Berber/AmazighMemory Work / 51
4 savageqqls,idersrequiring a Siv,illzi{lglad. Iheyhav"e"he.en
MemoryWork
Berber/Amazigh
BRUCE M ADDY- WEIT ZMA N
The transnational Berber lAmazighl culture movement that emerged in
recent decadeshas been a multifaceted phenomenon. As is the casewith
all ethnonational projects, the 9!a!-o-141i9g-apd.diss-esi-n-aflpn-o-f-modern
lerber identity has been accompanied by th-e fashiaa-i-ng*-o-f-a*memory-
communityi' This involved a search for a useable past and, once found, its
enshrinement in new narratives, rituals, and collective commemorations.
Shared memory, Anthony Smith tells us, is as essentialto the survival of
a collective cultural identity as is the senseof a common destiny.2It goes
without saying that the greater the successof the process of "remembering,
recovering and inventing" Berber history,3 the greater the influence it will
have on Algerian and Moroccan societies.a
Berber "memory worK' is carried out in a variety of ways and on a num-
ber of different levels. In its more popular form, the promotion of Berber
history and memory involves a considerable degree of myth making and
essentializingof the Berber "spirit" (embodied in |ean Amrouche's mem-
orable phrase, "the eternal fugurtha").5 In the realms of scholarship and
journalism, the_te-o*pe_fllug_OfNsrth Africanhistory to includelheBerher-q
pften pqqgs*real challenges ts*the 1'offieiat:-history propagated"bg-e9,nIglT"t-
p_g1ary!.igrth. Affiean states and .the-.largerArab.=Islamic,milieg-nfrathich
Ee-rbrrs.are a pafi. Related to but distinct from the work of historians are
acts of commemoration, namely, the creation, elaboration, and vigilant pro-
tection of "memory sitei' (Iieux de memoire) that enable groups to buttress
their identities againstthe constant push and pull ofhistorical currents that
threaten to sweep them away.6Musicians, poets, and writers have taken a
preeminent role in this regard, and some, such as writer Mouloud Mam-
meri and singer-poetLounes Matoub, havebecome a kind of "memory site"
themselves,as either cultural icons, martyrs to the cause,or both.
The task of Berber memory work is formidable. From the begirrrrirrgof
recordedhistory in North Africa, the Berlrershavc lrccttclcpicleclrtsscttti
especially..b,"ur-
dengdby the lpg+gy_-o"-fIplamieh_Lrtory4*riehprovide-dthgm yilh gl]"F3;-tsrn
1pd Arab"origin.myth::-that,-legitimize&theie"i.nelusion inJhe-zrn4g,"gL!-eit
as 4 pgimitiv.e"c.ommunity,r€-qqtr-"ing theiErnis-
the..Islamic-faith..to."iustify
gion and-assumption.of-power.7 Part of this istislam,or "submissionj' in-
volvedthe seeminglynatural superiorityconferredon the Arabic language,
the languagethrough which God'sword wastransmittedand subsequently
interpretedby the doctors of the holy law. Ironically,it was a non-Berber,
the premierMaghribi historianIbn Khaldun,writing nearlysevenhundred
yearsafter the Islamic conquestof North Africa, who made the Berbersa
'greatnation'like othersinthe umma.evenashe usedthemto demonstrate
historicallawsof the rise and declineof societies.
Up until recently,the essentiallyoral culture of the Berbers and the
4earth of written texts in TamazightplacedBerber memory workers at a
di_sadv'?n-tage..The steadypolitical, social,and cultural marginaliza-
-_severe
tion of Berbercommunitiesover the lastfive hundredyearsmadememory
work evenmore difficult. Smith'sdescriptionof the difficultiesconfronting
demotic and peripheralethniesseemsapt for the Berbers:"Excludedfrom
lhc instlumcnls of political q1,nsmlssion p,ndbq1eft of institutionalsupport,
and sometimeswithout 1-!bT of.sp_eci3lip{s- and developedcodesof com-
munication[,] , , . thei-rme3gdg:-.j"lttg"ll_s,r"l,tr,'9if
hqq"ggs-shadowy, and their
jiooityao-9"m"ni"a:'t
.
".,.,l+t-.'h"g;rd
.qf.udttisnu
Nonetheless, the threatspg.s_ed1oBgrberlapguageand identity_-b-y.{r-pl-""1y-
lndependentstatesl.policies o-fcentralizalipn4nd Alabi-zgtioq,qp.mingon
bl Eur-ope,g1
Jhe.m-as-si-v..e-,rrphe.avals.g9ng5ated
lgp -o_-f coloniaJig;ppnd lm-
p*qrgl!.s,9.pd.tqppsd.offby the.often pernicioushomogeq!7i.nggffectsof
globali?ationpfoq_e,-s
9Son local cultures,havealsohad a salutaryeffect.The
quest for cultural authenticity,perceivedas the basisof collectivedignity
and hencefreedom,is a worldwide contemporaryphenomenonin which
Berberintellectualsand activistsactivelyparticipate.As Smith says,if "the
secretof identity is memory,the ethnic past must be salvagedand re-ap-
propriated,so asto renewthe presentandbuild a common future in a world
of competingnationalcommunities."eNo wonder,then, that the Amazigh
movementplacesa premiumon memorywork.
