolitics is more and more obsolete, because the clash of interests

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between the great powers avoids the military force and there is instead a preference for using diplomatic tools, economic strategies, political and imagistic instruments. In 2005, professor Silviu Negu (PhD in geography, secretary general of the National Committee for Geography and one of the founding members of the Ion Conea Association of Geopolitics), from the Academy of High Economic Studies, published the study Introduction in Geopolitics (Ed. Meteor Press), continuing the collective effort made together with Vasile S. Cucu and Liviu Bogdan Vlad in 2004********. He launches the hypothesis that the civilizations are not shaped by the political, military and economic power but mainly by the spiritual one. Each civilization ghts to promote its way of thinking, opposing the existing frameworks. He also notices that there is a break in the progression from one civilization to the other. The authors attention also focuses on the challenge that the Christianism - the dominant religion of three continents, which was one of the main factors booting the development of market economy and democracy - faces in its contact with a resurrecting and militant Islam. One should also add that in 2002, I. Bdescu and I. Mrginean coordinated a study on the geopolitics of the European integration********. The foreign models Romanian geopolitics has developed, in the inter-war period, under foreign inuences, especially the German and French ones. After the end of the Communist regime, its adepts found new foreign models, as they tried to legitimize their discourse. There were often translations from foreign authors and especially from the French litterature. The French columnist of Le Monde Diplomatique, Ignacio Ramonet, became well-known in Romanian strategic literature, by his analysis of the globalization process, which brings supra-national integration and regionalism but also weak states, conicts and chaos is********. The volume A dictionary of Geopolitics: states, concepts, authors, by Aymeric Chauprade and Franois Thual was published in Romanian version by Corint Publishing House in 2003 (Romanian version, notes and afterword by erban Dragomirescu). The translator highly praised the two French authors for their useful and comprehensive dictionary and he also hails the initiative of Corint to launch the new series Geopol. erban Dragomirescu also mentioned that he and the representatives of the Romanian publishing house cooperated with the authors, to convince them to upgrade some of their analyses. Another important achievement of their cooperation was the reassessment of Romanias situation and the situation of other states in South-Eastern Europe. For example: the annoying recurrence of the syntagm the Orthodox bloc, with reference to Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Cyprus was eliminated, as it dened the aforementioned countries and dependants of the Russian interests in the area. The Romanian translator requested the authors the permission to include in section 4 (dedicated to authors in the eld) a number of the most important Romanian authors in the inter-war period, such as I. Conea, A. Golopenia, S.Mehedini, Gh. Brtianu. All of them were later repressed, imprisoned or murdered by the Communist regime in the fties. In spite of the fact the the Romanian editors asked the authors of the Dictionary to contribute with a preface, they failed to write it, although that was the rst translation of their dictionary into a foreign language. They may have considered the Romanian authors as irrelevant and/or provincial, or they might simply be afraid of being discredited,
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as perhaps they eroneously considered the inter-wars Romanian Geopolitics being too dependant of Nazi Germanys one. In order to explain this, Dragomirescu noted that : Unlike the German, Hungarian or Italian school of geopolitics, the Romanian school made the defense of the country unity its main goal; it also preserved an interdisciplinary outlook on the approached subjects. This illustrated the position of the inter-wars Romania, that favored the status-quo established at Versailles. As the Romanian editors received no answer from the French authors, they felt obliged to right brief explanatory notes meant to amend the errors, to actualize the information and to complete the text. Dragomirescu mentioned that a group of Romanian and French experts, coordinated by Professor Dr. Jacques Barrat and Academician Dan Berindei published a volume on The Geopolitics of Romania in France, in 2003. The most notable exception in this landscape is the introduction written for the Romanian edition of Huntingtons The Clash of Civilization.******** Professor Iulia Motoc situates the academic debates on this book within the framework of the IR Theory, focusing on the general tendency in the case of Realism to provide predictions (forecasts), not only explanations and laws of states behaviour. In her opinion, Huntington seems to be under the inuence of the same predictive complex as he suggested that the Cold War ideological rivalry may be continued by another conictual paradigm based on ethnic and national identity issues. The Realist paradigm could not predict the peaceful end of the Cold War because its instruments were not perfectly functional, the American author suggests. Even if he was right to identify a cultural factor explaining human collectivities behaviour and preferences, he excessively and mistakenly simplied the framework of international politics. Iulia Motoc asserts that Huntington cannot go beyond the (neo)realist paradigm, instead he simply substituted states with civilizations and the balance of power with the balance of civilizations (the West versus the rest). Even the more nuanced and exact concept of balance of threat, proposed by Stephen Walt in order to explain some failures of the balance of power explanative capacity, seems to be ignored when predicting future realignments on the international stage. At the same time, Huntington describes a world of conict and competition, therefore a complementary realist instrument, the bandwagoning behaviour is valorized, but under the civilizational paradigm, which denes how culturally related peoples and states tend to come together against different ones and avoid balancing each other. This mechanicist and determinist paradigm ignores not only the existence of complex interdependence, postulated since the 70 s by R. Keohane and J. Nye jr., but also topics like ethics and moral in International Relations which are emphasized by both the English School and the Constructivists. Professor Iulia Motoc ends its foreword by stating that Samuel Huntingtons best seller could become a dangerous ideological object, that will produce a self-fullling prophecy mechanism. The course of events, after the terrorist attacks of September 2001 against US military and civilian targets, has been widely interpreted by the realist thinkers as a conrmation of Huntingtons truth. In his book on Geopolitics, in a chapter named The Future of Civilizations conict or cooperation, Sergiu Tma criticizes Huntington and argues that the clear-cut separation between the western civilization and the rest of the world - as a mirroring of the opposition moderates/radicals is fundamentally wrong because such antagonism exists within any civilization and

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the economic causes of conict seem to be as pertinent explanatory factors as religious ones, if not more********. The conicts are dealt with (negotiations, threats, wars) by states, not by abstract civilizations, and the rules of game at the global level are dened and defended by the great powers. It is obvious that the non-state actors, the trans-national and supra-national ones are more and more active, but the state remains dominant. Tma underlines the fact that the problem of well-being, freedom and democracy is not conned to a specic civilization, in fact is a universal challenge transcending cultural differences. Professor Mircea Malitza also criticised Huntington for the confusion between civilization and culture but he did not rule out the religious-motivated conict in a geopolitical framework. In contrast with Prof. Motocs critical view, other Romanian authors seem to embrace a more Huntingtonian perspective when dealing with the challenge of radical Islam or the identity wars in the Balkans and Africa. Professor Vasile Secre asserts that political, civilizational, cultural and religious clash spreads widely on the verge between the centre and the ex-third world, more exactly within a part of the periphery the Islamic world********. Professor Gheorghe Vduva, from the National Defense Academy, offered a brief article on geopolitics of Islam in which he analyzed the public impact of the well-known journalist Oriana Falaccis book La rage et lorgueil, contre le djihad, contre la tolerance (Paris, Plot, 2002) on the western public opinion. He stated that there is a terrible geopolitical reality: the geopolitical fracture between the western civilization and the Muslim one really exists, even if, for some reason, the civilized world does not want to assert it. He takes all the Huntingtons argument on the civilizational clash and concludes that all the other civilizations which are in geographical contact with the Islamic world tend to be aggressed by this one and this is a big attrition war waged by the most radical part of the Islam********. The author then focuses on the tough competition between the world powers for energy resources, suggesting there is a connection between religion and material power. He argues that the Arab world is fragmented, heterogeneous (a fractal geopolitics, in mosaic) he also states that there is a bipolarism opposing the civilized world and the fundamentalist one (especially Muslim) an asymmetric and perverse geopolitics. On the opposite side, the sociologist Cristian Barna underlined that the western world tended to judge the Islamic religion through the lens of actions committed by a violent minority, therefore there is a regrettably confusion between Islamic fundamentalism and the Muslim religion. The Muslim identity was dened in opposition to the westernization of behavior, the political pluralism, the laic government and the individual rights. The propagation of the norms of materialism, individualism, liberalism and instrumental rationality provoked the reaction of a religious rejection of western modernity and encouraged the belief in an intrinsic moral superiority of the Islamic culture on the western one********. Ironically, Huntington doesnt seem to be aware of elementary facts regarding Romania when he asserted that the fault line which separates Catholicism from Orthodoxy passes through Transylvania inhabited population by a Hungarian Catholic
********

, in spite of the well-

known reality that Romanian orthodox are the majority there Therefore, the foreign topics and instruments of analysis which were
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adopted by the Romanian authors dealing with geopolitics can be divided into two tracks on one side, the Russian-inspired Eurasianism, with the name of Alexander Dughin being the most vehiculated ******** together with Z. Brzezinski who deeply impressed the public with his famous chessboard metaphor, and on the other side the theories of the growing Islamic fundamentalism implying a clash of civilizations and an islamization of Europe (S. Huntington, Benjamin Barber are the most frequently names referred to). The obsession of geopolitical regions natural decoupages or great powerss inventions? While the years 90 of the last century allowed the Romanian decision-making, strategic analysts and public opinion to focus especially on issues such as Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe, Central Europe, former Soviet space, in connection with the national goal of EU and NATO integration, the beginning of the new century shifted the Romanian publics attention to two geopolitical decoupages which were invented and spilled-over by some US strategic circles, but sometimes also with the intervention of signicant European thinkers. The rst is the Greater Middle East, the second is called the Wider Black Sea Area******** and they were quickly embraced by the Romanian political leadership and strategic thinkers. The GME is made up of numerous states, from Morocco, Egypt to Iran, Pakistan and even Bangladesh, the common denominators being security features such as: the existence of signicant Islamic fundamentalism, weak states, terrorism and migratory uxes caused by the demographic boom. The paternity of the Greater Middle East (also known as Wider Middle East/Broader Middle East and North Africa according to the EU and G8 terminology) initiative belongs to a group of American analysts from the Pentagon, that worked under the aegis of the Council on Foreign Affairs, RAND Corporation and the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) of Washington. They tried to bring on the security agenda of the US policy-makers this strategic belt, source of exceptional benets, but also of great challenges and risks for the medium and long run. They suggested that, after the end of the Cold War, the danger of communist ideology and of Soviet military block was replaced by a mixture made of radical Islam, terrorist networks, WMD proliferation, giving birth to a new enemy that poses non-conventional threats and is able to produce asymmetric conicts, one which gained legitimacy by contesting Western liberal values and interests********. The Wider Black Sea Area includes NATO members Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, newly independent CIS states Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and three South Caucasus states Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia********. Most frequently, the presence of oil and gas in the Black Sea-Caucasus region is analyzed through a geostrategic perspective focusing on the great powers and regional powers rivalry. The region is seen as an energetic cake able to satisfy the hungriness for hydrocarbures of the main consumers and also as an ellipse of strategic conicts which have to be dealt with if one of the objectives of the power poles is to stabilize the area********. The new political and strategic situation of Romania heavily inuenced this choice: the country is, since 2004, a NATO member and it will become a EU member in 2007. It is also one of the most loyal and prized allies of the USA in its global anti-terrorist campaign, in the NATO (ISAF)/coalition of the

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willings efforts to stabilize and democratize Afghanistan and Iraq. The US-Romanian strategic partnership, signed in 1997, and later upgraded, was crowned by the bilateral decision to install US military bases in south-eastern Romania, which will facilitate US capacity to project its military power in the Greater Middle East and Central Asia-Caucasus to ght trans-national terrorists. In fact, some foreign authors see this partial relocation of American troops from Germany, South Korea, and Japan to Central-Eastern Europe and Caucasus-Central Asia as a competitive game between USA on one hand, and Russia-China on the other one********. This is a neorealist perspective based on competition and fear among great powers in an anarchic system. Other scholars focused on the so-called clash between the western dominant powers and the Islamic radicals, an asymmetric warfare for the hearts and minds of the Muslims in the GME or Europe, fought by the weak against the strong by means of terrorism, insurgency and fourth generation warfare******** But both of these analyses put a strong emphasis on the natural energetic resources oil and gas which are to be found in the GME and Caucasus-Central Asia and are of prime importance for all the international power poles. Therefore, they foresaw a mix of competition and cooperation between US, EU, Peoples Republic of China, Russian Federation, and India for managing the scarce and valuable resources and the building up of pipelines. Concerning the GME region, most of the authors resorting to geopolitical and security studies have remarked the strategic importance or this area, produced by the existence of foreign interests, but also the domestic structural weakness of the Muslim states (demographic explosion, social unrest, gender discrimination, unemployment, corrupted and illegitimate leadership, lack of national identity etc.)********. They prefer to nd geometrical models for explaining the states realignment and strategic choices, for example using the axis theory. Professor Dan Dungaciu explains the formation of two geopolitical axis the North-South axis (Russia, Armenia, Iran) and the East-West axis (the Washington-London one which is interested in the Caucasus and Black Sea region). He focused on the need for a Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea area, because the Black Sea is today the only European natural periphery which has been ignored by Brussels********. The geopolitics of the GME is built on two coordinates the foreign powers access to oil and gas and the need for democratization and possibly regime change. These may be a half realist half liberal interpretation competition for resources, but also democratization as a positive factor especially for the Western states which must deal with the asymmetric risks generated by non-democratic and weak states., the rational exploitation of the resources in the benet of local peoples. Unfortunately, the constructivist interpretations are absent in the Romanian geopolitical thinking, except for the negative side the propagation of Islamic fundamentalist norms towards different states Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Central Asia, Caucasus etc. Even when analyzing the cooperation mechanisms formation, they usually emphasize the strategic and rational interests the states have in building international regimes but not the force of the norms and ideas in shaping new interests, new identities and behaviors. If the western powers want to export the democratic regimes and human rights norms in Europes neighborhood, this is not only a natural tendency of the power poles to promote their ideologies (soft power) but also the result of
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the norms socialization by international actors (individuals, states, trans-national epistemic communities, international organizations etc.) which interact. Analyzing the post -11 September 2001 events, many Romanian geopoliticians emphasize the general concern for the Islam issue, which is widely perceived in the West through the lens of Islamic fundamentalism. The Islamology is frequently used, mainly in the USA, to legitimize certain policies and decision-makers strategies. In this context, one could dene two dominant school of thought: the confrontational one which describes Islam as a big danger for the Western democratic world (Daniel Pipes, Judith Miller, Fouad Ajami, Bernard Lewis and S. Huntington), and the appeasementaccommodation theory which separates political Islam from Islamism and asserts that eventually the moderate Muslims will democratize and modernize their societies, acting as de facto allies of the West (John Esposito, John Voll, James Piscatori, Graham Fuller)********. It is therefore obvious that the Romanian authors usually embrace a top-down westernstyle perspective on the region and they try to understand the importance of this issue for the trans-Atlantic and European security space not for the well-fare of local peoples. The situation is similar when they refer to the Wider Black Sea area, focusing on the gravity of the frozen conicts existing in the former-Soviet space (Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh)******** and suggesting that Romania, as a NATO and EU member could further contribute to involve these organizations in the conict management. It would overcome the regional cooperation semi-paralysis produced by the lack of condence, the traditional rivalry feelings and the inuence of Russia in its neighborhood. The Romanian language-writer of Moldovan origin Oleg Serebrian was among the rst authors to focus on a strategic region (the Black Sea Area) using the instruments of geopolitics, which he defgined as a political science separated from the International Relations Theory. For him, the Black Sea is a geopolitical unit from a functional and geographic point of view********. The framework is not always realist, sometimes it embraces a security multi-leveled analysis and tend to privilege the peaceresearch and stability building thesis, thus warning on the possible use of energy access as an instrument of power. Therefore, the geopolitics of pipelines can create unexpected energy crises, undermining and placing under uncertainty both the democratic development and economic programs********. Romania in the 21st century a strategic prole An interesting debate took place during the last year in the political and academic circles of Romania concerning the strategic prole of the country, as a NATO and EU member. One can remember that in the years 2001-2003, where the divergence between pro-US states (especially Great Britain, but also Spain, Italy) and the Franco-GermanRussian ah hoc entente reached its climax, regarding the International Criminal Court (US asking for total immunity for its military in foreign theaters of operations) and the anticipated war in Iraq, Romania has been caught between the two opposing camps and there were deep feelings that the political choice in favor of the US could jeopardize chances for EU membership. Eventually, this did not happen but there is a popular concern that the trans-Atlantic rift could further widen and Romania could be bring in a position to choice between EU and USA. The subsequent debates on the Romanias

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strategic prole certainly incorporated the geopolitical regions already mentioned. While the USA focuses especially on the GME and intends to spill over security and stability in the contiguous Wider Black Sea Area-Caucasus, the European Union, through its European Neighborhood Policy wants a stable, democratic and prosperous Eastern dimension. The EU is also interested in securing energetic uxes coming through the Black Sea space, a fact which was nevertheless poorly reected in the recent European Energy Strategy. Therefore, Romanian authors produced a huge quantity of articles, studies and books on these geopolitical regions which have the potential to increase the strategic importance of the country, through its geographical position and Euro-Atlantic commitments. A huge book called The Axe the New Romania at the Black Sea has been published in 2005, being edited by the newspaper Ziua. Since the beginning of his mandate, in January 2005, Romanian president T. Basescu heavily focused on the role Romania would assume in the WBSA, as a potential regional power, promoter of democracy and stability, a bridge between the West (NATO, EU, US) and Russia. The main security interests of Romania are: regional security, the resolution of the frozen conicts in this area, the access to oil and gas, the ght against terrorism and organized crime and the trans-Atlantic solidarity. The book containing around 400pages combines analyses of Ziuas journalists, academic and strategic authors like Vladimir Socor (from Jamestown Foundation), Ronald Asmus (German Marshall Funds Transatlantic Center in Brussels), Dan Dungaciu, Ilie Bdescu (University of Bucharest), Adrian Severin (former Foreign Affairs minister) etc, contemporary and inter-war historians (Gh. Brtianu), also Romanian and foreign politicians Mihai R. Ungureanu (minister of Foreign Affairs), Vladimir Voronin (president of the Republic of Moldova)******** etc. Besides the Romanian authors contribution, the prestige of some foreign experts writing on the Black Sea area increased the interest toward this region. The Romanian translation of professor Charles Kings book The Black Sea. A History enhanced the propensity to study this area. The Black Sea geopolitical analysis began more and more frequently used in Romanian academic and political discourse, since the fall of 2004, when former Foreign Affairs minister Mircea Geoan met with Ronald D. Asmus, from the US Marshall Centre********. The result was a book called A new EuroAtlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region, published by the Romanian International Studies Institute Nicolae Titulescu********, under the aegis of the MFA. R. D. Asmus is well-known by the security studies community of experts for repeatedly having advanced the idea of Euro-Atlantic strategies, especially for the Greater Middle East. Another important author is Bruce P. Jackson, a US analyst afliated with the neoconservative wing around president G.W. Bush********. Asmus and Jackson constantly asked for US and NATOs involvement in the Black Sea Area. Therefore, geopolitics, strategy and regional security became more and more intricate, and they tend to focus on the national-interest of the regions states and of the external powers. This enhances a realist state of mind which has the potential to shape the public opinions preferences. It is true that even US president, G.W. Bush, when he visited Romania in 2002, told people gathered in the Royal Palace Square you can help our Alliance to extend a hand of cooperation across the Black See.
Within the Romanian political leadership, especially the Presidential Administration and the Government, there is an open debate on the status that Romania should strive to obtain
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in this region should it be a regional power, a cooperative security provider or a EU member shaping a regional strategy for the Eastern neighborhood of an enlarging Europe? If the northern EU states (Finland, Denmark) managed to promote a northern dimension of the EUs Common Foreign and Security Politics, why couldnt Romania and Bulgaria do the same with the Black Sea Area? Once the US establishes its permanent military bases in Romania, will this fact enhance the countrys image of regional power or will it be seen only as a second-class US partner? What about NATO, which at the Istanbul Summit (June 2004) recognized the strategic importance of the Black Sea and enhanced the bilateral relations with some of the regions countries which want to become full NATO members? Trying to explain these realities, during the last four years, hundreds of articles and books were written and geopolitics became a fashionable activity. Most of these analyses oat in a pure realist vein, as they suggest a harsh competition between the external and regional powers for political inuence and economic supremacy in the Wider Black Sea Area and focus mainly on states********. As one researcher points out, the Black Sea is a region of convergence of the main global actors interests and the positions of the smaller players should be shaped by the permanently reporting to these interests. There is a widespread conviction that the uncover of the energy resources in the Caspian Sea area red up the great powers ardent appetite to get a bigger part of the strategic cake, in order to satisfy for a time the world hunger for hydrocarbures********. The fact that Romania and Bulgaria are today NATO front posts at the Black Sea and the US wants to locate military bases in these countries shows clearly that the chess play for the hegemony on the Rimland (!) is actually on its way and Romania is one of the important pieces********. Even if some authors recognize that Realism seems unable to deal with all the current phenomena manifesting at the global level (transnationalism, globalization, democratic peace theory, economic interdependence etc.), they insist that the grate powers still practice a real-politik and play a geostrategic game to defend their interests in the highly valuable regions. The political Realism is nowadays perceived as a living presence in the practice of power relations, the contemporary international relations********, and, as concerns the sea, we see today a reactivation and revalorication of the Antiquitys concept of thalassocracy********. The real-politik considerations like the rivalry

between power poles, the western tendency

to project its interests to the Caucasus and ensure the access to the energy resources are merged with sociological aspects like the need for a wider cooperative mechanism in the Wider Black Sea, but also more constructivist ideas like the promotion of democracy and human rights norms, the international morality and responsibility. If one lists the qualications that the Black Sea region received in the Romanian geopolitical literature strategic synapse (Munteanu, Vaduva), geopolitical pivot (C. Ionescu) one can identify realist tendency, while the authors insisting on ideational factors are rarely encountered (ideological and mentally-constructed geopolitical unit Radu Moldovan********). The Moldovan professor Oleg Serebrian wrote in 1998 a book on the Black Sea Geopolitics and he focused the analyses on the main regional players, the structural problems, the challenges and opportunities which could favor each of them********. Conclusions Geopolitics is far from being a coherent discipline in the Romanian scientic landscape and there has not at all been reached a consensus among the specialists that it is really a political science. Few of the authors that use the word geopolitics or its linguistic derivates really provide specic instruments and methods

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of analysis in order to isolate this eld of study. Most of them prefer this term only to show that they focus on the international relations high politics that is war and peace, competition and cooperation, great powers rivalry and interests. As Romania strived for EU and NATO membership, there is no wonder that its geopolitics was dened through the eyes of the West, the mythical space of democracy, freedom and welfare. Generally speaking, the Romanian authors seem to accept that the identities assumed by the Western states (liberal democracies, rule of law states, open societies and promoters of world security) are given and naturally built, as a consequence of their power-based position in the system, of their history and political tradition of cooperation and harmony. They neglect the process of identitybuilding which is non-material. Sometimes, these authors tend to resort to a simplied and heterogeneous geopolitics in order to explain the current international relations. Once Romania becomes an EU member, its foreign and security policy decision-makers will have to rely on a new geopolitics, one which emphasizes solidarity and bloc strategies. As the national and the European/Euro-Atlantic interests will probably merge on the long run, one should not wonder if a European geopolitical
1 7 Geopolitica, Ramuri Publishing House, Craiova, 1940. See also Ion Conea, A New Science: Geopolitics, in Sociologie Romneasc, IInd year, no. 9-10, 1937.

