The Facts in The Recovery Process of Fukushima Nuclear Accident (Kawano)

The Facts in the Recovery Process of Fukushima Nuclear Accident
March 21, 2012 @IAEA IEM, Vienna Akira Kawano Tokyo Electric Power Company
All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
What I will present 1.How the Earthquake and the Tsunami affected the Power Supply at 1F and 2F sites ? 2.How the Accident Developed and was Stabilized at 1F and 2F Sites ? 3.How We Responded to the Accident at 1F and 2F Sites ? 4.Summary 5.Reference
How the Earthquake and the Tsunami Affected the Power Supply at 1F and 2F Sites ?
Fukushma Daiichi(1F) Fukushma Daini(2F)
Unit 1Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4
Unit 4 Unit 3 Unit 2 Unit 1
Overview of Fukushima Daiichi NPS (1F) and Fukushima Daini NPS (2F) Plant
In Unit Operation Since Power Main Output Contractor (MWe) BWR-3 460 GE Plant Type BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-5 BWR-5 BWR-5 BWR-5 BWR-5 784 784 784 784 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 GE/Toshiba Toshiba Hitachi Toshiba Pre-earthquake Status
1
2 3
1971.3
1974.7 1976.3 1978.10 1978.4 1979.10 1982.4 1984.2 1985.6 1987.8
Operating
Operating Operating Shutdown for maintenance Full core offloaded to spent fuel pool Shutdown for maintenance
1F
4 5 6 1
GE/Toshiba Shutdown for maintenance Toshiba Hitachi Toshiba Toshiba Operating Operating Operating Operating
3
2F
2 3 4
Power supply of Unit 1-4 @ 1F after Tsunami

Okuma Line 1L, 2L: Receiving circuit breaker damaged in earthquake Okuma Line 3L: Renovation work in progress Okuma Line 4L: Circuit breaker shutdown by protection relay activation
Ohkuma 4L Ohkuma 3L Ohkuma 2L
Shutdown by earthquake Shutdown by Tsunami
Ohkuma 1L
3SB 4B 4A
3SA 3B 3A 2B 2A
2SB
2SA
1S 1B 1A
4D 4E
4C
3D
3C
2D 2E
2C
1D
1C
DG DG 4A
DG 3B
DG 3A DG 2B
DG 2A
DG 1B
DG 1A
4B
The DG lost the function due to either M/C failure, loss of sea water system, or DG main unit failure.
Power supply of Unit 5/6 @ 1F after Tsunami

For transmitting power Futaba 1L Yonomori 1L Yonomori 2L Futaba 2L For transmitting power
5A
5B
5SA-1
5SA-2
5SB-1
5SB-2
6A-1
6A-2
6B-1
6B-2
5C
5D HPCS Shutdown by earthquake
6C
6D
DG 5A
DG 5B
Shutdown by Tsunami Survived after tsunami DG HPCS DG 6A
DG 6B
Damages of transmission line & Shinfukushima substation by earthquake

Collapse of filled soil & sand Transmission tower collapse
Tower collapse
Collapse
CGeoEye
- About 10 km away from both 1F and 2F site - Important switchgear station from which electricity of 1F & 2F is transmitted to Tokyo area
500kV Disconnector
275kV Circuit Breaker

6
2F Offsite Power was secured after the Tsunami

Offsite Power
Tomioka Line
One 500 kV line was available. 66 kV lines were outage because of scheduled maintenance and substation trouble but recovered. Iwaido Line
66kV
500kV H STr
Many power centers and motors were damaged because of the flooding. P : Cooling Pumps
/
: Diesel Generator
Unit #1, 2 STr
Unit #3, 4 STr
6.9kV
6.9kV
6.9kV
6.9kV
P
/ /
P
/ /
P
/
P
/ /
P
/
P
/ /
P
/
P
/
1H
1A
1B
2H
2A
2B
3H
3A
3B
4H
4A
4B
Emergency Power for Unit #1
Integrity of Power Supply System After the Tsunami at 1F and 2F

1F:No off-site power available
Fukushima Daiichi
Unit 1 Power panel
Can/can not be used
2F:Off-site power survived

Fukushima Daini
Unit 6
Can/can not be used
Unit 2 Power panel DG 2A

Can/can not be used
Unit 3 Power panel DG 3A DG 3B M/C 3C M/C 3D M/C 3A M/C 3B M/C 3SA M/C 3SB P/C 3C P/C 3D P/C 3A P/C 3B P/C 3SA P/C 3SB DC125V main bus panel 3A DC125V main bus panel 3B RHRS A RHRS B
Can/can not be used
Unit 4 Power panel DG 4A

Can/can not be used
Unit 5 Power panel DG 5A(*2) DG 5B(*2) M/C 5C M/C 5D M/C 5A M/C 5B M/C 5SA-1
Unit 1
Can/can not be used
Unit 2
Can/can not be used
Unit 3
Can/can not be used
Unit 4
Can/can not be used
Power panel DG 6A DG 6B air-cooled HPCS DG M/C 6C M/C 6D HPCS DG M/C M/C 6A-1 M/C 6A-2 M/C 6B-1 M/C 6B-2
Power panel DG 1A DG DG 1 M/C 1C M/C 1D M/C 1H M/C 1A-1 M/C 1A-2 M/C 1-1 M/C 1-2 M/C 1SA-1 M/C 1SA-2 M/C 1SB-1 M/C 1SB-2
Power panel DG 2A DG 2 DG 2 M/C 2C M/C 2D M/C 2H M/C 2A-1 M/C 2A-2 M/C 2-1 M/C 2-2
Power panel DG 3A DG 3 DG 3 M/C 3C M/C 3D M/C 3H M/C 3A-1 M/C 3A-2 M/C 3-1 M/C 3-2 M/C 3SA-1 M/C 3SA-2 M/C 3SB-1 M/C 3SB-2
Power panel DG 4A DG 4 DG 4 M/C 4C M/C 4D M/C 4H M/C 4A-1 M/C 4A-2 M/C 4-1 M/C 4-2
Can/can not be used
Emergency DG
DG 1A DG 1B
(*2)
(*2) (*2) (*2)
(*2)
(*2) (*2)
DG
Emergency use Regular use
Emergency use
DG 2B (*1) air-cooled M/C 2C M/C 2D M/C 2E M/C 2A M/C 2B M/C 2SA
DG 4B (*1) air-cooled M/C 4C M/C 4D M/C 4E M/C 4A M/C 4B
(*2)
M/C 1C M/C 1D M/C 1A M/C 1
M/C 6.9KV M/C
M/C 1S
M/C 2SB
M/C 5SA-2 M/C 5SB-1 M/C 5SB-2 P/C 5C P/C 5D P/C 5A P/C 5A-1 P/C 5B P/C 5B-1 P/C 5SA P/C 5SA-1 P/C 5SB DC125V P/C 5A DC125V P/C 5B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 1C P/C 1D P/C 1A
P/C 2C P/C 2D P/C 2E P/C 2A P/C 2A-1 P/C 2B P/C 2SB DC125V P/C 2A DC125V P/C 2B RHRS A
P/C 4C P/C 4D P/C 4E P/C 4A P/C 4B DC125V main bus panel 4A DC125V main bus panel 4B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 6C P/C 6D P/C 6E P/C 6A-1 P/C 6A-2 P/C 6B-1 P/C 6B-2 DC125V DIST CENTER 6A DC125V DIST CENTER 6B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 1C-1 P/C 1C-2 P/C 1D-1 P/C 1D-2 P/C 1A-1 P/C 1A-2 P/C 1B-1 P/C 1B-2 P/C1SA P/C1SB DC125V main bus panel A DC125V main bus panel B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 2C-1 P/C 2C-2 P/C 2D-1 P/C 2D-2 P/C 2A-1 P/C 2A-2 P/C 2B-1 P/C 2B-2 DC125V main bus panel A DC125V main bus panel B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 3C-1 P/C 3C-2 P/C 3D-1 P/C 3D-2 P/C 3A-1 P/C 3A-2 P/C 3B-1 P/C 3B-2 P/C 3SA P/C 3SB DC125V main bus panel A DC125V main bus panel B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 4C-1 P/C 4C-2 P/C 4D-1 P/C 4D-2 P/C 4A-1 P/C 4A-2 P/C 4B-1 P/C 4B-2 DC125V main bus panel A DC125V main bus panel B RHRS A RHRS B
480V PC P/C
DC power supply
Regular use
125V DC
P/C 1B P/C 1S DC125V main bus panel A DC125V main bus panel B
DC
Sea water system
A SW B
RHRS B
Sea Water System
O: operable
X:
damaged
*2 functionality lost due to the damage of sea water system
*1 functionality lost due to inundation of power panels
2. How the accident developed and was stabilized at 1F & 2F Sites?
Progress made by each plant towards cold shutdown (outline)

Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 - 4
Fukushima Daiichi Units 5 & 6
Fukushima Daini Units 1 - 4
Units 1-3 in operation Unit 4: outage in progress

[Power supply] Total loss of off-site power supply and DG [Sea water system] Total loss Water injection using IC, RCIC, HPCI
Outage in progress
In operation
[Power supply] One off-site power supply system secured [Sea water system] Total loss apart from Unit 3
[Power supply] Emergency DG 6B start up [Sea water system] Total loss
Water injection using RCIC Increase in spent fuel pool temperature to near 70C
3/12 Unit 3 cold shutdown
PCV Venting, SRV operation & Sea water injection Switch to freshwater
Heat removal route has been continuously improved Currently the closed cycle cooling is in function
Sea water was initially injected into the spent fuel pool; currently injecting freshwater
Installation of temporary RHRS Installation of temporary power supply 3/19 Alternative RHRS was started and the spent fuel pool and reactor were cooled
Units 1, 2, 4 Water injection using MUWC

RHRC motor was replaced Installation of temporary power supply
3/14 RHR startup
3/14 Units 1, 2 cold shutdown 3/15 Unit 4 cold shutdown All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. 10
3/20 Units 5, 6 cold shutdown
2F Unit 1 Plant Parameter and Operation

Earthquake Tunami 14:46 15:23 Cold Shut Down14:46 Overscale
Rx Water Level [mm]
7000 5000 3000 1000 -1000 3/11 12:00
0(TAF)
10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
D/W & S/C Rx Pressure Pressure [MPa] [MPa]
8.7MPa abs 7.47,7.54,7.61MPa abs 7.0MPa abs
3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
1.000 0.800 0.600 0.400 0.200 0.000
0.723MPa abs
S/C Pressure (MPa) D/W Pressure (MPa)
0.38MPa abs
3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
RCIC HPCS SRV No Operation( Inoperative due to submersion of power source and inoperative auxiliary cooling system)
Pressure Control 3:50 ~ Depressurization 0:00 ~ Restoration of RHR system
(18:30
MUWC
RHR PCV Vent
3:45 ~
Vent Line Configuration Completed All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
11
Response at Main Control Room and TSC

Operators initial response
Reactor Building
RPV Steam Water
Condensat e Storage Tank
MSIVs closed manually, and reactor pressure controlled by SRVs.

RCIC actuated manually to maintain reactor water level. RCIC repeated automatic trip due to high water level signal and manual restart. MUWC actuated for alternative water injection measure introduced for Accident Management, as stated in EOP manual for seamless water injection.
MSIV
RCIC
MUWC
Heat rejection by opening SRVs
RHR Pump
Suppression Temperature Chamber increase (S/C)

Equipment cooling system was not available.
RHRC Pump
Reactor depressurized and RCIC stopped due to steam pressure decrease.

Water level maintained by MUWC.
RHRS Pump
Sea
Heat Exchanger Building Inoperable by Tsunami flooding flooding
12
Successful Reactor Cooling during Transient

Securing uninterrupted water injection throughout the depressurization process with RCIC at high pressure condition and MUWC at low pressure condition was a critical factor for successful reactor cooling.
Reactor Water Level (Unit 1)
Out of measurement range
7
(mm) 1500 1000
Reactor Pressure (Unit 1)

(MPa [gage]) 8 3/11 16:15 Reactor depressurization started (SRV automatically opened) 3/14 10:05 3/11 15:36 - 3/12 4:58 LPCI and S/C cooling and spray RCIC Operation by RHR(B) (intermittent) 3/14 13:40 Cold shutdown
500 0 -500 -1000 3/11 3/12 3/13 3/14 3/15
5 4
3/11 16:15 Reactor depressurization started (SRV automatically opened)
3 2 1 0 3/11 3/12 3/13 3/14 3/15 3/12 0:00 MUWC started
13
Efforts to Control Temperature and Pressure in PCV

S/C water temperature reached 100C (212F). It eventually increased up to about 130C (266F). Water injected to S/C through Hydrogen Recombiner cooler discharge line in order to mitigate temperature and pressure increases. Alternative injection to reactor using MUWC switched to D/W spray, then S/C spray. S/C temperature decreased after restoration of RHR. EOP includes an alternative water injection measures employing MUWC . Flexible approach to cool S/C using Hydrogen Recombiner worked well.
kPa[gage]
S/C Pressure (Unit 1)

3/14 01:24 RHR(B) started with S/C cooling mode
3/17 20:0320:20 Water transfer from Condenser to S/C via CST to monitor Condenser water level
300
3/13 250 11:3213:26 14:2914:37 200 D/W spray
140 120 100 80 60 40
S/C Temperature (Unit 1)

3/13 11:3213:2614:2914:37 D/W spray
150 100 50 0 3/11
3/12 06:2007:45 S/C injection by FCS(A) 3/12 07:10D/W spray 3/12 07:37S/C spray
20
3/13
0 3/15Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo 3/11 3/17 3/19 3/13 All Electric Power Company,3/15 Inc.
3/12 06:2007:47 S/C injection by FCS(A) 3/12 07:10D/W spray 3/12 07:37S/C spray
3/17
3/19 14
Preparation for Venting

PCIS and SGTS actuated to secure isolation of the PCV and maintained negative pressure of the reactor building. Judging from the increasing PCV pressure trend and projected restoration time, as a back-up plan, TSC decided to make PCV vent line up ready. PCV pressure went up to about 280 kPa [gage] before restoration of RHR, but did not reach its design maximum pressure 310 kPa [gage].
PCV vent line up was made ready as a back-up plan. This would enable feed and breed cooling to avoid potential core damage. (As restoration of cooling capability was successful and cold shutdown was achieved, venting was not conducted actually.)
15