The PremodernPast
Moroccanhistory,as it appearsin lhe oftc1alep11qg!_iq.-c-p1.{,i_qu,!ggr-,_!s.eI-
plicitly"nalionalist/clynastici'
incorporatingIslamichistoly_lnto a specific
 Maddy-Weitzman
52 / Bruce
Moroccan historical experiencebeginning with the arriYal of Islam and
continuingthrough the establishmentof the Idrisid dynastyin A.D. 788by
Idris I, a descendantof the family of Ali, the ProphetMuhammad'sson-in-
law.Although Berbersaresubsumedin this history,they at leastcarry some
implicit standing:The Idrisis are known to have married Berberwomen'
and Moroccan dynastiesbetweenthe eleventhand fourteenth centuries
were Berber-based.l0 By contrast,narrativehistory as taught in indepen-
dent Algeria'sschoolshasbeen strikingly lacking in any Algerian-centered
orientation.ThusAlgeria'sBerberityhasbeenconsignedto Algeria'sdistant
past or ignored entirely.Moreover,the twentieth-centuryAlgerian Salafi
historian Tawfiq al-Madani regardedthe Berbersas "noble savages"in a
pristine state,a cultural blank page.It wasthe Islamic conquest,he wrote,
that brought aboutthe "perfection"of the Maghribi peoplethrough a fusion
of Arabs and Berbersinto one comtnuniryll Only recentlyhas this official
Salafireadingof Algerianhistorybegunto be questioned,for example,with
MahiedineDjender'srepresentation of Algeria asthe productof the interac-
tions of a Mediterraneancivilization.lz
qligll]LsPggqc
4uqz-tgLnLeo0*o-ry-,1c-p,rkers*regar-dle-rg.althertcpcnlrx-sf
nstipn-a!1-lerritpr,.r"alp""riqrilie-s-,.d.pgr-e-e''''''''p1:n-il*p:s-x"sr.g9--*gsJgtvlthlheil*f
jgr..ds.of .historical-accura,c;"a.r,e-Jiks:mjn$sdin..their-emphasisnnJhelgr-seminationof Islam in both Africa and Spain.To that end,Tariq BinZiyad,
astravinga+re*Islanic"pasLand"p.ne.invs..hi€lilt"h-eJ"*\eeJs.aq[ivg3ggqts,
P..pxs
j.pd
poJ.merel}"xoicc!e-qs.".namelp".s-aJo--ql"s-oJdi.e.:"s-"ga-d-rll.rlsrglgJnr-he-s4sgg
Illustrated books for children tell the storiesof ancientAmazigh
f.pasants-
heroes,such asfuba, Massinissa,and the Berber queen Dihya/the Kahina.
The Kahina holds particularly rnythical statusamong Arnazigh memory
workersasthe heroic leaderof Berberresistanceto Islamic invaders(for a
recentand contesteduseof the Kahina in Algeria,seebelow).l3
MohamedChafik,the deanof MoroccanBerberistintellectuals,hascon-
sistentlysought to redefineMaghribi collective memory, and hence its iden-
trty,by rehistoricizingMorocco'spre-Islamicpast.RecordedNorth African
history, he emphasizes, datesback to the Rornans,Greeks,Carthaginians,
and even,at times, Pharoanic Egypt.The native Amazigh-speaking popu-
lation was part and parcel of this history, accordingto Chafik, and pro-
duced numerous historical figures, such as Terentius (a Carthage-born
playwrightwriting in Greekand Latin during the second century B.C'),
Tertullianus(an important Christian writer from Carthagein the late first
century-early secondcentury A.D.), Arnobius (another Christian writer'
born in a Numidian villagein the secondhalf of the third century A.D)'
and St. Augustine.laFor Chafik and other Amazigh activists,languageis
Berber/AmazighMemory Work / 5j
the defining featureof culture and history (notwithstandingthe fact that
Amazigh heroesduring the Roman and Byzantineperiod had Latinized
namesand may or may not havebeen fluent in the Amazigh language).
As such,Amazigh history can be tracedeven further into the past,many
hundredsof yearsbeforethe barbaroibeganappearingin Greekchronicles.
Moroccan-bornethnologistHeleneHaganhaswritten a fascinatingmono-
graphon the Amazighunderpinningsof ancientEgyptiancivilizationbased
on the etymological roots of its language.lsThe "Libyan' pharoanic dy-
nastyfoundedby SheshounkI in 945 B.C.is now commonly referredto by
Amazigh memory workersasthe moment of entry of the Amazigh people
into history.Indeed,the Paris-basedAcadimie Berbdrechoseto propagate
a Berber calendarwith the year of Sheshonk'sascentas its starting point.
Accordingly,the year A.D. 2005is equivalentto 2955.Both datesare used
on the mastheadof the Rabat-based monthly Le MondeAmazigh(al-'Alam
al-Am azighiI Am adalAm azigh).
No lessimporta!-t &r Amazigt-A9m.g1'_yo_1kp_1g, {t"-",Jplgntr9!19gg_lt-he
$mZrgb-wasnoUneend of hi.story Tfdid nof srrbor inatefheirjdgtJ-iff_per
se,nor brin&it tp a mqst Berfectstate.In fact, it was the Amazigh people
themselves,Chafik emphasizes,who played an important role in the dis-
the fabledBerber commanderof the Muslim forcesthat first crossedinto
Iberia in A.D. 711,very much belongsin the pantheonof Berber heroes,
epitomized today by the Rabat center disseminatingBerber culture that
bears his name.l6Conversely,and not surprisingly,the destructionwrought
in Andalusiain the twelfth century by the troops of the religiouslyzealous
Almohad Berberdynastyfounded by Ibn Tumart is conspicuouslyabsent
from Berbermemory work. Collectivememory aswe know is alwaysselec-
tive, asmuch aboutforgettingasaboutremembering.lT
Chafik laid out his interpretationof MoroccanAmazigh history during
the Islamicperiod starkly,and at timespolemically,in the BerberManifesto,
issuedin March 2000 and signedby more than two hundred Berberintel-
lectuals. While providing a detailedexposdof the shortcomingsof the inde-
pendenceera,the manifestoalsoplacesthem in abroaderhistoricalcontext,
albeit one not commonly found in the history books.Most people,it says,
recognizethat the imposition of colonialismin 1912was madepossibleby
the sorry stateto which Moroccohad sunk.The reasonfor this wasthe tri-
umph of the makhzeniants political tradition of despotismand oppression,
accompanied by "haughtiness, ostentationand pomp."This tradition is said
to havebeeninherited from the Ummayadand Abbasidempires,'tontrary
54 / BrurcMaddy-Weltzman
to the spirit of political consultationprescribedby Islami' and practiced
by the Prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliphs.Coincidentallyor
not, this latter spirit, asdefinedby the manifesto,wasin line with Amazigh
political traditions,which were'gearedtowardsmanagingthe affairsof the
jama'a ('local community') . . . through dialogueand consultationl'The
makhzen,"pursuantto its heavyHeraclian-Khurasanheritagej'wassteered
for centuriesby "influentialpeopleJ'those who could"makeor breaki'who
preachedhatred toward anything Amazigh, while reducing the historical
roles playedby "Berbers."Occasionally,the rnanifestostated,enlightened
Sultansmadecommendableeffortstoward the Amazighpopulation.How-
ever,the makhzeniancircles"taught hatred towardsanything Amazigh to
generationaftergenerationoftheir offspringi'Theirdesireto preservetheir
privilegesled them to blindly adhereto political traditionsbasedupon dog-
matic and tightly closedreligious thinking. The clashbetweenthesetwo
worldviews resultedin violenceand disorder,rendering the country easy
prey for foreign invaders.