Ilie Bdescu, Dan Dungaciu (editors), Sociologia si geopolitica frontierei (Sociology and Geopolitics of the Borders), Editura Floare Albastra (Publishing House), Bucharest 1995, Volumes I and II.
8 9

For example, Michel Foucher, Fronts et fronti

Ilie Bdescu, Dan Dungaciu (editors), op. cit., II volume, pp. 343-356.res, 1988, Paris.
10 11 Sergiu Tma, Geopolitica, Noua Alternativa Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995. 12 The Copenhagen Security School was a current of thought which emerged at the end of the Cold War, by a common effort made by personalities such as Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Morton Kelstrup etc. in order to enlarge the security studies agenda from military issues to political, economic, societal and environmental ones. Instead on focusing only on states interests, they expressed the willingness to also study the human security, the societal security framework. 13

See Stan Petrescu, Cadrul geopolitic si geostrategic global si european, in Psihologia mass media, anul XI, nr. 2, 2005, pp. 68-72.

14 See Adrian Pop, At the Crossroads of Interlocking Subregional Arrangements. Romanias Pivotal Role in East Central Europe, edited by NATO Defense College, Fall 1999, pp. 84-89. Unfortunately, the author insists too much on Romanias geographic and economic assets, deriving a somewhat mechanical classication as a pivotal state, without inquiring the strategic position that our country is attributed to, by the foreign decisionmakers.

See Constantin Hlihor, Istorie si geopolitic n Europa secolului XX. Consideraii teoretice i metodologice, Academia de Inalte Studii Militare, Bucuresti, 1999, p. 16.

Gheorghe Vduva, Pivot sau margine?, in GeoPolitica, anul III, nr. 14-15 (4/2005), pp. 49 58.
15

See also Valentina Roca, Ilie Bdescu (coordinators), The Ethno-political Encyclopedia of Romanians (in Romanian), The Centre for Geopolitics and Visual Anthropology, University of Bucharest, 2003.
2 3 Darie Cristea, Geopolitica si societate Avatarurile geopoliticii, II, http://www.studiidesecuritate.ro/ arhiva/nr1/articol/cristea/dc_rp_003.pdf.

E. I. Emandi, Gh. Buzatu, V.S. Cucu (editors), Geopolitica (Geopolitics), Ist volume, Glasul Bucovinei Publishing House, 1994, Iasi, p.7.
4

The security complex concept was proposed by Barry Buzan in the late 80 and then by him and Ole Waever, in order to depict the security and strategic interdependences which exist between neighboring states, ranging from friendship and cooperation to absolute hostility, so that these states cannot think their security without taking the other ones into account. See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 40-92.
16 17 18

Pierre Galois, Gopolitique: les voies de la puissance, Plon-FEDN, Paris, 1990, pp. 25-38.
5

Idem, p.57-58.

See Mircea Maciu, Simion Mehedini and the Geopolitics, in E. I. Emandi, Gh. Buzatu, V.S. Cucu (editors), Geopolitica (Geopolitics), Ist volume, op. cit., pp. 350-359.
6

Ilie Bdescu, Geopolitics, globalization, integration, Mica Valahie Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003. 19 EUXIN, Revist de sociologie, politic i geoistorie, no. 1-2/1997, ISOGEP, pp.7-12.
20

Ibidem, pp. 11-12.

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21 Dan Berindei, Lucian Culda, Ioan Iano, Gheorge Marin, Silviu Negu, Cristian Troncot, tefan Vergati etc., and the director is professor Vasile Simileanu, a well-known geographer who also studied the strategy during his military education.

Geograe Politic, GeoPolitic i GeoStrategie, An II, nr. 9-10 (4/2004), pp. 29-34.
35

See Darie Cristea, Balcanii. Memorie si geopolitica, Ed. Economica, Bucharest, 2005. In his analyses on the geopolitics in the Balkans he insists especially on the imagology associated to this area by the Western countries, stating that the Balkans are synonymous with war, inter-ethnic and religious tensions, poverty, that it is the evil in Europe - pp. 17-21. This explains why all the East-European states reject the Balkan identity and the Balkanism as a label of behavior. The instruments he uses are more adequate for a constructivist and cultural approach than for a realist analysis.
22 23

Cristian Barna, Terorismul i religia islamic, in GeoPolitica, Revista de Geograe Politica, GeoPolitica si GeoStrategie, An II, nr. 9-10 (4/2004), pp. 121-130.

36

S. Huntington, Ciocnirea civilizaiilor i refacerea ordinii mondiale, Ed. Antet, 1998, p. 232.

Adela erban, Tradiie i post-modernitate n noo-spaiul romnesc. Nooscopie i geopolitic noologic, in Geopolitica, nr. 1(5)/2005, an IV, pp. 32-38, http://www.geopolitica.ro/revista/5/rev_03_ 005.pdf.

Ilie Bdescu, Alexander Dughin, geopolitica Rusiei i geopolitica Ortodoxiei, in Studii de Securitate, nr. 1/2003, www.studiidesecuritate.ro. For a good synthesis of different tendencies in Russian and Moldovan geopolitics, see also Stanislav Secrieru, Euro-Atlantism versus Euro-Asianism: the problem of geopolitical self-afrmation of the Republic of Moldova, 2003, unpublished paper.
37

24 25

Ibidem, p. 36.

Ile Bdescu Noopolitica - Sociologie noologic. Teoria fenomenelor asincrone, March 2006, Ziua Publishing House, Bucharest. Constantin Hlihor, Istorie si geopolitica in Europa secolului XX. Consideratii teoretice si metodologice (History and Geopolitics in the XXth Century Europe), Academia de Inalte Studii Militare, Bucuresti, 1999.

26

Ronald Asmus, Developing a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region, Istanbul Papers, no. 2, Turkey, June 25 27, 2004. Also Ronald Asmus, Bruce P. Jackson, The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom, http://www.policyreview. org/jun04/asmus.html. The Wider/Greater Black Sea Area is a geopolitical concept and it comprises the riparian states and also those that are interconnected within the same security complex: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova.
38 39

Constantin Hlihor, Geopolitica si geostrategie in analiza relatiilor internationale contemporane. Consideratii teoretice si metodologice, Editura Universitatii Nationale de Aparare Carol I, Bucuresti, 2005.
27

Vasile S. Cucu and Liviu Bogdan Vlad in 2004, Geopolitics of Romania (Geopolitica Romaniei), Ed. Transversal Targoviste, 2004.
28

See I.Bdescu, I.Mrginean (coord.), Geopolitica integrrii europene, Ed. Universitii Bucureti, 2002
29 30

Ignacio Ramonet, Geopolitica haosului, Ed. Doina, Bucureti, 1998.

Iulia Motoc, Forward to the Romanian edition of the S. Huntingtona Clash of civilizations (Ciocnirea civilizatiilor i refacerea ordinii mondiale), Antet Publishing House, Bucureti, 1998, pp. 15-23.
31 32 Sergiu Tma, Geopolitica, Noua Alternativa Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, pp. 311-312.

The Greater Middle East (GME) Initiative is a well-known political project, launched by the G.W. Bush Administration in the USA, at the beginning of 2004. The core of this initiative consists in the need of America to protect itself and its key allies against the new asymmetric threats which have dominated the global security agenda after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Furthermore, the US government identied a huge belt of strategic instability and of the most important source of threats and risks to the national security and to trans-Atlantic security too, lying between Morocco and Bangladesh, touching Sub-Saharan Africa, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, from the North Atlantic shore to the Western borders of the People Republic of China. Vladimir Socor, Security Priorities in the Black Sea Caspian Region, Papers of the Conict Prevention Studies Centre no. 7, 2003, Black Sea University Foundation.

40

V. Secre, Conicts of the rst decade: a few paradoxes, in Millenium III, Bucharest, 2002, pp. 47-51. Also you can see Paul Dobrescu, Alina Brgoanu, Geopolitica, Ed. SNSPA, Bucureti, 2001.
33

Stan Petrescu, Elipsa Strategic a Mrii Negre, in GeoPolitica, anul III, nr. 14-15 (4/2005), pp. 115128.
41 42 Philip H. Gordon, The End of the Bush Revolution, in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, Vol. 85, No. 4.

Gh. Vduva, Geopolitica Islamului o geopolitica fractal, n mozaic, in GeoPolitica, Revista de

34

Vasile Simileanu, Asimetria fenomenului terorist, Ed. Top Form, 2003.

43

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44

Doru Costea, Coordonate geopolitice ale Orientului Mijlociu Extins, in Monitor Strategic, anul VI, nr. 3-4/2005, pp. 29-61.

Bruce P. Jackson, The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Region, the Project for the American Century, 8 March 2005, www.gees.com.
53

Dan Dungaciu, Moldova Ante Portas, Ed. Tritonic, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 272-306 (the chapter Geopolitics and Security at the Black Sea)
45

Marius Lazr, Aspecte ideologice si geopolitice ale renasterii islamice contemporane, in GeoPolitica, anul III, nr. 14-15 (4/2005), pp. 219-254.
46

George Niculescu, NATO and the Wider Black Sea Region, in Monitor Strategic, anul VI, nr. 3-4/ 2005, pp. 15 19.
47

Oleg Serebrian, Va exploda estul? Geopolitica spaiului pontic, Ed. Dacia, Cluj Napoca, 1998, pp. 9-17.
48

Constantin Degeratu, Does the Black Sea Region Exist?, in Monitor Strategic, anul VI, nr. 3-4/2005, pp. 20 26.
49 50

See Mircea Chelaru, Geopolitica Marii Negre si securitatea Romaniei, paper presented at the Conference organized by the National Defense College and the National Institute for the Romanity and Romanistic, Constanta, 1994, later published in Armata Romniei, Bucureti, no. 17/228, 1994, Ion Cocodaru, Determinri geopolitice i geostrategice n bazinul Marii Negre i n zona adiacent acesteia in Gndirea Militar Romneasc, nr. 2/2004, Editura Statului Major General, 2004, Bucuresti, pp. 54-64. For a more nuanced approach, Mircea Hanganu, Tendine i evoluii geopolitice n zona Mrii Negre la inceputul mileniului III si inuenta lor asupra Romaniei in Buletinul ASIM, nr. 1/2001, Editura ASIM, Bucuresti, 2001, pp. 15-21.
54

The list of authors - R. Asmus, T. Bsescu, Baas, Babaoglu, M. Barnier, F. Bordonaro, Gh. Brtianu, Coman, Cotoi, Damian, Delahousse, Dill, Dungaciu, Emerson, Erler, Gheorghiu, Gruber, Gorbatchev, Iliescu, Jackson, Lavrov, Lupacu, Marakua, Medar, Minikes, Pdurean, Pop, Quayle, Roncea, Rotfeld, Severin, Socor, Susko, Tadic, Taplin, Tarasiuk, Tolkaci, Tursunov, Ungureanu, Vasiu, Voinescu and Voronin.

Marian Rizea, Marea Neagra epicentrul elipsei strategice europeano-arabo-asiatice. Geopolitica ieiului in Romania si consolidarea rolului acesteia ca furnozor de securitate, a XI-a sesiune de comunicri tiinice a Academiei Naionale de Informaii, 8 aprilie 2005, Vol. II, pp. 72-77.
55

Costin Ionescu, Marea Neagr un pivot geopolitic n disput?, in Geopolitica, Nr. 1(5)/2005, an IV, pp. 44 49.
56 57

Ronald D. Asmus is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and was the US deputy assistant secretary of state for European Affairs from 1997-2000.
51

Vasile Nazare, Geopolitic i realism politic la Marea Neagr, in GeoPolitica, anul III, nr. 14-15 (4/2005), pp. 67-84. Ibidem.

58 59

Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov, Joerg Forbrig, O noua strategie euro-atlantic pentru regiunea Mrii Negre, Institutul Roman de Studii Internationale N. Titulescu, 2004.
52

Radu Moldovan, Pontul Euxin un spaiu al jocurilor geopolitice, in GeoPolitica, anul III, nr. 1415 (4/2005), p. 97.
60 Oleg Serebrian, Va exploda Estul? Geopolitica spatiului pontic, Ed. Dacia, Cluj, 1998.

SUMMARY
Geopolitics, as a contested scientic discipline, emerged in Romania during the inter-war period, but the instauration of the Communist regime and the remembrances of the German imperialism during WWII made this a forbidden eld for the researchers. After the 1989 Revolution, Geopolitics has been discovered both at the academic level and at the political-strategically one, producing not only an abundant literature but also many think-tanks, academic programs and specialized journals. In spite of the fact that its scientic status is still under controversy, Geopolitics tends to replace the vacuum left by the poor development of the International Relations theory with the academic domestic arena. Romanias position in relation with the great powers and the neighboring states, the national identity, but also European and Euro-Atlantic integration have been frequently analyzed using geopolitical frameworks. Geopolitics, which brought many foreign models, especially from the Western Europe and USA, generally emphasized the material aspects of the international relations and suggested deterministic causality, largely ignoring non-material, socio-psychological factors like ideas, norms and values.

erban Filip Cioculescu is a Scientic Researcher at the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History.

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framework will dominate our International Relations imaginary in the future

NOTE

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Turkeys Middle East Policy between Domestic Politics and International Requirements
Bezen Balamir Coskun
Introduction
Despite its Western orientation, alienation from the Middle Eastern affairs has never been realised for the Republic of Turkey. 1673 kilometer-long borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria, 90% Muslim population, around 10 million ethnically-KurdishTurkish citizens, and the certain historical and cultural ties with the regional states and societies make Turkeys involvement in regional affairs inevitable. For decades Turkish foreign policy makers had underlined the primacy of West in Turkish foreign policy. At the beginning of the 21st century, Turkish state elite found themselves in rolesearching between Europe and the Middle East. Since 1990s, particularly with the 22nd government, which came to power in November 2002, Turkeys ruling elite has gained self-condence that it can play a constructive role in the region. As a reection of this change Turkey did not join the US-led military intervention in 2003, but it has put enormous effort into mobilizing regional support for a stable Iraqi state. Turkish foreign policy making has traditionally evolved around of two basic principles: (1) and maintenance nations independence as a result of domestic sensibilities and external pressures, the Turkish government has found itself to play a two-level game regarding its Middle East policy. Most of the studies on Turkish foreign policy have paid attention to Turkeys geo-strategic position and the role of systemic factors, which left the role of domestic factors understudied. Thus, here, given the importance of domestic sensitivities and constrains Turkeys recent Middle East policy will be put under the zoom. In this article it is argued that Turkeys current Middle East policy aims at balancing domestic sensitivities and international requirements. The objective of this paper is to analyse the 22nd Turkish Governments Middle Eastern policy making as a two-levelgame, which has been played by Turkish foreign policy makers in between domestic constrains and international pressures. Throughout the article the following questions will be answered: rst, what are the domestic sensitivities and constraints regarding the Middle East that should be considered by Turkish governments?; secondly, how does Recep Tayyip Erdogans government have balanced/ or not balanced the two-levels namely domestic and international? In order to answer these questions, the rst section will present the evolution of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. In the second section, Robert Putnams two-level games approach will be reviewed as theoretical framework for the analysis of Turkish Middle East policy. In the last section, considering both the domestic constraints and international pressures, the 22nd Turkish Governments Middle East policy will be analysed as a two-level game. Conclusions will be presented in the nal section.
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achievement of security; and (2) preservation of the status quo, the countrys modernist, secularist, and national regime. These principles have drawn the contours of Turkish foreign policy. However, since 1990s Turkey has undergone a serious internal reform process that has changed the framework of its foreign policy. This development has created more room for maneuver in Ankaras foreign policy in general and Middle East policy in particular. Turkeys new orientation seems more exible and adaptive to the challenges in the region. However,

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The Evolution of Turkeys Middle East Policy During the formation years of the Republic of Turkey (1920s-1930s), Turkey followed a nonalignment orientation in international era since it was a war-torn country in need of internal reconstruction, which made seeking peace a necessity. Thus, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder and the rst president of the Republic of Turkey, followed two foreign policy goals: to create a strong state which could defend its territorial integrity and political independence; and to make Turkey a full, equal member of the Western European community of nations. Consequently, an analysis of Turkish past policies proves that Turkish foreign policy has always given priority to relations with the West rather than the Middle East. For a long time Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East had been considered as an extension of its Western-oriented foreign policy. Through the history of the Republic of Turkey, its Western orientation remains as one of the fundamentals of Turkish foreign policyi. On the other hand, as far as the Middle East is concerned, Turkey has linked to the Middle East through sub-systems and not As it was stated by Kemal Karpat, Turkish foreign policy objectives in the Middle East from the 1940s on can be summarized as achieving rst,

national security, second, economic aid, and third, at expanding inuence in the areaiii. In this sense
Turkish policy towards the Middle East became an extension of Turkeys pro-Western foreign policy. None of these objectives were adopted for the sake of strengthening relations with regional states but rather as a result of Turkish attempts to prove itself to the West as a cooperative partner in regional affairs. Till 1960s, Turkeys core foreign policy objectives remained the same. Regarding the Middle East, Turkey was not very interested in the political structure and objectives of their Middle East neighbors. During the 1960s, Turkey attempted rapprochement with the Middle East as one of its foreign policy objective, again not for its own sake but in order to strengthen its position vis--vis the West. The mistakes committed during the 1950s paved the way to a new Turkish foreign policy, drafted in the mid-1960s. It was expected to correct previous mistakes that were blamed for the deterioration of relations with the Middle East, which caused Turkeys isolation in the region and alienation at the UN in Cyprus case. The most prominent feature of the so-called new Turkish foreign policy was its emphasis on multi-faceted policy making. Applied to the Middle East context, such a policy required less cooperation with the United States, and a more balanced attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute. However, Turkey was not in position to refrain from cooperation with the United States. For example, regarding the use of NATO bases for nonNATO purposes, Turkey insisted that it would not allow the use of its bases during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. But it was not an indication of a complete reversal in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey adopted a policy of caution in its attitudes toward Middle East crises as a result of pragmatic choices. Turkeys foreign policy during the 1960s was dened by the following principles: noninterference in the domestic affairs of Middle East

by an overarching foreign policy emphasis which is reserved for the West ii.
The main principle of Turkeys Middle East policy was to avoid interference in regional affairs. Although bilateral relations with regional states were established, the main idea was to leave the Arabs alone. The 1937 Sadabad Pact concluded with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan was a good example of how Kemalist foreign policy distanced itself from the Middle East. Rather than being an example of regional cooperation, the Sadabad Pact underlined the signatory countries afrmation of non-interference in each others affairs. Thus, the roots of Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East were laid in an era when Turkish foreign policymakers tended to avoid involvement in Middle East affairs. Relations with the West were given top priority, which led Turkey to avoid entanglement with the Middle Eastern states.

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countries; maintaining both diplomatic relations with Israel and political support for the Arab cause; preserving links with the West in regard to their impact on Turkeys relations with the Middle East; and development of bilateral relations. These principles continued to guide Turkish foreign policy makers throughout 1990s. Despite this continuation, Turkish foreign policy in the Gulf Crisis constituted a deviation from its traditional Middle Eastern policy, which centered on noninvolvement in Middle Eastern conicts. According to Philip Robins in a changing world, especially state elite with challenges and opportunities for which the Kemalist power bloc was not ready to faceV. Kurdish nationalism, Islamic internationalism and pan-Turkist revivalism has become a matter of bilateral relations and confronted the Kemalist elite whose existing political instruments authoritarian decision-making; a narrow territorial and unitary notion of state; neglect of social, ethnic and religious divisions; viewing national security in military terms - have remained inadequate to respond these internal and external challengesvi. Domestic conicts caused by social change were associated with alleged foreign intervention. This tendency was seen clearly in Turkeys relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors throughout 1990s. Turkeys relations with Syria, Iraq and Iran during 1990s are the best illustration of this tendency. The disagreements over the distribution of water between Syria and Turkey overlapped with the Kurdish problem and developed into a dangerous conict that brought two neighbors to the brink of war. As far as Turkey Iraq relations are concerned after the Gulf War and Operation Provide Comfort, which provided a Kurdish sanctuary in the Northern Iraq, Turkish ofcials declared the integrity of the Iraqi state and their objection to the creation of a Kurdish state in the Northern Iraq. Last but not least of examples, in Irans case, Turkish ofcials and journalists have blaimed a possible rise of political Islam in Turkey to foreign mainly Iranian intervention. Besides the Pan-Turkism and Kurdish nationalism, this attribution has also been possible source of tension between Iran and Turkey throughout 1990s. Since 1950s Turkey has been dragged into Middle Eastern politics even though it does not conceive itself as part of the region. The development of Turkey as a regional power, both militarily and economically, weakened its ability to stay away from the Middle East whose security complex had become more interwoven with the Turkish one. Thus, the guiding principles of last decades, such as non-interference in internal affairs and preference to bilateral relations with Middle
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one which has altered so profoundly on the cusp of the new decade, there will be modifying pressures on even the most basic principles of foreign policy. Iraqs invasion of Kuwait provided a new challenge to the principles of Turkish policy on the Middle Eastiv. The Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 brought
about a degree of change to Turkish foreign policy in that Turkey got involved in an inter-Arab dispute, something it tried to avoid since 1950s. It was argued that change in the external environment caused change in foreign policy, without paying due regard to internal dynamics. The profundity of the change in the external environment, the twin revolutions of the Cold Wars end and further integration of Europe, leads the analysts to conclude that Turkey automatically responded to these changes by adapting its foreign policy. Turkey has always been cautious towards the Middle East. Ongoing turmoil and instability in the region, a lack of democratic tradition, and the continuous ow of arms into the region accompanied by hostile regimes have always heightened Ankaras anxieties. Particularly, after the end of the Cold War international and local developments overlapped in Turkey particularly regarding the Middle East. The revival of the Greater Middle East idea in international era posed a challenge for Turkey, both externally and internally. According to Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli the idea of Greater Middle East has caused the revival of the neglected Ottoman heritage and confronted the

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Eastern states became less sustainable. At the beginning of the twenty-rst century Turkish state elite found themselves at a crossroad as a result of new regional and international environment. Since 1990s Turkey has undergone a serious internal reform process that has changed the framework of its foreign policy. This development has created more room for maneuver in Ankaras foreign policy in general and Middle East policy in particular. Turkeys new orientation seems more exible and adaptive to the challenges in the region. Throughout 1990s and the beginning of the millennium Turkeys ruling elite has showed self-condence that it can play a constructive role in the Middle East instead of alienate itself from the region. However, as a result of domestic sensibilities and external pressures, the Turkish government has found itself playing a two-level game regarding its Middle East policy, which will be analyzed in the last section. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games Particularly the neglect of domestic politics poses limitation for understanding individual states foreign policies. In order to understand the individual states foreign policy choices, domestic political context need to be examined since foreign policies are mainly reections of domestic interests. However, in foreign policy issues the perceptions of elites and the internal distribution of the costs and benets of international policies play the major roles. Thus, the tendency of ignoring domestic politics has caused deciencies in explaining foreign policies of the individual states. That is to say, in most cases the internal character of states and elites is one of the central elements in determining state preferencesvii. Krasner and Katzensteinviii focus on structural factors for domestic determinants of foreign policy. Both authors state that central decision-makers (the state) must be concerned simultaneously with domestic and international pressures. Following this line Robert Putnam sought to capture this quality of foreign policy with the metaphor of a

two-level game. In Putnams metaphor, statesmen

are strategically positioned between both levels: domestic and international.

