Sefer Chafetz Chayim Vol. 4

May it please Hashem that learning
this sefer should be a zechut for

the Iluy Neshama of our daughter
Mazal Bat Frieda.
Nifterah LeBeit Olamah 27 Elul 5766
"
Sefer
Chafetz Chayim
Hilchot Esurei Rechilut
English translation entitled
Mazal Elul
Volume 4
Kelal Aleph Kelal Beit Kelal Gimal
Kelal Dalet Kelal Heh Kelal Vav
Kelal Zayin Kelal Het Kelal Tet
Illustrative Examples Response of the Chavot Yair
Volume 4
Chafetz Chayim
Sefer Chafetz Chayim
Esurei Rechilut
English translation entitled Mazal Elul
copyright 2008
Mazal Elul
Yedidya Levy
2017 East 17th Street
Brooklynm, NY 11229
718-627-3795
mazalelul@chafetzchayim.org
All rights reserved
Page layout by
EFI A.B. Productions, Bnei Brak
Cover art: David Benoliel Creative Design
db@davidbenoliel.com
718-207-2125
ISBN 978-1-60585-655-1
Printed in Eretz Yisrael
Distributed by Feldheim Publishers

208 Airport Executive Park
Nanuet, NY 10954
845-356-2282
www.feldheim.com

"
This sefer is dedicated
LeIluy Nishmat our daughter
Mazal Bat Frieda A"H
A Remembrance of Mazal
A womans role in life is to actively partner with HaKadosh
Baruch Hu in sustaining His world by building a family in great
modesty, joyfully nurturing all of its members and implanting
within them lasting values of Torah and Chessed. That constant
effort spans an entire lifetime; nothing comes without her
investment of time and total involvement. Her fulfillment comes
from encouraging her husband to grow and from the pleasure
at watching her children mature with a sense of happiness and
stability that will give them the ability to deal with all of lifes
challenges.
Mazal fulfilled this role and more during her 34 years. She had
a joy for life that anchored her family and touched everyone
because she sincerely loved and cared for them, and in turn they
all loved her. She was the ultimate giver, always pleasant and
helpful, always accepting Hashems will without any expression
of personal need or hardship, with charm and grace, with
humor and a fierce dedication for the well being of her young
children. With absolute faith in Hashem she never worried
about tomorrow; she was focused on today and on the good that
could be done today. She knew better than most of us that life
is precious and she would strive not to waste a moment of it.
She was a living Kiddush Hashem and an example of how we all
should lead our lives.
Mazal was born on the 27th of Nissan 5732
Mazals neshamah returned home on the 27th of Elul 5766.
,

Dedicated in loving memory of our
Beloved wife, mother and grandmother
Masha Zeeva Bat Cima Miriam AH

By her husband
Eli Esses
Her children Jason, Joseph and Mazal
And their families
Dedicated in loving memory of

our beloved grandmother
Rachel Tawil AH
Whose life was devoted to her family
and to the highest values of Torah
May the merit of the study of these laws
Serve to elevate her soul for all eternity
Rachel and R. Saul J. Kassin and family
Sally and Ralph S. Tawil and family
Danielle and Gabriel Chehebar and family
Esther and Joey Dayon and family
Anna Tawil
Luach Halacha Yomi

KEY: P=Preface, I=Introduction, L=Lav, A=Aseh, C=curses,
K=Kelal (Esurei Lashon Hara) [egs., K/1= 1st Kelal, 1st halacha],
RK=Kelal (Esurei Rechilut)
Volume 1
Page
3
P. Daily Halacha: 1 Tishri, 1 Shevat, 1Sivan; Leap Year- 1 Tishri, 11 Shevat, 20 Eyar
P. Daily Halacha: 2 Tishri, 2 Shevat, 2 Sivan; Leap Year- 2 Tishri, 12 Shevat, 21 Eyar
11
17
21
25
27
P. Daily Halacha: 7 Tishri
35
I. Daily Halacha: 8 Tishri, 7 Shevat, 7 Sivan; Leap Year- 8 Tishri, 17 Shevat, 26 Eyar
39
I. Daily Halacha: 9 Tishri, 8 Shevat, 8 Sivan; Leap Year- 9 Tishri, 18 Shevat, 27 Eyar
129
L1. Daily Halacha: 10 Tishri, 9 Shevat, 9 Sivan; Leap Year- 10 Tishri, 19 Shevat, 28 Eyar
133
L3. Daily Halacha: 11 Tishri, 10 Shevat, 10 Sivan; Leap Year- 11 Tishri, 20 Shevat, 29 Eyar
145
L5. Daily Halacha: 12 Tishri, 11 Shevat, 11 Sivan; Leap Year- 12 Tishri, 21 Shevat, 1 Sivan
155
171
177
183
193
203
A1. Daily Halacha: 18 Tishri, 17 Shevat, 17 Sivan; Leap Year- 18 Tishri, 27 Shevat, 7 Sivan
215
225
233
A7. Daily Halacha: 21 Tishri, 20 Shevat, 20 Sivan; Leap Year- 21 Tishri, 30 Adar I, 10 Sivan
Leap Year- 7 Tishri
245
249
265
271
C1. Daily Halacha: 25 Tishri, 24 Shevat, 24 Sivan; Leap Year- 25 Tishri, 4 Adar I, 14 Sivan
283
K1/1. Daily Halacha: 26 Tishri, 25 Shevat, 25 Sivan; Leap Year- 26 Tishri, 5 Adar I, 15 Sivan
297
301
309
K1/7. Daily Halacha: 29Tishri, 28 Shevat, 28 Sivan; Leap Year- 29 Tishri, 8 Adar I, 18 Sivan
321
373
K2/3. Daily Halacha: 1 Cheshvan, 30 Shevat, 30 Sivan; Leap Year- 1 Cheshvan, 10 Adar I, 20 Sivan
403
K2/5. Daily Halacha: 2 Cheshvan, 1 Adar, 1 Tammuz; Leap Year- 2 Cheshvan, 11 Adar I, 21 Sivan
423
435
441
449
Volume 2
81
105
111
121
135
K4/1. D. Halacha: 11 Cheshvan, 10 Adar, 10 Tammuz; Leap Year- 11 Cheshvan, 20 Adar I, 30 Sivan
151
K4/3. D. Halacha: 12 Cheshvan, 11 Adar, 11 Tammuz; L.Y.- 12 Cheshvan, 21 Adar I, 1 Tammuz
173 K4/5. D. Halacha: 13 Cheshvan, 12 Adar, 12 Tammuz; L.Y.- 13 Cheshvan, 22 Adar I, 2 Tammuz
209 K4/9. Daily Halacha: 15 Cheshvan, 14 Adar, 14 Tammuz; L.Y.-15 Cheshvan, 24 Adar I, 4 Tammuz
221 K4/11. D. Halacha: 16 Cheshvan, 15 Adar, 15 Tammuz; Leap Year-16 Cheshvan, 25 Adar I, 5 Tammuz
237 K4/12. D. Halacha: 17 Cheshvan, 16 Adar, 16 Tammuz; Leap Year-17 Cheshvan, 26 Adar I, 6 Tammuz
245 K5/1. D. Halacha:
Leap Year-18 Cheshvan, 27 Adar I, 7 Tammuz
253 K5/2. D. Halacha: 18 Cheshvan, 17 Adar, 17 Tammuz; L.Y.-19 Cheshvan, 28 Adar I, 8 Tammuz
259 K5/3. Daily Halacha:
Leap Year-20 Cheshvan, 29 Adar I, 9 Tammuz
273 K5/7. Daily Halacha: 20 Cheshvan, 19 Adar, 19 Tammuz; L.Y.- 22 Cheshvan, 1 Adar II, 11 Tammuz
301 K6/3. D. Halacha: 22 Cheshvan, 21 Adar, 21 Tammuz; L.Y.- 24 Cheshvan, 3 Adar II, 13 Tammuz
377 K6/11. D. Halacha: 26 Cheshvan, 25 Adar, 25 Tammuz; L.Y.-28 Cheshvan, 7 Adar II, 17 Tammuz
Volume 3
85
K7/1. D. Halacha: 27 Cheshvan, 26 Adar, 26 Tammuz; L.Y.- 29 Cheshvan, 8 Adar II, 18 Tammuz
If the month of Cheshvan has only 29 days, then the learning for the 30th day is incorportated into the 29th day
99
K7/3. D. Halacha: 28 Cheshvan, 27 Adar, 27 Tammuz; L.Y.- 30 Cheshvan, 9 Adar II, 19 Tammuz
119 K7/5. D. Halacha: 29 Cheshvan, 28 Adar, 28 Tammuz; L.Y.- 1 Kislev, 10 Adar II, 20 Tammuz
If the month of Cheshvan has only 29 days, then the learning for the 30th day is incorportated into the 29th day
129
K7/7. D. Halacha: 30 Cheshvan, 29 Adar, 29 Tammuz; Leap Year-2 Kislev, 11 Adar II, 21Tammuz
139
K7/9. Daily Halacha: 1 Kislev, 1 Nissan, 1 Av;
Leap Year-3 Kislev, 12 Adar II, 22Tammuz
157
171
K7/11. Daily Halacha: Leap Year-5 Kislev, 14 Adar II, 24Tammuz
181
185
K8/1. D. Halacha: 4 Kislev, 4 Nissan, 4 Av;

Leap Year- 7 Kislev, 16 Adar II, 26 Tammuz
193 K8/3. Daily Halacha: 5 Kislev, 5 Nissan, 5 Av; Leap Year- 8 Kislev, 17 Adar II, 27 Tammuz
197 K8/5. Daily Halacha: 6 Kislev, 6 Nssan, 6 Av; Leap Year- 9 Kislev, 18 Adar II, 28 Tammuz
201 K8/7. Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 10 Kislev, 19 Adar II, 29 Tammuz
205 K8/8. Daily Halacha: 7 Kislev, 7 Nissan, 7 Av; Leap Year- 11 Kislev, 20 Adar II, 1 Av
215 K8/10. Daily Halacha: 8 Kislev, 8 Nssan, 8 Av; Leap Year- 12 Kislev, 21 Adar II, 2 Av
219 K8/12. Daily Halacha: 9 Kislev, 9 Nissan, 9 Av;
Leap Year- 13 Kislev, 22 Adar II, 3 Av
247 K9/3. Daily Halacha: 12 Kislev, 12 Nissan, 12 Av; Leap Year- 16 Kislev, 25 Adar II, 6 A
299 K10/4. Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 20 Kislev, 29 Adar II, 10 Av
313 K10/5. Daily Halacha: 16 Kislev, 16 Nissan, 16 Av; Leap Year- 21 Kislev, 1 Nissan, 11 Av
375 K10/14. Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 26 Kislev, 6 Nissan, 16 Av
Volume 4
99
RK1/1. Daily Halacha: 23 Kislev, 23 Nissan, 23 Av; Leap Year- 29 Kislev, 9 Nissan, 19 Av
105
RK1/3. Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 30 Kislev, 10 Nissan, 20 Av
109 RK1/4. Daily Halacha: 24 Kislev, 24 Nissan, 24 Av; Leap Year- 1 Tevet, 11 Nissan, 21 Av
115
RK1/6. Daily Halacha: 25 Kislev, 25 Nissan, 25 Av; Leap Year- 2 Tevet, 12 Nissan, 22 Av
121
127
133
139
If the month of Kislev has only 29 days, then the learning for the 30th day is incorportated into the 29th day
145
157
RK3/2. Daily Halacha: 1 Tevet, 1 Eyar, 1 Elul;
Leap Year- 8 Tevet, 18 Nissan, 28 Av
169
RK4/1. Daily Halacha: 2 Tevet, 2 Eyar, 2 Elul;
185
RK5/1. Daily Halacha: 3 Tevet, 3 Eyar, 3 Elul; Leap Year- 10 Tevet, 20 Nissan, 30 Av
191
RK5/3. Daily Halacha: 4 Tevet, 4 Eyar, 4 Elul; Leap Year- 11 Tevet, 21 Nissan, 1 Elul
199
201
207
211
223
233
RK6/7. Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 17 Tevet, 27 Nissan, 7 Elul
237
245
RK6/10. Daily Halacha:
249
253
RK7/2. Daily Halacha: 12 Tevet, 12 Eyar, 12 Elul; Leap Year- 21 Tevet, 1 Eyar, 11 Elul
255
Leap Year- 19 Tevet, 29 Nissan, 9 Elul
259 RK7/5. Daily Halacha: 14 Tevet, 14 Eyar, 14 Elul; Leap Year- 23 Tevet, 3 Eyar, 13 Elul
261
265
275
299
307
325
329
RK9/10. Daily Halacha: 21 Tevet, 21 Eyar, 21 Elul; Leap Year- 1 Shevat, 10 Eyar, 20 Elul
335
345
355
365
E1
375
E2/3. Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 6 Shevat, 15 Eyar, 25 Elul
377
E3/4. Daily Halacha: 26 Tevet, 26 Eyar, 26 Elul; Leap Year- 7 Shevat, 16 Eyar, 26 Elul
383
389
397
Daily Halacha: 25 Tevet, 25 Eyar, 25 Elul; Leap Year- 5 Shevat, 14 Eyar, 24 Elul
Mekor Hachayim - Page 29
Kelal Heh
with Beer Mayim Chayim - 185
(RK5 - 5th chapter)
Details of the sin of believing gossip or of listening to it, and if someone did
transgress this Lav, the method by which this sin can be remedied. There are 7
halachot in this Kelal.
Kelal Vav
(RK6 - 6th chapter)
The esur of accepting gossip as truth in the context of it being conveyed In the
presence of three people or conveyed directly to the victim. This Kelal will
explain the law if someone suffered a loss and word spread throughout society
that Plony caused the loss to this victim, or if someone conveyed that gossip (that
Plony was the cause of the loss) in casual passing, unintentionally, or if someone
conveyed that gossip and he (that speaker) had the authority of two authoritative
witnesses. Some other details of the laws of gossip will also be discussed in this
Kelal which consists of 10 halachot.
Kelal Zayin
(RK7 - 7th chapter)
An explanation of the different circumstances when Rechilut is forbidden. There

are 5 halachot in this Kelal.
Kelal Het
(RK8 - 8th chapter)
The law pertaining to intimations of gossip. There are 5 halachot in this Kelal.
Kelal Tet
(RK9 - 9th chapter)
An explanation of when gossip is permitted as the conditions of this Kelal are

fulfilled. There are 15 halachot in this Kelal.
Page 365
Illustrative Examples
Page 405
Response of the Chavot Yair
Volume 4
Contents

Kelal Aleph
(RK1-1st chapter)
The esur of Rechilut, meaning, that gossip is forbidden even if the information is
absolutely true. We will define gossip and how one should respond if confronted
by it. For example, if someone asked: What did Plony say about me?- and other
examples. There are 11 halachot in this Kelal.
Kelal Beit
(RK2- 2nd chapter)
The law as it relates to the leniency of In the presence of three people in a

framework of Rechilut. Other details will also be discussed. There are 4 halachot
in this Kelal.
Kelal Gimmal
(RK3-3rd chapter)
Rechilut is forbidden both when Plony (the person who is the source of the
gossip) is present to hear it repeated and when he is not present. There are 4
Kelal
Dalet
(RK4 - 4th chapter)
The law applying to gossip in the framework of the victim already knowing
about the gossip even without the speaker having repeated it to him, and how to
correct the sin of Rechilut. There are 3 halachot in this Kelal.

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volume 4

Kelal Alef

(RK1-1st chapter)
Kelal Alef
The esur of Rechilut, meaning, that gossip is

forbidden even if the information is absolutely true.
We will define gossip and how one should respond
if confronted by it. For example, if someone
asked: What did Plony say about me?- and other
Mekor Hachayim
Hagahah
Even though several of these laws of Rechilut could have been derived
from the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, still we did not rely on this (on
the reader thumbing through the laws of Lashon Hara until he found the
relevant law corresponding to the esur of Rechilut) and we have explained
these laws here for the reasons stated at the end of the Introduction.
Mekor Hachayim
Be'er Mayim Chayim on page 101
RK1/1. Someone who gossips about someone else (1) violates

a Lav of the Torah (Vayikrah 19:16) Do not peddle gossip in

Translators note: For purposes of this translation, in this context of Rechilut,

the person who initiated the remarks is called Plony, the subject of the
remarks is called the listener or the victim and the person conveying
those remarks to the listener is called the speaker, the gossip or the
reporter.
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volume 4

Kelal Alef
society. Rechilut is a very great sin and is the cause of the death
of many Jews. Therefore the Torah enjoins us in that same pasuk:
Do not stand by passively when a fellow Jew is in mortal danger.
Go and learn the consequences of gossip from Doeg the Edomite
whose gossip caused the annihilation of the entire population of
the priestly city of Nov. This Lav of the Torah (Vayikrah 19:16)
refers specifically to gossip. However, there are many other Laveen
and Aseen that address this subject of gossip, as I wrote in the
Introduction. (Please see that reference).
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/2. What is (the definition of) a gossip? Someone who conveys

information (2) from one person to another, saying- This is what he
said about you (3,) this is what he did to you, or this is what I heard
he did to you or wants to do to you. Even though the information
does not demean the victim at all, and that based on what this gossip
\ rachil said, had they directly asked Plony (4) exactly the same
thing, Plony would not have contradicted the information, either
because (he believed that) what he did was just and correct (5),
or because the intent of his actions and words was different that
what had been perceived by the gossip (Plony); nevertheless, he
(the rachil) is still called a gossip.
RK1/3. Understand clearly that Rechilut is forbidden even if the

speaker has no intent (7) to cause the listener (the victim) to hate
Plony, even if the speaker believes that Plony was correct in
what he said about the victim or what he did to him. For example,
Shimon is reprimanding Reuven because of something he said about
him or did to him and Reuven is defending himself by saying that he
did nothing wrong and the proof is that Yehudah also said the same
thing about Shimon. Even so, if Reuven evaluates the conversation
and decides that saying to Shimon that Yehudah sides with me
(sides with Reuven against Shimon) will provoke Shimon to dislike
Yehudah (and Reuven still goes ahead and makes that disclosure to
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volume 4

Kelal Alef
Shimon), by making that disclosure Reuven becomes a rachil, a

gossip
RK1/4. Everything we have said applies even if the remark is
Mekor Hachayim
absolutely true (8) without any trace of a lie. It is quite unnecessary

to say (further) that if Plony and the victim had been friends, by
spreading gossip the speaker is called a Rasha \ evil one. In making
his remarks, this speaker becomes an object of great disgust before
Hashem, as Mishle teaches (6:17-19) Six things are hated by
Hashem and the seventh (i.e., gossip) is disgusting to His Souland
the one who provokes argumentation between brothers. Regarding
this, Chazal have taught (Vayikrah Rabbah, perashat Mehtzorah
16:1) and this seventh character trait is the most disgusting of all.
But even besides this, if these two people hated each other very
much (9), if a person hears one of them saying something bad about
the other one and he then goes and repeats it to him, this person is
called a rachil \ a gossip.
RK1/5. There is no distinction in the esur of Rechilut if the remarks

were made voluntarily by the speaker or if the listener himself had
some prior understanding of the subject matter (10) and pressured
and cajoled the speaker to tell him what so-and-so said about him or
about his doings. Even if (11) pressured by ones father or rabbi to
disclose what so-and-so said about them, and even if the response
would only intimate gossip (Avak Rechilut), nevertheless, in all
circumstances it is forbidden to disclose the information.
RK1/6. Even if one understands that by not disclosing this gossip

he will incur a substantial loss (12) in his affairs, for example,
that he works for other people and his employers are aware that
something was said about them, and they pressure him to disclose
volume 4

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volume 4

Kelal Alef
that information to them, and he refuses to disclose it, and by

not disclosing it he will become suspected by them as also being
involved in that incident and as a result of that suspicion he will be
removed from his position, and if that happens he will not be able
to support (13) his family. Nevertheless, the disclosure is forbidden
just as it is forbidden to violate any Lav of the Torah. He is obligated
to give up everything he owns and not violate a Lav of the Torah, as
this law is explained in Yoreh Dehah, section #157, paragraph #1,
in the Hagahah, as long as there is no likelihood of some beneficial
outcome such as the aversion of damages or the reconciliation of a
dispute. However one may not be quick to take advantage of this
leniency because many conditions must first be satisfied, as I will
explain them at length, with Gds help, further on in the 9th Kelal.
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/7. Especially if withholding the disclosure (i.e., not gossiping)

will not result in monetary damages but only in insults and curses
(that others will insult him because he did not gossip) then most
certainly it would be forbidden for him to gossip. He should not
let the insults bother him at all and he should know down to the
core of his soul that in not gossiping, in the coming future he will
be counted among those who are beloved by Hashem Yitbarach.
His face will glow with the radiance of the sun, as Chazal teach in
Gemara Yomah (23a)- Those who are insulted but do not insult
back, who absorb insults without responding, the pasuk refers to
them specifically as (Shoftim 5:31) and His beloved ones will shine
like the sun in all of its strength, and all the more so regarding this
person who absorbs humiliation for the sake of fulfilling one of
Hashems mitzvot. Please see what I have written at length above
in the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, the 1st Kelal, 6th halacha.
RK1/8. On the topic of what to answer if someone were to askWhat did so-and-so say about me? The response is conditional:
If he has a practical way of answering (14) him and the response is
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volume 4

Kelal Alef
neither completely untruthful nor gossip, then one should respond in

that framework and not lie. However if he (the speaker) understands
that the person who asked the question will not be satisfied with
this type of answer, then it is permitted to respond with an answer
that is an absolute lie in order to maintain peace. But one may not
swear (15), Gd forbid, to a response which is a lie, even for the
sake of maintaining peace. (Please see the following Beer Mayim
Chayim).
RK1/9. Understand clearly that even if the speaker does not
Mekor Hachayim
reveal the identity of the person (Plony) who was talking about
this listener (16) and the speaker disclosed what had been said
about this listener just as a matter of fact (17) (without mentioning
Plonys name) and because of this disclosure the identity of Plony
became known. Or if the essence of what Plony said or did was
already known to the listener (the victim) but he did not know the
identity of Plony and now this speaker came and led him along
with a series of hints and suggestions (18) until the listener realized
Plonys identity; this too is forbidden.
RK1/10. Similarly, it is forbidden to gossip using a trick (19)

(to camouflage the speakers real intent), that the speaker knows
that once Plony did something inappropriate to this listener or
demeaned him and there was conflict between them and now this
speaker wants to re-ignite this old conflict between Plony and the
listener, but the speaker does not want the listener to be aware of
what he is actually doing. And so this speaker begins smooth-talking
the listener and seemingly, casually mentions the bad episode that
the listener experienced as though the remark was totally innocent
and that he was not even aware of it. And because the speaker made
those remarks, the listener recalls the episode and the bad that
Plony had done to him. These remarks and everything else like
them are absolutely forbidden.
11
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volume 4

Kelal Alef
RK1/11. Furthermore understand, that there is no distinction in
Mekor Hachayim
the esur of Rechilut if the speaker conveys what Plony said or

did to the listener verbally or in written form (20). It is also one
and the same (it is Rechilut) if the speaker tells the listener that
Plony degraded him or that Plony degraded his merchandise
(as I explained above in the context of Lashon Hara in the 1st Kelal,
the 8th halacha, and the 5th Kelal, the 7th halacha) since in either
event it would result in the listener hating Plony.
13
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volume 4

Kelal Beit

Kelal Beit
(RK2- 2nd chapter)
The law as it relates to the leniency of In the presence

of three people in a framework of Rechilut. Other
details will also be discussed. There are 4 halachot
in this Kelal.
Mekor Hachayim
RK2/1. It is forbidden to gossip even if only spoken in front of

one person and of course it is forbidden (1) if spoken in front of
many people.
RK2/2. Even suggestions of Rechilut (Avak Rechilut, the dust

of Rechilut) are forbidden in all circumstances (I will define Avak
Rechilut further on in the 8th Kelal). Even if the comments Plony
told this speaker could be interpreted in two different ways, if the
speaker conveys Plonys remarks in a framework that becomes
apparent (2) as degradation, that Plony specifically intended
to demean the victim, then of course it would be forbidden to
convey those remarks in any circumstance. Even if the speaker
conveys Plonys remarks in the context that they lean towards the
other way of understanding them (meaning, that they lean towards
an interpretation that is not denigrating) and that there was no intent
to demean the listener, nevertheless if the speaker knows the mindset
of the listener (3) (the victim), that he is contentious (meaning,
that the victim is constantly forming harsh opinions of people,
15
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volume 4

Kelal Beit
never giving them the benefit of the doubt and whatever people
do or say about him, he says was done only to antagonize him,
as Rabbeinu Yonah writes in the 3rd shaar of Shaare Teshuvah in
section # 231), or if there was some slight enmity between them
and this victim needs only the flimsiest of excuses to libel Plony,
(regarding this kind of personality, this victim) it is forbidden (to
convey to him any form of gossip) in any and all circumstances.
Mekor Hachayim
RK2/3. There is an opinion that holds if an individual spoke (4)

disparagingly (5) about his fellow Jew in the presence of three
people, those remarks would be immune from the esur of Rechilut
if these three people in-turn conveyed those remarks to the victim,
and told him that Plony said such-and-such about you. (According
to this opinion) The reason for exempting the speaker from the esur
of Rechilut is because remarks presented in this way will inevitably
reach back to the victim, that one person tells another person who
in turn tells another until it reaches the victim and this type of
information transfer was never forbidden by the Torah. But this
speaker must be very careful to conform to the rules explained above
in the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, in the 2nd Kelal, beginning with
the 4th halacha onward. However, in a practical sense one may not
rely on this leniency because the Maharshal in his commentary on
the SeMag wrote that many of our Early Authorities (namely the
Rambam, the SeMag and the Tosafot) disagree with this opinion
and completely forbid it in all circumstances, even to say this to
another person if his intention is to disclose to the victim(6) what
Plony said and of course one may not say it to the victim himself.
RK2/4. Based on this, if one business partner wants to dissolve

his partnership because he thinks (he can do better with) other
men who will go into partnership with him, but in the end that did
not happen, (and in a similar sense, this same concept applies to
a marital-match that is in progress, that the man believes he can
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Mekor Hachayim
Kelal Beit
find an even better match with a different woman and it does not
happen), it is forbidden to tell this to the (original, other) partner
(7) even though the potential for breaking the partnership was
known in the presence of three people or more (meaning, that
other people knew he was planning to break up the partnership), as
I wrote immediately above in the 3rd halacha, because with absolute
certainty it would cause him to be upset with his other partner
knowing that he wanted to dissolve the partnership. This concept
is expressed in Tanach, in Sefer Shoftim (11:7) regarding Yiftach
(at a time in history before there was a Jewish king in Israel and the
nation was searching for a leader) who said to the delegation that
came to him Why are you first coming to me only now that you are
in trouble? (Meaning, our enemies are beginning to overpower you
and you are looking to me to save you from them - and until now
I was an outcast). Perhaps this (knowledge that his partner had
attempted to start a new partnership with others and the dissolution
of this partnership) will become the cause of actually breaking this
current partnership or that he will cause his partner anguish because
of what he wanted to do. The Rambam addresses this (in Hilchot
DeAut, the 7th perek, the 5th halacha)- That someone who conveys a
remark that could cause damages to a fellow Jew, either physical
or monetary, or cause anguish and pain to a fellow Jew or cause him
to suffer some kind of loss, that comment is Lashon Hara.
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Kelal Gimal

Kelal Gimal
(RK3-3rd chapter)
Rechilut is forbidden both when Plony (the person

who is the source of the gossip) is present to hear it
repeated and when he is not present. There are 4
Mekor Hachayim
RK3/1. It is forbidden to gossip even if it is the absolute truth, and

there is no aspect of a lie in the comment being conveyed, and even
if the conveyed comment is made without Plony being present.
Even if this speaker knows he would (not hesitate to) make this
comment (1) with Plony being present, this too would be forbidden
and the comment would be characterized as Rechilut. And certainly
if this speaker is arrogant and literally tells Plony directly (2)- You
talked about so-and-so (the victim) or You did such-and-such
to him, it is forbidden and his sin is very much more serious. First,
the comment would cause the victim to hate Plony very much
because the victim will accept the comment (that Plony really
did make a comment about him) as being absolutely true. Most
certainly he would reason that the comment had to be true because
if not he would not have had the audacity to repeat it with Plony
standing right there next to him. Second, besides violating the esur
of Rechilut, he is putting himself and these two other people (Plony
and the victim) in the position of violating several other Laveen and
Aseen that are explicit in the Torah. I carefully explained all of this
in detail in the Introduction, in the 14th Lav, in the Hagahah of the
Mekor Chayim. Please see that reference.
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i.e., Plony, the person who initiated the gossip.
i.e., The victim, the person who was the subject of the gossip.
i.e., The speaker who conveyed Reuvens gossip to Shimon.

Kelal Gimal
RK3/2. If Reuven talked about Shimon in front of Levi and

Levi then went back to Shimon and told him what Reuven said, it
is forbidden for Shimon to go back to Reuven and say to him-Why
did you say those things about me to Levi? Because in doing that,
he (Shimon) also violates (3) the esur of Rechilut because of what
Levi said. Even if Shimon does not identify Levi as the source
of his information and that he quoted Levi anonymously- that I
heard you said such-and-such about me, if in saying this Reuven
will inevitably realize (4) who the source of the information was
(namely Levi) then Shimons comment would be forbidden. And
because of the many sins of society, many people make this mistake
and commit this sin.
Mekor Hachayim
RK3/3. Understand clearly that talking about someone else (the

victim) even if the comment was made without the victim being
present (5) to hear it, is still called gossip. For example, if someone
tells his friend - This is what I heard about Reuven who said
such-and-such about Shimon. These kinds of remarks as they are
passed from person to person until they reach back to the victim
would inevitably create contention between Reuven, the speaker,
and Shimon, the victim. (Please see the following Hagahah). And
of course it is forbidden for the speaker to repeat the comment made
by Plony about the children (7) or the relatives of the victim since
it is human nature to react defensively \ combatively because of the
criticism of his family, and the comment is gossip.
RK3/4. If the speakers motivation in conveying those comments

to a fellow Jew is for that friend to rebuke Reuven for speaking
Lashon Hara about Shimon, regarding this circumstance please see
what I wrote above in the first part of this sefer, in the 10th Kelal,
the 6th halacha.
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Kelal Dalet

Kelal
Dalet
(RK4 - 4th chapter)
The law applying to gossip in the framework of the

victim already knowing about the gossip even
without the speaker having repeated it to him, and
how to correct the sin of Rechilut. There are 3
Mekor Hachayim
RK4/1. Gossip is forbidden even if the speaker is repeating

something that is not new, that the victim already knew that Plony
said or did something that affected him but he (the victim) did
not think much of it at the time, that Plony wronged him, and this
speaker \ this gossip (1) reminds him again about what had happened.
(For example, Reuven lost a court case and Shimon meets him
and asks What was the outcome of your court case? Reuven
answers: The court found me liable for such-and-such. Shimon
then tells him: You know, the court did not judge you fairly!).
(This example and other comparable examples). Nevertheless it
is called gossip (2) since in prodding the conversation the speaker
is again reminding the victim to think about an entirely unpleasant
experience and provokes this victim to hate his court opponent who
won the case.
RK4/2. If Reuven degraded Shimon in the presence of two people

and one of those two people then violated the esur of Rechilut
and conveyed Reuvens comments to Shimon, still the second
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Kelal Dalet
of these two men should be careful not to convey (3) those same
comments back to Shimon, and all the more so if he embellishes
those comments, it is forbidden and he is called a gossip. There is
no question that if he understands Shimon is still not quite sure that
those comments were really made by Reuven (for example, Shimon
asks him- Is it true what your friend told me, that Reuven degraded
me in front of both of you?), it is absolutely forbidden to convey
those comments to him. But even if Shimon seems to have believed
the first speaker, still this second speaker may not even disclose
those comments because repeating those comments will only cause
Shimon to hate Reuven even more since he was the second person
to convey that gossip and he validated what Reuven said about him
more than would have been the case if only one person conveyed
the gossip. There is also the possibility that Shimon will come to
the point of fighting (with Reuven) because this second person reignited the gossip all over again.
Mekor Hachayim
RK4/3. If the speaker violated the Lav and gossiped about his
fellow Jew and now wants to atone for that sin, there is no remedy
(4) other than to ask forgiveness from the victim, to appease him
and to atone before Gd for violating this Lav of Do not peddle
gossip in society. All of these remedial details are identical to
those necessary to atone for speaking Lashon Hara and are located
in the first part of this sefer in the 4th Kelal, the 12th halacha. Please
see that reference and the related Beer Mayim Chayim.
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Kelal Heh