Chafik'semphasison the purlty of Muhammadand his immediatesuc-
cessors,the rashidun (the "rightly guided" caliphs),is a theme common
to Islamic reform currents dating back to the late nineteenthcentury.In
that sense,Chafik'sapproachis a consensualone,which seeksto incorpo-
rate Moroccan Islam into Amazigh identity. To be sure, Chafik seemsto
be advocatinga more thoroughgoingliberal reform of Islam than that of
reformersof earliergenerations,in line with modern times.Still, eventhis
Iglcls neLtruivgpe:sg"I!9i-1g-fl p*ama-zigb-"LcgyrslseJlr[ggitr glugr
containsmanymilitanl g-gpSl.ar.:sls,"amp-ng-tk3$SSd"t:gfg*dJgbhqhsl*of
7sWr!:!nqzts.!',,.-hiih*s*'sr'-:tt*I-'vs-l,x-4gg.-"q-el*'set**lhel1ltl'.!.ltumultuousdecades,one canperhapsexpectthat at somepoint both
endardateonitsmasthS_+.d,_$g'l?4x_tlS_:Ig!sip"99j9l9gJg*itg!-Rsyilde
leC-g.l-tu:c.A$ez1ghe"fiRCAM)"isnptuniyersalk-iriewedwirhfuvs*arnone
rle-M
On occasion,Chafik'swritings havealsobeen criticized for being essen- againstspanishand Frenchforces,Muhammadbin Abd al-Krim Khattabi,
tialist and ahistoricaland henceunhelpfulto the Amazighcause.Moroccan
scholarRachidldrissi takesChafik to task for ignoring history for stating
without proof, for example,that ancientBerberkings soughtto uniff all of
the Berbertribes under one centralpower,or for trying to forcibly bridge
Morocco'spre-Islamicand Islamic eras(for example,by holding up both
the Kahina and the twentieth-centuryRiffianleaderAbd al-Krim asBerber
heroesand models;for more on the latter,seebelow).Chafik'sdeclaration
that the conqueringArabs were the enemies of the Berbers, like all other and beyond.This triumph alsosuppliesimportant ammunition to modern-
conquerorsof North Africa from ancienttimesto modern,anclthat it was
Berber/AmazighMemory Work / SS
due to them that the Berbersdid not write down their own history was
simply inaccurate,accordingto Idrissi.such a view,he said,ignoredthe fact
that "the Berbersmixed with the Arabslike pure waterwith wine,'(quoting
Mokhtar soussi,a famousBerberMuslim intellectualof the earlytr,rrentieth
century).TheBerbers,saidIdrissi,beganto havea collectivememory when
they learnedto write in Arabic, aspart of the Islamic umma.z0
France,sMoroccan protectorate
The Berber Manifesto'scritique of 'bfficial" Moroccan history during the
yearsof the Frenchprotectorateis withering. Makhzeniancircles,it claims,
actually welcomedthe French protectorateand were the main beneficia-
ries of its rule. Together,they werealignedagainstthe "rebelliousBerbers,"
who weremilitarily subjugatedand then consignedto marginalizationand
nondevelopment.when the time came for national rebellion againstthe
French,it was the Irnazighenwho willingly provided the necessaryman-
power.At the sametime, the manifestostudiouslyavoidsany mention of
the most powerful Berberleaderduring the protectorateyears,Thami al-
Glawi, an omissionthat can only be understoodasa willful act.A positive
referenceto Glawi, whosepower rivaled that of the Sultan's,would situate
contemporaryBerber discourseon the side of the Frenchcolonial power
and opposedto Moroccan nationalism,not to mention the legitimacy of
the monarchy;mererepetitionof the dominant nationalnarrativet negative
treatmentof Glawi would run counterto the manifesto'soverallcritique of
that narrative.Given Glawi'sprominent role in Moroccan history during
those
dispassionatehistorians and Amazighactivistsmore militant than those
affiliatedwith the manifestowill take up the subject.2r
In contrastto the silenceon Glawi,the leaderof thelg2l-26Rif rebellion
hasbecomea preferred,evenreveredfigurefor modern-dayMoroccanBer_
bers engagedin memory work. Abd al-Krim combinedcharisma,military
prowess'educationboth traditionaland modern,and a politicalagendathat
led him to seekto uniSrthe historicallyfeudingtribesof the Rif into a single
political unit. In the process,he accumulatedthe ultimate anti.imperialist
credentials,inflicting a crushingdefeaton Spanishforcesat the battleof An-
oual in 1921,an outcomethat resonatedwidely throughout the Middle East
day Berberactivistsdeterminedto combatthe accusations that Berberstoo
56 / l l r t t t t M tu ltly Wtilzttr tr tr
olicn collitboratcdwitlt colottiarlrule and that their assertionof Berber iden-
tity is linkcd to olclercolonialistprojectsto divide Berbersfrom Arabs.
At {irst glance,appropriating bin Abd al-Krim may not seemlike an en-
tirely smooth matter for secular Berberists. He is generally understood by
historians to have been a promoter of Islamic reform,23in line with wider
Islamic currents at the expenseof popular religious practice, which Berber
activists often recognize as central to their specific heritage. Nor did bin
Abd al-Krim emphasize an explicitly AmazighlBerber identity in his ef-
forts to mobilize fellow Rifians againstthe foreigner.Hence, in addition to
he is often viewed as a premodern type of
his Islamic reforrnist creder.rtials,
leader, leaclinga nol-untyl.ricaland ultimately futile nativist revolt against
the corrcluerors.
As with all lristorical personalities,bin Abd al-Krim'.sactualbehavior and
views do rrot corrpletely lit the requirements of an idealized Berber hero.
