LAWRENCE

KOIILBERG

AND CAROL CILLIGAN

The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World

Those whose exterior semblance cloth belie Thy Souls immensity; Thou best Philosopher Thou little child, yet glorious in the might Of heaven-horn freedom on thy Beings height, Why with such earnest pains dost thou provoke, The years to bring the inevitable yoke? Thus blindly with thy blessedness at strife? Full soon thy Soul shall have her earthly freight, And customs lie upon thee with a weight Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life! The thought of our past years in me doth breed Perpetual benediction; not indeed For that which is most worthy to be blest; Delight and liberty, the simple creed of childhood But for those obstinate questionings Of sense and outward things, FaIlings from us, vanishings; Blank misgivings of a creature M ov in g a bout in wodds not rca lire High instincts before which our rn_ortal Nature Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised;

THE CENTRAL themes of this essay are first, the definition of adoles-

cence as a universal stage of development; second, the way in which the unive~sa]features of adolescence seem to be acquiring unique colorings in the present era in America; and third, the implications of these changes for education,
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i.nEDALUS

Th~ Adolescent as a Phiiosopher~ This social role view of ~dol~see~ce, the adolescent as teenager, places the instability of the adolesce~itself against the background1 of a stable sociaty. Against he background of the moods and tan-] trurns and dreams of the A nerican teenager lay an unquestioned] acknowledgment of the sta ility and icahty of the social order the adolescent was to enter, U derneath the hedonism and rebellion: of the teenager lay the conf rmist. l~laroldTeen and Andy Hardys first law wai conformity to the norms of the peer group. Beneath: this conformity to the peer roup, hawever, was the teenagers necognition that when the chip were d~wnabout your future you listened to dear old Dad. An xtreme example in reality of the Amer-I ican image of the teenager a cutting up while basically conforming is a group of California su urban high school seniors of the late 1950s, This group celebra d graduation by a summer of wellplanned robberies. Their o e concei~nwhile they engaged in their delinquent activities was th t if they]were detected, they would not get into the college of their c oice. Gonformity to the peer ultqreJt~en,was the first theme of the American treatment of th adoies~ent in the fifties, of August Hollingsheads Elmiowns tt~.,Jafres Colemans Adolescent Society, Albert K. Cohens D linquent] Buys. The second theme was that this peer culture was it elf deteiimined by the realities of adult? social class and mobility in hthh the peer culture was embedded.] Wh~ther grind, jock or hoo glhmo4r girl, sex kitten or Plain Jane,~ the teenagers discovery of self: led to the enactment of the stock] roles of the adolescent cult re. At a/different level than the sociol-I ogy of the teenager, Americ n literature also presented adolescence] as accepting unquestioning y the r~alityof adult society. Adoles-, cence was presented as an maginative expansion of the innocence of childhood facing the sor id but unquestionable reality of adult life. From Huckleberry Fin to Cat~her the Rye, the true Ainerin ican adolescent brought th childs nnocence to a new awarenessi of adult reality, leading to vision d:f the phoniness and corruption: of the adult world, which w s, howeyer, unquestioned in its reality. Sherwood Andersons story ~f the fQurteen-year-old finding his father figure with a piostitute ~s titled II Want to Know Why While the American adolescent m%ht be shocked by the sordid elements of adult life and might wa4t to kn~wwhy there was no question that he would eventually ~nter an~ accept adult reality. Even when he wanted to know ~vhy, th4 American adolescent seldom questioned the American astumptio4s of progress and upward mu-

Adolescence as a Role Transition and as a. Stage of Dcreioprnent in turn-of ~the-century America, C. Stanley Hall laimehed clcvel01

onontal psycliolog) with his discussion of adolescence as a stage

of development. For the next fifty years, however, most Amcrican oduoutors and psychologists tended to think about adolescence not os a stage but as a period in life, the teens. The teenager was viewed as half-child, half-grown up, with a halt-serious peer culire or youth Cul turc of his own. Textbook after textbook on adolescence was written telling in statistical detail the sort of information which could he gathered from reading Seventeen or
I tarot Teen.

Even with the textbook description of the teenager, one could

suonise that the central phenomenon of adolescence is the discov-

ccv of the self as something unique, uncertain, and questioning in its position in life. The discovery of the body and its sexual drive, and self-conscious uncertainty about that body, is one stock theme of adolescent psychology. The romantic concerns and hopes for the sells future has always been another element of the stock description of the adolescent, The third stock theme implied by the discoYetV of the self is the need for independence, for self-determination and choice, as opposed to acceptance of adult direction and control. The fourth stock theme implied by the adolescent discovery of soil is adolescent egocentrism and hedonism, the adolescent focus upon events as they hear upon his self-image and as they lead to ininediate experiences. ( \Vhile the child is egocentric and hedonistic, lie is not subjective; he focuses upon events, not upon his subjective experience of the. events, as what is important.) While the discovery of the self in the senses just listed has been
a stock therrie in American discussion of adolescence, it has been

subordinated to another theme, the theme of adolescence as a marginal role between being a child and being grown-up. The adoles01 it souse of self, with its multiple possibilities, its uncertainties, md its self-consciousness has been vie\ved as the result of a social position in which one is seen and sees oneself, sometimes as adult, sometimes as child. In the marginal role view, the adolescents need Inc nidepericlence and fantasies of the future are seen as the desire to he gro~vn-up, his conflicts-and instabilities are seen as the conflict between the desire to he grown-up and a role arid personality not 0 t consistent with being grownup.
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bilite, the assumption that society was moving ahead. Rather, he qi.mestionedl the wisdom dif his parents because they were oldfash iomied. this questioning was itself an expression of faith in the adult society of the future, The adolescents sense of the superiority of Ins values to those of his parents was an expression of the adolescents belief in a greater closeness to the adult society of the future than his parents had; it was a faith in progiess. Today, we are aware of the possibility of a deeper questioning 1w tIme adlolescent than was true at earlier times. Our image of the adolescent must acconunodate to the phenomena of the counterculture, of the hippie and the revolutionary who does not believe in progmessanrl upward mnobility. Both the hippie and the New Left meject not only the content of adult society hut its forms. The new radical refuses to organize as his revolutionary predecessors of the tlmirties did. Unlike the revolutionary of the thirtiel, he does not want to he ag rownup, to really transform and govern the adult society of the fotore. Audi beneath a qnestiomnng of social forms is a questioning of social functions. The current radical rejection of adult society seems to he the rejection of any adult society whatever, if an adult society means one including institutions of work, family, law, and government. Radicals have always questioned the sociLd forni.s of authority, of competitive achievement, and of the nuclear privatistic family and have dreamed of a more egalitarian and cormunutnal society. The essential realities of the social functions of work, child meaning, and of an organized social order were never questioned, lioweven. Since Paul Goodmans Growing Up Absurd, we have been aware that the reality of work amid making a living has come into question. Now the new ethics of population control and the Womens Liberation Movement leads to the questioning of the supreme reality of adulthood, being a parent and having children. Finally, the nealitv of social order is in question. When current adolescents talk of revolution, they do not seem to mean merely that adult society is evil and is resistant to rational change. More deeply, they seem to be saying that there is no real social order to destroy anyway. Social order is a myth or illusion in the adults
mind and revolution is not the destruction of an order, whether good or bad. On the optimistic side this is the message of Charles hcichs revolution in consciousness, the idea that the young can transform society without entering or dealing with it. On the pes-

simistic side, the popular versions of the counterculture reiterate the theme of Easy Ruler, the theme that the adult eultum-e is hostile
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and absurd, that it does no want y~uto join it but that it envies you and will destroy you in the] endi:no matter what you do. To summarize, all aecou ts ~f adolescence stress both the sense of questioning and the pan id dise~veryor search for a new sd of the adolescent. Usually t us ~nesfioning and search for self has been seen as the product of the adolescents marginal role between] childhood and adulthood. Jsually, ~oo, it has been assumed that] there are undd dying givens ben ath the questioning th rt whatever uncertainties the adolescent has, he Wants to be a grownup. Recent: experience makes real for mericabs the much deeper forms of: questioning which may cha .acterize: adolescence, one which is not merely a matter of roles. T e potential for a deeper questioning by the adolescent is imphed y the i4entity conflict central to Erik Eriksons psychohistonical st ge theory of adolescence, It is the phil-, osophic doubting about tr ith, goodness, and reality implied b~ J. Piagets epistemologieal stage th]eory of adolescence. It is th doubting represented by Do. toevskys adolescents, not Mark Twains Deeper doubting is still a are phenomenon, for adolescents. Be neath most hippie exterior is an ipterior more like Harold Tee than Hamlet or Raskolniko But thqsoretieal understanding of adoj lescence as a stage must str ss its i4al type potential, not its aver age manifestations. The importance of takin adoles4ent questioning seriously is no only important for psychol gical th~ory,it is also central to a suej cessfnl resolution of the e rrent p~oblemsof the American higI~ school. For education, the pro,bien~of meaning just raised is th~ problem of whether the hi s~hool] has meaning to the adolescent[ We said that American psy hology placed the adolescent discover~ of the self against a stable hut pro~ressivesocial order. It saw th~ discovery of self within a esire to be grown up however con fused or vague this image o the groWnup was, The high school had a double meaning to the a olescent from this point of view. First, it was the locus of the pee culture 1: which he found his immedi1 in ate identity, whether as gr nd, jock, or hood. Second, on the aeah demie side, it was a poin of conirection to a place in the adult world. In most high seho Is these meanings still remain and th questioning of the reality f adulthbod is not that deep. in other however, it is a serious p oblem ~nd high school is essentially meaningless place. Before we can~ solve the problem of the fel meaninglessness of the hi h schoo~,a clearer view of adoleseen
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DrEDALdIS

