3More fundamentally, Plaintiff’s misappropriation of the analogy to judicial impartialityconflates his genuine interest in obtaining a favorable legal precedent for future use with aconstitutionally-cognizable injury sufficient to underpin his claim. Plaintiff’s impartiality mightwell be questioned in the context of a properly-constituted quo warranto claim against thePresident because, in the unlikely event such a claim succeeded on the merits,
MTD at 1-2, itwould provide Plaintiff with a favorable precedent if he needed to challenge the President’seligibility in the future were he to become “actually entitled to the office.” But the absence of such a favorable precedent is not the same as an actual, concrete injury that supports standing forhis quo warranto claim against the President today.
Plaintiff has not alleged an actual injury to his First Amendment right toaccess the courts.
Although Plaintiff correctly observes that the chilling of First Amendment rights canconstitute a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to support standing, his opposition failsto address the absence of any allegation of such injury in his complaint.
The essence of Article III’s standing requirement is to ensure that “legal questionspresented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but ina concrete factual context.”
American Legal Foundation v. FCC
, 808 F.2d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir.
To the extent Plaintiff is arguing that his
claims should be treated as a First Amendment retaliation claim,
Opp. at 39-40, review of his Amended Complaint demonstrates that he has not alleged the “five basic elements”that his own filing contends are necessary to state “a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation.”
Plaintiff correctly quotes the five elements from the Ninth Circuit’s
Rhodes v. Robinson
, which include an “assertion that astate actor took some adverse action against an [individual] because of  that [person’s] protected conduct …” 408F.3d 559, 567-68 (9
Gill v. Pidlypchak
, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J.) (“tosustain a First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must demonstrate  (1) that the speech or conduct at issuewas protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causalconnection between the protected speech and the adverse action.”). Nowhere in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint isthere any description, statement, or allegation regarding any protected conduct for which Defendants were allegedlyretaliating or any causal connection between such conduct and Defendants’ alleged actions. Plaintiff has thereforefailed to plead the requisite elements of a retaliation claim.
Case 1:12-cv-00001-JDB Document 16 Filed 04/23/12 Page 3 of 6