Kelal Heh
(RK5 - 5th chapter)
Details of the sin of believing gossip or of listening

to it, and if someone did transgress this Lav, the
method by which this sin can be remedied. There
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/1. Just as the Torah forbids believing Lashon Hara, so too

does the Torah forbid believing gossip (1), that gossip \ Rechilut
is also included in the category of Lashon Hara. Meaning, one
should not take to heart that the gossip told to him was true, that
Plony did such and such to him or said such and such about him.
The listener (this victim) who does believe it violates the Torahs
Lav of (Shemot 23:1) Do not accept a false report in addition to
violating all of the other Laveen and Aseen that are associated with it,
as I explained them in the Introduction. (Please see that reference).
Chazal have taught us (Rambam, Hilchot DeAut, 7th perek, end of
the 3rd halacha) Lashon Hara kills three people; the speaker, the
listener who believes what the speaker said and the victim. (As
we know this from Doeg the Edomite. Doeg (the speaker) was
barred from Olam Haba because the gossip he conveyed to Shaul
HaMelech, Nov- the city of Kohanim (the victim of Rechilut) was annihilated, and Shaul HaMelech (the listener) was killed later
on because he believed the gossip that Doeg told him). The one
who accepts the gossip is punished even more than the speaker.
Chazal have taught (Gemara Pesachim 118a) It is appropriate to
throw to the dogs anyone who speaks Lashon Hara and anyone who
believes Lashon Hara from the juxtaposition of two pesukim. The
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the Lashon Hara they give the speakers report credence and will more
decisively guide the listener to a conclusion. For example, the unkempt
and bedraggled appearance of Mephiboshet as he presented himself in
audience before David HaMelech seemed to bear out the Lashon Hara
reported to him by Tzevah, namely that his master Mephiboshet was
unhappy that David HaMelech emerged from the civil war with Avshalom
as undisputed king of Israel. The Chafetz Chayim ZL differentiates
and strong between Lashon Hara supported by weak
has been rendered For purposes of this translation
as circumstantial evidence, although these facts do not constitute
evidence, but rather they are simply varying degrees of indication that
the reported Lashon Hara is true.
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Kelal Heh
pasuk teaches (Shemot 23:1) Do not accept a false report and

the pasuk that immediately precedes it teaches Throw it (him) to
the dogs.
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/2. Listening to gossip is a severe sin (2) just as it is a sin

to listen to Lashon Hara, as I wrote above in the first part of this
sefer in the 6th Kelal, the 2nd-6th halachot, even if at the moment the
gossip was conveyed the victim still has not decided whether or
not to believe it. Still, believing gossip is a more severe sin than just
listening to it. Regarding the victim listening to gossip, and the
victim understands from the outset of the remarks that if the gossip
is true it will pertain to him at some future time, for example, the
listener realizes the speaker wants to tell him that Plony wants to
hurt him, either physically or financially (or something comparable),
then most certainly (3) it is permissible to listen to that gossip (and
not believe the gossip as truth, but) in order to learn what steps
he needs to take to protect himself from Plony. But to decide \ to
believe that gossip he hears is the truth is strictly forbidden by the
Torah in all circumstances; however to suspect that perhaps it might
be true is permissible in order to protect oneself. Chazal have taught
this concept (in Gemara Niddah 61a) even though Lashon Hara is
forbidden to be believed as truth, nevertheless one should suspect
its possible veracity (and take the necessary precautions to protect
oneself). Please see above in the section of this sefer discussing the
esur of Lashon Hara, the 6th Kelal, the 3rd halacha, to learn how to
react to someone who wants to convey gossip, in order to satisfy
our obligation to Gd. That law applies here as well.
RK5/3. If the victim sees circumstantial evidence (that supports

are literally recognizeable facts. In this context are

weak circumstantial facts or indications that tend to corroborate the Lashon
Hara told to a listener. The by themselves are not substantial
enough to prompt the listener to form a conclusion, but when coupled with
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Kelal Heh
the gossip conveyed to him), that a fellow Jew \ Plony wants to

harm him physically or financially, even though he has not heard
this from anyone else, still it is permissible for him to investigate
and to inquire from other people whether or not Plony intends to
harm him in order to decide (4) how to protect himself (5) from him.
This victim should not worry that people will demean or degrade
Plony because of his investigation.
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/4. Understand clearly that all of the rules we wrote in the first
part of this sefer in the 6th Kelal (10th and 11th halachot) relating to
suspecting the veracity of Lashon Hara apply equally to suspecting
that the gossip might be true (6). Therefore one must be very careful
when he hears that Plony said something negative about him or
that he did such and such to him or wants to do such and such to
him, not to believe that gossip but (only) that he can take whatever
steps are necessary to protect himself. But even in that framework,
he may not even suspect there is some truth to the remarks because
Plony still has a presumption of righteousness and most probably
Plony did not do or say anything bad about him. Therefore, it is
forbidden to do anything to him or to cause any loss to him or to
humiliate him in any way, not in a significant way and not even in
an insignificant way. Even to secretly harbor in ones heart some
hatred for him is an esur, a Lav of the Torah. And most certainly
the victim may not use the gossip as a basis for absolving himself
(7) from any obligations to Plony. The victim is obliged to extend to
Plony all of the courtesies \ all of the good that the Torah commands
us to extend to any Jewish person since Plonys standing has not
been diminished at all as a result of the gossip he heard. Our
Authorities gave us a rule that the victim \ the listener may not
suspect that Plony may have said something against him but that he
could take whatever steps were necessary to protect himself in the
future so that Plony would not be able to harm him. But in all other
regards it is forbidden to suspect him at all.
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Kelal Heh
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/5. From all of this, see how foolish many people are, that their
personality is to question their friends to find out what Plony said
about them even if that information would have no impact on their
lives. And when their friends decline to disclose that information,
they put great pressure on them until they finally tell them what
they want to hear, what Plony said about them. Occasionally, that
information is demeaning and they will believe the information
is true and they will come to hate Plony because of it. Now if
we come to assess the great destruction and calculate the number
of Laveen and Aseen that are commonly violated by someone
who is entrenched in this disgusting character trait, the number
is incredibly great. Please refer back to the Introduction and you
will understand what we are saying, because truthfully speaking,
the esur of believing Lashon Hara or gossip applies even if Plony
commented of his own accord about events that are relevant to this
victim. Yet the Torah commands us not to believe that gossip but
only (at most) to perhaps suspect it might be true. And if the gossip
is irrelevant to this victim, then even listening to it is forbidden as I
wrote above in the second halacha of this Kelal. And how much even
more so is it forbidden to pressure someone into disclosing gossip
against their will to the point where the speaker will enter into the
category of speaking Rechilut and the listener will transgress the
esur of accepting Rechilut. This listener who forced the disclosure
of Rechilut is himself a sinner and he causes other people to sin
(and his punishment is much more severe). Therefore man must
stay very very far away from asking about these kinds of things
unless it is clear to him that the comment \ the gossip is relevant
and he needs to know about it in order to decide how to best protect
himself from Plony.
RK5/6. Understand clearly that there is another aspect to the esur

of believing gossip, as I will now explain. Even if it is clear to him
that the gossip conveyed is true, that Plony spoke about him or did
something against his will but it is possible to give him the benefit of
a doubt (8) and decide that his actions were not intended to demean
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Kelal Heh
him, that he really meant it in some other context, and that based
on those circumstances Plony has no culpability. It is well known
that the law considers it a mitzvah to judge him favorably, but this
victim, because he did not want to judge Plony favorably, then
necessarily Plonys actions or his remarks were perceived by the
victim as unjust and he becomes upset with Plony because of
it. Because of this, the victim is characterized as someone who
believes Rechilut, someone who accepts gossip as truth. (Please
refer to the immediately following 6th Kelal and the Hagahah in the
3rd halacha, to the two illustrations that exemplify the acceptance
of gossip as truth, which basically arises from not giving Plony the
benefit of a doubt and judging him favorably).
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/7. If a victim violated this Lav and believed the gossip

he heard, the remedy (9) is to strengthen himself and remove that
thought from his heart to the point where he no longer believes it.
And even if it is difficult for him to think that the speaker made
up the entire story, he should think that perhaps the speaker added
something of his own to the story or left out some significant detail or
comment that Plony made about this victim or that the speaker said
it in some completely different tone of voice and because of these
differences the entire sense of the story changed from something
good to something bad. The victim should resolve that from now
on not to believe any Lashon Hara or gossip about any Jew. In this
regard he should make a Vidduy, a sincere expression of his will
in atonement. In so doing he will have remedied his past sin as long
as he has not spread this gossip and conveyed it to anyone else.
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Kelal Vav
Mekor Hachayim
Kelal Vav
(RK6 - 6th chapter)
The esur of accepting gossip as truth in the context of

it being conveyed In the presence of three people
or conveyed directly to the victim. This Kelal will
explain the law if someone suffered a loss and word
spread throughout society that Plony caused the loss
to this victim, or if someone conveyed that gossip
(that Plony was the cause of the loss) in casual
passing, unintentionally, or if someone conveyed
that gossip and he (that speaker) had the authority
of two authoritative witnesses. Some other details of
the laws of gossip will also be discussed in this Kelal
which consists of 10 halachot.
RK6/1. It is forbidden to believe gossip. Even if the speaker

conveyed it publicly in front of several men (1), nevertheless, one
may not form a conclusive opinion that the gossip he heard was
true. However it is permissible to suspect its possible veracity and
to investigate the matter (to determine) if it will have a future impact
on his life (2).
RK6/2. Just as we explained above in the first part of this sefer, in

the 7th Kelal, the 2nd halacha, that the law forbids believing Lashon
Hara even if the comments were made in front of the victim, so
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Kelal Vav
Mekor Hachayim
too is the law the same for Rechilut. Namely, that someone says
to Plony: You (Plony) said such and such about him (about the
victim), even if Plony remains quiet now (3) (meaning, he does not
answer back the charge) while they are repeating that gossip, that he
(Plony) said about the victim. Nevertheless, it is still forbidden for
the victim to believe it and he may not draw any conclusions from
the circumstances that the gossip was true. Even if Plonys usual
temperament was not to remain silent in other matters but here he
remained silent, Plonys silence is not proof that the gossip was
true, as I explained this all above. (Please see that reference).
All this applies even if the speaker (4) in conveying his gossip does
not violate the Torahs Lav of Do not peddle gossip in society. For
example, the speaker tells the victim to protect himself from Plony
because he (Plony) wants to harm him (or something comparable),
as I will explain further on (in the 9th Kelal). And most certainly if
he spoke Lashon Hara without purpose about the victim or gossiped
about him, this has already been explained above (in the first part of
this sefer at the beginning of the 2nd Kelal) quoting our Authorities,
that both Lashon Hara and Rechilut are forbidden whether or not
they are conveyed directly in front of Plony and even if they are
true. Therefore, even if everything was true, just as he conveyed it,
that Plony said such and such about him, nevertheless the speaker
is an absolute Rasha, because of what he said since he violated the
Lav of Do not peddle gossip and the Lav of Do not convey (or
accept) a false report as well as other Laveen and Aseen that are
listed and explained in the Introduction. And so, because of this
Rasha, do you think we should deprive Plony of his presumption
of legitimacy and say that he spoke Lashon Hara about the victim
or something comparable? (Of course not!) Obviously this speaker,
who is himself suspect for violating the Lav of Rechilut and Lashon
Hara is also suspect to have lied and to have embellished the story
he conveyed and added to it (and changed its entire sense) from
beginning to end.
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Kelal Vav
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/3. And if his (the victims) business was harmed and this
victim did not know the reason for it, for example, he bought a
particular exclusive right from the government (egs., the right to
collect property taxes in that locale on behalf of the government)
and the officer (the government official) removed him (took away
that right) and this victim did not know if someone informed on
him or if the government official decided this by himself of his own
accord, or something comparable, it is forbidden for him to suspect
any Jew (as being the cause unless he is aware of circumstantial
evidence, and I will define circumstantial evidence further on (in
the 9th halacha), only then would it be permissible to conclude an
opinion as to who was the cause of the loss, however this victim
may not cause a loss to this person based solely on this gossip, as
I will explain further on (primarily at the end of the 9th halacha
and in the 10th halacha) since we do not presume people to be evil.
Regarding this circumstance, the Torah instructs us (Vayikrah 19:15)
Judge your brother \ your fellow Jew charitably. (Please see the
following Hagahah). Even if this victim heard that Plony was the
cause of the loss, still the most he is permitted to do is to suspect
that what he heard might be true yet he may not conclude an opinion
that what he heard was true. Even if other men begin to argue with
Plony because of this and they said to Plony that based on what they
heard he caused a great problem for the victim and in so doing he
committed a terrible sin, and throughout all of this Plony remained
silent (and did not answer the charge against him), nevertheless,
this victim may not conclude a firm opinion about Plony because
of this (meaning, because of Plonys silence) and believe what he
heard was true. Even though truthfully it is a mitzvah for a person
to defend himself against an indictment and to argue against his
accusers that he is completely innocent of the accusations against
him, as the Torah commands us (Bamidbar 32:22) and you should
be innocent in Gds eyes and in the eyes of Jewish society, still,
perhaps Plony understood from the circumstances (5) that society
pre-judged him and he concluded they believed the Lashon Hara
against him and that it would be pointless to try and defend himself
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and that is why he remained silent. Perhaps Plony accepted upon

himself to remain silent and thereby placed himself among those
who are shamed yet do not shame others, who absorb disgrace and
do not answer back (6).
RK6/4. Understand clearly that it is forbidden to believe gossip

even if it was conveyed by two or more people or even if that gossip
was commonly circulating throughout society (7), that Plony said
something about the victim or did such-and-such to him. Despite
its common knowledge, it is forbidden to believe it or to conclude
an opinion that it must be true. Even if the future well being of
the victim is motivating the people conveying the gossip, and in so
doing they are not considered to be evil people, nevertheless it is
still forbidden to believe them, as I explained above in the second
halacha of this Kelal.
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/5. It is forbidden to believe gossip even if the speaker

conveying it has the same authority as two witnesses and even if there
is no way to think favorably about Plony (8). Everything we have
said until now applies if the gossip has no bearing on the victim and
that information will have no future impact on his life. However, if
the gossip is relevant and will result in some benefit (9) to the victim,
for example- the speaker told him Plony wants to harm him, either
physically or monetarily, or something comparable, and therefore
this victim should protect himself from him, then it is permissible to
believe this speaker (who has the same authority as two witnesses).
However the victim may not disclose this information \ this gossip
to anyone else (10), not even to members of his own household,
unless some future benefit will evolve as a result of that disclosure.
All this is relevant only if the speaker himself heard Plony threaten
the victim. But if the speaker was not a firsthand witness, and
someone else told him (11) what Plony said, he has no basis for
depending on the word of another person (and he may not believe
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Kelal Vav
that gossip, even if the speaker has the same authority as two
witnesses).
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/6. Even in a useful circumstance where the victim can

believe the speaker, that is only when the victim knows the speaker
very well, meaning, that the victim is very familiar with the
personality of the speaker (12), that he never lies and does not
exaggerate, and the victim is so confident of the truthfulness of
the speaker and he believes him in this regard and in fact always
believes him in whatever he says (13) with the same authority as two
witnesses testifying in court whose testimony is incontrovertible.
(Please see the following Hagahah). But if this victim does not
always believe the speaker in all other regards, just in this regard
because he relishes and enjoys the gossip and Lashon Hara, and so
this victim now rationalizes and decides that the speaker must be
telling the truth and he believes him just as he would believe two
witnesses; obviously this is forbidden. In fact, contrary to this, the
more he believes him and concludes the story is true, the more he
falls into the category of those people who believe Lashon Hara and
Rechilut.
RK6/7. All this, however, was relevant only during the epoch of
the Talmud. But nowadays all Authorities are in agreement (15)
that nobody can claim they believe someone because they are as
authoritative as two witnesses testifying in Beit Din and that he
never lies about anything. Therefore in no circumstance can the
victim believe the testimony \ gossip of this speaker although
he can suspect the veracity of the speakers story. Apart from this,
it is improbable that one could comply with all of the conditions in
the 5th and 6th halachot. From this you can see how many people
make a mistake in this regard, that they are very careful not to
speak Lashon Hara or Rechilut and not to believe it if they hear
it being spoken by others but they will believe it if it is spoken by
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Kelal Vav
their father or mother or wife because they feel these people would
most certainly never lie to them. But this is a very serious mistake
because it makes no difference who is conveying the gossip (16).
Please see above in the first part of this sefer, in the 8th Kelal, the
14th halacha and additionally further on in this part of the sefer, in
the 7th Kelal, the 5th halacha.
RK6/8. This law, that it is forbidden to believe gossip, applies

even if the gossip is conveyed unintentionally, in some unrelated
context (17), meaning that the victim realizes the speaker had no
intention to incite a dispute with a fellow Jew and just unthinkingly
those words came out of his mouth. All of the additional details of
this law were explained above in the first part of this sefer, in the
7th Kelal, the 9th halacha, in the context of Lashon Hara. And these
details apply equally here as well, that it is forbidden to believe
gossip.
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/9. If the victim is aware of circumstantial evidence that

gives credibility to the gossip, that points to the gossip conveyed
to him as being true, that Plony did something to him or said suchand-such about him, then regarding the issue of whether or not that
circumstantial evidence is a sufficient basis for believing it, please
see above in the first part of this sefer, in the 7th Kelal, the 10th
through 14th halachot because there, with Gds help, we explained
all of the relevant details. But in order to make things easier for the
reader, I will summarize here what I expressed over there. These
five conditions must be fulfilled:
(1) The circumstantial evidence must substantiate the gossip as
being true (18) with no grounds for judging him favorably
based on what he said or did, because if there was a side to
judge him favorably, what was the point of the circumstantial
evidence substantiating the gossip as being true? Even if it was
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Kelal Vav
true, the victim may not conclude a bad opinion about Plony, as
I explained above several times.
(2) The circumstantial evidence must strongly point to the gossip
as being true. It cannot be weak circumstantial evidence that
slightly suggests the gossip is true.
(3) The victim must have seen the circumstantial evidence himself,
first hand, and not learn about it because someone else told
him.
Mekor Hachayim
(4) (The gossip is permitted) only if the victim could conclude

something constructive will evolve as a result of knowing this
gossip, because if that was not so, it would be forbidden to listen
to what he had to say, as I wrote above in several places.
(5) After complying with these first four conditions, one may use
this circumstantial evidence only as a basis for believing the
gossip is true but not as a basis for repeating the gossip to other
people (19). In all circumstances (20) it is forbidden to use
circumstantial evidence as a basis for causing a monetary loss
to Plony or to hit him because of it, Gd forbid. Please see that
reference (the 7th Kelal of the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara), the
12th through 14th halachot where the concept was explained at
length.
RK6/10. Based on this, we can see for ourselves how people make
this mistake, because of the many sins of society, that if someone
suffers a loss in his affairs because someone informed on him, or
something comparable, and he has circumstantial evidence pointing
to Plony as being the cause of his loss, in relying on this circumstantial
evidence this victim goes and informs on Plony because of societys
misconception that if someone informed on you, you now have the
license to retaliate and inform back on him.
Truthfully, this is a very serious mistake from several aspects:
(1). The victims right to retaliate (i.e., the law permitting
retaliation) and inform back on someone who first informed
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Kelal Vav
Mekor Hachayim
on him is applicable only if there will be a future outcome that

is beneficial, for example, that this someone will not be able
to inform on the victim again and that there was no other way
of achieving this benefit except by informing on him. Only then
would it be allowable. But if this victims only motivation was to
take revenge, most certainly it would be absolutely forbidden, as is
brought down in Choshen Mishpat (section #388, paragraph #9, in
the Hagahah).
(2). Before retaliating against this someone, the victim himself
must have seen someones act of informing and not merely
surmise someone was the culprit because of circumstantial
evidence, even if the circumstance evidence is obvious and the
victim himself saw that evidence, as I wrote above, and certainly
not if (he did not see the circumstantial evidence and) other people
told him that someone informed. In this circumstance it would
be forbidden to even conclude an opinion about this someone, to
believe that the gossip was true, as long as there were no witnesses
who testified in court (or even outside of court, as long as there was
positive proof with no possibility of a doubt). And how much even
more so is it forbidden to rely on this hearsay and to cause even the
smallest loss to a fellow Jew even if in so doing he is motivated to
achieve a useful future outcome.
At this point in the review of Hilchot Esurei Rechilut
our daughter Mazal was niftar on 27 Elul 5766.
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Kelal Zayin

Kelal Zayin
(RK7 - 7th chapter)
An explanation of the different circumstances when

Rechilut is forbidden. There are 5 halachot in this
Kelal.
Mekor Hachayim
RK7/1. It is forbidden to gossip and it makes no difference if the

gossip is conveyed by a man or by a woman (1), by a relative or
by someone who is not a relative. Even if someone heard Plony
insult ones father or mother and because of his great concern for
their sense of honor he told them what Plony said; this too is called
gossip. (Please see the following Hagahah). Similarly it makes no
difference if Plony is a man or a woman, an adult or a child (2).
All of this follows from the above discussion of the Laws of Esurei
Lashon Hara in the 8th Kelal, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd halachot.
There are people who make this mistake: Someone sees two boys
hitting each other and then goes over and tells the father of one of
these boys that the second boy hit his son. Very often great trouble
is caused by these kinds of reports, and this father will go and hit the
boy who hit his child because of his hatred for that boy. Inevitably
this will cause a bitter conflict between this father and the father
of the boy he hit. Very often this scenario takes place in a shule
or Beit Midrash. Now if we gave some thought to the seriousness
of the sins committed in conveying this gossip, the number of sins
committed in this scenario would be too numerous to count. It goes
without saying that if this speaker did not clearly know which one of
these boys was within the law in what he did, it would be forbidden
to tell the boys father what had happened. But rather even if he
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Kelal Zayin
does clearly know which boy was halachically allowed to do what

he did, still he may not go and report back to the father of the second
boy, except if he satisfies all of the conditions and details listed
further on in the following 9th Kelal. Please see that reference.
RK7/2. Understand clearly that it is forbidden to gossip even about
Mekor Hachayim
someone who is coarse and unlearned because this man is also

your brother. Even though this speaker clearly saw this coarse
person senselessly denigrate the victim without his being present
and the law supports this victim, still we explained above in the
1st Kelal (4th halacha) that conveying gossip is forbidden even if the
gossip is true. And all the more so is it forbidden to repeat the gossip
if the person who initiated the remarks is a Torah Scholar. The sin is
greater and more profound from several different perspectives:
(1) From the perspective of the essence of gossip itself, it is obvious
that if the speaker conveyed gossip to the victim and inserted his
own lies into the gossip, of course his punishment is much greater
than someone who conveyed gossip that was true. As we examine
this more intently, we will find that in a majority of times the gossip
is a lie because a Torah Scholar generally does not denigrate anyone
and generally does not needlessly harm anyone so we can presume
that whatever this Torah Scholar did, he did with the sanction of the
law. Therefore anyone who gossips and libels a Torah Scholar is
spreading gossip that is a lie.
(2) From the perspective of Plony, who is a Torah Scholar, the Torah
commands us to cleave to Torah Scholars at every opportunity, to
eat and drink with them, to engage in business for their benefit, to
marry off our daughters to them and to extend great honor to them.
How much even more so is it forbidden to incite contention against
them, since this brings about the opposite result of everything we
have said above.
(3) From the perspective of the after-effect that will evolve from
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Kelal Zayin
this gossip, it is well known that a person (the victim) will not be
particularly surprised \ bothered if (he is told that) a coarse person
demeaned him or did something wrong to him (and the gossip will
barely bother him at all). But if the victim is told (gossip) that a
Torah Scholar demeaned him, most certainly a sense of hatred will
enter this persons heart (he will become much more bothered by
this gossip - by what a rabbi said about him) and very often the after
effect will be contention and conflict because of it. In particular if
this person is told that the communitys chief rabbi said something
about him, the damage that can come from that gossip will be very
great and very often the victim will steal away the livelihood of the
rabbi because of this.
Mekor Hachayim
RK7/3. Learn something even more, it makes no difference if

the speaker conveyed the gossip directly to Reuven (the victim),
what Plony said about him, or if the speaker conveys the gossip
to Reuvens wife (3) or to Reuvens relatives since most certainly
the gossip will anger them and they will develop feelings of anger
and resentment against Plony because of it. Therefore, even if the
speaker first cautions them not to tell anyone (about the gossip he
is about to convey to them) that does not absolve him of the sin of
gossip.
RK7/4. Similarly, the law makes no distinction and gossip about

a Jew is forbidden whether it is conveyed to a Jew or conveyed to
non-Jews. When one carefully analyzes this law, he will realize
that conveying gossip to a gentile is a significantly greater sin
than conveying it to a Jew. Because of his gossip, that Plony did
something to him (did something to this non-Jew) or said something
about him, most certainly the result could be a loss or harm to the
Jew (for this reason as well as other reasons, as I explained at length
in the first part of this sefer in the 8th Kelal, in the 12th halacha).
Yet there are many men who make this very serious mistake and
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Kelal Zayin
they point out to this gentile any defects or problems with the
merchandise he bought from a Jew or in the quality of work a Jew
did for a gentile (and anything else that is comparable). (Please see
the following Hagahah). This becomes the source of great loss and
suffering and often the gentile will steal away the livelihood of the
Jew because of this.
Mekor Hachayim
RK7/5. The law regarding the esur of believing gossip as truth is

the same as the law regarding the acceptance of Lashon Hara as
truth, as discussed in the first part of this sefer, in the 8th Kelal, in
the 13th and 14th halachot, please see that reference. Therefore, man
must be cautious not to believe the gossip conveyed by anyone, not
even from his own wife. And if one carefully thinks about this, he
will realize that in accepting \ believing the gossip of his wife, that
Plony said such-and-such about him, apart from the sin he commits
of believing gossip, he will bring down upon himself many, many
other troubles. When she sees her husband readily, pleasantly
accepting her gossip, she will constantly convey these same kinds of
gossip to him and she will cause him to become angry and cause him
to fight with other people and cause him soulful anguish. Therefore
it is correct and very appropriate for a sincere, principled person to
rebuke his wife (very gently) when she launches into these kinds of
discussions.
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Kelal Het

Kelal Het
(RK8 - 8th chapter)
The law pertaining to intimations of gossip. There

Mekor Hachayim
RK8/1. There are many kinds of remarks that are forbidden

because they suggest or allude to gossip (Avak Rechilut- the dust
of gossip). I will summarize several of these circumstances and
from them a person of understanding will be able to extend them
globally to life in general. For example, a person tells his friend
(1) how people were inquiring from someone \ Plony about him
and that this someone \ Plony answered emphatically Quiet!- I
do not want to say what happened and what is going to happen, or
any comparable remark made by Plony that intimates this friend
did something inappropriate. This is Avak Rechilut, an allusion to
gossip.
RK8/2. Similarly a person who compliments someone to his

friend and by doing so (2) it is possible that the friend will
develop a sense of complaint against this someone and because
of the comment something bad might happen to this someone.
This is also categorized as Avak Rechilut. Therefore it seems to me
that a person should be cautious about praising Reuven in front of
his partner, Shimon (or praising a woman in front of her husband or
praising a husband in front of his wife) because he did him a favor
by extending a loan to him or gave him charity or gave him a (high)
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The giver has no way of declining the favor to someone else and at the
same time maintain his sense of self-dignity; he was caught in a lie or at
the very least in an uncomfortable situation. The giver then becomes
indignant at Plony for his indiscretion.
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Kelal Het
salary (or anything comparable) because in so doing it is common

for Shimon to develop a sense of resentment towards his partner
Reuven. There are occasions when this can be the cause of a loss to
Reuven or the cause of strife (and similarly a woman can come to
resent her husband or her husband can come to resent his wife) if he
comes to believe that his partner is squandering his money.
RK8/3. Similarly a person should be very careful when he asks a

fellow Jew (the giver) for a favor and this giver responds that
he cannot accommodate him. This person should not ask him (3)
Then why did you do that same favor for Plony? Plony told me
himself (4) (that you extended to him this very same favor) since
it often happens that because of this persons (accusative) question,
the giver will develop a sense of enmity against Plony because he
publicly disclosed the favor and now the giver has no way out of
protecting himself.
Mekor Hachayim
RK8/4. There are still other things that are forbidden because they
allude to gossip. For example, the speaker conveys to the victim
a comment made by Plony that was not defamatory (5) but still is
something that people are somewhat sensitive about (6) if it is told
to them directly.
RK8/5. Man is obligated to hide (7) any secret confided in him by

a fellow Jew even if disclosing the secret has no aspect of gossip
since publicizing the secret damages his friend and is cause to ruin
his plans. Also, in revealing a secret, this person sheds his sense
of discretion \ modesty as he does something that is contrary to the
wishes of his fellow Jew.
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Kelal Tet

Kelal Tet
(RK9 - 9th chapter)
Mekor Hachayim
An explanation of when gossip is permitted as the

conditions of this Kelal are fulfilled. There are 15
In our discussion above of the esur of Lashon Hara, in the 10th Kelal, we
explained the circumstances which would permit one to speak Lashon Hara
against someone who was behaving inappropriately in an interpersonal
framework and this speaker intends to achieve a useful \ beneficial outcome.
(Please see that reference). In this Kelal we will explain the circumstances
under which someone would be allowed to gossip as long as the speakers
intent is to prevent some harm from occurring. I ask Hashem for guidance
that I not make any mistakes in formulating these laws.
RK9/1.
If an observer sees a fellow Jew about to form a

partnership in some venture with someone else and realizes that the
partnership would result in a bad outcome, he is obligated (1) to
warn him in order to save him from a bad loss but he must comply
with the five conditions that I will explain shortly.
RK9/2. These are the conditions (that must first be fulfilled before
gossip is allowed):
(1). One must be very careful not to come to an immediate
conclusion and decide that what he observed was a bad situation.
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Instead he should first carefully investigate (2) and determine if the

situation he observed is indeed bad.
(2). The speaker may not exaggerate the bad he observed any
more than it actually is.
Mekor Hachayim
(3). The speakers sole intention in conveying the gossip must be

only to achieve a useful \ beneficial outcome (3), in particular his
intent in reporting his gossip must be to save the victim from a
loss and not because he hates Plony.
(This particular third condition is inclusive of yet another condition.
Apart from his being motivated to achieve a positive outcome by
conveying his gossip, and not because he hated Plony, the speaker
(Reuven) must consider beforehand if his remarks will achieve a
positive outcome and exclude the likelihood which happens often
(4) that if in his making his report to Shimon, Shimon will ignore
his advice and form a partnership with Plony anyway, and later (5)
when there is a falling out (between Shimon and Plony), Shimon
tells him (Plony) - You know, Reuven was right and I should not
have gone into partnership with you (or something comparable).
To these kinds of people whom Reuven recognizes, and he knows
that their personality is such that they will launch into gossip and
Lashon Hara, there is no leniency at all that applies to them because
in so doing Reuven would cause these blind men to violate the
Torahs Lav of gossip).
(4). If the speaker is able (6) to achieve this same useful \ beneficial
outcome without conveying anything negative about Plony, then he
may not say anything negative about him.
(5). All of this is permitted only if in conveying this gossip no
actual bad will happen to Plony, rather only the good that
someone would have done for him would not be done. Even though
declining that favor is in itself something bad, still it is permitted
to convey the gossip. But if something actually bad will happen
to Plony, then it is forbidden to gossip about him (7) because other
requirements (8) now come into play that will be explained further
on, with Gds help, in the 5th and 6th halachot of this Kelal. And
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of course if the speaker, if Reuven sees that real harm will happen
to Plony if he conveys his gossip, more than the law would have
demanded (9), then it is forbidden to say anything. Please reference
what I wrote further on in the 5th halacha of this Kelal.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/3. Now I will explain another circumstance which does

not violate the esur of gossip, namely, if someone (the speaker
Reuven) heard (10) someone else (Plony) say If I meet up
with so and so (the victim,- Shimon) in such and such a place
I will beat him up or I will insult him and berate him, or Reuven
heard Plony say he wants to cause a financial loss (11) to Shimon.
Then the law allowing Reuven to convey that gossip \ report to
Shimon is conditional: If Plony has an established reputation (12)
for carrying out his threat because he has demonstrated that ability
on several past occasions or that Reuven realizes from the current
circumstances (13) that Plony was not exaggerating and will most
certainly carry out his plans, then most certainly Reuven must
convey that report to Shimon and in so doing perhaps he (Shimon)
will be on guard against Plony so that no humiliation or loss will
occur. (Please see the following Hagahah). However Reuven must
be careful to abide by all of the rules that are written above (in the
2nd law of this Kelal).
RK9/4. Even though this is a very great mitzvah (to warn someone
abut the possibility of impending danger) and is included in the
mitzvah of bringing about peace, still, one must be very careful not
to impulsively go and report this gossip unless one first carefully
thinks through the entire matter, that based on his report the intended
victim will protect himself and not go over by himself to the place
where Plony is, in order that Plony will not hit him or curse or

The editor of the Poral Taasiyot edition believes that perhaps the reference is
to the 13th halacha.
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berate him, or alternatively offer some other advice and based

on this advice, if followed through, the grievance between them
will disappear. (Thinking it through carefully before reporting to
Shimon is very important because) Very often a common outcome
of the report, that Plony wanted to insult him, is that Shimons
anger against Plony will grow and intensify and Shimon will take
the initiative and provoke a fight with him resulting in an even more
terrible conflict, Gd forbid. Therefore one must consider very
carefully how to approach this situation so that the outcome will be
resolved (amicably).
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/5. And now, with the help of Hashem Yitbarach, I will

elaborate on another important fundamental principal in these
matters and in so doing the 5th rule will be explained (i.e., no
actual bad will happen to Plony). Understand clearly that this
entire basic leniency that we wrote above in the 1st halacha of this
Kelal was specifically framed in the context of Shimon not having
finalized a transaction with Plony (15) although they had agreed
in principal to close their deal at some point in the future. But if
their deal was finalized (for each different type of deal an action
was done that our Authorities consider as being the finalization
of a transaction that forbids both sides from reneging on the deal)
then reporting the gossip to Shimon is conditional. If he (Reuven)
knows (16) no harm \ damages will happen to Plony (by reporting
his gossip to Shimon) but that Shimon will protect himself in
order not to sustain any loss caused by Plony, and Reuven is in
compliance with all five rules listed above in the 2nd halacha, then
it is proper and correct to convey that gossip to Shimon. But if
he (Reuven) is familiar with Shimons personality, that if he tells
Shimon what he knows about Plony then Shimon will immediately
jump to a conclusion and he will believe the gossip as absolute
truth (either because his personality is to immediately believe the
bad he hears about someone or because he has circumstantial
evidence regarding Plony or because Shimon very much depends
on Reuven) and Shimon will rationalize the law in his own favor
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Mekor Hachayim
Kelal Tet
and take matters into his own hands (17), for example, to renege on
his deal with Plony or cause some other harm \ loss to Plony based
on Reuvens report, even though he would not do anything worse
than a Beit Din would have done based on what the law demanded
if two witnesses had given their testimony in court. Still, conveying
that report is forbidden since his (Reuvens) report will be the cause
of his (Plonys) loss and that loss would not have occurred even if
he would have given single-witness testimony in court. No loss
would have occurred because the court could not have compelled a
monetary penalty based on the testimony of a solitary witness. Yet
now he (Reuven) is causing real damages to Plony because of the
report he made. Therefore, if two people (18) themselves saw the
incident (19) seemingly it would be permitted to convey that report
in a case where their only motivation (20) is to prevent a loss from
occurring (to Shimon). Nor should any more happen to Plony than
the law requires (and if they realized that in giving their testimony
the result would be something more severe happening to Plony than
the Beit Din would have imposed, then they have no more basis
for giving their testimony than the testimony of a solitary witness
and most certainly it is forbidden for the two of them to make their
report \ gossip). Furthermore, these two witnesses must not fail to
comply with any of the other details (21) listed above in the 2nd
halacha.
RK9/6.
This entire leniency of allowing two people to convey

a report \ gossip in a case where Shimon, the person receiving that
gossip has the kind of a personality who takes matters into his own
hands, only helps to make them immune from the essential sin of
speaking Lashon Hara or Rechilut however they are not immune
from the esur of assisting someone in committing a sin (22) since
the esur, the conveying of their report \ gossip, was the impetus
for Shimons (illegal) reaction. The law is that it is forbidden (for
Shimon) to believe them and then to go and do something that
results in a loss to Plony as long as that report was not made in Beit
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Kelal Tet
Din by two witnesses who testified against Plony and the Beit Din
subsequently gave Shimon permission to act against Plony, as was
explained in the 6th Kelal, in the 9th and 10th halachot. Apart from
all of this, it is very difficult to illustrate this law in a practical sense
(meaning it is difficult to illustrate the leniency allowing two men
to legally convey gossip to Shimon who then causes a loss to Plony)
because it is completely improbable to find two speakers who are
familiar with all of the details of the law that relates to this topic
and who can then assess the consequences of their report and that
Shimons subsequent reaction against Plony will be consistent with
the Torahs law. Therefore, one must be careful not to convey any
information to someone who is quick to react \ retaliate without the
consent of the Beit Din in order that he not become trapped in the
net of those people who speak Lashon Hara. Those who guard
their mouths \ speech protect their souls from tragedy (Mishle
21:23).
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/7. This is also the law regarding informing someone (Shimon)

(23) that someone else (Plony) stole from him or harmed him in
some way or did some other bad to him; it (conveying the report)
is not permitted until the speaker complies with all of the conditions
listed above (in RK9/2) and that he also first rebuked Plony and
Plony ignored him. But if the speaker is not in compliance with all
of these conditions it is forbidden for him to convey that report to
Shimon, as I wrote above in the 1st Kelal, in the 3rd halacha. Please
see that reference. Another detail to be extremely careful about
is not to rationalize and immediately decide what the law should
be (in these kinds of cases and that one is allowed to convey his
report to Shimon). Rather, from the very outset he should consider
carefully whether or not he complies with all of these rules, because
if he does not first think this through he will very likely violate the
Torahs Lav against conveying gossip.
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Kelal Tet
RK9/8. Understand clearly that it make no difference (24) in any

of the laws in this Kelal that we have written if someone (Shimon)
pressures him (Reuven) to tell him (what Plony said) or if he
(Reuven) volunteers the information. If there was compliance with
all of the conditions in this Kelal (25) even if he was not asked, still
Reuven is obligated to tell Shimon. And if he is not in compliance
with all of these conditions, it is forbidden under any circumstances
for him to tell Shimon.
RK9/9. Understand clearly something else, one must be careful to

observe all of rules of this Kelal, even if he only wanted to convey
his gossip to someone else (an unrelated third party), since that
report is also Rechilut as we wrote in this section of the sefer in the
3rd Kelal in the 3rd halacha.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/10. Because in this regard it is so very easy to fall into

violating the esur of Rechilut, it is necessary to illustrate this esur
with several examples and to use them to elaborate on this subject
in order that people with understanding will generalize them (and
extend the lessons of these examples into their everyday lives). But
in order not to overburden the reader with an extensive discussion, I
will bring only one example here and with Gds help several more
examples at the end of this sefer.
If he (Reuven) sees someone (Shimon) anxious to go into a particular
store (Plonys store) to buy some merchandise and Reuven knows
Shimon is an honest straightforward person (meaning he is not
sharp enough to understand the tricks that salespeople play on their
customers) and Reuven also knows this store owners (Plonys) entire
desire is dedicated to grabbing this kind of innocent and tricking
him, whether it be with the type of merchandise or the amount and
weight, or the sale price, Reuven is obligated to tell Shimon about
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Kelal Tet
Plony and to warn Shimon not to step foot into Plonys store even if
Shimon already agreed to buy from Plony. Even more so is Reuven
obligated to warn Shimon if he sees Plony about to cheat Shimon,
either by virtue of the merchandise Plony wants to sell Shimon (that
Plony is misrepresenting the merchandise as being world renowned
and prestigious and Reuven knows it is a lie (26)) or to cheat Shimon
in the quantity or weight or worth of this merchandise. (Please
see the following Hagahah). Most certainly Reuven is obligated
to warn Shimon in order that he will not come to be cheated. But
one must be extremely careful not to neglect any of the conditions
written above in the 2nd halacha of this Kelal.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/11.
All this applies if Reuven wants to stop Shimon from

being cheated. But if Shimon already took the merchandise and
Reuven knows that he was fooled by Plony, either because the
value was not equal to the sale price or some other reason, then
disclosure to Shimon is conditional: If according to Torah law
Shimon has no claim against Plony because the overcharge was less
than one-sixth (of the market value) or because there was already
more than enough time to show the merchandise to a merchant or
to his relative to authenticate the sale price or some other reason
(29) by which Shimon has halachically lost his chance to get back
his money from Plony, then under any of these circumstances if
someone was to disclose the incident and show Shimon how Plony
cheated him, most certainly he would be in violation of the esur of
Rechilut since from the laws perspective at this moment there is
nothing Shimon could hold against Plony. Conveying that report
now is nothing but pointless rhetoric and Reuven is just like any
other gossipmonger that we have been discussing all along who
collects and transmits information from one person to another (30).
(Please see the following Hagahah.) Even if the person who was
cheated, Shimon, asks Reuven (under these circumstances) still,
Reuven should not tell Shimon (31) the truth and all the more so
if Reuven sees that in responding to Shimon it is likely that Plony
will suffer some loss. For example, that Shimon will grab from
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Kelal Tet
him or Shimon will not pay Plony the balance of the money due
him for his purchase. Most certainly Reuven would have violated
a profound sin for having created this situation. But if Reuven sees
that the Torahs law supports Shimon (either because Shimon could
retract his obligation to buy this bad merchandise or that Plony was
obligated to return the amount overcharged) and if Shimon would
have known the truth he would not have agreed to the sale, Reuven
is obliged to tell Shimon the truth (32) just as it is in order to force
Plony to pay back the overcharge but he must be careful and alert to
these following guidelines (listed in RK9/12).
RK9/12. (1). One may not exaggerate the problem or the deficiency
Mekor Hachayim
any more than it actually is.