The 4dolescent as a Philosopher questioning is nequired. For this, we must turn to stage theory of tIme Eriksunm and Piaget variety. The Meaning of the Stage ConceptIllustrated from the lre,sc/mool Years To understand the universal meanings of adolescence as a stage and its implications for education, it will help to examine briefly an earlier stage and its implications for education, one more thoroughly understood than the stage of adolescence. Almost all cultures im recognize two 1mlimhtly Adolescence, thegreat stages or transformations imi developwent. second transformation, traditionally termiuatcd compulsory schooling. The first transformnation occurring from five to seven years of age initiated compulsory schooling.m This five tci-seven shift is termed the onset of the latency period by Freudian theory, the onset of concrete logical thought by Piaget. As emnbod in educational thought, the Freudian interpretation of the fivetwsevei) shift implied letting the child grow, Jetting him work through his fantasies until lie had repressed his sexual instincts and \\05 read to turn his energies into formal learning. This Freudian interpretation of the preschool stage suffered both from lack of conlimmation by empirical research and from irrelevance to the intellectual development and everyday behavior with which the schools were concerned. When the Great Society decided to do something for the disadvantaged child, the Freudian let him work through his oedipus complex implications of the five-toseven shift were dismissed as a luxury for the wealthy. Programs of preschool intellectual stimulation and academic schooling were initiated, with the expectation of long-range effects on intelligence and achievement, These programs failed to fulfill their initial hope of changing general intellectual maturity or longrange achievement.2 One reason they failed was hecause they confused specific teaching and learning with the development of new levels of thinking duly indicative of cognitive maturity. The evidence of limitations of these early education programs, together with growing positive research evidence of the existence of cognitive stages, convinced early educators of the reality of the stage transformation at the age live to seven. The stage transformation of the period five to seven is now conceived in quite a different way than in the vogue of Inudian education. In the Freudian view, the preschooler was in a stage of domination of thought by sexual and aggressive fantasies.
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The new stage which succeed d this was defined negatively as latency, rather than positively. nder tl~ieinfluence of Piaget, more recent thinking sees the presc ool childs fantasy as only one aspect of the preschoolers pattern of preiogi~althought. In the prelogical stage, subjective appearance i nqt fu~lydistingnished from reality; the permanent identities of thing$ are not differentiated from their momentary transformati ns. In tte prelogical stage view, the preschool childs special fanta y W not]the expression of an instinct later repressed but of a cogni ye, ]ev~lof thought. The decline of fantasy in the years five to yen, longitudinally documented by R, Schefller,tm is not a repressi n; it is ~losely related to the positive development of concrete logic l patterhs of thought. The childs changed orien ation to reality in the five-to-seven period is part of the develo ment o~concrete logical operations then. During this period the hild develops the operations of categorical classifications, of seria orderinf, addition, subtraction, and inversion of classes and relat ns. Thip development occurs in the absence of schooling in Afric n and Taiwanese villagers in much the same way that it occurs i the Arjierican suburban child.4 As a concrete example, Pb get andi the writers have asked children if they had had a bad dr am and ~f they were frightened when they woke imp from their ba dream.]~Susie, aged four, said she dreamt about a giant and ans erd, Yes, I was scared, my tummy was shaking and I cried an told mn~ mommy about the giant. Asked, Was it a real giant r was it~ just pretend? Did the giant just seem to he there, or was re~dly fherei? she answered, It was really there but it left when w~ketjp. I saw its footprint on the floor. According to Piaget, Susi s rvspomhse is not to be dismissed as the product of a wild imnagin tioji, but represents the young childs general failure to differentiate suhjectite from objective components of his experience. Children g through a regular series of steps in their understanding of drea as suh~ectivephenomena. The first step, achieved before five by ~nost American middle-class children, is the recognition that dream s are nqt real events. The next step, achieved soon thereafter, is t e realittion that dreams cannot be seen by others. The third step is the n~tionthat dreams are internal (but still material) events, By the ages six to eight c ildren +e clearly aware that dreams are thoughts caused by them elves. Th say such cognitive changes define stages implies the follo~vingthi4gs:
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Th~Adolescent as a Philosopher plausible to view a successio n of logi~sas an evolutionary and functional program of innate wir ng.) At the samne time, however, Piaget argued that stages indicate that mn~ntalstructure is not merely a reflection of external physics I re4mlitie~or of cultural concepts of different complexities. The strv cture of 1~ childs concepts in Piagets the than ~he adults, it is also different. view is not only less comnpl ~mx The childs thought is not jt st m~simplified version of the adults. Stages, or mental structu res) thei~,are not wired into time orga-1 nism though they depend uf nn inbot organi2ing tendencies. Stages( are not direct reflections of the childs cmmlture arid external world,] though they depend upon e~ :perienc~for their formation. Stages are] rather the products of inte: -actional experience between the child and the world, experience which l~ads to a restructuring of the: to childs own organization rat her than~ the direct imposition of the:: cultures pattern upon the thud. While hereditary components of] I.Q., of the childs rate of ii ifonnati~nprocessing, have some influ-: ence on the rate at which ti me child moves through invariant cogni~ tive sequences, experiential factors] heavily influence the rate cognitive-structural develop ment.7 kind of experience whic stimulates cognitive stage evelopnlent is, however, very differen from the direct academic tm aching ~f information and skills whic is the focus of ordinary schoi )ling. P~gramsof early education whicI~ take account of cognitive st ~.ges,th~n,look neither like the permis sive let them grow nnrse~ school jattern nor like the early teach ing programs popular in the sixties, They are a new form now com ing into being.8 Cognitive Stages in A olescen~e The older children get, he i~nore] ifficult it is to distinguish uni d versa! stage changes from ci~culti~ral transitions in development] We said that the core phe om~nonof adolescence as a stage wa~ the discovery of the subjec ye self *nd subjective experience and ~ parallel questioning of adu t culturm~l eality. The manifestations of r timis discovery, however, ar? heavily colored not only by historical and cultural variations, but also by previous patterns of life history of the child. In our first section, we discusse~one mnanifestation of the disk covery of the self, the disc very of]the body and its sexual drivesj.. In part this is, of course, a iologicdl universal, the physical growtl~ spurt markimmg adolescent p berty and an accompanying qualitativelj
1o5~

(1) Tlmat young childrens responses represent not mere igno

ranee or error, but rather a spontaneous manner of thinking about time world that is quahtatively different from the way we adults tljiulc and vet has a structure of its own. (2.) The notion of different developmental structures of thought implies consistency of level of response from task to task. If a childs response represents a general structure rather than a specific learning, then the child should demonstrate the same relative structural levels iii a variety of tasks.
(3) lime concept of stage implies an invariance of sequence in

development, a regularity of stepwise progression regardless of cultural teaching or circumstance. Cultural teaching and experience can speed up or slow down development, but it cannot change its order or sequence. The concept of stage, then, imnplies that both the youngest chil dreos conceptions of the dream as real and the school age childrens view of the dream as subjective are their own; they are products of the general state of the childs cognitive development, rather than the learmmirmg of adimlt teachings. Cross-csmltural studies indicate the universality of the basic sequence of developnient of thinking about the dream, even where adult beliefs about the meaning and significance of dreams is somewhat different from our own,t While the stage of concrete operations is culturally nniversal and in a sense natural, this does not mean it is either inrmate or that it is inevitable and will develop regardless of enviromnnental stimimlation. In the United States, the doctrine of stages was assumed for sometime to mean that childrens helmavior unfolded thronmgh a series of agespecific patterns, and that these pattermms arid their order were wired into the organism. This indecri was the view of Cesell and Freud, and Americans misunderstood Piaget as maintaining the same thing. The implications of the Cesellian and Freudian theory for early education were clear; early teaching and stimnulation would do no good since we must wait for the unfolding of the behavior, or at least the unfolding of time readiness to learn it. In cormtrast, Piagct used the existence of stages to argue that basic cognitive structures are not wired in, hut are general forms uf cm juilibniumn resulting from the interaction betwecmi organism and em virunment. If children have their own logic, adnmlt logic or mental structure cannot he derived from innate neurological patterning because such patterning should hold also in childhood. (It is hardly
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?ihe Adolescent as a PhOosoph~r new sex drive. If there is anything which can be safely said about what is new im the mninds of adolescents, it is that they, luke their elders, have sex on their mnmds. These changes, of course, have been the focus 0f Freudian thinking about adolescence as a stage. If anything, however, Freudian thinking has underestinmated the novel elements 0f sexual experience in adolescence, For the Freudian, early adolescent sexuality is the reawakening, of early childhood sexuality previommsly latent, with a consequent resurrection 0f oedipal feeling. Although it is true that adolescent sexuality bears the stamp of earlier experience, it is not the resurrection of earlier sexual feel9 i ngs. ..-\doleseent sexual drive is a qualitatively new phenomenon. While sexual drives arc awakened at puberty, there are vast individual arid cultural variations in the extent to which they determine the adolescents behavior and experience. Sexuality is a central concern for the self of some fourteen-year-olds; it is something deferred to the future for others. What is commnon for all, however, is arm intensified ernotionality whether experienced as sexual or not. This emotionality, too, is now experienced as a part of the self, rather
U ian asa correlate of objective events in the world. C. Ellinwood

studied the age development of the verbal experiencing and expressior~of emotion in projective tests amid in free selfdescriptions. She found that prior to adolescence (agedl twelve or so), emotions were experienced as objective concomitants of activities and objects. The child experienced anger because events or persons were bad; he experienced affection because persons were good or giving; he felt excitement because activities were exciting or fun, At adolescence, 1 uwever, emotions are experienced as the result of states of the self rather than as the direct correlate of external events)5 The dliffererice may perhaps he clarified by reference to middleclass drug experiences. Occasionally, a psychological preadolescent may take drugs, as he may drink beer or sneak cigarettes. When he does this, he does this as arm activity of an exciting forbidden and grown-up variety. For thme adolescent drug-taker, drugs represent rather a vehicle to certain subjective moods, feelings, and sensations. In many cases, the drug experience is a vehicle for overcoming depression, felt as an inner subjective mnood. In any ease, drugtaking is not an activity with an objective quality; it is a mode of activating subjective inner feelings and states, The same is true of such activities as intensive listening to music, an activity characteristieallv first engaged in at early adolescence (ages eleven to fourteen) Thc rook, folk-rock, and blues music so poprmlar with adoles.