But contemporary Arnaz.ighactivistshave not been deterred by thesecave-
ats.They concentrateon portraying bin Abd al-Krim as a leader who hero-
ically led his people againstthe occupier,unlike the urban Arab class,which
sat on its hands during the Rifian revolt rather than lend a hand againstthe
colonial oppressor.The recovery of the history of bin Abd al-Krim and his
short-lived "Rifian Republic" is hence an ongoing project, intimately con-
nected to the themes of marginalization and identity denial that character-
ize the contemporary Berberist discourse. Only recently, Amazigh activists
initiated a campaign to return Abd al-Krim's remains from Cairo, where he
died in 1963,and to construct a combination mausoleum-museum-cultural
complex in his Ajdir redoubt.2aIn August 1999,the newly crowned King
Muhammad VI conferred an important measure of legitimacy on Rifian
Amazigh memory work. Aware of the Rif's problematic status,economi-
cally, socially, and historically vis-ir-vis the Moroccan central authorities,
and seeking to bolster his own legitimacy in a region that his fathet as
crown prince, had bombed and repressedin 1958-59, Muhammad made
a high-profile visit to the region, something his father had always avoided.
Moreover, his gestures to the Rifian Berbers were not limited to pledges
for material improvement but also included a promise that the Ajdir ruins
would be reconstructed and a visit with bin Abd al-Krim's son, who came
especiallyfrom Cairo for the occasion.
Notwithstanding Muhammad VI's gestures,however, he has failed to ad-
dress a painful episode that highlights the makhzent historic indifference
Berber/Amazigh
Memory Work / 57
to the Rifian war, namely, the Spanish military's systematic use of poison
gas against Rifian fighters and civilians, with the assistanceof French and
German manufacturers. It is only in recent years that this matter has come
to light, thanks in part to the work of a number of Spanish scholars and
British historian SebastianBalfout25aswell astwo German journalists, who
revealed German involvement in Spain'sactions. Le Monde Amazigh,which
has played a prominent role in recent years in promoting and disseminating
the Abd al-Krim story through articles and conferences,has given promi-
nence to this shocking and sorry episode in a number of issues.The battle
.q!I]9Imarginalizatiqn and official.indifference.extendsto,.the-ptgqent: S.ul,
qg_
yfvols 9f pgison gas attacks and their offspring"are. said-_t9".pgftrfr.o-mpu-
mer_o99..l.r;qlthp5'abl-e_ms,
including inordinatqlyhigh,faleEpJge.1r 9r.But up
until now, Moroccan authorities have ignored Amazigh demands and been
unwilling to raise the matter of possible acknowledgment and compensa-
tion for elderly survivors with the Spanish government, fearing that it would
adversely affect bilateral ties.26In response,one speaker at a conference held
in the Rifian city of Tetouan in the spring of 2004 proposed a number of
concretemeasures,including suing the German and French companiesthat
participated in the manufacture of the toxic gasesusedby Spain and appeal-
ing to the European Court of Human Rights.27
Praising bin Abd al-Krim's anticolonial exploits is only part of the
{paTigh movement!^effo-rts to. deb.unk the stigrna-of eollaboration-wifl
the r-qlers,whicf.,gqlp-ed,currency especially.after
-the.jssuing."of
99!9n!gl
the qo;_q?lle-d"Berber.dahiir(royal ed.ic"t)
b-y.theFrench authoritiesin.JgS0"
France'sattemptto institutioqalizgBerbercustoma.rylaw.at.theexpense.of
Qurani-claw serveda$.a.cruci.al.catalyst.in the.,formationof.-the..natipnaliCl
movement.In recentyears,someBerberactivistshavetaken anotherlook
at the episode.MuhammadMounib blamedthe nationalistsfor the false
"Berber" appellationof the dahir, for it implicitly implicatedthe Berbersin
the Frenchproject to divide them from the Arabs.z8Chafik found another
wayto debunkthe myth of Berbercollaborationwith the Protectorate,em-
phasizingthe importanceof transcribingand studyingAmazighpoetryas
llte reservoirof the memoryof resistance to the Frenchoccupationduring
191244.2e Commemorationsof battlesagainstthe colonizers,suchas the
orteof llougaferin the Middle Atlas in 1933,areconnectedby organizers
kr olht:r historicaland contemporaryeventsin differentregions,so as to
t.rrrplrirsizc
t lresupra-tribal,collectivenatureof Berberidentity.3o
58 / BruceMaddy-Weitzman
Battlingthe lstiqlal
The Moroccan Berberist counternarrativehas drawn an almost straight
line betweenofficial indifferenceto the Rif and the subsequentfounding
of the stateand marginalizationof the Berbercommunitiesby the Istiqlal-
dominatednationalistmovement.The failure of the stateto officially com-
memoratethe battleof Anoual or other episodesof resistanceto the French
pacificationcampaigns,wrote one commentator,contrastedsharplywith
its attentionto eventscommemoratingthe Istiqlal.3lThe murder of Rifian
LiberationArmy leaderAbbasM'sa'adi in 1956,apparentlyon the order of
the Istiqlal'sMehdi Ben Barka,has becomeanother subjectof discussion
in recentyears,32 as has the authorities'forcible repressionof the 1958-59
rebellion. Ironically,one of the eighteendemandssubmittedto the king in
November1958by a Rifian committee(which includedbin Abd al-Krirds
son)wasfor the rapid Arabizationof the educationalsystemthroughoutthe
country.The context of this demand was the use of Frenchin the former
Spanishzone,to which the Rif belonged,which put the local populationat
a disadvantagerelativeto the centralauthorities.33 Subsequently,ofcourse,
Arabizationbecameone of the chief bugaboosof the Amazigh moverirent,
owing to the overt threat it posedto Tamazightand to the alreadyunequal,
subordinatesocialstatusof its speakers.