Earthquake Tunami 15:27 14:46
Core Damage Started due to MAAP Analysis
Unit 1 R/B Explosion 15:36

Fuel Range (A) (mm) Fuel )(Bmm Range (B) (mm)
)(Amm
Rx Water Level [mm]
5000 3000
In Operation(Over Scale)
Rx water level data revealed incorrect afterward

3/11 18:00 3/12 0:00 3/12 6:00 3/12 12:00
0(TAF)
-10003/11 12:00 -3000 3/12 18:00 3/13 0:00
1000
Rx Pressure [MPa]
10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00
Rx Pressure (A) (MPa) Rx Pressure (B) (MPa)
3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
D/W & S/C Pressure [MPa]
1.000 0.954MPa abs 0.800 0.600 0.53MPa abs 0.400 0.200 0.000 3/11 12:00
S/C Pressure (A) (MPa) D/W Pressure (B) (MPa)
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
IC HPCI SRV
FP/Fire Engine
14:52 No Operation No Operation
18:18 - 25 21:30
Operation Unclear
4:00 Fresh Water Order for Vent Preparation 0:06
80t
14:53 19:04Sea Water 14:30 D/W Pr decrease confirmed
PCV Vent
Order for Vent 8:03
16

Earthquake 14:46 Tunami 15:27
Rx Water Level [mm]
6000 4000 2000
Unit1 R/B Explosion 15:36
Fuel Range (A) (mm) Fuel Range (B) (mm) CAMS D/W(A)(Sv/ CAMS S/C(A)(Sv/
Impact sound 6:00-6:10

10 8 6 4
In Opera ti on ( Ov er Sca l e)
0(TAF) 0
-2000 3/11 12:00 -4000 3/11 18:00 3/12 0:00 3/12 6:00 3/12 12:00 3/12 18:00 3/13 0:00 3/13 6:00 3/13 12:00 3/13 18:00 3/14 0:00 3/14 6:00 3/14 12:00 3/14 18:00 3/15 0:00 3/15 6:00 3/15 12:00 3/15 18:00
3/16 2 0:00
0
Rx Pressure [MPa]
10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00
3/11 12:00
1.000 0.800 0.600 0.400 0.200 0.000 3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
0.954MPa abs
0.53MPa abs
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
(2:55)
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
RCIC HPCI SRV FP/Fire Engine PCV Vent
Operation confirmed
(13:25)Out
of Service Judged Valve Condition Unclear
No Operation
Depressurization
~18:00
2Valves Open
Order for Sea Water Injection 19:Sea Water Preparation 12:05 (11:00 Vent Line Small Vent Valves Opened Configuration Completed Order for Vent Preparation 17:30 All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
17

Earthquake Tunami 14:46 15:27
Rx Water Level [mm]
6000 4000 2000
I n O pe ratio n ( O ve r S c ale )

3/14 18:00 3/15 0:00
Fuel Range (A) (mm) Fuel Range (B) (mm) Fuel Range (mm) Wide Range (mm)
3/15 6:00 3/15 12:00 3/15 18:00 3/16 0:00
0(TAF) 0
-2000 3/11 12:00 -4000
10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
Rx Pressure [MPa]
8.7MPa 7.44MPa,7.51MPa,7.58MPa 7.0MPa
3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
1.000 0.800 0.600 0.400 0.200 0.000
0.954MPa
0.53MPa abs
3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
(16:03)
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
RCIC HPCI SRV

D/D-FP FP/Fire Engine
(11:36)
Trip
(2:42)
Automatic Start
(12:35)
Stop ~9:08Depressurization
After HPCI shut down, water injection using D/D FP was implemented, however not possible due to high reactor pressure
PCV Vent
Fresh Water 9:25 13:12Sea Water 16:30Sea Water Order for Vent Preparation 17:30 (8:41 Vent Line Configuration Completed All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
Order for Preparation 17:12
(22:15) Stop due to running out of fuel
18
3. How We Responded to the Accident at 1F & 2F Sites?

- What difficulties existed - What were effectively utilized - How the difficulties were overcome - Testimonies
19
What 1F site focused on during March 11-15

Establishing an alternative method to inject water into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) Venting of the primary containment vessel (PCV) Recovery of the most important instrumentations: reactor water level reactor pressure drywell pressure
wet-well (suppression chamber: S/C) pressure

Recovery of the lights in the control rooms and other power supply sources
20
Major Activities at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 Factors disturbing the recovery work (inside the building)
Activities were done in complete darkness due to lack of power sources.
Scram response
Deteriorating operability due to the tsunami Preparations for water injection
Work in complete darkness In the service building. Many scattered objects were also on the floor.
Preparations for venting

Water injection started Venting
Temporary power supply Connect temporary batteries to recover instrumentations.
21
Major Activities at 1F Factors disturbing initial recovery of instrumentations and power supply
Used batteries taken from cars for recovery of important instrumentations. Put Engine-Generators to provide power for the control room lightings and PCV vent valve actuation.
Deteriorated operability due to the tsunami Preparations for water injection
Scram response
Tried to connect a mobile power supply vehicle to P/C 2C/4D with temporary cable. The hydrogen explosion of Unit 1&3 caused damage of the temporary cable.

Hurdles for the work: Darkness and suspensions due to aftershocks, tsunami alarms, Puddles, openings of manholes, debris and other obstacles caused by the tsunami, Influence of the hydrogen explosions
Image of a power supply cart
22
Number of Aftershocks Greater than M 5.0

Cumulative Number of Aftershocks Greater than M 5.0
23
Daily Number of Aftershocks Greater than M 5.0
On March 11th alone 155 times > M 5.0 37 times > M6.0 3 times > M7.0
Total during first week 358 times > M 5.0
3/11
4/1
Dates (from March 11, 2011 to Dec. 5th, 2011)
12/5
Major Activities at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 Factors disturbing the recovery work (inside the buildings)
Instruments were monitored wearing a full face mask with a flashlight in complete darkness
Scram response
Supervising (1) Check indicated values only with a flashlight in complete darkness

Supervising (2) Supervising at a deputy supervisors desk wearing a full face mask in complete darkness
24
Major Activities at 1F Unit 1

<factors disturbing recovery work (outside the building) >
Many obstacles on access routes disturbed access to the field.
Scram response
Vehicles had to avoid passing over fire protection hoses laid in the field. Most of the prepared communication tools between the ERC and the control room were unavailable.