(2). The primary motivation in conveying that report \ gossip
must be to strive to reach the truth and to assist the person who
was cheated and not to rejoice at the downfall of this cheater
(Plony) (33) even though Reuven clearly knows (with certainty)
that Plony cheated Shimon. This detail of law includes yet another
similar detail which is practically the same, namely, that Reuven
must assess that conveying his report will result in an outcome that
is beneficial to Shimon, meaning that his report must benefit the
cheated party. However, if Reuven knows Shimons personality
as being someone who is not likely to take his grievance to Beit
Din or to seek the help of other people who can help him in this
matter, but instead he will absorb the hurt caused by learning what
Plony did and he will develop a hatred towards Plony, then Reuven
should not tell him (Shimon) (34). More than this, if Shimon asks
Reuven to respond, in this context as well as in the prior context,
namely in a situation where it is forbidden for Shimon to renege on
his purchase, it is a mitzvah to praise the merchandise in front of
Shimon and the praise has no aspect of stay away from a lie (as
Chazal have taught in Gemara Ketubot (17a) regarding someone
who made a bad purchase in the marketplace one should praise
the purchase in his eyes).
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Kelal Tet
(3). If Reuven assesses that Plony will listen to his rebuke and give
back the amount of the overcharge, then Reuven should privately
rebuke Plony so that the excess charge will be returned to Shimon
and he may not tell Shimon what he did.
(4). If Reuven is able to accomplish this same beneficial outcome
using some other strategy (35) that does not involve denigrating
Plony, then he may not denigrate him.
Mekor Hachayim
(5). Shimon, the person to whom the report is being conveyed,

should not have the personality of a gossipmonger. If Reuven
recognizes this terrible character trait in Shimon and that most
likely Shimon will report what he said back to Plony, the seller, that
Reuven told him that his merchandise is bad or Reuven told him
that it is not worth what he paid for it, then the issue here requires
more thought and analysis as to whether or not it is permitted to tell
the truth to Shimon since Reuven would be leading Shimon into the
sin of Rechilut. But if Reuven assesses that if he warns Shimon and
asks him not to reveal his identity, Shimon will agree that he will
not tell Plony who told him that information, then that is what he
should do.
RK9/13. Everything that we have said applies only if Reuven

recognizes Shimons personality, that if he tells him he was cheated,
Shimon will not take matters into his own hands but instead he will
go and file charges in Beit Din and take Plony, the cheater, to Beit
Din and follow the courts decision. But if Reuven recognizes
Shimon as someone who will take matters into his own hand and
seize the value of the overcharge or that Shimon will return the
merchandise to Plony or will not pay the balance of the money he
owes Plony without the courts permission, then Reuven must be
careful in reporting this gossip to Shimon and must conform to three
rules in order not to violate the esur of Lashon Hara or Rechilut: (1)
That both speakers (conveying this report to Shimon) must have
been first-hand witnesses to the overcharged sale. If they only
heard about the overcharge in the selling price of the merchandise
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Kelal Tet
Mekor Hachayim
from others, it is forbidden for them to tell Shimon (36) (that he

was cheated). (2) There must be two speakers (37) (conveying this
report \ gossip to Shimon). (3) The consequences of their report to
Shimon may not cause any more damages to Plony that he would
have received if the case had gone to a Beit Din and the court found
Plony guilty (and penalized him to the extent that the law required).
But if these two speakers are familiar with Shimons personality
(38) and they know that he will punish Plony more than the law
would have required, and that later on he would not comply with
the verdict of the Beit Din in favor of Plony, then it is forbidden for
them to report to Shimon that Plony cheated him.
With the inclusion of the first five conditions, there are now a total of
eight conditions (that must be fulfilled before allowing gossip) and
it is very unlikely to comply with all of them. Even if all of these
conditions were satisfied, it would only help to absolve the speakers
of the esur of Lashon Hara and Rechilut but it would not give them
immunity from the sin of assisting someone else in committing a
sin because from the perspective of the law it is forbidden for the
listener to launch an action based on their report. Even if many
people reported the same gossip to him, still it is forbidden for
Shimon to react on that basis as long as their testimony was not
brought in court and the Beit Din allowed him to proceed against
Plony, as I explained above in the 6th Kelal, in the 9th and 10th
halachot. Therefore, one must be very careful in what he reports to
a (cheated) person whose personality is to take the law into his own
hands without the permission of the Beit Din. Also, please see what
I wrote above in the 6th halacha.
And now my brother, please, please see, that because of the many
sins of society, how very many people make this terrible mistake.
That when someone buys something in a store and took it and held
it for himself (i.e., he makes a Kinyan on the article by lifting it
up and in so doing acquires it) so that halachically it becomes his
and then shows it to his friend to see if what he bought is worth
the price he paid or not. It is not enough that this friend does not
praise his purchase but instead he degrades it (and incites a quarrel)
and tells him the seller cheated you badly, without paying much
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Kelal Tet
Mekor Hachayim
attention to what he is saying at that moment to find out what the

actual current market price is for that item. And very often the
market price can change on short notice and the buyer does not
pay attention to how much he was overcharged and if the Torahs
definition of overcharge was exceeded, or precisely when the
overcharge occurred. Perhaps the time limit expired (the allotted
time the buyer has to return the merchandise to the place where
he was overcharged) which is the time it takes to be able to show
the merchandise to another merchant or to his own relative, and
conveying that report \ gossip now to the buyer is pointless and
would only serve to provoke the buyer to hate the seller. The
speaker conveying this report is an absolute gossipmonger since he
transmits gossip from one person to another.
Quite often it happens that the speaker made his remarks out of a
sense of malice towards the seller and later it becomes apparent the
merchandise was bought at a fair price. Frequently the speakers
gossip results in a loss to this buyer as he pressures the buyer to return
the merchandise, telling this buyer- Take those goods back and tear
it into pieces in front of the seller and if you are embarrassed to do
it yourself, send them back with someone else and if the seller will
not take them back do not pay him or do not pay him the balance
you owe him for some other purchase. (Often this is illegal or is
literally stealing or extortion). And when this buyer attempts to
return these goods to the seller and the seller refuses to accept them
and he tells this buyer that he is trying to cause him a loss and he
is doing something the Torah considers to be illegal, they come to
argue and fight with each other.
See how much bad this gossipmonger caused. He violated the
Lav of Do not peddle gossip in society (if he is not careful to
observe the rules and conditions we wrote above) and the Lav
of Do not put a stumbling block in the path of a blind person,
since he advised the buyer to illegally return the merchandise or
caused the buyer some other loss and through him the buyer will
27 Figuratively tear it into pieces, but not literally.
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Kelal Tet
come to the point of dispute and controversy and will transgress

the Lav of each of you shall not aggrieve his fellow, and other
Laveen as well that evolve from controversy, Gd should protect
us from this tragedy. All this being so, how very careful must this
speaker be not to involve himself in these matters unless he first
thinks through everything we have said above and only then will he
receive Hashems guidance in preventing him from being the cause
of other peoples mistakes (sins).
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/14. If something inappropriate was done (39) to Reuven

but he did not know who was the cause of it and Reuven went and
asked Shimon - Who did this to me? Even though Shimon senses
that Reuven thinks he was the cause, still it is forbidden for him to
disclose the identity of the person who was the cause even though
he was a first-hand witness to the event. Shimon should limit his
response to - I did not do this thing to you (please see the following
Hagahah) (unless it was the kind of inappropriate action for which
Shimon would be obliged to volunteer information even if he was
not suspect at all and Reuven did not question him, for example,
where all the conditions are in effect that are listed \ explained above
at the beginning of this Kelal in the 7th halacha) as I explained in
the first part of this sefer in the 10th Kelal in the 17th notation, in
the context of Lashon Hara. Please review that reference carefully
since all of the opinions brought there in the Mekor Chayim and
in the Beer Mayim Chayim both from the perspective of law and
from the perspective of satisfying ones obligation to Heaven (to
Gd) also apply here.
RK9/15. Now we will explain a common mistake \ sin made by

many people. I will illustrate this with an example and from this
example people with understanding will be able to relate this to any
other similar event in their own lives.
Often a merchant will bring his goods to sell in a city and many
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Mekor Hachayim
Kelal Tet
buyers will come to him. Frequently it happens that someone

without the money to pay for his purchase at that moment will
choose some merchandise and ask the merchant not to sell the goods
until he goes away and returns with the money. In the interim other
buyers come and intensely pressure this merchant to sell them the
same goods that were set aside for the first buyer and the merchant
accedes to them. Later, when the first buyer returns and asks for
his merchandise that was set aside for him by this merchant, the
merchant tells him: Plony came, I did not want to give him those
goods but he threw the money at me and took the merchandise
against my will. I had to accede to him because I did not want to
start an argument with him. In this way this merchant violates the
absolute Lav of Do not peddle gossip in society. Even though the
second buyer committed a serious sin (41) because he pressured
this merchant to give him merchandise that was already set aside
for the first buyer, nevertheless, since the merchant did sell it to
this second buyer and received money for the purchase (42) most
certainly the sale is valid and binding and no benefit whatsoever can
come from revealing the identity of the person who pressured him.
The only thing that disclosure of the second buyers identity would
accomplish would be to create hatred by this buyer for this person
and that disclosure is absolute Rechilut, as I wrote above in the first
Kelal in the 3rd halacha. This law is comparable in all of its details
to the 14th halacha written above.
But more than this, we find happening so often that this second
buyer did not pressure the merchant very much and the merchant
did not tell him that he concluded a deal with someone else for that
same merchandise. He simply sold the goods because he wanted to
help himself, for whatever reasons that he had (43). And in order
that the first buyer not have any complaints against him and say that
he reneged on his word (the merchant creates a fiction \ a lie) and
passes the blame from himself onto someone else. Most certainly
this is an extremely profound sin since he is slandering him. All of
the Laveen and Aseen brought down in the Introduction are relevant
to this speaker (relevant to this merchant).
One must be extremely careful in these kinds of matters not to
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Kelal Tet
disclose the identity of this second buyer even if this merchant takes
the blame himself, saying: I am the one who made a mistake in this
matter since he (the second buyer) did not know anything about the
deal that you and I agreed to, because it is very possible that this
admission will still provoke a sense of hatred in the heart of this first
buyer for the second buyer. He will think that this second buyer is
stealing his livelihood. The most the merchant should say to the
second buyer is: I mistakenly sold it to someone else.
Mekor Hachayim
Understand clearly that everything we have written in this sefer on

the subject of how profoundly important it is to be careful not to
commit this sin of Lashon Hara, applies to those people who are
called your brother \ your fellow Jew. But regarding those people
who repudiate Hashems Torah, even one letter of the Torah, and
those people who ridicule Chazal, it is a mitzvah to publicize their
lying words for everyone to see and to openly disgrace them so that
society will not learn to emulate their evil ways.
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remarks is called the listener or the victim and the person conveying
those remarks to the listener is called the speaker, the gossip or the
reporter.
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Kelal Alef - Halachah 1

(RK1-1st chapter)
Kelal Alef
The esur of Rechilut, meaning, that gossip is

forbidden even if the information is absolutely true.
We will define gossip and how one should respond
if confronted by it. For example, if someone
asked: What did Plony say about me?- and other
Hagahah
Even though several of these laws of Rechilut could have been derived
from the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, still we did not rely on this (on
the reader thumbing through the laws of Lashon Hara until he found the
relevant law corresponding to the esur of Rechilut) and we have explained
these laws here for the reasons stated at the end of the Introduction.
Daily Halacha: 23 Kislev, 23 Nissan, 23 Av;
Leap Year- 29 Kislev, 9 Nissan, 19 Av
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/1. Someone who gossips about someone else (1) violates

a Lav of the Torah (Vayikrah 19:16) Do not peddle gossip in
society. Rechilut is a very great sin and is the cause of the death
of many Jews. Therefore the Torah enjoins us in that same pasuk:
Do not stand by passively when a fellow Jew is in mortal danger.

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Translators note: For purposes of this translation, in this context of Rechilut,

the person who initiated the remarks is called Plony, the subject of the
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Go and learn the consequences of gossip from Doeg the Edomite

whose gossip caused the annihilation of the entire population of
the priestly city of Nov. This Lav of the Torah (Vayikrah 19:16)
refers specifically to gossip. However, there are many other Laveen
and Aseen that address this subject of gossip, as I wrote in the
Introduction. (Please see that reference).
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK1/1/1)-(1) ..Someone who gossips about someone else: This

is the language used by the Rambam in Hilchot DeAut, the 7th perek,
1st halacha, and the SeMag in his commentary on the 9th Lav. Please see
what I wrote above in the Laws of Lashon Hara, the 1st Kelal, in the Beer
Mayim Chayim, the 3rd notation, and how I reconciled a potential question
you may have posed against the Rambam and the SeMag from Gemara
Ketubot (46a). (Please see that reference).
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/2. What is (the definition of) a gossip? Someone who

conveys information (2) from one person to another, saying- This
is what he said about you (3,) this is what he did to you, or this is
what I heard he did to you or wants to do to you. Even though the
information does not demean the victim at all, and that based on
what this gossip \ rachil said, and had they directly asked Plony (4)
exactly the same thing, Plony would not have denied \ contradicted
the information, either because (he believed that) what he did was
just and correct (5), or because the intent of his actions and words
was different that what had been perceived by the gossip (Plony);
nevertheless, he (the rachil) is still called a gossip.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK1/2/1)-(2).. conveys information: This is the language used by

the Sifra in perashat Kedoshim (commenting on Vayikrah 19:16) and in
the Rambams commentary there (2nd halacha).
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(RK1/2/2)-(3).. he said about you: This is the language used by the

Kesef Mishneh in his commentary on that cited Rambam (at the beginning
of the first halacha) as well as the SeMag in his commentary on the 9th
Lav, namely, what is the definition of a gossip (rachil \ peddler)- Anyone
who discloses to his fellow Jew information that was said about him in
confidence, etc. (Please see that reference). This is also the language of
the Chinuch in his commentary on mitzvah #236, as follows: (The Torahs
imperative means) to refrain from speaking gossip, as the pasuk teaches
Do not peddle gossip. That circumstance is one in which someone hears
someone say something bad about someone else (the victim), one may
not go over to the victim and say to him- This is what so-and-so said
about you. (Please see that reference). So too is the implied opinion of
Rabbeinu Yonah in Shaare Teshuvah (3rd shaar, section #222), that the
core of this Lav is addressing this specific example (of gossip).
And what I wrote above, that so-and-so did to you etc., or wants to do
to you etc., is in the context of so-and-so being correct or that nothing
beneficial could result by making the victim aware of what Plony said
about him which would then cause the victim to protect himself from any
possible harm. Please reference Gemara Babba Kamma (99b) regarding
the incident involving the butcher who slaughtered someones animal
and its kashrut was suspect. For if this was not the case, there are many
circumstances where it (Rechilut) is permitted, as I will explain at length
with Gds help further on in the 9th Kelal.
(RK1/2/3)-(4).. directly asked Plony (4): An example of this is Doeg

the Edomite telling Shaul HaMelech that the leading Kohein in the city of
Nov, AchiMelech, gave David HaMelech bread and Golyats sword. If
someone were to ask AchiMelech directly if he did this, he would not have
denied it and in fact he himself told this to Shaul HaMelech, not out of a
sense of contrition but just the opposite, out of a sense that he thought in
so doing he was serving Shaul HaMelech, that he said (Shemuel I 22:14)
Who else more than David is honored in the House of Shaul and that
David is Shaul HaMelechs son-in-law. Still, since Doeg the Edomite
knew very well the angry mindset of Shaul HaMelech, he is called a gossip.
Similarly, this is what the Kesef Mishne wrote.
(RK1/2/4)-(5)..(he believed that) what he did was just and

correct (5), or because: A proof to this concept can be found in
Gemara Sanhedrin (29a) What is the basis for learning that a judge may
not go.
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(RK1/2/5)-(6).. or because: A proof to this concept comes from Doegs

informing on AchiMelech, as I wrote above.
Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 30 Kislev, 10 Nissan, 20 Av
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/3. Understand clearly that Rechilut is forbidden even if the

speaker has no intent (7) to cause the listener (the victim) to hate
Plony, even if the speaker believes that Plony was correct in
what he said about the victim or what he did to him. For example,
Shimon is reprimanding Reuven because of something he said about
him or did to him and Reuven is defending himself by saying that he
did nothing wrong and the proof is that Yehudah also said the same
thing about Shimon. Even so, if Reuven evaluates the conversation
and decides that saying to Shimon that Yehudah sides with me
(sides with Reuven against Shimon) will provoke Shimon to dislike
Yehudah (and Reuven still goes ahead and makes that disclosure to
Shimon), by making that disclosure Reuven becomes a rachil, a
gossip.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK1/3/1)-(7)..even if the speaker had no intention: A proof

to this concept comes from Rabbeinu Yonahs Shaare Teshuvah (3rd
shaar, section #74), that we punish someone for speaking Lashon Hara
even if it was only through negligence with no intent to humiliate the
victim. Chazal have also taught this same concept in the Sifri (perashat
Behaalautcha, #99) and just as Miryam had no intent to. This is also
the Rambans opinion in his commentary on the Torah, perashat Tehtzeh
(Devarim 24:9), that the laws of esurei Lashon Hara are applicable even if
there is no intent to hurt the victim at all. It seems to me that this also
applies to Rechilut (and even without intent, the laws forbidding gossip
are applicable).
A clear proof to this concept can be found in Gemara Sanhedrin (30a)
What is the text of a written verdict? Rebbe Yochanan holds (a one-word
verdict): Zakai \ winner (and not more than that one word) in order not
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Yochai fled for his life and successfully hid in a cave for 13 years with his
son Rebbe Elazar. Rebbe Yehudah Ben Garims remarks were identified by
the gemara as Lashon Hara even though he did not directly communicate
anything to the Romans. Rebbe Yehudah, who seemingly praised Roman
society, was promoted by the government to the position of lead spokesman
(for Jewish society). Rebbe Yossi, who remained silent, was exiled to the
town of Tziporri.
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to violate the Torahs Lav of Do not peddle gossip. Resh Lakish holds
(the text of the verdict reads) so-and-so are the judges who decided this
litigant was the winner and so-and-so is the judge who dissented and said
this litigant is the loser, even though at the time the justices wrote their
verdict they had no intent to gossip about the judge who held the litigant
liable, still, this situation is not at all comparable to the case described in the
Mishnah which uses the expression but what else could I have done, as
the Pnei Moshe explains in his commentary on the Yerushalmi (3rd perek,
10th halacha, Mareh HaPanim, commentary beginning with the word
Said). Still, Rebbe Yochanan holds to his opinion, against the opinion of
Resh Lakish, that saying any more than Zakai becomes gossip.
Yet a further proof comes from Gemara Shabbat (33b) relating the incident
involving Yehudah Ben Garim who repeated what he saw and heard, etc.
(Please see Rashis commentary there). In that incident Yehudah Ben
Garim had no intention, Gd forbid, to shame Rebbe Shimon Bar Yochai,
since Yehudah Ben Garim was a great man, a prestigious person, as the
Tosafot explain in that reference. Please study carefully the Maharshas
commentary on that citation (Chidushei Agadot, citation beginning with
the words How many) that Rebbe Yehudah Elaei did not disagree with
Rebbe Shimon Bar Yochai. Similarly, Rebbe Yossi seems to concur with
him even though he was afraid to openly express that same sentiment.
Therefore if everyone who was part of that conversation concurred, most
certainly Yehudah Ben Garim did not disagree with that sentiment. For
although he was prestigious, nevertheless he was their student and still he
is considered a gossip in repeating what he heard (because of the harm it
caused his teachers) and from the fact of his subsequent punishment, since
Rebbe Shimon Bar Yochai turned him into pile of bones.
And do not try to contend against this concept by arguing that the incident
involving Yehudah Ben Garim was not relevant to Lashon Hara because
that contention is wrong since the Rambam also used this incident to learn

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The Gemara Shabbat (33b) is illustrating an example of Lashon Hara: Rebbe

Yehudah, Rebbe Yossi and Rebbe Shimon Bar Yochai were in discussion.
Rebbe Yehudah (seemingly) praised the civil engineering accomplishments
of the Romans. Rebbe Yossi remained silent but Rebbe Shimon Bar Yochai
criticized the Romans for the monsters that they were. Yehudah Ben Garim
was listening to this discussion and mentioned it to someone in his household.
Eventually word of Rebbe Shimon Bar Yochais comment got back to the
Roman government who then condemned him to death. Rebbe Shimon Bar
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the law as it applies to Lashon Hara, as he expressed it in the 5th halacha,
that if one person will hear from another personto hurt him or to instill
fear into him. The Kesef Mishneh comments on this, that this law is
derived from the incident involving Yehudah Ben Garim cited above: so
we see that this man is called a rachil \ a gossip, in all circumstances.
This (expression of the Kesef Mishneh) is a proof to everything I have
written in this halacha.
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/4. Everything we have said applies even if the remark is

absolutely true (8) without any trace of a lie. It is quite unnecessary
to say (further) that if Plony and the victim had been friends, by
spreading gossip the speaker is called a Rasha \ evil one. In making
his remarks, this speaker becomes an object of great disgust before
Hashem, as Mishle teaches (6:17-19) Six things are hated by
Hashem and the seventh (i.e., gossip) is disgusting to His Souland
the one who provokes argumentation between brothers. Regarding
this, Chazal have taught (Vayikrah Rabbah, perashat Mehtzorah
16:1) and this seventh character trait is the most disgusting of all.
But even besides this, if these two people hated each other very
much (9), if a person hears one of them saying something bad about
the other one and he then goes and repeats it to him, this person is
called a rachil \ a gossip.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK1/4/1)-(8) ..is true: Because society is so prone to make this

mistake, I am going to elaborate somewhat on this topic and draw sources
from the gemara and our Authorities:
(1) The Gemara Moed Kattan (16a) comments: Where is the source from
which we learn that if someone insultingly rejects a summons by the Beit
Din and the courts agent reports this back to the courts justices, that the
agents report is not called Lashon Hara? Please see the text version of
the Rosh and the Rans commentary (Nemukei Yosef on the Rif, 8a) on
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that citation, that the meaning of the gemara is- If the person summoned
insults the Beit Din in front of the agent, (the gemara brings proof that) the
agent is allowed to report this information back to the Beit Din based on
the pasuk in Bamidbar (16:12). That pasuk relates how Datan and Aviram
were summoned to appear before the court of Moshe Rabbeinu and they
insultingly responded by saying that even if the eyes of Moshe Rabbeinu
would be gouged out they would not appear in Moshe Rabbeinus Beit
Din. Its agent conveyed this report, which was Lashon Hara, back to the
court. Thus, even though the agent knew it was the truth, this agent would
himself have been called a gossip, were it not for the fact that he was
working in the agency of the court.
(2) The Gemara Sanhedrin (29a) states: Where is the source from which
we learn that if a judgeeven though it is the truth, he is called a rachil.
(3) The Gemara Babba Kamma (99b) teaches: Regarding the incident
involving the butcher who slaughtered someones animal and its Kashrut
was suspect. Rav held the meat was Treif yet he exonerated the butcher
(who slaughtered the animal) from paying the cost of the animal that he
rendered not Kosher. Rav Kahana and Rav Assi met up with the owner
of the animal and they told him that Rav did two things to him. The
gemara questions the behavior of these two Amoraim- But we learned
from a Beraitah: Where is the source from which we learn that if a judge,
implying that even though they knew they were right, that Ravs ruling
was halachically inappropriate, still they should not have told this to the
owner of the animal since the disclosure was Rechilut.
There are many other proofs that are too numerous to list here, that even
if the disclosure is true, the speaker is called a gossip. This is also evident
from the words of the Rambam (Hilchot DeAut 7:2) and the SeMag (9th
Lav) and the cited Chinuch (in this 1st Kelal, in the 3rd notation of the Beer
Mayim Chayim), that even if his report was true, the speaker is called a
gossip. This is also the implication of the words of Rabbeinu Yonah in
Shaare Teshuvah, section #222 [#225] and other references in that source,
that one who spreads gossip is included in the same category as one who
speaks Lashon Hara. Rabbeinu Yonah has already explained in section
#214 that this is so (that he is considered as one who speaks Lashon Hara)
even if the disclosure was true.
(RK1/4/2)-(9).. these two people hated each other very much:

The proof to this concept comes from the cited Gemara Moed Kattan, that
with certainty these men hated each other. Datan and Aviram with absolute
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stoning. No hatraah \ no warning is needed to caution this individual

against proselytizing. The sin of the Mehseet is so severe that he may be
entrapped into enticing a Jew to idol worship and then tried and executed
by the Beit Din.
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certainty already hated Moshe Rabbeinu, his memory is a legacy for peace,
since the pasuk relates (Shemot 4:19) since everyone who wants to kill
you has died, implying that they also (still) wanted to kill Moshe and
that they still continued to hate him, as the Torah relates to us in perashat
Korach. And Moshe Rabbeinu AH most certainly hated them, as Tehilim
teaches (139:21) and those that hate you, Hashem, I will hate, and these
men were positively in the category of those who hate Hashem since
they wanted to pull the entire Jewish people away from Hashems Torah.
They denied the holy prophecy (of Moshe Rabbeinu) and our redemption
from Egypt by Gds hand (they obscured these events as though they
never occurred and they completely lied about these events) and turned
them upside down, then they accused Moshe (Bamidbar 16:3) why are
you assuming the leadership of society? (literally, the congregation of
Hashem).
Also it seems obvious to me that there is a Lav specifically not to love these
kinds of people from the Torahs instruction to us involving a Mehseet
(someone who proactively strives to pull the Jewish people away from the
Torah and the teachings of our Chazal). The Torah instructs us specifically
not to love this person (this Mehseet) (Devarim 13:9) and Rashi explains
this based on the Sifri. Rambam similarly decided this law, that the
Torah commands us not to love this person. And do not say that this
commandment relates only to a Mehseet who pushes society to worship
other gods because that is not so! The reason for this commandment not
to love him is stated in the Torah (Devarim 13:11) since he wanted to
separate you from your attachment to Hashem, your Gd, etc. The Gemara
Sanhedrin (67a) teaches that a Mehseet who provokes a single individual
or a group (to break their attachment to Hashem) must be hated and how
much even more so if he provokes conflict and controversy directly with
the master of all prophets and convinces several hundred Jews to join with
him in contending against Moshe using various seductions and strategies
designed to convince them not to believe in the Torah given to us at
Mt. Sinai by Moshe Rabbeinu AH. How much even more so are we
commanded by the Torah not to love them!
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In the Yad HaChazakah, the 5th chapter of The Laws of Idol Worship (4th
halacha), the Rambam defines a Mehseet as anyone who entices even a
single Jew to worship an idol (a foreign god). After taking testimony from two
witnesses, the punishment imposed by the Beit Din on the Mehseet is death by