cents is explicitly a prcsen ation of] subjective mnood and is 1isten~ to in that spirit. : Associated with the di covery ~f srmbjeetive feelings and moo4s ms time dmscovery of mmbiv ence and conflicts of feelmng If feelmngs are objective correlates of extrual good and bad events, there cah he little tolerance and ace ptance ~f feeling bate and love for tile same person, of enjoying ad~essand feeling sad about pIeasur~. Ellinwoods. study do.cnme ts that adolescents are consciously e4prcssing such ambmvalence whmth m~ of couisc the stock mu tnde dl the blues and folk-rock mu sic framed to them, We have spoken of the dolesceflt discovery of subjective mnoo4 md fcclings is imukcd to p bemty \jlore basically mt is linked to the unmveisal cognitive stages I Pmaget We have said that the five to seven transition is defined by Piagpt as the transition to abstract, reflective thought. More cx ctly, it is the transition from logical in~ ference as a set of con.cret operations to logical inference as a set of formal operations or o eration5 upon operations. Operations upon operations imply th, t the ai~olesceutcan classify ciassificaf tiou, that he can combine c1 mhinatjons, that he cami relate relation1 ships. It implies that he can]think about thought, and create though systems or hypothetico-de~luctivetheories. This involves the log ical comistruction of all ~05 ibilities+.that is, the awareness of th observed as only a subset what may be logically possible. In ret lated fashiomi, it implies the hmypothetico-deductive attitude, the no tion that a belief or propo ition is not an immediate truth but hypothesis whose truth val e consi$ts in the truth of the concret propositions dcii vahie from t. An example of the shift rom coi~crete formal operations ma to he taken from time work of E. A. Peel. Peel asked children wha they thought about the full wiiFmg e~ent: Only brave pilots are al1 lowed to fly over high mo mnt~ins,~k fighter pilot flying over th~ Alps: collided with an acrid cable-u~ay,and cnt a main cable caus~ ing some cars to fall to II e glacie~- below. Several people werd killed. A child at the concr te-Operiflional level answered: I thinl4 that the pilot was not very ood at fl,~ing.He would have been bet-F ter off if he went on fighting. A formal-operational child responded:: He was either not informe of the mountain railway on his route, or he was flying too low als his fiyipg compass may have been af-: fected by some thing bcfor4 or ifter take off tIns setting him off course causing collision witl~ the cable. The concrete-operational~child a~sumesthat if there was a col1061

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The Adolescent as a Philosopi cv us iua the pilot \vasa bad pilot; the formnaloperatiommal child considers all the possibilities that might have canscd the collision. The concrete-operational child adopts the hypothesis timat seems most probable or likely to him. The formaloperational child constrm.mcts all possibilities and cheeks them out one by one.
As a second example, we may cite one of Piagets tasks, system12 The atically replicated by D. Ktmhn, J. Langer, and L. Kohlberg. child is shown a pendulum whose length may vary as well as the number of weights attached. The child is asked to discover or cxplam what determiues the speed of movement (or period) of the pen~mlumn.Only the formal-operational child will isolate variables, that is, vary length hoidimig weight constammt, and so forth, and ar riveat the correct scilutiorm (for example, that period is determined by length). Success at time task is unrelated to relevant verbal knowledge about science or physics, hut is a function of logical level, In fact the passage from concrete to formal operations is not an all or mione phenomenon. There are one or two suhstages of formal operations prior to the full awa,reness of all possibilities just described. These substages are described in table 1, which presents mn overview of the Piaget cognitive stages. For simplifying purposes, we may s;mv that for nmic!clle-class Americans, one stage of formal operations is reached at age ten to thirteen, while the con sicleiatiomm of all possibilities is reached around fifteen to sixteen, At time first formal-operational stage, children becamne capable of reversing relationships amid ordering relationships one at a time or in chains, hut not of abstract consideration of all possibilities. (They are capable of forming the inverse of the reciprocal, in Piagets terminology; but riot of comnbinimig all relationships. ) A social, thinkinmg exammiple of failure to reverse relationships is shown in concrete operational chiidremms responses to the question: What does the Golden Rule tell you to do if someone comes up on the street and ImPs yoi.i? The typical answer is hit him hack, do unto others as they do unto you. The painful process of the transitional formaloerational child in respomise to the qimestion is given by the following response: Well, for the Colden Rule you have to like dream that your mmmiud leaves your body and goes into the other person, tI mcii it comes back into you and you see it like he does and you act like the \vay you saw it from there, We have described Piagets stage of formal operations as a logical stage. \Vhat is of special importance for understanding adolescents, however, is not tile logic of formal operations, but its episte1062 Table 1. Piagets eras an~stages 01 logical and cognitive development

Era I (age 0-2) he era of: sensorimotor intelligence Stage 1. Reflex action. Stage 2. Coordination f reflexesFand sensorimotor repetition (prim4ry circular reach n). 1 Stage 3. Activities to make in~resting events in the environm nt reappear (seco mdar,y cirm~ularreaction). Stage 4. Means/ends b liasior a~id search for absent objects. Stage 5. Experimental marc,h for ~1ew means (tertiary circular reactid m). Stage 6. Use of irnager r in: insi~htfulinvention of new means and in recall of ahsen objects ~nd events. Era II (age 2-5) Sy ibolic, inthitive, or prelogical thought F Inference is carried on through, images and symbols which do hot maintain logical relations or invarian~eswith one another. Magical tlmihking in the sense of (a) conf ision of 4pparent or imagined events with teal events and objects and (b) cm nfusion of perceptual appearances of qualitative and quantitative change wit actual change. Era III (age 6 10) Concrete operational thought Inferences carried on th uugh system of classes, relations, and quantities nt maintaining logically invari~ prupeflties and which refer to concrete objdcts. These include such logical rocesses ~s (a) inclusion of lower-order cIa ses in higher order classes; (h) transitive seriation (recognition that if a : h logical liddition and multiplication of cia :ses and b > c, then a > c); and quantities; (d) conservi tiun of nbmber, class membership, length, nd mass under apparent chang Substage 1. Formatior of stable categorical classes. Substage 2. Formatior of quamktitative and numerical relationi- of invariaimce Era IV (age tl to dulthoud) Formal-operational thought Inferences through logi al operaeions upon propositions or operat ons upon operations. Reasonir g about (easoning. Construction of system of all possible relations or in plic~tion. I-Iyputlmetico-deductive isolatiox of variables and testing of hyp theses. Substage 1. Formatioi of the [mverse of the reciprocal. Capacit to form negative classes (for i xanjple, the class of all nut-crows) and to see relations as simultaneously reciproc~.l (for example, to understand (hat liquid in a [5-shaped tube I otdsf an ehual level because of counterbala4ced pressures). Substage 2. Capacity o order ~riads of propositions or relations (for example, to understand th if Bob is taller than Joe and Joe is shdrter than Dick, then Joe is the s .ortest of: the three). Substage 3. True form U thought. Construction of alt possible combinatiuns of relations, systenma ic isolation of variables, and deductive hypothesistesting.

muology, its conception of trutim and reality. In the previous section we said that the childs attainment of comicretc operations at age six to seven led to the differentiation of subjective and objective, apmeam-amice amid reality. The dlifleremmtiatiomm at this level was one in 1 which reality was edhuatedl with the physical and time external, We cited the childs concept of the dlieamn, in which the mmreality of the dream was equnalent to its definition as arm inner mental event witim no physical external correlate, The subjective and the memmtal are to tIit, concrete-operational child ec uated with fantasies, with un1 realistic replicas of external physical events. The development of formal operations leads, lmowever, to a new view of the external amid the physical. The external amid the physical are only omie set of many possibilities of a suhiective experience. The external is no longer die real, the objective, and the internal the unreal. The internal may be real and the external unreal. At its extreme, adolescent thoimght entertains solipsism or at least the Cartesian cogito, the

mnade by the adolescent, t me cloud:ing and d~uestioningof the vali~ity of societys truths and its righdmess is the o.ther. To cormsider ti~is side of adolescence we m ist turn from cognitive to moral stages.~ Before we turrm to ad lescent moral thought we need to not~a real difference between t e development of concrete operations a~md the development of form 1 opema ious. There are two facts whibh 1 distimiguish the adolescen revolutipn in logical and epistemologi al

uotion that the only thing real is the self. I asked a fifteen-year-old girl: What is the most real thing to you? Her unhesitating reply
was myself. The hmies fromn Wordsworth introducing this essay represent his ,nvmm adoleseeut expenemice described by him as follows, I was cftemm u uablc to think of external things as having external existence, mmmd I communed with all that 1 saw as something not apart from, bitt m}merent in, my own material nature. Many times while going to school have I grasped at a wall or tree to recall myself from this abyss of idealism to the reality. At this time 1 \vas afraid of such pruces~es .i~ Wordsworths adolescent solipsism was hirmked to Ins awakened mimetic sense, to his experience of nature, and to his transcendental