As with the Rifian demandsfor indemnity for the victims of Spain'spoi-
songasattacks,reopeningthe woundsof tr958is not just a matterof concern
to historians,or evento identitybuilders.In February2004,the Committee
of Victims of the 1958WalmasEventswas established.The committeede-
mandednot only the revelationof the truth but alsoindemnity for the sur-
vivorsof the repressionof the mostly BerberArmy of Liberationmembers,
from the Walmastribal grouping,by the "militia" of the Istiqlal party.As is
usuallythe case,the royal family'srole in the eventswasdownplayed.3a
The first Amazigh intellectualto speakout publicly againstthe falsifica-
tion of Moroccanhistory by the Istiqlal-dominatedestablishmentand the
systematicignoring of the Berbers,thosewho representthe "real cultureof
the countryi'was the recentlydeceased Ali Sidqi Azaykou(d. 2004).Char-
acterrzingthehistoricalorigins of Morocco'scultural problem asstemming
from repeatedcolonizationby outsiders,including Arabs, and publishing
his viewsin Arabic,no less(addingfuel to the fire), he wasconvictedin 1982
of 'disturbing the securityof the state"andimprisonedfor oneyear.35 Begin-
ning in the 1990s,however,the Moroccanauthoritiesbegantreating such
expressions more benignly.By 2001,the BerberManifestocould address
Berber/AmazighMemory Work / 59
Morocco'smore recenthistory in an unabashedlyrevisionistand explicitly
political tone. It hammeredawayat the denial of Morocco's'Amazighness"
and the arrogationby professionalpoliticiansand most membersof Moroc-
co'selites,since 1956,of "monopolistic rights to 'patriotism' and 'political
action."'Even speakingof this monopolization,the manifestonoted, has
long beena taboo in Moroccanlife.
Little by little, statedthe Manifesto,it becameclear after independence
that none of the extantpolitical forces,whetherpro-monarchyor not, were
going to give the Amazigh their due and include them in the definition of
a modern Morocco.Instead,successive nationalgoyernmentspursuedthe
policy of building an exclusively 'Arab Maghribi' led by an ArabizedMo-
rocco.In presentingtheir demandsfor a reorderingof national priorities,
the signatoriesof the manifestowere determined"to combat the cultural
hegemony"that has been programmedin order to bury a very important
part of [Morocco's]civilizationalheritage[emphasisin original].36
Although the broad dichotomy laid out in the manifestobetweenthe
"good' Berbersand the "bad" Istiqlallmakhzenmay be generallyaccepted
by the Amazigh movement,a more complex reality has begun to be ac-
knowledged.SomeBerbers,including former Liberation Army members,
joined the Union Nationaledes ForcesPopulaires(UNFP) in 1959,which
was formed by Ben Barka as a breakawayfrom the Istiqlal. They did so,
accordingto veteranactivist Muhammad al-Kassimi,in order to stop the
injustice causedto authentic"resisters"by the appointmentto high posi-
tions of "collaboratorsi'e.g.,Gen. Muhammad Oufkir, who servedin the
French army (as did tens of thousandsBerbergoums [tribal irregulars])
and eventuallybecamethe king'sright-hand man until his ultimate demise
inl972, and "feudalistsj'a referenceto the Berberrural notableswho made
common causewith the monarchy through the Mouvement Populaire.3T
The state'scrackdownon the tribes of the Khenifra region inI973 followed
an attempteduprisingin MoulayBouazaby the UNFP'ssecretmilitary wing
led by Sidi Muhammad Umed, which, accordingto Kassimi,had won a
measureof sympathyamongthe civilian population.The punishment in-
flicted on his family, friends and the region in generalis now being spoken
of openly,along with demandsfor indemnities.Meanwhile,Umed fled to
Algeria,where he had previouslyresidedfor twelveyears,died during the
1980s,and wasburied therewith honors.To complicatethe picture further,
the UNFP itself may have been involved in the unsuccessfulcoup d'6tat
againstKing HassanII the previousyear,through Lt. Col. Muhammad
Amokrane. This of coursewas the event that brought Oufkir, held up by
 v
60 / Maddy-Weitzman
Bruce
Kassimi as the'tollaborator" par excellenceduring the 1950s,to ruin.38The
very fact that Le Monde Amazigh published the interview with Kassimi
while he was being treated in an army hospital at the state'sexpense for
injuries he suffered while in prison, indicates the increasing possibilities of
conducting open discussion of formerly repressedepisodesof Morocco's
recent past. It also signals that at least some within the Amazigh move-
ment are opposed to reductionist, one-dimensional representationsof that
past.3e
Subaltern History
Recovering and remembering rural and tribal history is very much part of
the Amazigh culture movement's agenda.Here the primary factor in de-
termining identity is not language per se but land, around which society
is organized. In Morocco, the authorities, whether French or Moroccan'
are depicted as running roughshod over Amazigh communal land rights
and traditions. For example, Le Monde Amazigh published a long article
denouncing the administrative confiscation of the lands belonging to the
Zayan tribes in the Khenifra region, pointing to similarities between cur-
rent policies and those used by the Protectorate authorities, who had bought
out one of the leadingcailds,Mouha U Hamou Zayani. Previously, he had
joined with Arab tribes in their fight againstthe French during their "paci-
fication' campaign. However, in return for his agreement not to fight the
French any further, Mouha U Hamou was granted the lands of neighboring
tribes.
The confiscation of communal lands also had important negative effects
on social and cultural life. For example,a traditional spring holiday gather-
ing of the Zayan tribes, which featured a theatrical performance by tribal
notables involving pledges of mutual solidarity and a sharing of the lands,
according to Berber customary law, vanished with the transfer of the lands
to Mouha U Hamou. The administrative means for doing so were and re-
main Royal dahirs, which do not recognize customary law and view tribal
lands as belonging to the state.ao
The question of the relationship between customary law and Islamic law
has been ofcontinuing interestto scholars.The French Protectorateauthor-
ities stepped into a minefield when they tried to formally institutionalize
customary Berber practicesand thus officially place them on an equal fool-
ing with the Sharila. It is generallyheld that Berber customary law (izcr.l)is
not diametricallyopposedto the Shari'a and takesit irrtoaccourrl.Howcvcr,
Berber/AmazighMemory Work / 6I
Injaz Abdallah Habibi, in writing aboutthe Zayantribes,openly questions
whetherthis is the case,indicatinga desireto diminish the religiousaspects
of Berberidentity.His emphasison the positiveaspectsof communalvillage
customsis part of a broaderthemeof Amazigh memory work, namely,the
essentiallydemocraticnature of village societyand, by extension,Berber
cultureasa whole(asarticulatedin the BerberManifesto).Theuplandvil-
lageis presentedas the repositoryof deep-rootedBerbertraditions,with
the traditional art, handicrafts,and householdmanagementbywomen who
stood at the centerof daily life.arS_uchtrgatmgn-!.al
timggspillsover into an
idealizationof tra{ltlgqal life, reminiscentof the"nostalgiarladen presenta
tlg gf th" Eptern Europeanlewishshtetl(v!f!agg)by writers and publicists
k99n on promotlng and presel-vingJewiqh.i_denil* "andculture, evenas its
wasbeing erodedand then violeqtly qr.a{lcated.Another writer even
fgg
went so far as to describevillagesocietyt organizingconceptof jama'a,
which is usuallyassociatedwith a (negative)tribal mentality,ashaving the
attributesof love,altruism, love of the land and the 'bther," and hencebe-
ing not in contradictionwith the requirementsof modernity but rather in
harmony with it.azThis may seemcontrived; however,it may also fit the
categoryof reinterpretingone'shistory and societyin a usefulfashion.