At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developmentsix.
Thus governments should be in line with their respective domestic interests for pursuing international typically seek policies. to The two-level games and approach based on the assumption that statesmen manipulate domestic international politics simultaneously. The statesmen are in general forced to balance international and domestic concerns in a process of double-edged diplomacy. In general diplomatic strategies are constrained both by what other states will accept and by what domestic constituencies will approve. According to Moravcsik, diplomacy is a process of

strategic interaction in which actors simultaneously try to take account of and, if possible, inuence the expected reactions of other actors, both at home and abroad x. The outcome of international
negotiations depends on the strategy that particular statesman chooses to inuence domestic politics. Moreover, international strategies can be employed to change the character of domestic constraints. According to Putnam a more adequate account

of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and non-economic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive ofcials and institutional arrangements xi. The domestic constraints
on policy-makers depend on both group calculations of interests and on their political inuence. The regime structure of a given state is also a signicant factor in shaping foreign policy calculations. In democratic regimes the hands of decision-makers

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are tied by institutional constraints and shared democratic norms. Besides the regime structure, societal factors such as historical legacies, longstanding enmities, political structure and national attributes of a given country have also impact on foreign policymaking by inuencing how decisionmakers dene foreign policy goals. In sum, the understanding of international bargaining as a two-level game is important because it captures the essential elements of the foreign policy-making process by suggesting that domestic politics affects the extent and the ability of a head of government to respond to constraints at the international level. Informed by rationalchoice theory, the two-level game approach offers the researcher a framework in which domestic factors are likely to be most crucial, and thus seeks to move discussion of the domestic determinants of foreign policy. Furthermore, the statesmans strategic reect simultaneous double-edged calculations of constraints and opportunities on both domestic and international level. In the light of Putnams two-level-games approach the 22 Turkish
nd

foreign policy orientation to Europe and the West, the perennial priorities of the countrys Kemalist elite, would not change under their leadership. The re-emergence of conict between Iraq and the US was a watershed for new government. The uneasiness among public and political elite was exacerbated by deep economic problems of the country, and the scenario of renewed Kurdish refugee ows to Turkey in case of a war in Iraq. It was widely assumed that Turkey would join US-led coalition of the willing even though the public opinion was overwhelmingly against the war. Turkeys need for continuing external aid and strategic urge by the countrys military elite to be part of a coalition led by the worlds only superpower clashed with the public opinion. On the other hand, the messages given by the EU throughout the Iraqi crisis hurt Turkish national dignity. Thus, the ghosts of early 1920s began to awaken, so-called Svres Syndromexii, a Turkish preoccupation with renewed attempts by the great powers to remake the Middle East to Turkeys disadvantage. Moreover, the American remarks such as Colin Powel welcoming the reconvening of Kurdish Parliament in northern Iraq were also considered as evidence of a hidden US agenda for the creation of a Kurdish state, which is the worst nightmare of the Republic of Turkey. Considering the uneasiness among Turkish sensitivity regarding revival of the Svres Syndrome, Tayyip Erdogan began (then he was not PM) to speak about the need for referendum on Iraq policy, and the need for Turkey to consider the policies of its Muslim neighbours. Consequently, in January 2003 the AKP initiated a new opening to the Muslim Middle East. It was an attempt by the AKP to manage the Iraq issue and to nd a sustainable regional policy. Within this context, considering the economic and humanitarian crisis that Iraqs neighbors faced during and after the Gulf War, Turkey launched a neighborhood initiative prior to the US-led military intervention in Iraq. Through the Neighbors Forum Turkey has attempted to promote consultations between Iraq and the
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governments Middle East policy will be assessed in the following section. Here it is argued that the current Middle East policy of Turkish government reects the governments great effort to balance domestic constraints and international requirements.

Turkeys Middle East Policy between Domestic Politics and International Diplomacy (2002 2006)
After the November 2002 parliamentary elections, a brand new party Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerged as the largest single party in the 550-member Turkish Grand National Assembly. It was quite unusual to have a single-party government with 363 deputies for the decades-long Turkish multi-party democracy. Even though the AKP is one of the successor parties to an Islamic party (FP), which had been closed down because of its openly Islamist character, both the party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Prime Minister Abdullah Gul signalled that Turkeys

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neighboring countries. Moreover, a Special Envoy was appointed to coordinate Turkeys national and international endeavors vis--vis Iraq. Turkey has also designated a high level Special Coordinator Nevertheless, the United States continued to put pressure on Turkey to send troops to Iraq to help stabilize a steadily deteriorating situation. This time the US government was more careful in terms of Turkish sensibilities. Furthermore, the US administration also authorized the potential release of $8.5 billion in credits without linking it to Turkish troop deployments in Iraq. In Turkey, while the military and the government wanted to make this deal, public opinion still opposed any involvement in Iraq. In order to legitimise the cause in the eyes of the public, both the government and the military underlined that Turkeys role would be a humanitarian one emphasizing the restoration of public services. A frequently used expression was Turkeys role to try to put out the re in the

for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in

order to mobilize Turkeys assistance to Iraq. As protests against war in Iraq took place across the world, the AKP took refuge in the assumption that war could be prevented. As was stated by Robins, having won a popular mandate just three

months before, it was reluctant to go against a public opinion so obviozzusly against war, and a support base that would frown uponxiii. On March
2003 the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted in favour of the motion 264 to 251, but it was lost on a technicality in spite of simple majority. This was a shock for international community particularly for the US who were expected unconditional support from Turkish government. In order to ease the tension, the Turkish side, military and government, reassured the Americans that the motion would be presented once more to parliament. In three months, between December 2002 and March 2003, Turkey underwent an extraordinary reversal in its foreign policy. Since then, Turkeys privileged relationship with the US has been undermined and the underemphasised relations with the Middle East have been prioritised. Various factors played a critical role in Turkeys initial decision not to permit the transit of US troops to Iraq. First of all, public opinion strongly opposed it. An underlying factor here was that Turkish education and socializations emphasise on national independence, non-intervention in other countrys affairs, and deep suspicion of the West in general and the United States in particularXIV. Turkish public opinion did not buy the US claims that their intentions in Iraq are purely humanitarian, idealistic considerations of wanting to end brutal repression, promote democratization and dismantle weapons of mass destruction. Turkish public opinion was also affected by the perception that Turkey was being portrayed in the US as a greedy country merely trying to prot from the situation.

neighbours house. Consequently, in October 2003,

the Turkish parliament authorised the government to send troops to Iraq despite continued widespread public disapproval. The security elites immediate concern was the repercussions that chaos and instability in Iraq could have on Turkey. They feared the break up of Iraq and the emergence of a Kurdish state. They argued that sending troops would block these outcomes while guaranteeing Turkey a place at the negotiating table where Iraqs future would be discussed. However, this time the decision met with the Iraqi Governing Councils opposition, and especially Kurds in northern Iraq, to the presence of Turkish troops. This was a relief for the government and a win-win situation for it. Since 2003 Turkey has developed a proactive

peace policy towards Iraq, which aims at developing

relations with different segments of Iraqi society regardless of ethnic and sectarian differences. Within this context, before the elections, major Sunni opposition gures and envoys from the United States were invited to Ankara to ensure Sunni participation in the Iraqi national elections. Through proactive communication with different Iraqi groups, Turkish diplomats aim at preventing conicts in Iraq.

Turkey thus naturally continues to support the political process and remains rmly committed to assisting Iraq in its search for security, peace and

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stability. Aware of the vital importance of rebuilding Iraqs national security network and capabilities, Turkey has been contributing to NATOs Training Mission in Iraq. Turkeys contributions as a transit hub for humanitarian assistance, essential goods and services to Iraq are crucial for its reconstruction xv.
In general, the 22nd Turkish governments Middle East policy has been developed vis--vis the EUs and individual member states contradictory claims and increasing demands from Turkey. Despite Turkish governments enthusiasm, the EUs demands, particularly the ones regarding Turkish sovereignty issues, have touched the nerves of Turkish public and military elite. The Euroskeptic circle in Turkey has increasingly outnumbered and started to criticize the AKP governments position of to do reconciliation. However, the hopes for reconciliation between Israel and Palestine were obscured by the election of Hamas government in Palestine. Turkeys claimed constructive role in the Middle East has been tested during and after Israels recent intervention in Lebanon. Both the US and other European states proposed Turkeys involvement in the UN-led peace-keeping operation in Lebanon. The idea of sending Turkish troops to Lebanon has paved the way to an internal debate in Turkey similar to the one before the Iraqi war. In general, Turkish public opinion was against the idea of Turkish involvement in such a mission which would require possible clashes with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Besides the general public sensitivity towards the idea of ghting against other Muslims, even though Hezbollah is regarded as terrorist group, there was another debate regarding the Turkish troops clashes with Kurdish guerrillas in Southeast Turkey. The increasing numbers of casualties, as a result of Kurdish insurgency, have caused resentment which coincided with Lebanon crisis. Thus, Turkish public opinion has turned against the idea of sending troops to Lebanon which would cause more casualties. The public protests demanding to stop increasing casualties responded harshly by PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In a speech he responded the public cry regarding actual casualties in south east Turkey and prospective casualties in Lebanon as saying army is not a place for lay down. Being

whatever they want for the sake of membership.

On the other hand, the increasing Islamophobia in Europe as a result of so-called Islamist Terror organizations attacks on the US and its friends, the cartoon crisisxvi, the initiation of discriminatory measures towards the Muslims in several European countries have caused resentment towards Europe among Turkish public. In order to ease the domestic tensions, the AKP government has developed new foreign policy rhetoric: Turkey as a bridge between East and West, between the Middle East and Europe, and between civilizations. Both the government and Turkish state elite has underlined the Turkeys role as bridge between two worlds. Considering the background given in the rst section, the bridge rhetoric is not a totally novel idea. This rhetoric is rooted in multi-faceted policy making, which had dominated Turkish foreign policy rhetoric after 1960s. As a reection of this rhetoric, Turkey kicked off Alliance for Civilisations initiative in order to develop mutual understanding between Islamic world and the Christian world. As another reection of bridge rhetoric, throughout 2004 Turkey expressed its readiness to facilitate negotiations between Israel and Palestine. Till the election of Hamas government in Palestine, Turkey played a balanced diplomacy towards both sides of the conict in order to contribute to the

part of Turkish army requires ghting even dying for the nation. Moreover, despite of public resentment,
Turkish Parliament approved the motion to send troops to Lebanon for the UN peacekeeping operation. Prime Ministers unfortunate sentences and the Parliament decision to send troops to Lebanon cost the party a 9.75% drop in public support, which is very signicant for a party aiming for another term as government.

Conclusion
Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of bipolarity, many states and their respective foreign policy experts have been confronted with the uncertainties of a new world order in the making and the question of where to nd an adequate place in this emerging new order. This scenario particularly ts Turkey, which
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is often characterized by its geo-strategic position that requires a careful balance between West and the Middle East. During 1990s, Turkey sought for a role in post-Cold War era. In the meantime, Turkey developed self-condence in its foreign affairs. The majority government of the AKP coincided with Iraqi crisis and this coincidence posed a watershed for the Turkish foreign policy in general and Middle East policy in particular. Since then, Turkish foreign policy makers have underlined Turkeys role as a bridge between the West and the Middle East. As was analysed throughout the article, besides the international developments and requirements, Turkish public and domestic constraints have also played a signicant role in terms of the development of this policy. NOTE
i Oral Sander (1993), Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and Change, Turkish Review, Winter Issue, p.31. ii Leonard Stone (2001), Turkish Foreign Policy: Four Pillars of Tradition, Perceptions, VI(2), p.1. iii Kemal Karpat et al. (1975), Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition, Leiden, E.J. Brill, p.115. iv Philip Robins (1999), Turkish Foreign Policy, Ramat Gan, The Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. v Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli (2001), Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and the Greater Middle East, London: Zed Books, p.106. vi Jung and Piccoli, ibid., p.106. vii Helen Milner (1992), International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses, World Politics, 44(3), 466-496. viii Krasner and Katzenstein (1978) as cited by Robert D. Putnam (1993), Appendix I: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, (eds.) Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, p.435. ix Robert D. Putnam (1993), Appendix I: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. cit., p.436. x Andre Moravcsik (1993), Introduction, DoubleEdged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. cit., p.15. xi Robert D. Putnam (1993), Appendix I: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. cit., p.435. xii The perception of being encircled by enemies seeking to destroy the Turkish state has remained a feature of the social habitus of the Kemalist elite in Turkey. xiii Phillip Robins (2003), Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq, International Affairs, 79(3), p. 564. xiv Kemal Kirisci (2004), Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy, Meria, 8(1), p.6. xv Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy. http://www. mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Synopsis/SYNOPSIS. htm (accessed April 15, 2006). xvi One of the Danish newspapers published a number of cartoons of Prophet Mohamed. These cartoons were considered as humiliation by the Islamic circles and after re-published of these cartoons by several European newspapers caused anger among the Muslims all over the world.

SUMMARY
Despite its Western orientation, alienation from the Middle Eastern affairs has never been realised for the Republic of Turkey. For decades Turkish foreign policy makers had underlined the primacy of West in Turkish foreign policy. However, at the beginning of the 21st century Turkish state elite found themselves in rolesearching between Europe and the Middle East. Since 1990s, Turkey has undergone a serious internal reform process that has changed the framework of its foreign policy. Particularly with the 22nd government, which came to power in November 2002, Turkeys ruling elite has gained self-condence that it can play a constructive role in the region. This development has created more room for maneuver in Ankaras Middle East policy. However, as a result of domestic sensibilities and external pressures, the Turkish government has found itself to play a two-level-game regarding its Middle East policy. In this article, the 22nd Turkish Governments Middle Eastern policy making will be analyzed as a two-level game, which has been played by Turkish foreign policy makers in between domestic constrains and international pressures.

Bezen Balamir Coskun is a PhD Candidate in Loughborough University Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies. She is working on her PhD dissertation entitled Analysing Securitisation Processes: Prospects and Problems for Reconciliation in Israeli Palestine Conict. Ms. Coskun has published several articles, book chapters and research papers on Middle East security, the EUs Middle East policy and Turkish Middle East policy.

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STRATEGII DE SECURITATE

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Conflictele de mic intensitate. Implicaii de ordin politico-militar

Drago Alexandru Bnescu
Cadrul conceptual. Deniii Conictul de mic intensitate (CMI) este un concept ce combin elemente militare i non-militare (politice, religioase, economice, ideologice, psihologice). Problema stabilirii unui cadru conceptual precis const n faptul c exist numerose concepte ce in de latura non-convenional a conictelor armate, care sunt e asociate ca sinonime conictelor de mic intensitate, e ca subtipuri ale acestora. Analiznd din punct de vedere al teoretizrii literatura de specialitate referitoare la conictele de mic intensitate, se poate observa c unele concepte, precum rzboi special, rzboi limitat (limited warfare), mic rzboi (small war), sunt considerate a sinonime cu CMI. Pe de alt parte, alte concepte precum contrainsurgen, rzboi de insurgen, rzboi de gheril, insurgen/ gheril urban, i chiar rzboi revoluionar sunt considerate a categorii operaionale sau subtipuri ale conictelor de mic intensitate. Una din deniiile cel mai des ntlnite n studiile privind CMI arm c acest tip de conict este o lupt politicomilitar limitat, care are obiective politice, militare, sociale, economice i psihologice. Are de obicei un timp ndelungat de manifestare, cuprinznd forme de lupt ce variaz de la presiunile diplomatice, economice i psihologice, pn la aciuni teroriste i insurgen armat1. Aceeai deniie insist asupra faptului c CMI se limiteaz la o anumit arie geograc nu foarte mare, i se caracterizeaz prin anumite limitri impuse la nivelul armamentului, tacticilor utilizate n lupt, precum i nivelul forei angajate. CMI presupune utilizarea mijloacelor militare de lupt sub nivelul conictelor dintre forele armate regulate, convenionale. Mai multe aspecte pot deduse din aceast deniie general. n primul rnd se insist asupra faptului c CMI nu este exclusiv un concept militar, ci integreaz mai ales aspecte civile, precum cele menionate anterior: politice, religioase, economice, ideologice, psihologice. De altfel, din punct de vedere al consecinelor, componenta politico-strategic a CMI este de o deosebit importan pentru analiza conictelor actuale. O alt deniie care se regsete n doctrina militar a Statelor Unite, denete CMI ca ind o confruntare politico-militar ntre state sau grupri rivale (...) care implic de cele mai multe ori nfruntri prelungite din cauza unor principii sau ideologii diferite. CMI variaz de la subversiune la lupt armat. Conictele de mic intensitate se duc prin utilizarea simultan a diverselor mijloace de lupt, combinnd instrumente politice, economice, informaionale i militare2. n plus, CMI au un pronunat caracter local i au ca spaiu de emergen n special statele Lumii a Treia, ns de cele mai multe ori au i implicaii regionale i globale de securitate. Categorii operaionale: Insurgen, contrainsurgen, combaterea terorismului, operaiuni speciale, lovituri cu obiectiv limitat, operaiuni militare altele dect rzboiul. Insurgena armat este denit drept o lupt armat orientat politic, organizat,
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al crei scop este acela de a obine puterea prin mijloace revoluionare i nlocuirea autoritii existente3. Uneori, obiectivele insurgenilor pot limitate, de exemplu obinerea controlului politic i militar asupra unei anumite regiuni i/sau subminarea legitimitii i autoritii guvernului sau conducerii unui stat. Contrainsurgena (COIN) este considerat a , alturi de insurgen, cea mai important categorie operaional a CMI. Principiile pe care se bazeaz contrainsurgena sunt clasicate dup cum urmeaz: recunoaterea caracterului politic al insurgenei; stabilirea unei autoriti de comand militaro-civile; importana obinerii informaiilor prin intermediul HUMINT (human intelligence NATO denete HUMINT ca ind o categorie a procesului de obinere a informaiilor prin intermediul surselor umane), ctigarea rzboiului psihologic i, n special, ncrederea populaiei autohtone din regiunea/ zona de manifestare a fenomenului insurgent4. n timp ce n cazul conictelor convenionale se pune accentul pe componenta militar a confruntrii, n cazul contrainsurgenelor decidenii militari se concentreaz pe identicarea aspectelor politice, economice, religioase i ideologice care au generat conictul, n funcie de care se poate obine o imagine asupra posibilei evoluii a evenimentelor. Combaterea terorismului include dou componente: antiterorism care presupune msuri defensive luate n scopul reducerii vulnerabilitii fa de aciunile teroriste5 i contraterorism, adic acele msuri cu caracter activ i ofensiv care au drept obiectiv prevenirea i descurajarea aciunilor teroriste. Aciunile contrateroriste se desfoar sub forma a trei tipuri distincte de operaii: de prevenire; de contracarare i ripost la aciunile teroriste n curs de desfurare; de salvare6. Loviturile cu obiectiv limitat (sau operaiunile chirurgicale, e terestre sau aeriene), presupun lovirea unor inte foarte precis identicate, prin intermediul unor fore convenionale; aceast categorie operaional poate aplicat pentru conictele care presupun celelalte trei forme prezentate mai sus. Operaiuni militare altele dect rzboiul (MOOTW / OMAR) combaterea terorismului, operaiile de meninere a pcii, sprijinul operaiilor antidrog, impunerea sanciunilor, impunerea zonelor de excludere (aerian, maritim sau terestr), asisten umanitar, operaiuni de cutare-salvareevacuare7. Doctrina militar a Comitetului ntrunit al elor Statelor Majore ale Armatei Statelor Unite (Joint Chiefs of Staff) privind Operaiunile Speciale (JP 3-05.1- IV-2), din decembrie 2001, prevede c insurgena, contrainsurgena precum i operaiunile de sprijin pentru insurgen sunt tipuri de operaiuni militare altele dect rzboiul (military operations other than war). Totui, pentru o mai bun nelegere a tipurilor de operaiuni specice CMI, am abordat separat denirea insurgenei i a contrainsurgenei. OMAR este acronimul romnesc pentru operaiuni militare altele dect rzboiul. Operaiunile forelor speciale conform unui studiu privind forele speciale americane8, cele mai importante tipuri de astel de operaiuni sunt: - Operaiuni speciale de recunoatere (SR) misiuni de recunoatere, cu grad maxim de dicultate, n teatru inamic; - Aprare intern n spaiul extern (FID) asisten pentru guvernele altor state care sunt ameninate de activiti subversive sau insurgene armate; - Activiti militare de mic vizibilitate (low-visibility military activity) sprijin pentru operaiuni militare sau paramilitare de lung durat. Acest tip de misiuni include rzboiul de gheril i alte forme de activitate militar cu grad sczut de vizibilitate;

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- Combaterea terorismului (CT) msuri ofensive pentru a preveni, descuraja i rspunde la aciunile teroriste; - Contra-proliferare (CP) aciuni de conscare, distrugere sau recuperare a armelor de distrugere n mas; - Afaceri civile (CA) activiti privind legtura dintre forele militare i autoritile civile i populaia civil, n scopul facilitrii operaiunilor militare n teatre de operaii; - Operaiuni psihologice (PsyOps) operaiuni de transmitere de informaii ctre fore strine aliate, pentru a induce acestora atitudini favorabile fa de obiectivele forei care a generat operaiunile.