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Kelal Alef - Halachah 5-6
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/5. There is no distinction in the esur of Rechilut if the remarks

were made voluntarily by the speaker or if the listener himself had
some prior understanding of the subject matter (10) and pressured
and cajoled the speaker to tell him what so-and-so said about him or
about his doings. Even if (11) pressured by ones father or rabbi to
disclose what so-and-so said about them, and even if the response
would only intimate gossip (Avak Rechilut), nevertheless, in all
circumstances it is forbidden to disclose the information.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK1/5/1)-(10): if the listener himself had some prior

understanding of the subject matter: From the incident involving
Doeg the Edomite described in Tanach, that Shaul HaMelech greatly
pressured them, as the pasuk relates (Shemuel I, 22:8) all of you have
allied together against meand no one informed me when my son formed
a bond with the son of Yishay (i.e., David HaMelech). Even though these
men were in great fear of Shaul HaMelech, nevertheless Doeg is called a
gossip because of his disclosure. But even without this, it is obvious
that if a person came and pressured someone to eat pigs meat, do you
think it would be permitted to eat it because of that pressure? But if there
is a possibility that some benefit would be derived from the disclosure,
that some form of damages would be averted, then please see the rules to
follow as they are listed further on in the 9th Kelal, the 3rd halacha.
(RK1/5/2)-(11).. Even if : I have already discussed this, with Gds

help, in the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, the 1st Kelal, the 8th notation in
the Beer Mayim Chayim and brought several explicit proofs to support
this law as I stated it. (Please see that reference).
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/6. Even if one understands that by not disclosing this gossip

he will incur a substantial loss (12) in his affairs, for example,
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that he works for other people and his employers are aware that
something was said about them, and they pressure him to disclose
that information to them, and he refuses to disclose it, and by
not disclosing it he will become suspected by them as also being
involved in that incident and as a result of that suspicion he will be
removed from his position, and if that happens he will not be able
to support (13) his family. Nevertheless, the disclosure is forbidden
just as it is forbidden to violate any Lav of the Torah. He is obligated
to give up everything he owns and not violate a Lav of the Torah, as
this law is explained in Yoreh Dehah, section #157, paragraph #1,
in the Hagahah, as long as there is no likelihood of some beneficial
outcome such as the aversion of damages or the reconciliation of a
dispute. However one may not be quick to take advantage of this
leniency because many conditions must first be satisfied, as I will
explain them at length, with Gds help, further on in the 9th Kelal.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK1/6/1)-(12).. a substantial loss: Do not consider saying that

even regarding a literal informer, someone whose sin is most certainly
very much more severe than the sin of the person being discussed here,
the Shach decided the law in Choshen Mishpat chapter #388, paragraph
#22, that even if this informer reported on someone while under pressure
only in order not to incur a substantial monetary loss, still it is possible
for him to say that he holds like those Authorities who absolve him of any
obligation to repay that loss. This is not so! First, even in a circumstance
where the coercion was life-threatening, that all Authorities are unanimous
in holding that this unique circumstance is categorized as coercion and
this person is absolved from the repayment of the cost of any damages,
as is brought down in that citation in Choshen Mishpat, yet even so the
MeIrat Enayim writes there in paragraph #12 that this person is only
freed from paying any compensation arising from this life-threatening
circumstance but that he is still guilty of the sin of causing the damages
because he could have paid money to get himself out of a situation of lifethreatening coercion and not have had to pass on that burden (the loss that
he caused) to someone elses responsibility. Even according to the Taz
who comments on that citation (reference beginning with the words this
person is absolved from) that even as a first approach it is permitted to
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inform, but that is only in a situation of life-threatening coercion. But in
a situation of financially threatening coercion, all Authorities hold it is a
severe sin to inform and because of that, this person is called a Rasha \ an
evil person. Even according to those Authorities who absolve repayment
in a situation of financial-coercion, as the Vilna Gaon comments there in
sub-paragraph #28, by bringing a proof to this law from Gemara Ketubot
(18b), those people who are coerced by virtue of financial pressures and
are called evil, wicked people.
Now to return to our subject, namely in that situation they (these witnesses)
are characterized as evil \ wicked because they should not have signed
something that was a lie and in so doing violate the Lav of (Shemot 20:13)
Do not testify falsely just for the sake of money. The witnesses who sign
a document are effectively giving testimony before the judges of a court.
Therefore here too, in our discussion, the Lav of Do not peddle gossip
is not any worse than that (than the Lav violated by witnesses signing
falsely). And besides this, throughout all of law, the Gemara Pesachim
(118a) equates one who speaks Lashon Hara, etc., with one who testifies
falsely, etc. Furthermore, even if the transgression involves a rabbinically
enacted law, our Authorities determined the law is a person must give
up all of his possessions and not violate that rabbinical enactment (any
rabbinical Lav) (please reference the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, 1st
Kelal, 10th notation in the Beer Mayim Chayim). And how much even
more so when the transgression is as serious as this (gossip, i.e., a Lav of
the Torah).
(RK1/6/2)-(13).. not be able to support: This is obvious to anyone

who is familiar with the law, that this situation is not at all comparable to
circumstances that are life-threatening which would exempt a person from
these laws and allow him to violate a Lav of the Torah.
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/7. Especially if withholding the disclosure (i.e., not gossiping)

will not result in monetary damages but only in insults and curses
(that others will insult him because he did not gossip) then most
certainly it would be forbidden for him to gossip. He should not
let the insults bother him at all and he should know down to the
core of his soul that in not gossiping, in the coming future he will
be counted among those who are beloved by Hashem Yitbarach.
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His face will glow with the radiance of the sun, as Chazal teach in
Gemara Yomah (23a)- Those who are insulted but do not insult
back, who absorb insults without responding, the pasuk refers to
them specifically as (Shoftim 5:31) and His beloved ones will shine
like the sun in all of its strength, and all the more so regarding this
person who absorbs humiliation for the sake of fulfilling one of
Hashems mitzvot. Please see what I have written at length above
in the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, the 1st Kelal, 6th halacha.
RK1/8. On the topic of what to answer if someone were to askWhat did so-and-so say about me? The response is conditional:
If he has a practical way of answering (14) him and the response is
neither completely untruthful nor gossip, then one should respond in
that framework and not lie. However if he (the speaker) understands
that the person who asked the question will not be satisfied with
this type of answer, then it is permitted to respond with an answer
that is an absolute lie in order to maintain peace. But one may not
swear (15), Gd forbid, to a response which is a lie, even for the
sake of maintaining peace. (Please see the following Beer Mayim
Chayim).
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK1/8/1)-(14)..If he has a practical way of answering: The

source for this is Gemara Sanhedrin (30a) which asks- How was it
written? (Meaning, when the courts justices are split in their decision
and the verdict follows the majority opinion, what is the format used in
the written verdict?) Rebbe Yochanan holds- (only a one-word written
verdict) Zakai \ winner (and not more than that one word) because of
the Torahs admonition Do not peddle gossip. Resh Lakish holds (that
the written text of the verdict is) so-and-so are the judges who decided
he is innocent and so-and-so is the judge who dissented and decided he is
liable because otherwise the written verdict would have the appearance
of a lie. Rebbe Elazar holds (a compromise) that the written verdict should
say after deliberations, so-and-so is the winner and so-and-so is liable
since Rebbe Yochanan presented his arguments and Resh Lakish presented
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his arguments, therefore we write the verdict as both opinions hold. Our
Authorities codified the law per the opinion of Rebbe Elazar, so we see
that as a first approach the response should not have any appearance of a
lie.
Concerning what I wrote above, but if the speaker understands, in
this regard Rebbe Elazar would most certainly agree with the opinion of
Rebbe Yochanan, his rebbe. But (he chose a compromise) because he had
another way of (avoiding the problem and) protecting himself from lying
(that is why the halacha follows his opinion). But if not for this alternative
approach, most certainly the law would follow the opinion of Rebbe
Yochanan and it would not follow the opinion of Resh Lakish. Moreover
the gemara has already concluded in Masechet Yevamot (65b) that it is a
mitzvah to change the details of a story in order to promote peace. That is
also the deciding opinion of the Rif and the Rosh there and also in the 2nd
perek of Gemara Baba Metziah (the Rifs commentary, 13a). Also, it is
obvious to me that Resh Lakish holds this same opinion since this subject
is the opinion of the earlier Tanaim in Gemara Yevamot. Furthermore,
this is also the opinion of the Yeshiva of Hillel (and the law nearly always
follows this opinion) in Gemara Ketubot (17a), regarding the subject of
how to compliment a bride at her wedding (who hold the praise for a bride
should be unqualified). The Ritbah explains there that the leniency of the
Yeshivah of Hillel (Beit Hillel) is based on the concept of promoting peace
(between a newly married couple- hence the leniency to compliment the
bride irrespective of how she appears in order to endear her to her new
husband). But Resh Lakish held as he did (his format of the written verdict)
only in the case of the mishnah when a judge tells the losing litigant- I
am the one who was in favor of you but I was in a minority (and had no
choice but to vote against you) implying he still believed the loser was
right. In that circumstance the losing litigant will develop a deep hatred
of the other judges who voted against him and therefore it (the judges
remark) is prohibited. However in a written verdict, using the format that
initially there had been a dispute, but in the end they all agreed and the
law clearly defined the verdict and the losing litigant, in this circumstance
the loser would not develop a hatred for the judges. This is the rationale of
the Tosafot in their commentary (Sanhedrin 30a), that Resh Lakish holds
that his format is immune from the Lav of Do not peddle gossip. I have
found support to this understanding in the Pnei Moshes commentary on
the Yerushalmi (op. cit., 3rd perek, 10th halacha). But in our discussion all
Authorities are unanimous that it is permitted to change the story (i.e., to
lie) in order to promote peace.
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And do not challenge what I wrote above if you have a practical way of
answering him what was the proof of the cited Gemara Yevamot peace is
so great that even HaKadosh Baruch Hu changed the details of the incident
that happened. Meaning, that at first Sarah said (Beresheet 18:12) and
my master (my husband, Abraham Aveinu) is old. But when Hashem
questioned Abraham about Sarahs reaction, He changed her words to
and I (meaning, Sarah) am old. Why cant we say that the intent of the
pasuk was only to quote what she said (18:12) now that I am old (past
child-bearing age) will I regain a menstrual period? (Rashi) and not to rephrase and my master is old as and I am old. This approach is better as
we can now say that He did not lie since ultimately HaKadosh Baruch Hu
only mentioned one crime, that she committed- that she laughed about
herself (when she heard the news that she would give birth to a child) and
He did not tell Abraham about the second crime she committed- that
she marveled at how Abraham could father a child, that he was too old.
(Do not ask this question!) It is possible to answer that you are right, this
was the intent of the pasuk, and I have seen this idea expressed by the
Ramban in his commentary on Chumash. (Please see that reference). But
the gemara still calls this a change in the way Hashem Yitbarach reported
Sarahhs words in that only half of the conversation was reported by Him
and He did not report the part that she said and my master is old. This
is what our intent was when I wrote above and the response is neither
untruthful. Meaning, that often we can report back to the listener what
someone said about him but omit those things that he would not want to
hear, like this incident involving Abraham Aveinu.
(RK1/8/2)-(15)..one may not swear: Because most times he can push

off the questioner even if he is standing over this speaker and pressuring
him to swear. That is to say, that he does not swear even to the truth. And
even if the speaker is unable to push off this listener, that the listener will
not believe him unless he swears and the speaker believes that if he does
swear the listener will be satisfied and the listeners anger will subside.
Then if this speaker does not see a clear loss accruing to Plony, it seems to
me based on my grasp of this subject that this swear is absolutely forbidden.
Because necessarily the only leniency is to change the details of a story
to promote peace but this leniency never extended to include swearing to
something that is a lie, Gd forbid. Please see the responsa of RaMah,
section #33 (revised edition Zeev \ Splendor, section #100, notation
#10, paragraph #11) and even if the speaker does see that Plony will suffer
a certain financial loss unless he swears, then this specific case requires
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Kelal Alef - Halachah 9-10
much more study and analysis (in my humble opinion) to decide whether
or not this type of swear is categorized as a coerced swear (and as
such beyond power of the speaker to forestall). Please see Yoreh Dehah,
section #232 (paragraph #12) in the Hagahah.
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/9. Understand clearly that even if the speaker does not

reveal the identity of the person (Plony) who was talking about
this listener (16) and the speaker disclosed what had been said
about this listener just as a matter of fact (17) (without mentioning
Plonys name) and because of this disclosure the identity of Plony
became known. Or if the essence of what Plony said or did was
already known to the listener (the victim) but he did not know the
identity of Plony and now this speaker came and led him along
with a series of hints and suggestions (18) until the listener realized
Plonys identity; this too is forbidden.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK1/9/1)-(16)..(Plony) who was talking about this listener:

This same law applies to everything we have said above in the 3rd halacha
(of this Kelal).
(RK1/9/2)-(17)..just as a matter of fact : For the source of this law,

please reference above in the laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, the 3rd Kelal, in
the 3rd notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim, quoting the Yerushalmi.
(RK1/9/3)-(18)..along with a series of hints and suggestions:

Please see above in the first half of this sefer (in the laws of Lashon Hara)
the 1st Kelal, the 13th notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim, where you will
find the source of this halacha.
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/10. Similarly, it is forbidden to gossip using a trick (19)

127
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(to camouflage the speakers real intent), that the speaker knows
that once Plony did something inappropriate to this listener or
demeaned him and there was conflict between them and now this
speaker wants to re-ignite this old conflict between Plony and the
listener, but the speaker does not want the listener to be aware of
what he is actually doing. And so this speaker begins smooth-talking
the listener and seemingly, casually mentions the bad episode that
the listener experienced as though the remark was totally innocent
and that he was not even aware of it. And because the speaker made
those remarks, the listener recalls the episode and the bad that
Plony had done to him. These remarks and everything else like
them are absolutely forbidden.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK1/10/1)-(19) .. using a trick: This law originates with the

Rambam in Hilchot DeAut, the 7th perek, the 4th halacha, in his discussion
of someone speaking Lashon Hara surreptitiously etc, or that these are
the doings of so-and-so. Here I expressed that same idea in the context
of Rechilut. I have already written several times, that which the Rambam
expressed in the context of Lashon Hara also applies to Rechilut.
Mekor Hachayim
RK1/11. Furthermore understand, that there is no distinction in

the esur of Rechilut if the speaker conveys what Plony said or
did to the listener verbally or in written form (20). It is also one
and the same (it is Rechilut) if the speaker tells the listener that
Plony degraded him or that Plony degraded his merchandise
(as I explained above in the context of Lashon Hara in the 1st Kelal,
the 8th halacha, and the 5th Kelal, the 7th halacha) since in either
event it would result in the listener hating Plony.
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK1/11/1)-(20).. in written form: This law originates in Gemara

Sanhedrin (30a) in the discussion of the format of the text of a written
judicial verdict, that Rebbe Yochanan holds the correct format is a oneword written verdict, Zakai! \ winner!, in order not to violate the
Torahs Lav of Do not peddle gossip (and any statement more than that
would be forbidden according the Rebbe Yochanan even though it was in
a written format).
End of the 1st Kelal.
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Kelal Beit - Halachah 1-2

(RK2- 2nd chapter)
Kelal Beit
The law as it relates to the leniency of In the presence

of three people in a framework of Rechilut. Other
details will also be discussed. There are 4 halachot
in this Kelal.
Mekor Hachayim
RK2/1. It is forbidden to gossip even if only spoken in front of

one person and of course it is forbidden (1) if spoken in front of
many people.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK2/1/1)-(1)..of course it is forbidden: We do not say that since

this gossip was disclosed in the presence of many people the speaker
knows with certainty that his remarks will become known to Plony
and it is as though the speaker said directly to Plony- You said suchand-such about the victim - because this too would also be absolute
gossip, as I will explain further on in the 3rd Kelal, the 1st halacha. Also,
please see above in the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara in the Beer Mayim
Chayim the beginning of the 2nd Kelal, that this expression of the law has
the unanimous consent \ approval of all of our Authorities.
Mekor Hachayim
RK2/2. Even suggestions of Rechilut (Avak Rechilut, the dust

of Rechilut) are forbidden in all circumstances (I will define Avak
Rechilut further on in the 8th Kelal). Even if the comments Plony
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Kelal Beit - Halachah 2
told this speaker could be interpreted in two different ways, if the

speaker conveys Plonys remarks in a framework that becomes
apparent (2) as degradation, that Plony specifically intended
to demean the victim, then of course it would be forbidden to
convey those remarks in any circumstance. Even if the speaker
conveys Plonys remarks in the context that they lean towards the
other way of understanding them (meaning, that they lean towards
an interpretation that is not denigrating) and that there was no intent
to demean the listener, nevertheless if the speaker knows the mindset
of the listener (3) (the victim), that he is contentious (meaning,
that the victim is constantly forming harsh opinions of people,
never giving them the benefit of the doubt and whatever people
do or say about him, he says was done only to antagonize him,
as Rabbeinu Yonah writes in the 3rd shaar of Shaare Teshuvah in
section # 231), or if there was some slight enmity between them
and this victim needs only the flimsiest of excuses to libel Plony,
(regarding this kind of personality, this victim) it is forbidden (to
convey to him any form of gossip) in any and all circumstances.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK2/2/1)-(2)..becomes apparent: All this was explained above

in the first section of this sefer (in the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara), in
the cited Beer Mayim Chayim, in the second notation. Please see that
reference and the following Hagahah.
(RK2/2/2)-(3)..knows the mindset of this listener: This obviously

follows from what I wrote above (in the Laws of Rechilut) in the 1st Kelal,
the 3rd halacha, that even if the gossip himself is etceven so since the
remarks he conveyed caused the listener to hate Plony, etc. (Please see
that reference). That being so, the law here is the same as there. But
even besides this, the speaker is placing a stumbling block (meaning,
he is creating a basis for the listener to also commit a sin) in front of this
blind, angry, contentious person and is actually helping him to violate
the Torahs Lav of judging a fellow Jew favorably etc., as well as a number
of other sins. Please reference the first section of this sefer (in the Laws of
Esurei Lashon Hara), the 2nd Kelal in the 2nd notation of the Beer Mayim
Chayim where we explained there the law of in the presence of three
people in the context of a fellow Jew who is not contentious.
135
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Hagahah
If the speaker conveys Plonys remarks in a way that both interpretations
can be equally understood, that the way in which the remarks were
conveyed is neutral and does not specifically lean to either interpretation,
then this situation requires more study to determine if conveying those
remarks is permitted or forbidden. Because it is possible that the listener
(i.e., this person who is the subject of the gossip) will judge the remarks
as being degrading and he will think that Plonys intent was most certainly
to degrade him.
Ostensibly, there is a proof in Gemara Babba Kamma (99b) to support
the approach that these kinds of remarks can be repeated to the victim
(i.e., to the listener). The gemara there discusses an incident involving
a butcher who slaughtered an animal whose kashrut was questionable.
Rav held the meat was Treif and yet exonerated the butcher from paying
any fine and that the butcher did not have to compensate the animals
owner at all. Sometime later on Rav Kahanah and Rav Assi met up with
the owner of this animal and told him that Rav did two things to him
(presumably that Rav invalidated the slaughtered meat and deprived the
owner of compensation). The gemara asks, What two things? If you
had presumed the two things were losses to the owner etc., but we have
a Beraitah that says - What is the source that teaches that when a judge
leaves the court following a verdict he may not say to the loser I held
you were right but my colleagues held you were liable and (since they
were a majority) what could I have done? (Then if Rav Kahana and Rav
Assi could not report the losses, what two things did they convey to the
animals owner?). Therefore they must have conveyed remarks that were
superlatives, namely, that Rav judged a questionable case and decided
the meat could not be eaten in order that you would not eat questionably
unkosher meat. Then necessarily, neither Rav Kahana nor Rav Assi
elaborated on their remarks to the animals owner, because if so, what was
the gemaras initial question? Even so, neither of these two rabbis ever
suspected (they did not even entertain the thought that) the owner would
interpret their remarks negatively. However, one can deflect this entire
approach and argue that when the gemara asked What two things? it
meant- How did Rav Kahana and Rav Assi conclude their remarks? If
you were to say that...etc.
Alternatively, Amoraim in general and Rav in particular had very well
respected public reputations (please see Gemara Yevamot 37b) and the
animals owner would most certainly have judged the comment made to
137
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him about Rav as being a superlative and he would have had no complaints
at all against this decision. (In a parallel sense, Rabbeinu Y. Braunah
(section #38) answered a question in Gemara Shabbat (127b) regarding
how Rebbe Yehoshua could seemingly have brought himself to point of
being suspect). But for men of ordinary status, responding as these rabbis
did would be forbidden. It is possible that this situation is conditional on
whether or not the speaker would have been willing to make his comments
directly in the presence of Plony. (For example, Reuven says to Shimon
Levi said such-and-such about you. In this example, Levi is Plony,
the initiator of the remark). Please see above (in the 2nd Kelal of the Laws
of Esurei Lashon Hara) the discussion in the Beer Mayim Chayim where
we explained the opinion of the Tosafot (regarding the leniency of in the
presence of three people, and how and when it can be applied.)
If the month of Kislev has only 29 days, then the learning for the 30th day is incorportated into the 29th
day
Mekor Hachayim
RK2/3. There is an opinion that holds if an individual spoke (4)

disparagingly (5) about his fellow Jew in the presence of three
people, those remarks would be immune from the esur of Rechilut
if these three people in-turn conveyed those remarks to the victim,
and told him that Plony said such-and-such about you. (According
to this opinion) The reason for exempting the speaker from the esur
of Rechilut is because remarks presented in this way will inevitably
reach back to the victim, that one person tells another person who
in turn tells another until it reaches the victim and this type of
information transfer was never forbidden by the Torah. But this
speaker must be very careful to conform to the rules explained above
in the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, in the 2nd Kelal, beginning with
the 4th halacha onward. However, in a practical sense one may not
rely on this leniency because the Maharshal in his commentary on
the SeMag wrote that many of our Early Authorities (namely the
Rambam, the SeMag and the Tosafot) disagree with this opinion
and completely forbid it in all circumstances, even to say this to
139
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another person if his intention is to disclose to the victim(6) what

Plony said and of course one may not say it to the victim himself.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK2/3/1)-(4)..spoke: Please see above in the Laws of Esurei Lashon

Hara, the 2nd Kelal, in the 6th notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim where we
demonstrated that even though the Rashbam held this way (this leniency)
in his commentary on Gemara Babba Batra (39a) (citation beginning with
the words they were spoken), and many other Early Authorities as well
intimated this same lenient opinion. Nevertheless the Maharshal, one of
the greatest sages among our Later Authorities, held that it was forbidden
since the Rambam, the SeMag and the Tosafot all concurred that it was
forbidden. Therefore it is forbidden to apply this leniency (The point
made several times in the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara is that conveying
gossip in the presence of three people does not exempt the speaker from
the esur of Rechilut and should he gossip he would be liable for violating
the Torahs Lav of Rechilut). Especially since this esur originates in the
Torah, then necessarily it is forbidden to be lenient in this regard. Please
see what we wrote in that reference in the Hagahah of the Beer Mayim
Chayim.
(RK2/3/2)-(5)..disparagingly: This same rule applies to anything that

can lead to one person hating another, as I wrote above.
(RK2/3/3)-(6)..if his intention is to disclose to him: But if the

speaker had no specific intent to disclose this happening (what Plony
said about the victim or did to the victim), we have already explained
the applicable law above in the first section of this sefer, in the 2nd Kelal,
beginning with the 3rd halacha and onward. (Please see that reference).
Mekor Hachayim
RK2/4. Based on this, if one business partner wants to dissolve

his partnership because he thinks (he can do better with) other
men who will go into partnership with him, but in the end that did
not happen, (and in a similar sense, this same concept applies to a
marital-match that is in progress, that the man believes he can find
an even better match with a different woman and it does not happen),
141
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it is forbidden to tell this to the (original, other) partner (7) even

though the potential for breaking the partnership was known in the
presence of three people or more (meaning, that other people knew
he was planning to break up the partnership), as I wrote immediately
above in the 3rd halacha, because with absolute certainty it would
cause him to be upset with his other partner knowing that he wanted
to dissolve the partnership. This concept is expressed in Tanach, in
Sefer Shoftim (11:7) regarding Yiftach (at a time in history before
there was a Jewish king in Israel and the nation was searching for
a leader) who said to the delegation that came to him Why are
you first coming to me only now that you are in trouble? (meaning,
our enemies are beginning to overpower you and you are looking
to me to save you from them - and until now I was an outcast).
Perhaps this (knowledge that his partner had attempted to start a
new partnership with others and the dissolution of this partnership)
will become the cause of actually breaking this current partnership
or that he will cause his partner anguish because of what he wanted
to do. The Rambam addresses this (in Hilchot DeAut, in the 7th
perek, the 5th halacha)- That someone who conveys a remark that
could cause damages to a fellow Jew, either physical or monetary,
or cause anguish and pain to a fellow Jew or cause him to suffer
some kind of loss, that comment is Lashon Hara.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK2/4/1) (7)..it is forbidden to tell this to the (original, other)

partner: Similarly, a rabbi who travels from his city to another city that
made him a potential job offer, but the job offer did not work out. No
one among the residents of that other city may tell anyone in the rabbis
city what happened for the reason stated above in the Mekor Chayim.
Even though word of the job offer was already known to many people
and would eventually (with certainty) leak out to the people of the first
city, nevertheless it is forbidden because people in the rabbis city will
complain and criticize him, that he entertained taking another job and that
diminished their prestige and honor. Conveying this information, that the
rabbi considered another job possibility, is called Rechilut and is forbidden
in all circumstances as I wrote above.
End of the 2nd Kelal
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Kelal Gimal - Halachah 1

Kelal Gimal
(RK3-3rd chapter)
Rechilut is forbidden both when Plony (the person

who is the source of the gossip) is present to hear it
repeated and when he is not present. There are 4
Mekor Hachayim
RK3/1. It is forbidden to convey gossip even if it is the absolute

truth, and there is no aspect of a lie in the comment being conveyed,
and even if the conveyed comment is made without Plony being
present. Even if this speaker knows he would (not hesitate to) make
this comment (1) with Plony being present, this too would be
forbidden and the comment would be characterized as Rechilut.
And certainly if this speaker is arrogant and literally tells Plony
directly (2)- You talked about so-and-so (the victim) or You
did such-and-such to him, it is forbidden and his sin is very much
more serious. First, the comment would cause the victim to hate
Plony very much because the victim will accept the comment (that
Plony really did make a comment about him) as being absolutely
true. Most certainly he would reason that the comment had to be
true because if not he would not have had the audacity to repeat
it with Plony standing right there next to him. Second, besides
violating the esur of Rechilut, he is putting himself and these two
other people (Plony and the victim) in the position of violating
several other Laveen and Aseen that are explicit in the Torah. I
carefully explained all of this in detail in the Introduction, in the
14th Lav, in the Hagahah of the Mekor Chayim. Please see that
reference.
145
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK3/1/1)-(1)..knows he would (not hesitate to) make this

comment: Because why would it be any better (why should it be any
less sinful) if the speaker knows he would make the comment to the victim
with Plony being present since Rechilut is forbidden whether or not
Plony is present, as I will explain right now.
(RK3/1/2)-(2)..tells Plony directly: In order that you, the reader, not

misunderstand the statement of Rebbe Yossi (Gemara Shabbat 118b and
Gemara Arachin 15b) never once in my life did I ever say something that
I had to retract (any statement he made he would also have said in front
of the person who was the subject of his remarks and thus he did not have
to retract any remarks he made), I am obliged to elaborate somewhat in
order to demonstrate that among all of Early Authorities and in the entire
Talmud there is no uncertainty \ dispute in this law.
The Rambam expresses this law in the 7th perek of Hilchot DeAut in
the 5th halacha as follows: Lashon Hara is forbidden both if the victim
is present to hear it or if the victim is not present. The Rambam holds
this opinion even if the remarks are perfectly truthful, as he wrote at the
beginning of that section (2nd halacha). Most certainly this opinion of the
Rambam includes Rechilut, that gossip conveyed directly to the victim
is forbidden even if Plony is present to hear it (and even though he did
not write this explicitly here), since the Rambam prefaced this chapter by
defining both Lashon Hara and Rechilut and then grouped together the
two terms under a common umbrella and called it Lashon Hara because
they both are in fact Lashon Hara (as Rabbeinu Yonah writes in Shaare
Teshuvah, the 3rd shaar, section #222). All of the laws that the Rambam
wrote subsequently in this cited perek revolve around and deal with both
of these topics (both Lashon Hara and Rechilut) as I demonstrated to you
above with specific proof in (the first section of this sefer, in) the 2nd Kelal
of the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, in the 3rd notation of the Beer Mayim
Chayim.
In order to satisfy the eye of the reader, I will show you yet another clear
proof based on what the Rambam wrote at the end of the 3rd halacha in
this perek (that the law he expressed in this perek applies equally to both
Lashon Hara and Rechilut): Lashon Hara kills three people (the speaker,
the listener and the victim). This exact same statement is brought down in
the context of Rechilut in the Yerushalmi, the first perek in Pehah, the 1st
halacha (page 4b). There, the Yerushalmi (in listing examples of people
147
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who spoke Lashon Hara and Rechilut) pointed to Doeg the Edomite as the
model \ the example of a speaker and Shaul HaMelech as the model of
a listener. Thus from that illustration we learn that gossip is also called
Lashon Hara. (Please see the immediately following Hagahah after which
this 2nd notation in this Beer Mayim Chayim will continue).
Hagahah
The commentary of the Kesef Mishneh at the end of the second halacha
in this Rambam requires more study and analysis as it is inconsistent with
the Yerushalmi. The implication of the Kesef Mishneh there is that the
Rambams statement three people are killed by Lashon Hara applies
only to Lashon Hara (and not to Rechilut). However, one can reconcile the
Kesef Mishneh with the Yerushalmi by deflecting the implication of the
Kesef Mishneh and arguing that the Kesef Mishneh was only explaining
the Rambam in the context of his disagreement with the Raavad who held
the Yerushalmi (Three people are killed by Lashon Hara) was speaking
only in the context of Rechilut but that the Rambam holds the Yerushalmi
was also speaking in the context of Lashon Hara. For it is not likely that
Chazal would use the expression Lashon Hara and mean only Rechilut
(therefore the statement was expressed both in the sense of Lashon Hara
and gossip). Regarding our law as it is being stated here (RK3/1) the
commentary of the Kesef Mishneh is not relevant because even he would
agree that it also applies to Rechilut, just as I proved above in the first
half of this sefer from the words of the Kesef Mishneh himself, that the
Rambams expression of law (Hilchot DeAut, 7th perek) applies equally
to Lashon Hara and Rechilut.
Beer Mayim Chayim, (RK3/1/2) continued:

Moreover, I have already brought proof above (that the law applies equally
to Lashon Hara and Rechilut) in the first half of this sefer, the 2nd Kelal, in
the 2nd notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim, from the Tosafot that forbids
gossip in all circumstances, even in the presence of three people and
even in the presence of Plony. (Please see that reference). Why should
we suggest (needlessly) that the Rambam disagrees with the Tosafot.
Furthermore, it is obvious according to all Authorities that Rechilut is
forbidden even if Plony (the person who originated the remarks) is standing
there while his remarks were being repeated to the victim. It is well known
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that the leniency of allowing the remarks \ Rechilut to be repeated to the
victim evolves from the fact that the speakers would have made those
same remarks even if Plony was standing there together with the victim.
But that is based solely on the remarks being truthful. But we have proven
above in the 1st Kelal (in the 8th notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim) that
Rechilut is forbidden even if the remarks are true based on the gemara, the
Rambam, the SeMag, the Chinuch and Rabbeinu Yonah, that even if the
remarks are true the Torah forbids Rechilut in order to prevent a sense of
hatred from developing between man and his fellow Jew. So the fact that
Plony is standing there together with the victim is irrelevant (and in either
event the remarks are forbidden).
Another proof comes from Gemara Babba Kamma (99b) in the gemaras
questioning of the behavior of Rav Kahana and Rav Assi How could
they have done that? (Meaning, that they both encountered the animals
owner and told him- Rav did two things to you: He declared the animal
Treif and he exonerated the butcher from compensating the animals owner
for his loss and these two decisions of Rav are paradoxical). But we have
an explicit Beraitah that teaches- What is the source from which we learn
that when a judge comes out of court after rendering a decision, he may
not say (to the losing party)- I favored your side but my colleagues who
were in a majority voted against you, so what could I do? Regarding
this, the Torah teaches Do not peddle gossip in society! Why doesnt
the gemara defend them by saying that they knew they would have made
the same remark even if Rav was present to hear them say it and therefore
conveying the remark would be permissible even if he was not standing
there. (From here we see that this is no basis for permitting Rechilut). And
even if you wanted to deflect this answer by arguing since they were Ravs
students, it is unlikely they would make those remarks in his presence (but
truthfully that deflection is not a conclusive argument- because if not for
the esur of gossip they could have reported back to the animals owner and
told him, even in front of Rav, that they too were surprised by his rulingwhy did Rav exonerate the butcher since Rav himself held the butcher, in
slaughtering the animal, rendered it unkosher, as the Gemara Sanhedrin
(6b) teaches- What is the source that teaches that a student sitting in his
rebbes presence and sees a way to defend an indigent defendant may not
remain silentthe Torah teaches (Devarim 1:17) Do not be afraid of any
man) I will bring you two more proofs that they have no argument:
(1) That which I brought above in the 1st half of this sefer, a proof from
Gemara Sanhedrin (30a) What is the text of the written verdict? Rebbe
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and the name(s) of the dissenting judge(s) are not disclosed.
The commentary on the Rif in Masechet Moed Kattan referred to by many

as the Ran was actually written by the Nemukei Yosef.

Yochanan holds Zakai \ Winner for the reason of Do not peddle
gossip in society even though they signed the verdict in the presence of
the litigants - as is seen in the Yerushalmi commenting on this Mishnah.
Therefore this is a proof that even in front of them (repeating the remarks)
is forbidden because those remarks are Rechilut \ gossip.
(2) Another clear proof comes from Gemara Moed Kattan (16a)- Rava saidIf the person summoned by the Beit Din insults \ curses the courts agent
and the agent reported that back to the courts judges, the agents report
is immune from the esur of Lashon Hara. And based on what I explained
above (in the 1st Kelal, the 8th notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim), based
on the opinions of the Rosh, (and the Ran) [and the Nemukei Yosef] the
context was gossip, that the courts agent told Moshe Rabbeinu AH,
what Datan and Aviram said about him. And if you hold that the statement
of Rebbe Yossi who said never once in my life did I say something that
I had to retract also applies to Rechilut, then what proof has the gemara
brought? Why cant we say that the courts agent knew he was reporting
the truth and that he knew he would have made that report even in front of
Datan and Aviram. Rava himself holds the same opinion as Rebbe Yossi
there in Gemara Arachin (15b) and that it was permitted.
And do not say that nevertheless it would have been forbidden for Moshe
Rabbeinu AH to listen to the agents report and to write their words
(Datan and Avirams reply) in the Holy Torah and that when the gemara
said anything said in the presence of the victim (Arachin 15a) is exempt
from the laws of Lashon Hara applies only to the initial speaker, because
if that were so (that the leniency only extended to the initial speaker- the
courts agent, but not to the listener- Moshe Rabbeinu AH)- (Do not say
this!), how could Rebbe Yossi have said never once in my life did I say
something I had to retract since he would have caused the people listening
to him to commit a sin (as they spread his remarks to others). Moreover,
this was also expressed by the Rambam, as we have written above in the
first part of this sefer (in the 2nd Kelal of the laws of Lashon Hara in the
3rd notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim), that the Rambam understands
the statement of the Gemara Moed Kattan that the immunity from the esur
of Lashon Hara applies equally to the agent of the Beit Din (and to the
judges themselves). Therefore, with certainty, there is no difference (i.e.,
whether or not Plony is present to hear his remarks repeated in front of the
victim), and gossip is forbidden by the Torah in all circumstances, even
if the remarks are true and even if they are repeated in Plonys presence.
(Please see the following Hagahah after which this 2nd notation of the
Beer Mayim Chayim will continue).
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Hagahah
The Rehem in his Sefer Yereim (section #41, and in the unabridged Sefer
Yereim section #191) is of the opinion that the statement of Rebbe Yossi
(never once in my life did I say something I had to retract) was referring
only to Lashon Hara and not to Rechilut. Even though we explained in
the first part of this sefer at the beginning of the 3rd Kelal that Lashon
Hara is also prohibited even if the speaker knows he would have said it
directly to the victim, and that it was forbidden in all circumstances,
the Rehem was speaking in a context that from the perspective of the
Torah it is immune from the esur of Lashon Hara. For example, Rabbeinu
Yonah permitted this in Shaare Teshuvah, (3rd shaar) section #221
(since the speakers intention is to help the victim) as we explained his
meaning above in the first part of this sefer in the 3rd Kelal at the end of
the 1st notation in the Beer Mayim Chayim. However, what he said at the
conclusion of that section represents a significant problem to me. There
he writes that Rebbe Yossi derived his opinion from the gossip spoken
by Tzevah, that the pasuk says (Shemuel II 19:28) he then talked about
(slandered) your servant to my lord the king you are deriving your rule
from an incident where not only was Mephiboshet not present, but Tzevah
specifically did not want Mephiboshet to be there and to hear what he
said. So how can you use this incident to justify speaking Lashon Hara?
(Answer-) I can learn this rule from the unspoken opposite case. (The
Rehem is quoted up until this point). If Tzevah was telling the truth about
him, most certainly it would have been permitted even if he did not want
Mephiboshet to hear his comments, as I will explain further on with Gds
helping the 9th Kelal.
Regarding this we can say (granted the Lav of) Do not peddle gossip,
however, there is also another consideration; the pasuk also says Do
not remain passive when your fellow Jew is in mortal danger! It was
a great mitzvah to tell this to David HaMelech in order that he protect
himself from him (Mephiboshet) as they did do this later on several times
in comparable circumstances, as the pasuk says there (15:34) and you
will cancel Achitofels advice, and similarly elsewhere. But if Tzevah
was lying about him (Mephiboshet), most certainly in all circumstances it
would be forbidden and he would be called a gossip as we proved above in
the first part of this sefer in the 2nd Kelal of the Laws of Lashon Hara, in the
1st notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim, from the Gemara Ketubot (46a).
If so, how could Rebbe Yossi have learned from this incident involving
Tzevah and generalize it to apply it to all statements that are truthful,
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i.e., Shimon (the victim,) the person who was the subject of the gossip.
i.e., Levi (the speaker) who conveyed Reuvens gossip to Shimon.

since necessarily we are forced to say that statements similar to Tzevahs
remarks are forbidden in all circumstances? (That being so, please see
what Maran Chafetz Chayim wrote above in reconciling the discussion
in the 1st half of this sefer, in the 3rd Kelal, in the 1st notation of the Beer
Mayim Chayim.)
Beer Mayim Chayim, (RK3/1/2) continued:

What results from this entire discussion is that Rechilut is forbidden in all
circumstances even if the remark being conveyed is truthful and even if
Plony is present to hear it repeated, as we explained this, based on several
sources in Shas and the Rambam. The SeMag also quoted the Rambam
(and agreed with him). So too did the Tosafot also agree that Rechilut is
forbidden even if the remarks conveyed are true and even if those remarks
would have been repeated with Plony being present to hear them, as I
wrote above in the 1st half of the sefer in the cited 2nd Kelal (in the 2nd
notation cited above). The subject is obvious to anyone who studies their
words carefully that there is no difference whether the remark is repeated
without Plony being there and the speaker knows he would not hesitate
to repeat them even if Plony was standing there, or if Plony is literally
standing right there hearing what he is saying; either way Rechilut is
forbidden. This is also clearly seen in Rabbeinu Yonahs Shaare Teshuvah
in the 3rd shaar, section #228, that in all circumstances it is forbidden to
speak either Lashon Hara or Rechilut. Therefore, he was forced to place
Rebbe Yossis statement in the context that he did and based on this I wrote
this entire law as it appears in the 1st halacha of this Kelal.
Daily Halacha: 1 Tevet, 1 Eyar, 1 Elul;
Mekor Hachayim
RK3/2. If Reuven talked about Shimon in front of Levi and

