Premodern military commanders made use of advisers, but they generally derided thinking andexalted fighting. Shakespeare summed up their attitude nicely in Troilus and Cressida, when hehad Ulysses complain:They tax our policy and call it cowardice,Count wisdom as no member of the war,Forestall prescience and esteem no actBut that of hand. The still and mental partsThat do contrive how many hands shall strikeWhen fitness calls them on, and know by measureOf their observant toil the enemy's weight,Why, this hath not a finger's dignity.They call this "bed-work," "mapp'ry," "closet-war."So that the ram that batters down the wall,For the great swinge and rudeness of his poiseThey place before his hand that made the engine,Or those that with the finesse of their soulsBy reason guide his execution.In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this attitude started to change with the emergence of army quartermasters, who were responsible for scouting terrain, planning marching routes andencampments, and furnishing supplies. French military historians trace the modern general staff to an 1801 pamphlet by the adjutant Paul Thiébault; their German counterparts, to an 1801memorandum by Colonel Christian von Massenbach. Both documents mention intelligence.Thiébault proposed creating a general staff divided into four bureaus, one of which would dealwith spies, guides, and prisoner exchanges. Massenbach, then a quartermaster, noted thatofficials "must know not only their own country, they must also know the neighboring states;they must not only be in the position to indicate those positions that we, under certain conditions,would have to take, but also those which the enemy commander, under these very conditions,would take, and would have to take."