thinking from the five-to seven r~volutionin thinking,. The first is that the adolescent revolt tion is e~tremely variable as to time. T e second is that for mnany eople itF never occurs at all. With reg d to concrete operations, so e chil~renattain clear capacity for I gical reasoning at five, so e at eight or nine, But all children u imately display some clean capacity for concrete-logical reasonin 15 This is not true for for al-operational reasoning. As an examp~ e, the percentage of 265 per o.ns at v~riousages showing clear form~loperational reasoning at he pen1ulum task is as follows: Age ten to fifteen: 451er cent Age sixteen to twenty: 53 per cent Age twenty-one to thir y: 65 p~r cent Age forty-five to fifty: 7 per centme
The subjects studied crc low~r-middle amid upper-middle-cl~ss California parents (age f rty~flveto fifty) and their children (m ge ten to thirty). The figure indicat;e that it is not until age twen yone to thirty that a clear majority~(65 per cent) attain formal r asoning by this criteria. Ti ey suggpst that there is no further de I.opment of formal reasoni: g after ~tgethirty. This means that aIm st 50 per cent of American dults n~verreach adolescence in the c gnitive sense. The figures houid nt he taken with too great serio 5ness, since various tasks re d1uiri.ng formal operatio.ns are of somewljlat varying difficulty. In the i study e~tedanother problem, a corr~lation problem, was used hich w4s passed by even fewer memb~rs of the adult population. ] is possible that easier tasks could he 8evi~edwhich would lead o more people displaying formal rea4ning. The point, however is that F a large proportion of Ameri$ns 1 never develop the capaci y for a~stract thought. Most who do, 1e1 velop it in earlier adoles enc~i(age eleven to fifteen), but some do not reach full formal rea5 ;oniimg nptil the twenties. We should nqte, too, that rate of attainm ent of formal operations is not simply~ a ~Iations ~ietween Piaget and. I.Q. measutes function of I.Q.: the corr~ simpler culturesfor example, villages are in the 50s. Finally,

meligiositv. It seems that for all adolescents the discovery of the subjectise is a condition fir aesthetic feeling in the adult sense, for the experience of nature as a contemplative experience, and for rehigitmsity of a mystical varity. It is probably the condition for adolescent momnantic love as well. This whole constellation of experiences is called romantic because it is cemitered on a celebration of the selfs experience as the self enters into union with the selfs counterpart uutsic]e, The commmion view of romanticism as adoiescenmt, then, is correct in defining the origins of romanticism in the birth of the soi jectivc self in adolescemice. if the discovery of stmhjective experience amid the transcendental 1 sc: t is one si~ieof the new differentiation of subjective and objective

1001

1063

1.),EJ)ALUs

The Adolescent as a Philosopher

groups or persons who Ii ld then~and apart from time individua,ls identification witlm those p ~rsonsor: groups. F \Vithin each of these three levels there are two discerna Ic stages. At the preconvent onal lev~Iwe have. Stage 1: Orientati n toward punishment and u mqtmestioiming deference to superior pow r. The physical consequen es of 4tion regardless of their hum n meaning or value determi e its go*dness or hadness. Stage 2: Ri t action consists of that whi h instrumentally satisfies ones own nec and occasionally the nee.s of oth~mrs, Human relations are view d in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, re iprocity, and equal sharin are pr~sent,but they are always mt preted in a physical, prag at~c w4y. Reciprocity is a matter of y scratch my back and Ill s rat~h y*urs, not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice. At the conventional Ic el we h~vC:Stage 3: Good-boy-good- rI orientation. Good behavi is that F~vhichpleases or helps others ajid is approved by them. T crc is n~much conformity to stereotypiCal images of what is majorit or natural behavior. Behavior is oft~n judged by intentiouhe means well becomes important for the first time and is overused. One seeks approval by being nice. Stage
4: Orientation toward a thority, fixed rules, and the maintenance

in Tturkey--fulI formal Oieratious never seem to he reached at all though it is reached by urbanized edlucated Turks).

Time high variability in age of attainment of formnal operations, indicates that we dimlmot equate a cognitive stage with a defi imite age period. Ptmberty, the attainmnent of formimal operations, and the transition from childhood to adult status are all components of adolescence variable it., time andi in their relations to one another.
timemm,

Moia.l Stages in Adolescence and Their Relation to

Cognitive Stages Joseph Adelson, in this voltmme, documents the \vay in which thc adolescents thinking about political society is transformed by time advemmt of formaloperational thought. To understand time ado iesd:emmts social thiukimig, however, we need to he aware not only of logical stages but also of stages of moral judgment. In our research, we have found six definite and universal stages of development in moral thought. In our longitudinal study of seventy-six American boys from preadolescence, youths were presented with hypothetical muoral dilemmas, all deliberately philosophical, some of them found in medieval works of causistry. Orm the basis of their reasomnng about these dilemnmas at a given age:, each boys stage of moral thought could be determined for cach of twelve basic moral concepts, values, or issues. The six stages of moral thought are divided into three major levels, the preconveniioimal, the corwentiono!, and the postconventionai or autonomous. While the prec:onventional child is often well-behaved and is rdsponsive tc cultural labels of good and had, lie interprets these Ia biTs in termns of their physical consequences (punishment, reward, cxclmange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate time rules and labels of good amid bad. This level is usually oc.:cupied in time mnidclle class by children aged four to ten. Ilie sedOmid or conventional level usually becomes dominant in pmeadlolescence. Maintaining the expectation and rules of the mdividluals famnilv, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own might. There is c:oncern not omily with conforming to the individuals social order, but also in maintaining, supporting, amid justifying this order. Ihe postconventional level is first evident in adolescence and is characterized hy a major thrust toward autonomous mnoral principles which have validity and application apart from authority of the
1.000

of the sod:ial order. Rig t behavior consists of doing ones duty, showing respect for auth rity, an4 maintaining the given social (irder for its own sake. One earns re~pect y performing dutifully. b At the po.stconvention I level ~e lmave: Stage 5A: A social-c4ntract orientation, generall with legalistic and utilitarian overton~s. Right action tends to he defined in terms of general rights and un terms of standards which have been critically examined and agm-qed upon by the whole socie y. The.r~is a clear awareness of the rejlativism of personal value, and opinions and a corresponding e phasis upon procedural ules fori reaclming consensus, Aside fr m what is constitutionally a reed upon, right or wrong is a matter of personal values and opi ion; Th~result is an emphasis upon he legal point of view, but itlt an emn.phasis upon the possibility of changing law in termns f r~tior4Iconsiderations of social util ty, rather than freezing it in the~term4sof Stage 4, law and order. 0 tside the legal realm, fre agk-een~entand contract are the bind ng elements of obligation. TI is is the~othcialmorality of American g vcomment, arid finds its gr und in the thought of the writers of the Constitution. Stage SB: rientat!on to intermial decisions of cnscience but without dc a r itmomi ! or urmmvc rs ii prmmicmples Stage 6
-

1067

n nnALus 1

The Adolescent as a fltUosopner

reasoning of the conventic nal or Sfage 3-4 kind never occnmrs before the preconventional Stage 1 and Stage 2 thought has taken piaco. No adult in Stage 4 has gc ne through Stage 6, but all Stage 6 adults have gone at least through 4. F While the evidence is mot complete, our study strongly sugge.4s that moral change fits thi stage pattern just described. Figures 1 and 2 indicate the cultur, ml univeksahity of the sequence of stag which we found. Figmmre I presenth the age trends for middle-cIa s urban boys in the United States, ffaiwan, and Mexico. At age t n in each country, the orde of use pf each stage is the same as tl e order of its difficulty or n aturity. ~n the United States, by age si teen the order is the rever se, from the highest to the lowest, exce that Stage 6 is still little ised, Tl~eresults in Mexico and Taiw are the same, except that de~elop(nentis a little slower. The m conspicuous featm.mre is tha at the age of sixteen, Stage 5 thinkim g is much more salient in th~UpitedFStates than in Mexico or Taiw~ Nevertheless, it is present in. ihe other countries, so we know th~t this is not purely an Ame ricap dehmocratic construct. Why should there he uch! a uqiversal invariant sequence of c~evelopmnent? In answering this qu~stion,we need first to analy~e these developing social c ~ncepts nn terms of their internal logical structure. At each stage, be same~basicmoral concept or aspectlis defined, but at each high er stage! this definition is more differeptiated, more integrated, am more general or umuversal. When ones concept of humnamm life me yes fronj Stage I to Stage 2 the value pf life becomes more differe itiated &om the value of property, more integrated (the value of life en~ersan organizational hierar4y where it is higher than propert~rso that one steals property ~n order to save life) and nmm u-c univ4rsalized (time life of any sentieht being is valuable regardli 55 of s4tus or property). The same a vance is true at each stag in: the hierarchy. Each step of develo ment, then, is a better cc gnitive 4rganization than the one hefo e it one which takes accot i-mt of ev~rythingpresent in the previo stage, but making new dis tinctionsF and organizing them into a m comprehensive or more iuilibratid structure. What is the relation ol mqral skage development in adolescen e to cognitive stage develop]nenf? In1. Piagets and our view, both ty s of thought and types of vm .luing of feeling) are schemata whi h develop a set of general s tructura]~characteristics representing s ccessive forms of psycholo~ ~ical eq4ilibrium. The equihhriumn of if fective and interpersonal s therata~justice or fairrmess, involves mnatmy
-

