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Bracing for Low Fertility and a Large Elderly Population in South Korea, by Elizabeth Hervey Stephen

Bracing for Low Fertility and a Large Elderly Population in South Korea, by Elizabeth Hervey Stephen

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For the first time in its history, South Korea is experiencing the challenge of extremely low fertility and a rapidly increasing number of elderly persons. This dramatic shift in population distribution is a result of total fertility rates below replacement levels for the past thirty years and to a smaller extent, increases in life expectancy. To date, policies have n
For the first time in its history, South Korea is experiencing the challenge of extremely low fertility and a rapidly increasing number of elderly persons. This dramatic shift in population distribution is a result of total fertility rates below replacement levels for the past thirty years and to a smaller extent, increases in life expectancy. To date, policies have n

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Published by: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) on Apr 18, 2012
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Bracing for Low Fertility and a Large Elderly Population inSouth Korea
Dr. Elizabeth Hervey Stephen is an Associate Professor of Demography in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University. Dr. Stephen’s paper is the fty-rst in KEI’s Academic Paper Series. As part of this program, KEI commissionsand distributes approximately ten papers per year on original subjects of current interest to over 5,000 Korea watchers,government ofcials, think tank experts, and scholars around the United States and the world. At the end of the year, thesepapers are compiled and published in KEI’s
On Korea
volume. For more information, please visit www.keia.org/aps_on_korea.
April 18, 2012
 Elizabeth Hervey Stephen, Ph.D.
For the rst time in its history, South Korea is experienc
ing the challenge of extremely low fertility and a rapidlyincreasing number of elderly persons. This dramatic shiftin population distribution is a result of total fertility rates below replacement levels for the past thirty years and to asmaller extent, increases in life expectancy. To date, poli
cies have not been effective in increasing fertility levels;social and economic structures currently in place have en
couraged delayed marriage and delayed childbearing. For any pronatalist policy to be effective there will need to bemajor changes, so that women can better integrate workingand familial roles. It will become critical for South Koreato adjust to smaller families to care for the elderly and tohave a greater reliance on the government for pensions andsupport of the elderly. The income redistribution will comeat a time when the numbers of persons in the labor force will be contracting as a result of sustained low fertility. If gov
ernment actions are not effective to increase fertility, thenit will take the collective efforts of civil society to make thenecessary adjustments to the new population distribution.
 Since 1983 the Republic of Korea has experienced below replacement fertility. As recently as 1970, Koreanwomen were having on average 4.5 children, but in thesubsequent 13 years fertility declined by 54 percent
. Between 1983 and 2003 the Total Fertility Rate (TFR)dropped from 2.08 children per woman to 1.19, and hasremained steady at 1.2 ever since 2003.
This sustainedlow fertility level is one of the most dramatic in the worldand is unprecedented historically. This dramatic demographic shift over the pastgeneration is already evident in the age structure of SouthKorea. The number of children enrolling in school for the rsttime declined by 39 percent between 1990 and 2011 and thenumber of young men aged 15-24 who are potential recruitsfor the military will decline by 1.3 million between 2010 and2025, which is a 37 percent decline.
Conversely, the number of persons aged 65 and over in the South Korean populationincreased from less than a million in 1970 to 5.4 million in2010 and is expected to be nearly 18 million by 2050.
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service. 2012.http://kosis.kr 
The full impact of this demographic tsunami, however, isnot widely known or understood in South Korea. This paper examines the causes of the fertility decline and the structuralchanges and policy ramications that will be required in SouthKorea to adapt to a rapidly changing population distribution.
In order to have a sense of whether the fertility trend can bereversed, it is important to understand what caused the fertilitydecline. The South Korean baby boom of the 1950s, coupled
   C   h   i   l   d  p  e  r   W  o  m  a  n
 – 2 –
with slow economic growth, was a concern to Korean policy makers who saw a cycle of poverty. The PlannedParenthood Federation of Korea (PPFK) was started inApril of 1961 with nancial and technical assistance fromthe International Planned Parenthood Federation.
The National Family Planning program was initiated in 1962 as part of the rst Five-Year Economic Plan; the governmentworked closely with PPFK and policies were included insuccessive ve-year economic plans.
The drop from a TFR of 6 in the early 1960s to replace
ment level fertility in 1983 was hailed as a success.
Theslogans imploring citizens to limit births matched the rapideconomic expansion and social change of that era in theROK. “Unplanned parenthood traps you in poverty” wasan early slogan, followed by “Sons or daughters, stop attwo and raise them well” in the 1970s.
The economicincentives offered to women for using contraceptives andthe state disseminated messages promoting small familiescoincided with the country’s rapid rise of urbanization andindustrialization and women’s desires to limit pregnancyand childbirth.
Unintended consequences did arise in the 1980s and early1990s with rising sex ratios at birth (as high as 115 males per 100 females) as parents strove to have a male child.
The importance of having a son was critical for families asa means of economic and social support, as well as main
cent were in the labor force in 1995, which increased to 72.7 percent in 2007.
The effect of the increased percentage of women workingoutside of the home is exacerbated by long working hours.According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD), South Koreans work the most hours per year of any member country.
(The concept used is thetotal number of hours worked over the year divided by theaverage number of people in employment.)
In 2010, Koreansworked on average 2,193 hours per year, as compared with theUnited States at 1,778 and the average for the OECD countriesof 1,749. The long hours create strain for employed womenwith children and place more of a burden on women whoseemployed husbands have limited time with their families.Women’s employment has yet another feature that tends todecrease fertility. Although the number of childcare facilitiesis increasing, childcare facilities meet only 30 percent of thedemand.