Levi then went back to Shimon and told him what Reuven said, it
is forbidden for Shimon to go back to Reuven and say to him-Why
did you say those things about me to Levi? Because in doing that,
6
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i.e., Reuven (Plony,) the person who initiated the gossip.
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he (Shimon) also violates (3) the esur of Rechilut because of what

Levi said. Even if Shimon does not identify Levi as the source
of his information and that he quoted Levi anonymously- that I
heard you said such-and-such about me, if in saying this Reuven
will inevitably realize (4) who the source of the information was
(namely Levi) then Shimons comment would be forbidden. And
because of the many sins of society, many people make this mistake
and commit this sin.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK3/2/1)-(3)..he (Shimon) also violates: Because he is comparable

to a peddler that carries gossip from one person to another and Reuven
will hold Levi responsible for repeating what he said. And do not say that
since Levi violated the esur of Rechilut it is permitted to talk about him,
because if that was so, Reuven truly was the first one to violate the esur
of Lashon Hara by talking about Shimon to Levi and the esur of Lashon
Hara is more severe than the esur of Rechilut according to the opinion
of the Rambam (Hilchot DeAut, 7th perek, 2nd halacha). Even so, the
Torah forbids Levi to go and convey those remarks to Shimon. Here too
(in this discussion of Rechilut) the same rule would apply and the reason
is obvious; just because of a persons casual conversation, that does not
take him out of the category of Your fellow Jew, as this is the opinion
of the SeMag in his commentary (mitzvot Aseh 112-113) on the positive
commandment to respect ones father.
(RK3/2/2)-(4)..Reuven will inevitably realize: As we wrote above

in this sefer in the 9th halacha of the 1st Kelal, that it is strictly forbidden
even if the speaker does not reveal the identity of the person (i.e., Plony)
who made the remarks about him yet gives the victim enough information
to deduce by himself who the gossip is. And do not say that even though
his main intention was not to reveal Levis identity (but that his identity did
become known anyway from the context of his remarks) that it would then
be permitted. Do not say this! Because it is forbidden in all circumstances,
as we wrote in the first half of the sefer above (Esurei Lashon Hara) in the
1st Kelal, the 3rd halacha (please see that reference) since inevitably it will
lead to one Jew hating another Jew.
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Mekor Hachayim
RK3/3. Understand clearly that talking about someone else (the

victim) even if the comment was made without the victim being
present (5) to hear it, is still called gossip. For example, if someone
tells his friend - This is what I heard about Reuven who said
such-and-such about Shimon. These kinds of remarks as they are
passed from person to person until they reach back to the victim
would inevitably create contention between Reuven, the speaker,
and Shimon, the victim. (Please see the following Hagahah). And
of course it is forbidden for the speaker to repeat to the listener the
comment made by Plony about his children (7) or his relatives since
it is human nature to react defensively \ combatively because of the
criticism of his family, and the comment is gossip.
Hagahah
One must be very careful not to make these kinds of comments about
other people even if the speaker cautions the listener to keep the comments
between themselves and not convey them to anyone else and even if the
speaker knows the listener will keep the comment strictly confidential.
Most times (6) during the course of making his comments the speaker will
say something demeaning about Reuven or Shimon and these comments
remain in the category of Lashon Hara.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK3/3/1)-(5)..the comment was made without the victim being

present: The source for this law is the Rambam, Hilchot DeAut, the 7th
perek, the 5th halacha, where he writes a speaker who conveys comments
that lead to contention. This is also the opinion of the Yad HaKetana,
in Hilchot DeAut (9th perek, 1st halacha). There is also a proof to this
expression of the law from Gemara Shabbat (33b) regarding the incident
involving Rebbe Yehudah Ben Garim who repeated a conversation he
heard and word of that conversation eventually got back (to the Roman
government). Rashi comments on that gemara (citation beginning with
the words and he repeated) that he repeated the conversation to the
members of his household, which eventually got back to the government
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authorities and those comments are characterized as Lashon Hara since
ultimately Rebbe Shimon Bar Yochai turned him into a pile of bones. The
Kesef Mishneh alludes to this proof (in that reference at the end of the 4th
halacha). Another proof comes from the mishnah in Gemara Sanhedrin
(29a) Where is the source that teaches when a judge comes out of court
after rendering a decision he may not say - I found in favor of so-and-so
but my colleagues found against him. The implication of that unqualified
mishnah is that it is forbidden to say this even to someone else because that
remark might get back to the loser of the court case.
(RK3/3/2)-(6)..Most times: There are occasions when the speakers

comments will contain no hint of demeaning either party, because both
parties presented valid arguments demonstrating the law was on their
side
(RK3/3/3)-(7)..his children or his relatives: Even if he was warned

not to reveal the comments to his son, the comments are absolute gossip
since with certainty his immediate response will be to form a negative
impression about Plony because it is well-known that a father will hate
anyone who criticizes his son in any way (as is brought down [in Yalkut
Shimoni- Yeshayahu, paragraph #406] smash the mouth of anyone who
criticizes \ speaks badly about My children). This same rule applies when
telling a son what was said about his father or his mother and is derived
from the Sifri, perashat Reheh (commenting on the pasuk in Devarim
13:7) If your brother comes to entice you. Your fellow Jew who is like
your own soul- is a reference to your father, as Rashi comments on that
pasuk. This is also the understanding of the Gemara Sanhedrin (85b) A
son may not act (as an agent of the Beit Din) to hit his father or to curse
him except if his father is a Mehseet, since the Torah instructs us (13:9)
Do not have any compassion or any mercy on him. Meaning, that this
instruction applies to what is written in the immediately preceding pasuk
of (13:7) If someone tries to entice. And what I wrote concerning other
relatives is derived from logical reasoning. That since the listener is the
redeemer (the person most responsible for his own relatives well being)
and his relative, if someone tells him that Plony talked about his relative
he would become enraged.
And do not attempt to question this rule (that all relatives share the same
presumption as ones father) by citing the Gemara Sanhedrin (72b)
regarding the topic When the sun shines on him. (Meaning, that only
when it is clear the thief would kill the resident if he resisted the burglary
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10 Please see that reference in the gemara.
11 Devarim 13:7, -8, -9, -10: If your brother, the son of your mother* or
your son or your daughter or the wife of your bosom or your fellow Jew
who is like your soul secretly entices you saying Let us go worship other
gods that you did not know nor did your fathers know...from the gods of the
people that are around youyou shall not take pity on him nor have any
compassion for him...you will absolutely kill him, your hand will be the
first against him to kill him.
* (Translators note: I heard a derasha on the Torahs use of the expression
the son of your mother. The wording of the Torah is precise and is
alluding the The Mehseet, Yeshu, who claimed no father impregnated his
mother and that he was the son of his mother only).
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does the resident have the license to kill the thief). If ones father tunnels
into ones home intent on robbing the house it is forbidden for that son to
kill him, because ordinarily a father loves his son so much that even if the
son puts up a fight to resist the theft, still the father would not kill him.
But that is not so if the thief was some other relative, because there you are
dealing with another presumed factor. There the presumption is different
because a person does not remain passive (but would put up a fierce fight)
for the sake of his money (and any relative other than a father would try
to kill the resident who was attacking him in defense of his own money),10
because if that was not so, how could the Torah have permitted a case of
killing someone, the thief, on just conjecture that the thief might kill the
resident? However, the truth is that without doubt or question the Torah
considers it a certainty that the thief would kill because of that presumed
factor that the resident would put up a fight to resist the thief. (The Torah
instructs us that this is a case of certainty and not something doubtful
because) with absolute certainty this thief decided beforehand that if his
fellow Jew resisted and put up a fight, he would kill him. Understand
clearly that what I wrote above is true since human nature is such that a
son sincerely loves his father, as we proved above from the commentary
of the Sifri, perashat Reheh, yet even so, in cases of forced entry, the
Torah permits killing the thief even if he is the son of the resident and we
are forced to say the underlying reason is the presumption that he might
kill the resident first (even though the son normally loves his father, a son
burglarizing his fathers house might kill his father if he resists and so the
father has license to kill him first. But the reverse is not true).
And do not ask- Why did the Torah specifically use the language (Devarim
13:7) 11 Your fellow Jew who is like your soul, when the issue involved
a Mehseet, to include ones father? If the Torah instructs us not to be
compassionate or to have any mercy on a Mehseet even on ones own
son whom he naturally loves very much, even more than a father, as the
pasuk says or your son then by logical deduction a son may (may not

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Chazal have taught in Gemara Sanhedrin (72b) If someone comes to kill you,
kill him first. A thief breaking into a home has the presumption of coming to
kill the resident because if the resident resists the theft, the thief will kill the
resident or try to kill the resident and so the resident can kill him first. But that
is not the case if the thief is the residents father, because a father would never
kill his son even if the son put up a fight to resist the theft, and so the son has
no license to kill him.
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show any mercy) to (a Mehseet who is) his father. (Answer-) Because
the Torah wanted to conclude with your hand shall be the first against
him to kill him, that the mitzvah is for the enticed person to be the first
to punish the Mehseet and kill him. And if not for the Torah specifically
instructing us in this regard (to include a father who is a Mehseet), we
never would have known it based on our own reasoning, as the Gemara
teaches (Sanhedrin 85b) a son may not act as the courts agent to hit his
father or curse himexcept for a Mehseet as I wrote above. Everything
we have elaborated on regarding his other relatives applies even if he first
cautions them not to repeat the comment to anyone else, and even though
the comment conveyed by gossip did not demean anyone, because if that
was not so, none of this would have been necessary, as I wrote above.
Mekor Hachayim
RK3/4. If the speakers motivation in conveying those comments

to a fellow Jew is for that friend to rebuke Reuven for speaking
Lashon Hara about Shimon, regarding this circumstance please see
what I wrote above in the first part of this sefer, in the 10th Kelal,
the 6th halacha.
End of the 3rd Kelal
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Kelal Dalet - Halachah 1

Kelal
Dalet
(RK4 - 4th chapter)
The law applying to gossip in the framework of the

victim already knowing about the gossip even
without the speaker having repeated it to him, and
how to correct the sin of Rechilut. There are 3
Mekor Hachayim
RK4/1. Gossip is forbidden even if the speaker is repeating

something that is not new, that the victim already knew that Plony
said or did something that affected him but he (the victim) did
not think much of it at the time, that Plony wronged him, and this
speaker \ this gossip (1) reminds him again about what had happened.
(For example, Reuven lost a court case and Shimon meets him
and asks What was the outcome of your court case? Reuven
answers: The court found me liable for such-and-such. Shimon
then tells him: You know, the court did not judge you fairly!).
(This example and other comparable examples). Nevertheless it
is called gossip (2) since in prodding the conversation the speaker
is again reminding the victim to think about an entirely unpleasant
experience and provokes this victim to hate his court opponent who
won the case.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK4/1/1)-(1)..this gossip: Gemara Babba Kamma (99b) Rav did

two things to you! Which two? (Please see that reference). This law is
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brought down in Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat, section #19, in the
Shachs commentary, the 2nd notation quoting our teacher and revered sage
MaHaRa Stein. Please see the explanation of MaHaRa Stein commenting
on the SeMag (9th Lav) who derived this law from the cited Gemara
Babba Kamma.
(RK4/1/2)-(2).. Nevertheless it is called gossip: Even if his only

intention is to strive to reach the truth, that the person who should have
been the winner of the court case was found instead to be liable, this too
is forbidden (and proof comes from the cited Gemara Babba Kamma)
because it is very easy to make a mistake (in matters such as these) since
the speaker did not hear the arguments of the other side. And even if all
of the arguments of both sides of this court case are clearly known to him,
still it is forbidden to speak in the presence of the party who was found
liable because what good could come from that since the verdict was
finalized and irrevocable. Even if there was a legal error that would have
reversed the verdict, still, one should not tell the losing party. Rather, one
should first approach the Beit Din and speak with the judges (and discuss
his concerns about the legal issues of the case), perhaps they will rescind
their decision, as our Authorities explained in Shulchan Aruch Choshen
Mishpat, section #19, cited above.
Mekor Hachayim
RK4/2. If Reuven degraded Shimon in the presence of two people

and one of those two people then violated the esur of Rechilut
and conveyed Reuvens comments to Shimon, still the second
of these two men should be careful not to convey (3) those same
comments back to Shimon, and all the more so if he embellishes
those comments, it is forbidden and he is called a gossip. There is
no question that if he understands Shimon is still not quite sure that
those comments were really made by Reuven (for example, Shimon
asks him- Is it true what your friend told me, that Reuven degraded
me in front of both of you?), it is absolutely forbidden to convey
those comments to him. But even if Shimon seems to have believed
the first speaker, still this second speaker may not even disclose
those comments because repeating those comments will only cause
Shimon to hate Reuven even more since he was the second person
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to convey that gossip and he validated what Reuven said about him
more than would have been the case if only one person conveyed
the gossip. There is also the possibility that Shimon will come to
the point of fighting (with Reuven) because this second person reignited the gossip all over again.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK4/2/1)-(3)..the second of these two men should be careful

not to convey: I am going to quote here all of the opinions I had in order
to explain this subject clearly. Seemingly, the comment conveyed (by the
second speaker) should be permitted based on the gemaras relating (the
statement of Rabbah Bar Rav Hunah) that anything said in the presence
of three people is immune from the esur of Lashon Hara. The Rashbam
explains the underlying rationale in Gemara Babba Batra (39a), that any
comments that will inevitably become public knowledge are immune from
the esur of Lashon Hara and all the more so these comments, since they
were already conveyed to this victim. However, it is possible to refute
this argument by arguing that this case is different. There, in that case, at
the moment the first speaker made his comments, they were made in front
of three people standing there listening to him and most certainly word of
those comments would inevitably become public knowledge. Therefore,
the comment could be conveyed later on by one of those three people
because the speaker obviously wanted his comments to become public
(i.e. the speaker wanted his comments to reach the victim because why
else would he address his remarks to three people if not for his intent that
they should become public knowledge), as the Yad HaKetana writes in
his commentary. Or the comment may be conveyed for the reason we
wrote above in the first part of this sefer, in the 2nd Kelal, the 4th notation,
namely, that the characterization (the label) Rauchel \ gossipmonger
is not applied to someone who comments on something that would
have inevitably become public knowledge without his having made
those remarks. (Please see that reference). (Please also refer above in
the first part of this sefer, the 2nd Kelal, the 3rd halacha, that cites several
Authorities who view this law strictly and would not permit the remarks
to be conveyed even if their public knowledge was inevitable). But that
is not the case here. Here, when Plony made his comments, it was not
inevitable that they would become public knowledge since the comments
were only made to two people (and not to three people, which is the
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halachically minimum criterion for public dissemination). The Gemara
Babba Batra (39b) concludes that all Authorities unanimously hold of the
statement of Rabbah Bar Rav Hunah and therefore the law of Rechilut
does apply to those comments. (Yet here in our case, do you think that)
since one of these two people violated the Torahs law of Rechilut, Do
not peddle gossip, and conveyed Plonys comments to the victim, the
second speaker now has the license to spread this same gossip? However
(it is possible to argue just the opposite, and say that) it is not clear that the
comments conveyed by the second speaker are forbidden. It is possible to
say that since the comments were already made known to the victim and
this second speaker is not adding anything new in conveying those same
comments, then passing along those same comments to the victim is not
forbidden.
And do not bring proof that the comments of the second speaker are forbidden
from the Yerushalmi, the 1st perek in Pehah (4b), that it is permitted to
speak Lashon Hara against someone who provokes contention, as the
Torah relates (Melachim I, 1:14) I will follow after you and complete
your words.12 From the fact that the Yerushalmi did not relate (to us) the
initial advice that (the prophet) Natan gave (to Bat Sheva) to go (to David
HaMelech and) tell him what Adoniyahu was doing as a proof that Lashon
Hara is permitted against someone who provokes controversy, we see that
it is not proof that he could have conveyed Adoniyahus doings himself.
And if that is so, what is the proof from the pasuk and I will follow after
you. Say instead that because of that (because Adoniyahus doing would
inevitably have become known to his father David HaMelech) it would
have been permitted later on for Natan to convey word of Adoniyahus
conspiracy against David because Bat Sheva actually was the first to
convey word of that conspiracy to David. This argument can be refuted by
arguing that Natan elaborated more on the conspiracy and that he also told
David about the involvement of Evyatar (the High Priest), something Bat
Sheva did not discuss at all. From all of this the Yerushalmi proves it is
permitted to speak Lashon Hara against anyone who provokes controversy
and contention.
Apparently this law is comparable to the law discussed in Gemara Babba
12 The prophet Natan said this to Bat Sheva, in planning their meeting with
David HaMelech to inform him of his son Adoniyahus attempt to usurp his
monarchy and eliminate Shelomo.
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13 The Gemara Babba Kamma (10a) poses a question as part of an ongoing

discussion: Someone who placed bundles of dried twigs in the path of
an oncoming fire in order to add to the fire already heading towards his
neighbors stack of grain and causes the grain to ignite and burn and
destroys the grain. If we say that without his intervention the fire would not
have traveled and destroyed the neighbors stack of grain, it is obvious that
he is entirely liable and not the fires owner (i.e., the person who started
the fire). [Rashi: That had he not added the bundles of dried wood to the
fire, the fire would have died out by itself]. So this cannot be the case.
Instead say the case is that even without his intervention the fire would
have traveled and destroyed the neighboring stack of grain. If so, then
what damage did he actually cause? In this issue, the gemaras analysis
in Babba Kamma is comparable to our discussion relative to the second
gossip conveying the same information to the victim as the first gossip.
What damage did he actually cause?
14 Someone dug a pit in a public thoroughfare nine Tefachim deep and another
person came along and deepened the pit one additional Tefach to a total
depth of ten Tefachim. Rebbe says the second man is fully responsible if
an animal falls into the pit and dies and both men are jointly responsible
if it did not die but suffered injury. The Tanna Kamma holds the second
person fully responsible for both injuries sustained by the animal or for its
death since a pit nine tefachim deep would not be deep enough to cause an
animal to die.
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Kamma (10a) 13 regarding someone who placed dried wood in the path of
an oncoming fire (in order to divert it to burn the stack of grain belonging
to a neighbor in an adjoining field). (Please see that reference and the
Tosafot (10b) there in the citation beginning with the words- What more
did he do? quoted as follows: Throughout that entire gemara, every time
it says what more did he do, the underlying discussion revolves around
the issue of what more did this second person do than the first person,
in order to make each one of them liable for the share of the damage
they each caused? This is similar to the gemaras discussion (in Gemara
Babba Kamma 51a) of someone who dug a pit in a public area 14 that was
ten Tefachim deep (about 40 inches deep and a second person came and
increased its depth to twenty Tefachim and) a (third) person came along
and increased it depth to thirty Tefachim. All of these men are liable even
though without these other men the animal that fell into the pit would have
died (after falling into the pit that was only ten Tefachim deep). However
here in this case (of the burning grain) one must be analytically precise
and argue - Just because he tossed one branch into an already raging fire,
etcbut to someone who dug a pit ten Tefachim deep and someone else
came along and increased its depth to eleven Tefachim. (Tosafot quoted
up until this point). Please review carefully the Roshs commentary on the
gemara (Babba Kamma- in the 1st perek, 9th section) where he explains
What more did he do? and he completely exonerates this second person.
The Nemukei Yosef also holds this same opinion (in his commentary
on the Rif in that same gemara, 4b in the Rif, citation beginning with
the words He). Please see the Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat
section #396, paragraph #7 where Maran cites the differing opinions of
two different Authorities on this subject. Further, please see there the
commentary of the Vilna Gaon on the Shulchan Aruch (15th notation) that
the Tosafot, the Rambam and the Rashbah all agree that both men are
liable (for destroying the grain). And the Tosafots question However, if
we are precise is answered by the Rashbah, that the case where the second
person is also responsible, is only when the fire would have traveled even
if only his wood would have been there, just as this person did who dug
the pit deeper from ten to twenty Tefachim. Therefore the second person
is just as liable as the first person since his bundle of dried wood would
have been enough to destroy the grain. But if not for that, the case would
have been comparable to someone extending the depth of a pit from ten
Tefachim to eleven Tefachim. Yet there, the Rosh and the Nemukei Yosef
hold that the second person is completely exonerated. And that is similar
to our discussion; that according to the opinion of the Tosafot, the Rambam
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and the Rashbah, since the second speaker alone in conveying gossip to
Shimon would have been the cause for Shimon to hate Reuven, just as the
first person (the first gossip) alone, the law of Rechilut applies equally to
this second person.
However it is possible to refute this conclusion by arguing the two cases
are not similar. There, we are talking about a case where at the moment
the second person set down his bundle of dry wood in the path of the fire,
the stack of grain had not yet burned because of the actions of the first
person (the initial arsonist), and we are just assuming that the grain stack
would have burned because of him. But when the stack finally did burn,
both bundles of wood caused it to burn, and therefore the second arsonist
is just as culpable as the first arsonist because we can argue why hold the
first arsonist completely responsible for the burning of the grain stack to
the exclusion of the second arsonist since the second arsonist just as easily
could have burned down the grain stack. Therefore the second arsonist
is as much responsible as the first arsonist. But here in our case when
the second speaker conveyed the gossip to Shimon, Shimon already knew
about Reuvens degrading comments from the first speaker and that first
speaker alone was responsible for provoking Shimon to hate Reuven. The
second speaker in conveying the same gossip as the first speaker did not
cause Shimon to increase his hatred of Reuven any more than what had
already existed. Ostensibly this would be comparable to the first arsonist
burning down the grain stack completely before the second arsonist even
set down his bundle in the path of the fire. Therefore according to all
opinions, the second person did not do an esur \ did not violate the Lav of
Rechilut.
However, when one carefully examines that case (the grain stack) he will
realize it is not at all comparable to our case and all Authorities are in
agreement that the second speaker is doing an esur (and is violating the
Torahs Lav of gossip). There, in that grain stack case, the gemaras
framework is something that has already happened in the past, that the
second person had already set down his bundle of wood, and we see that
the grain stack did not burn any more completely as a result of what the
second arsonist did than it would have burned as a result of the fire set by
the first arsonist alone. But most certainly it would have been forbidden
for the second arsonist to set down his bundle since he might cause more
damage than the damage caused by the first arsonist. There the second
arsonist is obviously culpable as Maran brings down in Shulchan Aruch
Choshen Mishpat section #418, paragraph #10. (Please see that reference).
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However in our case we are discussing the issue of whether or not the
second speaker can (also) convey gossip, (namely Reuvens remarks, to
Shimon). Most certainly he may not do so! (He may not do so because)
We have to suspect that Shimon will hate Reuven even more because of
the second speakers gossip. (Because) As a rule, when two people convey
the same gossip, the victim will take it more to heart (will be more affected
by it). (Please see the following Hagahah). It is also very common that
when the first person gossips the gossip will not lead to anything, but when
the second speaker conveys that same gossip it will lead to an outcome (it
will accomplish) and they will come to fight. Rechilut which results in
fighting is much more serious than casual gossip, as the gemara relates in
Masechet Arachin (16a). (Please see the Rashi there, the citation beginning
with the words It accomplished). And based on everything said here I
have written the law that appears here.
Hagahah
Do not say that perhaps I brought down the subject of putting down his
bundle of dry wood in the context of our subject as a pedantic exercise.
Please refer carefully to Choshen Mishpat section #388, paragraph #7 in
the Hagahah there (the citation beginning with the word Two...) that
if this person immediately followed the first person, the second person
is exonerated; as long as the first person is culpable (the second person
is exonerated) since the damage occurred only because of the actions of
that first person. In that reference please see the commentary of the Vilna
Gaon (sub-paragraph #44) and his source is from this gemara.
Mekor Hachayim
RK4/3. If the speaker violated the Lav and gossiped about his
fellow Jew and now wants to atone for that sin, there is no remedy
(4) other than to ask forgiveness from the victim, to appease him
and to atone before Gd for violating this Lav of Do not peddle
gossip in society. All of these remedial details are identical to
those necessary to atone for speaking Lashon Hara and are located
in the first part of this sefer in the 4th Kelal, the 12th halacha. Please
see that reference and the related Beer Mayim Chayim.
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK4/3/1)-(4)..there is no remedy: This is how the Rokeach expresses

the Lav in section #28: The (sin of the) gossipmonger is incurable unless
he asks forgiveness from the victim and appeases everyone that he gossiped
about. More of these details are brought down above in the first part of this
sefer (the Laws of Lashon Hara) in the 4th Kelal, the 12th halacha (in the
discussion of esurei Lashon Hara).
However, regarding the subject that I discussed in that citation, where I
wrote this subject requires more thought and analysis (the 48th notation),
it seems to me that here in this discussion of Rechilut the law is that the
moment he gossips to Shimon about Reuven, that he tells Shimon what
Reuven said about him or did to him and he realizes that Shimon believes
him even though Shimon has not yet begun to argue with Reuven because
of that gossip, still this speaker must apologize \ appease Reuven because
if not, the incident could escalate and cause Reuven damages or a fight \
argument. This approach fits very well with the Rokeachs opinion, that
he expressed the law broadly without any qualifications. Or, the speaker
should use some (wise) technique to talk Shimon out of hating Reuven.
End of the 4th Kelal
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Kelal Heh - Halachah 1

(RK5 - 5th chapter)
Kelal Heh
Details of the sin of believing gossip or of listening

to it, and if someone did transgress this Lav, the
method by which this sin can be remedied. There
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/1. Just as the Torah forbids believing Lashon Hara, so too

does the Torah forbid believing gossip (1), that gossip \ Rechilut
is also included in the category of Lashon Hara. Meaning, one
should not take to heart that the gossip told to him was true, that
Plony did such and such to him or said such and such about him.
The listener (this victim) who does believe it violates the Torahs
Lav of (Shemot 23:1) Do not accept a false report in addition to
violating all of the other Laveen and Aseen that are associated with it,
as I explained them in the Introduction. (Please see that reference).
Chazal have taught us (Rambam, Hilchot DeAut, 7th perek, end of
the 3rd halacha) Lashon Hara kills three people; the speaker, the
listener who believes what the speaker said and the victim. (As
we know this from Doeg the Edomite. Doeg (the speaker) was
barred from Olam Haba because the gossip he conveyed to Shaul
HaMelech, Nov- the city of Kohanim (the victim of Rechilut) was annihilated, and Shaul HaMelech (the listener) was killed later
on because he believed the gossip that Doeg told him). The one
who accepts the gossip is punished even more than the speaker.
Chazal have taught (Gemara Pesachim 118a) it is appropriate to
throw to the dogs anyone who speaks Lashon Hara and anyone who
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believes Lashon Hara from the juxtaposition of two pesukim. The

pasuk teaches (Shemot 23:1) Do not accept a false report and
the pasuk that immediately precedes it teaches Throw it (him) to
the dogs.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK5/1/1)-(1).. so too does the Torah forbid believing gossip:

The Rambam relates this concept in Hilchot Sanhedrin, the 21st perek,
the 7th halacha, that the Torahs Lav of Do not accept a false report also
includes the person who believes the Lashon Hara he hears and most
certainly the Rambams statement includes the person who believes the
gossip he hears since the expression Lashon Hara includes both.
This concept (that Rechilut is included in the definition of Lashon Hara)
is specifically apparent in the Rambams Hilchot DeAut, the 7th perek,
the 3rd halacha where he writes: Chazal have also taught that Lashon
Hara kills three people- the speaker, the listener who believes him and
the victim. Most certainly this teaching of Chazal is referring to Rechilut,
as I wrote above in the 3rd Kelal, in the 2nd notation of the Beer Mayim
Chayim, quoting a specific Yerushalmi. The fact that the Rambam called
it Lashon Hara was meant to also include Lashon Hara in the statement of
Chazal and the same thing also applies here. And that which the Gemara
Pesachim teaches (118a), that the Torahs Lav applies to the listener (if
the listener believes him), the gemara there says that the speaker of
Lashon Hara as well as the listener etc.., is also for the same reason
(that they are both included in the Torahs Lav of Do not accept a false
report). Similarly, in Gemara Shabbat (56a) the gemara says that David
HaMelech believed the Lashon Hara that he heard and there the subject
being discussed was gossip, as it is seen clearly from the pesukim that the
gemara cites. Therefore, necessarily, the expression Lashon Hara includes
both of them, both Lashon Hara and Rechilut. This concept is explicit in
Rabbeinu Yonahs Shaare Teshuvah in the 3rd shaar, section #225, quoted
as follows: The Torah warns us against believing Lashon Hara, as the Torah
instructs us (Shemot 23:1) Do not accept a false report and our sage,
Rabbeinu Yonah is addressing the subject of Rechilut from the beginning
of section #222 through section #225. Obviously the expression Lashon
Hara includes Rechilut. This Lav is inclusive of (Rechilut and) Lashon
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Hara as Rabbeinu Yonah indicates (explicitly) at the end of section #213.
(Please see that reference).
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/2. Listening to gossip is a severe sin (2) just as it is a sin

to listen to Lashon Hara, as I wrote above in the first part of this
sefer in the 6th Kelal, the 2nd-6th halachot, even if at the moment the
gossip was conveyed the victim still has not decided whether or
not to believe it. Still, believing gossip is a more severe sin than just
listening to it. Regarding the victim listening to gossip, and the
victim understands from the outset of the remarks that if the gossip
is true it will pertain to him at some future time, for example, the
listener realizes the speaker wants to tell him that Plony wants to
hurt him, either physically or financially (or something comparable),
then most certainly (3) it is permissible to listen to that gossip (and
not believe the gossip as truth, but) in order to learn what steps
he needs to take to protect himself from Plony. But to decide \ to
believe that gossip he hears is the truth is strictly forbidden by the
Torah in all circumstances; however to suspect that perhaps it might
be true is permissible in order to protect oneself. Chazal have taught
this concept (in Gemara Niddah 61a) even though Lashon Hara is
forbidden to be believed as truth, nevertheless one should suspect
its possible veracity (and take the necessary precautions to protect
oneself). Please see above in the section of this sefer discussing the
esur of Lashon Hara, the 6th Kelal, the 3rd halacha, to learn how to
react to someone who wants to convey gossip, in order to satisfy
our obligation to Gd. That law applies here as well.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK5/2/1)-(2).. Listening to gossip is a severe sin: With Gds

help I explained this concept at length in the first part of this sefer in the
6th Kelal, in the Beer Mayim Chayim, the 2nd and 3rd notations. Please
see that reference.
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namely that his master Mephiboshet was unhappy that David HaMelech
emerged from the civil war with Avshalom as undisputed king of Israel.
The Chafetz Chayim ZL differentiates between Lashon Hara supported by
For purposes of this translation and strong weak
has been rendered as circumstantial evidence, although
these facts do not constitute evidence, but rather they are simply
varying degrees of indication that the reported Lashon Hara is true.
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(RK5/2/2)-(3).. most certainly: This subject was also discussed in

that same reference.
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/3. If the victim sees circumstantial evidence15 (that supports

the gossip conveyed to him), that a fellow Jew \ Plony wants to
harm him physically or financially, even though he has not heard
this from anyone else, still it is permissible for him to investigate
and to inquire from other people whether or not Plony intends to
harm him in order to decide (4) how to protect himself (5) from him.
This victim should not worry that people will demean or degrade
Plony because of his investigation
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK5/3/1)-(4).. in order to decide: A proof to this concept comes

from Gemara Shabbat (56a), that if he saw circumstantial evidence
supporting the gossip then it is permissible to believe that Plony intends
to something bad, without violating the Lav of believing gossip. It is an
obvious logical deduction that one can investigate someone else in order
to determine the best way to defend oneself against him. It is possible
that even if he did not see any circumstantial evidence, just that he heard
from someone that Plony wants to harm him physically or financially, it
is permissible to investigate and inquire of people about Plony in order to
know how to best defend against him. Even though hearing gossip from
one person is sufficient reason to form a suspicion, still, hearing that same
15 are literally recognizeable facts. In this context are
weak circumstantial facts or indications that tend to corroborate the Lashon
Hara told to a listener. The by themselves are not substantial
enough to prompt the listener to form a conclusion, but when coupled with the
Lashon Hara they give the speakers report credence and will more decisively
guide the listener to a conclusion. For example, the unkempt and bedraggled
appearance of Mephiboshet as he presented himself in audience before David
HaMelech seemed to bear out the Lashon Hara reported to him by Tzevah,
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gossip from several people would reinforce that suspicion. However he
must be very careful not to formulate a firm opinion in his mind (regarding
Plony), even if he hears the same gossip from many people he may not
believe those comments as being the truth (but he can suspect the veracity
of those comments and take steps to protect himself accordingly). I will
explain further on that it is forbidden to believe gossip as being true, even
if many people convey it, but one can do whatever is necessary to protect
oneself.
(RK5/3/2)-(5).. how to protect himself: More than this, it seems to

me that even if he did not see any circumstantial evidence and even if he
has not yet heard anything from other people that Plony hates him, but
he did see something unusual (in Plonys behavior), and that it still is too
early to call that unusual behavior circumstantial evidence yet (what he
saw) does slightly allude to it, even in this circumstance it is permissible
to launch an investigation and ask people about Plony. (He may launch
an investigation) in order to determine the reason for what is actually
happening, if he sees a hatred developing in Plony that could eventually
grow to hurt him physically or financially, and he should not be concerned
that his investigation will cause any humiliation to Plony. However, he
must be careful not to form a judgmental opinion about Plony; the most
he can do is suspect the gossip might be true and take the precautions
necessary to protect himself.
There is a slight proof to this concept in Masechet Shabbat (56a) in the
gemaras discussion of David HaMelechs incident with Tzevah, that
Shemuel (the Amorah) said David HaMelech did not transgress the Lav
of accepting Lashon Hara since David did see circumstantial evidence (in
Mephiboshets behavior) that lent enough credibility to Tzevahs comments
(about Mephiboshet) to allow David HaMelech to believe it. However
one may ask that this is consistent with the ending of that incident when
David HaMelech saw actual circumstantial evidence (that Mephiboshet
was not supportive of him and so he awarded half of Mephiboshets
wealth to Tzevah). But before that happened, at the beginning of that
incident, how could David HaMelech have inquired of Tzevah regarding
Mephiboshets actions (intentions)? He (David HaMelech) should have
suspected that Tzevah might respond derogatorily, especially since
David HaMelech knew beforehand that Tzevah did not like (his master)
Mephiboshet, as it says there that Tzevah defamed Mephiboshet saying
he had no Torah knowledge yet David found that he was filled with Torah
knowledge. The fact that Mephiboshet did not come together with Tzevah
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to greet David HaMelech is not called actual circumstantial evidence
(against Mephiboshet) but only a slight indication of circumstantial
evidence (as Rashi explains there at the end of his commentary on that
page in the gemara, that David HaMelech made his award to Tzevah
conditional on whether or not in the end there was substance to Tzevahs
comments. Thus (Mephiboshets initial behavior) is not called actual
circumstantial evidence. Therefore most certainly the law is as we wrote
it, since he (David HaMelech) saw something unusual (in Mephiboshets
behavior), namely that Mephiboshet did not come to greet him together
with Tzevah, and he (David HaMelech) assumed that he might be harmed
(by Mephiboshet), that perhaps Mephiboshet was planning a revolt or
some other harm to David HeMelech, then it was permissible for him to
investigate Mephiboshet.Even though it is possible to argue and say that
only there it was allowed because David HaMelech was concerned for his
life, and he was dealing with a possible life threatening issue, nevertheless
(even without this reason) it seems to me (in my humble opinion) that
in the context of our discussion here it still is permitted to inquire about
someone who might do harm even though there is no hard circumstantial
evidence to support that contention.
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/4. Understand clearly that all of the rules we wrote in the first
part of this sefer in the 6th Kelal (10th and 11th halachot) relating to
suspecting the veracity of Lashon Hara apply equally to suspecting
that the gossip might be true (6). Therefore one must be very careful
when he hears that Plony said something negative about him or
that he did such and such to him or wants to do such and such to
him, not to believe that gossip but (only) that he can take whatever
steps are necessary to protect himself. But even in that framework,
he may not even suspect there is some truth to the remarks because
Plony still has a presumption of righteousness and most probably
Plony did not do or say anything bad about him. Therefore, it is
forbidden to do anything to him or to cause any loss to him or to
humiliate him in any way, not in a significant way and not even in
an insignificant way. Even to secretly harbor in ones heart some
hatred for him is an esur, a Lav of the Torah. And most certainly
the victim may not use the gossip as a basis for absolving himself
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(7) from any obligations to Plony. The victim is obliged to extend to