Ali Azaykou,for his part, recommendedstudyingMorocco'spastvia the
methodof /?istoiretatoude,a metaphorfor unwritten documentspreserved
by geographyand archaeology,in addition to the oral traditions embodied
in the Amazigh collectivememory.In addition, one may learn something
evcpfrom the actualtaltoo often engravedon the Berbers'skin.Useofthe
tattoo metaphoris especiallypoignant,given the fact that in contemporary
Morocco,the tattoo is often seen as an emblem of inferiority inflicted by
.one'sparents,and considerableefforts are made to surreptitiouslyremove
it, often resultingin scarringof the skin.a3
Algeria'sBerbers- Kabyleand Chaouior Amazigh?
The Berberistreadingof the broad historicalthemesof Amazighhistory
in both the pre-Islamicand Arab-Islamicperiods,aswell asthe challenges
posedby the postcolonialstate,cut acrosscontemporaryinter-statebound-
rries.France's abortedeffortsto baseits rule on a policyof dividingBerbers
lhrnr Arabs,underpinnedby a well-constructed setof origin and character
tttylhs,aa pr<lveda difficult legacyfor Berbersin both Moroccoand Alge-
liir, wlro werreirl.painsto demonstratetheir patrioticand anticolonialcre-
rlcnlills.l{cgardless of theirefforts,contemporary opponents of the Berber
62 / BruceMaddy-Weitzman
culture movementaccuseit of promoting colonialismin a new guise.But
unlike earlierdecades,Berberinsistenceon their anticolonialistcredentials
doesnot deter them from sharplycriticizing Arab nationalism,the domi-
nant ideologyof all modern statesin North Africa. More and more, Arab
nationalisrnappearsin Berberdiscourseasa perniciousforeignimport, its
fuller appellationbeing'Arab-IslamicBa'athism"or, alternately,'Arab-Is-
larnic totalitarianism."In rejectingthe Arab nationalistdoctrine of a single
Arab homeland(al-Watanal-'Arabi) from the Atlantic Oceanto the per-
sian Gulf, Berberistsemphasizethe existenceof a singleAmazigh people
existing from time immemorial in its homeland (Tamazgha),stretching
from the CanaryIslandsto the Siwaoasisin westernEgypt.Effortsto desa-
crahzethe Arabic languageinclude labelingthe Arabic script'Arameanl'as
Concurrently,a modified versionof the ancientTifinagh script, preserved
for usageby the TouaregBerbersof the Sahara,is held up as an important
symbolof Berberidentity, and its usageis activelypromoted.In the realm
of commemorativeefforts,pan-Berberidentity was recentlymanifestedin
a petition by the Paris-basedCongrdsMondial Amazigh to the UN's Com-
mittee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) demanding
that Franceadd to its list of officiallysanctionedholidaysthe Amazighholi-
daysof Yennayer(Amazigh New Year,a traditional agricultural festival),
occurring on |anuary 12,and the'Amazigh Spring" (commemoratingthe
eventsin Algeriain 1980;seebelow),on April20.a6
At the sametime, the particularhistoricalexperiences and socialrealities
of the berberophonecommunitieshaveshapedtheir memory work, result-
ing in a type of"Berberism in onecountryi'carrying at leasta potentialten-
sion with the pan-Berberistview. Nowhereis this more evidentthan with
the Kabylians,who makeup two-thirds of Algeria'sberberophonepopula-
tion. To be sure,Kabylianshaveplayeda vanguardrole in laying the foun-
dation for the modern Berber culture movement,embodiedover the last
four decadesby the France-based intellectualproduction ofsuch bodiesas
the Acad6mieBerbdre/AgrawImazighen,the Group d'EtudesBerbdresde
lluniversitd de Paris-vIII, and the centre de RechercheBerbdreat Institut
NationaldesLangueset CivilisationsOrientales(INALCO) in paris.How-
ever,the samefactorsthat placedthem in the vanguardof "pan-Berberism"
alsoresultedin a sharpeningofKabylian specificity.By contrast,the second
largestberberophonegroup,the Chaouia(from the AurdsMountains),has
historicallybeenlessisolatedfrom its Arab surroundingsand slowerto de-
velopa modern Amazighidentity.
