Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Tier 1 Recommendations
Seismic and flooding reevaluations Seismic and flooding walkdowns Station blackout (SBO) rulemaking Mitigating strategies for beyond design basis events Reliable hardened vents for Mark I and II containments Spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation Integration of emergency procedures rulemaking Enhanced EP staffing and communications
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Tier 2 Recommendations
Spent fuel pool makeup capability
Order licensees to provide safety-related AC electrical power for SFP makeup Order licensees to revise their technical specifications to address requirements to have one train of onsite emergency electrical power operable for SFP makeup and SFP instrumentation when there is irradiated fuel in the SFP, regardless of the operational mode of the reactor Order licensees to have an installed seismically qualified means to spray water into the SFPs, including an easily accessible connection to supply the water
Request that licensees reevaluate external hazards other than seismic and flooding
Tier 3 Recommendations
Ten-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards Potential enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically induced fires and floods Reliable hardened vents for other containment designs Hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings EP enhancements for prolonged SBO and multiunit events Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability Additional EP topics for prolonged SBO and multiunit events EP topics for decision-making, radiation monitoring, and public education Reactor Oversight Process modifications to reflect the recommended defense-indepth framework Staff training on severe accidents and resident inspector training on severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs) Basis of Emergency Planning Zone size Prestaging of potassium iodide beyond 10 miles Transfer of spent fuel to dry cask storage
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Guidance Issued 1st Update Plan Submitted Periodic Updates Latest Completion
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Licensees were asked to perform and provide the results of a reevaluation of hazards, including actions planned to address vulnerabilities Results will be used to determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary
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Guidance Issued or Endorsed Licensees Identify Walkdown Procedures To Be Used Licensees Provide Results of Walkdowns
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~ May 2012
180 days after NRC endorsement of the walkdown procedure (~November 2012)
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June 9, 2012 (communications) Licensee Responses June 9, 2012 (staffing items 3 through 6) October 31, 2012 (staffing items 1 and 2)*
* 60 days after issuance of guidance associated with Recommendation 4.2 order
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NRC Follow-Up
Review and assess licensee responses Establish necessary regulatory framework Inspect to ensure licensee compliance with all new regulatory requirements Consider implications for other types of nuclear facilities
Conclusion
NRC is moving forward with identified enhancements for U.S. plants NRC is following the development of lessons learned by the international community NRC will evaluate additional lessons learned for applicability to U.S. plants
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