Plony all of the courtesies \ all of the good that the Torah commands
us to extend to any Jewish person since Plonys standing has not
been diminished at all as a result of the gossip he heard. Our
Authorities gave us a rule that the victim \ the listener may not
suspect that Plony may have said something against him but that he
could take whatever steps were necessary to protect himself in the
future so that Plony would not be able to harm him. But in all other
regards it is forbidden to suspect him at all.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK5/4/1)-(6).. apply equally to suspecting that the gossip

might be true: Please see above in the first part of this sefer, that all of
the opinions and proofs (and conclusions) that appear there in the context
of Lashon Hara apply here as well in the context of Rechilut.
(RK5/4/2)-(7) ..the victim may not use the gossip as a basis

for absolving himself: Meaning, that even if he suffered a financial
loss and they told him Plony was responsible for that loss, even so he
may not use the information (the gossip) as a basis for absolving himself
of any monetary obligations to Plony. That which I said above all of the
courtesies \ all of the good applies even if the loss came as a result of being
reported to the government authorities and they told him that Plony was the
informer, and if it were permissible to believe gossip, apparently it would
have been permissible not to extend any good to Plony. Please review
Yoreh Dehah section # 158 and section #251 (the 1st and 2nd halachot) and
the commentaries of our Later Authorities on those two sections. Also
see Choshen Mishpat section #358 in the Shachs commentary, notation
#55.16 Thus I chose to use as an example an informer, because if the
issue was only that Plony denigrated the victim behind his back, then it
seems to me that even if it was absolutely clear that the gossip was true,
still he is obliged to extend to Plony all of the courtesies \ all of the good
that he is obligated by the Torah to extend to any fellow Jew; for example,
to extend a loan to Plony or something comparable. Because if he did not,
16 Quoting the editor of the Agudat Nautzrei Lashon, 13th edition: I think the
correct source is notation #62.
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he would be culpable for violating the Torahs Lav of (Vayikrah 19:18)
Do not take revenge and do not hold a grudge, that the Gemara Yomah
(23a) does allow this but only in cases of bodily pain and suffering
and denigrating someone behind his back is not called bodily pain and
suffering. (However if Plony was by nature a difficult person and a
borrower from whom it would be difficult to recover a loan and that loan
recovery would require a court case and the intervention of a judge, then
there would be no obligation to extend a loan to him). And most certainly
if the victims complaint against Plony is that Plony denied him a monetary
favor, of course he violates the Lav of Do not take revenge and do not
hold a grudge when he, in turn, takes his revenge and denies Plony a
favor, as I wrote above in the Introduction regarding this Lav, quoting the
Sefer Yereim, that the law of taking revenge or holding a grudge applies
when the victim refuses a monetary request to someone because a prior
monetary request of his to that person was denied.
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/5. From all of this, see how foolish many people are, that their
personality is to question their friends to find out what Plony said
about them even if that information would have no impact on their
lives. And when their friends decline to disclose that information,
they put great pressure on them until they finally tell them what
they want to hear, what Plony said about them. Occasionally, that
information is demeaning and they will believe the information
is true and they will come to hate Plony because of it. Now if
we come to assess the great destruction and calculate the number
of Laveen and Aseen that are commonly violated by someone
who is entrenched in this disgusting character trait, the number
is incredibly great. Please refer back to the Introduction and you
will understand what we are saying, because truthfully speaking,
the esur of believing Lashon Hara or gossip applies even if Plony
commented of his own accord about events that are relevant to this
victim. Yet the Torah commands us not to believe that gossip but
only (at most) to perhaps suspect it might be true. And if the gossip
is irrelevant to this victim, then even listening to it is forbidden as I
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wrote above in the second halacha of this Kelal. And how much even
more so is it forbidden to pressure someone into disclosing gossip
against their will to the point where the speaker will enter into the
category of speaking Rechilut and the listener will transgress the
esur of accepting Rechilut. This listener who forced the disclosure
of Rechilut is himself a sinner and he causes other people to sin
(and his punishment is much more severe). Therefore man must
stay very very far away from asking about these kinds of things
unless it is clear to him that the comment \ the gossip is relevant
and he needs to know about it in order to decide how to best protect
himself from Plony.
RK5/6. Understand clearly that there is another aspect to the esur

of believing gossip, as I will now explain. Even if it is clear to him
that the gossip conveyed is true, that Plony spoke about him or did
something against his will but it is possible to give him the benefit of
a doubt (8) and decide that his actions were not intended to demean
him, that he really meant it in some other context, and that based
on those circumstances Plony has no culpability. It is well known
that the law considers it a mitzvah to judge him favorably, but this
victim, because he did not want to judge Plony favorably, then
necessarily Plonys actions or his remarks were perceived by the
victim as unjust and he becomes upset with Plony because of
it. Because of this, the victim is characterized as someone who
believes Rechilut, someone who accepts gossip as truth. (Please
refer to the immediately following 6th Kelal and the Hagahah in the
3rd halacha, to the two illustrations that exemplify the acceptance
of gossip as truth, which basically arises from not giving Plony the
benefit of a doubt and judging him favorably).
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK5/6/1)-(8).. but it is possible to give him the benefit of a

doubt: The source for this statement can be found in the first part of this
sefer in the 6th Kelal, in the 20th notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim.
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(Please see that reference). One should know that we are speaking here
about a circumstance that is doubtful (what one saw could be equally
understood in one of two different ways), meaning, it is no more likely
that Plony is culpable than it is likely he is not culpable. The mitzvah is
addressing this circumstance and one must judge his fellow Jew charitably
(and give him the benefit of the doubt). Rabbeinu Yonah writes this in
Shaare Teshuvah, the 3rd shaar, section #218. (Please see that reference).
(Because if this was not so, even though it is a mitzvah (something very
proper to do) not to judge him guilty, as Rabbeinu Yonah writes in that
citation, still if he violated this mitzvah it is not categorized as Lashon
Hara, as I wrote above in the first part of this sefer, in the 3rd Kelal, the 7th
halacha).
Even though its possible for someone who is persistent to refute these
proofs that I brought above in the first part of this sefer and argue that all
of them were expressed in the context of circumstances tilting favorably
towards exonerating Plony and that is why (someone who judged him
unfavorably) someone who spoke negatively about him or who believed a
demeaning story about him is called a person who accepts Lashon Hara
(since Plony is basically innocent). But that is not so if he believed Plony
to be guilty in an equivocal situation (guilty in a 50-50 circumstance), he
would not be called a person who accepts Lashon Hara and that maybe
it is only a generalized mitzvah but that there is no imperative to do so,
and if he does judge Plony unfavorably he is still not called a person who
speaks Lashon Hara or accepts Lashon Hara as truth. To this argument
I will give two answers: (1) Since we see the Torahs intent is to judge
him favorably and this listener, this victim is doing just the opposite of
what the Torah is asking of us and he decides for his own reasons to judge
him unfavorably, to denigrate him because of those circumstances, then
necessarily this becomes a profound sin (in concluding a value judgment
opposite to the Torahs intent). (2) Moreover, who has (meaning, nobody
has a perfect) balance and a judgmental scale to see the circumstances with
absolute objectivity and therefore knows Plony is as much innocent as he
is guilty? Maybe Plony really is slightly more innocent than guilty?! If so,
and if this victim judges him guilty, then the victim becomes caught up in
the trap of those people who speak Lashon Hara or who believe the Lashon
Hara they hear. Therefore, whoever wants to protect his soul should stay
very far away from this.
Mekor Hachayim
RK5/7. If a victim violated this Lav and believed the gossip

he heard, the remedy (9) is to strengthen himself and remove that
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thought from his heart to the point where he no longer believes it.
And even if it is difficult for him to think that the speaker made
up the entire story, he should think that perhaps the speaker added
something of his own to the story or left out some significant detail or
comment that Plony made about this victim or that the speaker said
it in some completely different tone of voice and because of these
differences the entire sense of the story changed from something
good to something bad. The victim should resolve that from now
on not to believe any Lashon Hara or gossip about any Jew. In this
regard he should make a Vidduy, a sincere expression of his will
in atonement. In so doing he will have remedied his past sin as long
as he has not spread this gossip and conveyed it to anyone else.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK5/7/1)-(9).. the remedy: For the source of this law, please see
above in the first part of this sefer, the 6th Kelal, the 12th halacha and the
related Beer Mayim Chayim.
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Kelal Vav - Halachah 1

(RK6 - 6th chapter)
Kelal Vav
The esur of accepting gossip as truth in the context of

it being conveyed In the presence of three people
or conveyed directly to the victim. This Kelal will
explain the law if someone suffered a loss and word
spread throughout society that Plony caused the loss
to this victim, or if someone conveyed that gossip
(that Plony was the cause of the loss) in casual
passing, unintentionally, or if someone conveyed
that gossip and he (that speaker) had the authority
of two authoritative witnesses. Some other details of
the laws of gossip will also be discussed in this Kelal
which consists of 10 halachot.
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/1. It is forbidden to believe gossip. Even if the speaker

conveyed it publicly in front of several men (1), nevertheless, one
may not form a conclusive opinion that the gossip he heard was
true. However it is permissible to suspect its possible veracity and
to investigate the matter (to determine) if it will have a future impact
on his life (2).
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK6/1/1)-(1).. in front of several men: Please see above in the laws
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of esurei Lashon Hara, the 2nd Kelal, in the 2nd notation of the Beer Mayim
Chayim where we brought several explicit writings on this subject.
(RK6/1/2)-(2).. if it will have a future impact on his life:

Meaning, by way of example, the victim was told that Plony harmed him
or that he was told in front of someone else that Plony insulted \ degraded
him. There are times when it is important to know what the truth is in
order for the victim, going forward, to know how to best protect himself
from Plony. However if the gossip has no relevance to the victim and
will not impact his life, the victim may not inquire of other people to find
out what exactly Plony said about him because in his investigation, most
certainly this victim will himself violate many esurim. In particular he
will have violated the Lav of causing another Jew to stumble blindly
into committing a sin because whoever answers his inquiry is called a
Rauchel. Please see the immediately preceding Kelal, the 5th halacha.
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/2. Just as we explained above in the first part of this sefer, in

the 7th Kelal, the 2nd halacha, that the law forbids believing Lashon
Hara even if the comments were made in front of the victim, so
too is the law the same for Rechilut. Namely, that someone says
to Plony: You (Plony) said such and such about him (about the
victim), even if Plony remains quiet now (3) (meaning, he does not
answer back the charge) while they are repeating that gossip, that he
(Plony) said about the victim. Nevertheless, it is still forbidden for
the victim to believe it and he may not draw any conclusions from
the circumstances that the gossip was true. Even if Plonys usual
temperament was not to remain silent in other matters but here he
remained silent, Plonys silence is not proof that the gossip was
true, as I explained this all above. (Please see that reference).
All this applies even if the speaker (4) in conveying his gossip does
not violate the Torahs Lav of Do not peddle gossip in society. For
example, the speaker tells the victim to protect himself from Plony
because he (Plony) wants to harm him (or something comparable),
as I will explain further on (in the 9th Kelal). And most certainly if
he spoke Lashon Hara without purpose about the victim or gossiped
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about him, this has already been explained above (in the first part of
this sefer at the beginning of the 2nd Kelal) quoting our Authorities,
that both Lashon Hara and Rechilut are forbidden whether or not
they are conveyed directly in front of Plony and even if they are
true. Therefore, even if everything was true, just as he conveyed it,
that Plony said such and such about him, nevertheless the speaker
is an absolute Rasha, because of what he said since he violated the
Lav of Do not peddle gossip and the Lav of Do not convey (or
accept) a false report as well as other Laveen and Aseen that are
listed and explained in the Introduction. And so, because of this
Rasha, do you think we should deprive Plony of his presumption
of legitimacy and say that he spoke Lashon Hara about the victim
or something comparable? (Of course not!) Obviously this speaker,
who is himself suspect for violating the Lav of Rechilut and Lashon
Hara is also suspect to have lied and to have embellished the story
he conveyed and added to it (and changed its entire sense) from
beginning to end.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK6/2/1)-(3)..directly in front of the victim even if Plony

remains quiet now: Please reference above in the first part of this sefer
in the cited Kelal (7th Kelal, 2nd halacha, 2nd notation in the Beer Mayim
Chayim), that all of the explicit proofs that were brought there apply
equally to both Lashon Hara and Rechilut.
(RK6/2/2)-(4).. All this applies even if the speaker, etc.: This was
all explained above in the Beer Mayim Chayim in the 2nd and 3rd notations
except there I wrote the law in the context of Lashon Hara and here in the
context of Rechilut.
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/3. And if his (the victims) business was harmed and this
victim did not know the reason for it, for example, he bought a
particular exclusive right from the government (egs., the right to
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collect property taxes in that locale on behalf of the government)

and the officer (the government official) removed him (took away
that right) and this victim did not know if someone informed on
him or if the government official decided this by himself of his own
accord, or something comparable, it is forbidden for him to suspect
any Jew (as being the cause unless he is aware of circumstantial
evidence, and I will define circumstantial evidence further on (in
the 9th halacha), only then would it be permissible to conclude an
opinion as to who was the cause of the loss, however this victim
may not cause a loss to this person based solely on this gossip, as
I will explain further on (primarily at the end of the 9th halacha
and in the 10th halacha) since we do not presume people to be evil.
Regarding this circumstance, the Torah instructs us (Vayikrah 19:15)
Judge your brother \ your fellow Jew charitably. (Please see the
following Hagahah). Even if this victim heard that Plony was the
cause of the loss, still the most he is permitted to do is to suspect
that what he heard might be true yet he may not conclude an opinion
that what he heard was true. Even if other men begin to argue with
Plony because of this and they said to Plony that based on what they
heard he caused a great problem for the victim and in so doing he
committed a terrible sin, and throughout all of this Plony remained
silent (and did not answer the charge against him), nevertheless,
this victim may not conclude a firm opinion about Plony because
of this (meaning, because of Plonys silence) and believe what he
heard was true. Even though truthfully it is a mitzvah for a person
to defend himself against an indictment and to argue against his
accusers that he is completely innocent of the accusations against
him, as the Torah commands us (Bamidbar 32:22) and you should
be innocent in Gds eyes and in the eyes of Jewish society, still,
perhaps Plony understood from the circumstances (5) that society
pre-judged him and he concluded they believed the Lashon Hara
against him and that it would be pointless to try and defend himself
and that is why he remained silent. Perhaps Plony accepted upon
himself to remain silent and thereby placed himself among those
who are shamed yet do not shame others, who absorb disgrace and
do not answer back (6).
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK6/3/1)-(5).. still, perhaps Plony understood from the

circumstances: Even if society labeled him as the cause of the victims
loss, nevertheless it is forbidden for this victim to conclude a firm opinion
that the gossip was true and to hate Plony as a result of it as long as no
witnesses appeared to give this testimony in court, as I will write in the
immediately following halacha (And of course it is forbidden to cause
a loss to Plony in retaliation for the loss suffered by the victim). Please
reference further on in the 10th halacha of this Kelal). At this moment,
the most the victim is permitted is to suspect Plony (and to defend himself
accordingly).
(RK6/3/2)-(6).. and do not answer back: As Chazal have taught

us in Gemara Chulin (89a) What is the foundation of the continued
existence of the universe? The foundation is those people who remain
silent during an argument (Eyov 26:7) (and absorb all of their humiliation
without answering back).
Hagahah
Because of societys many sins, many faults \ problems arise because of
this terrible character trait of believing gossip. I will present to you two
brief illustrations of this common occurrence, because of societys many
sins. Perhaps in Gds mercy it will help us somewhat to stop this sin by
publicizing the strategy of the Yetzer Hara.17
(1) Regarding the government official (the governor) or some other gentile
who libeled him (libeled the victim), when the victim asks them Why
did you do this to me, to impoverish my life? and they answer him back
in a way to deflect any blame from themselves - Your complaint is not
against us, your fellow Jew, Plony, informed on you. Immediately, their
response makes an impression on him and he believes what they said as
being absolutely true. The victim now considers Plony to be an informer
and believes this gentile was not lying, that the gentile neither embellished
nor diminished the story and that he accurately portrayed the details of
17 Chazal have taught (Gemara Babba Batra 16a) that the Yetzer Hara, the evil
inclination that pushes him to sin is also the Satan who prosecutes against him
before Gd and is also the Angel of Death who kills him.
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up its passenger, the Gaon. The Gaon intended to tell this gentile that it
was not his fault at all, that he was not negligent and that it was the fault
of the wagon driver who was not careful and did not properly control his
horse. But instead, the Gaon strengthened himself and did not answer the
gentile. Later, the Gaon remarked that had he answered the gentile he
would have stepped over the line of halacha and would have become an
informer (because truthfully the wagon driver was also legally innocent
and this law is well known). But even if the wagon driver was guilty of
negligence, the most he would be liable for would be the compensation
owed to the gentile for his loss but certainly not to be beaten up. Had he
spoken up, the Gaon would have been liable for causing an undeserved
loss to a fellow Jew since the driver was not legally responsible. (Had the
Gaon informed on the wagon drive) Necessarily he would have had to be
reincarnated as a mad dog and neither his Torah learning nor his mitzvot
would have been enough to save him.
(All this was told to me by the great righteous sage, our teacher, Rabbeinu
Yehoshua, of blessed memory, the author of Sefer Chosen Yehoshuah
and Sefer Maoz HaDat, who heard it from the pure righteous sage, our
teacher, Rabbeinu David Taybeel (author of Sefer Nachalat David), of
blessed memory, who was the presiding judge of the city of Minsk, who in
turn heard it from the Maor HaGolah, our teacher Rabbeinu Chayim, of
blessed memory, who was the senior-most student of the Vilna Gaon, his
memory is a legacy for peace). From all of this, man should come to know
how careful he should be in matters such as these throughout his entire
life.
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Plonys betrayal. Because of this, the victim now hates Plony and at the
very next opportunity he will go and betray Plony to the government. In
so doing he himself becomes an absolute informer. 18
(2) Similarly, it is common to find instances when a gentile agreed to buy
something from a Jew, beverages (liquor) or something comparable and
the deal was finalized and the gentile even brought his empty barrels to the
Jew to fill with liquor (the liquor was not yet paid for). There are gentiles
who even after they finalize a deal with someone will go to other Jewish
merchants of that same product to shop prices with them, trying to get a
slightly better deal with them than they did with the first merchant. The
gentile will renege on the first Jew and he does not tell this to the second
merchant, how he (the gentile) finalized a deal with the first merchant.
Since this second merchant is oblivious of what this gentile was doing,
there are occasions when the second merchant will offer those same goods
at a slightly cheaper price than the first merchant. When the gentile hears
he can do a better deal with the second merchant, he immediately goes
back to the first merchant and takes back his (empty) barrels without any
explanation. And when this first merchant asks him Why did you do
this? in order to deflect any criticism or take responsibility for himself,
18 Please see the first ending footnote to the Epilogue of Sefer Shemirat HaLashonBook 1 (Poral Taasiyot edition, Bnei Brak, 5751), where the Chafetz Chayim
AH explains the definition of an informer and the punishment that awaits
this person in Olam Haba; quoted as follows from the Mazal Elul English
translation of Sefer Shemirat HaLashon (Feldheim Distributors, New York
and Jerusalem, 5766):
217
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How so very great is the sin of the man who informs on a Jew to a gentile; his
sin is so great as to be unbearable and his punishment is comparable to the
punishment of a heretic or someone who denies that the Torah is Gd-given
or denies that at some time in the (near) future Gd will give life back to those
who have died. Their punishment is so great that Gehinnom will have ceased
to exist but their punishment will continue to endure, as Chazal teach us in
Gemara Rosh Hashanah (17a). Our great Kabbalists have written about this
person, that his punishment will be to become reincarnated as a mad dog.
I have heard this same idea expressed by the Vilna Gaon, his holy memory
is a legacy of peace, in the following incident. The Gaon accepted upon
himself a form of exile and hired a wagon and a Jewish driver. The
horse pulling this wagon strayed off the road and trampled some plowed
furrows on the side of the road belonging to a gentile. From a distance
away the gentile saw what happened and ran towards the wagon to beat
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the gentile answers - So and so, the merchant, approached me with a
deal Why dont you buy those good from me instead of him? I have
merchandise that is a lot better than Plonys (the first merchant) and my
merchandise is cheaper than his! Immediately, Plony (the buyer) believes
the gentiles story as being absolutely true and considers this other merchant
to be meddling in someone elses affairs and stealing away another mans
livelihood and is therefore an evil person, a Rasha. Plony then hates this
other Jew and tomorrow, at the next opportunity, he will undercut him in
every way that he can until he destroys his livelihood and they become
sworn enemies. Each merchant now wants to utterly destroy the other yet
each one sees his actions as being completely permissible and a mitzvah
since his antagonist has done the same thing to him.
See how many Laveen were transgressed because of this: Do not accept
a false report, Do not hate your brother \ your fellow Jew and Do
not take revenge and do not hold a grudge as well as many other Laveen
and Aseen explained above in the Introduction. On occasion he meets
the Torahs criteria for an informer. All of this because he believed the
gossip he heard from the goy, that he believed this gentile was telling him
the truth. The law sees the acceptance of gossip as truth as being forbidden
even if a Jew conveyed that gossip directly to the victim in front of Plony
and even if the gossip is irrelevant to this speaker and Plony remained
silent and did not respond to the accusation. Even so, it is forbidden to
conclude an opinion that the gossip must have been true (as we explained
above in the first part of the sefer (the 7th Kelal, the 2nd halacha) quoting
the unanimous opinion of all our Authorities). And all the more so in our
case where the speaker is a gentile (please refer to Gemara Babba Batra
45a) and he is looking out only for his own good in order to obscure his
own culpability, and yet he is directly an interested party (with an obvious
compelling motivation to lie about his involvement). How much even
more so is it forbidden to accept his gossip and believe that what he was
saying was true. It would have been much better, regarding this victim, to
presume the gentile had a vested interest, an ulterior motive, that he was a
liar and to have judged his fellow Jew favorably (in the first example).
And in the second example he (the first merchant) should have assumed
the second merchant knew nothing about the deal that was transacted with
the gentile and had he taken that approach, he would have been spared
from violating many Laveen. First among them he would have fulfilled
the Torahs commandment of Judging your fellow Jew favorably and,
naturally, as soon as the second merchant saw that he was given the benefit
219
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of a doubt and that he was judged favorably and that the first merchant did
not hate him, then going forward he would be careful never again to do
anything that would cause him harm or a loss. No loss, Gd forbid, would
have occurred to either of them, neither because the first merchant would
have informed on the second merchant nor because the first merchant
would have attempted to undercut the business of the second merchant
or something comparable. (In not believing the gossip) It would be good
for both merchants both in this life and in Olam Haba. Regarding this
and anything comparable, David HaMelech teaches in Tehilim (34:13-14)
Who is the man who desires life (meaning Olam Haba) and wants to see
his days filled with good (meaning in this life)? Restrain yourself from
saying bad. (And he must resolve) Most certainly never again to believe
gossip since the sin of the person who believes gossip is greater than the
sin of the person who conveyed the gossip; Gd should protect us from
committing this sin.
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/4. Understand clearly that it is forbidden to believe gossip

even if it was conveyed by two or more people or even if that gossip
was commonly circulating throughout society (7), that Plony said
something about the victim or did such-and-such to him. Despite
its common knowledge, it is forbidden to believe it or to conclude
an opinion that it must be true. Even if the future well being of
the victim is motivating the people conveying the gossip, and in so
doing they are not considered to be evil people, nevertheless it is
still forbidden to believe them, as I explained above in the second
halacha of this Kelal.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK6/4/1)-(7).. even if it was conveyed by two or more people

or even if that gossip was commonly circulating throughout
society: If you want to know the source of this statement, please
reference above in the first part of this sefer, in the 7th Kelal, the 3rd and
4th halachot and the related Beer Mayim Chayim. There you will find
that these statements are expressions of our Chazal and explicit pesukim
dealing both with Lashon Hara and Rechilut. Please see that reference.
221
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All of the details of law found in that reference in the context of Lashon
Hara pertain here in this context of Rechilut. Understand even more,
that if someone in society has an established reputation for being an evil
person, it seems to me in my humble opinion that it is permitted to believe
the gossip spoken about him, as I explained above in the first part of this
sefer (in the 7th Kelal, in the 5th halacha) in the context of Lashon Hara.
Please see that reference.
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/5. It is forbidden to believe gossip even if the speaker

conveying it has the same authority as two witnesses and even if
there is no way to think favorably about Plony (8). Everything
we have said until now applies if the gossip has no bearing on
the victim and that information will have no future impact on his
life. However, if the gossip is relevant and will result in some
benefit (9) to the victim, for example, the speaker told him Plony
wants to harm him, either physically or monetarily, or something
comparable, and therefore this victim should protect himself from
him, then it is permissible to believe this speaker (who has the same
authority as two witnesses). However, the victim may not disclose
this information \ gossip to anyone else (10), not even to members
of his own household, unless some future benefit will evolve as a
result of that disclosure.
All this is relevant only if the speaker himself heard Plony threaten
the victim. But if the speaker was not a firsthand witness, and that
someone else told him (11) what Plony said, he has no basis for
depending on the word of another person (and he may not believe
that gossip, even if the speaker has the same authority as two
witnesses).
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK6/5/1)-(8).. even if there is no way to think favorably about

Plony: Meaning, there is no way of favorably judging Plony, about whom
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the speaker said Plony said something about him or did something to
him. The basis for this law is as we explained it above in the first part
of this sefer, in the 6th Kelal, in the Hagahah of the 21st notation of the
Beer Mayim Chayim quoting there the Yad HaKetana. The general rule
to follow is if it is forbidden for the speaker to say it, it is forbidden for
the victim to listen to it. Apart from this, there is the additional esur of
causing another Jew to blindly stumble into committing a sin.
(RK6/5/2)-(9).. if the gossip is relevant and will result in some

benefit: As I wrote at the beginning of the 5th Kelal (2nd notation) of this
sefer, that in this circumstance it is permissible to listen to gossip and to
suspect that it might be true. (Please see that reference). Therefore if this
speaker can be believed with the same authority as two witnesses, then it
is permissible to believe him and conclude a definitive opinion.
A proof to this idea comes from Gemara Pesachim (113b) regarding the
incident involving Tuvia is one allowed to tell this to his rebbe in order
that he too should come to hate him (to hate Plony for what he did)? He
told him, if his rebbe believes the speaker with the same authority as two
witnesses then he should tell him, etc.... Implying that it is permissible
for ones rebbe to believe the gossip conveyed to him and to conclude a
definitive opinion as long as the speaker has the same authority as two
witnesses in all matters. In this circumstance the Torah does not forbid
accepting Lashon Hara and the proof is that the gemara permitted his
rebbe to hate him because of this.
And the writings of the Maharik (on this subject) are well known. He
was cited in the 6th Kelal of the first part of this sefer in the 31st notation
of the Beer Mayim Chayim (please see that reference): In an instance of
ordinary Lashon Hara, which is forbidden to be believed although one may
suspect its truthfulness, it is forbidden, Gd forbid, to hate Plony because
of this. Therefore it is obvious here (where the reason he is allowed to hate
the victim is only because the speaker is absolutely believed in all matters)
that concluding a definitive opinion is permissible. And even though the
immediate subject of that gemara involving Tuvia was expressed in the
context of Lashon Hara, that same conclusion applies here as well in the
context of gossip.
Having said all of this, still, if it is at all possible to give Plony the benefit
of a doubt and judge him favorably, the victim must do so and he must
be careful not to retain any derogatory feelings towards Plony because of
this.
225
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(RK6/5/3)-(10).. may not disclose this information \ gossip to

anyone else: This is no different than if someone privately insulted the
victim directly to his face. We explained above (in the first part of this
sefer, in the 10th Kelal, in the 11th through 15th halachot) that it is forbidden
to go and tell others what has happened unless something constructive
can come from making this disclosure. And what I wrote not even to the
members of his own household expresses an idea that I will explain in
detail further on, that it is forbidden to speak Lashon Hara or gossip and
it makes no difference if the speaker is conveying it to someone else or if
he is conveying it specifically to his wife (either way, both are forbidden).
(Please reference above the first part of this sefer, in the 8th Kelal, the 10th
halacha).
(RK6/5/4)-(11).. and that someone else told him: This is obvious,

since the speaker himself is forbidden to believe the gossip told to him by
someone else.
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/6. Even in a useful circumstance where the victim can

believe the speaker, that is only when the victim knows the speaker
very well, meaning, that the victim is very familiar with the
personality of the speaker (12), that he never lies and does not
exaggerate, and the victim is so confident of the truthfulness of
the speaker and he believes him in this regard and in fact always
believes him in whatever he says (13) with the same authority as two
witnesses testifying in court whose testimony is incontrovertible.
(Please see the following Hagahah). But if this victim does not
always believe the speaker in all other regards, just in this regard
because he relishes and enjoys the gossip and Lashon Hara, and so
this victim now rationalizes and decides that the speaker must be
telling the truth and he believes him just as he would believe two
witnesses; obviously this is forbidden. In fact, contrary to this, the
more he believes him and concludes the story is true, the more he
falls into the category of those people who believe Lashon Hara and
Rechilut.
227
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK6/6/1)-(12).. is very familiar with the personality of the

speaker: Meaning, to exclude the case where the victim is unfamiliar
with the personality of the speaker, just that he knows the speaker has a
reputation for being pious. That degree of unfamiliarity with the speaker
would not help at all (meaning, it would not make his gossip credible), as
the Maharik writes in his responsa, section #82 regarding an incident that
occurred in his community where a solitary witness came forward and
said that a particular married woman admitted in front of him that she had
committed adultery and she denied his story saying that she never said any
such thing. The Maharik writes in his responsa as follows: Moreover,
it seems to me in my humble opinion that the witness cannot be believed
to make this woman forbidden to her husband unless he (the husband)
knows the witness so well that he knows the witness would never lie;
for example, that the witness is a friend and frequent companion to this
husband and the bond of friendship between them is very strong. But this
husband may not believe any other person whom he does not know very
well even though this witness may have a very widespread reputation for
being righteous and proper. The proof supporting my decision comes from
Gemara Ketubot (85a) (perek HaKotev), that Rava did not believe Rav
Papa to testify against the validity of a contract even though he did believe
the daughter of Rav Chisdah (who was Ravas wife) and even though it
is obvious that Rava considered Rav Pappa to be perfectly righteous and
very proper and that Rav Pappa was frequently with Rava as is evident
throughout Shas. Nevertheless, Rava would not believe Rav Pappa nor
did he rely on his testimony with the same authority as two witnesses
(testifying in court). Rava said- I do not know you well enough to say
you never lie as the gemara there states.
Similarly one can make a precise inference from a responsa of the Rashbah
(part I, section # 237) that a necessary condition to be fulfilled is that the
speaker must be very well believed by the victim (in whatever he says).
Therefore, it is obvious that there is no basis for this husband to believe
the witness except when he knows the witness very well and upholds
everything he says as being the truth. Even if he trusts him to the extent
that he would believe Rebbe Chaninah Ben Tradyaun (still that would
not be sufficient) as I proved above in the cited perek HaKotev (Gemara
Ketubot- 85a), that Rava did not believe Rav Pappa (Maharik quoted up
until this point). This law is brought down in Shulchan Aruch Ehven
229
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HaEzer, section #115, paragraph #7 in the hagahah and in the related Beit
Shemuel, paragraph #33. (Please see that reference).
Given that this is so, then that is also the law in our framework of Rechilut,
that the gemara expressed it as if he is believed by his rabbi with the
same authority as two witnesses meaning, we require that he must totally
believe the speaker (without any hesitancies at all). This cannot be refuted
by saying that only there, regarding forbidding a wife to her husband, the
court has no power to forbid his wife to him as long as the husband does
not completely \ absolutely believe the witness. First, there it was not in
the context of what the law demands but rather the context of satisfying an
obligation to Heaven, as our Early Authorities have explained. And even
so, we hold that the husband should not accept the witnesses testimony as
long as he is not completely familiar with this speakers personality and
knows that he would never lie for any reason at all. Moreover, why should
there be a leniency in this context regarding the acceptance of Lashon
Hara as truth, which is also forbidden by the Torah, and then to imagine
a fictitious leniency and say that maybe the gemaras definition of as
authoritative as two witnesses in Masechet Pesachim (113b) is different
than the gemaras definition in Masechet Kedushin (66a). Besides all this,
we have already explained in the first part of this sefer, in the 7th Kelal,
in the 7th notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim, quoting Rabbeinu Yonah
who specifically writes that we require that when saying Lashon Hara to
his rebbe, the rebbe believes him just as he would believe two witnesses
but not just as two ordinary men (who are not witnesses). (Please see
that reference). This leans towards the opinions of the Maharik and the
Rashbah that were referenced above. Now everything stated in this 6th
halacha should be clearly understood by you.
(RK6/6/2)-(13) ..he believes him in this regard and in fact

always believes him in whatever he says: This is the implication
of the Rashbahs opinion quoted in the cited responsa of the Maharik.
And that which I wrote with the same authority as two witnesses is a
quotation from the Rabbeinu Yonah, cited above.
Hagahah
Understand clearly that even if all of the criteria were met that define
believing the speaker with the same authority as two witnesses, that only
satisfies the victims own personal needs, meaning that the victim can
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now believe the speaker, but it does not give the victim license to cause
a financial loss to Plony or to hit him, Gd forbid, or to verbally degrade
him (14) just because of the speakers remarks. It is not at all up to him to
believe the speaker as he would believe two witnesses and thereby harm
someone else.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK6/6/3)-(14).. but it does not give the victim license to cause

a financial loss to Plony or to hit him, Gd forbid, or to verbally
degrade him: The source for these statements can be found above in
the first part of this sefer in the 7th Kelal, in the 15th and 20th notations of
the Beer Mayim Chayim. (Please see that reference).
Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 17 Tevet, 27 Nissan, 7 Elul
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/7. All this, however, was relevant only during the epoch of
the Talmud. But nowadays all Authorities are in agreement (15)
that nobody can claim they believe someone because they are as
authoritative as two witnesses testifying in Beit Din and that he
never lies about anything. Therefore in no circumstance can the
victim believe the testimony \ gossip of this speaker although
he can suspect the veracity of the speakers story. Apart from this,
it is improbable that one could comply with all of the conditions in
the 5th and 6th halachot. From this you can see how many people
make a mistake in this regard, that they are very careful not to
speak Lashon Hara or Rechilut and not to believe it if they hear
it being spoken by others but they will believe it if it is spoken by
their father or mother or wife because they feel these people would
most certainly never lie to them. But this is a very serious mistake
because it makes no difference who is conveying the gossip (16).
Please see above in the first part of this sefer, in the 8th Kelal, the
14th halacha and additionally further on in this part of the sefer, in
the 7th Kelal, the 5th halacha.
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK6/7/1)-(15).. all Authorities are in agreement: I have expressed

this based on the commentaries of the Rif (Gemara Ketubot 43b) and the
Rosh (Gemara Ketubot, perek HaKotev, in the middle of his 6th paragraph)
quoted as follows: We have seen the writings of Rav Hai Gaon who has
said: Nowadays a judge may not say that I trust the testimony of this
particular person because the definition of trust is not at all clear to us.
This concept is brought down in Choshen Mishpat, section #15, paragraph
#5 as a matter of law even though this law is not brought down in Ehven
HaEzer, section #115 (paragraph #7 in the Rama) cited above. There, in
order to keep someone away from doing something that is forbidden, the
Shulchan Aruch is strict in the laws application. But here, if the victim
does not believe the gossip and does not conclude an opinion, so what of
it? The victim could still suspect Plony and protect himself against him.
And even without this, there is nearly not even one person in a thousand
in matters such as these (for many people do not even consider this to be
a sin, because of the very many sins of society) that we can say about him
that he can be believed by the victim with the same authority as he would
believe two witnesses testifying in court, that this speaker would never
add or subtract even one word from the story as it actually happened, that
there is no way to judge Plony favorably and that the future outcome of
this gossip is useful and beneficial.
(RK6/7/2)-(16).. it makes no difference who is conveying the

gossip: Who can say that they can be believed with the same authority
as two witnesses? We see even the most discrete \ careful among them do
add or subtract their own comments to a story. Never can we find anyone
whose testimony is precisely and objectively as factual as the testimony
of two witnesses in court. Moreover, we require that the speakers gossip
\ report must be believed by this victim in any and all circumstances
reported by this speaker, just as he would believe two witnesses and not
just here; and that is not at all plausible! After all of these leniencies,
there also must be no way to judge Plony favorably, and the gossip he has
conveyed must have been for some useful \ beneficial future outcome,
as I wrote above. Practically speaking all of these conditions are nearly
impossible to fulfill.
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Kelal Vav - Halachah 8-9
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/8. This law, that it is forbidden to believe gossip, applies

even if the gossip is conveyed unintentionally, in some unrelated
context (17), meaning that the victim realizes the speaker had no
intention to incite a dispute with a fellow Jew and just unthinkingly
those words came out of his mouth. All of the additional details of
this law were explained above in the first part of this sefer, in the
7th Kelal, the 9th halacha, in the context of Lashon Hara. And these
details apply equally here as well, that it is forbidden to believe
gossip.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK6/8/1)-(17) unintentionally, in some unrelated context:

