Read without ads and support Scribd by becoming a Scribd Premium Reader.
 
Chapter 13
Political parties in Malawi:An accountability analysis
Nandini Patel 
1. Introduction
It has been observed that the dawn o multiparty politics that occurred in the1990s in sub-Saharan Arica has led to the emergence o dominant politicalparties (Van de Walle 2003; Bogaards 2004). In some countries, multiparty elections did not bring about a change in government as ormer ruling partiescontinued to cling to power. In countries where change did occur, the newincumbents proceeded to stay in power, thereby extending the relevance o theone-party dominant model. Te case o Malawi is markedly dierent rom thisprevalent scenario. In 1994, the winds o change ushered in a new governmentunder a new party, the United Democratic Front (UDF). However, since comingto power, the UDF has been reduced to a small entity. Instead o consolidatingits political position, it was relegated to the position o third largest party in the2009 parliamentary elections.However, since the election o President Dr Bingu wa Mutharika in 2004and the subsequent ormation o his own party, the Democratic ProgressiveParty (DPP), there are signs o emerging one-party dominance in the Malawianpolitical landscape, although it remains to be seen whether the DPP willmaintain this dominance in the long-term. Te DPP lacks internal democracy and accountability which are the main actors that contributed to the all o theUDF. Moreover, the party revolves almost completely around its leader Binguwa Mutharika.Te accountability role o political parties in Malawi, both within and outsidethe National Assembly, has varied rom 1994 to the present. In the early yearsaer the democratic transition, the opposition parties in Parliament, althoughnot always consistent and eective, attempted to perorm their oversight roleby holding the party in power to account. However, this important role becamediluted as opposition party leaders, without consultation or due process,switched sides in return or avours rom the ruling party. Furthermore, as time
 
217Political parties in Malawi
passed, parties developed actions and ragmented due to a lack o intra-party democracy, thereby urther reducing the eectiveness o their oversight role.Te lack o adherence to democratic practices and norms within political partiesexerted a weakening inuence not only on the parties themselves but also onstate institutions o governance.
2. Political parties and accountability
Accountability has two dimensions.
1
Horizontal accountability reers to theprocess whereby state institutions hold other state institutions, organs andagencies to account or their perormance, actions and omissions. Verticalaccountability relates to the means whereby ordinary citizens, mass media andcivil society actors seek to enorce standards o good behaviour and perormanceupon public ocials and state institutions (McNeil & Mumvuma 2006). Politicalparties play a crucial role in ensuring both dimensions o accountability.Teoretically, democratic accountability is closely linked to the concept o political representation which ocuses on whether elected representatives shouldact as delegates or as trustees o the people they represent. Representatives who aredelegates simply ollow the expressed preerences o their constituents, whereastrustees are representatives who ollow their own understanding o the best actionto pursue. Both viewpoints fnd support in the writings o eminent scholars likeJames Madison and Edmund Burke. In emerging democracies in Arica, wherethere is anxiety and deep ervour to saeguard the hard-won democracy, theelectorate is keen to exact accountability upon elected representatives and thuspreer mechanisms through which they can directly hold their Members o Parliament (MPs) to account. Te common understanding o accountability hereis one related to the ‘delegate’ interpretation o representation. However, moderndemocracies require that representatives not only act in ways that saeguardthe capacity o the represented to hold their representatives accountable butalso to uphold the capacity o the representative to act independently o thewishes o the represented (Pitkin 1967). Te complex and conicting standardso representation make it dicult to bind all representatives to a fxed set o guidelines and prohibit a single understanding o what representatives must do.In the Arican context, the diculty o identiying representational roles thatenhance accountability is urther compounded by the behaviour o party leadersand their inner circle who, in a classic maniestation o neopatrimonialism, bindboth elected representatives and the party rank and fle in tightly controlledpatronage networks. More oen than not, party leadership can be equated withthe wishes o one powerul individual within the party. Political parties in Arica
1 For a urther discussion, see chapters 1, 15 and 16.
 
 Accountable Government in Africa218
thus do not provide ertile grounds or inculcating principles o representationand accountability into their members.In theory, political parties in multiparty democracies are important vehiclesor political representation, political competition and democratic accountability.Teir contributions range rom linking the state and civil society, ormulatingpublic policy, engaging in political recruitment, structuring electoral choicesand acilitating coalitions. Unortunately, in most Arican democracies, politicalparties remain weak and poorly institutionalised despite having embraced andsupposedly practised multiparty democracy or over two decades.Lawson & Rakner (2005) have analysed how certain institutions o accountability operate in anzania and the extent to which they inuence thequality and eectiveness o public policy. Amongst a range o institutions — suchas local associations, traditional authorities, NGOs and religious bodies opposition parties ranked lower on the list, whereas religious bodies emerged asthe most eective. Tis pattern would not dier greatly in Malawi.Generally in Arica, opposition parties are severely discredited, suer romnegative public opinion and are not seen as a viable alternative by the electorate(Olukoshi 1998). Ruling parties oen resort to strategies o obstruction,harassment and division in order to weaken the opposition and are highly reluctant and resistant to accommodate dissent and diversity. Tis is true notonly where the transition to multiparty democracy ailed to bring about a changeo government, but also in other transition scenarios. Generally, there is no levelplaying feld in Arican politics and opposition parties lack unding, knowledgeand skills, which tends to weaken them to the point o ineectiveness.In the Arican context generally and in Malawi in particular, both horizontaland vertical accountability mechanisms are weak due to a political culture thatis characterised by an overwhelmingly powerul State President. Oppositionparties have only limited space in which to perorm their rightul role o holdingthe government to account. Teir role is urther weakened by a lack o intra-party democracy and leadership tussles. Weak vertical accountability relationships inturn undermine the level o public trust in elected ocials. Against this generalbackground, Malawian party politics since 1994 has ollowed an interestingtrajectory, rom relative stability to ragmentation and signs o emerging one-party dominance. Tis chapter describes this trajectory and analyses how it hasinuenced accountable governance in Malawi.
3. 1994–2004: From relative stability to fragmentation
3.1. The emergence of opposition parties in Malawi 
Until 1993, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) was the only ocially registeredpolitical party in Malawi. Te national reerendum held on 14 June 1993
Search History:
Searching...
Result 00 of 00
00 results for result for
  • p.
  • More From This User

    Notes
    Load more