Implicaii de ordin militar Decidenii politico-militari americani, spre exemplu, sugereaz c un numr din ce n ce mai mare de militari trebuie s primeasc pregtirea necesar luptei specice rzboielor de mic intensitate, e c este vorba despre contrainsurgen, anihilarea gherilelor urbane, sau contracararea terorismului. Aceast intenie se manifest n special ca un posibil rspuns la noile provocri pe care insurgenele irakian i taliban le impun eforturilor americane de stabilizare post-conict. Problema const, practic, n a alege ntre dou alternative: 1) creterea numrului de formaiuni (uniti) ale unei armate antrenate conform tehnicilor i principiilor CMI sau 2) pstrarea numrului de uniti de fore speciale, astfel nct acestea s i pstreze caracterul lor de baz, i anume acela de ealoane tactice cu misiuni strategice. Aceast dilem poate rezolvat de ctre decidenii militari prin analiza caracterului conictelor de mic intensitate (CMI): aciune n plan tactic i operativ i rezultate n plan strategic. Putem arma c CMI au fost purtate i au evoluat

n principal la nivel tactic, dar au avut consecine la nivel politico-strategic, rezultatul unor astfel de conicte hotrnd, practic, evoluia mediului de securitate la nivel regional. Simplicnd enunul de mai sus, putem spune c n cazul CMI avem de-a face cu un calcul de tipul: INPUT la nivel tactic OUTPUT la nivel politico-strategic. Una din caracteristicile CMI se refer la faptul c acestea apar ca o evoluie a unor conicte clasice n conicte nonconvenionale. Astfel, poate exista posibilitatea ca un rzboi convenional n prim faz s degenereze ntr-un conict de mic intensitate. Dei unii comentatori militari nu s-au pus denitiv de acord asupra acestui fapt, rzboiul dus de forele americane n Vietnam poate considerat un astfel de exemplu. Acesta a debutat prin lupte ale unor uniti clasice ale armatei americane mpotriva forelor comuniste vietnameze, pentru ca pe parcurs rzboiul s capete i accente ale conictului de mic intensitate, n care tacticile militare clasice erau n bun msur nlocuite cu forme de lupt specice CMI, respectiv tactici specice gherilelor i gruprilor revoluionare. Importana tehnologiei i a metodelor de obinere a informaiilor n CMI. Pregtirea informativ specic n teatrul de operaii. Progresul tehnologiei militare va avea un impact din ce n ce mai profund asupra modului de purtare a rzboiului, att la nivel convenional, ct i non-convenional. n majoritatea tipurilor de conicte, tehnologia deine un rol crucial n special n domeniul obinerii informaiilor pe cmpul de lupt. Aceast tendin este observat mai ales la nivelul aplicrii inovaiilor hightech n domeniul SIGINT (signal intelligence
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obinerea informaiilor prin analizarea semnalelor electronice, prin interceptare radio sau altfel de mijloace specice) i ELINT (electronic intelligence obinerea informaiilor prin intermediul senzorilor electronici radare, sisteme de aprare antiaerian etc.). ns n cazul CMI, n domeniul intelligence, atenia trebuie s se concentreze n special pe componenta HUMINT, ntruct n numeroase teatre (Kosovo, Irak, Afganistan i Liban, doar pentru a cita cele mai recente exemple) s-a observat necesitatea obinerii informaiilor prin aceast metod. Cu alte cuvinte, n cazul CMI, componenta uman n procesul de obinere a informaiilor despre elementele inamice este mult mai important dect alte tipuri de surse, care tind s e supratehnologizate i informatizate. n plus, este necesar integrarea la nivelul superior de decizie a diferitelor tipuri de intelligence. Inltrarea n interiorul gruprilor insurgente, teroriste sau de tip paramilitar, de exemplu, prin metode specice HUMINT, poate oferi o mai bun analiz asupra tacticilor de lupt ale acestora. Acest lucru este valabil cu att mai mult cu ct principiile de baz ale luptei n conictele de mic intensitate nu s-au schimbat foarte mult de-a lungul istoriei conictelor armate9. n ceea ce privete pregtirea informativ specic a terenului de lupt, trebuie menionat c aceasta este un proces continuu, un proces dinamic, care necesit constant re-evaluare10. Factorii de care trebuie s se in seama n mod special (n afar de cei tradiionali clim, teren .a.) sunt: atitudinea populaiei civile (care poate ostil sau pozitiv, sau neimplicat); posibilitile de susinere logistic i proiecie a forei; evaluarea capacitilor de sprijin ale statului gazd (host nation support); resursele economice critice ale ariei respective; riscul apariiei victimelor colaterale; controlul eventualilor refugiai 11; accentul pe misiuni de recunoatere, pentru observarea i identicarea activitilor inamice; dezvoltarea unor sisteme pentru eliminarea posibilelor cazuri de friendly-re, a cror posibilitate de apariie este mai mare n cazul CMI dect n conictele clasice; cunoaterea prolului leadershipului local/regional (pentru o eventual cooperare n plan politic i militar); liderii la nivel local pot lideri militari, lideri tribali (e.g. Afganistan, Irak) i religioi (diverse state din Orientul Mijlociu). n plus, este necesar cunoaterea orientrilor de natur politic i religioas a liderilor la nivel local. Aceasta este cu att mai necesar cu ct, n unele state, complexitatea riscurilor crete odat cu suprapunerea unor clivaje ideologice i religioase; utilizarea cu succes a operaiunilor psihologice; identicarea pattern-urilor de autoritate i legitimitate n interiorul statului/ regiunii respective; aceasta vine ca o completare la analiza prolului leadership-ului; informare ecient asupra modalitilor de recrutare a elementelor insurgente; aceasta permite formularea strategiei prin care se urmrete ctigarea sprijinului i ncrederii populaiei (ctigarea aanumitului rzboi al inimilor i minii hearts and minds). Activitile de tip CIMIC (Cooperare civili-militari) sunt, de asemenea, eseniale pentru a se asigura o ct mai bun informare asupra condiiilor din teatrul de operaii, pentru o ct mai rapid identicare a contramsurilor necesare i ctigarea sprijinului i ncrederii populaiei. Aceste

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activiti sunt foarte importante mai ales datorit faptului c, n majoritatea conictelor de mic intensitate, nu numai factorul militar este cel predominant, ind necesar o atenie deosebit acordat aspectelor politice. De aceea, n cazul CMI se impune cooperarea dintre factorii de decizie militari i autoritile civile, n acest moment exemplele din Irak i Afganistan ind cele mai concludente n acest sens. Att timp ct natura rzboiului difer n CMI, exist o nevoie de adaptare i modicare a structurilor i metodelor, lucru care ar putea implica crearea unor fore specializate, pregtite n rzboaie mici, i nu bazarea pe o masiv putere de foc i manevr pentru a ctiga rzboiul12. Transformrile la nivelul CMI se refer i la regulile de angajare. Constrngerile ce apar la nivel tactic n ceea ce privete utilizarea puterii de foc i a violenei sunt inerente n cadrul CMI13. Necesitatea rspunsului rapid, identicarea elementelor inamice, instabilitatea politic cronic, cutumele locale, sunt elemente care duc la creterea complexitii i importanei regulilor de angajare n lupt, ele neind ntlnite n mod normal n operaiuni convenionale. n cazul unor operaiuni specice CMI (operaiunile de impunere a pcii, de exemplu), cel mai important aspect privind regulile de angajare este acela c nclcarea lor poate avea efecte negative pentru buna desfurare a operaiunilor i chiar pentru securitatea trupelor. n consecin, regulile de angajare trebuie s e clar exprimate i s sufere un proces de adaptare la condiiile impuse de zionomia conictului14. Implicaii de ordin politic Acest tip de implicaii se manifest n cazul CMI n special pentru a identica cauzele care au determinat declanarea insurgenei. De cele mai multe ori, conictele interne apar ca un efect al tulburrilor la nivelul diverselor categorii sociale, al crizelor economice cu implicaii sociale, sau al prbuirii ordinii sociale existente (cum este cazul acelor failed states, state slabe din punct de vedere al autoritii politice, care se dezintegreaz). De aceea, cei care iau deciziile n privina angajrii forelor n teatru n cadrul unui CMI trebuie s in seama de aceste elemente declanatoare cu caracter politic, social i religios. Una din deniiile conictelor de mic intensitate arm ca acestea presupun o lupt politico-militar limitat, care are obiective politice, militare, sociale, economice i psihologice, de aici rezultnd, nc o dat, c CMI presupun evaluarea constant a mediului politic al statului pe teritoriul cruia se desfoar respectivul conict. Calculele specic militare (dimensiunea, numrul i tipul unitilor utilizate n lupt, amplasarea n teatru etc.) nu sunt n nici un caz suciente ntr-un conict de mic intensitate. Mediul de manifestare al unor astfel de conicte este foarte complex (elementele cu caracter politic, economic, religios, n centrul crora stau ideile de autoritate i legitimitate), innd seama de multitudinea de factori ce trebuie identicai pentru structurarea unei ct mai eciente strategii de combatere a adversarilor. Este, deci, eronat premisa conform creia, automat, capacitatea de a face fa unui rzboi convenional se aplic i forei militare implicate ntr-un rzboi neconvenional, cum este cel de mic intensitate15. Operaiunile eciente n CMI permit statelor superdezvoltate s ating obiective selectate, concomitent cu reducerea riscurilor ntr-o lume n care proliferarea armelor de distrugere n mas,
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a sistemelor de lansare a rachetelor, i a altor echipamente sosticate transform varianta unor rzboaie de medie i mare intensitate ntr-o alternativ neatractiv pentru decidenii raionali 16. n ultim instan, implicaiile politice se refer la faptul c decidenii militari trebuie s aib o relaionare ecient cu liderii politici din statul gazd. Acest fapt este mai vizibil n cazul operaiunilor militare pe care comunitatea internaional le ntreprinde n Irak i Aganistan. Analiznd eforturile privind nfrngerea insurgenei n Irak i a rebelilor talibani n Afganistan se poate arma faptul c este necesar o bun coordonare inter-instituional, n sensul unei eciente cooperri ntre autoritile politice ale statelor gazd i forele militare internaionale. Stingerea unui conict de mic intensitate nu are aceleai semnicaii precum cazul unor conicte clasice - care sunt de natur militar per se-, necesitnd acordarea unei atenii deosebite unor elemente de ordin politic, precum consolidarea autoritii i legitimitii politice, respectarea cutumelor locale legate de organizarea politic i religioas, caracterul leadership-ului, aciunile CIMIC i utilizarea ecient a mass media pentru obinerea sprijinului populaiei locale. Conictele de mic intensitate implic adesea identicarea clar a obiectivelor politice i elaborarea unei strategii generale care necesit sprijinul forelor militare pentru atingerea respectivelor obiective. De aici rezult, practic, imperativul unei bune cooperri la nivelul CIMIC, cu att mai mult cu ct controlul violenei n cadrul unui conict de mic intensitate nu implic ntotdeauna exclusiv o soluie militar unic. Concluzii n viitoarele conicte militare se vor ntreptrunde att aspecte ale conictelor de mic intensitate, dar i ale conictelor militare clasice. La nivel global se observ tendina de transformare a rzboaielor de mare intensitate n conicte de mic intensitate, n special n statele n care este necesar un complex proces de reconstrucie post-conict (e.g. Irak, Afganistan). Aspectul asimetric i cel nonconvenional al luptei sunt elemente pregnante n cadrul conictelor de mic intensitate. Acestea determin translatarea accentului de la utilizarea unor tactici general aplicabile ctre ideea de adaptare la tacticile de lupt ale adversarului i adoptarea unor tactici precum cea a luptei n oglind. Dei unele aspecte ale operaiunilor militare convenionale pot adaptate la un conict de mic intensitate, sunt multe altele care cer reorganizarea forelor, echipamentelor i tacticilor, precum i adaptarea regulilor de angajare. Conictele de mic intensitate nu au soluii rapide, ele avnd origini culturale, religioase i istorice complexe, n care preponderente sunt tacticile de lupt asimetrice. n cadrul conictelor de medie i mare intensitate, forele militare contribuie prin aciuni directe la ndeplinirea obiectivelor strategice, iar pentru denirea acestor obiective se utilizeaz concepte de natur militar; prin contrast, n cazul conictelor
de mic intensitate, obiectivele strategice au mai degrab un caracter politico-militar, fora militar ind doar una din componentele utilizate pentru atingerea obiectivelor. Dei obiectivele celor dou tipuri de conicte (de mare i mic intensitate) pot identice, totui mijloacele de ndeplinire a acestor obiective difer.

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Utilizarea forei militare este doar una dintre componentele strategiei generale aplicate n cadrul conictelor de mic intensitate. Aspectele economice, politice, diplomatice i informaionale completeaz o abordare integrat privind managementul conictului.
NOTE
1 Field Circular Low-Intensity Conflict, FC 10020, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth/Kansas, May 30, 1986, p.V, n Jochen Hippler, Low intensity warfare and its implications for NATO, 1988 - www.jochen-hippler. de/Aufsatze/low-intensity_conflict 2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Official Dictionary of Military Terms, JCS Pub 1-02, Second Edition, Irvine, CA, Global Professional Publications, 1992, p. 212. 3 Major Eric N. Nyberg, USMC, Insurgency: The Unsolved Mystery, 1991, p. 4. Nyberg preia aceast definiie din Field Manual (US Army) 10020, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict: (4: 2-0), Washington DC: Headquarters Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 1990. AAP-6 (2004) - NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. 6 7 8

ibidem, p.53. Ibidem, capitolul 3.

USSOCOM Fact Sheet, nedatat, decembrie 1996, citat n Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operation Forces in Action: the challenge of unconventional warfare, Routledge (UK), 1998, p. 15.
9 Field Circular Low-Intensity Conflict,FC 100-20, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth/Kansas, May 30, 1986, p.V, n Jochen Hippler, Low intensity warfare and its implications for NATO, 1988 - www.jochenhippler.de/Aufsatze/low-intensity_conflict 10 Low Intensity Conflict Specific Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), disponibil la http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/ 1990/90-9/9093ch2.htm 11 Low Intensity Conflict Specific Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), disponibil la http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/ 1990/90-9/9093ch2.htm 12 Vladi Sofroniev, Conflictele de joas intensitate, n Impact Strategic, Nr. 3/2005.

Low Intensity Conflict Lessons Learned, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/ call/call_90-4_llp1.htm

13 14 15 16

Dr. Daniel Marston, Force Structure for Highand Low-Intensity Warfare: The Anglo-American Experience and Lessons for the Future, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, p. 8, studiu disponibil la http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/ 2004_05_25_papers/force_structure.doc
4 5 E. Bdlan, T.Frunzeti, Aciunile militare altele dect rzboiul, Ed. Militar, Bucureti, 2001, p.51.

Ibidem.
Vladi Sofroniev, op.cit.

David Isenberg, Special Forces: Shock Troops for the New Order, n Middle East Report, No.177, Aug. 1992, p.24.

SUMMARY
This paper aims at setting a conceptual framework for the analyses of the low intensity conicts (LIC), providing a set of denitions of this concept and commentaries regarding the nature of this kind of conicts and their implications for the features of warfare in the 21st century. The paper also provides some denitions of the subcategories of low intensity conict, e.g. insurgency, counterinsurgency, special operations and military operations other than war. The analysis then focuses on the political and military inferences of the low intensity conicts on security in post-conict rehabilitation process (rules of engagement, the inuence on intelligence gathering, the role of technology in preparing the theatre of operations).

Drago Alexandru Bnescu holds a B.A. in Political Sciences and a M.A. in International Relations and Conict Management. He is also a research assistant in security studies and defence policy. His main areas of interest are international security, strategic studies, international relations, security strategies and conict analyses.

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Strategii de securitate post-Rzboi Rece

Bogdan Sgrcitu
Globalizarea i securitatea naional n era post-Rzboi Rece Globalizarea a avut i are un impact puternic asupra problematicii securitii naionale. Cum am artat, att teoretic ct i practic, conceptul de securitate naional a dobndit, n era post-Rzboi Rece, un caracter holistic1. Securitatea neleas strict militar a devenit depit, structurarea instituional i acional n acest domeniu nregistrnd modicri substaniale. Pe de o parte au acionat forele multiple dezlnuite de schimbarea sistemic post-Rzboi Rece de la bipolarism la multipolarism i uni-multipolarism, iar pe de o alt parte, manifestarea fenomenului globalizrii a adus schimbri mentalitilor dar i mediului nconjurtor sub toate nfirile lui. Ne propunem s vedem cum a fost perceput la nivel teoretic impactul schimbrii sistemice i a aciunii forelor globalizrii n abordarea problematicii securitii. Pasul urmtor este s studiem cum aciunea practic s-a subordonat noilor unghiuri de vedere i perspectivelor deschise de noile teorii, comparativ cu cele ale perioadei Rzboiului Rece. Cu alte cuvinte, vom cerceta binomul teorie practic n era post-Rzboi Rece n cmpul securitii. Pentru a ne atinge scopul urmrit vom recurge la rezumri ale principalelor orientri teoretice evidente ca impact n cmpul aciunii practice. n acelai timp, vom apela la comparaii ntre strategiile de securitate naional recente ale unor actori mari i mici/ mijlocii care s evidenieze tendinele lor de evoluie. Comparaiile ntreprinse servesc la punerea n eviden a schimbrilor aprute n domeniul politicilor de securitate la nivel mondial. Noi ameninri n era post-Rzboi Rece n perioada Rzboiului Rece paradigma securitii era caracterizat prin stabilitate, punndu-se accent pe supravieuirea i orientarea superputerilor de a-i promova i implementa propriile valori i interese ntrun sistem bipolar, iar strategia descurajrii nucleare a avut poate cel mai important rol n acest sistem de securitate. Procesele globalizrii au modicat considerabil modul de abordare a securitii. Aspectele non-zice ale securitii, diversicarea ameninrilor i importana pstrrii identitii, sunt doar cteva efecte importante n ce privete securitatea internaional post-Rzboi Rece. Aceste efecte se reect n asumarea anumitor orientri politice interne i externe de ctre state. n primul rnd, globalizarea induce interpenetrarea problemelor interne i externe, astfel nct guvernele naionale opereaz n spaii denite de intersectarea intereselor de securitate intern i extern. Ameninrile devin transnaionale, dar pericolul militar transnaional pierde din importan. n al doilea rnd, globalizarea exercit presiuni suplimentare asupra guvernelor care trebuie s gseasc un rspuns adecvat. Statul interacioneaz cu actori non-statali i trans-statali, ceea ce determin un grad nalt de complexitate a relaiilor internaionale. n al treilea rnd, globalizarea face calculul capacitilor relative ale statului, aa numita tradiional