Please see above in the first part of this sefer, in the 7th Kelal, the 9th halacha
and in the related Beer Mayim Chayim. All of the laws and opinions
expressed there in the context of Lashon Hara apply here as well in the
context of gossip.
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/9. If the victim is aware of circumstantial evidence that

gives credibility to the gossip, that points to the gossip conveyed
to him as being true, that Plony did something to him or said such
and such about him, then regarding the issue of whether or not that
circumstantial evidence is a sufficient basis for believing it, please
see above in the first part of this sefer, in the 7th Kelal, the 10th
through 14th halachot because there, with Gds help, we explained
all of the relevant details. But in order to make things easier for the
reader, I will summarize here what I expressed over there. These
five conditions must be fulfilled:
(1) The circumstantial evidence must substantiate the gossip as
being true (18) with no grounds for judging him favorably
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based on what he said or did, because if there was a side to

judge him favorably, what was the point of the circumstantial
evidence substantiating the gossip as being true? Even if it was
true, the victim may not conclude a bad opinion about Plony, as
I explained above several times.
(2) The circumstantial evidence must strongly point to the gossip
as being true. It cannot be weak circumstantial evidence that
slightly suggests the gossip is true.
(3) The victim must have seen the circumstantial evidence himself,
first hand, and not learn about it because someone else told
him.
(4) (The gossip is permitted) only if the victim could gain something
constructive as a result of knowing this gossip, because if that
was not so, it would be forbidden to listen to what he had to say,
as I wrote above in several places.
(5) After complying with these first four conditions, one may use
this circumstantial evidence only as a basis for believing the
gossip is true but not as a basis for repeating the gossip to other
people (19). In all circumstances (20) it is forbidden to use
circumstantial evidence as a basis for causing a monetary loss
to Plony or to hit him because of it, Gd forbid. Please see that
reference (the 7th Kelal of the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara), the
12th through 14th halachot where the concept was explained at
length.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK6/9/1)-(18).The circumstantial evidence must substantiate

the gossip as being true: If you want to know the source for these
conditions, please see the first part of this sefer, the 7th Kelal, beginning
with the 10th halacha and onward to the end of that Kelal and in the related
Beer Mayim Chayim where you will find clear proofs for them.
239
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(RK6/9/2)-(19) ..but not as a basis for repeating the gossip to

other people: This is no better than if he heard someone belittling him,
that it is forbidden for him to go and tell other people what happened, as I
have already written above in several places, unless some future benefit can
be had by repeating the Lashon Hara, that Plony will not be able to repeat
what he did or he will stop denigrating him. In this type of circumstance,
it is possible that it would also be permitted in our case.
(RK6/9/3)-(20).. In all circumstances: Meaning, that even if his

intention is to achieve some future benefit, that Plony will not repeat what
he did or he will not denigrate him again, and even if the incident was such
that if it was true, that if Plony had done this to him, it would have been
permitted to cause a loss to him, as I illustrated below in the 10th halacha.
Even so, since the incident was not disclosed by two witnesses testifying
in Beit Din but rather only by circumstantial evidence, it is forbidden for
the victim to cause any monetary loss to Plony. And it makes no difference
if this loss caused to Plony results in no monetary benefit to the victim or
if the victim wants to seize Plonys money even without witnesses present
because of what Plony had done to him; either way it is all forbidden.
A proof to this concept comes from the text of Gemara Babba Batra (93a)An ox that was gored and an ox that had repeatedly gored (and was known
to have gored three times) are standing together in a field. One cannot
say with certainty this is the ox that gored. This law is expressed in
Choshen Mishpat, section #408, paragraphs 1 and 2, that we do not allow
compensation to an injured party unless the evidence is clear.
The Maharik writes in Source # 129 that even in a quite apparent
incriminating circumstance, like the one brought in Gemara Sanhedrin
(37b), where someone was running after someone else with a knife in his
hand to kill him and I found him with his knife in his hand standing over
the stabbed man and the stabbed man was lying on the floor writhing in his
last death throes with blood pouring out of his dying body. The gemara
holds that (in the absence of witnesses) we do not judge him to die just
because of that apparently incriminating circumstance. Similarly in cases
of monetary issues, even in a very apparently incriminating circumstance,
such as the one in Gemara Sanhedrin, we do not make Plony culpable (to
compensate the victim) because The Merciful One has commanded us in
His Torah (Devarim 19:15) on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses
(testifying in court) can punishment be administered.
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he owes the money. But if there were no witnesses and Shimon was called
to court, he would win because of a migo meaning that he could claim
he snatched it and he would win because he could have answered a better
answer, that he bought it (a migo- a better answer), and he would
be believed by the court that the item was his. But here in our discussion,
where there is only circumstantial evidence that there was a loss (and
that it was caused by Reuven), even if there were no witnesses to the
seizure, Shimon would lose because he has no right to make the seizure.
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Thus it becomes obvious to us in our case that the victim does not have
license to seize Plonys money, not even to seize it without witnesses being
present, because there is no difference if witnesses gave testimony on this
circumstantial evidence in a court or if the victim himself is aware of the
circumstantial evidence.
I have illustrated further on an example (in the 10th halacha) of
circumstantial evidence in the context of an informer and now I will
illustrate it with another small example that is commonly found today in
society, as follows: Money was stolen from Shimons house and that night
Reuven happened to have slept there. Shimon went through his safe (his
locked box) and discovered it was broken into and all indications pointed
to Reuven as being the thief. Even so, it is forbidden for Shimon to seize
any of Reuvens property even if the seizure is made without any witnesses
being present.19 The most Shimon can do is to take Reuven to Beit Din
where the court will force Reuven to swear to his innocence (and if he
refuses to swear, he will have to pay the victim the amount in contention).
(Please see the following Hagahah).
Do not contradict what I have said by citing the statement in Gemara
Shabbat (56a-b) David HaMelech did not transgress the Lav of accepting
Lashon Hara (he did not accept Tzevahs report about Mephiboshet as
being true), because he saw circumstantial evidence that Mephiboshet
was not loyal. There, because of this report, David HaMelech imposed
a loss on Mephiboshet he commanded Mephiboshet to relinquish half of
his field to Tzevah. That citation is not at all a challenge to what I have
said, as I wrote above in the first part of this sefer, in the 7th Kelal, the
22nd notation. (Please see that reference). Now regarding the issue of
verbally denigrating Plony because of the circumstantial evidence, this
issue requires substantially more thought and analysis to resolve.
19 Translators note: 4 Adar Aleph 5763: Rabbi Yaakov Koenigsberg (Yeshivat

Mikdash Melech, Brooklyn) gave an insight (a peshat) to this statement of
the Chafetz Chayim: even if there were no witnesses. That if there were
witnesses to the seizure, Shimon would lose in a Beit Din because the witnesses
would testify that he snatched the item away from Reuven. Even if Shimon
admitted he snatched it away but claimed he was snatching his own (stolen)
property or compensation for his stolen property, he would still lose because
the court presumes the original holder of the item is in fact the owner of the
item. Nor is Reuven liable for any compensation unless witnesses testify that
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Hagahah
This law is explicit in the Shachs commentary in the 75th section of Choshen
Mishpat, paragraph #64. The Tazs commentary there in paragraph #17 is
in agreement with the law as expressed by the Shach, that the victim may
not seize any of Plonys property even without witnesses being present.
In this regard the Sefer MehIrat Enayim (49th notation) has a dissenting
opinion.
Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 19 Tevet, 29 Nissan, 9 Elul
Mekor Hachayim
RK6/10. Based on this, we can see for ourselves how people make
this mistake, because of the many sins of society, that if someone
suffers a loss in his affairs because someone informed on him, or
something comparable, and he has circumstantial evidence pointing
to Plony as being the cause of his loss, in relying on this circumstantial
evidence this victim goes and informs on Plony because of societys
misconception that if someone informed on you, you now have the
license to retaliate and inform back on him.
Truthfully, this is a very serious mistake from several aspects:
(1). The victims right to retaliate (i.e., the law permitting
retaliation) and inform back on someone who first informed
on him is applicable only if there will be a future outcome that
is beneficial, for example, that this someone will not be able
to inform on the victim again and that there was no other way
of achieving this benefit except by informing on him. Only then
would it be allowable. But if this victims only motivation was to
take revenge, most certainly it would be absolutely forbidden, as is
brought down in Choshen Mishpat (section #388, paragraph #9, in
the Hagahah).
(2). Before retaliating against this someone, the victim himself
must have seen someones act of informing and not merely
surmise someone was the culprit because of circumstantial
evidence, even if the circumstance evidence is obvious and the
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victim himself saw that evidence, as I wrote above, and certainly

not if (he did not see the circumstantial evidence and) other people
told him that someone informed. In this circumstance it would
be forbidden to even conclude an opinion about this someone, to
believe that the gossip was true, as long as there were no witnesses
who testified in court (or even outside of court, as long as there was
positive proof with no possibility of a doubt). And how much even
more so is it forbidden to rely on this hearsay and to cause even the
smallest loss to a fellow Jew even if in so doing he is motivated to
achieve a useful future outcome.
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Kelal Zayin - Halachah 1

Kelal
Zayin
(RK7 - 7th chapter)
An explanation of the different circumstances when

Rechilut is forbidden. There are 5 halachot in this
Kelal.
Mekor Hachayim
RK7/1. It is forbidden to gossip and it makes no difference if the

gossip is conveyed by a man or by a woman (1), by a relative or
by someone who is not a relative. Even if someone heard Plony
insult ones father or mother and because of his great concern for
their sense of honor he told them what Plony said; this too is called
gossip. (Please see the following Hagahah). Similarly it makes no
difference if Plony is a man or a woman, an adult or a child (2).
All of this follows from the above discussion of the Laws of Esurei
Lashon Hara in the 8th Kelal, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd halachot.
There are people who make this mistake: Someone sees two boys
hitting each other and then goes over and tells the father of one of
these boys that the second boy hit his son. Very often great trouble
is caused by these kinds of reports, and this father will go and hit the
boy who hit his child because of his hatred for that boy. Inevitably
this will cause a bitter conflict between this father and the father
of the boy he hit. Very often this scenario takes place in a shule
or Beit Midrash. Now if we gave some thought to the seriousness
of the sins committed in conveying this gossip, the number of sins
committed in this scenario would be too numerous to count. It goes
without saying that if this speaker did not clearly know which one of
these boys was within the law in what he did, it would be forbidden
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to tell the boys father what had happened. But rather even if he
does clearly know which boy was halachically allowed to do what
he did, still he may not go and report back to the father of the second
boy, except if he satisfies all of the conditions and details listed
further on in the following 9th Kelal. Please see that reference.
Hagahah
This same statement applies to someones rabbi, as I wrote above in
the first part of this sefer, in the 10th Kelal, the 5th halacha. And do not
question what I have said based on an incident in Gemara Kedushin
(70a) they went and told Rav Yehudah because there it was obvious
he was specifically sent by Rav Yehudah (as you see clearly in Rashis
commentary, citation beginning with the words wait until) and there is
no aspect of Lashon Hara (in that report) if he then goes and reports back
to the Beit Din that someone insulted him or the court. This agent of the
court, in his report back to the Beit Din also has the same authority as
two witnesses. Please reference the Choshen Mishpat at the end of the 8th
section and in the related commentary of the Beer HaGolah. Therefore,
Rav Yehudah answered at the end that they also antagonized \ abused the
agent of the rabbi.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK7/1/1)-(1).. by a man or by a woman: (We learn this) From the

incident involving Miryam, where the context was Lashon Hara, and it
applies as well here in the context of gossip. Regarding what I said above
Plony insulted ones father please refer back to the first part of this sefer,
to the 10th Kelal, in the 20th notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim where I
brought down an explicit gemara (which is the basis of this law).
(RK7/1/2)-(2).. or a child: That is obvious because a child is also

within the category of your brother. Also, since the overriding reason
given above, that gossip if forbidden, is because it ignites contention and
usually results in great damage, a child is included within this category. For
the deaf, people with no understanding and children, are never responsible
for their actions (literally: contact with them is bad) and anyone who hits
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them is liable to compensate them (no matter what the provocative cause).
A child who is embarrassed is sensitive and feels that shame and so the
person who embarrassed him is culpable, as is brought down in Gemara
Babba Kamma (86b).
Leap Year- 21 Tevet, 1 Eyar, 11 Elul
Mekor Hachayim
RK7/2. Understand clearly that it is forbidden to gossip even about

someone who is coarse and unlearned because this man is also
your brother. Even though this speaker clearly saw this coarse
person senselessly denigrate the victim without his being present
and the law supports this victim, still we explained above in the
1st Kelal (4th halacha) that conveying gossip is forbidden even if the
gossip is true. And all the more so is it forbidden to repeat the gossip
if the person who initiated the remarks is a Torah Scholar. The sin is
greater and more profound from several different perspectives:
(1) From the perspective of the essence of gossip itself, it is obvious
that if the speaker conveyed gossip to the victim and inserted his
own lies into the gossip, of course his punishment is much greater
than someone who conveyed gossip that was true. As we examine
this more intently, we will find that in a majority of times the gossip
is a lie because a Torah Scholar generally does not denigrate anyone
and generally does not needlessly harm anyone so we can presume
that whatever this Torah Scholar did, he did with the sanction of the
law. Therefore anyone who gossips and libels a Torah Scholar is
spreading gossip that is a lie.
(2) From the perspective of Plony, who is a Torah Scholar, the Torah
commands us to cleave to Torah Scholars at every opportunity, to
eat and drink with them, to engage in business for their benefit, to
marry off our daughters to them and to extend great honor to them.
How much even more so is it forbidden to incite contention against
them, since this brings about the opposite result of everything we
have said above.
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(3) From the perspective of the after-effect that will evolve from
this gossip, it is well known that a person (the victim) will not be
particularly surprised \ bothered if (he is told that) a coarse person
demeaned him or did something wrong to him (and the gossip will
barely bother him at all). But if the victim is told (gossip) that a
Torah Scholar demeaned him, most certainly a sense of hatred will
enter this persons heart (he will become much more bothered by
this gossip - by what a rabbi said about him) and very often the after
effect will be contention and conflict because of it. In particular if
this person is told that the communitys chief rabbi said something
about him, the damage that can come from that gossip will be very
great and very often the victim will steal away the livelihood of the
rabbi because of this.
RK7/3. Learn something even more, it makes no difference if

the speaker conveyed the gossip directly to Reuven (the victim),
what Plony said about him, or if the speaker conveys the gossip
to Reuvens wife (3) or to Reuvens relatives since most certainly
the gossip will anger them and they will develop feelings of anger
and resentment against Plony because of it. Therefore, even if the
speaker first cautions them not to tell anyone (about the gossip he
is about to convey to them) that does not absolve him of the sin of
gossip.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK7/3/1)-(3).. to Reuvens wife: Even though it is forbidden to

convey to someone else what Plony said about this victim, since this
information might become known to the victim, because of the rule
word will travel from person to person, as I explained above in the 3rd
Kelal, the 3rd halacha, nevertheless there is a distinction (in this law) if the
speaker first cautioned this someone not to tell anyone else and in fact
nobody else was told, as I wrote above, that in this circumstance the esur
of Rechilut is not violated. (Nevertheless, to tell it to ones wife or relative
is forbidden).
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Understand clearly that this particular halacha is applicable even if the
speakers gossip contains no denigration, neither of Plony nor of Reuven
(the victim), for example that each of them was justified in what they
did (that both Plony and the victim were within the law in what they did
or said and this speaker went and conveyed this gossip to someone).
This had to be the case because if it was not, the speakers comments are
blatantly Lashon Hara and his conveying that gossip would be forbidden
in all circumstances even if he conveyed it to someone else. Please
reference above in the 3rd Kelal, in the 3rd halacha there and in the related
Beer Mayim Chayim where this was all clearly explained.
Mekor Hachayim
RK7/4. Similarly, the law makes no distinction and gossip about

a Jew is forbidden whether it is conveyed to a Jew or conveyed to
non-Jews. When one carefully analyzes this law, he will realize
that conveying gossip to a gentile is a significantly greater sin
than conveying it to a Jew. Because of his gossip, that Plony did
something to him (did something to this non-Jew) or said something
about him, most certainly the result could be a loss or harm to the
Jew (for this reason as well as other reasons, as I explained at length
in the first part of this sefer in the 8th Kelal, in the 12th halacha).
Yet there are many men who make this very serious mistake and
they point out to this gentile any defects or problems with the
merchandise he bought from a Jew or in the quality of work a Jew
did for a gentile (and anything else that is comparable). (Please see
the following Hagahah). This becomes the source of great loss and
suffering and often the gentile will steal away the livelihood of the
Jew because of this.
Hagahah
Meaning, here we are addressing a libel that is a lie. But if the comment is
true, just as it would be permitted to tell it to a Jew it would be permitted
to tell it to a gentile, as the Torah instructs us (Devarim 16:20) pursue
justice, pursue justice and Jews, who are a holy people, are especially
cautioned in this regard. [Editors note, Agudat Nautzrei Lashon 13th
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edition: This Hagahah was seemingly made necessary in order to pass the
(Kaisers) censor].
Mekor Hachayim
RK7/5. The law regarding the esur of believing gossip as truth is

the same as the law regarding the acceptance of Lashon Hara as
truth, as discussed in the first part of this sefer, in the 8th Kelal, in
the 13th and 14th halachot, please see that reference. Therefore, man
must be cautious not to believe the gossip conveyed by anyone, not
even from his own wife. And if one carefully thinks about this, he
will realize that in accepting \ believing the gossip of his wife, that
Plony said such and such about him, apart from the sin he commits of
believing gossip, he will bring down upon himself many, many other
troubles. When she sees her husband readily, pleasantly accepting
her gossip, she will constantly convey these same kinds of gossip
to him and she will cause him to become angry and cause him to
fight with other people and cause him soulful anguish. Therefore
it is correct and very appropriate for a sincere, principled person to
rebuke his wife (very gently) when she launches into these kinds of
discussions.
End of the 7th Kelal.
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Kelal Het - Halachah 1

(RK8 - 8th chapter)
Kelal Het
The law pertaining to intimations of gossip. There

Mekor Hachayim
RK8/1. There are many kinds of remarks that are forbidden

because they suggest or allude to gossip (Avak Rechilut- the dust
of gossip). I will summarize several of these circumstances and
from them a person of understanding will be able to extend them
globally to life in general. For example, a person tells his friend
(1) how people were inquiring from someone \ Plony about him
and that this someone \ Plony answered emphatically Quiet! - I
do not want to say what happened and what is going to happen, or
any comparable remark made by Plony that intimates this friend
did something inappropriate. This is Avak Rechilut, an allusion to
gossip.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK8/1/1)-(1).. a person tells his friend: This is obvious, since

this is inclusive of Avak Lashon Hara, as I wrote above in the first part of
this sefer, in the 9th Kelal (in the 1st halacha), it must be that this comment is
inappropriate. Then necessarily, if this speaker tells the victim that Plony
said something about him in this context, immediately this victim would
develop a sense of hostility towards Plony. It is possible that this speaker
then becomes categorized as a literal Rauchel \ a gossipmonger since
he conveys remarks made by Plony to the victim. But in any event the
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speaker is certainly not excused from the category of someone who speaks
Avak Rechilut.
Mekor Hachayim
RK8/2. Similarly a person who compliments someone to his

friend and by doing so (2) it is possible that the friend will
develop a sense of complaint against this someone and because
of the comment something bad might happen to this someone.
This is also categorized as Avak Rechilut. Therefore it seems to me
that a person should be cautious about praising Reuven in front of
his partner, Shimon (or praising a woman in front of her husband or
praising a husband in front of his wife) because he did him a favor
by extending a loan to him or gave him charity or gave him a (high)
salary (or anything comparable) because in so doing it is common
for Shimon to develop a sense of resentment towards his partner
Reuven. There are occasions when this can be the cause of a loss to
Reuven or the cause of strife (and similarly a woman can come to
resent her husband or her husband can come to resent his wife) if he
comes to believe that his partner is squandering his money.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK8/2/1)-(2)..and by doing so: We can also learn this concept from

what was brought down in the first part of this sefer in the 9th Kelal (in
the 1st halacha), that it is forbidden to praise someone if it will result in
someone else degrading him, and this concept is automatically extended
to any type of harm that may come to the person who was praised, as
is brought down in Gemara Arachin (16a) one should not praise the
goodness of his fellow Jew because in praising him it can evolve into
something bad and this statement of the gemara is inclusive of all of the
bad (that can happen to him). And that which we wrote in the context of
giving charity is specifically in the context of giving a large sum (and
similarly in extending a large loan or paying a high salary, each according
to its circumstance), that because of the comment this mans partner would
become very demanding of him.
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Kelal Het - Halachah 3-4
Mekor Hachayim
RK8/3. Similarly a person should be very careful when he asks a

fellow Jew (the giver) for a favor and this giver responds that
he cannot accommodate him. This person should not ask him (3)
Then why did you do that same favor for Plony? Plony told me
himself (4) (that you extended to him this very same favor) since
it often happens that because of this persons (accusative) question,
the giver will develop a sense of enmity against Plony because he
publicly disclosed the favor and now the giver has no way out of
protecting himself.20
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK8/3/1)- (3) ..should not ask him: This rule also evolves from
what we said in the first part of this sefer (in the Laws of Esurei Lashon
Hara), in the 9th Kelal, in the 3rd halacha. There it says: From here we
also learn that if someone gets a loan from someone else he should be
careful not to publicize it, and necessarily, someone who tells the lender
that so and so disclosed that he received a loan from him becomes liable
for violating an esur.
(RK8/3/2)-(4).. Plony told me himself: Occasionally even if he does

not finish his comment by saying Plony told me, it still is forbidden (to
ask). For example, if the lender realizes that this person could only have
known about the loan if Plony told him.
Mekor Hachayim
RK8/4. There are still other things that are forbidden because they
allude to gossip. For example, the speaker conveys to the victim
20 The giver has no way of declining the favor to someone else and at the
same time maintain his sense of self-dignity; he was caught in a lie or at the
very least in an uncomfortable situation. The giver then becomes indignant
at Plony for his indiscretion.
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a comment made by Plony that was not defamatory (5) but still is
something that people are somewhat sensitive about (6) if it is told
to them directly.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK8/4/1)-(5) ..that was not defamatory: And of course (it is

forbidden) if it was defamatory, even if the comment is not literally
defamatory yet is something that people consider to be inappropriate. For
example, they told him that Plony said about him that nobody else is always
cooking meat and fish as they do in his house, or something comparable,
that most certainly this alludes to gossip (Avak Rechilut). And of course
based on what we wrote in the first part of this sefer in the 9th Kelal (in the
notation attached to the 3rd halacha) quoting the SeMag and the Hagahot
Maymoniyot, that this statement is absolutely Lashon Hara. And then
necessarily if the speaker tells this to the victim, the comment made by
Plony, it is gossip.
(RK8/4/2)-(6).. people are somewhat sensitive about: This is the

language used by the Yerushalmi to express this concept (Pehah, the 1st
perek, the 1st halacha) Come and see how oppressive are allusions to
Lashon Hara, that the Torah chose to use fictitious language in order to
promote peace between Abraham and Sarah (Beresheet 18:12) Sarah
laughed etc and the commentary of the Pnei Moshe explains that the
Yerushalmi identified that as an allusion to Lashon Hara since it would not
be categorized as literal Lashon Hara even by saying my master is old
because what degradation was contained in those words. But rather it was
an intimation of Lashon Hara. And even so (even though it was only
Avak Lashon Hara) still the Torah created a fiction and did not quote her
as saying my master is old (but instead quoted her as saying and I
am old). And that which the Yerushalmi said- Avak Lashon Hara and
not Avak Rechilut was because the subject was Sarahs comment (there
the context was Lashon Hara and not Rechilut) just as the Pnei Moshe
explained there (in commenting on the Yerushalmi). Also it is common
to find Rechilut expressed under the title of Lashon Hara and that is why
Chazal used the expression Avak Lashon Hara (because it is inclusive of
Avak Rechilut).
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Mekor Hachayim
RK8/5. Man is obligated to hide (7) any secret confided in him by

a fellow Jew even if disclosing the secret has no aspect of gossip
since publicizing the secret damages his friend and is cause to ruin
his plans. Also, in revealing a secret, this person sheds his sense
of discretion \ modesty as he does something that is contrary to the
wishes of his fellow Jew.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK8/5/1)-(7).. Man is obligated to hide: This is the language used

by Rabbeinu Yonah in the 3rd shaar of Shaare Teshuvah (section #225) to
express this concept (please see that reference) and in Gemara Sanhedrin
(31a) this person reveals secrets! (Please see that reference). Violating
this confidence is very significantly more serious than plain allusions
to Lashon Hara and gossip, as demonstrated by Rabbeinu Yonah in that
reference.
End of 8th Kelal
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Kelal Tet

Kelal
Tet
(RK9 - 9th chapter)
An explanation of when gossip is permitted as the

conditions of this Kelal are fulfilled. There are 15
Mekor Hachayim
In our discussion above of the esur of Lashon Hara, in the 10th Kelal, we
explained the circumstances which would permit one to speak Lashon Hara
against someone who was behaving inappropriately in an interpersonal
framework and this speaker intends to achieve a useful \ beneficial outcome.
(Please see that reference). In this Kelal we will explain the circumstances
under which someone would be allowed to gossip as long as the speakers
intent is to prevent some harm from occurring. I ask Hashem for guidance
that I not make any mistakes in formulating these laws.
Beer Mayim Chayim

Before I begin this subject I would like to place before the reader an
important rule that is essential to this entire discussion. Understand an
essential rule clearly from the writings of the Rambam in the 7th perek of
Hilchot DeAut (the 5th halacha), quoted as follows: If someone conveyed
information to his fellow Jew, any remarks at all that if they became known
would cause physical harm to the victim or cause a financial loss to him
or cause him anguish, sorrow or to become afraid, is Lashon Hara. It is
apparent that this law of Lashon Hara is unlike other laws that apply to
financial damages (losses), where the Torah absolves a person from being
responsible if he was an indirect cause that eventually resulted in a loss.
Those laws are very different than this Lav of Lashon Hara where this
person would immediately be held culpable (even before the onset of any
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Kelal Tet
of the damages described in the cited Rambams definition of Lashon
Hara).
The reason for this is that regarding monetary damages, the Torah speaks
about the obligation to pay only after the damage was incurred. Thus
the Torah does not hold this person liable for indirect damages. But that
is very different than our case involving Lashon Hara where the issue
is whether from the very outset the person is allowed to make certain
remarks or not. Therefore, the Torah forbids the kinds of speech that can
cause damage, even though that speech would only be an indirect cause,
as we find by damaging indirectly, that it is forbidden to do so, as the
Gemara Babba Batra (22b) brings down this law that indirect actions that
cause losses are forbidden (even though the person who prompted those
damages is exempt from compensating the victim). What evolves from
this is that someone whose remarks indirectly cause a loss to a fellow Jew
violates the Lav of Esur Lashon Hara. For example, someone wanted to
form a partnership with someone else or applied for a job (and this same
rule applies in all of the illustrative examples that follow) and this person
conveyed (for example, conveyed remarks) from one to another, meaning
he conveyed gossip about him from one person to another, (since this is the
language used by the Torat Kohanim commenting on the pasuk (Vayikrah
19:16) Do not peddle gossip in society meaning, do not be like a peddler
who carries articles (remarks) from one person to another) to the point
where those remarks cause the business deal to be cancelled and results in
a loss to this victim. The gossip is inclusive of Lashon Hara.
And do not (attempt to) refute this idea by arguing the Rambam was
only addressing a specific case where the speakers remarks caused a
real (quantifiable) loss, which is not the case here where the speaker only
prevented someone from receiving a benefit and therefore there is no aspect
of Lashon Hara here. This is not so! Because at the very least it falls into
the category of someone who causes anguish to his friend through his
speech, which is Rechilut.
(Moreover in this regard, this case is no worse than the case of someone
meddling in someone elses business, and that someone came and took
something that a poor man was rummaging through. This someone
is called evil \ a Rasha (Gemara Kedushin 59a), and by a simple logical
deduction it is forbidden here too, as follows: If in the rummaging
case whereby a person takes an (ownerless) object that a poor man was
rummaging through and this person gains (acquires) for himself the object
and nevertheless he is called evil (Gemara Kedushin 59a) because he
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Kelal Tet - Halachah 1
deprived the poor man of a livelihood (as Rashi explains at the beginning
of perek Haomer, citation beginning with the words Is called), how
much even more so is this person a Rasha here in our case where he gains
nothing for himself in conveying his gossip since he does not have any
involvement in this partnership and since he was not interested in a job
placement for himself. The fact of not gaining anything for himself
applies to all of the coming illustrative examples. In all these cases, this
person \ speaker merely prevents his fellow Jew from gaining a benefit
and this gossip characterizes the speaker as evil. This same concept is
expressed in Choshen Mishpat in section #237, in the first sub-paragraph
as follows: Someone who is transacting to buy merchandise and another
person comes along and buys it first is called a Rasha and this same
law applies to someone applying for a job and someone else steps in and
grabs it first. (Please see that reference). In our discussion, all of the cited
Authorities are in unanimous agreement that this person is called evil
since in doing what he did he never intended to gain a real benefit for
himself (his actions were malicious and he is a Rasha).
I elaborated on this subject in order that anyone who carefully reviews
these laws will realize that these kinds of comments are absolute Lashon
Hara and absolute Rechilut unless the conditions are fulfilled that are
detailed further on in this Kelal. And what I wrote (RK9/1) in some
venture is inclusive of all of the illustrative examples that I will bring at
the end of this sefer with Gds help.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/1.
If an observer sees a fellow Jew about to form a

partnership in some venture with someone else and realizes that the
partnership would result in a bad outcome, he is obligated (1) to
warn him in order to save him from a bad loss but he must comply
with the five conditions that I will explain shortly.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/1/1)-(1).. he is obligated: In order not to astound you, the reader,