Thefirst manifestations of a moderntypeof Kabylian-Berber conscious-
Berber/AmazighMemory Work / 63
ness'expressedthrough new kinds ofcultural expressionssuch asthe po-
etry of resistanceof colonization,were alreadymaking their appearanceat
the end of the nineteenthcentury.At this point, therewas no intermediate
referenceto an 'Algerian" or "Maghribian' community,only the immedi-
ateKabylianidentity and the wider Islamic one.47 |ean Amrouchdschants
Berbdresde Kabylie(1939)was followedby many other works in the fields
of music and poetry (e.g.,works by Mouloud F6raoun,TaosAmrouche,
Mouloud Mammeri, and Ait Menguillet).Their recovery,transmission,and
production of Kabylian cultural artifactswere crucial to the development
of modern Kabylian identity. on the more explicitly political level,young
radical Kabylian militants who fomentedthe so-calledBerberistcrisis in
1948-49,sharpenedmatters further. According to the analysisof Melha
Benbrahim,the textsof thesemilitants are dominatedby referencesto the
Berber, and specificallyKabylian, patrimony: the reclaiming of the pre_
IslamichistoricalfiguresMassinissaand fugurtha,and the heroicresisterto
the Arab conquest,the Kahina;the fierceKabylianresistanceto the French
forces(1857,l87l); referencesto the Djurdura and the montagneladraras
a symbol of resistance;the honor of the group; and their fidelity to their
ancestorsand symbolicheritage.YoungKabylianintellectuals,statessalem
chaker, werethus situatedat the intersectionof radical nationalismof the
modern type (laique)and the specificBerbercultural tradition.as
Interestin the "Berberistcrisis" is part of the wider interestamongKab-
ylian activistsin reopeningfor scrutiny the eventsof Algeria'swar of in-
dependenceand its immediate aftermath.Scholarshavegenerallydown-
playedthe specificBerber dimension of the Algerian revolution'sinternal
blood-lettingsand political purges,for example,the assassinations ofAbane
Ramadaneand BelkacemKrim and the failure of Hocine Ait Ahmed'sop-
position to the newly independentauthoritiesin 1962-63.ae Nonetheless,
theseepisodes,underpinnedby the wholesaledenial of Kabylianspecific-
ity-and any diversity,for that matter-in favor of a stridentlyuniform and
uni-dimensional nationalism,are now increasinglyviewed as part of the
backgroundto the cultural flourishing and simmering proto-political op-
position amongthe Kabyliancommunity during the 1970s.politically,Ait
Ahmed organizedhis supportersin 1963under the bannerof the Forcesdes
Front socialistes.This organizationwould be joined at the end of the l9g0s
by the smaller,more militantly secular-BerberistRassemblement pour la
Cultureet la D6mocratie.so
Theproblematicnatureof the Algerianstateand its failure to adequately
acconrmodate the Kabylianregiongenerated a confluence of circumstances
6'4 / llrure Machly..Wellenun
Berber/AmazighMemory Work / 65
that fedtcrthe now-mythical"BerberSpring"(LePrintempsBerbdre).sr Ac- broadcastingfrom paris,for example.Matoub'sdeath,and
thoseof others,
eorellngto BenjaminStora,"Theeffectof the'Berberspring'wasto produce, quickly cameto serveasa referencepoint for increasedKabylian
militancy.
fur the first time since independenceand from within Algeria, a public Giventhe centralityof cultural producersin the fashioningof
modern Kab-
counter-discourse of real import, in a country operatingon the principle of ylianlAmazighidentity,it wasfitting that a veteransinger/poet/activist,
Fer-
unanimism.In that compactuniverse,wheresocietyand state,privateand hat Mehenni,hastakenthe reaclin recentyearsin proiroting
autonomyfor
public mingled together in a singlebloc, the blossomingof autonomous Kabylie,a radical idea indeed.s6whatever the courseeventJwould
take,it
popular associationsand organizationsgavetexture to Algerian society. wasclearthat the fearsof Mouloud Mammeri, the Kabylian
cultural icon of
Theappearance of cultural,democraticpluralism allowedconflictsexisting the previousgeneration,of another "absurddeath of the
Aztecs,,was pre-
'within the people'to be expressedand resolvedby political means."sz mature,at the very least.57
In terms of memory work the anniversaryof the BerberSpringhasbe- Although Kabyliahasbeenat the centerof the ArgerianAmazigh
move-
comea centralcommemorativeeventfor Amazigh cultural associationsin ment'spolitical and cultural ferment,it would be misiaken
to assigi it exclu_
Algeria and the diaspora.53 Since2001,it hasbeenjoined by Le Printemps sivity.ssBerbermemory work in the Aurdsregion,the site
of th. Lbl"d 8".-
Nolr (BlackSpring),the bloody eventssparkedby the deathof a youngKab- ber resistanceto the invadingArab-Muslim forcesat the end
of the seventh
ylian in policecustodythat resultedin the deathsofover one hundredpeo- century,has recentlyreacheda new level.In February2003,
rlAssociation
ple, a veritablecivil revolt againstthe authoritiesand the creationof a new Aurds El-Kahina erecteda large statueof the heroic Berber
queenin the
body outsideof existingpolitical parties,the aarouch(lit. 'tribes"), which centerof the town of Bagha'iin the wirayaof Khencher".
Th" statuewas
led an ongoingstruggleto changethe natureof Kabylian-staterelationsand, designedby a graduateof the EcoleNationaledes Beaux-Arts
dAlger. of
by extension,the natureof the Algerian stateitself.Theextentto which the course'sucha public commemorativeact could not be done in
Algeria (ex-
aarouchconstituteda modern,grass-rootsorganizationdrawingsustenance cept perhapsin Kabylia)without the consentof the authorities.
In fact, the
from traditional collectivevillage symbolsor, alternatively,constitutedan ceremonywasattendedby the presidentof the republichimsel{,
AbdelAziz
unwelcomereversionto factionalized,premodern antidemocratictribal Bouteflika.Thepresident'spresencewasclearlyintendedas
a gestureto the
norms remainsto be determined.sa Amazigh community,with whom the statehas been at logge-rheads
for so
The two "Springs"of 1980and 2001serveasbookends,of a sort, to the manyyears(thoughprimarilyin Kabylia,not in the Aures);
ii alsoindicated
breakdownof the postindependenceFLN Algerian stateand the descent a desireto placegreateremphasison specificallyAlgerian history,
albeit a
into horrific violenceduring the 1990sbetweenthe authoritiesand Islamist particular readingof it. Indeed,one shouldn'ttakethis too
far; hispresence
oppositionforces.Thesetumultuoustimesresultedin the creationof Kabyl- at the unveiling of the Kahina statuewas ignored entirely
by the national
ian "martyrs,"from the numerousintellectualsand artistsslain during the press.