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balan a puterii, s poarte un caracter complex, non-linear i uneori impredictibil. n sfrit, globalizarea modic natura rzboiului i face ca modelele pe larg acceptate de gndire strategic i deterrence raional s e desuete i tot mai puin relevante, mai ales, n ce privete noii actori ai politicii mondiale2. Exist noiuni utilizate n anii 90 n domeniul securitii, precum extinderea democraiei, angajare selectiv i preempiune, care sunt mai degrab efecte ale sfritului Rzboiului Rece dect ale globalizrii. Concepte precum caracterul perimat al rzboiului i securitate nonmilitar, statele paria nu sunt prezentate ca avnd ca prim cauz globalizarea, dei sunt clar legate de acest proces. Totodat, rspndirea informaiei i tehnologiei crete exponenial pericolul unor noi ameninri, de natur transnaional, precum rspndirea armelor de distrugere n mas i a substanelor sionabile pentru fabricarea lor, iar globalizarea face ca tehnologia necesar s e uor accesibil. La cellalt capt al spectrului globalizare securitate pot plasate reelele extremiste i fundamentaliste, care au capacitatea de a se organiza transnaional i de a utiliza tactici teroriste care sunt puternic ntrite de globalizarea tehnologiei i a informaiei3. Ameninri transnaionale Emergena exponenial a ameninrilor transnaionale a indus percepia c noiunea de suveranitate naional e depit, deoarece aceste ameninri afecteaz comunitile i indivizii dincolo de frontierele statale. Este evident c nici un stat nu poate funciona izolat n ziua de astzi. Mai mult, indiferent de mrime, statele nu-i pot asigura singure securitatea datorit gradului crescut de interconectivitate (globalizare) i aciunii transfrontiere a ameninrilor. De aceea, teoreticienii au nceput s chestioneze relevana opiunilor de securitate centrate pe stat i s propun abordri alternative. Ameninrile transnaionale, denite ca riscuri non-militare, care amenin integritatea politic i social sau bunstarea i sntatea unei naiuni sunt deja o certitudine. Cele mai elocvente exemple de ameninri transnaionale sunt terorismul, reelele criminale transnaionale, tracul de arme, persoane, substane interzise i droguri, migraia ilegal, bolile infecioase, degradarea mediului etc. Aceste ameninri nu reprezint neaprat o provocare pentru suveranitatea teritorial a unui stat, ci mai degrab sunt o provocare pentru autoritatea statal i eciena guvernrii. Distribuia inegal a resurselor, defriarea pdurilor i epuizarea resurselor naturale, pan-ideologii fundamentaliste sau extremiste, probleme identitare i chiar statele falimentare pot reprezenta ameninri transnaionale. Toate acestea risc s devin, n combinaie sau chiar individual, ameninri primare deopotriv pentru securitatea individual, autoritatea/legitimitatea statal i frontierele naionale recunoscute internaional. Mai mult, provocrile locale la adresa securitii naionale se disemineaz rapid i pot cpta un caracter regional sau chiar global datorit interdependenelor aprute la aceste niveluri. Spre deosebire de provocrile tradiionale la adresa securitii, ameninrile transnaionale se insinueaz treptat i adesea nu primesc un rspuns concentrat sau timpuriu. De asemenea, abordarea ameninrilor transnaionale impune att un rspuns intern, ct i extern, ceea ce readuce n discuie problema relaiilor internaionale ale statelor. Adesea, n plan intern supraveghetorii acestor ameninri sunt ocialii non-militari din executiv, iar n cel extern ocialii militari. Aceast situaie paradoxal prin prisma tradiional se explic
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prin faptul c utilizarea forei ar nsemna doar un rspuns parial i adesea neadecvat la acest tip de ameninri cu caracter dispersat. Un rspuns militar, spre exemplu, mpotriva organizaiilor criminale ar nsemna un rspuns supradimensionat, inecient i costisitor, deoarece combaterea unor organizaii cu caracter de reea cere cu predilecie folosirea altor mijloace dect cele militare. Existena frontierelor ntre state are serioase implicaii din punctul de vedere al legalitii efortului de combatere i eradicare a ameninrilor transnaionale. Pe lng cooperarea ntre ageniile specializate interstatale cu caracter non-militar, statele sunt nevoite s dezvolte structuri non-militare cu caracter de sprijin al activitii forelor armate. Ele ar putea asigura transportul, ajutorul medical de urgen i chiar sprijinul acordat pentru interceptarea diferitor forme de trac, combaterea consecinelor unor fenomene ecologice, dar ar putea avea i contribuii n domeniul strngerii de informaii. Dezvoltarea n era post-Rzboi Rece a aciunilor de peace-keeping i peaceenforcement, precum i a celor de nationbuilding i post-conict rehabilitation arat n mod persuasiv aceast cerin a structurrii moderne a forelor de securitate ale statelor. Noi paradigme teoretice: constructivismul i neo-liberalismul n era Rzboiului Rece, teoria relaiilor internaionale a fost dominat de trei paradigme realism, liberalism i structuralism iar dezbaterea ntre aderenii lor a creat impresia c modalitile de abordare a relaiilor internaionale au fost epuizate. Sfritul Rzboiului Rece a impus ns dou direcii teoretice majore. Dezbaterea ntre neo-realism i neo-liberalism, conturat de multiplicarea unghiurilor de nelegere a sistemului mondial odat cu manifestarea tot mai clar a globalizrii i a aciunii actorilor non-statali, pare s fost ctigat de cei din urm. Pozitivismul ca baz metodologic a realismului a fost semnicativ subminat de noile dezvoltri n tiinele sociale, iar partizanii instituionalismului neo-liberal au crescut semnicativ ca pondere n literatura de specialitate. Paradigma neo-liberal, evident dup sfritul Rzboiului Rece i accentuarea fenomenului globalizrii, se caracterizeaz prin existena unor voci diferite n interiorul liberalismului tradiional. n interiorul paradigmei neo-liberale exist trei abordri distincte: internaionalismul neo-liberal, neoidealismul i instituionalismul neo-liberal. Internaionalismul neo-liberal, sau teza pcii democratice, arm c statele liberale nu se rzboiesc ntre ele. Acest lucru nu nseamn c statele liberale nu sunt energice/ agresive cnd este vorba despre alte state cu regimuri autocratice sau entiti non-statale4. Explicaia cea mai des ntlnit pentru teza pcii democratice este c statele liberale, ind bogate, ar avea mai puin de ctigat de pe urma unui rzboi dect un stat cu regim autocratic, de regul mai srac. O alt explicaie pune accentul pe faptul c ntr-un regim liberal-democratic decizia declanrii unui rzboi aparine cetenilor, ceea ce face conictele mai puin frecvente dect n cazul unui regim autocratic. O a treia explicaie este c statele democratice pur i simplu tind s e n relaie de amiciie unele fa de altele5. Internaionalismul neo-liberal a produs ideea sfritului istoriei6, care celebreaz triumful liberalismului. Articolul i ulterior cartea lui Fukuyama despre sfritul istoriei a avut un impact major, furniznd legitimitate ideilor de exportare a valorilor liberale n toate statele i fundamentnd conceptul de intervenie umanitar. La nivel politic, statele puternice din sistemul internaional ar capabile s utilizeze constrngeri instituionale pentru a implica state nonliberale n ordinea politic a statelor liberale.

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Neo-idealismul i internaionalismul neo-liberal au o viziune comun asupra angajamentului n privina formelor democratice de guvernare i credina c interdependena face rzboiul tot mai improbabil. Neo-idealitii nu consider ns pacea i dreptatea ca ind condiii naturale, ci rezultatul unei activiti deliberate. n consecin, este nevoie ca sistemul internaional s e reformat spre transparen i democraie att la nivelul statelor, ct i la nivelul instituiilor internaionale. Globalizarea poate aduce anarhie etic i decdere a valorilor tradiionale, ceea ce conduce la o agend diferit n ce privete politica global. Primul loc pe aceast agend este democratizarea politicii globale7. Held susine c ordinea westphalic a devenit neadecvat, iar ca rezultat al sfritului Rzboiului Rece un numr important de state au nceput un proces intens de democratizare. Totui, societatea internaional a statelor rmne blocat n acelai sistem generator de anarhie. Astfel, n locul unor modele westphalice ale politicii globale (ONU, de exemplu), Held propune un model cosmopolitan al democraiei, cu parlamente regionale. n al doilea rnd, drepturile omului ar trebui s e monitorizate de o nou Curte Internaional pentru Drepturile Omului. n al treilea rnd, reforma propus a ONU sau nlocuirea acestei organizaii cu un parlament global reprezentativ i responsabil ar elimina anarhia wetsphalic. Instituionalismul neo-liberal, reprezentat de cteva vrfuri, cum ar R. Keohane i J. Nye, propune o ntoarcere la abordarea centrat pe stat n analiza politicii mondiale. Unul dintre principiile de baz ale instituionalismului neoliberal este acela c actorul-stat reprezint n mod legitim societatea. Existena anarhiei n relaiile internaionale nu poate evitat, dar regimurile internaionale i instituiile internaionale pot diminua considerabil anarhia. De asemenea, n viziunea lor, creterea integrrii la nivel regional i global este primordial (evoluia Uniunii Europene este un test vital). Paradigma constructivist pune accentul n studierea politicii mondiale att pe sensurile pe care actorii le dau aciunilor lor, ct i pe identitatea acestor actori. Cei mai cunoscui exponeni ai constructivismului sunt F. Kratochwil, A. Wendt i P. Katzenstein. Studiul lui A. Wendt din 1992, intitulat Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of World Politics (dezvoltat mai apoi n lucrarea Social theory of international politics, aprut n anul 1999) rmne central pentru aceast orientare teoretic. Wendt susine c: 1. Dezbaterea neo-realism vs. neoliberalism este central n relaiile internaionale, ind concentrat n special pe ideea c aciunea statului este inuenat mai mult de structura sistemului (neo-realism) sau c este inuenat mai mult de procese, interaciuni i de dinamica instituiilor (neoliberalism). 2. Att neo-realismul ct i neo-liberalismul sunt teorii raionaliste, bazate pe teoriile alegerii raionale i consider identitile i interesele actorilor ca de la sine nelese. Pentru ambele teorii, actorii sunt state egoiste. 3. Teoriile reectiviste sau constructiviste se concentreaz pe modul n care practicile relaionale ntre actori rezult n identiti i interese care sunt formate n procesul interaciunii. Cu alte cuvinte, suntem ceea ce suntem prin felul n care interacionm i nu indiferent de aceasta. 4. Identitile i interesele au caracter relaional i sunt denite n funcie de situaie. Instituiile reprezint seturi relativ stabile de identiti i interese. Auto-ajutorarea este o asemenea instituie, dar nu este unicul mod de combinare a deniiilor identitilor i intereselor n condiii de anarhie.
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5. Nu exist o dilem a securitii automat pentru state. 6. Dac statele se a ntr-o situaie de autoajutorare, aceasta este din cauza comportamentului lor, iar schimbndu-se comportamentul statelor se va schimba i sistemul. Totui, aceasta nu implic ideea c sistemul bazat pe autoajutorare, ca orice alt sistem social, poate schimbat uor. 7. Agenda viitoare de cercetare pentru relaiile internaionale ar trebui s constea n analiza a ceea ce fac i ceea ce sunt actorii internaionali. Cu alte cuvinte, disciplina relaiilor internaionale ar trebui s analizeze modul n care actorii denesc sistemul internaional. Wendt consider c acesta este aspectul n care neo-liberalii i constructivitii pot colabora pentru a oferi o paradigm a relaiilor internaionale care ar n competiie cu paradigma neo-realist. Astfel, ideea principal a constructivismului este c identitile i interesele pe care paradigmele raionaliste le consider reti nu sunt de fapt de la sine nelese, ci sunt create de noi. Aa cum le-am creat, tot aa le putem schimba. Analiza comparativ a Strategiilor de Securitate ale SUA, NATO i UE O comparaie ntre strategiile de securitate ale SUA (2006), UE (2003), precum i conceptul strategic al NATO (1999) analizeaz viziunile strategice a trei dintre cei mai importani actori la ora actual n plan mondial. Chiar dac NATO este o alian politico-militar multinaional, iar UE un actor rezultat n urma unui proces de integrare nc nenalizat ca ntindere i profunzime, viziunile lor strategice sunt importante pentru c au o pondere i un impact semnicative, dac nu decisive, asupra mediului internaional contemporan. Comparaia efectuat trebuie s ia n considerare, ntre altele, i faptul c n NATO i UE sunt muli actori care fac parte din ambele organizaii, iar SUA este aliatul cu ponderea cea mai nsemnat n NATO. ndeobte se vorbete de legtura transatlantic, ceea ce desemneaz teoretic o identitate de orientare a celor trei actori analizai. Actorii consacrai i-au asumat n perioada post-Rzboi Rece o evoluie pronunat autonom, iar cteva exemple de comportament ale actorilor internaionali pot exemplica acest lucru: reticena SUA de a face apel la NATO imediat dup 11 Septembrie 2001, dar i atitudinea UE (ori cel puin a unei pri a acesteia) n 2003 fa de al doilea Rzboi din Golf8. Comparaia ntreprins trebuie s in cont de cteva diferene specice: n primul rnd, avem strategia SUA foarte recent (emis la 16 martie 2006 de administraia Bush), cea a UE, relativ recent, (din 12 decembrie 2003), i un Concept Strategic, cel al NATO, adoptat n 1999, aadar nainte de 11 septembrie 2001. n al doilea rnd, strategia SUA este o obligaie legal a oricrei noi administraii americane, Conceptul Strategic al NATO este o readaptare a celui din 1991, iar strategia UE este prima de acest gen. n al treilea rnd, strategia SUA este naional i prezint un program detaliat al politicii externe i de securitate, n vreme ce celelalte dou documente (ale NATO i UE) sunt mai degrab concepte strategice dect strategii, tinznd s reecte cel mai mic numitor comun n domeniu al membrilor ce le constituie. n nal, comparaia ntreprins vizeaz postura din care este evaluat (global sau regional) mediul de securitate, ameninrile i ordinea internaional i politica regional, lsnd n afar analizei aspectele tehnice legate de promovarea politicilor, dezvoltarea forelor armate etc.

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Mediul de securitate. Conceptul Strategic NATO adopt un perimetru mai amplu al securitii, care implic extinderea cooperrii i parteneriatului militar (n special sunt menionate Rusia, Ucraina i regiunea mediteranean), Aliana ind deschis unor noi membri i colaborrii cu alte organizaii internaionale. Aceast abordare este un reex al sfritului Rzboiului Rece i, deopotriv, al emergenei, n condiiile globalizrii, a conceptului securitii cooperative. Strategia de Securitate a Statelor Unite asum pentru SUA rolul de lider global angajat n rspndirea libertii i democraiei n lume (misiune global), i a luptei mpotriva tiraniei n Coreea de Nord, Iran, Siria, Cuba, Belarus, Myanmar (Birmania), Zimbabwe i a unui nou totalitarism echivalat cu radicalismul islamic. Scopul urmrit este sfritul tiraniilor. Promovarea drepturilor omului, libertii i democraiei a fost unul dintre pilonii centrali ai politicii de securitate americane de-a lungul mai multor ani9. Pentru strategia UE, referina cheie n abordarea mediului de securitate este integrarea european, care a transformat relaiile dintre state. Strategia conchide c Europa nu a fost niciodat mai prosper, mai liber i mai n siguran. Scopul urmrit este acela c UE trebuie s-i asume responsabilitatea pentru securitatea global i construirea unei lumi mai bune. Conceptul Strategic al NATO i Strategia de Securitate a UE exprim interesele globale ale acestora prin referinele fcute la adresa securitii globale10, dar extensia intereselor rmne doar regional (incluznd Orientul Mijlociu). UE pune accentul pe securitatea n vecintatea noastr i se pronun pentru abordri multilaterale la problemele de securitate internaional, prin parteneriat i colaborare cu organizaiile internaionale. Conceptul Strategic al NATO se concentreaz pe mediul de securitate euroatlantic i limiteaz Aliana la un actor regional o instituie indispensabil securitii spaiului euro-atlantic, care are drept scop asigurarea securitii i libertii membrilor si. SUA, dimpotriv, se denete drept campionul aspiraiilor pentru demnitate uman, aadar de anvergur global; iar UE se pregtete pentru a asuma o responsabilitate pentru securitatea global i construirea unei lumi mai bune. n poda aspiraiilor globale exprimate, UE rmne, totui, limitat ca aciune n afara frontierelor sale. Percepia ameninrilor Percepia ameninrilor este, pentru Uniunea European, SUA i NATO, n general similar. Conceptul Strategic al Alianei NordAtlantice scoate n eviden patru ameninri, n urmtoarea ordine: La adresa stabilitii generale a spaiului euro-atlantic generate de rivalitile etnice i religioase, disputele teritoriale, reformele euate sau inadecvate, nclcrile drepturilor omului i disoluia statelor. Proliferarea armelor de distrugere n mas. Proliferarea tehnologiei militare. Terorismul, sabotajul, crima organizat. Strategia Naional a SUA menioneaz urmtoarele ameninri: Terorismul. Tiraniile, statele care ncalc n mod agrant principiile democraiei, drepturile i libertile omului i ceteanului. Proliferarea armelor de distrugere n mas. Conictele regionale. Rspndirea bolilor epidemice. Tracul de droguri, ine umane, arme. Catastrofele naturale ca urmare a activitii umane sau dezastrele naturale de proporii: cutremure de pmnt, tsunami etc.
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Strategia de Securitate European menioneaz cinci ameninri: Terorismul. Proliferarea armelor de distrugere n mas. Conicte regionale. Statele falimentare. Crima organizat. Toate strategiile scot n eviden legtura dintre terorism, crim organizat i proliferarea armelor de distrugere n mas. Dat ind faptul c documentul Conceptului Strategic al NATO a fost lansat nainte de 11 septembrie 2001, acesta este mai puin specic n privina terorismului internaional. Att strategia american, ct i cea european relaioneaz terorismul cu extremismul religios violent. UE i NATO percep ameninrile ca ind generate i din interiorul spaiului lor (n acelai timp i int i baz pentru terorism i crima organizat). Strategia de Securitate a SUA pune accentul pe faptul c ameninrile vin din exteriorul SUA. Att pentru Uniunea European, ct i pentru SUA proliferarea armelor de distrugere n mas este socotit o ameninare de prim ordin n strns legtur cu terorismul i crima organizat. Nu att ordinea n care sunt testate ameninrile impuse n comparaia efectuat este important pentru demersul nostru dei aceasta este esenial n elaborarea strategiilor , ct cvasi-similitudinea de percepie a celor trei actori, evident, cu nuanele semnalate. Aceasta este o concluzie logic ce putea anticipat, ntruct exist strnse legturi ntre actorii considerai, actori ce exprim o comunitate de cultur strategic ce s-a dezvoltat n spaiul occidental. Percepia asupra ordinii mondiale i politicii regionale Pentru Aliana Nord-Atlantic, celelalte organizaii internaionale existente dau trsturi distincte mediului de securitate. ONU, OSCE, UE (i Uniunea Europei Occidentale) sunt menionate ca avnd o contribuie distinctiv la securitatea i stabilitatea spaiului euro atlantic. Consiliul de Securitate al ONU este creditat cu responsabilitatea fundamental de meninere a pcii i securitii internaionale. OSCE, considerat cea mai larg organizaie de securitate din Europa, are un rol important pentru promovarea pcii i stabilitii, democraiei i drepturilor omului. Din strategie reiese clar c evoluia PESC a UE va avea mari implicaii pentru Alian i c toi membrii NATO ce fac parte i din UE trebuie s participe la ea. Dezvoltarea parteneriatului dintre NATO i UE este parte a unei abordri mai largi a securitii n care contribuia Alianei la securitatea i stabilitatea spaiului euroatlantic i a altor organizaii internaionale este complementar i mutual consolidat. Se insist asupra faptului c NATO va rmne forumul principal n probleme de securitate i aprare n spaiul euro-atlantic, menionndu-se caracterul indispensabil al relaiei transatlantice ntre America de Nord i Europa pentru a susine valorile i interesele comune. Criticat pentru unilateralismul aciunilor pe arena internaional din strategia precedent, noua strategie american (2006) formuleaz o nou concepie a leadershipului global american. n situaia unic creat post-Rzboi Rece, n care nu exist diferende mari ntre actorii principali, SUA nu renun la metoda preempiunii de a rspunde pericolului terorismului. n centrul sistemului american de aliane se a comunitatea democraiilor care mprtesc aceleai valori i interese: rile membre NATO, Japonia, Australia, Coreea de Sud. NATO rmne un pilon vital al politicii externe a SUA i instrument de stabilitate i pace n afara granielor sale. Referitor la Europa, accentul este pus pe relaia special pe care SUA o are

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cu Marea Britanie. Rusia este numit partener cu care SUA are i interese comune, dar i interese diferite. Ea are o inuen n multe regiuni de interes vital pentru SUA (Europa, Orientul Apropiat i Mijlociu, Asia Central de Sud i de Est), dar accentul cade nu pe interesul geopolitic, ci pe evoluia intern a Rusiei, dezvoltarea instituiilor i libertilor democratice din aceast ar ind n pericol, dup cum se menioneaz n textul strategiei. Un alt semnal trimis Moscovei este acela c de atitudinea Rusiei fa de progresul democratic din vecintatea apropiat acesteia vor depinde n continuare evoluia relaiilor sale cu SUA i UE. Orientul Mijlociu Lrgit rmne regiunea prioritar pentru administraia de la Washington. SUA vor continua aciunile din Irak i Afganistan. Rezolvarea problemei palestiniene va depinde de capacitatea Hamas de a se include n procesul de negociere a pcii. Problema iranian va deveni n anii urmtori una acut. Un succes important al diplomaiei americane este restabilirea relaiilor de parteneriat strategic cu India. n regiunea Marelui Orient Mijlociu, SUA va continua parteneriatul cu aliaii tradiionali: Israel, Egipt, Arabia Saudit, Pakistan. Relaiile cu China dobndesc o alt perspectiv n raport cu precedenta strategie naional. SUA salut transformarea Chinei ntr-un actor dintre cei mai importani pe arena internaional i exprim sperana n sporirea transparenei militare i n rezolvarea problemei Taiwanului pe cale panic. SUA apreciaz c dezvoltarea economic a Chinei va duce treptat spre democratizarea sistemului politic intern, aa cum s-a ntmplat i n alte ri din Asia, ceea ce va duce i ctre un comportament responsabil din partea Chinei n arena mondial. Privitor la Organizaia Naiunilor Unite, SUA se pronun pentru reformarea acesteia din punctul de vedere al ecienei organizaionale pentru a rspunde noilor provocri ale securitii internaionale. Perspectiva regional din Strategia american reiese i din interesul pentru emisfera de Vest, o rearmare a tradiionalei Doctrine Monroe. Strategia pentru aceast regiune urmrete consolidarea relaiilor cu Canada i Mexic, ct i a celor strategice cu liderii regionali din America Central i de Sud. Strategia de Securitate a UE este diferit de cea a SUA, prin exprimarea principiului multilateralismului efectiv11 care prevede o societate internaional mai puternic, instituii internaionale mai funcionale i o ordine internaional fundamentat pe legi. Arhitectura internaional cuprinde i organizaii internaionale cum ar OMC, FMI, Consiliul Europei, ASEAN, MERCOSUR i Uniunea African. Centrul acestui sistem este ONU, iar ecientizarea activitii acestuia este prioritatea Uniunii Europene. Consiliul de Securitate al ONU are responsabilitatea fundamental pentru meninerea pcii i securitii internaionale. Este o abordare diferit de cea a SUA i nuanat mai apropiat de cea a Alianei Nord Atlantice. Reiese faptul c, n cazul NATO, conceptul strategic este rezultatul unei negocieri transatlantice i c, deopotriv, a fost conceput nainte de 9/11. Din perspectiv regional, UE este interesat de securitatea vecintii apropiate, n primul rnd de rezolvarea conictului arabo israelian. Alte regiuni pentru care UE i exprim interesul sunt: Balcanii, vecinii de la est, Caucazul de Sud i arealul mediteranean. Concluzii Cele trei strategii comparate evideniaz deopotriv similitudini i diferene (marcante ori minore). La similitudini este central percepia cvasi-identic a ameninrilor, ca rezultat al unei perspective asemntoare
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a comunitii de analiz. NATO i UE exprim aceeai poziie n ce privete indispensabilitatea parteneriatului transatlantic. SUA, fr a prsi unilateralismul, las loc larg multilateralismului, dar menine preempiunea ca posibilitate de aciune strategic. UE are ca obiectiv promovarea unui multilateralism efectiv, bazat pe solidaritate i asisten umanitar. NATO pune accentul pe exigenele de ordin militar i politic ale securitii, dar nu neglijeaz faptul c trebuie s e epuizate mai nti toate mijloacele pn la utilizarea celor militare. Cele trei strategii comparate evideniaz mutaiile fundamentale intervenite n conceptul de securitate n epoca post-Rzboi Rece12: - preeminena dimensiunii transnaionale a securitii ca rezultat al globalizrii; - imperativul gestionrii internaionale; - apariia preempiunii ca modalitate de aciune strategic n anihilarea ameninrilor transnaionale; - ciocnirea unipolarism multipolarism i unilateralism multilateralism ca trstur de baz a evoluiei relaiilor internaionale. Analiza comparativ a Strategiilor de Securitate ale unor state mici i mijlocii aate n subsisteme regionale de cooperare Ungaria, Cehia, i Slovacia pot considerate cazuri relevante pentru analiza opiunilor strategice ale statelor mici (i mijlocii) n domeniul securitii n era globalizrii. Statele alese pentru a demonstra schimbrile intervenite au numeroase trsturi comune, dar pun n eviden i diferene semnicative. Astfel, sunt state membre (recent incluse) ale Uniunii Europene, au dimensiuni teritoriale i poteniale demograce similare, sunt aate ntr-un continuu geograc situat ntr-o arie cultural istoric denumit Mitteleuropa de la care i revendic elementele de baz ale culturii politice. Aceste state au totui o istorie recent diferit, Cehia, Ungaria i Slovacia ind incluse dup al Doilea Rzboi Mondial n blocul comunist i avnd pe teritoriul lor o prezen militar sovietic pn la sfritul Rzboiului Rece. Aceast trstur de istorie recent, inclusiv divorul de catifea din 1993 ntre Cehia i Slovacia a determinat o abordare diferit a relaiilor cu instituiile spaiului Euro-Atlantic, Uniunea Europeana si NATO. Mai trebuie spus i c cele trei state au avut un traseu predominant comun dup 1989, ind iniial (1990) membre ale grupului Viegrad (mpreun cu Polonia) iar apoi ind (mai puin Slovacia) constant pe aceeai linie n efortul de aderare la instituiile de securitate euroatlantice. Analiza comparativ a ameninrilor n cazul celor trei state este fcut n baza strategiilor de securitate ale Cehiei (2002), Slovaciei (2005) i Ungariei (2004) adoptate aadar dup aderarea la NATO, i concomitent, sau nainte de, ori dup aderarea la UE ct i a unor studii de prol publicate de analiti cehi, slovaci i unguri n domeniul de referin. De la bun nceput trebuie s spunem c, chiar dac fondul problemelor ameninrilor este identic, n ceea ce privete prezentarea lor este diferit. Astfel, strategia Cehiei prezint clar ameninrile cu care se confrunt att la nivel global, ct i la nivel naional, Ungaria le listeaz mai mult n calitate de provocri globale, regionale i interne, iar n cazul Slovaciei, nu este fcut o delimitare clar ntre provocri i ameninri. n cazul celor trei state central-europene, partea din strategie legat de ameninri i riscuri este aproape identic, practic cele trei state mprtind aceeai percepie asupra ameninrilor la adresa securitii lor (cu mici diferene specice). Acest lucru ne demonstreaz, pe de o parte, faptul c Cehia,