25
Major Activities at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 Containment Vessel Venting Operation (1)
Two valves, a PCV vent valve (MO valve) and a S/C vent valve (AO valve: small) were selected as the target for manual PCV venting operation . Manual valve operation were planned to be conducted by 3 teams with 2 shift workers per team (one worker per team would be difficult due to the total darkness) and shift supervisors and viceScram supervisors were selected to the team members. response Equipment for the teams included fire-resistant clothing, self-contained breathing apparatus, APD, survey meter and flash light. At 9:03, it was confirmed that evacuation from the vicinity of south side of the NPS completed. At 9:04, the team members headed to the site for the venting operation. Deteriorating operability Exhaust Ruptured due to the MO Broke at stack disc MO 210 0.549MPabs tsunami 0.549MPabs Preparations for water injection
Shift workers operation to AO manually open AO 83 Closed valve D/W maximum operating pressure: D/W 0.528MPaabs 0.528MPabs Venting

IA
Solenoid valve
AO AO 90
AO 1
Closed
AO
Closed
pressure: 0.954MPabs
0.954MPaabs

IA

RPV
Cylinder
D/W
MO 213
AO
AO AO 72 Closed All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
Cylinder
Self-contained breathing apparatus 26
Manual Operation to manually open opening PCV vent valve (MO valve) operation 1st team proceeded to site to operate successful PCV vent valve (MO valve) on the 2nd level of the R/B, and implemented operation to open the valve manually. IA Operation to open PCV vent valve (MO valve) successful IA

MO 210
(25% open) 25%
MO
Ruptured disc Broke at 0.549MPabs 0.549MPabs
Air stack
Scram response
AO Closed 83
AO
D/W maximum operating pressure D/W

0.528MPabs
AO 1
Closed AO 90
AO
Closed
Venting pressure 0.954MPabs
Solenoid valve
AO

Cylinder
RPV
D/W
MO 213
AO
Closed AO 72
AO
North-side double door
Cylinder
Solenoid valve

Water injection started Venting R/B 1st level
To 2nd level by southeast stairs South-side double door
PCV vent valve (MO valve) R/B 2nd level
Access route to PCV vent valve (MO valve)
27
Operation to manually open S/C Manual opening MO operation successful vent valve (AO valve) valves 2nd team entered the torus room (R/B AO Manual opening B1F), but the valve was located at a operation abandoned direction of 180 degrees from where the due to high dose AO team entered the torus room. IA AO The survey meter rose up to the limit on the way, and the team members returned. IA AO MO Manual operation was abandoned and another means were selected
MO 210
(25% open) 25% Ruptured disc Broke at 0.549MPabs 0.549MPabs
Air stack
Scram response
AO 83
Closed
D/W maximum operating pressure D/W 0.528MPabs
AO 1
Closed
0.954MPabs
Venting pressure
Solenoid valve
AO 90
Closed
Cylinder
RPV
D/W
AO 213
AO 72
Closed
Cylinder
Solenoid valve
North-side double door

Dose at the north-side double door was high, and southbound course was selected

Water injection started Venting R/B 1st floor
S/C vent valve (AO valve)
South-side double door
Access route to S/C vent valve (AO valve)

R/B B1F
28
What were available for the recovery work after the tsunami?
There were only the following limited number of devices and tools available ! Fire Engines: only a few people knew how to operate them. Flashlights Cable Tools (screwdrivers, etc.) Batteries taken from cars Engine driven Generators* Engine driven Air Compressors* *They were in the warehouses of the affiliated companies and difficult to find.
29
System Status after the Tsunami at 2F

System RHR(A) RHR(A) including cooling systems
RHRC/RCRS(A,C)
Unit 1
inoperable due to the loss of power source and cooling system inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the loss of power source and cooling system inoperable due to submerge inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to submerge inoperable due to the loss of cooling system stand-by
Unit 2
inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the submerge of power source inoperable due to the submerge of power source inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the loss of cooling system stand-by
Unit 3
inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the loss of cooling system stand-by
Unit 4
inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to the submerge of power source inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the loss of cooling system inoperable due to the loss of cooling system stand-by
EECW(A) LPCS EDG(A) RHR(B) RHR(B) including cooling systems

RHRC/RCRS(B,D)
stand-by
EECW(B) RHR(C ) EDG(B) RWCU

MUWC (alternative water injection)
operation
stand-by
operation inoperable due to the loss of cooling system stand-by
MUWC()
RCIC
stand-by
stand-by
stand-by
stand-by
secure (power, pump and motor all working)
malfunction (inoperable due to factor other than power, pump or motor)
loss of function (power, pump or motor inoperable) All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
30
Field Walkdown
In order to establish a well-prioritized restoration strategy, degree of damage and possibility of short-term restoration must be understood through walkdown. Challenges in conducting field walkdown
Under continuous tsunami alerts, walkdown must be done in the field where a lot of debris, openings and flooding areas existed in the dark. Preparation for emergency evacuation in case of further tsunami and other safety measures for personnel going out to the field. Successful access to the field was 6 hours after the tsunami flooding.
Field walkdown after the tsunami

Plant equipment status checked / component functionality verified. Results were summarized and shared at TSC. TSC set priorities on recovery of RHR (B) cooling systems by replacing motors and supplying power from survived electrical buses and mobile power vehicles through temporary cable.
31
Logistics in Emergency Situation

Procurement and transportation of Materials and Equipment
Emergency procurement of motors, cable, mobile power vehicles, fuel oil and mobile transformers with close cooperation between site TSC and corporate ERC. Rated output of some motors were not the same as that of the original motors. TSC determined to install them based on the evaluation of actual load conditions.
Difficulties experienced in logistics

Motors were transported from Toshiba by a chopper of SDF and from Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPP by trucks. Securing redundant communication measures were critically important when major highway was damaged and public cell phone services were disrupted.
Mobile Power Vehicles Necessary materials and equipment prioritized and listed Fuel oil delivery to the site
32
Emergency Restoration Efforts in the Field

Pumps of RHR cooling systems (RHRC, RHRS, EECW) were inspected.
Motors were replaced for pumps in RHRC and EECW.

In order to restore the inundated electrical buses, temporary cable and high voltage mobile power vehicles were deployed.
Temporary cable was laid from survived power cubicles in Rad-Waste Building and Unit 3 Heat Exchanger Building.
Drawing made at TSC for temporary cable laying Motor replacement
33
Recovering Electricity
Temporary cable of 9 km length was laid by about 200 personnel within a day. Usually this size of cable laying requires 20 personnel and more than 1 month period.
After the pumps for RHR cooling systems were restored and temporary cable was laid, RHR (B) of Unit 1 started up at 1:24 on March 14 and other units followed. Finally at 15:42 on March 14 with the start up of Unit 4 RHR, RHR of all four reactors of Fukushima Daini started operation.
34
Temporary Power Supply and Motor Replacement at 2F

About 9 km of temporary cables were laid and motors were replaced.
Unit #4 Hx Building
Unit #3 Hx Building
Unit #2 Hx Building
Unit #1 Hx Building
Mobile Power Supply 6.6kV/480V Truck Transformer (500kVA) Unit #4 Unit #3 Turbine Turbine Unit #4 Reactor Unit #3 Reactor
Mobile Power Supply 6.6kV/480V Truck Transformer (500kVA) Unit #2 Unit #1 Turbine Turbine Unit #2 Reactor Unit #1 Reactor
Temporar y Cables
Rad-Waste Building
TSC
Main Office
35
System Status after Emergency Restoration at 2F

System RHR(A) RHR(A) including cooling systems
RHRC/RCRS(A,C)
Unit 1
inoperable due to loss of power source and cooling system inoperable due to submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to loss of power source and cooling system inoperable due to submerge operation
Unit 2
inoperable due to loss of cooling system inoperable due to submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to submerge of power source and motor inoperable due to loss of cooling system inoperable due to loss of cooling system operation
Unit 3
Unit 4
EECW(A) LPCS EDG(A) RHR(B) RHR(B) including cooling systems

RHRC/RCRS(B,D)
operation
operation
operation
operation
EECW(B) RHR(C ) EDG(B) RWCU

