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Backgrounder: What to know about the upcoming P5+1-Iran summit
Bryan Gold
13 April, 2012
he Iranian nuclear program is one o the most polarizing issues acingthe international community since its public disclosure in 2002. Overthe past decade, the program has signicantly expanded and tensionsover it have continually increased. Both Israel and the United States have de-clared that Iran will not be permitted to produce a nuclear weapon and that “alloptions are on the table” to prevent it rom doing so.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned the world that Israel’s “window o opportunity” or successul military action against the Iranian nuclear program is slowly clos-ing. Mr. Netanyahu views the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat to the Stateo Israel and believes that the current sanctions regime, while painul, has yet to aect theprogram.
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President Obama has sought to dissuade Israel rom attacking Iran beore diplomacy hasbeen attempted and as a result,sanctions have been tightened. Mr. Obama told the Ameri-can Israel Public Aairs Committee at their most recent meeting that, “For the sake o Israel’ssecurity, America’s security, and the peace and security o the world, now is not the time orbluster.”
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Te President believes that Israeli military action may destabilize the region andsuch actions would embolden the current Iranian regime.Increased tensions stemming rom a November 2011 IAEA report, which detail Iranian work on nuclear weapons research, and ears o military action has driven up oil prices; romroughly $80 a barrel beore the report to a height o $110 a barrel last month.
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Heightenedtensions and the start o spring and summer driving seasons has increased the national aver-age price o gasoline to $3.93 a gallon, nearing the mythical $4.00 a gallon mark.
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As the rhetoric continues, sanctions levied against Iran are widening and their impact isgreater than ever. Headlined by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Di-vestment Act (CISADA) and the more recent Section 1245 o the 2012 National Deense Authorization Act (NDAA), sanctions have been exceptionally eective at reducing Iran’s oilexports and isolating it rom the international banking system.
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SWIF, a global banking communications rm, recently cut o 30 Iranian banks rom itssystem, making international monetary transers increasingly dicult.
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Tis will complicateIran’s repatriation o billions o dollars in international oil sales and other nancial dealings,
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and has put urther pressure on Iran’s currency value and oreign currency reserves.
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Due to these and other international sanctions, Iran’s crude oil production has been declining aster than previ-ous estimates as European and Japanese reneries drastically cut their Iranian oil imports. JPMorgan estimatesthat Iranian crude production could all 1 million bpd (barrels per day) to 2.5 million bpd by the end o Junecompared to the pre-sanctions rate o 3.55 million bpd at the end o 2011.
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On January 26th, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad oered to restart negotiations over Iran’s nuclearprogram that had been stalled or more than a year. It is hard to determine how much the current sanctionsregime has persuaded the Iranian government to restart negotiations.Te international community quickly responded to the oer and on March 6th, the P5+1 agreed to ace-to-ace negotiations with the Iranians.
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However, some worry that Iran is simply buying time to allow continuedUranium enrichment and construct o its Fordow enrichment site.Both sides moved orward with the talks by agreeing to meet in Istanbul on April 13th. However on April 5th,two Iranian ocials, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the head o the Parliamentary Committee or National Security andForeign Policy, and Mohsen Rezayee, the secretary o the Iranian Expediency Council expressed concerns overthe choice o Istanbul as the location or upcoming talks.
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Mr. Boroujerdi declared that “Iranian ocials are not interested in urkey as the host,” due to urkey’s escalat-ing pressure on Syria, a key Iranian ally. Mr. Rezayee suggested the talks should be moved the more “neutral”cities o Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, or an unnamed city in China instead o Istanbul.On April 6th Iranian lawmaker Gholamreza Mesbahi Moghadam, stated that Iran has the scientic capacity toproduce a nuclear weapon, but will never do so.1
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Tis is the rst time that such a prominent Iranian gurehas declared Iran’s nuclear weapons capability.Fortunately, on April 8th, the Islamic Republic agreed to hold talks in urkey, ending a war o words betweenIran and urkish Prime Minister Recep ayyip Erdoğan.
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United States’ Position and Possible Demands
he United States’ aims or the talks are straightorward. President Obama wants to de-ang the Iraniannuclear program by dismantling acilities and removing Iran’s stockpile o 20% enriched Uranium. TeObama Administration has also publicly committed to preventing Iran rom producing a nuclear weapon. Administration ocials recently released its demands or the conerence, starting with the complete closingand dismantling o the Fordo enrichment acility located under a mountain near the city o Qom.Fordo began operations in January o 2012 and estimated to hold approximately 3,000 centriuges enrichingUranium up to 20%. Te Fordo acility’s location in a hardened mountainside tunnel makes it dicult todestroy by aerial bombardment.Te Administration is also calling or the halt in the production o 20% enriched Uranium and the removalo Iran’s 20% stockpile.
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Iran currently holds 100 kg o 20% enriched Uranium and has announced plans to
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increase its production in coming months. While the administration in concert with the other members o the P5+1 are prepared to allow Iran to possessa nuclear power program or civilian power generation and medical isotope production, Iran must rst provethat it does not have a nuclear weapons program. o do so, administration representatives have stated Iranmust allow IAEA inspectors to visit all Iranian nuclear sites.Unlike previous talks that have ell apart on the precondition that Iran halt all enrichment activities, the Unit-ed States and the other members o the P5+1 have not established any preconditions. By not instituting suchpreconditions the United States is attempting to determine the credibility o the Iranian oer or negotiations.But the meetings, in the words o Secretary o State Clinton, will not be “an open-ended session,” which al-lows the Iranians to stall or time while building their nuclear program.
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Most experts agree that the meeting will not bring a swit conclusion to the issue but will hopeully set a ramework or urther negotiations totake place down the road.
Possible Future U.S. Initiatives:
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An agreement to suspend enrichment up to 20% in return or some sanction reduction.
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Restart the 2010 uel swap agreement in which Iran would send enriched Uranium to ur-key and would retain the right to import 20% enriched Uranium rom Russia.
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Expand the Russia-Iranian uel swap agreement to include 20% enriched Uranium in which the material would be processed by Russia and used in Iran’s medical isotope reactorand the ehran Research Reactor.
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Increased Iranian transparency and IAEA inspection o all Iranian nuclear sites in returnor sanction reductions and security guarantees.
Iran’s Position and Possible Demands
he Iranian nuclear program serves two purposes. One is to continue Supreme Leader Khamenei’s “visiono an Iran that is sel-sucient enough to be economically independent and economically independentenough to be politically independent.” Nuclear power will reduce Iran’s reliance on oil and natural gas orelectricity production, and allow more oil and natural gas exports.wo, the capability to produce a nuclear weapon will increase Iran’s national security in a region surroundedby threats rom Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. A nuclear weapons capability is a more ecientand cost-eective deense against attack than building up a conventional military. Te nuclear program or weapons capability may also increase the internal stability o the Iranian government by improving its internalprestige and deense capability.
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