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Ungaria i Slovacia membre NATO i UE n mare parte se aliniaz modului de gndire al organizaiilor din care fac parte, dar i c elitele celor trei state resimt un destin comun (tradiional i contemporan). Astfel, terorismul, proliferarea armelor de distrugere n mas, conictele regionale i regiunile instabile, statele falimentare i crima organizat sunt ameninri care pot identicate n aceeai ordine a importanei n strategiile celor trei state central-europene, dar i n Strategia de Securitate a UE. Apare o deosebire de abordare a terorismului n cazul Cehiei, care este unica ar dintre cele trei care face o referin explicativ la pericolul real al unui atac terorist. Celelalte dou state, Ungaria i Slovacia, se refer la terorism n strns legtur cu procesul de globalizare, entitatea ameninat ind spaiul euro-atlantic. Ungaria este comparat chiar cu un copil cuminte care a copiat cuvnt cu cuvnt Strategia de Securitate a UE13. Explicaia cea mai la ndemn pentru frauda copierii strategiei UE n domeniu este c astfel se demonstreaz internaionalismul asumat n domeniul securitii, alinierea ind rezultatul adncirii cooperrii. Fr a exclude dorina/voina de a se vdi un copil cuminte a se observa i recentul proiect de Strategie de securitate naional a Romniei (aprilie 2006) care listeaz n aceeai ordine ameninrile , nu poate deloc trecut cu vederea c nsi faptul apartenenei la UE induce, cel puin teoretic, substanierea uniform a unui pachet identic de ameninri pentru toi membrii acestei organizaii. Toate cele trei strategii naionale au n comun, de asemenea, prezentarea ameninrilor la nivel global, cum ar dezechilibrul economic mondial, dezastrele naturale, industriale i epidemice. Ungaria i Slovacia identic n comun pentru acest nivel problema migraiei ilegale, ceea ce este explicabil prin faptul c, odat devenite membre ale Uniunii Europene, frontiera de Est a UE coincide cu graniele naionale ale celor dou state. Ambele state menioneaz c au devenit din state de tranzit, state care sunt obiect al migraiei ilegale, generate n special de ceteni ai statelor spaiului exsovietic. La nivelul global al ameninrilor, o particularitate o reprezint strategia Slovaciei, care vizeaz serviciile de informaii strine i dependena de resurse vitale. n acest caz ameninarea o reprezint tot spaiul exsovietic, n special serviciul de informaii rus i crima organizat din Rusia14. Explicaia este de gsit n experiena acestei ri. Astfel, un diplomat rus chiar a fost expulzat n mai 2004 din Slovacia pentru activiti incompatibile cu statutul su de diplomat. Dependena de resursele vitale se explic, n cazul Slovaciei, prin importul masiv i exclusiv de gaz i petrol din Rusia. n momentul de fa, Slovacia este unica ar membr a Grupului Viegrad al crei import de gaz i petrol (90%) este numai de provenien ruseasc. Tot Slovacia este pe locul doi (pe primul loc este Ucraina) dup volumul de petrol rusesc destinat Europei care tranziteaz teritoriul slovac15. n ceea ce privete ameninrile la nivel naional este interesant faptul c toate cele trei state central-europene listeaz extremismul politic i religios, xenofobia i rasismul. O explicaie se poate gsi n istoria recent, cele trei ri ind confruntate istoric cu regimuri fasciste: Cehia (ocupat de Germania nazist n 1938-1939), Slovacia (regimul Tiso), Ungaria (regimul amiralului Horthy). n prezent ele se confrunt cu forme de rasism, anti-semitism i extremism politic difuze. Cehia se mai confrunt cu problema organizaiilor sudete din Germania care reclam restituirea proprietilor i e foarte sensibil la orice act politic major ntreprins de fore extremiste n rile vecine (cum a fost venirea la putere a FP a lui Jrg Haider n Austria). Slovacia a depit recent
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o deriv ultranaionalist i xenofob, care a mpiedicat-o s adere la NATO alturi de celelalte state din Grupul Viegrad n 1999. Iar Ungaria adpostete poate una dintre cele mai numeroase micri skinhead din regiune. Fenomenul este prezent i n Cehia i Slovacia. Pericolul este cu att mai mare, cu ct aceste micri au fost contra rzboiului anti-terorist, iar atacurile antisemite ale acestora sunt n concordan cu cele ale naionalitilor extremiti islamici i palestinieni16. O alt problem cu care se confrunt Cehia i Slovacia este intolerana i tratamentul discriminatoriu aplicat minoritii rrome. Problemele comune la nivel naional ntre Ungaria i Cehia sunt cele legate de corupie, economia subteran, tracul cu droguri i crima organizat. Interesant este faptul c strategia slovac nu menioneaz problema corupiei printre ameninrile la adresa securitii statului slovac, dei Slovacia este unul dintre statele din regiune cu un grad nalt de corupie. Cehia este singura ar care menioneaz n strategie ameninarea proliferrii armelor i a materialelor cu utilizare dual. Principala concluzie a acestui studiu comparativ este c noile state membre UE i NATO i formuleaz strategiile dup paradigmele folosite de organizaiile din care fac parte. Ameninrile sunt percepute, cu mici excepii, la fel de toate cele trei state central-europene.

Tabel: Percepia ameninrilor din perspectiva Strategiilor de Securitate a Cehiei, Slovaciei i Ungariei
Ungaria Nivel Global Terorism Proliferare ADM Regiuni instabile State n criz Crim organizat Slovacia Nivel Global Terorism Proliferare ADM Conflicte regionale State n criz Crim organizat Creterea influenei actorilor non-statali Dezechilibru economic Dependena de resurse vitale Dezastre naturale Migraie ilegal i necontrolabil Vulnerabilitatea sistemelor informatice i de comunicaie Servicii de securitate strine Nationalism radical Nivel naional Republica Ceh Nivel Global Terorism Proliferare ADM Conflicte regionale State n criz Crim organizat

Instabilitate economic

Corupie Dezechilibru Nord Sud

Riscuri civilizaionale Riscuri naturale Riscuri sanitare Migraie ilegal Provocri ale societii informaionale

Inclzire global Epidemii Accidente industriale

Nivel naional Crim organizat Rspndirea drogurilor Economia subteran, corupia Extremism politic i religios

Extremism politic i religios

Nivel naional Terorism Crim organizat Migraia ilegal Traficul de droguri Corupia i criminalitatea economic Xenofobia, rasism i extremism politic Proliferarea armelor ilegale i a materialelor cu utilizare dual

Provocri demografice

Dezvoltri demografice dezechilibrate

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Concluzii Globalizarea a indus att teoretic, ct i practic percepia unei securiti naionale/ internaionale holistice i trans-naionale. Nici un stat nu se poate apra singur n faa masivitii ameninrilor transnaionale. Cooperarea n domeniul securitii a devenit imperativ. S-a nscut un concept, al securitii cooperative, care nseamn, printre alte aspecte, gestionare n comun, la ealon regional, a problematicii securitii. Dezvoltarea securitii cooperative a presupus i a coincis cu o tendin sistemic semnicativ, a integrrii economice, politice i de securitate la nivel regional. Cazul UE este cel mai vizibil pentru aceast tendin, dar ASEAN, NAFTA sau Pactul Andin i Mercosur previzioneaz evoluii asemntoare. Nu trebuie neglijat i o alt tendin evideniat la nivel sistemic, anume cea a interveniei de tip umanitar, ceea ce semnic o depire a ncorsetrii westphalice17 i un curs ascendent al gestionrii internaionale a securitii. Rspunderea pentru securitatea internaional este neleas asimetric, n poda schimbrilor integrate sistemic. Marii actori dezvolt n poda constrngerilor sus amintite agende de securitate proprii, n care imperativul de cooperare al globalizrii este restrictiv (regional continent, emisfer). Aadar nu sunt excluse contradicii, viziuni diferite (multilateralism versus unilateralism) cu inuena neaprat asupra relaiilor internaionale viitoare i gestionrii globale a securitii. Actorii mijlocii/mici nfieaz, n contextul securitii cooperative, o izbitoare similitudine de percepie a ameninrilor i de identicare a strategiilor optime, rezultat al constrngerilor geopolitice i geoeconomice, care faciliteaz asocierea i colaborarea. Marii actori joac global, iar cei mijlocii i mici (mai ales) local i cel mult regional. O aliniere a acestora din urm la opiunile marilor entiti integrante este observabil, reasc i de viitor. Instituiile internaionale de securitate au dobndit un rol tot mai vizibil, att n privina legitimrii aciunilor internaionale pentru stabilitate/securitate, ct i relativ la desfurarea de facto a acestora (planicare, nanare, gestionare). Reforma acestor instituii pentru acomodarea la noile realiti ale binomului globalizare/securitate internaional este esenial.

NOTE
1

Mihail E. Ionescu, Strategii de securitate

naional n era post - Rzboi Rece, Note de curs, SNSPA, 2006.

2

Victor D. Cha, Globalization and the Study

of International Relations, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no. 7, May, 2000.
3

Ibidem, p.392-393. Michael W. Doyle, On the Democratic Peace,

International Security, vol. 19, no. 4, 1995.

5

T. Dunne, Liberalism, n J. Baylis, i S.

Smith, (ed.), The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001.
6

Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and

the Last Man, Macmillan, New York, 1992.

7

David Held, Democracy: From City-states to

a Cosmopolitan Order, n D. Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993.
8

Cristina Romila, Strategia de securitate a

UE in contextul euroatlantic, pe www.sarindar.ro/ articles/00013.htm

9

Ivo H. Daalder, Statement on the 2006 NSS,

The Brooking Institution, 16 martie, 2006, pe www. brookings.edu/views/op-ed/daalder/20060316nss.htm

10

Mark Leonard i Richard Gowan, Global

Europe. Implementing the European Security Strategy, pe www.fpc.org.uk/fsblob/187.pdf

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11

Manca, Daniela, Follow up to the European

www.bmlv.gv.at/wissen-forschung/publikationen/ publikation.php?id=245
14

Security Strategy: Effective Multilateralism, n European Security Review, 23, iulie 2004, pe www.isis-europe.org/ftp/download/ESR%2023Effective%20Multilateralism.pdf
12

Luk Fila, SIS to crack down on foreign spies,

mafia, n The Slovak Spectator, vol.9, no.25, pe www.slovakspectator.sk/clanok-13199.html

15

Mihail E. Ionescu, op.cit. Lszl Pti i Judit Takcs, The Case

Simon Analoff, Slovak Backland of Polish

13

Attack on Putins Position, n AXIS din 7 martie 2006, pe www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=717

16

of Schizophrenic Musteknabe: Comparing the Hungarian and the European Security Strategy n The Security Strategies of the Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia in the Context of the European Security Strategy, Bratislava, 2005, pe

Jan

Munk,

Anti-semitism

and

Right-

Wing Extremism in the Czech Republic, pe www.osce.org/documents/sg/2003/06/249_en.pdf

17

Mihail E. Ionescu, op.cit.

SUMMARY
The main assertions of this paper focus on the effects of globalization upon national security. Globalization introduced, both practically and theoretically, the perception of a transnational and holistic security. There is no country in the world able to defend itself when facing the massive transnational threats. A new concept has been born, cooperative security, which means managing the national security issues in a common manner, on a regional level. This paper also presents a comparative analysis of the security strategies of the Unites States, the EU and NATO, as well as of Czekia, Slovakia, Hungary in order to confer a comprehensive assessment of the transformations within national security in the globalization era.

Bogdan Sgrcitu is currently director of external relations of Bechtel. Between 1999-2000, he was counselor of the Romanian Minister of Defence. He holds a PhD in political science and a MA degree at Sussex University, UK.

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Romanian Armed Forces Participation in Post-Conflict Military Actions. Case Study: Afghanistan
Lieutenant-Colonel Laureniu-Cristian Dumitru

Characteristics and typology of postconict military actions Romanian Armed Forces contribution to the multinational effort of stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan ts in the framework of post-conict military actions. The historical perspective demonstrated that the stages that come next after the conict require certain measures of managing the post-conict situation, of rehabilitating and reconstructing the state/area that supported, generated or induced the conict. The end of the Cold War also representing the end of the bipolar balance of power generated the (re)appearance of crisis situations that eventually led to armed conicts. Under such circumstances, certain general characteristics of the post-conict stage became visible, but also numerous particularities related to the geographic area, geopolitical implications, specicity and physionomy of the ended conicts, the various interests of the contending parts, the effects of the conicts on the region, the position of the power centers/poles and of the organizations involved in crisis management, but also to the appearance of new challenges, vulnerabilities, risks and threats1. The post-Cold War security environment was characterized by a recrudescence of instability, induced by the reconguring of the new security architecture in various areas of the globe2. The processes of both enlargement and complex transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance conferred it the necessary capabilities

for crisis and conict management, being able to promote stability both on the inside and the outside of the Euro-Atlantic area of responsibility. The proliferation of terrorism and of asymmetric conicts led to the start of the global ght against terrorism. The great strategic mutations of this stage required a series of actions in order to efciently tackle the new challenges and to supply viable solutions. The aim of these strategies concerns the global ght against terrorism and asymmetric threats, the decreasing of the conictual state, the prevention of military conicts and the successful unfolding of post-conict actions, including military ones. From a practical point of view, the post-conict stage has numerous particularities caused by the concrete conditions that led to conict and by the attitudes of the involved parties/actors. The aspects related to the stabilization of an area are: defusing the conict, combating terrorism and trafcking, free elections, transfer of power to the local authorities and supporting them in the initiation and successful implementation of the democratic reconstruction, by all means. The actions from this stage are what we call operations of stabilization. In this phase, the role of the military is to assure optimal conditions for the state structures to become operational, to help the respective state constitute its own armed/security forces and to settle the existing rivalries among the parties that were previously involved in conict3.
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The post-conict military actions belong to the ensemble of actions from a theatre of operations with the purpose of solving armed conicts and ensuring the reconstruction of an area, under every aspect. Although they use from an operative and tactical perspective the same personnel and almost the same instruments, they differ from a strategic perspective by purposes, politicalmilitary objectives and specic manners of planning, organizing, projecting and supporting the forces, with or without the Host Nation Support (HNS) in the theatre of operations4. The post-conict strategy of rehabilitation has a series of prerequisite parameters: the correlation between the perception of the threat and the subsequent reaction, the adoption of an optimal model of post-conict rehabilitation and the afrmation of the solidarity among the participating states. Any desynchronization may lead to negative repercussions on the international stability and security5. The main objectives of the post-conict strategy are stabilization and prevention of armed hostilities in the areas that have been involved in conict. Usually, the post-conict military actions are unfolding in a frequently hostile environment, which induces a feeling of uncertainty to the military engaged in this kind of operations6. After the end of the conict, the strategy of functional readjustment of the state should not aim the maximal objectives of rehabilitation of the society, in the short run7. The analysis of the complexity of the objectives of post-conict rehabilitation, reconciliation and reconstruction imposes the harmonization of the relations between states and group of states, which confers substance to the actions of the international actors that participate in the reconstruction of states asking for support. The values that are shared and defended by the NATO and EU member states are the driving force behind such operations. The aspects related to the post-conict stage require the suspension of the hostilities and putting an end to the conict. The period after the end of the conict is as complex as the one who precedes it. Practice showed that the end of armed conicts marked a boost for terrorism and asymmetric threats, who must be combated with proper strategies and, implicitly, with (sometimes long-time) postconict military actions, which can be dened through a large range of demarches, means and operations achieved by collaboration of the involved parties and of the actors who manage the given situation. The dening conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of each specic theatre of operations points that the result of post-conict actions can be successfully implemented if the host nation/population manifests its will of getting involved and cooperate. The typology of post-conict military actions has certain characteristics related to the objectives, on one hand, and to the available means, resources and capabilities, on the other hand. Peace-making operations mostly require the use of diplomatic means in order to convince the contending parts to put to an end the hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful outcome. These operations function according to specic principles that refer to unity, safety, restriction, clarity of objectives, legitimacy, perseverance, proportional use of force, expanding conict prevention, diversity and complementarity of actions, exibility, noninstigation, transfer of power and authority to civilian structures. They have two essential components: stabilization operations and peace support operations8. Usually, both of them function together, as a whole. Peacekeeping operations appeared and developed as a way of managing conicts

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by sending multinational military personnel in the area of interest in order to keep under control and settle the armed conict. These operations usually take place to tackle conict situations within the states. The missions of the peacekeeping forces under UN mandate vary from interposing among belligerent parties, collecting both light and heavy weaponry, distributing the humanitarian aid to the civilian population, to the establishment of contacts between the former combatant parties. They are the most frequent, most developed and most complex operations, having a very prominent preventive function9. social and military structures and to combat the asymmetric threats and the phenomenon of new terrorism11. The post-conict military actions are part of the international communitys crisis and conict management strategy through its organisms and organizations. The new challenges, vulnerabilities, risks and asymmetric threats should represent a priority and, therefore, they should be addressed in a participative and cooperative way, as factors of instability may leave an unsolved crisis to evolve into an armed conict. In the postCold War period, the types of armed conicts became more diverse, more numerous and more violent12. That is why, in parallel with preventive policies and strategies, the continuing development and use of post-conict strategies is needed, with the purpose of preparing the proper forces and means for post-conict military actions. Taking into consideration that some areas are traditionally conictual, their approach by the international community should be adapted to each case in order to stop the conicts while still incipient or to channel them to non-violent forms, thus adjusting the strategies of combating new threats, with a special emphasis on terrorism. Romanian Armed Forces participation in Afghanistan The case of Afghanistan, from the perspective of the above typology, is a mixture of all the enumerated models, which denotes not only the complexity of the post-conict military actions from this area, but also their extremely ambitious objectives. On October 7th, 2001, the US and British forces began the rst aerial strikes meant to annihilate the Taliban regime from Kabul.
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Peace enforcement/peace-implementation operations start off when the contending parts do not want to negotiate an end to the conict and continue the hostilities. Usually, in such situations, after exhausting all the means of reconciliation and after identifying the conict as a threat to international peace and security, the UN Security Council may authorize the legal use of force in order to impose/implement peace. This confers member states the authority to take all the appropriate measures, including the military ones, in order to implement the approved resolutions. The peace enforcement/peaceimplementation operations are organized and led by a state, a group of states, an alliance or a coalition and require the use of force10. Peace-building operations comprise the activities designed to help the nations to build and maintain peace after a conict has ended. For this kind of operations, the mandate is quite broad because of the implications generated by the reconstruction of a state. In the framework of peace-building operations, military and civilian components work closely together in order to minimize the vulnerabilities of the new political, economic,