MUWC (alternative water injection)
operation
operation
operation
operation
stand-by operable using tie-line from unit #2 inoperable due to the loss of purge line stand-by inoperable for loss of core pressure
stand-by
stand-by
stand-by
stand-by inoperable due to the loss of purge line stand-by inoperable for loss of core pressure
stand-by inoperable due to the loss of purge line stand-by inoperable for loss of core pressure
stand-by inoperable due to the loss of purge line operation inoperable for loss of core pressure
MUWC(B)
RCIC
secure (power, pump and motor all working)
malfunction (inoperable due to factor other than power, pump or motor)
loss of function (power, pump or motor inoperable) All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
36
Overview of the 10-Unit Simultaneous Accidents

Date
1F 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2
3/11 15:27 1st Tsunami, 15:35 2nd Tsunami
2F 3 4
3/11 15:22~ Tsunamis
3/11
Station Black-Out
3/12 8:13 D/G-6B
3/12
3/12 15:36 Unit 1 Explosion
3/12 12:15
Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink

3/13
3/14 1:24 RHR 3/14 7:13 RHR 3/14 15:42 RHR 3/14 17:00 3/14 18:00 3/15 7:15
3/14
3/14 11:01 Unit 3 Explosion
3/15 6:00-6:10 Unit 4 Explosion (?)
3/15
3/16-19
3/19 5:00 RHR
3/19 22:14 RHR
3/20
3/20 15:46 P/C-2C
3/20 15:46 P/C-2C
3/22 10:36 P/C-4D
3/22 10:35 P/C-4D
3/20 14:30
3/20 14:30
Cold Shutdown
37
Testimonies from the Field (Operators)

In an attempt to check the status of Unit 4 D/G, I was trapped inside the security gate compartment. Soon the tsunami came and I was a few minutes before drowning, when my colleague smash opened the window and saved my life. In total darkness, I could hear the unearthly sound of SRV dumping steam into the torus. I stepped on the torus to open the S/C spray valve, and my rubber boot melted. The radiation level in the main control room was increasing 0.01 mSv (1 mrem) every 3 seconds but I couldnt leaveI felt this was the end of my life. I asked for volunteers to manually open the vent valves. Young operators raised their hands as well; I was overwhelmed. Unit 3 could explode anytime soon, but it was my turn to go to the main control room. I called my dad and asked him to take good care of my wife and kids should I die.
38
Testimonies from the Field (Maintenance Persons)

We saw our car crashed by the explosion of the Unit 3. If we had gotten on the car a few minutes earlier, all of us would have been dead. We were replacing fire hoses when the explosion of Unit 3 occurred. We felt almost dying since many large rubbles were falling down to us. I urgently ran underneath a nearby fire engine. One of my colleagues got injuries in his leg and stomach. There were so many manholes opened by the tsunami. In order to lay cables, we had to proceed step by step carefully checking safety in the complete darkness. We were working in the Unit 3/4 control room when the explosion occurred. I was resigned to my fate. Dose rate was going up in the room after the explosion and we desperately tried to find places with lower dose rate. After replacing an air cylinder for the PCV ventilation of Unit 3, I heard sound of steam and saw white mist around us. I got into a panic for a while.
39
4. Summary
40
Summary of Lessons Learned

The 1F accident was caused by the simultaneous loss of multiple safety functions due to far beyond design basis of tsunami. The main factors of the accident are the simultaneous loss of total AC power and DC power for a extended period of time and the loss of the heat removal function of the emergency seawater system for a extended period of time. Preparations had been previously made to receive power from neighboring units in the event that AC power and DC power were not available. During the accident, direct tsunami damage was so widespread that the neighboring units were all in the same condition.
Carefully consider the robustness of current design of nuclear power plants and emergency preparedness against beyond design basis events that could lead to common cause failures regardless of their assumed probability demonstrating a continuous learning organization.
41
Technical Lessons Learned

Success path regarding Cooling and Heat Removal from the Reactor
1)Promptly initiate core injection 2)Initiate depressurization methods before losing methods using high-pressure cooling of high-pressure cooling water injection function water injection equipment 3)Stable low-pressure cooling water injection methods should be available during the depressurization stage
4)Provide reliable PCV venting methods (heat removal through the atmospheric discharge of heat)
5)Provide measures to restore the cooling function using sea water
6)Provide measures which enable necessary monitoring for those operation and plant conditions.
It is inevitable to maintain water injection and core cooling function thoroughly and continuously even in poor environmental conditions.
42
2F Key Success Factors

Organization and Management Features Accident mitigation by applying EOP and AMG Prioritized restoration strategy based on Field Walkdown Prompt restoration with success of emergency procurement for materials and equipment Logistics for long term emergency response Organizational integrity: Leadership, Communication, Accountability, Professionalism
Design/Engineering Features
Availability of most of M/C, P/C and Battery Availability of off-site power
43
Website Information
TEPCO English website
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/index-e.html
Internal Investigation Committee Interim Report (Dec. 2nd, 2011)

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11120205-e.html
Report on initial responses to the accident (Dec. 22nd,2011) The Latest version of accident Timeline (Dec.22nd, 2011)
English version will be on the following website soon.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11122208-e.html
INPOSpecial Report on Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/reports/special-reporton-the-nuclear-accident-at-the-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-station
EPRIFukushima Daini Independent Review and Walkdown

http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?Abstract_id=000000000001023422
44
Thank you for your attention!
45
5. References
46
Intensity of the earthquake at the power stations

In Fukushima Daiichi the observed data partially exceeded the maximum response acceleration with respect to the design-basis earthquake, however most data was below the baseline
Observed Data
Observation Point (The lowest basement of reactor buildings) Maximum Response Acceleration (gal) Horizontal (N-S) 460* 348* 322* 281* 311* 298* 254 243 277* 210* Horizontal (E-W) 447* 550* 507* 319* 548* 444* 230* 196* 216* 205* Vertical 258* 302* 231* 200* 256* 244 305 232* 208* 288* Maximum Response Acceleration against Basic Earthquake Ground Motion (Gal) Horizontal (N-S) 487 441 449 447 452 445 434 428 428 415 Horizontal (E-W) 489 438 441 445 452 448 434 429 430 415 Vertical 412 420 429 422 427 415 512 504 504 504
Unit 1 Unit 2 Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 1 Fukushima Daini Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4
*: The records were stopped approximately 130-150 seconds after recording started.
Note) Standard ground motion Ss: Seismic motion that was newly established to evaluate seismic safety, taking into account the earthquakes, etc., that could occur around the power station, based on the revised seismic design review guidelines. All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
47
47
Intensity of the earthquake at the power stations

In Fukushima daiich observation record partially exceeded the design-basis earthquake ground motion, however it was confirmed to be almost the same level
Fukushima daiich Unit 2W-E
(Gal)
(Gal)
Fukushima daini
Unit 3N-S
550 550
800 400 0 -400 -800
0
2FZ2011031114463R2_NS 2F3_mat_Ss-1H_NS 50 2F3_mat_Ss-2H_NS times 100 2F3_mat_Ss-3H_NS Res_1FZ2011031114461R2_EW.waz Observation records Res_1f1_Ss-1_mat_EW.waz Design-basis seismic ground motion Ss-1H Res_1f1_Ss-2_mat_EW.waz Design-basis seismic () ground motion Ss-2H Res_1f1_Ss-3_mat_EW.waz Design-basis seismic ground motion Ss-3H
(h=0.05)
800 400 0 -400