violenceof the 1990s,ss to GuermahMassinissa, the youth whosekilling of course,Amazighactivistscontestthe state'sorientationto Berber
heri-
touchedoff the BlackSpringin 2001.Singerand poet LounesMatoub is tage,whetherit involvedappropriationor neglect.one Aurds-centered
web
perhapsthe most prominent martyr of them all. His murder in fune 1998, site,displayingthe picture of the new Kahina statue,added
superimposed
allegedlyby Islamistextremists,touchedoffmassiveantigovernmentdem- imagesof the Amazigh flag on both sidesof the Kahina statue's
pedestal.se
onstrationsthroughout Kabylia, and his last CD, releasedposthumously, Activists bemoan the degradationand official neglectof the
archaeologi-
containsa withering indictment of the postindependenceAlgerian state, cal site' which is consideredto havebeenthe mountainousredoubt
of the
set to the tune of Algeria'snational anthem,with the refrain of "Betrayal, Kahina. Someacademicshave urged that uNESCo be approached
to in-
BetrayalJ'Thecoverof the CD drawn by Ali Dilem, one of Algeria'sleading clude it on its list of protectedworld Heritagesites,and that
the Ministry
caricaturists,containsimagesof dripping blood, the Amazighflag,Algeria's of culture take the lead in promoting its va1ue,as it was inhabited
from
military and political leadersand leadingIslamists,a referenceto the Ara- prehist.ric times until the eleventhcentury Hilalian invasion.60
According
bization languagepolicy, and a sign that reads'AlgeriassicPark."It serves to chaouia activists,the endangered statusof anothersite posesa threat
asan almosticonicposteqbeingusedby Berbersatellitetelevisiorr(llRl'V) lo their collectivememory:the mausoleumof Imadghacen,
a cylindricar

drff&itil,,
I aa I l l k r r , i l ftr r lr lt,lr tll;r tr tu r
f

Berber/Amazigh
MemoryWork / 67
lrcderldl eighteerrand a half meters high and fifty-nine meters in diam- includes the date according to the Jewish calendar on its masthead!)
Alter-
clrlr' iu tlrc' wilirya of Batna, which is among the oldest material evidence natively, will space be made for multiple, even competing narratives?
will
rl'tlre Massyle Amazigh dynasty, and which under the subsequentrule of Amazigh commemorative efforts be legitimized or repressed?
And what
Massinissais consideredto have sought to unifr the Maghrib into a single may be the impact on the Amazigh movement's memory work
of varying
entity. A suggestion to rename the Batna airport after Imadghacen (Imed- state policies? one may only say that the fashioning of Amazigh
identity
hassen) was rudely rejected, prompting the following rejoinder from the through memory work promises to be an ongoing and ever_increasing
disappointed former governor of Batna, who had been removed by Boute- en_
terprise that will surely have an impact on, and interact with, parallel
pro-
flika allegedly following the pressure of the "local mafia": "|ust as you have cessescurrently reshaping the identity of Algerian and Moroccan
societies
negated our origins at this moment, there will come a generation which will as a whole.
negate youi'61Meanwhile, chaoui Amazigh activists have begun using the
name anyways.62
Notes
Concluding Thoughts Note: This studywas supported by the Israel ScienceFoundation (grant
no.5 25104_2U5).
special thanks to samir Ben-Layashifor his assistancein researching
As Lawrence Rosen has shown in his study of a Moroccan village, day-to- this article.
1.For convenience'ssake,the terms "Berber" and .Amazigh'will
be used interchange-
day social boundaries between 'Arabs" and "Berbers" are generally fluid ably throughout this chapter.
and negotiable,63belying the all-too-common tendency among pundits and 2. Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationarism in a Global Era (carnbridge: polity
policy makers, past and present, to cast in stone the "Berber-Arab dichot- Press,1995),133.
omyi' Nonetheless, in light of the social, cultural, and political developments 3. Bernard Lewis,History-Remembered, Recovered,
Invented(princeton, N.J.:prince-
in Morocco over the past thirty years, it would behoove researchersto re- ton University Press,1976).
4' The percentageofberberophones in Algeria is generaily deemed
visit this relationship, particular as Berber memory work proceeds apace. to be 20-25 per-
cent, and in Morocco 40-45 percent.
The same is true regarding neighboring Algeria. In his insightful analysis
5' fugurtha was the king of a united Numidia between 156ancr104
B.c. and grand-
of "the Berber" as a national signifier in Algerian historiographies, son of Massinissa.He died in a Roman prison. The article is remembered
fames as depicting
McDougall warned against the possibility that the development of a Berber the Berbers as eternally rebellious; in fact, there was much more
to Amrocuhes 1946
counter-narrative to the Algerian state'sdominant narrative might harden article, which described the duality of Berber culture in response
to the .bther" and
social boundaries and intolerance in the name of cultural authenticity, a recommended the shedding of (female) cultural characteristicsthat
prevented the Ber_
process that would in effect substitute one essential "authenticity" for an- lrers from becoming agentsin history. Michael Brett anclElisabeth
Fentress,TheBerbers
( l,ondon: Blackwell, 1996), 269-7 0.
other.6aIndeed, one can identifii without difficulty this tendency among
6. Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: LesLieux de Mdmoirel'
some Amazigh militants. Representa_
/iors, Memory and Counter-Memory specialissue,26 (Spring l9g9):
At this point, Berber memory work, and the Berber/Amazigh culture 12.
7. Abdelmajid Hannoum, coronial Histories,post-colonial Memories:
TheLegendof
movement to which it belongs, is clearly a genie that has been let out of lha Kahina, a North African Heroine (portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann,
2001),7-9; Brett
a bottle whose cork was then discarded. Its future course, permutations, ittttl l:entress, Berbers,l20-32;MichaelBrett,..IbnKhaldun and the Arabisationof
North
and points of emphasis will depend in no small measure on the policies A liica," MaghrebRevi ew 4, no. I (f anuary_Febr rurry 1979),:9_16.
of the Algerian and Moroccan states toward the phenomenon. will their ll. Srnith, Nationsand Nationalism,64.
dominant national narratives be sufficiently modified to include Amazigh 9. ll)i(1.,146.

elements?can one imagine, for example, that daily newspaperswill include f0. Mrrya Shatzuriller, The Berbersand the Islamic state: The Marinid
Experiencein
Itrt l'rolcclorrilaMorocco(princeton,N.J.:Markus Weiner,2000).
the Amazigh year on their masthead, alongsidethe year according to the
ll. lirn('s Mcl).ugall, "Myth and counter-Myth: 'The Berber'asNational
Muslim and Gregorian calendar?(Perhapsthis is not so far-fetchec.l; signifier in
after all, AlgclirrrrI lisloriogrirplricsl' IladicalllistoryReviewg6 (Spring2003):75,g0_gl.
the Moroccan palace'sFrench-languagemouthpiece, Le Motitt tlrt snltttrtt, l , l . l l t i r l . .t l ? .