In 2003, there were 4,405 childcare facilities (publicand workplace); by 2007, this had increased to 17,650. Evenwith the nearly quadrupling of facilities, the number of spotsavailable falls far short of demand. Employed women spendnearly three and a half hours on household chores/child care inan average working day, which is about seven times as muchtime as their husbands.
As a result of few childcare facilitiesand/or the demands of childcare and housework, nearly half of all employed women quit their jobs when they have a child.With a lack of public childcare facilities in Korea, the burdenfor caring for young children generally falls to families, andmost specically to mothers. Of the OECD-27 countries, Korearanked last (as of 2003) in the total public spending per childas a percentage of average earnings and had the lowest publicspending for children aged 0-6.
As the family system has become more nuclear, there is less of a support network fromother relatives for childcare. Although there are no schoolfees for public elementary and middle schools, extra-curricular studies and private after school academies (
)—whichare attended by most children—are very expensive and timeconsuming. Children have upwards of a 15-hour school day bythe time they complete their after school academy. The over 
sight of the child’s education traditionally falls to the Koreanmother and excellence is expected. A
 New York Times
articlequoted one South Korean mother as saying, “Most Koreanmothers want their children to get 100 on all the tests in allthe subjects.”
A child’s three-year preparation time for thecollege entrance exam is nearly a full-time job for mothers.
The high costs of childcare and extra-curricular education,combined with the change in women’s status, have increasedthe costs of having a child to women and families. “Theaverage share of household expenditure spent on children’seducation increased from 7.4 percent of the total householdexpenditure in 1985 to 11.6 percent in 2005.”
The cost of raising and educating a Korean child is estimated to be at leastUS $253,000.
taining Confucian patriarchal traditions passed on througha son. Sex determination technology allowed families toterminate unwanted pregnancies.
The government didrevise laws to outlaw prenatal sex determination and by promoting the value of daughters as well as sons, the sexratio at birth has declined to much more natural levels of about 105 boys born for 100 girls.
To date, no policies or  public opinion have been as effective, however, in reversingthe sustained low fertility levels.Although nearly all childbearing in Korea takes placewithin marriage—98.5 percent as of 2007—marriage ismuch less attractive to the current childbearing genera
Marriage is seen as a sort of luxury, which is soughtafter an “expanded educational and job-seeking period.”
In 1970, 88 percent of women aged 25-29 in South Koreawere married; by 2005 it was 40 percent.
This retreatfrom marriage has resulted in a rapid rise in the mean ageat marriage and in the mean age of childbearing. Mean ageat rst marriage rose from 24.1 years in 1985 to 28.9 yearsin 2010; mean age at rst birth was 27.2 in 1995 and was30.1 years in 2010.
The delay in marriage is a result in part of greater opportuni
ties available for women who have made tremendous gainsin obtaining higher education and securing jobs. Between1995 and 2008 the percentage of females who graduatedhigh school and entered higher education increased from50 to 84 percent.
Among women aged 25-29, 47.9 per 
 – 3 –
Economic factors, in addition to demographic factors, havekept fertility rates very low. The 1997 economic crisiswas devastating for Korea with unemployment rates for men aged 20-24 jumping from 8.7 percent in 1997 to 19.4 percent in 1998, and Korea has again been affected bythe international nancial crisis of 2008.
The economicshocks have led to diminishing expectations for labor mar 
ket success, which is one of the factors that has led to anincreasing mean age at marriage as well as young personsenjoying a more materialistic life and continuing to dependon their parents.
Housing is very expensive for young people, and yet there is the desire to live separately fromtheir families once the young couple marries. In the 2005Census, 76 percent of single men aged 25-29 were livingwith their parents compared with 86 percent of married menaged 25-29 living in their own households.
Improved public health measures, diet, and medicaladvances have helped South Korea become a healthier country and as a result mortality rates have declined. Lifeexpectancy at birth reects these positive changes with anincrease from 72 years in 1990 to 79 in 2012.
While the
increase in life expectancy at birth has been an importantfeature of the health and welfare of the elderly population,it has actually been the dramatic drop in fertility that hasshifted the percentage distribution of South Korea towardthe elderly.The very low fertility rates over a sustained period of timeare also reected in the overall population growth of thecountry and in the median age. The current populationgrowth rate is 0.2 percent, and by 2025, the country is ex
 pected to experience negative growth rates.
The medianage has been increasing and will continue to climb: from19.0 years in 1960 to 31.8 in 2000, and is projected to be43.7 in 2020 and 56.2 in 2050.
Korea will move from an aged society to a super-aged soci
ety very quickly, as can be seen in the population pyramidsfor 2012, 2025 and 2050 in
Figure 2
. Historically, theelderly were a very small percentage of the population in allcountries. During the late-1800s, European countries beganto see an increase in the elderly population. It took France115 years to move from 7 to 14 percent elderly, whereas itwill only take Korea 18 years.
Korea will be classiedas a super aged society with an estimated 20 percent of its population elderly by 2026. Population projections for theyear 2050 estimate that 38 percent of the South Korean population will be 65 or older, making it one of the oldestcountries in the world.
South Korea is not the only Asian country to experiencerapid aging. Japan has the highest life expectancy in theworld (84 years) and a total fertility rate of 1.4, a bit higher than South Korea’s. Currently the median age in Japan isnearly 45 years. The pattern of a rapid increase in the elderlyhas been observed in Japan, just as in South Korea. As of 1970, the elderly in Japan accounted for only 7.1 percent of the total population; in 1994, it had almost doubled to 14.1 percent. Although Japan has the highest life expectancy in theworld, South Korea experienced an even more compressed risein the elderly population combined with even lower fertilitythan in Japan.
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service. 2012.http://kosis.kr 

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