Res_1FZ2011031114462R2_EW.waz Res_1f2_Ss-1_mat_EW.waz Res_1f2_Ss-2_mat_EW.waz 50 times 100 Res_1f2_Ss-3_mat_EW.waz Res_1FZ2011031114461R2_EW.waz Observation records Res_1f1_Ss-1_mat_EW.waz Design-basis seismic ground motion Ss-1H Res_1f1_Ss-2_mat_EW.waz Design-basis seismic () ground motion Ss-2H Res_1f1_Ss-3_mat_EW.waz Design-basis seismic ground motion Ss-3H
(h=0.05)
277 277
Acceleration Gal
Acceleration Gal
-800 0
3000
2000
150
150
(h=0.05)
3000
2000
(h=0.05)
Acceleration Gal
Acceleration Gal
1500 2000
1500 2000
1000

(Gal)

1000
(Gal) 1000
500
(Gal) (Gal) 1000

500
0 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5
0 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5
0 0.02
0.05
0.1
()
0.2
0.5
0 0.02
0.05
0.1
0.2 ()
0.5
() periods
periods ()
48
Inundated Areas at 1F
Inundation throughout almost all areas where main buildings sited
Units 1~4: Inundation height in areas where principal buildings sited: OP approx. 11.5m~15.5m (Localized inundation height in southwest area: OP approx. 16m~17m) Unit 5 & 6: Inundation height in areas where principal buildings sited: OP approx. 13m~14.5m
Almost whole area was flooded
Fukushima Daiichi
Unit 6
Unit 5
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4 Radwaste Processing building
Elevation of major Unit-5,6 buildings: O.P.13m
Elevation of major Unit-1-4 buildings: O.P.10m
C)GeoEye
49
Location of Openings from which Sea Water could Flow into Main Buildings
(Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station)
O .P.+4 m O .P.+4 m
Unit 6
Unit 5
Turbine building Reactor building
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
O .P.+1 0 m
O .P.+1 3 m
Unit 6 D/G building
Openings at the ground level from which sea water could flow into buildings Openings connected to underground trenches/ducts where sea water could flow into buildings
3u Emergency D/G air inlet louver
50
Inundated Areas at 2F
Inundation occurred throughout all areas along the sea, but it was not observed to have inundated over the slope and into areas where major buildings are sited. Run up of tsunami centered on the south side of Unit 1
Inundation height in sea side area: OP approx. +7.0~7.5m Inundation height in areas where principal buildings sited: OP approx. 12~14.5m Inundation height in area south of Unit 1: OP approx. + 15~16m
Limited area was flooded
Inflowed intensively
Unit 4 Unit 3 Unit 2 Unit 1
Elevation of major Unit-1-4 buildings: O.P.12m
C)GeoEye
51
Location of Openings from which Sea Water could flow into Main Buildings
(Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station)
Inside Unit 1 heat exchanger building
Units 3 & 4 Sea side of turbine building
Heat exchanger building
Turbine building Reactor building
Unit 4
Unit 3
Unit 2
Unit 1
Openings at the ground level from which sea water could flow into buildings Openings connected to underground trenches/ducts where sea water could flow into buildings
52
52
Tsunami Height @1F v.s. 2F
The new design basis Tsunami height for 1F & 2F were evaluated based on the JSCE Tsunami assessment methodology. (1F: O.P.+5.7m, 2 F: O.P.+5.2m) The countermeasures were implemented at both NPSs, such as pump motor elevation raised @1F and openings sealed @2F, that were all equivalent from the viewpoint of resistance against Tsunami hazard. The 15m class Tsunami caused by M9.0 class earthquake that accidentally attacked 1F was far beyond design basis and whatever evaluation and whatever countermeasures did not matter at this time. 1F
Design basis Assumed highest tsunami height tsunami water level level O.P.+5.7m O.P. +5.7m
Main building area Inundation height Safety measures has apx. O.P. +14-15m taken against 5.7m Tsunami height Turbine building Site level O.P. +4m
Water Pump
Ocean-side area
49
Reactor building
Base level O.P. 0m breakwater
Site level O.P. +10m (Units 1-4*) * Site level on Units 5 and 6 is O.P. +13m
Main building area
Water intake
2F
Design basis tsunami height O.P.+5.2m
Ocean-side area
Inundation height apx. O.P. +6.5 - 7m Safety measures has taken against 5.2m Tsunami height Site level Hx building O.P. +4m Site level O.P. +12m breakwater Water intake
Reactor building
Turbine building
Base level O.P.0m
O.P.Onahama Point
53
Differences in Tsunami that hit Fukushima Daiichi and Daini NPSs

Fukushima Daiichi
Tsunami of various magnitudes at a depth of around 150m were amplified at the same rate and struck at each nuclear power station Fukushima Daini
Postulated Tsunami Model
14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 10
Peaks coinciding Tsunami height: High
Maximum tsunami height m
Same amplification rate

50 [m] Water depth [m] 100
150
Peaks not coinciding Tsunami height: Low
Sea floor displacement [m]
Time T
Water level fluctuation from each block
Warm colored blocks generated massive tsunami wave heights
54
54
Permitted Design Basis(1) Tsunami assessment

Historical tsunamis of Iwate and Miyagi coast were larger than that of Fukushima Approved design basis at Fukushima NPS was 3.1-3.7m
3.11.2011 tsunami heights (m)
Historical tsunami heights (m)
Inundation Run-up
Fukushima NPSs Fukushima NPSs

Preliminary results by The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Joint Survey Group( http://www.coastal.jp/ttjt/) 07 May 2011
Tsunami assessment in construction permit

Unit Ground Level R/B,Tb/B m Pumps m Tsunami Heightm Design Basis Modified in 2002 (2009) 11 march 2011
1F 1-4
1F 5-6 2F1-4
10.2
13.2 12
4
4 7
3.1
3.1 3.7
5.7 (6.1)
5.2
14-15
7-7.5 55
Permitted Design Basis(2) Tsunami assessment