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One month and a half later, on December 21st, 2001, the Romanian Parliament approved Romanian Armed Forces participation to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), at the request of the Romanian president, and empowered the government to choose the forces, means and nancing for this mission13. In this rst phase, Romanian contribution consisted in the following forces and means: a) 15 person military medical team with their own support in the theatre of operations, ensured by a C-130 Hercules aircraft. In the event of new requests, Romania committed itself to enlarge the team up to 20 military medical personnel; b) 1 NBC Company, made of 70 military personnel, which had to be transported by a third party, according to the outcome of the negotiations; c) 1 Military Police Platoon, made of 25 military personnel, extendable to 30, if necessary. Their transportation was ensured by a C-130 Hercules aircraft; d) 1 Company of 170 military personnel that was to become operational in 30 days after request. Four months later, on April 30th, 2002, the Romanian Parliament approved Romanias participation to the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) with the following means and forces14: a) 1 Infantry Battalion of 405 military personnel; b) 1 NBC Company of 70 military personnel; c) 10-person reserve in case Romania was requested to supplement its contribution with liaison and general staff elements. The central issue of the NATO summit in Istanbul, on June 28
th

in Afghanistan. The communiqu issued by the heads of state and government participating in the reunion of the North Atlantic Council ofcially acknowledges that the main priority of the Alliance is to obtain peace and stability in Afghanistan by consolidating a fully representative multiethnic government. In order to successfully face this challenge, NATO will act in two directions: the strengthening of the military effectives and the creation of several more Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In practice, the Council decided that the Alliance would supplement the effectives of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) functioning under UN mandate with 3500 military personnel, out of which 1300 will be stationed outside Afghanistan and will be deployed only in cases of emergency. Therefore, if the ISAF comprised, until that moment, 6,500 military personnel, after the Istanbul summit it reached 10,000. ISAF also committed to expand its presence from the already existing PRT in Kunduz to Mazar-eSharif, Maimana, Feyzabad and Baghlan. The rst step in this direction was taken just two days after the end of the Istanbul Summit, on July 1st, 2004, when the teams from Mazar-e Sharif and Maimana moved from US to North Atlantic Alliance authority. The Communiqu also mentioned that the purpose of strengthening NATO presence in Afghanistan aims at the creation of a climate of security needed for the stabilization and reconstruction of the country and for combating terrorism, but also for preparing the elections, whose postponement represented an obstacle for the consolidation of the Afghan government. ISAF encourages the cooperation with as many international institutions and organizations as possible and will work closely with the Afghan government,

and 29 , 2004, was

th

the settling of a coherent policy of the North Atlantic Alliance concerning its involvement

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with the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (with whom it has a relation of complementarity) and with the UN assistance mission, UNAMA15. On December 5th and 6th, 2005, during the annual meeting of the South East Defense Ministerial (SEDM) in Washington D.C., the agreement on SEEBRIG (SouthEastern Europe Brigade) command deployment in Afghanistan was signed.

operations,

control

of

takes-off

and

landings and air trafc control. Also, the Romanian personnel analyzed the weather forecast for safe ights, would maintain the communication systems in operational parameters and ensured the logistic support of operations on the Airport18. On July 31st, it took place in Kabul the ceremony by which Romania handed over to Bulgaria the command of the Kabul International Airport (KAIA). At the ceremony, Major General Hans-Werner Ahrens, Deputy Commander of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) stated that: During the past four months, Romania took command over KAIA mission. I would like to thank you, Cmdr. Adrian Marinescu, and to the personnel under your command, for the exemplary guidance through which you have accomplished your mission. This period of time, you took a great step towards the integration of the units within the KAIA concept. By means of your activities here, you have redounded to the improvement of ights security, you have accomplished a better coordination of all those involved in KAIA mission, and not least you have erected a unique monument for the Romanian airmen, as of to remind everyone your presence here. Thank you for your proven professionalism, for your resoluteness and energy you have invested in all activities and for the reconstruction projects that have been initiated, as well19. During the rst half of year, the contribution as follows20:
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Therefore, 233 Romanian soldiers from the SEEBRIG command and two support sub-units participated for six months, since February 2006, in ISAF mission, meaning about 66% of the SEEBRIG dispatched forces. The Brigade command consists of 101 positions with 18 belonging to Romania. Our country ensures the staff company (125 soldiers) and the transmission one (90 soldiers plus 30 Turkish soldiers). The financial contribution of Romania was about 2.5 millions euro and the contribution to the common bugget 17.82%. The Brigade functioned under UN mandate and NATO operational command. During the mission in Afghanistan, the Brigade will be called Kabul Multinational Brigade IX (KMNB IX)16. On April 1 , 2006, 39 Romanian soldiers
st

of the Romanian Air Force took over the command of the Kabul International Airport (KAIA) from the Greek contingent, being appointed to the Airport administration and command structures . The Romanian
17

detachment acted within ISAF under NATO operational command. The main missions that the Romanian troops accomplished in their four month mission were airport management, daily coordination of air

of

the

Romanian

Armed

Forces in Afghanistan can be summarized

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Operation Contribution Personnel Location Missions
- Control of access in the base - Traffic control - Patrolling; - Reconnaissance - Escort - Securing the area - Specific missions - Medical assistance within PRT - Patrolling - Reconnaissance - Kabul Multinational Brigade leadership (KMNB) - Support of KMNB command - Specific missions for ISAF - Specific missions for ISAF - Kandahar air base security - Patrolling, traffic control, escort of convoys - Humanitarian aid for Afghan population; medical assistance - Implementing CIMIC projects, food distribution - Specific missions - Training Afghan military personnel and counseling them during missions - Deployment; coordination of forces in the theater

ISAF (NATO)

Military Police Platoon

25

Kabul

ISAF (NATO) ISAF (NATO) ISAF (NATO) ISAF (NATO) ISAF (NATO) ISAF (NATO)

Staff Personnel Medical team Mobile observation team SEEBRIG Command Intelligence Structure Intelligence Structure

8 3 7

Kabul Kunduz Mazar-eShariff

233

Kabul

25 5

N/A N/A

OEF

Infantry Battalion

372

Kandahar

OEF OEF

Staff Personnel ANA TRAINING Detachment National support elements

10 46

Kabul, Bagram Kabul, Kandahar Kandahar

OEF

Also, on July 31st, 2006, NATO took over responsibility from the United States for ensuring the security in Southern Afghanistan. Thus, the North Atlantic Alliance reconrms the responsibility and the capacity to generate stable durability in Afghanistan, indispensable condition for democratic and economic reconstruction of this country. Romania has had an important contribution in NATO mission in Southern Afghanistan. Romanian military personnel contributed to assuring security in two provinces, Kandahar and Kabul, alongside Australian, British,

Canadian, Estonian, Danish, Dutch and US troops21. On this occasion, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, commander of the US-led coalition forces, said in a NATO statement that todays transfer of authority demonstrates to the Afghan people that there is a strong commitment on the part of the international community to further extend security into the southern regions provinces22. Starting with the second half of the year, the contribution of the Romanian Armed Forces in Afghanistan can be summarized as follows: one Infantry Battalion with 375 troops

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work in Enduring Freedom Operation near Kandahar Airport, 6 staff ofcers in the Joint Multinational Command in Bagram, and 8 staff ofcers in Kabul. The Romanian infantry troops act under the command of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade, are assigned to guard and secure Kandahar Airport, to patrol the main roads and to conduct combat missions, independent or within different groups, as established by order of the multinational force commander. There are another 46 troops working with ANA TRAINING IV Detachment in Camp Phoenix Kabul and Camp Perini Gardez, within the same operation. Their main mission is to train Afghani soldiers in different military specialities such as infantry, recce, tank, communications or logistics. An Infantry Battalion consisting of 400 troops and its subordinate company, the US Dragon, work within NATO-led ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mission in Camp Julien Kabul. Their main mission is to assist the Afghan military and police forces to ensure security during the election process by patrolling, protecting the force, escorting individuals and convoys and protecting different objectives. A Military Police Platoon of 25 troops work within the Multinational Brigade Kabul, in Camp Warehouse. Here they have search and recce tasks on different routes, escort missions of military and civilian convoys, VIP escort and protection, trafc control and monitorization, ensuring the security of ISAF objectives. 16 staff ofcers and a military intelligence detachment of 25 troops work in Kabul as well, while a medical team of three specialists work in Konduz. A mobile observer team of seven troops have recce and monitoring missions in their area of responsibility in the Mazar-e-Sharif Province. There are 911 troops deployed in the theater of operations in Afghanistan, 435 of which work within Operation Enduring Freedom the rest of 476 troops within ISAF23. On September 6th, 2006, in the presence of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan signed the Declaration by NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, setting out a Framework for Enduring Co-operation in Partnership. The Declaration launches a substantial programme of long-term cooperation between the North Atlantic Alliance and Afghanistan. It builds on NATOs unique relationship with the country and reects the Alliances support for Afghanistans national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The programme will concentrate on defence reform, defence institution building and the military aspects of security sector reform, as well as on other areas such as promoting interoperability between the forces of the Afghan National Army and those of NATO members24. Addressing a news brieng at NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, US Marine General James L. Jones said that the mission in Afghanistan is NATOs most important and ambitious mission since the end of the Cold War. However, it will take a concerted international effort towards reconstruction and reform in Afghanistan to secure the future, he said. Concerning this issue, he added: it is a problem of showing the people of Afghanistan and enabling the government to expand its reach and bring hope in new standards of living and opportunities to the people of that country, who absolutely have shown by their courage at the polls that theyre ready for this25. Between September 2nd and 17th, 2006, the ISAF (under NATO command) launched Operation Medusa, in order to bring to a standstill the Taliban attempt to strengthen their positions. On this occasion, General James L. Jones, commander of Allied Command Operations, said: it has been
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necessary to ght in this instance to achieve the required effect. Importantly it has proved that NATO will not shirk from taking robust action where necessary and especially given the level of insurgent activity26. In southern Afghanistan, the contribution of the Romanian Land Forces consists of one Infantry Maneuver Battalion (personnel 302; location Qalat; period of time underway; missions patrolling, trafc control, escort of convoy, search and rescue for Coalition Forces` security, humanitarian aid for the Afghani population and medical assistance) and one Guarding Detachment (personnel 177; location Kandahar; period of time underway; missions Kandahar Airport and base security)27. In southern Afghanistans Zabul Province, there is a small base, Forward Operating Base Maizan (FOB), made up of soldiers from the Tenth Mountain 2-4 Infantry, Charlie Company 1-4 Infantry Regiment and Romanian troops from Task Force Clugreni, which took control of Zabul on July 31st, when the NATOled International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took command of southern Afghanistan from the US command. The mission of the troops at the base is to provide security to the district. In Maizan and other districts, Talibans attacked Afghan police ofcers and troops and the Coalition soldiers faced ambushes and mortar attacks this summer. In a recent interview, Lieutenant-Colonel McLaughlin, who heads the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Qalat, the provincial capital, said that for the moment, the Talibans have been reluctant to mount frontal assaults on the Coalition troops in Zabul, because they are afraid of the Romanians 14 mm machine guns, but for how long?. In his turn, Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Petrescu, who heads Task Force Clugreni in Qalat, added that where Kandahar goes, goes Afghanistan. So by stabilizing Kandahar, we will solve more problems here in Zabul28. The latest military event delivered in the operation theatre occurred on October 5th, 2006, when the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has expanded its operations to include the East of Afghanistan. On this occasion, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer issued a statement in which he said: NATO will now carry out its UN-mandated mission to extend the authority of the Afghan Government, and to create the conditions for reconstruction and development throughout the whole country, building on the efforts of the US-led Coalition. The expansion of the NATO-ISAF mission is a reection of the Alliances unagging commitment to help the Afghan people build a better future for them29. The Romanian contribution to the efforts of combating the new global threats, to the international peace and security marks a substantial involvement in the ght against terrorism and other non-conventional threats, an active participation in the post-conict peace-building operations, stabilization and democratic reconstruction of these areas. National security requires the direct participation in maintaining regional and international stability. Regional instability may induce negative inuences on the national security. Therefore, Romania pays special attention to the political and military engagement in supporting the processes of stabilization and democratization in various areas. This approach represents a particular case from a broader vision that includes the Western Balkans area, the Greater Black Sea Area, the Greater Middle East and Central Asia, the latter including Afghanistan. Conclusions. Perspectives Since 1991, Romania was actively involved in UN peacekeeping missions, participating till now with more than 10,000 military personnel of various forces: infantry and engineering

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battalions, military mobile hospitals, military police, transportation capabilities, military observers, general staff ofcers. The broad range of military operations (humanitarian, reconstruction, combat) contributed directly to the development of training and the implementation of NATO interoperability standards, according to the lessons learned from the participation in multinational missions. At present, Romanian Armed Forces participate in many peacekeeping and combating terrorism operations, as follows30: under NATO command KFOR (Kosovo) since 01.03.2002, NATO HQ Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina) since 02.12.2004, ISAF (Afghanistan) since 2002 and NATO Training Mission (Iraq) since August 2005; under EU command EUFOR (BosniaHerzegovina), mission ALTHEA since 2004; under UN mandate MONUC (Congo) since 23.10.1999, UNMIK (Kosovo) since 10.06.1999, UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea) since 09.10.2000, UNOCI (Cte dIvoire) since 15.06.2003, UNOMIG (Georgia) since 2003, UNAMA (Afghanistan) since 25.07.2003, UNMIL (Liberia) since 18.11.2003 and UNOB (Burundi) since 05.01.2004; under OSCE mandate OSCE Mission to Georgia since 19.12.2005; within multinational coalitions Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) since 2002 and Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) since July 2003. The Romanian Armed Forces are, therefore, an active participant in postconict military actions, be it under NATO, international organisms or multinational coalitions command. The accumulated experience is expressed in the new operational doctrines that comprise this kind of postconict actions. At the same time, the update of both theory and practice of post-conict military actions has an important role in preparing the forces that will effectively participate in the planning and unfolding of such operations. The deployment of armed forces in multinational operations, the transformation of the classic defense concepts in expeditionary policies and the broadening of both role and missions of the Romanian Armed Forces, all of them contributed to the gradual outlining of a new Romanian strategic prole. From this perspective, the transformation of the defense policies is fundamental, evolving from an approach based on ensuring its own security and national territory, then assuming an important role in securing South-East Europe, to the outlining of coherent policies at a multiregional level which comprise components of reconstruction and stabilization of areas far away from European continent, such as Central Asia and Middle East. The Romanian Armed Forces will have to be prepared and trained in order to be able to participate, in a near future, in a large range of operations and in more and more complex forms of international military involvement. The role of these forces in actions of mediation and security assistance is growing signicantly as a direct consequence of the gradual transformation of Romania as a contributor to the regional and global security. These changes are reected both in the mission planning and the ongoing transformation process of the Romanian Armed Forces. NOTES
Grigore Alexandrescu, Gheorghe Vduva, Aciuni militare post-conflict (Post-Conflict Military Actions), National Defense University Carol I Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, p. 12.
2 Dorel Dumitra, Ion Giurc, Alianele i coaliiile politico-militare (Political and Military Alliances and Coalitions), National Defense University Carol I Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, pp. 155-160. 3 Grigore Alexandrescu, Gheorghe Vduva, op.cit., pp. 19-20. 4 Keith Krausse, Conflict Prevention, in International Security. Challenges and Prospects, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affaires Publishing House, Berne, 2003, p. 20. 1

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Romnia. Membru al Alianei Nord-Atlantice (Romania. Member of North-Atlantic Alliance), National Defense University Carol I Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, pp. 63-64.
6 Grigore Alexandrescu, Gheorghe Vduva, op.cit., pp. 27-28. 7 Marina Ottaway, Promoting Democracy after Conflict. The Difficult Choices, in International Studies Perspectives, no. 4/2003, p. 316. 5

ro/cpresa/continuarearhiva.php?id=1877&an=200 6&luna=01&nr_pagina=3 International Security Assistance Force, Press Release, www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/Update/ Press_Releases/newsrelease/2006/Release_ 01Apr06_020
18 Press release no. 6, March 21, 2006, Romanian Ministry of Defense website, www. mapn.ro/cpresa/continuarearhiva.php?id=1982&a n=2006&luna=03&nr_pagina=2 19 Romanian Ministry of Defense, International Missions, www.mapn.ro 20 21 17

Kurt R. Spillmann, Thomas Bernauer, Jrg M. Gabriel, Andreas Wenger, Yvonne Rosteck, Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives, www.fsk.ethz.ch/documents/Studies/ volume_9/general_introduction.htm Eugen Bdlan, Teodor Frunzeti, Aciunile militare altele dect rzboiul (Military Actions other than the War), Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, p. 10. John Mackinlay, The Development of Peacekeeping Forces, www.fsk.ethz.ch/documents/ Studies/volume_9/mackinlay.htm Doron Zimmermann, The Transformation of Terrorism, www.fsk.ethz.ch/documents/Beitraege/ zu_67/docs/zb_67_low.pdf
12 Stephen J. Blank, Rethinking Asymmetric Threats, www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/0309blank.pdf 13 Government decision no. 38, Monitorul Oficial (The Official Gazette), Part I, no. 832, December 21, 2001. 14 Government decision no. 15, Monitorul Oficial (The Official Gazette), Part I, no. 295, April 30, 2002. 15 Istanbul Summit Communiqu, www.nato.int/ docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm 11 10 9

Ibidem

Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, www.mae.ro

22 The Guardian, www.guardian.co.uk/ worldlatest/story/0,,-5984142,00.html 23 Romanian Ministry of Defense, International Missions, www.mapn.ro 24 NATO website, www.nato.int 25 Sara Wood, USA Forces Press Service, Additional Forces Will Give NATO Flexibility in Southern Afghanistan, www.defencetalk.com/ news/publish 26 NATO website, www.nato.int/shape/news/ 2006/09/060917a.htm 27 Romanian Ministry of Defense, International Missions, www.mapn.ro 28 Fort Apache in Taliban Land, September 14, 2006, www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,153 5064,00.html 29 NATO website, www.nato.int 30 Romanian Ministry of Defense, International Missions, www.mapn.ro

Press release no. 6, January 11, 2006, Romanian Ministry of Defense website, www.mapn.

16

SUMMARY
The post-conict military actions are part of the international communitys crisis and conict management strategy. The Romanian contribution to the efforts of combating the new global threats to the international peace and security marks a substantial involvement in the ght against terrorism and other non-conventional threats, an active participation in the post-conict peace-building operations, stabilization and democratic reconstruction of different areas. The case of Afghanistan, from this perspective, denotes not only the complexity of the postconict military actions from this area, but also their extremely ambitious objectives. LTC Laureniu-Cristian Dumitru is an Army ofcer, researcher and head of the defense strategies sector within the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History. He earned a B.A. in History, a M.A. in International Relations, both of them from University of Bucharest and at present is a Ph.D. candidate in History in the same university. The defense studies, military alliances topics, Geopolitics and Geostrategy, post-conict military actions and the transformation process of the Armed Forces are among his areas of interest.

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Din agenda tiinific a Institutului pentru Studii Politice de Aprare i Istorie Militar
Maior Stelian Fizean
Aat n subordinea Departamentului pentru Politica de Aprare i Planicare, Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Aprare i Istorie Militar a continuat i n a doua jumtate a anului 2006 s desfoare, conform atribuiilor, activiti de cercetare tiinic n domeniul securitii naionale i internaionale, al politicii de aprare i istoriei militare. Rezultatele muncii colectivului su de cercettori au fost remarcate cu ocazia participrii la simpozioane, conferine i alte manifestri interne i internaionale, n cadrul unor aciuni de cooperare bilateral cu alte institute de prol i prin volumele i revistele de specialitate editate. Prezentm, n cele ce urmeaz, cele mai importante activiti la care au participat cercettorii notri. Locotenent-colonelul Laureniu- Cristian Dumitru i as.cc. Cristina Romila au fost prezeni la convocarea organizat la 7 august a.c. de Confederaia Interaliat a Oerilor n Rezerv (CIOR), Uniunea Naional a Cadrelor Militare n Rezerv i Retragere (UNCMRR) i Asociaia Oerilor n Rezerv (AOR) la Predeal, i au susinut comunicri avnd ca tematic istoria i civilizaia romneasc i direciile actuale ale politicii externe i de securitate ale Romniei. Au participat oeri n rezerv din Armata Romniei i din armate ale statelor membre NATO i PfP. ntre 19 i 26 august, directorul ISPAIM, dr. Mihail E. Ionescu i directorul adjunct, dr. Petre Otu, au participat la cel de-al 32-lea Congres internaional de Istorie Militar, desfurat n oraul-centru al istoriograei militare germane, Potsdam. La reuniune au participat 255 de specialiti din 37 de ri, care au dezbtut tema Nation State, Nationalism and the Military. Delegaia romn a prezentat comunicarea The European Construction of Romanian Armed Forces during the Long Century: 1789-1914 i a intervenit pe marginea unor expuneri ale participanilor strini. De asemenea, membrii delegaiei romne au avut numeroase contacte cu reprezentanii unor ri prezeni la congres, ind abordate aspecte ale cooperrii tiinice bi i multilaterale, cu numeroi participani, dintre care amintim pe cei ai rii gazd, pe cei ai Comisiei Marocane de Istorie Militar, ai Comisiei elene, pe eful Centrului pentru Documentare istoric al Armatei Belgiene, pe directorul Scarecrow Press Inc. din SUA, istorici polonezi, italieni i, nu n ultimul rnd, pe reprezentanii Comisiei Internaionale de Istorie Militar (profesorii Luc de Vos i Pieter Kamphuis). Cc.t. erban Cioculescu a fost invitat s susin, n ziua de 24 august a.c., o expunere la lucrrile colii de var de la Braov, organizate de Fundaia Konrad Adenauer-Romnia. Cercettorul a prezentat aspecte privind bazele sistemului juridic n Uniunea European i Politica Extern i de Securitate Comun a UE. Locotenent-colonelul Laureniu-Cristian Dumitru a susinut, la Palatul Cercului Militar, la ntrunirea comun a UNCMRR i AORR din 5 septembrie, comunicarea cu titlul

Transformarea Armatei Romniei.

