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Table Of Contents

1.1 Introduction
1.2 Cain and Abel: Bargaining with God
Figure 1.1. Game tree of Cain’s murder of Abel
1.3 Rahab and the Spies: Making a Just Agreement
1.4 Solomon’s Arbitration: Discovering the Truth
Figure 1.5. Outcome matrix of Solomon’s game
1.5 Conclusions
Notes
Chapter 2 Bargaining Procedures and the Problem of Honesty
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Honesty Problem
2.3 The Bonus Procedure
2.4 The Bonus Appraisal Procedure
2.5 The Penalty Procedure
2.6 The Penalty Appraisal Procedure
2.7 The Expansive Appraisal Procedure
2.8 Camp David: The Logic of the Procedures Applied
2.9 Conclusions
Chapter 3 Arbitration Procedures and the Problem of Convergence
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Different Arbitration Procedures
3.3 Trade-Offs and Implicit Arbitration
3.4 Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA)
3.5 FOA in Practice: The Importance of Winning
3.6 Bonus FOA
3.7 Combined Arbitration
3.8 Two-Stage and Multistage FOA
3.9 Is Convergence in Stages Desirable?
3.11 Conclusions
Chapter 4 Superpower Crisis Bargaining and the Theory of Moves
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken
4.3 The Cuban Missile Crisis as a Game of Chicken
4.4 Deception and Power in the Cuban Missile Crisis
4.5 A Sequential View of the Cuban Missile Crisis
4.6 The 1973 Alert Decision
4.8 Stability in the Cease-Fire Game
Figure 4.8. 1973 cease-fire game (with alert) as Prisoners’ Dilemma
4.9 Was There an Alternative to the Alert?
4.10 The Possible Effects of Power in the Cease-Fire Game
4.11 Conclusions
Chapter 5 Threats and Reputation in Bargaining
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Repeated Play of a Sequential Game
Figure 5.1. Moves in Chicken and Prisoners’ Dilemma
5.3 Threat Outcomes in Repeated Play of a Game
Figure 5.5. Category 2 games in which one player has a threat strategy
5.4 The Sequential-Primary Game
Figure 5.9. Payoff matrix in one primary election (Player A weak)
Figure 5.10. Payoff matrix in one primary election (Player A strong)
5.5 Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The Use of Threat Power in Poland, 1980–81
6.4 The White House Tapes Case: The Trap
6.5 Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Judgments about Vote Trading
7.3 Definitions and Assumptions about Vote Trading
7.4 Sincere and Insincere Voting
7.9 Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Vote Trading
7.11 Majority, Minimal Majority, and Governing Coalitions
7.12 Measuring Bargaining Strength under Coalition Voting
7.13 Possible Uses of Coalition Voting
7.14 Conclusions
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Power in the U.S. Federal System
8.3 What Should a Power Index Measure?
8.4 The Power of Approval and Disapproval
8.5 Empirical Evidence of Presidential Power
8.6 The Paradox of the Chair’s Position
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Negotiation Games

Negotiation Games

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Published by: guzo0123456 on Mar 15, 2012
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