Tsunami Assessment was revised based on the JSCE (Japan Society of Civil Engineers) Method,2002
English edition http://www.jsce.or.jp/committee/ceofnp/Tsunami/eng/tsuna mi_eng.html
In JSCE- 2002, assumed 8 earthquakes individually. March 11 Earthquake occurred over several areas simultaneously.
Earthquake
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5
Magnitude
8.2 8.4 8.3 8.6 8.2
Earthquake
1952 Nemuro-oki 1968 Tokachi-oki 1896 Meiji-Sanriku 1611 Keicho-Sanriku 1793 Miyagi-oki
#6
#7 #8 2011/3/11 source area
7.7
7.9 8.1
1978 Miyagi-oki
1938 Fukushima-oki 1677 Enpo-Bousou
All Rights Reserved 2011The 2011/3/18 http://outreach.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/eqvolc/201103_tohoku/#Inversion Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
56
Damage Status of Unit 1 & 2 Emergency DG and Emergency High Voltage Switchboard (Immediately after the Tsunami)
Unit 1
Equipm ent Installed building Installe d floor
Possi bility of use Status
Unit 2
Equipme nt Installed location Installed floor
Pos sibili ty of use Status
DG 1A
T/B
B1FL
Submerged
DG 2A
T/B
B1FL
Submerged M/C submerged cannot be used Submerged
DG
DG 1B
T/B
B1FL
Submerged
DG 2B
Shared pool T/B
1FL
M/C 1C
T/B
1FL
Water damage Water damage
M/C 2C
B1FL
(M/C) Emerge ncy high voltage switchb oard
M/C 1D
T/B
1FL
M/C 2D
T/B
B1FL
Submerged
M/C 2E
Shared pool
B1FL
Submerged
57
Unit 3
Equipme nt Installed location Installe d floor
Unit 4
Possi bility of use
Status Equipme nt Installed location Install ed floor
Pos sibili ty of use
Status
DG 3A
T/B
B1FL
Submerge d
DG 4A
T/B
B1FL
Submerged (Construction in progress) M/C submerged cannot be used
DG
DG 3B
T/B
B1FL
Submerge d
DG 4B
Shared pool
1FL
Submerged (Inspection in progress) Submerged
(M/C) Emerge ncy high voltage switch board
M/C 3C
T/B
B1FL
Submerge d
M/C 4C
T/B
B1FL
M/C 3D
T/B
B1FL
Submerge d
M/C 4D
T/B Shared pool
B1FL
M/C 4E
B1FL
Submerged
58
Unit 5
Equipme nt Installed location Install ed floor Po ssi bilit y of use Status Equipment
Unit 6
Installed location Install ed floor Pos sibili ty of use Status
DG 5A
T/B
B1FL
Related equipment Water damage Related equipment Water damage
DG 6A
R/B
B1FL
Related equipment Water damage
DG 5B
T/B
B1FL
DG 6B
DG building
1FL
HPCSD/G
R/B
B1FL
Related equipment Water damage
(M/C) Emerge ncy high voltage switchb oard
M/C 5C
T/B
B1FL
Submerged
M/C 6C
R/B
B2FL
M/C 5D
T/B
B1FL
Submerged
M/C 6D HPCS DG M/C
R/B
B1FL
R/B
1FL
59
Fukushima Daiichi: DG System Outline

Sea water-cooled DG (10)
Unit 1 (A)(B), Unit 2 (A), Unit 3 (A)(B), Unit 4 (A), Unit 5 (A)(B), Unit 6 (A)(H)
Sea
Sea water pump
D/G Heat exchanger
All function was lost after the tsunami
Air-cooled DG (3)
Unit 2 (B), Unit 4 (B), Unit 6(B)
Outside air
Cooling water pump
Air cooler
Heat exchanger
D/G
Power was secured in Unit 6 (B) only
[Fukushima Daini: DG System Outline]

Sea water-cooled DG (12)
Unit 1 to Unit 4(A)(B)(H)

Sea
Sea water pump
Heat exchanger
Cooling water pump
D/G
Power was secured in Unit 3 (B)(H) and Unit 4 () only

60
Power Access/Restoration Status Immediately after 1F-1,2 Shutdown

Date March 11 Operation and Restoration Status Temporary MCR lighting on (Temporary small engine generator) Power source for Unit 1 Instrument restored (Temporary small engine generator) Power source for Unit 1 Instrument restored (power source cart)
March 12
Temporary small engine generator destroyed by H2 explosion
Temporary MCR lighting on (another temporary small engine generator)

March 19 March 20 Backup transformer ~ Unit 1 & 2 temporary M/C (A) cable laid Off-site power restored (P/C2C power received)
61
Power Access/Restoration Status Immediately after 1F-3,4 Shutdown
Date March 11 March 13
Operation and Restoration Status Temporary MCR lighting on (Temporary small engine generator) P/C 4D restored (power source cart)
Yonomori Line 1L step-down transformer cart (66/6.9kW) connected to the Shin-Fukushima Substation
March 14 Yonomori Line 1L ~ Okuma Line 3L connected Power source for Unit 1 Instrument restored (power source cart) The power source cart destroyed by H2 explosion March 18 March 22 Unit 3 & 4 MC, Switch installation location Off-site power restored (P/C4D power received)
62
Power Access/Restoration Status Immediately after 1F-6 Shutdown

Date Operation and Restoration Status
March 11
DG6B startup (6A and 6H were shut down by the tsunami, 6B is an air-cooled type
SGTS(B) startup, DC125V/250V (B system) restoration
March 12 March 13
DC125V/250V (A system) restoration MUWC(B) startup RHR 6B startup, temporary RHRS alternative pump startup (power source cart) DG6A startup (March 21 shutdown)
March 19
March 20 March 22 March 23
Cold shutdown condition Off-site power restored (M/C6C, 6D power received) Temporary RHRS alternative pump switched to off-site power
63
Power Access/Restoration Status Immediately after 1F-5 Shutdown

Date March 12 March 13 March 18 Operation and Restoration Status DC125V/250 restoration MUWC(A), SGTS(A) startup Temporary RHRS alternative pump startup (power source cart)
March 19
March 20 March 22 March 23
RHR 5C startup
Cold shutdown condition Off-site power restored (M/C6C, 6D power received) Temporary RHRS alternative pump switched to off-site power
64
Recovery Process of I&C equipments @1F (1/2)

After tsunami Total loss of instrumentations due to loss of offsite power and DC 125V
March 11-14: to install temporary batteries to important instrumentations, such as reactor water level, reactor pressure, D/W pressure, S/C pressure etc. (1F-1-3: March 11, 1F-5/6: March 14) and to start to obtain plant data
March 22-25: to recover AC 120V bus for I&C (1F1: March 23, 1F2: March 25, 1F3/4: March 22)
Present: to prioritize the recovery of redundant instrumentations for their reliability and to change step by step from temporary battery to original power source
65
Recovery Process of I&C equipments @1F (2/2)

May 9: to go into R/B to calibrate the D/W pressure instrument @1F1 May 10-12: to calibrate the fuel zone reactor water level instrument @1F1
- water level assumed as lower than -500cm of TAF
June 3-4: to install the temporary reactor pressure and pressure instrument at the test line of fuel zone reactor water level instrument @1F1, to obtain more precise data on reactor pressure and water level June 22-24: to install the temporary reactor pressure and pressure instrument at the test line of fuel zone reactor water level instrument @1F2
- not successful due to rapid evaporation of water inside instrumentation line by high PCV temperature
66
Current status of important instrumentations @1F

Paramete r/unit
Reactor water level
Reactor pressure Reactor water temp. Temperatur e around RPV D/W pressure S/C pressure CAMS rad monitor S/C temparature
1F1

1F2

1F3

1F4
N/A N/A
1F5

1F6

Not sampled
Not sampled
Not sampled
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
D/W S/C
D/W S/C
D/W S/C
N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
67
calibrated, assumed to be intact, under continuous observation, failure

Unit 1 Isolation Condenser

Function of the Isolation condenser
Depressurization of the reactor by steam condensation during reactor Isolation (MSIV closure condition) Redundancy design(2 systems)
Heated water in the tank released to the open air
system
Reactor steam is cooled by Isolation condenser coolant tank
Open to the Air system
Isolation Condensor
2A
MO
2B
MO
MO
MO
1A
MO
1B MSIV
MO
RPV
10B
10A 3A
MO
4A
MO
PLR PP
Pure water make up system Fire protection system

