Professional Documents
Culture Documents
International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 19 -22 March 2012, Vienna, Austria
2008 2009
11 March 2011
2011 onward
- Fukushima accident
- Post-Fukushima actions
2
Five countries (U.S.A., France, Japan, Russia and Germany) altogether produce 70% of nuclear-generated electricity in the world. Light water reactors of three types (PWR, BWR, VVER) represent 80% of global reactor fleet. Five countries (Russia, France, Japan, China, India) are developing fast reactor technologies in an advanced phase. Six companies (Rosatom, URENCO, USEC, EURODIF, CNNC, JNFL) are performing commercial-scale uranium enrichment. Six countries (France, United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, China, India) have nuclear fuel reprocessing capacities.
3
TMI 1979
1989
1986 Chernobyl
2011 Fukushima
4
Commission Strengths
Experience and Expertise
William (Bill) Coley, former CEO, British Energy; former Pres. Duke Power Photo Unavailable
Philippe Van Troeye General Manager of Generation, Belgium & Luxembourg Electrabel
Hideki Toyomatsu Director, EVP and CNO Kansai Electric Power Co.
Photo Unavailable
GAO Ligang, Senior Vice President China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Company (CGNPC)
Commission Strengths
Major Companies/Organizations Represented
Commission Strengths
International Composition
Ukraine
Canada
Russia
U.S.A. Belgium
China
Czech Republic
France
Japan
South Korea
Commission Strengths
All WANO Regions Represented
Tokyo Centre Japan Nuclear Technology Institute Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Atlanta Centre Ontario Power Generation Entergy
Paris Centre
CGNPC Electricit de France (EDF) EnBW Kernkraft GmbH (EnKK) Electrabel
Moscow Centre
CEZ, a.s. Concern Rosenergoatom NNEGC Energoatom
Commissions Scope
10
TECHNOLOGY
(technical safety ensuring)
LEGISLATION
Federal laws (responsibility principles) System of rules and regulation State licensing authority (independent regulation)
KNOWLEDGE BASE
The safety fundamentals are correct and shall not be subject to any revisions
11
The key criterion of success: - recovery of power supply - water feed for the decay heat removal
As prompt as possible!
Availability of undamageable portable engineering means for power and water supply in the conditions of NPP isolation
12
Commission Recommendations
Fukushima Related Expand the scope of WANO programs Promote and implement a worldwide, integrated nuclear industry event response Performance Gap Related Achieve peer-review performance improvement within four years Become more publicly visible Conduct periodic internal peer reviews
13
1 2 3 4 5
Priority in recommendations is given to SAFETY Review of the accomplished modernization measures focused on safety improvement
Equally high priorities accident prevention and accident mitigation: - implementation of design fundamental; - emergency preparation; - SA management.
16
Quality of design, justification of design solutions Self-protection inherent safety features Taking into account both internal and external initial events Quality assurance at all stages of construction, operation and decommissioning
17
Defense-in-depth
Implementation of design safety fundamentals for the prevention of core damage accident:
Evaluation of design features to determine the area of safety improvements based on operating experience
Corrective actions
18
Defense-in-depth
(cont.)
Training of personnel
Verifying key elements of emergency response procedures Sharing of operating experience and good practices
19
20
Accident prevention
(for all possible initial events NPP design shall justify that destruction limits for fuel elements would not be exceeded)
21
REACTIVITY ACCIDENTS
DIFFERENT MODES OF FUEL ROD FAILURE
FAILURE OF FUEL CLADDING
Cladding crimping at fuel pellet edge locations
Cross-section of the fuel element in the maximum deformation area Specific bulge with the cladding destruction Fragments of the fuel pellets with melted-out central part
Testing of fresh and Testing of fuel and in the burnt up freshrodsburnt up GIDRA, the GIDRA, IGR fuel rods in IGR, BIGR (Russia), Cabri BIGR pulse reactors (France), NSRR (Japan)
Development of dynamic computer code neutronics coupled with thermohydraulics; fuel rod thermo-mechanics. Analysis of possible accident scenarios
MECHANICAL PROPERTY DATA BASE FAILURE THRESHOLD DATA BASE COMPUTATION SCENARIO CATALOG
Progression of an accident
with loss of core cooling function at a nuclear plant is a sequence of plant states, each of them being more severe as compared to a preceding one due to a greater degree of safety barriers damage
TMI-2
24
25
For each severe accident state its own safety specific goal should be determined, and the accident management strategy and methods shall be focused on achievement of that goal:
Prevention of fuel damage Molten fuel retention inside the reactor vessel Prevention of the containment damage
26
To prevent the core melting (To keep the integrity of the Ist and IInd physical barriers)
27
28
To retain melt inside the RPV (To keep the integrity of the IIIrd physical barrier)
29
MASCA
Data base was obtained on the melt thermal-physic properties under the temperatures up to 3100 Data base was created describing the key parameters for the melt pool behaviour Computational tool was developed
30
To prevent the containment failure (To keep the integrity of the IVth physical barrier)
Development of the core catcher Development of hydrogen safety system Filtered venting system
31
Gas-dynamic computer
codes have been developed (turbulent deflagration and detonation of gas mixtures)
600
600
400
400
P, ka
200
P, ka
200
0
32
33
Definition of safety goals for every phase of accident progression (safety goals tree)
2.