Orientation towardi ethical principlesappealing to logical commipre lieim,siveness, universality, ammd consistency. These principles are abstract amid etlncal (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. Instead, they ame universal principles of justice, of tIme reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings a.c individual persons. These stages are defined by twelve basic issues of moral judgment, On one such issue, Conscience, Motive Given for Rule Obedicuce or Moral Action, the six stages look like this: 1. Obey rules to avoid punishment. 2. Conform to ohtain rewards, have favors returned, and so on. 3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others. 4. Conformn to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and resultant gimilt. 5A. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms of edmmmunity welfare, E13 Conform to avoid self-condemnation. in amiothcr of these mnoral issues, the value of human life, the six stages c:amm he defined thus: 1. The value of a human life is confused with the value of physical objects armcl is based on the social status or physical attributes of its possessor. 2. lime value of a human life is seen as irmstrumental to the satisfaction of the micecls of its possessor or of othe.r persons. 3. TIme value of a humarm life is based on the empathy and affection of famnily members and others toward its possessor. 4, Life is conceived as sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or meligiocms order of rights andi duties, 5. Life is valued both in terms of its relation to community welfare audI in terms of hieing a universal human right. (3. l3elief in the sacredness of human life as representimig a universal human value of respect for the individual. We call our types stages because they seem to represent an invariant developmental sequence. True stages Come one at a time amid always in tIme same order. All movement is forward in sequence and does miot skip steps. Children may move t,hrough these stages at varying speeds, of course, and may be foimnd half in and half out of a particular stage. Amm individual may stop at any given stage and at any age, but if he commtinm,es to mnove, he mnust mnove in accord with these steps. Moral 1008

(+

10~39

/0

00

Q1

5!!
<0

5
-0

-~ ~

Omega

Stage

1. Middle-clan urban boys in the U.S., <Taiwan and Mexico (above). Al e~e the alagee are used IS accoeding to ,mmntculty. M age fl Siege 2 mc meet uted by all three 9000mm, /et age 16 U.S. boys have maccreed the order am age 10 stages (with limo- ercepimon 01 8). in Taiwan and MexIco, conventional 0-4) Macca prevail at age 16, WIth Stage S aloe tittle teed.
2
U

1
60

50

1. (emo mottled villages, One jn Tories, time other in Yucatan, show ammeter pootterne ml, moral thinking. There me no revered of order, and pi-econeenmionet (I-i) Ihoughi does dove not gall a clear ascendancy oyer conventIonal sIeges at age IS.

of the same basic stmudtu ai features ts th equmlmbrmum of cognmtrve schemata logicality. Justi e (porttayed as balancing ti-me scales) is a form of er1nilibrium h ween c&ifiicting interpersonal claims, so that imm contrast to a giv n m-ule imposed upon ti-me cl-mild from otmt side, the rule of justice is an inmm~neritcondhtiomm of soc[aI relationsimips or a law governing theiy eqUilibrium.7 What is hieing asserte~i,then, is not that moral judgnmeut sta es are cognitivethey are r4ot time n~ereappIicatiou logic to mo al of problenisrhut that time efcistence of moral stages implies that n rmal development has a ~asic cogimitive-structural component. The Piagetian ration~iejust advanced suggests ti-mat cognit ye maturity is a necessamy, b t not a ~mfficientcondition for moral ju gmeut maturity. While fo ai Fopemlations may be necessary for pr cipled morality, one may e a theOretical physicist and yet not m ke moral judgments at the pmneipled~level. As noted in the previ us secdon, Kuhn, Langer, and KdhTh g found that 60 per cent o persons~ over sixteen had attained fon al operatiomial thinking (by their p~rticuiarmeasures). Only 10 er cemmt of subjects over sirt en ~how d clear principled (Stages 5 6) thinking, hut afl these 10 ~er c~nt were capable of formai-ope~ational logical thought. M re gene*aIiy, there is a point-to-point c~rrespondence between Pia ret logical and moral judgment stages,) as indicated in table 2, The relatiomj is that attainment of the logi~al stage is a necessary but not su lent condition for attainment, of the moral stage. As we s all notei in the mmext section, the fact that many adolescents have f mal logical capacities without yet having developed the correspon ng degree of n-moral judgment maturFity is a particularly importan backgr4mund factor in some of the currtnt dilemmas of adolescents,
-

0
2
0

40

30
0

Adolescent Question ng and: the Problem of Relativity o Truth and Value

Stage 2

~20j

.4 m0~ Stge3

~ 5, ma
-~

Sm ~ m TURKEY a

I
ma ma YucATAN me

AGE

The cornerstone of a Piagetiah interpretation of adolescenc~is the dramatic shift in cog oition fr9m concrete to formal operatip.ns by which old conceptions of .the ~vorld are restructured in termsl of a. new philosophy. Piage dehne4 the preschool child as a phil~sopher, revolutionizing ch lid psycitmoiogy by demonstrating that $he child at each stage of dcv elopmet actively organizes his experiem~ce and makes sense of the p iysi~aiafrid social world with which he interacts in terms of the cl mssi~alclitegories and questions of philps~
1~171

0/EDALUS

T~re dolescent as a Philosopher A

Table 2. ciai kind of cancer. There w one dr~gthat the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of ra ium tha( a druggist in the same town ha~i recently discovered, TI-me dot was expensive to make, but the druggi~t was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make, He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 f:or a small dose of the drug. Thp sick womans he,asband, Hem: went teb everyone he knew to borrow th~ money, hut he could only g together about $1,000 which was halt eef what it cost, He told the dm1 gist that his wife wa~dying, and asked hicim to sell it cheaper or let him ay later.: But the drimggist said, No, I diicovered the drug and Im ga ng to make money from it, Heinz got de~perate and broke into the mar s store t~steal the drug for his wife,

Relations between Piaget logical stages and Kohlherg moral stages. (all relations are that attainnment of the logical stages is necessary, hut not sufficient, for attaiminment of the moral stage) Logical stage Svemmhoiir, in.trtritive thought Coeecrete operations, Substage I Categorical classification Uoaceete operations, Substage 2 Reversible concmete thought ih,rmat operations, Substage 1 Re-ia times involving tile inverse of the reciprocal J~myrnajoperations, Substage 2
Sot nec<i
0

Moral stage Sta<ge 0: Tlee good is what I want and like, Stage I: Punishment-obedience orientation. Stage 2: Instrumnental hedonism al-md concrete reciprocity. Stage 3: Orientation to interpersonal relations of mutuality, Stage 4: Maintenance of social order, fixed rules, and authority. Stage 5A. Social contract, utilitarian lawmaking perspective. Stage SB: Higher law at-md conscience orietitatiomm, Stage 6: Universal ethical principle orientation.

Should the husband have one thm~t?Was it right or wrong? Bo a junior in a liberal privatc high school, says:
Theres a million ways tc look at it Heinz had a moral decision make, Was it worse to steal let his wife die? In my mind I can eith condemn him or commdone hin In this case I think it was fine. But poss bly the druggist was womkin~ on Ia capitalist morality of supply amtd dc mand,

~errttiome,s, Substage .3

I went on to ask Bob, \-Vo eld ~t be~ wrong if he did not steal it? It depends on how he is oriented morally. If he thinks its worse
steal than to let his wife die th4n it Hould be wrong what he did, Its all relative, what I would do is s(eal the drug. I cant say thats right r wrong or that its what everyo ne should do,

ophers concerning space, tune, causahty, reality, and so on, It is, however, only in adoiesceroce that the child becomes a philosopher in. time formal or traditional sense. This emergence of philosophic questioning has beemi studied most carefully in ti-me onorai realm. The transition frono preconventional to conventional m.orality generally occurs during the late elementary school years. The shift

Bob started the interyie:w by wOndering if he could answer

cause< he questioned the n hole terminology, the whole moral hag), He goes on; But then Im also an mcml dible moralist, a real puritan in some sense and moods. My moral judgmr ent and (he way I perceive things moralhe changes very much when ~ y mood changes. V/hen im in a cyrtic4l mood, I take a cynical view of morals, but still whether I like it or no(, lm terribly moral in the wa I look ikt things. B,mt Im not too comfor 1 able with it.

in adolescence from concrete to formal opeTa~orls, he ability now t to see the givere as only a subset of the possible and to spin out the alternatives, constitutes ti-me necessary precondition for the transition
from conventional to principled moral reasoning~ It is in adoles-

cence, then, that the cl-mild has the cognitive capability for moving f:ron( a conventional to a postconventional, reflective, or philosophic
view of values and society. The rejection of conventional moral reasoning begins with the perception of relativism, ti-me awareness that any given societys defimntion of right and wrong, however legitimate, is only one among mnany, both in fact and theory. To clarify the issue of morai reiativismn as perceived by an adolescent, we will consider some adolescent responses to the following dilemma: Ito Europe., a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a spe1072

Here are some other ju hors fro-~an upper-middle-class pubh high school:
Dan: Imnmoral is strictly a re ative te4n which can be apphed to almo.t any thought On a particular s object .4. if you have a man and a woma in bed, that is immoral as o~ posed to ~if you were a Roman a few thor sand years ago and you wer used to kngies all the time, that would a be immoral, Things vary so w en you 4aii somethin.g iononorai, its reiativ to that society at that time nd it vares frequently. [Are there any ci cumstaroces in which wrong n some 4bstract moaal semose would be a plicahle?] Well, in that seas , th~onl!~thing 1 could find wsong won be when you were hurting soc eh~dya*ainst their will.
107t3

llhe Adolescent as a Philoso~htfr

Elliot: I thimok one individuals set of moral values is as good as the next imodividuals , . . I think you have a right to believe in what you believe ire, but I dont thirok you have a right to enforce it on either people. John: 1 dont think anybody should be swayed by the dictates of society. Its probably very much up to tie individual all the time and tioeres no general principle except when the views of society seene to conflict with ycour views and your opportunities at the moment and it seems that the views of society dont really have any basis as being right and in that case, most people, I think, would tend to say forget it and Ill do what I want, Time high school students just quoted are, from the point of view of mnoral stage theory, in a transitional zone. They understand and