MO
MO
Condensate water return back to RPV driven by natural convection force
3B
4B
Initiating system by opening the valve
Primary Containment
68
1F Unit 1 Schematic System Diagram (After Tsunami )

Stack
D/W vent valve
SRV
IC
RPV
Tb
Condenser
Gen
W
H/W
SLC
Sea :Operable
CP
S/C vent valve
RFP
CRD
:Inoperative due to power loss : Briefly

Operative
CS
CCS
CCSW
from CST H/W
CST HPCI
MUWC DD FP Filtrated Water Tank
Sea
D/G
Sea
69
Summary of the Plant Behavior in Unit 1 (1/2)

The automatic isolation interlock of the IC was actuated due to the loss of power caused by the tsunami and then lost its function. Afterwards, the reactor water level decreased in a short period of time and the core was exposed (Dropped to TAF), leading to the core damage. During this time, it was difficult to understand plant status due to the loss of power.
Based on the analysis results, it is evaluated that the core would have been damaged regardless of the continuation of the operation of the IC after 18:18.
When the water level gauge was temporarily restored using a temporary power source after 21:00 on March 11, a reading was obtained showing that the reactor water level was above TAF. However at this point, there was not enough information to comprehensively determine that this reading was erroneous. At the Emergency Response Headquarters on the site and the Head Office, it was not deemed at this point that the IC had stopped. The possibility of the core damage was recognized due to the increase in dose rate in front of the double doors of the reactor building at around 23:00 on March 11 and the unusually high reading for the dry well pressure that was obtained for the first time at around 0:00 on March 12.
70
Summary of the Plant Behavior in Unit 1 (2/2)

On March 12 at around 3:00, the reactor pressure decreased, although reactor depressurization operation was not conducted. This implies that damage to the reactor cooling water pressure boundary had occurred due to core damage. This implies that core damage might have progressed to a considerable extent in a short period of time. Based on the results using the accident analysis codes, it took about 3 hours to drop to TAF after the earthquake and about 4 hours until core damage began, which indicates the rapid event progress to the core damage. This result is consistent with the events actually observed.
71
1F Unit 2 Schematic System Diagram (After Tsunami)

Stack
SRV D/W vent valve
Tb
RPV
Condenser H/W
Gen
W
Sea
LPCP
SLC
MDRFP S/C vent valve TDRFP
:Operable :Inoperative due to power loss :Inoperative
CRD
HPCP
CS RHRS Sea
RHR
from CST H/W
HPCI RCIC
CST CST
D/G
MUWC DD FP
Filtrated Water Tank
Sea
72
Summary of the Plant Behavior in Unit 2

As the RCIC of Unit 2 functioned for a relatively long period of time, the core
decay heat was lower than immediately after shutdown. However as the highpressure systems (RCIC) lost its function, decrease in the reactor water level started.
About 1 hour and 20 minutes later after the RCIC shutdown, the fire engines
pump was started up and preparations for low-pressure water injection were ready. However the SRV did not immediately operate during reactor depressurization.
It is considered that core damage occurred because low-pressure water injection

did not function immediately after the SRV was activated and reactor depressurization was achieved. Because of the rapid decrease in the retained water due to the outflow of steam to the S/C associated with reactor depressurization, cooling function degraded furthermore.
According to the analysis by using the MAAP code, it is evaluated that core
damage started due to the decrease in reactor water level followed by degradation of the function of the RCIC.
73
1F Unit 3 Schematic System Diagram (After Tsunami)

Stack
SRV
D/W vent valve RPV
Tb
Condenser H/W
Gen
W
Sea :Operable
LPCP
SLC
MDRFP S/C vent valve TDRFP
:Inoperative due to power loss :Inoperative
CRD
HPCP
HPCI CS RHRS Sea
RHR
from CST H/W
CST CST
RCIC
D/G
MUWC DD FP
Filtrated Water Tank
Sea
74
Summary of the Plant Behavior in Unit 3

In Unit 3, preparations for low-pressure water injection were performed by
activating the diesel-driven fire pump. However, because the reactor pressure was higher than the water injection pressure, switching to low-pressure water injection was not immediately successful after shutdown of the high-pressure systems (HPCI). This caused degradation of cooling and thus leading to core damage.
S/C venting was conducted and repeated several times. The monitoring car
reading near the main gate increased temporarily. However no large increase in the background level was observed.
In addition, the hydrogen that was generated following the core damage was not
completely retained in the PCV and leaked into the reactor building, and is considered to have caused the explosion of the reactor building.
75

The Facts in The Recovery Process of Fukushima Nuclear Accident (Kawano)

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The Facts in the Recovery Process of Fukushima Nuclear Accident

All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Unit 1Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4

Unit 4 Unit 3 Unit 2 Unit 1

All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Power supply of Unit 1-4 @ 1F after Tsunami

Shutdown by earthquake Shutdown by Tsunami

Power supply of Unit 5/6 @ 1F after Tsunami

5D HPCS Shutdown by earthquake

Shutdown by Tsunami Survived after tsunami DG HPCS DG 6A

All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Damages of transmission line & Shinfukushima substation by earthquake

275kV Circuit Breaker

All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

2F Offsite Power was secured after the Tsunami

Unit #1, 2 STr

Unit #3, 4 STr

Emergency Power for Unit #1

Emergency Power for Unit #2

Emergency Power for Unit #3

Emergency Power for Unit #4

All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Integrity of Power Supply System After the Tsunami at 1F and 2F

2F:Off-site power survived

Unit 2 Power panel DG 2A

Unit 4 Power panel DG 4A

Can/can not be used

(*2) (*2) (*2)

DG 2B (*1) air-cooled M/C 2C M/C 2D M/C 2E M/C 2A M/C 2B M/C 2SA

DG 4B (*1) air-cooled M/C 4C M/C 4D M/C 4E M/C 4A M/C 4B

M/C 1C M/C 1D M/C 1A M/C 1

M/C 6.9KV M/C

P/C 1C P/C 1D P/C 1A

Sea water system

Sea Water System

*1 functionality lost due to inundation of power panels

All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

2. How the accident developed and was stabilized at 1F & 2F Sites?

All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Progress made by each plant towards cold shutdown (outline)

Fukushima Daiichi Units 5 & 6

Fukushima Daini Units 1 - 4

Units 1-3 in operation Unit 4: outage in progress

[Power supply] Emergency DG 6B start up [Sea water system] Total loss

Units 1, 2, 4 Water injection using MUWC

3/14 RHR startup

3/20 Units 5, 6 cold shutdown

2F Unit 1 Plant Parameter and Operation

Rx Water Level [mm]

7000 5000 3000 1000 -1000 3/11 12:00

D/W & S/C Rx Pressure Pressure [MPa] [MPa]

8.7MPa abs 7.47,7.54,7.61MPa abs 7.0MPa abs

1.000 0.800 0.600 0.400 0.200 0.000

S/C Pressure (MPa) D/W Pressure (MPa)

Response at Main Control Room and TSC

MSIVs closed manually, and reactor pressure controlled by SRVs.

Heat rejection by opening SRVs

Suppression Temperature Chamber increase (S/C)

Reactor depressurized and RCIC stopped due to steam pressure decrease.

Heat Exchanger Building Inoperable by Tsunami flooding flooding

All Rights Reserved 2011The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

(2) (2) (*2)