attendance at his tomb and stated his aversion to family and children,and said that Al-Qaeda and the perpetrators of the 9/11 incident havea far better understanding of MKO’s ideological revolution than thoseinside the Camp Ashraf. The Mojahedin leadership is also quoted to have said; “We did theideological revolution but Al-Qaeda is actually practicing it”.Regardless of all these stated remarks, MKO’s silence and indifferentposition is an indirect approbation of the terrorist act of Al-Qaeda. Thefact is that an act the same as the 9/11 incident was long a deepyearning for Mojahedin. It is natural for an organization that dreamedto create another Vietnam in Iran not to hide its feeling over aVietnamized America in spite of appealing to imperialism to musterprotection. The incident was an actual test of the organization todetermine its degree of sincerity towards the US it attempted to utilizeto achieve its political objectives. While in a world wide propagandaMKO maneuvers on beguiling mottos of “peace”, “democracy”, and“human rights”, inside the organization it refers to these mottos astactics to assume political power. This innate hypocrisy has even madesome supporting powers to be skeptical of the group. Years before the 9/11 incident, in a US State Department reportsubmitted to the Congress in 1994 on "people's Mojahedin of Iran",Mojahedin’s duality, untruth, and reversal was not a fact for the US tobe unaware:Current Mojahedin publications assert the group's advocacy of specific guidelines for a future provisional government, including:"democracy," "peace," "love, friendship, and unity," "separation of church and state," and "recognition of private ownership and amarket economy," A recent addition has been the Mojahedin claimto support the Middle East peace process. The group also stressesits commitment to the rights of women and has drafted a "NCRplan on Women's Rights." These claims present a revolutionary departure from thesubstantial written record of Mojahedin ideology. Examples of suchreversals include the switch from revolutionary Islam to separationof church and state and from nationalization to private ownership. Yet the changes in MKO ideology occurred without any publicdebate, and there is no public record of discussion or review of Mojahedin principles. It is also unclear when each change in policyoccurred, and what internal factors motivated each shift. Theabsence of dialogue about this critical issue of ideology contrastsmarkedly with the group's earlier history of discourse.