Relativity Mocal Sta es, and Ego Identity

We first came across e treme r~iativistresponses in some of o4r longitudinal subjects short y after college entrance in the early si~-

can use conventional moral thinking, hut view it as arbitrary and relative. They do not yet have any cleat understanding of, or commitment to, moral principles which are universal, which have a claim to sonic nonrelative validity. Insofar as they see any principles as nonrelative, it is the principle of do your own thing, and let others do theirs. This principle has a close resemblance to the principles characteristic of younger childrens Stage 2 instrumental egoistic thinking. The following examples of a ten-year-old naive egoist and a college student transition relativistic response are more clearly of ti-mis instrumental egoistic form.
Jhnmny (American city, age 10): It depends on how much he loved his wife, He should if he does, [if he doesnt love her mnuch?] if he wanted her to die, I dont think lie should. [Would it be right to steal?] In a way its right because he knew his wife would die if he didnt and it would ho right to save bee, [Does the druggist have the right to charge that touch if no law?] Yes, its his drug, look at all hes got invested in it, [Should the judge punish?] tie should put him in jail for stealing and he should put the druggist in because he charged so much and the drug didnt work, l:toger (Berkeley Free Speeclo Movement student, age 20): IJe was a victim of circe.mmstances and can only be judged by other mcii whose varying vahie and interest frameworks produce subjective decisions which are neither permnanent nor absolute, The same is true of the druggist. id do it, As far as duty, a husbands duty is up to the husband to decide, and anybody can judge him, and lie can judge anybodys judgment. If he values her life over the consequences of theft, he should do it, [Did the druggist have a right?] One can talk about rights until doomsday and never say anything. Does th~lion have a right to the zebras life where lie starves? When lee wants sport? Or when he will take it at will? Does he consider rights? ls man so different? [Should he be punished by the jm.edge?] All thus could be avoided if the people would organize a planned economy. I think the judge should let him go, but if he does, it will provide less incentive for the poorer people to organize.
1074

ties.8 At ti-mat time, we in erpreted their responses as a regressiob to Stig 2 thmnkmng Fmfte per cent of our college bound male stu dents who were a mixtur of conventional (Stage 4) and socialcompact-legalist (Stage 5) thought at the end of high school, retrogressed to an apparent tage 2 i~estrninentalistpattern in colleg~. In terms of behavior, e eoyone Cf our retrogressed subfects haU high moral character rati gs in high school, as defined by hot teachers and peers. In coil ge at le;st half had engaged in anticom ventional acts of a more less d~lirsqnentsort, As an example Stage 2 Nietzschean had b en the [nost respected high school st
-

dent council president in y ars~In his college sophomore intervie

however, he told how two from a friend at work. He was just too good, too Oh teach him what the world

days be~ore had stolen a gold watc he ad done so, he said, because his frien st-like,, too trusting, and he wanted as like. He felt 1-mo guilt about the steal ing, he said, but he did fe I frustra ed. His act had failed, he said , 1 because his trusting friend nsi~tedipe lost or mislaid the watch an simply refused to believe i ha4l be*.n stolen.
The forces of developm t ~hic~ led our 20 per cent from up~ standing conventional rnora ity to R~skolnikovmoral defiance event tnahly set them all to right, Every sngle one of our retrogressorsj had returned to a Stage 5 orality by age twenty-five, with mor~ Stage 5 social-contract prin~iple, ies~Stage 4 or convention, timan in high school. All, too, were c~rwerthonal1ymoral in behavior, at least as far as we can observe th~m.In sum, this 20 per cent was amo.ng the higiest group at high ~chooi, Was the lowest in college, and again among the highest at t~wenty-fi~c. In other words, moral tiativisnJ and nihilism, no mnatter ho extensive, seemed to be a transitidnal attitude in the movemen from conventional to princip ed morality.

Cognitive Moral Stage arid Ego-Identity

In considering further th meani4g of relativism in adolescence,
it is helpful to relate logical and mo4al stages to Eriksons stages of ego-identity. I.~ogicaland oral stages are structures of thought through which the child m ve~ se~uentiaily. Eriksons stages are
1015

o ,EOALUS rather segments of the life Fmistories of individuals; they define the central concerns of persons in a developmental period. An adolescent does not know or care that he is moving from concrete to formal thought; he knows and cares ti-mat he is having an Erikson identity crisis. Cognitive_developmental stages are stages of structure, not of content. The stages tell us how the child thinks concerning, good acid bad, truth, love, sex, and so forth. They do not tell us what he thinks about, whether he is preoccupied with morality or sex or acleievement. They do not tell us what is on the adolescents mind, hut only how he thinks about what is on his mind. The dramatic cieanges in adolescence are not changes in structure, hut changes in content. The adolescent need not know or care he is going from conventional to principled moral thinking, but he does know and care that sex is on his mind. In this sense cognitive structural stages milay he contrasted \vith hotic psychosexual and Eriksonian stages.19 When we turn to Eriksons ego stages, we are partly dealing with a logical sequence as in logical arid moral stages. Within Eriksons stages is the logical necessity that every later disposition presupposes each prior disposition, that each is a differentiation of prior dispositions. Eriksons ego stage centers around a series of forms of self-esteem (or their inverse, negative self-esteem). The first polarity trust-mistrust is one in which self and other are not differentiated. Trust is a positive feeling about self_and-other; mistrust is a negative feeling. The next polarity, autonomy versus shame, involves ti-me self_other differentiation. Autonomy is a trust in the self (as opposed to the other); shame is a depreciation of self in the eyes of another whose status remains intact. Shame, however, is itself a failure to differentiate what one is from what one is in the eyes of the other, a differentiation implied in the sense of guilt. Similarly, initiative (I can be like him, its all right to be or do it) is a differentiation from autonomy (I can do it). Such sequential progrssive differentiations in self-esteem are involved throughout the Erikson stages. While ti-mere is an inherent logical (as opposed to biological) sequence to tie Erikson ego stages, they are not hierarchical in the way cognitive stages are. Resolutions of identity problems are not also resolutions of trust or initiative problems, ti-mat is, each of the earlier problems and dispositions persists rather than being integrated into or being hierarchically dominated by the next, As a result, when we turn to E.riksons stages as defining focal concerns, we have a stage scheme which is so multidimensional as to
1076

The Adolescent as a Philosopl4r

resist empirical proof in th sense i~which Piagetian stages may e proved. Ultimately the En so4 stases are ideal-typical in Webe s sense. They are not unive sal abst~actionsfrom data, but purifiertions and exaggerations of typical life histories. They do not predi,t regularities in the data, t ey aid i~establishing historical conne~itions in case histories. As ~rikson vses his stage schema, it helps (o suggest historical connecti~nsin a particular life, like Luthers, The truth of the stage schema ~s not in question; the truth of particular historical connections is. lihe stage schema helps select and illuininate these historical conne~tions.In this sense, the stage of identity formation is not a step in an absti1act but observable universal s~mquence, but is an ideal-ty ical characterization for a concrete hi torical period of adohescen e. As such, it need not ave any~ exact logical relation to logic i and moral stages, as the must to one another. While Enikso s stages cannot be defined, measured, or logically handled in t e same sense as cognitive-d vehqpm~ntalstages, siggestive empiric ml relations between ego-ide tity ter~esand moral stages are bun M. H. Poddtmem gave an go-iden~ityinterview to 134 male colic e iuniors and seniors as we I as~ the~.moraljudgment interview, F Ilowing J. E. Marcia,mr th idcntit~interview covered occupation i choice, religious beliefs, a d political ideology. Crisis and cot mitment are assessed in each of these areas and serve to defi e each identity status. Whe an ind~vidualundergoes active eonsi eration of alternative goa s ahd v~iueshe is said to have expe i~ enced a crisis,> Commit en? is ~he extent to which an individuhl has invested himself in is choic~s. The identity statuses oper~mtionaily defined are. (1) i entity achievcmcnthas gone through crisis and is committed; 2) moratoriumis in crisis with vague commitments; (3) forecl sureh~ms experienced no crisis but is committed to goals and v hues of parents or significant others; (4) identity diffusionhas no commitpient regardless of crisi.s. Subjects in the Podd udy co4d be grouped into three maj&r groups, the conventional Stages ~ and 4), the principled (Stag..s 5 and 6), and the transi ional. The transitional subjects could n turn be divided into two roups, those who were a combination f conventional and pnincipi1ed thinking and the extreme relativi s who rejected conventionr~lthougi~it and used more instrument 1 egoistic (Stage 2) mod~s.Two4hirds of the principled subje s had an <identity achievem1ent~ stat~as,So too did about 40 per cc of the conventional subje1ts, the r~mainderbeing mainly in ide
-