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n perioada 6-9 septembrie 2006, directorul ISPAIM, dr. Mihail E. Ionescu s-a deplasat n Polonia, la Forumul Economic de la Krinyca, care a avut ca tem European Challenges: Grupului de Lucru pentru zona Mrii Negre pe anul 2006 i obiectivele pe anul viitor, printre care se numr i organizarea reuniunii anuale a grupului n primvara anului 2007. De asemenea, directorul ISPAIM a fost invitat, la Chiinu, la Conferina internaional cu tema Soarta evreilor din

The Question of Europes Identity. La activitate au fost dezbtute i aspecte din domeniul politicii i securitii internaionale. Directorul ISPAIM a fost invitat la seciunea cu tema The Black Sea Region: Inuencing Identities, Europe and Beyond i a prezentat un scurt istoric al Mrii Negre din perspectiva de mare deschis, respectiv, de mare nchis. Reprezentantul romn a evideniat, totodat, importana geostrategic a Mrii Negre n contextul extinderii NATO i UE i a factorului energetic i a fcut o analiz a principalelor caracteristici ale mediului de securitate din regiune. S-a remarcat c lipsa unei strategii comune pentru regiunea Mrii Negre nu trebuie s mpiedice realizarea unui cadru coerent de cooperare regional. O delegaie a ISPAIM format din dr. Petre Otu, cpitanul Darie-Mircea Dau i cc.t. Carmen Rjnoveanu a efectuat ntre 19 i 22 septembrie o vizit la Centrul Superior pentru Studii de Aprare Naional (CESEDEN) din Spania. Vizita a permis meninerea dialogului tiinic dintre cele dou instituii i dintre Comisiile de istorie militar ale celor dou ri. Au fost fcute demersuri pentru identicarea unor direcii de colaborare i pentru convenirea unor proiecte de cercetare, precum realizarea unei lucrri comune i organizarea de mese rotunde.
n ziua de 18 septembrie a.c., directorul ISPAIM, dr. Mihail E. Ionescu a fost prezent, la Roma, la reuniunea Comitetului Director al

Basarabia, Bucovina i Transnistria n anii 1940-1944, din perioada 15-17 octombrie 2006. Activitatea a fost organizat de US Holocaust Memorial Museum din Washington D.C., Institutul Naional al Holocaustului Ellie Wiesel din Romnia i Universitatea Pedagogic de Stat din Chiinu. Cc.t. Lucia Vreja a participat, n perioada 28-29 septembrie 2006, la reuniunea Grupului de Lucru pentru lupta mpotriva terorismului, al Consoriului PfP al Academiilor de Aprare i Institutelor pentru Studii de Securitate, din cadrul Centrului George C. Marshall din Garmisch (Germania). Reuniunea s-a concentrat asupra prezentrii concluziilor unui studiu privind rutele tracului de droguri, arme i ine umane n Europa, cu accent pe regiunea Europei de Sud-Est i asupra conexiunilor posibile dintre infracionalitatea organizat i terorism. S-a subliniat c fenomenul terorismului internaional poate prota material de pe urma migraiei ilegale i tracului ilicit i c, totodat, controlul frontierelor i cooperarea dintre state sunt condiii fundamentale pentru contracararea tracului ilegal i, implicit, a unor eventuale atacuri din partea unor organizaii teroriste islamiste.
Dr. Alexandru Madgearu a luat parte, n perioada 4-6 octombrie 2006 la sesiunea anual de comunicri Pontica, organizat de Muzeul de Istorie Naional i Arheologie din Constana i dedicat cuceririi Daciei de ctre romani i mplinirii a 140 de ani de la nceputul domniei regelui Carol I. Au fost

Consoriului PfP al Academiilor de Aprare i Institutelor pentru Studii de Securitate. Agenda ntlnirii a cuprins discutarea celor mai recente evoluii din cadrul Consoriului. Directorul ISPAIM a prezentat activitatea

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prezeni att specialiti n istorie antic i arheologie, ct i specialiti n istorie modern i recent, sesiunea prilejuind prezentarea unor contribuii notabile la istoria Dobrogei i, n general, la istoria naional. La sfritul aceleiai luni, dr. Alexandru Madgearu a participat i la conferina internaional cu titlul Habitat, religie i etnicitate. Arheologia Evului Mediu timpuriu n bazinul carpatic, organizat de Muzeul Naional al Unirii din Alba-Iulia i Departamentul pentru Relaii Interetnice al Guvernului Romniei. Au fost prezeni cercettori din Romnia, Ungaria i Slovacia, care au dezbtut teme referitoare la descoperirile arheologice recente din zon, problema atribuirii etnice unor vestigii pe baz de argumente arheologice i cretintatea n regiune n secolele X-XI. Conferina a prilejuit expunerea unor idei interesante pentru specialitii n domeniu i a demonstrat c istoricii romni i unguri pot discuta fr a ajunge la dispute legate de problema primului venit n Transilvania. Tot n luna octombrie a.c., cc.t. erban Pavelescu i cc.t. Cerasela Moldoveanu au participat, n garnizoana Brila, la Zilei manifestrile dedicate srbtoririi n perioada 09-11 noiembrie 2006 au avut loc, la Soa, lucrrile conferinei internaionale cu tema Dtente and CSCE in Europe (19661975), organizat de Cold War Research Centre (Bulgaria) i Universitatea Mannheim (Germania). La conferin au participat cercettori din Bulgaria, Germania, Cehia, Polonia, Romnia, Rusia, Ungaria. Din partea ISPAIM a participat cc.t. Carmen Rjnoveanu. n cadrul lucrrilor, o atenie deosebit n analiza proceselor reuniunilor CSCE a fost acordat Ostpolitik-ului promovat de RF Germania n relaiile Est-Vest i rolului statelor din Tratatul de la Varovia n cadrul negocierilor de la Geneva i Helsinki (1972-1975). Cu ocazia mplinirii a nouzeci de ani de la intrarea Romniei n Primul Rzboi Mondial, institutul nostru a organizat la Palatul Cercului Militar Naional, n ziua de 14 noiembrie a.c., un simpozion naional. La lucrri au fost prezentate contextul intern i extern premergtor intrrii n rzboi, planurile de campanie i operaiile armatei romne, starea de spirit din societatea romneasc i alte teme de interes pentru specialiti din mediul academic i universitar, militar i civil. La 23 noiembrie a.c., la conferina organizat de CSSAS Universitatea Naional de Aprare Carol I, asistenii de cercetare Cristina Romila i Drago Bnescu au susinut comunicrile Democratizarea ca instrument al aciunii externe a UE n relaia cu statele de la frontiera estic i, respectiv, Modele teoretice ale dinamicii de securitate regional n era post-Rzboi Rece. Cri i reviste Sub coordonarea directorului ISPAIM, dr. Mihail E. Ionescu, a fost elaborat cartea Romnia-UE. Cronologie 1989-2005, publicat n acest an la Editura Militar.
AGEND TIINIFIC

Armatei Romniei 25 Octombrie. Cei doi au prezentat comunicrile cu titlul Semnicaia

istoric a zilei de 25 Octombrie 1944 i Reform militar i modernizarea societii romneti, de la cutrile secolului XX la provocrile secolului XXI.
n cadrul activitilor de cooperare dintre ISPAIM i Serviciul Istoric al Aprrii din Frana, dr. Sergiu Iosipescu s-a deplasat (23 octombrie-7 noiembrie) la un stagiu de documentare la Vincennes, n arhivele i bibliotecile din Paris, n vederea elaborrii

Napoleon III i romnii. Relaii politico-militare.

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Volumul face parte din seria studiilor aprute ca rezultat al preocuprilor cercettorilor din Institut pentru analizarea proceselor complementare de aderare a Romniei la NATO i Comunitatea european i constituie un instrument de lucru pentru specialiti. Cartea prezint principalele repere politice, sociale i economice n relaiile rii noastre cu Uniunea European, reuind s surprind, n egal msur, evenimente politico-militare i de securitate de referin, n contextul integrrii interne i extinderii UE. n primul semestru al acestui an au aprut publicaiile de specialitate ale institutului, ale cercettorilor romni i francezi pe tema Relaii militare romno-franceze, de la Napoleon I pn n zilele noastre. Ediia special romno-francez a fost lansat n cadrul Trgului de carte Polemos, organizat de Editura Militar i Societatea Scriitorilor Militari, n perioada 1-4 noiembrie 2006. La acelai trg de carte a fost lansat i culegerea de studii coordonat de directorul ISPAIM, generalul-maior (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, Marea Neagr, de la lacul bizantin

Revista de Istorie Militar nr. 1-2/2006 i Monitor Strategic nr. 1-2/2006, ambele coninnd articole incitante i bine apreciate de publicul-int.
A aprut, n Frana, Revue historique des armes, nr. 244, trimestrul 3/2006, editat de Serviciul Istoric al Aprrii, numr consacrat relaiilor bilaterale, n care apar articole ale unor cercettori romni i francezi. Enumerm titlurile autorilor romni: Relations politiques et militaires entre la France et les principauts de Transylvanie, de Valachie et de Moldavie (Sergiu Iosipescu), La mission militaire franaise dirige par les frres Lamy (Maria Georgescu), Linuence de la doctrine militaire franaise sur lvolution de larme roumaine (1878-1940)(Petre Otu), Les relations franco-roumaines de 1938 1944 (Mihail E. Ionescu), Entre suspicion et condence: Les relations franco-roumaines dans les premires dcennies dela guerre froide (erban Liviu Pavelescu). Revista cuprinde i o prezentare a institutului nostru i a Muzeului Militar Naional din Bucureti. n paralel, comun ISPAIM a editat un numr al

la provocrile secolului XXI. Lucrarea se adreseaz mediului academic, dar i publicului iniiat n domeniu, autorii evocnd, dintr-o perspectiv istoric, date, elemente de cultur i civilizaie, de via economic i social preioase din arealul pontic, ncepnd cu etapa dominaiei bizantine i pn n zilele noastre, cnd zona Mrii Negre devine tot mai mult o regiune de securitate a spaiului euroatlantic.
De asemenea, a aprut n seria Occasional Papers, editat sub egida ISPAIM, lucrarea Romnia, Ostpolitik-ul i CSCE. 1967-1975, al crei autor este directorul institutului, dr. Mihail E. Ionescu. Acesta este unul din puinele studii autohtone despre perioada Rzboiului Rece, date ind reglementrile legale privind accesul la arhive (termenul de 30 de ani). Este cunoscut faptul c Romnia a fost prima ar, dup URSS, care a stabilit relaii diplomatice cu R.F.Germania. Materialul red n capitolele sale percepia la Bucureti a noii politici rsritene a Germaniei Federale din acea perioad, relaiile economice dintre Bonn i Bucureti i modul de cooperare dintre Romnia i RFG n cadrul Conferinei pentru Securitate i Cooperare n Europa. Studiul conine, de asemenea, concluzii i, pentru exemplicare, o Anex cu extrase din documente de arhiv.

Revistei de Istorie Militar. Publicaia insereaz studii

romno-francez
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Liviu C. ru, ntre Washington i Moscova: Romnia 1945-1965,

Ed. Tribuna, Cluj-Napoca, 2005
Cerasela Moldoveanu
Lucrarea reprezint teza de doctorat a autorului, rod al eforturilor sale de migloas cercetare n renumite arhive i biblioteci, din strintate i din ar. Ea abordeaz istoria raporturilor dintre trei actori. Doi dintre acetia, SUA i URSS, sunt principalii protagoniti ai scenei politice postbelice, ntr-o lume divizat bipolar, n timp ce Romnia, cel de-al treilea stat-actor, a resimit cu duritate impactul acestei divizri. Prin structura ei, teza autorului folosete ca principii metodologice eseniale urmtoarele periodizri contextuale, care se suprapun, dealtfel, celor trei capitole ale crii: a) un context larg, global, prin expunerea i explicarea situaiei internaionale, a raporturilor de putere dintre SUA i URSS, la sfritul celui de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial; b) unul mediu, local, regional, prin denirea frontierelor de securitate ale celor dou mari puteri n estul Europei, n perioada postbelic, ca i constituirea ariei strategice n estul i centrul Europei, n confruntarea sovieto-american, ntre anii 1948-1953; c) i n nal, contextul specic, cel mai ntins de altfel, care urmrete impactul politicilor de securitate naional ale SUA i URSS asupra Romniei, cu implicaiile sale majore: etapele sovietizrii rii noastre n perioada 1943-1953, relaiile Moscovei cu rile est-europene satelite, politicile SUA fa de aceste ri ntre 1953-1965, relativa autonomie a Romniei n blocul sovietic. Lucrarea constituie o analiz cuprinztoare a principalilor factori care au condus lumea la o er a bipolaritii: dispunerea geopolitic i antagonismul ideologic i de sistem, aducnd n discuie teoriile geopolitice ale lui Mahan, Mackinder sau Spykman, referitoare la competiia dintre puterile maritime i cele continentale din Eurasia. Localizarea ntr-un anumit spaiu a diferitelor state, n special ale celor din estul i centrul Europei, a fost deosebit de important n crearea cordonului sanitar, de securitate, dorit de Stalin. Apariia unor enclave comuniste pe alte continente (China, Coreea, Vietnam, Cuba), dar aate n apropierea axei determinate politic i geograc de Moscova, a exercitat o inuen ideologic puternic. n unele cazuri, aceste divergene au fost pe cale s genereze adevrate catastrofe, care ar schimbat caracterul Rzboiului Rece ntr-unul ct se poate de erbinte (ex. criza rachetelor din Cuba, 1962). n acelai timp, diferenele fundamentale i incompatibilitatea existente ntre cele dou sisteme politico-ideologice, capitalism i socialism, au fost considerate ca ind elementele eseniale care au condus la Rzboiul Rece. i singurul merit al acestui nou gen de rzboi a fost c nu s-a transformat, n decursul deceniilor, ntr-un rzboi cald. Apariia diverselor crize ale acestei perioade i a noi zone de conict, prin implicarea unuia sau altuia dintre cei doi actori importani (Coreea, Cuba, Vietnam, Afganistan etc), nu a depit fazele declarative incendiare sau a blocadelor economice instituite ntr-o form sau alta, de obicei de SUA, a cror dezvoltare economic nu a putut niciodat egalat de adversara sa.
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Autorul analizeaz conictul tacit dintre cele dou tabere, manifestat plenar pe toate palierele: geopolitic, ideologic, strategic, militar, economic, social i cultural. Concurena acerb dintre cele dou sisteme a evideniat rolul strategic, deosebit de important dobndit de rile din Europa de Est n contextul Rzboiului Rece. Aceste ri, devenite modele de implementare a noii ideologii sovietice, constituind adevrai cobai politici i socio-umani, au atras n unele cazuri atenia Occidentului, n funcie de specicul ecreia, sau de surile survenite la un moment dat n actul de guvernare politic. Un astfel de caz a fost Romnia, care prin relativa sa autonomie fa de Moscova, survenit n perioada anilor 60, a servit intereselor puterilor occidentale de a ncerca s creeze suri n unitatea blocului comunist. Dei implementarea, ndeosebi dup 1945, a primelor guverne de orientare comunist n Europa de Est a dus la concluzia c aceast parte a Europei a fost de mult sortit marelui vecin de la rsrit, Liviu ru consider (contrar concluziei rspndite n mediile istoriograce din Romnia) c, Europa de Est nu a fost vndut sovieticilor la Ialta, dar planurile militare stabilite n timpul rzboiului au adus Armata Roie pn n centrul Europei. Temerea Aliailor de a nu vedea Armata Roie instalndu-se la Viena, sau chiar la Paris, a condus la o politic mai lax i mai permisiv fa de Moscova din partea factorilor decizionali de la Londra i Washington. Pe de alt parte, n perioada 1945-1947, Stalin a preferat o comunizare treptat a statelor aate deja n zona sa de inuen, pentru a nu pierde ajutorul economic din partea Vestului, i a nu genera un conict de proporii cu acesta, pentru ca n perioada urmtoare s treac la o stalinizare brutal a acestor ri, fr s mai in cont de prerile fotilor aliai. El viza chiar extinderea acestei sfere de inuen asupra Greciei i Turciei. Reacia american a fost lansarea Doctrinei Truman n plan politic, a Planului Marshall n cel economic i n plan militar, crearea Alianei Atlanticului de Nord n 1949. Replica Kremlinului a fost consolidarea puterii sovietice n rile satelit i crearea, n octombrie 1947, a Kominformului, organism de conducere a partidelor comuniste din rile aate sub inuena URSS i, tot ca replic, n plan militar, crearea Tratatului de la Varovia, n mai 1955. Antagonismul dintre cele dou sisteme reprezentate de dou superputeri mondiale se produsese n fapt. Lumea intra ntr-o situaie fr precedent n istorie. O consecin a impunerii acestui sistem bipolar sovieto-american a fost trecerea unor mari puteri, cu tradiie ndelungat, precum Frana, Italia, Japonia, Marea Britanie n postura de puteri secundare. Moartea lui Stalin, n 1953, schimbrile reformatoare din vremea lui Hruciov i restructurarea raporturilor dintre Moscova i sateliii si est-europeni, pe de-o parte, i cu SUA, de cealalt parte, au marcat o perioad de destindere relativ a Rzboiului Rece. Chiar Hruciov, n raportul su secret, prezentat la cel de-al XX-lea Congres al PCUS din anul 1956, a declarat c o confruntare ntre lumea capitalist i cea socialist nu era o necesitate, aa cum proclamase Lenin n perioada de nceput a socialismului. Acest nou context a permis armarea i recuperarea parial a identitilor naionale n politica regimurilor comuniste est-europene. n perioada anilor 1945-1958, pentru a-i menine controlul asupra statelor aate n sfera lor de inuen, conductorii sovietici au recurs la aciuni brutale, materializate n

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deportri forate, detenii masive obinute prin procese arbitrare, oprimare politic a unor categorii largi de ceteni i chiar oprimarea zic a zeci i sute de mii de oameni din aceste teritorii. Situaia Romniei, ca ar satelit a Moscovei, situat ntr-o zon geopolitic de conuen, a fost considerat cea mai exploatat ar de ctre liderii sovietici. Sovietizarea Romniei s-a produs ntr-o manier brutal i discriminatorie, care a lsat urme adnci n mentalul colectiv, ntr-o msur mai mare dect n alte ri din Europa de Est. Aversiunii tradiionale exprimate nc din vremea Rusiei ariste fa de statul romn, i s-a adugat maniera dispreuitoare n care conductorii bolevici i-au tratat pe conductorii comuniti romni. Din punct de vedere economic, Romnia a fost ajutat de Moscova s se menin ani buni printre rile satelite cu un PIB sczut, situndu-se n ultimele rnduri n privina dezvoltrii economice i a schimburilor comerciale interne i externe. n perioada anilor 60, adoptarea n Romnia a unei linii naionaliste, i a unei politici de detaare fa de Moscova, i-a convins pe liderii de la Washington s dezvolte o politic de apropiere fa de Bucureti. Aceast nou postur a adus benecii economice importante, prin extinderea relaiilor economice cu state occidentale, politic care s-a perpetuat i dup moartea lui Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, n 1965, i venirea la putere a lui Nicolae Ceauescu. Analiza complex i pertinent fcut de autor unei perioade n care ntreaga civilizaie uman s-a vzut chemat s fac fa jocului de fore dintre dou superputeri, Romnia situndu-se n postura unui actor secundar, ce s-a micat ntre bocancul apstor al sovietelor i, de cealalt parte, liberalismul ndeprtat al americanilor, a beneciat de un suport
documentar bogat: de numeroase surse edite: enciclopedii, cri, studii, lucrri de memorialistic, semnate de autori de diverse naionaliti, din sfere social-profesionale diverse, interviuri i coresponden dintre personaliti mai mult sau mai puin marcante ale perioadei Rzboiului Rece, .a; Ca un element deosebit, trebuie subliniat accesul autorului la documente din arhivele americane i britanice, precum: National Archives, Washington D.C; coleciile de documente microlmate deinute de Library of Congress; Washington D.C i Main Library; Public Record Ofce; Kew Gardens, London; i ntr-o msur mai mic din cele romneti. Foarte interesant pentru cititorul avizat din Romnia este recursul la volumele de documente edite privitoare la politica extern american, Foreign Relations of

the United States, pentru perioada 19451968, precum i cele britanice, Documents

On British Policy Overseas, care acoper

anii 1945-1948, mai puin spectaculoase ca valoare a informaiei, dar valoroase ca aport bibliograc ntr-o lucrare romneasc. Autorul perioada atenia nsui abordate arm nu de c tema aduce i n pot

istoriograc

specialitate

lucruri inedite. El a ncercat, ns, bazat pe bogate surse documentare, s aeze pentru prima dat n aceeai paradigm de analiz evoluia raporturilor strategice dintre cele dou supraputeri postbelice i efectul acestor politici asupra Romniei din primele dou decenii de dup 1945. Este de remarcat la aceast lucrare valoarea sa documentar deosebit, avnd meritul unei argumentaii convingtoare i al formulrii unor rspunsuri obiective la probleme controversate ale acestei perioade sau mai puin cunoscute istoricilor romni.
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SUMMARY

THE GREATER BLACK SEA AREA

- Major interests and strategies for the Black Sea Region. Framework Analytical Review OGNYAN MINCHEV 5

ENERGY SECURITY
- GUAM and OSCE the Role of Multilateral Institutions in Dealing with the Security of the Greater Black Sea Area VLADIMIR SOCOR - EU-Russia cooperation and the security of oil and gas suppliance Major STELIAN FIZEAN 31 36

PERSPECTIVES ON EUS ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

- Norway and an Enlarged European Union H.E. LEIF ARNE ULLAND 51

COLD WAR
- Deterrence and the offensive-defensive balance MIHAI ZODIAN 61

THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

- People Human Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Matrixes VLADIMIR LUKOV 77

GEOPOLITICS
- The Rebirth of Romanian Geopolitics after the Cold War ERBAN F. CIOCULESCU 89

ISPAIM monitor strategic 3-4 / 2006

MIDDLE EAST
- Turkeys Middle East Policy between Domestic Politics and International Requirements BEZEN BALAMIR COSKUN 109

SECURITY STRATEGIES
- Low Intensity Conicts. Military and Political Implications DRAGO BNESCU - Security Strategies after the end of the Cold War BOGDAN SGRCITU 119 126

DOCUMENTARY
- Romanian Armed Forces Participation in Post-Conict Military Actions. Case Study: Afghanistan LTC CRISTIAN DUMITRU 141

SCIENTIFIC AGENDA
- Scientic Agenda of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History Major STELIAN FIZEAN 151

REVIEWS
- Liviu C. ru, Between Washington and Moscow: Romania 1945-1965 CERASELA MOLDOVEANU
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