OBLICON FINAL EXAM CASES DIGEST
absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, petitioner Rosencor willbe presumed to have acted in good faith in entering into the Deed of AbsoluteSale over the disputed property.Considering that there is no showing of bad faith on thepart of the petitioners, the Court of Appeals thus erred in ordering therescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 4, 1990 betweenpetitioner Rosencor and the heirs of the spouses Tiangco. The acquisition by Rosencor of theproperty subject of the right of first refusal is an obstacle to the action forits rescission where, as in this case, it was shown that Rosencor is in lawfulpossession of the subject of the contract and that it did not act in bad faith..This does not mean however that respondents are leftwithout any remedy for the unjustified violation of their right of firstrefusal. Their remedyhowever is not an action for the rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale but anaction for damages against the heirs of the spouses Tiangco for the unjustifieddisregard of their right of first refusal.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals datedJune 25, 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 13, 1996 of theQuezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 217 is hereby REINSTATED insofar as itdismisses the action for rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale datedSeptember 4, 1990 and orders the payment of monthly rentals of P1,000.00 permonth reckoned from May 1990 up to the time respondents leave the premises.
Khe hong cheng vs CA 355 scra 701
By Samboy Fajardo in Exclusively for 1-Manresa · Edit Doc · Delete
Facts:Petitioner is the owner of Butuan Shipping Lines. In 1985, the Phi agricultural Trading corporationshipped on board the vessel M/V Prince Eric, owned by petitioner, 3,400 bags of copra at Masbate for delivery toDipolog City. Said shipment was covered by a marine insurance policy issued by American Home Insurance Co.
(respondent Philam’s assured). However, the vessel sank resulting in the total loss of the
shipment. American HomeInsurance Company paid the amount of Php354K (the value of the copra) to the consignee.Having been subrogated to the rights of the consignee, AHIC instituted a civil case to recover the moneypaid to the consignee. While the case was still pending, on December 20, 1989, petitioner executed deeds of donations of parcels of land in favor of his children, co-petitioners Sandra Joy and Ray Steven. December 29, 1993(4 years after the donation and registration in the names of co-petitioners) the Trial Court rendered judgment infavor of petitioner. After the said decision became final and executor, a writ of execution, however was not served. An alias writ of execution was, thereafter, applied and granted on October 1996. Despite earnest efforts, the sheriff found no
property under the name of Butuan Shipping Lines/ or petitioner to levy or garnish the satisfaction of the TC’s
decision. When the sheriff went to Butuan City to enforce the alias writ of execution, they discovered that petitionerno longer had any property and that he had conveyed the subject properties to hi children.Thereafter, respondent Philam filed a complaint for the rescission of the deeds of donation executed bypetitioner in favor of his children and for the nullification of their titles alleging that petitioner executed the aforesaiddeeds in fraud of his creditors. Petitioner subsequently filed their answer to the complaint a quo. They moved for itsdismissal on the ground that the action has already prescribed. They posited that the registration of the deeds of donation in December 1989 constituted a constructive notice and since the complaint a quo was FILED IN February1997, or more than 4 years after said registration, the action was already barred by prescription.Issue:WON the prescriptive period to file an action for rescission of the subject deed of donation has already commenced.Ruling:
Article 1389 of the CC simply provides that, ― The action to
claim rescission must commenced within four
years.‖ Since this provision is silent as to when the prescriptive period would commence, the general rule, i.e., from
the moment the cause of action accrues, therefore, applies. Article 1150 pf the CC is particularly instructive whichprovides that: The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordainsotherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.The SC enunciated the principle that it is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines thestarting point for the computation of the prescriptive period for the action. Article 1383 of the CC provides that: anaction for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be instituted except when the party suffering damages has no otherlegal means to obtain reparation for the same. It is thus apparent that an action to rescind or an
must be of last resort, availed of only after all other legal remedies have been exhausted and have been provenfutile.In the case at bar, it bears stressing that petitioner even expressly declared and represented that he hadreserved to himself property sufficient to answer for his debts contracted prior to this date. Respondent Philam onlylearned about the unlawful conveyance made by petitioner in January 1997 when its counsel accompanied thesheriff to butuan City to attach the properties of petitioner. There they found that he no longer had any propertiesin his name. It
was only then that respondent Philam’s action for rescission of the deeds of donation accruedbecause then it could be said that respondent Philam had exhausted all legal means to satisfy the trial court’s
judgment in its favor. Since respondent Philam filed its complaint for
against petitioners barely amonth from its discovery that petitioner had no other property to satisfy the judgment award against him, its actionfor rescission of the subject deeds clearly had not yet prescribed.
UNION BANK VS ONG 491 S 581