10 7

ILEOALUS

The Adolescent as a Philosophefgap between conventional orlil expectations and actual moral b4 havior. It is clear that thes de&elo~mentai hallenges are univers4 c challenges; the integration of bne~moral ideology with the fact~ of moral diversity and in onsistency is a general development.cjl task of youth in an open sodety; its solution is the formation o1f a universal principled mora ity For our extreme rehativ sts or a4orahists, there seemed to be 4 additional task in the need to free ~hemselves from their own ear4 rigid morality In Erikso s terms our retmogrcssors wcre hmvmg in a late adolescent psychoso Ml moratorium, in which new and nonconforming patterns of th ught and behavior are tried out. Their return to morality or mora though% is the eventual confirmation ~f an earlier identification as nes owin identity. To find a sociomor4h identity requires a rebelli us moratoriwn, because it requires Ii eration of initiative from t e gihilt ftoth which our retrogressors su fer, At the stage of iden ity the adult conforms to his standar because he wants to, not ecause he anticipates crippling guilt f lie does not. By the 1970s the extr .me don~tand relativism which earTh r characterized only a mirio ty of co l.ege students appears both ea her and much more perva vely. It is now sometimes found towar the end of high school.22 I ouj owp Harvard undergraduate cour e for freshmen and sophom res, about two-thirds of the students a ser~that there are no such things a~ valid moral rules or principle, no objective sense in whic one thii~g morally better titan anothe is It appears that a majority athtr than a minority of adolescents no are. aware of relativism an of ~ost~onventiona1 questioning, thou it is still a minority who eally atfrmpt postconventional or pri cipled solutions to these q estiOns. Parallel historic i1 cha ges seem to have occurred in the rela tionship of extreme moral relativism: to identity issues. Podds fin~1ings from the late sixtie differe~lfrom those of Kohlberg ar~d Kramer in the early sixti s in omw important way, Kohlberg ausd Kramer found their extrem relativists, the Stage 2 or regressed subjects, in a condition of nw atorium~in a state of crisis with vag4e and uncertain commitmen s. In contrast, Podd found them in a co dition of identity diffusion ith no ~ense of commitment and not ne essarily a sense of crisis, In other words, extreme relativism no long r appeared to be a tennpora.r ego-de~elopmental aneuver of a sm 11 m group of subjects in crisi but rather to represent a more stahl less crisis-hike pattern of I w comnlitment. It seems likely to us th t
,

foreclosure (a status missing among the principled). None of time morally transitional subjects had an identity achievement status, and very few had foreclosed identity questioning. Esseutiall)r, then, morally transitional subjects were inn transition with regard to identity issues as well as moral issues, Stated slightly differently, to have questioned conventional nnorality you must have questioned your identity as well, though you may continue to hold a conventional moral position after having (lone so. Thc, impact of the Podd study is that the relativistic questioning of conventional morality and conventional reality associated with logical mmd moral stage developnnenit is also central to the adolescents identity concerns. As a corollary, morally conventional subjects have a considerable likelihood of never having an identity cnsls or an identity questioning at all. Eriksons picture of mm adolc,s cent stage of identity crisis al-md its resolutions, then, is a picture dependent upon attainment of formal logical thought and of questioning of conventional morality. It fits best, then, the picture of adolescence in the developmentally elite and needs further elabora lion For other adolescents.
lit)

Historical Change in Adolescent Relativism

We have linked adolescent relativism to a transition from con-

ventional to principled morality, associated with identity crisis. This

picture emerged most clearly from our longitudinal data from the late fifties and early sixties reported in the Kohlherg and Kramer article (see note 18). In this data only a small minority of college students entered a phase of moral nihilism and relativism in the transition front conventional to principled morality. Typically they attempted to constrmmct or select an ideology of their own in this transitional phase, ideologies which ranged from Nietzschean racism to Ayn Rand objectivism to early S.D.S. New Left formulations. In tliese college subjects of the early sixties it was possible to see an intense identity crisis, in Eriksons terms, These college relativistegoists were rare, and they all seemed to have been moralistic and guilt prone in high school, As part of their identity crisis, they seem to have had strong problems in freeing themselves from childhood amoral expectations and guilt. There were two universal developmental challenges to conventional morality to which these regressors were also responding: fIrst, the relativity of moral expectations and opinion; second, the
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10 9

)rii)ALU5

T~e Adolescent as a Philosoph4

culture which is largely c nvention~alin its appeal hut which lac the solidarity of tradition I donvqntional society and is not enjbedded in it. As moral c untercujture, the hippie culture diffe4s primarily from the conve tional ch.ilture in its extreme .reiativisiln an~consequent fluidity, n t ii~any~ positive forms of moral thougqt different from the conventi naL I In most eras of the pa the a+lescent svnt through questio ing of value, meaning, an trith in a world of adults apparently oblivious to these doubts, Reflecti~eadolescents have always coAsidered adults as benighte for acpepting conventional norms anld imposing them on youth, fir never doubting the truth and goodnds of their world. The questio ing ado~escent as always seen the adult h acceptance of the conventi nah soc~al orld as reflecting the hypow ricy, insensitivity, and drclaniness Qf the adult. Equally, the que~tioning adolescent has al~aysexpdcted to remake the adult word nearer to his hearts desir~,and at given moments in history h succeeded. What is new s the ci~eationof a questioning cnltu e providing half-answers to which 4dolescents are exposed prior o their own spontaneous c1ue tioningj The adolescent is faced then with not one but two cultures off ing alternative ideologies~ kvay~ live. Both present resoiutio is nd to to the postconventiona) d nbt whi)ch now appears to be so perv msive. Both may be embrac d in out sense conventionally for the s t of answers they provide, d r may l:~eseen in principled terms, tTh ir validity as social systems resting ~n the principles of justice th y more or less successfully ci body.
, -

the psychological meaning of extreme relativism had changed in ilme five to ten years between tlc data reported by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969). Extreme relativism is no longer the struggle for independence from a strongly internal conventional morality in a pe iiOdl of moratorium and crisis in ones identity.

The relativistic rejection of convention, once individuality and spontaneously developed by adolescents in the course of reflecting on their own experience, is now manufactured as a cultural industry called the counterculture, Further, the adult culture itself of[eisa very unsteady counter to the counterculture, particularly from the viewpoint of the adolescent to whom it offers a dwindling nnmlxi of jobs and a world already overcrowded and crying out for less rather than more. it is clearly seen that one result of affluence, tech riologY, and increased longevity has been to decrease ti-me need of the adult community for its adolescents. Instead, it has some stake in keeping them in the youth culture since in one sense they only further threaten an already defensive adult world xvith fewer jobs and still more people. Thus the adults at oice produce and market a. counterculture and present themselves as a less than appealing alternative to it, From the point of vie\v of the adolescent, the counterculture has othex meanings. The rejection of the conventional culture can he seen as a rebellion which can either turn into submission spelled backwards, or into thie formation of principles. In our terms, the former remains conventional in form with only the content changed by being stood on its head, Although the impetus for the counterciiltimrd ]nay have been once either principled or the expression of

young people in identity crisis, the mauufacture of the counterculti ire transforms it in to yet another conventional system, although

Implications for Edna a.tihn

The extreme relativism of a co~msiderableportion of higl sehqol adolescents provides both a threat to current educational practi~e and a potentiality for a nes focus of education. We said earlier that th five-to-seven shift has been traditionally represented in education iy the b~ginningof formal schooling. The traditional educational e nbodimnt of the adolescent shift hlas been a different one, that of a tw6-track educational system divi,~1elite capable of abstract thought ing adolescents into two g oups, ai~ and hence of profiting fro n a libei~aleducation and the masses ~v1io are not. At first, this divi ion was, made between the wealthy 4d those who went to work As public high schools developed, tjme tracking system instead b came thfit of an academic school or lyc~e
1481

one lacking the solidity of the traditional conventional society. While only a inmority of adolescents actually have a postco.n ventional view of morality and society, many more live in a post conventional culture or society. As a specific example, the majority of a sample of Hiaight-Ashbury hippies23 emerge as mixtures of preconventional Stage 2 and conventional Stage 3 thinking. While hippie culture appeams to be postconventional, it is almost entirely a mixture of Stage 2 do your own thing and Stage 3 be nice, be loving themes. The hippie culture continually questions conventional mnorahty but on Stage 3 grounds of its being harsh and mean, ni Stage 2 grounds of XvVhy shouldnt I have fun? rather than in terms of its irrationality. Many hippies, then, belong to a counter