3. 4.
5.
There are safety functions that ensure achievement of the defined goals Loss of such a function leads to a request on its restoration Based on knowledge of specific parameters of the emergency process a relevant effective procedure of accident management is selected Assessment of preparedness to manage an accident effectively (evaluation of the knowledge level) shall produce a request on additional investigations
34
KNOWLEDGE BASE
Reliability
The equipment additional failures Deterministic experience related to BDBA consequences evaluation
36
NPP
1) Total loss of: - electric power supply; - core cooling; - coolant sources 2) Loss of primary circuit integrity
3) No operators accident management actions
37
Evaluation of time to degradation of safety barriers on the path of radioactive fission products dispersal due to sequential failure of safety functions of regular systems and unsuccessful accident management actions Decay heat removal to the final absorber
24 hours
In case of LOCA for Tianwan NPP, Kudankulam NPP, AES-2006 In case of LOCA for VVER-TOI
72 hours
As long as necessary
39
The accumulated knowledge of severe accident processes and phenomena allow us to solve the problem of severe accident management by means of:
NPP design quality and using operating experience accumulated as much as possible (accident prevention) A consistent fight for retention of integrity of physical safety barriers while every barrier being considered as a last one on the way of the melt propagation (accident management)
1 2
40
41
Suggestions to WANO
To develop and implement a mutually recognized generic methodology for analysis of the Defense-in-Depth robustness for different reactor types
To develop additional peer review subprogrammes focused on reviewing of effectiveness of the measures aimed at increasing the existing NPPs robustness to abnormal events
To consider a possibility to establish regional emergency response centres according to reactor types for provision assistance to operating organizations
42
At the WANO BGM in Shenzhen in October 2011, Director General Amano called for greater cooperation between WANO and IAEA IAEA Fukushima action plan and WANO action plan both call for greater cooperation Revised Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is being drafted Nuclear safety is best served by a strong WANO and a strong IAEA
43
3.
4.
5.
6.
New entrants to our industry Common definition for performance indicators Sharing resources between peer reviews and OSARTs Sharing generic issues and trends identified from data reviews Supporting each others working groups (example: review of IAEA safety standards) Attend INSAG meetings
45
Recommendations to IAEA
1. Widen the involvement of representatives of operating organizations in TWGs and SAGNE.
2. Expand the representation of high level experts from operating organization in INSAG to intensify feedback from operating organizations and their experience in safety. 3. Enhance communications between SAGNE and INSAG. 4. Strengthen the Agencys capabilities to collect and disseminate the best operational practices. 5. Strengthen the Agencys cooperation and collaboration with WANO. 6. Facilitate interactions between operating organizations of experienced countries and newcomers.
7. Open wider communication of operating organizations with public though IAEA communication tools.
46
Closing Thoughts
Fukushima will offer important industry lessons, but the safety fundamentals are correct and shall not be subject to any revisions Human performance (safety culture) is still the leading cause of core damaging events Our industry (and WANO) must shift its mindset from prevention to prevention and mitigation Our industry (and WANO) will emerge from the Fukushima event with an even stronger commitment to nuclear safety
47
Conclusions
1. Nuclear safety is not based only on regulators. The prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests with operating organizations which have the necessary experience and knowledge. 2. Improvement in safety can be reached through better sharing of operation experience and improvements in technology. The IAEA is to increase interactions with utilities and nuclear industry. 3. The IAEA should declare clearly the recognition of the role of operating organizations and nuclear industry in safe, efficient and sustainable nuclear power development and to strengthen cooperation with them.
48
http://www.wano.info
49