Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Save to My Library
Look up keyword or section
Like this
1Activity

Table Of Contents

1.1 The “Rational Man”
1.2 The Traditional Economist’s Position
1.3 The Attack on the Traditional Approach
1.4 Experimental Evidence
1.5 Comments
1.6 Bibliographic Notes
1.7 Projects
2.1 Motivation
2.2 Preparing the Tools: Similarity Relations
2.3 A Procedure of Choice between Vectors
2.4 Analysis
2.5 Case-Based Theory
2.6 Bibliographic Notes
2.7 Projects
3.1 Knowledge and Bounded Rationality
3.2 Information Structure
3.3 The Set-Theoretical Deªnition of Knowledge
3.4 Kripke’s Model
3.5 The Impact of the Timing of Decisions and Having More Information
3.6 On the Possibility of Speculative Trade
3.7 Bibliographic Notes
3.8 Projects
4.1 Imperfect Recall
4.2 An Extensive Decision Making Model with Imperfect Information
4.3 Perfect and Imperfect Recall
4.4 Time Consistency
4.5 The Role of Randomization
4.6 The Multiselves Approaches
4.7 On the Problematics of Using the Model
4.8 Bibliographic Notes
4.9 Projects
5.1 Optimal Information Structures
5.2 What Is “High” and What Is “Low”?
5.3 Manipulating Informational Restrictions
5.4 Perceptrons
5.5 Bibliographic Notes
5.6 Projects
6.1 Introduction
6.3 Processing Information
6.4 Aggregating Preferences
6.5 Bibliographic Notes
6.6 Projects
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Interactions Between Luce Players
7.3 A Game with Procedurally Rational Players
7.4 Limited Foresight in Extensive Games
7.5 Bibliographic Notes
7.6 Projects
8.1 Introduction
8.2 The Model of the Repeated Game: A Brief Review
8.3 Strategies as Machines in Inªnitely Repeated Games
8.4 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games
8.5 The Structure of Machine Game Equilibria
8.6 Repeated Extensive Games
8.7 Concluding Remarks
8.8 Bibliographic Notes
8.9 Projects
9.1 Motivation
9.2 Implementation of Strategies by Machines
9.3 Counting is Costly
9.4 Bounded Capability to Count
9.5 Machines Also Send Messages
9.6 The -Equilibrium Approach: A Deviation Is Costly
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Informal Results on Computability
10.3 Is There a “Rational Player”?
10.4 Turing Machine Game
10.5 Bibliographic Notes
10.6 Projects
11.1 Simon’s Critique
11.2 Response
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
br

br

Ratings: (0)|Views: 45 |Likes:
Published by Oscar Benítez

More info:

Published by: Oscar Benítez on Mar 27, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

03/27/2012

pdf

text

original

You're Reading a Free Preview
Pages 5 to 19 are not shown in this preview.
You're Reading a Free Preview
Pages 24 to 119 are not shown in this preview.
You're Reading a Free Preview
Page 124 is not shown in this preview.
You're Reading a Free Preview
Pages 129 to 184 are not shown in this preview.
You're Reading a Free Preview
Pages 189 to 220 are not shown in this preview.

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->