Jose

nArnALUs

leading to the university and a vocational school. The clearest formulation of this two~tracksystem as based on the dawn of abstract thought was found in the British 11+ system. Based on his score on an intelligence test given at the dawn of adolescence, a child was assigned to either a grammar (academic) or a modern (vocationab enmumenci aI ) high school. rhe aristocratic tracking system just described rested on the assninption that the capacity for abstract thought is all or none, that it appears at a fixed age; and that it is hereditarily limited to an elite group in the popniation. The evidence on formal operational thought does not support these assumptions. However, when demo. eratie secondary education ignored the existence of the adolescent cognitive shift arid individual differences in their attainment, real difficulties emerged. Most recently this ignorai occurred in the wave of high school. curriculum reform of the late fifties and early sixties in America, the new math., the new science, and the new social studies. These curricula reforms were guided by the notion that more intellectual content could be put into high school and that this content should not be factuai content and rote skills, but he basic pattern of thinking of the academic disciplines of mathemnatics, physics, or social science. The focus was to be upon understanding the basic logical assumptions ar-md structure of the discipline and the use of these assumptions in reflective or critical thinking and problem-solving. Clearly the new curricula assumed formaloperational thought, rather than attempting to develop it. Partly as a result of this igm-mo.ral, some of the most enlightened proponents of the nesv curricula became discouraged as they saw only a subgroup of the high school population engaging with it. The solution we have proposed is that the new curricula be reformulated as tools for developing principled logical and moral thought rather than presupposing it.2~ Experimental work by our colleagues and ourselves25 has shown that even crude efforts based on such objectives are challenging and are successful in inducing considerable upward stage movemnent in thought. Hopefully, our efforts are the beginning of reforinulating ti-me new high school science, mathematics, social studies, and literature as approaches using disciplines as vehicles for the stimulation of the development of tho.ught, rather than making young PhDs. Ihe difficulties and failures of the new curricula and of the general movement to democratize higher learning or liberal education,
.1.082

then, is not due to heredit~rydiffetences in capacity used to justi 37 the two-track system. Th4y repre~cnt,instead, ti-me failure of se ondary education to take d ve1opm~ntal sychology seriously. Wh n p stage development is tak seriou~lyby educators as an aim, red developmental change ca occur irough education, In saying this, we ret rn to th~thought of John Dewey whi h is at the heart of a demo rallc educational philosophy. Accordim g to Dewey, education was the~ stii4ulation of development throu h stages by providing oppoi unities for active thought and active rgapization of experience. The only solid ground of a surance that the educator is not setting hip impossible artificial aims, tim t h~is n0t using ineffective and pervertihg methods, is a clear and defi -mite kno~ledge Pie normal end and foc(is of of mental action. Only kno ledge ~f the order and connection of the stages in the development ;of the psychical functions can, negatively, guard against those evils, 6r positively, insure the full maturation and free, yet, orderly, exercises!~of the physical powers. Education is ptecisely the work of supplying the conditions which will enable the psychical functions, as they succe sivly arjise, to mature and pass into higher functions in the freest and f Ilest mamjner, This result can be secured oi~1y by a knowledge 0f the pro ss of deyelopment, that is only by a kno4dedge of psychology,26 Besides a clear focus on dev~lopment, an aspect of Dewe s educational thought whic needs revival is that school experie e must he and represent re I life e~periencein stimulating devel pment. American educatio in the ~wentieth century svas shaped ~y the victory of Thorndike veij Dewey. Achievement rather than evelopment has been its im.I Bu~now the achieving, society, e achieving individual, an even th~eachievement tests are seriou ly questioned, by adults an ad:oies~entsalike. If development rat em than achievement is to b the ain~of education, such deveiopm nt must be meaningful or r al to th~adolescent himself, In this se sc education must be sense by th~ adolescent as aiding him in mix search for identity and t must deal with life Neither a conc&n with self or with life are concerns opposed to intellectuality om tellectual development, he opposition of intellect and lifei is itself a reflection of the t -o-track: system in which a long period: of academic education pro ~ded a moratorium for leisurely self-crystallization of an adult r Ic ident4ty by the elite while the masses were to acquire an earl adult tcational identity, either throm4gh going to work or throngl commit7nent to a vocation in a vocatio~al high school.
1)53

o/F[)AL[1S

T4e Adolescent as a Philosoph4

Err EiE

Our discussion of adolescent relativism and identity diffusion that the two tracks are both breaking down and fusing. Vocational goals are. evaded by relativism and counterculture (ltws tiuiug as are deferred goals of intellectual development. An identitv crisis and questioning are i-mo longer the prerogative of the elite, and they now occur earlier and without the background of logical and moral development they previously entailed. If the high school. is to have meaning it must take account of this, which means it must lake account of the adolescents current notion of himself and his identity. Like most psychologists, most adolescents think the self has little to do wIth intellectual or moral development. The rela. ti.vistie adolescent is content to answer myself to questions as to the source and basis of value anti meaning. Like most psychologists he tends to equate the content of self-development with the ego, with self-awareness, with identity. The other pole of ego or selfdevelopment, however, is that of new awareness of the world and values; it is the awareness of new meanings in life. We discussed the moral strand of ego development, which is clearly philosophical. We have also noted aesthetic, religious, metaphysical, and epistemnologicai concepts and values born in adolesccimce. One side of ego development is the structure of the selfcumicept and the other side is the individuals concept of the true, the good, the beautiful, and the real. lf education is to promote sell-development, ego development must be seen as one side of an education whose other side consists of the arts and sciences as philosophically conceived, We have pointed to the need for defining the aims of teaching the arts and sciences in developmental terms, In tIns sense one basic aim of teaching high school science and ruathcmnatics is to stimulate the stage of principled or formal-operational logical thought, of high school social studies, the stimulation of principled moral judgment. A basic aim of teaching literature is the developmnent of a stage or level of aesthetic comprehension, expression, judgment. Behind all of these developmental goals lie moral and philosophic dimensions of the meaning of life, which the adolescent currently questions and the school needs to confront, The adolescent is a philosopher by nature, and if not by nature, by coontereultu.ral ~sw-ea The high school must have, and represent, a philosophy if it is to be meaningful to the adolescent, if the high school is to offer some purposes and meanings which c-an stand up to relativistic qm.me.stioning, it must learn philosophy.
,g 1084

Mc Es

1. S. H. White, Some Gen mal outiimLs of the Matrix of Development 1 Oianges Between Five to even Yean, )luiletin of the Orton. Society, 2 (1970), 41-57.

2. L, Kohlberg, Early Educ Child Development, 39 (D Much Can We Boost I.Q. tiond Review, 39 (1969),

tion: A Cognitive-Developmental Approach ceniber 1~68), 1013-1062; A. H. Jensen, Ho ad scho4astie Achievement? Harvard Ethic -123,

3. H. ScheMer, The Develo men~of ~hildrens Orientations to Fantasy th~ Years 5 to 7, unpublis d Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 197~. 4. L. Kohlberg, Moral Educ tion!in tl* School, School Review, 74 (1966~, 1-30; Kohlberg, Early Edu ation. 5. Kohlberg, Moral Educatio in the S~hool. 6. Ibid.

7.

Cognitive stage maturity i different from I.Q., a separate factor, though the two are correlated. (S e L. Koblherg and R. DeVries, Relations be-

tween Piaget and Psychom

Tic

Asses$ments of Intelligence, in C. Lavatel~i,

ed. The Natural

Curricutu [Urban~:University of Illinois Press, 19714) General impoverishment o organize~lphysical and social stimulation leafls

to retardation in stage dev* Iopment. ~ultimrallydisadvantaged children te4id to he somewhat retarded mpared ~o middle-class children with the sate I.Q.s in concrete-operatiou al logic. Experimental intervention can to so4w extent accelerate cogmmitive dev*lopm.ent if it is based on providing expefiences of cognitive conflict which stimulate the child to reorganize or think his patterns of cogni ive ordering. 8. Kohlherg, Early Educatio 9. Kohlherg, Moral Educati n in;the ~hool. 10. C. Ellinwood, Structural De~elopthentin the Expression of Emotion y Children, unpublished P .D.~dissqrtation, University of Chicago, 19 9, 11. E. A. Peel, The Psycholo ical :Baris[of Education., 2d ed. (Edinburgh ajnd London.: Oliver and Boyd, 1967). 12. D. Kuhn, J. Langer, an L. Koh berg, The Development of Forn4al.. Operational Thought: Its Relation to Moral Judgment, unpublished ~aper, 1971. 13. Another example of trans ional stage response is success on the question: Joe is shorter than Bob, Joe is taller than Alex, who is die tallest? The transitional child can sol this by the required reversing of relations and
serial ordering of them ho wilt fail the pendulum task. 14. Wordsworths note to od on ,tntinmhztions of Iro.mortaiity quoted in Limel Trilling The Liberal Irnag tim. (New York: Viking, 1941).

l)EDALUS 1 5. Km
3 i

Iherg, Moral Edu catson in the School.

IC Take ii tromn Kuhn, L anger, and KohIhe rg, The Devel opument of Formal 1 (3 peratio nit Eli ought. 17.

. Piaget, Thc Moral Judgment of the Child 1948; originally published in 1932).

( Clencoe,

Ill.; Free Press, as,

18. l~.. Kohlberg and Ii. Kramer, Crmritinuities and Discontinuities in ChilrI hood and Adult Moral Development, Iivroan Development, 12 (1969), 93-120. 19. j. Loevinger, The Meaning nod Measurement of Ego Development, American Psychology (1966), 195206.

Fl). M, I-I. lodd, Ego Identity Status and Morality: Ami Emupirical Investigation of Iwo th v~ lopnic nt il C oncept~ unpublsshc d Ph 1) dissertation 1969. 2!. j. F:. Marcia, Development and Validation of Ego Identity Status, Joar no! of Persvoaiity and SOcioi Psychology, 3 (1966) 551558. 2.2. C. Cilligan, L. Kohlbcrg, and J, Lerner, Moral Reasoning About Sexual Dilemmas : A Developmental Approach, in L. Kohlherg and E. Turiel, eds., Recent Research in. Moral Development (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). 2:3. N. Haaru amid C. Holstein, unpublished data, 1971. 2~l. L. Kablberg arid A. Lockwood, CognitiveDevelopmental Psychology and jul itical Eulocation: 1 ro gress in the Sixties, speech lor So cml Science Consortium Convention, Boulder, Colorado, 1970; L. Kohlberg and E. lurid, Moral Dcvelrmpment and Moral Education, in C. Lesser, ed., Psycho/ogy and Educational Practice ( Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1971). 2.3. 1.. Kohlherg and Ni. Blatt, The Effects of Classroom Discussion on Level of Moral Judgment, irs Kobll,erg amid Turiel, eds., Recent Research in Momai Development. 26.

J. Dewey, 0mm Education: Selected Writing, ccl. H. D. Archambault Yomk.: The Modern Library, republished 1964).

( New
in,.

in,.

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