because I was so quick to say that this observer- (Reuven,) must go
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and tell his friend- (Shimon) not to form that partnership, I must now
elaborate on this subject. (I will express this law by illustrating it with
one example but this concept extends to all of the illustrative examples
that follow). For example, someone (Shimon) wants to hire Plony as a
caretaker in his home and Reuven recognizes Plony and knows from his
past that he is a thief. There are three possible paths to follow: (1) Is it
permissible to tell Shimon what he knows about Plony and prevent Shimon
from hiring him and incurring a loss, or (2) Maybe it is also a mitzvah, an
obligation to tell Shimon about Plony, or (3) Maybe it is forbidden to tell
Shimon because conveying that information is Rechilut and in so doing he
would cause a loss to Plony, as I mentioned in the Beer Mayim Chayim at
the beginning of this Kelal.
It seems to me that the law obligates Reuven to tell Shimon about Plony
and the proof comes from Gemara Sanhedrin (73a): Where is the source
for learning that if someone sees a fellow Jew drowning in a river that he
has to save him?or the case of armed robbers coming that.(Answer)
the Torah instructs us (Vayikrah 19:16) Do not stand by passively
while your fellow Jew is in mortal danger. This law is brought down in
Choshen Mishpat section # 426, paragraph #1, that Reuven is obligated to
tell Shimon about the impending danger. (Please see that reference).
And do not attempt to refute what I have said by arguing that there, in that
case, armed robbers are actually coming to kill him and in order to save
Shimons life Reuven must go over to him and tell him about the intent of
these armed people (these murderers) in order that Shimon protect himself.
But in monetary matters maybe the Torahs instruction did not extend to
allowing Reuven to tell Shimon by reporting on Plony because that is not
so! The [Mechilta] Sifra commentary addresses this concept as does the
Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvot (Lav #297), that the Lav of Do not stand
by passively includes a warning not to withhold testimony in monetary
matters even if he was not called to testify (he is obligated by the Torah to
step forward and give his unsolicited testimony in Beit Din) as we infer
from the language of that Torah imperative Do not stand by passively!
This concept is also brought down in Sefer Shaar HaMishpat at the
beginning of the section dealing with the laws pertaining to witnesses
giving testimony and implicit in the cited Sefer HaMitzvot.
Also, do not try to refute this law by arguing that in those cited references
we are asking this person to testify in court and in court his testimony
is immune from the laws of Rechilut but outside of court he may not
testify. This too is not so, since the Sifra commentary taught us that
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the Lav of Do not stand by passively includes monetary matters, most
certainly included in this Lav is an obligation not to passively stand by
and leave his fellow Jew to eventually sustain a monetary loss just as it
does obligate him not to sit by passively when someones life is in danger.
The Torahs intent in instructing us in this Lav is not to abandon or leave
a fellow Jew alone to allow him to suffer a life-threatening loss, just as
the Baraitah illustrates in its example of someone drowning in a river,
that the Torah obligates one to save him \ her; for in the Torah there is no
mention at all of testimony in that Lav. (The issue was not witnessing
or witness testimony, the issue was- Not standing by passively while
someones life was in danger of drowning). And that which the Baraitah
illustrated withholding testimony (which could imply that the Lav is
only regarding testimony) comes to teach us that the Lav of Do not
stand by passively applies in monetary matters even if this person already
gave his money to unscrupulous men who are now disputing his claim to
return his money and that this witness must testify in court and help the
plaintiff recover his money. And if this witness is lax and does not give
testimony, he now violates this Lav of Do not stand by passively. And
all the more so in our case, that Shimon, who is seeking to hire Plony yet
does not know his character (his lack of honesty) and routinely assumes
he is trustworthy. Yet Reuven does know Plony as being a thief and even
though Reuven is a solitary witness it is obviously a mitzvah to go and
report what he knows to Shimon in order that Shimon not lose his wealth
(at the hands of Plony).
(Even though in this context of withholding testimony the Lav of Do
not stand by passively is valid only if two witnesses are present (who
withheld testimony), because if that was not so there would be no proof
that his testimony would help him (the victim), as the gemara implies
in Masechet Babba Kamma (56a) that a single witness who withholds
his testimony is liable (only) at the hands of Heaven. And if you were
to suggest that the Lav of Do not stand by passively is applicable in
all circumstances even if there is only one witness, because through his
testimony the victim might have been able to recover his money if the
other defendant declined to take an oath, then the gemaras question
would remain, (namely) It is a Torah imperative! (Please see that
reference). There, the only support the defendant could receive was from
the testimony of two witnesses who (are the only ones that could) recover
his (the plaintiffs) money now being held by the man he is contending
against in this court case. But here in our discussion, where the subject is
preventing a loss before it started taking place, and Reuven in conveying
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his report (his Rechilut) to Shimon is provoking a decision on the part
of Shimon, since Shimon would most certainly believe him, and in so
doing Reuven will stop a loss (stop the thief - Plony) from occurring (from
being hired). Reuven is most certainly obligated to tell Shimon what he
knows about Plony even though he is only a solitary witness and this is
comparable to a solitary witness being obligated to save someones life (to
warn him that someone wants to kill him).
Please review carefully the Sefer HaMitzvot cited and you will realize the
Rambam expressed this very same concept, quoted as follows: We are
warned (by the Torah) not to be laxwhen we see a fellow Jew confronted
by mortal danger or by an impending loss and this observer has the
resources to save him. The Rambams expression or by an impending
loss most certainly refers to a monetary loss, just as he quotes this same
idea in the commentary of the Sifra. From the plain understanding of
his meaning, we can infer that this rule prevails in all situations, whether
Shimon already suffered a loss and Reuven can recover that money or save
Shimon from losing money by giving him advance notice of an impending
loss.
Another clear proof comes from the Rashbam in Gemara Babba Batra
(39b) regarding the protest \ declaration of land ownership. Please see
the Rashbam, citation beginning with the words and the opinion that
holds where he explains that in conveying that specific gossip there
is no aspect of Lashon Hara, and moreover it is a mitzvah to tell Shimon
who is now residing on the field what he heard, what Reuven said about
him, that he is a thief and is eating off the land through theft, even though
these remarks are absolutely Rechilut, in order that Shimon should keep
his purchase-contract in a safe place (so that asset cannot be taken away
from him since he retained his proof of purchase). The Rashbam allows
them (the witnesses) to make this report directly to Shimon (in that citation
beginning with the words We require witness testimony. So we see that
as long as the essential testimony has nothing to do with defaming Plony
but rather its purpose is to help Shimon from now on to retain his proofof-purchase evidencing ownership, then the testimony \ the report is not
categorized as Rechilut, and even more so, it is a mitzvah to report this and
that is the law here as well in our case.
This is also the opinion of the Tosafot there in the citation beginning with
the words We require witness testimony, paralleling the opinion of the
Rashbam that a protest \ declaration of land ownership demonstrating
retention of land ownership is immune from the esur of Lashon Hara.
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Then necessarily it is because of the reason stated by the Rashbam and this
is also the prevailing law in our discussion here of the esur of Rechilut.
This concept is also brought down by the Chinuch in his commentary on
mitzvah #236, in a situation where the speakers intent is to remove any
(possibility of a) loss and to arbitrate a dispute and bring about peace,
the Lav of Do not peddle gossip does not apply. (Please see that
reference).
Now even though all this is clear, one must be very careful not to
immediately seize this leniency unless his intentions are good from
the very outset and he complies with all of the conditions listed in the
immediately following law. But if not, most certainly this person will fail
(and in failing he will have committed many sins, as the Chafetz Chayim
writes in his Introduction) and will violate the esur of gossip, Gd forbid.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/2. These are the conditions (that must first be fulfilled before
gossip is allowed):
(1). One must be very careful not to come to an immediate conclusion
and decide that what he observed was a bad situation. Instead he
should first carefully investigate (2) and determine if the situation
he observed is indeed bad.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/2/1)-(2).. carefully investigate: Anyone who wants to know

the background of these laws should reference what was written above in
the laws of Lashon Hara, in the 10th Kelal, in the 6th and 9th notations of
the Beer Mayim Chayim.
Mekor Hachayim
(2). The speaker may not exaggerate the bad he observed any
more than it actually is.
(3). The speakers sole intention in conveying the gossip must be
only to achieve a useful \ beneficial outcome (3), in particular his
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intent in reporting his gossip must be to save the victim from a

loss and not because he hates Plony.
(This particular third condition is inclusive of yet another condition.
Apart from his being motivated to achieve a positive outcome by
conveying his gossip, and not because he hated Plony, the speaker
(Reuven) must consider beforehand if his remarks will achieve a
positive outcome and exclude the likelihood which happens often
(4) that if in his making his report to Shimon, Shimon will ignore
his advice and form a partnership with Plony anyway, and later (5)
when there is a falling out (between Shimon and Plony), Shimon
tells him (Plony) - You know, Reuven was right and I should not
have gone into partnership with you (or something comparable).
To these kinds of people whom Reuven recognizes, and he knows
that their personality is such that they will launch into gossip and
Lashon Hara, there is no leniency at all that applies to them because
in so doing Reuven would cause these blind men to violate the
Torahs Lav of gossip).
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/2/2)-(3) .. only to achieve a useful \ beneficial outcome:

This can be seen clearly in the 3rd shaar of Rabbeinu Yonahs Shaare
Teshuvah in section #228 and in the Shetah Mekubetzets commentary
on Gemara Babba Batra (39b) quoting the Aliyot of Rabbeinu Yonah, of
blessed memory, where he expressed this law in the context of interpersonal
relationships. Please see further what I wrote in the referenced, 10th Kelal,
in the 10th notation.
Our intent is not limited to literally this particular circumstance, that if
this observer \ speaker is not motivated solely to achieve a useful outcome
he is absolved from conveying any report at all since it might become
gossip, because the Torahs imperative is Do not stand by passively even
in a monetary matter, as I wrote above (in the first notation in the Beer
Mayim Chayim of this Kelal) (and the speaker must convey his report).
Please see Rashis commentary in Gemara Sanhedrin (73a), the citation
beginning with the words therefore the pasuk comes to teach us (that if
you yourself are unable to help, you must find any other possible means
to help and you may not stand by passively while your fellow Jews life
is in mortal danger). But rather, this observer \ speaker must force himself
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while he is speaking to think that his sole motivation is to be helpful, that
he is striving to accomplish a useful outcome and he must push out of his
mind any thoughts of hatred he has for Plony. In so doing, he necessarily
beautifies himself (removes himself) from violating the esur of gossip.
(RK9/2/3)-(4).. that happens often: This kind of thing happens

very often when a matchmaker is urging a particular couple, and nothing
anybody would say could break that match (even if someone tells them
something negative (about that match) with no intention to speak Lashon
Hara and without violating any of the laws of esur Lashon Hara) and after
the match is made, we find very often, because of the many sins of society,
one will tell the other side that Plony criticized him \ her and that Plony
said such and such about him \ her. To these kinds of people, no leniency
at all is permitted and one may not convey any report to them at all.
(RK9/2/4)-(5) .. and later: Although it was not particularly necessary

to spell it out, I elaborated on a point because I wanted to illustrate a very
common occurrence. But this same law applies, that one may not convey
gossip even if Shimon would listen to Reuvens advice but Reuven knows
that Shimons personality is such that he gossips and that Shimon is likely
to go out and tell people that Reuven advised him not to take on Plony as a
partner because of such and such and these criticisms can eventually reach
Plony and cause great strife and contention. Or because Plony begins
to pry him to learn what the reasons were that prevented the partnership
from forming even though in principle he did decide to take him on as a
partner, and in response Shimon tells Plony that Reuven said such-andsuch about you. To these kinds of people who are gossipmongers one
may not convey any Rechilut at all.
Mekor Hachayim
(4). If the speaker is able (6) to achieve this same useful \ beneficial
outcome without conveying anything negative about Plony, then he
may not say anything negative about him.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/2/5)-(6) .. is able: For the source of these statements, please see

the reference 10th Kelal of the Laws of Lashon Hara in the 11th notation of
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Mekor Hachayim
(5). All of this is permitted only if in conveying this gossip no
actual bad will happen to Plony, rather only the good that
someone would have done for him would not be done. Even though
declining that favor is in itself something bad, still it is permitted
to convey the gossip. But if something actually bad will happen
to Plony, then it is forbidden to gossip about him (7) because other
requirements (8) now come into play that will be explained further
on, with Gds help, in the 5th and 6th halachot of this Kelal. And
of course if the speaker, if Reuven sees that real harm will happen
to Plony if he conveys his gossip, more than the law would have
demanded (9), then it is forbidden to say anything. Please reference
what I wrote further on in the 5th halacha of this Kelal.21
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/2/6)-(7) .. then it is forbidden to gossip about him: The

reason is because this speaker has no authority to force an outcome that
the Beit Din itself could not enforce based on what this speaker reported
and we know that Beit Din would not extend any bad to someone based
on the report of a single witness. The most the court would do in the face
of single-witness testimony is force Plony to swear an oath in his own
defense (in a monetary matter). Please reference the source for this law
later on in the Mekor Chayim and in the 17th notation of the Beer Mayim
Chayim where you will find an explicit gemara that discusses this issue.
(RK9/2/7)-(8) .. other requirements: Meaning, if the bad which

would happen to him is demanded by the law and that two speakers are
involved. Please see the 6th halacha, that even in this circumstance one
must be very careful from the very outset (in conveying this gossip to
Shimon) because they are not excluded from those who help a sinner.
(Please carefully review that reference).
Understand clearly that what I said above actual bad is illustrated in a
case where this person (Plony), who is being defamed by Reuven in front
21 Note: The editor of the Poral Taasiyot edition believes that perhaps the
reference is to the 13th halacha.
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of Shimon in order to prevent Shimon from forming a partnership with
him, once had some other partnership dealings with him (with Shimon) and
there was a great loss sustained in that partnership (by Shimon). Reuven
knows that this past loss was caused by this crook (Plony). And when he
(Reuven) now comes and conveys to Shimon this defamatory report about
Plony, Shimon will understand the reason for his loss was caused by this
crook (by Plony) and he will grab (i.e., Shimon will recover his prior loss
from) him because of that loss.
(RK9/2/8)-(9) .. more than the law would have demanded: I will

illustrate a small point and from that anyone with a sense of understanding
will be able to extend this concept to all other comparable situations. For
example, someone (Shimon) is considering hiring someone else (Plony) as
the caretaker of his home and he (Reuven) recognizes him from the past
as the thief who once stole from some person. The law demands that he
(Reuven) must report this to Shimon but only if he complies with the five
conditions that are stated above and even though in truth it is possible that
he (Plony) is sorry about what he had done and has decided never to steal
again. Nevertheless, it is still proper and correct to consider the possibility
that Plony was not remorseful and is still a thief and to take steps necessary
to protect Shimon.
But if he (Reuven) senses that in conveying this report to Shimon it is
possible that the story will get out and society will now perceive Plony as
a thief and very bad things will happen to him (to Plony), like this very
bad habit that some people have, that they are prone to instantly judge
people in matters of life and death and decide he (Plony) is the most evil
person in the entire city and that it is a mitzvah to pursue him (and punish
him). In this situation, one (Reuven) must be very, very careful not to
defame any man because otherwise it would be just as though he (Reuven)
shot him (Plony) with an arrow in conveying his gossip \ report. I will
elaborate on this elsewhere with Gds help.
And now that Hashem Yitbarach has guided me to explain these five
conditions, I will elaborate on another detail so that you (the reader who
carefully goes through this analysis) will not be astounded by why I
omitted here the first condition listed above in the 10th Kelal (2nd halacha)
of the Laws of Esurei Lashon Hara, that this speaker must be a first-hand
observer to the event that he is reporting, because I have a serious doubt
as to whether or not this condition is relevant here. Apparently it would
be sufficient (to permit reporting this event) even if he heard about it from
others. A proof to this argument comes from the Gemara Niddah (61a)
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since he (Gedaliah Ben Achikam) should have given some credence to
the report of Yochanan Ben Koreach (and taken steps to protect himself
from being assassinated by Yishmael Ben Netanya, but did not), (Chazal)
consider him (Gedaliah) as though he killed his own supporters. The
Rosh writes in his commentary on that gemara (9th perek, 5th paragraph)
in relation to its impact on the law as follows: In this specific regard one
should give some credibility to the (gossip) Lashon Hara wherever there
is a possibility that some harm or loss will follow to him or to others if
the gossip would be ignored completely, like the case of Gedaliah Ben
Achikam. From this we see that if someone hears something that could
result in harm or a loss to others, for example- someone wants to hurt them
or the caretaker that someone is considering hiring is a thief (or something
comparable, as will be illustrated in the coming examples), even though
the law forbids believing the gossip or the Lashon Hara, nevertheless one
may suspect that the report might be true and one must warn these other
people so that they can protect themselves.
This is also seen clearly in the Rashbam in his commentary on Gemara
Babba Batra (39b) in the citation beginning with the words and the
authority who holdsit is a mitzvah and (also) in the citation beginning
with Here... that even if he himself (Shimon) did not hear what Reuven
said about Plony (who is holding onto the field now) that he (Plony) was a
thief, but that it was told to him by others, this too would be permissible to
tell Plony since his primary motivation is not to convey gossip but rather
to warn Plony to protect his purchase-contract. The Rashbam expressed
this as or to tell others to tell him (to tell the one who is currently on the
field), because if not for this reason (of wanting to protect someone from
injury) most certainly other people would not have the authority to tell the
person now residing on the field that Reuven called him a thief. Therefore
the law must necessarily be as I stated it. And so even though they
themselves are forbidden to believe these two witnesses who told them
about Reuven, that he called Plony a thief, and to conclude a definitive
opinion, (because if they would definitely believe it, then either way one
of these men is a Rasha, either the thief (Plony) or Reuven who defamed
him, and a person does not have the right to assume others are Reshaim,
as we explained in the first part of this sefer, in the 3rd halacha of the 7th
Kelal, that it is forbidden to believe Lashon Hara even if it is reported
by two people if their testimony is made outside of the Beit Din). Still
it is necessary to suspect the Lashon Hara and maybe Reuven did call
Plony a thief. Therefore Shimon must inform the intended victim so that
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he will protect his contract \ proof-of-purchase. (Please see the following
Hagahah after which this 9th notation will continue).
Hagahah
Nevertheless it seems to me that the Lav of Do not stand aside passively
while your fellow Jews life is in danger is not relevant to this circumstance
except if he witnessed the event himself or (even) if he heard about it from
someone else and it is clear to him that the report is true. But just hearing
something in general, even though one can suspect its truth, (acting on what
he heard and warning the victim) is only a general mitzvah (but it is not the
imperative of the mitzvah of Do not stand by passively). Regarding this,
they (Chazal) have said (Gemara Niddah 61a) He (Gedaliah) should have
suspected, but Gd forbid Gedaliah Ben Achikam did not transgress any
sin, he was a great man and he did not violate the Lav of Do not stand
aside passively while your fellow Jews life is in danger, merely that he
held a different opinion of what the law requires regarding the acceptance
of Lashon Hara and Rechilut as truth, to the extent that he believed it was
forbidden to even suspect it might be true.
Beer Mayim Chayim, continued ..
(RK9/2/8)-(9) .. other requirements: Even though there are strong

proofs supporting this basic expression of the law, that even if there is only
a suspicion of possible loss, one must deflect that suspicion away from a
fellow Jew. However it is possible to deflect them quite simply by arguing
they are not relevant to our topic because on the basis of conveying his
report and stopping a possible loss from occurring to him (to Shimon)
he is causing a loss to him (to Plony), and maybe the gossip he heard
about Plony was a lie. Regarding this law in the cited reference, it is
known that the Roshs opinion is that only if the gossip will not result in
any loss to Plony, but rather it will protect Shimon and he now he will
be alert to protect his assets, and on this basis the speaker is obligated to
convey his report in order to satisfy both parties; this one (Plony) is not
damaged by the speakers report and this one (Shimon) protects himself
even from a suspicion of possible harm since he is allowed to suspect
the report might be true. But that is not so (the speaker may not convey
a report) if as a result of his report Plony will suffer real damages. Most
certainly it would be forbidden, as we clearly proved in the first part of
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this sefer in the 7th Kelal, in the 30th notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim
using explicit proofs. So too in our subject, if the speaker sees that his
report will indirectly cause some type of loss to Plony, it is possible that
conveying that report would be forbidden just as it would be forbidden if
his report would directly result in a real loss to Plony, since it is possible
that in disclosing his report word will spread and society will perceive this
caretaker as being a thief or this potential partner as being disreputable, or
something comparable, in all of the coming illustrative examples that we
will bring with Gds help, and they will not find a source of livelihood;
maybe what he heard about him was a lie. From the commentary of the
cited Rashbam we have no proof that would permit a leniency in this law
(no leniency that would permit the gossip \ report) and this entire subject
requires much more thought and analysis.
However, it is obvious to me that if this speaker is not familiar with this
caretaker as being a thief (or something comparable in all of the coming
examples), just that some people told him so, even if we hold that it is
permitted to tell Shimon so that he can take steps to protect himself, still
he should not convey that report without any qualifications and give the
impression that he knows what he is saying because he is implying that
he was a first-hand witness. What he should say is I heard from others
such-and-such about Plony and it might be true, therefore you (Shimon)
should suspect it is true and take steps to protect yourself. And having
said this, you (the reader) will understand what I said at the beginning of
the first illustrative example that follows at the end of this sefer, with Gds
help, that he recognizes him (Plony) and knows him very well (that he
is a thief).
And similarly in all of the coming illustrative examples ([he should warn
the future potential victim that Plony is a thief] with the exception of the
examples of the childrens tutor \ teacher and the bridegroom both of
which contain suggestions that these people (the tutor or the bridegroom)
are heretical, Gd forbid. I reviewed and changed the language that I
used, and I used the expression I heard... (meaning I only know of this
because someone told me) because of the great harm that commonly
occurs because of that kind of gossip), even if we say that it is permitted
to warn the victim by just hearing from others about Plony being a thief or
something similar, and it is not necessary to know the situation personally
in order to warn the victim. Yet because society is not careful in this
regard and people will repeat it back to the victim who is the subject of
the gossip using language that expresses the gossip as a certainty because
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they are not educated in the laws of accepting Lashon Hara as truth, which
is absolutely forbidden, since the speaker conveys his gossip as though it
was a certainty he is demonstrating that he believes that gossip and in so
doing he immediately violates the Lav of accepting Lashon Hara as truth.
That is why I framed this example in the context of recognizing Plony
from his past (as being a thief).
Up until this point I explained why I omitted the first condition in the
cited Kelal. Now I will explain why I omitted the condition of rebuking
since it is unnecessary here. Granted that there (in the 10th Kelal of the
laws of Esurei Lashon Hara) the subject is someone who already violated
an esur and another person wants to tell others what he did because he is
zealous for the sake of truth, and so we required that the speaker must first
rebuke Plony in hopes that he will remedy the problem all by himself.
But here, where the topic is warning someone (Shimon) so that no harm
will come to him from Plony and that Plony is a (possible) thief or a bad
potential partner (or something comparable, as illustrated in all the coming
examples), what is the purpose of the rebuke? Even if Plony promises
never to do it again, perhaps he will not keep his promise.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/3. Now I will explain another circumstance which does

not violate the esur of gossip, namely, if someone (the speaker
Reuven) heard (10) someone else (Plony) say If I meet up
with so and so (the victim,- Shimon) in such and such a place
I will beat him up or I will insult him and berate him, or Reuven
heard Plony say he wants to cause a financial loss (11) to Shimon.
Then the law allowing Reuven to convey that gossip \ report to
Shimon is conditional: If Plony has an established reputation (12)
for carrying out his threat because he has demonstrated that ability
on several past occasions or that Reuven realizes from the current
circumstances (13) that Plony was not exaggerating and will most
certainly carry out his plans, then most certainly Reuven must
convey that report to Shimon and in so doing perhaps he (Shimon)
will be on guard against Plony so that no humiliation or loss will
occur. (Please see the following Hagahah). However Reuven must
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be careful to abide by all of the rules that are written above (in the
2nd law of this Kelal).
Hagahah
All of this is relevant if Reuven first rebuked Plony and Plony ignored him
or if Reuven determined his rebuke would be pointless. But if Reuven does
not know how Plony will react to his rebuke, in an ordinary circumstance
Reuven must first rebuke (14) Plony for wanting to do bad to this victim
(Shimon) or to try to appease him, perhaps in so doing (Reuven will mollify
Plony and) his anger will disappear. The advantage of this approach is that
Reuven will not have to go to Shimon and convey his gossip \ report about
Plony. Moreover, Reuven will have fulfilled the Torahs Aseh of rebuking
a fellow Jew and causing peace. Please see the associated Beer Mayim
Chayim.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/3/1)-(10) .. if someone (the speaker Reuven)

heard: Based on what we explained above in the immediately preceding
9th notation, this would be the law even if he (Reuven) did not hear Plonys
threat firsthand because in this situation it is not common to find that some
harm will come to Plony as an outcome of gossip, just that Reuven will
remove a threat of loss from Shimon. But Reuven must be careful in his
choice of language and not report his story to Shimon as being a matter of
fact. Instead he should tell Shimon I heard such and such, perhaps it is
true and if so, then you should suspect Plony and protect yourself.
(RK9/3/2)-(11) ..cause a financial loss : This law evolves from the

Roshs commentary on Gemara Niddah (9th perek, 5th paragraph) that we
quoted above in the preceding 9th notation. All of the proofs brought there
apply here as well.
(RK9/3/3)-(12) .. established reputation : I wrote this expression

of the law because of the discussion in Gemara Shvuot (46a) Rav
Nachman said- If a person grabs an axe and says I will go and chop down
Plonys date-palm-tree, people tend to exaggerate their intentions but do
not carry through on their threats. But if he has a reputation for carrying
out his threats, we do not use this maxim of people tend to exaggerate as
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the Tosafot write there (in the citation beginning with the words people
tend to) quoting the Rokeach. This concept is brought down as law in
Choshen Mishpat in section #90, paragraph #2, in the commentary of the
Taz and other Authorities. In the Choshen Mishpat section #388, (sub
paragraph #8) the Hagahah there also implies that if someone had a prior
reputation for carrying out his threats then according to all Authorities we
do not apply the maxim people tend to exaggerate but do not. Please
reference there the commentary of the Vilna Gaon annotated to the 11th
sub-paragraph, and all of this is obvious.
However, on the other hand I am uncertain as to whether or not the
requirement of an established reputation is applicable here at all.
Maybe we do not use the maxim of people tend to exaggerate to say
that because of it the person would not be obligated to pay, like the cited
case in Gemara Shevuot, or to say that the exaggerated threat would not
disqualify the speaker from becoming a witness in Beit Din, as is the law
in Choshen Mishpat, but in any event he is still suspect to carry out the
threat. Therefore in our case, even where there is a remote suspicion (that
he might carry out his threat) one must warn the intended victim, as I
wrote above in the 9th notation quoting the Rosh. Perhaps one can make a
distinction between a generalized suspicion, having heard his threat, (and
in that case one should tell the victim) and the maxim of people tend to
exaggerate. That maybe it is carrying that suspicion too far (and in that
case one may not tell the victim).
And do not challenge what I have said by citing the case of Gedaliah
(Yirmiyahu 40:13-16), that Yochanan Ben Koreach told him that Yishmael
Ben Netanya wanted to assassinate him. Yochanan was correct and
complied with the law in what he told Gedaliah (even though Yishmael
had no prior reputation as a killer), as the gemara there demonstrates (thus
proving that the maxim people tend to exaggerate does not exonerate
a person from telling the intended victim about the threat. Do not say this!
First, because in matters of threats to a persons life we are concerned
about even the most remote possibility and we do inform the intended
victim. Second, it was apparent to Yochanan Ben Koreach that Yishmael
Ben Netanya was serious about carrying out his threat against Gedaliah
Ben Achikam, as the text relates (and so it was necessary to report that
threat to the intended victim). In these cases (where the threat is apparent)
the maxim of people tend to exaggerate but do not carry out their threat is
not applicable as I will discuss further on in the (following) 13th notation.
(RK9/3/4)-(13) .. realizes from the current circumstances:
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This is clearly stated in the Choshen Mishpat section #388 in the Shachs
commentary in sub-paragraph #54, that if it is apparent that Plony will
carry through on his threat we do not apply the maxim of people tend to
exaggerate but do not carry through on their threats.
(RK9/3/5)-(14) .. must first rebuke: Seemingly, based on what I wrote

at the end of the 9th notation, this detail (this condition) of rebuking is
unnecessary, meaning, maybe Plony will make a promise and then not
keep his word. However, there is a distinction in applying this concept.
There, the framework was a relationship that would continue over an
extended period of time, like a household caretaker or a (bad) partnership
or something comparable, in all the scenarios that will be brought with
Gds help at the end of this sefer. In those kinds of circumstances a
rebuke is generally pointless and will not help change Plonys disposition
to become upstanding to the point where one need not suspect him and
therefore one must report him to his intended victim. But that is not the
case in our discussion where Plonys anger is only a momentary thing
and will soon pass. One finds that often in a case like this when Plony
is rebuked or appeased, his anger will quickly subside and completely
disappear and one need not be suspicious (of him) at all. In this sense
I wrote as I did (Reuven must first rebuke \ warn Plony). However,
realistically speaking, this is all dependent upon Plonys personality. If we
know him to be someone who will not keep his word since several times in
the past he promised something but then changed his mind, then we have
to be concerned that Plony will harm Shimon in some financial sense, as he
said he would do, then we must warn Shimon. This approach is relevant
only if we know that Plony has an established reputation for harming his
victims. But if he has no prior history of ever having harmed someone,
then the matter requires a great deal more thought and analysis.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/4. Even though this is a very great mitzvah (to warn someone
abut the possibility of impending danger) and is included in the
mitzvah of bringing about peace, still, one must be very careful not
to impulsively go and report this gossip unless one first carefully
thinks through the entire matter, that based on his report the intended
victim will protect himself and not go over by himself to the place
where Plony is, in order that Plony will not hit him or curse or
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berate him, or alternatively offer some other advice and based

on this advice, if followed through, the grievance between them
will disappear. (Thinking it through carefully before reporting to
Shimon is very important because) Very often a common outcome
of the report, that Plony wanted to insult him, is that Shimons
anger against Plony will grow and intensify and Shimon will take
the initiative and provoke a fight with him resulting in an even more
terrible conflict, Gd forbid. Therefore one must consider very
carefully how to approach this situation so that the outcome will be
resolved (amicably).
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/5. And now, with the help of Hashem Yitbarach, I will

elaborate on another important fundamental principal in these
matters and in so doing the 5th rule will be explained (i.e., no
actual bad will happen to Plony). Understand clearly that this
entire basic leniency that we wrote above in the 1st halacha of this
Kelal was specifically framed in the context of Shimon not having
finalized a transaction with Plony (15) although they had agreed
in principal to close their deal at some point in the future. But if
their deal was finalized (for each different type of deal an action
was done that our Authorities consider as being the finalization
of a transaction that forbids both sides from reneging on the deal)
then reporting the gossip to Shimon is conditional. If he (Reuven)
knows (16) no harm \ damages will happen to Plony (by reporting
his gossip to Shimon) but that Shimon will protect himself in
order not to sustain any loss caused by Plony, and Reuven is in
compliance with all five rules listed above in the 2nd halacha, then
it is proper and correct to convey that gossip to Shimon. But if
he (Reuven) is familiar with Shimons personality, that if he tells
Shimon what he knows about Plony then Shimon will immediately
jump to a conclusion and he will believe the gossip as absolute
truth (either because his personality is to immediately believe the
bad he hears about someone or because he has circumstantial
evidence regarding Plony or because Shimon very much depends
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on Reuven) and Shimon will rationalize the law in his own favor
and take matters into his own hands (17), for example, to renege on
his deal with Plony or cause some other harm \ loss to Plony based
on Reuvens report, even though he would not do anything worse
than a Beit Din would have done based on what the law demanded
if two witnesses had given their testimony in court. Still, conveying
that report is forbidden since his (Reuvens) report will be the cause
of his (Plonys) loss and that loss would not have occurred even
if he would have given single-witness testimony in court, no loss
would have occurred because the court could not have compelled a
monetary penalty based on the testimony of a solitary witness. Yet
now he (Reuven) is causing real damages to Plony because of the
report he made. Therefore, if two people (18) themselves saw the
incident (19) seemingly it would be permitted to convey that report
in a case where their only motivation (20) is to prevent a loss from
occurring (to Shimon). Nor should any more happen to Plony than
the law requires (and if they realized that in giving their testimony
the result would be something more severe happening to Plony than
the Beit Din would have imposed, then they have no more basis
for giving their testimony than the testimony of a solitary witness
and most certainly it is forbidden for the two of them to make their
report \ gossip). Furthermore, these two witnesses must not fail to
comply with any of the other details (21) listed above in the 2nd
halacha.
Beer Mayim Chayim
RK9/5/1)-(15) .. Plony: Within this statement I have included all of

the illustrative examples that will follow with Gds help at the end of
this sefer regarding this law. For example, regarding an employer hiring
a worker, who then gave this worker a symbolic indication that the deal
would be finalized, or he grasped onto a tool used by this expert craftsman
symbolically demonstrating their deal was finalized (and the worker was
hired), as is brought down in Choshen Mishpat section #333, paragraph #1
in the Hagahah. This is the law in all of these examples, each example using
the symbolism that is specific to that particular circumstance, although it
is not practical to list them all here since these various symbolisms change
depending on circumstances.
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(RK9/5/2)-(16) .. If he (Reuven) knows: But if he is unsure, then

the matter requires more thought and analysis. Even though we do not
perceive people as being wicked people still, we can see ourselves that
because of the many sins of society it is very common to find Shimon
reacting against Plony in a way that is completely outside of the law.
What I wrote above, that it is proper and correct to convey that gossip
to Shimon is because all of the proofs and opinions \ arguments that are
relevant above are also relevant here since no harm will happen to Plony
because of Reuvens report to Shimon and the only reason the report was
made was to alert Shimon to an impending problem in order that he protect
himself.
(RK9/5/3)-(17) .. take matters into his own hands: Because the

maxim taught by Chazal in Gemara Yomah (86b), that there is a mitzvah
to publicize the identities of flatterers \ manipulators, and its purpose is
to warn people not to associate with them so that they will not suffer any
loss because of them. Or even if a deal was finalized and they formed
a relationship and this speaker (Reuven) is familiar with Shimons
personality (the one who formed a relationship) and knows that the most
Shimon would do is to suspect that perhaps Reuvens report was true and
he would take steps to protect himself, then it would be a mitzvah to tell
him, but that Plony should not incur any real loss more than the Beit Din
would have penalized him had he (Reuven) appeared before the court as
a solitary witness.
A proof to this concept comes from Gemara Keritute (12a): If two
people told him-You became ritually impure and he responded- I did
not become ritually impure, Rebbe Yehudah says regarding this type of
circumstance that a person is believed to testify on himself more than the
testimony of 100 witnesses, but the rabbis, his colleagues, disagree with
him. The gemara there (12b) quotes Rav Nachman that the law follows
the opinion of Rebbe Yehudah. Rav Yosef said that this is the law only in
a private situation and only when it pertains to himself. Please reference
Rashi there who explains that Rebbe Yehudahs opinion is upheld as
law, that he is believed to say he is ritually pure only in regard to eating
Taharot 22 in private, but in a public setting he may not eat Taharot since
it could result in their trivializing the Taharot. Rashi goes on to explain
22 Taharot are foods that can only be handled and eaten in a state of ritual
purity.
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that what Rav Yosef said and only when it pertains to himself, means
he is believed to eat the Taharot that he touched since a person is believed
to testify on himself but he may not feed it to others. (Rashi quoted up
until this point). What follows from this is that even if we uphold the law
according to the opinion of Rebbe Yehudah [which is the opinion of the
Raavad (in the amendments to the Laws of Shigegot \ Unintentional
Mistakes, the 11th perek, in the 8th halacha) that the law does follow Rebbe
Yehudahs opinion; and most certainly according to the Rambam (in that
reference) who held the law is like the rabbis (who disagreed with Rebbe
Yehudah) all of this is unnecessary] that this man is believed (to say he
is ritually pure and) to eat the Taharot that he touched since he himself
knows what the truth is, that he is ritually pure, nevertheless only he is
allowed to eat that Taharot but he is not allowed to feed that Taharot to
others. The implication is obvious that even if others know nothing about
the testimony brought by these witnesses saying that this man was impure,
still it is forbidden for him to feed them this Taharot even though he himself
knows that he was pure since he understands that his word would not stand
up in court as being truth (since two witnesses testified otherwise). It
was in this regard that Rebbe Yehudah said the law is a man is believed to
testify about himself more than the testimony of 100 witnesses, but only
about himself and not regarding others. So too in our discussion; even
though he (Reuven) knows it is the truth, since from the perspective of the
Torahs laws the testimony of a single witness in monetary matters has no
value except to compel the defendant to swear an oath in his own defense
and Reuven knows that Shimon will believe him as though he was two
witnesses (contrary to the law) and in so doing cause a loss to Plony, it is
forbidden to convey that report \ gossip.
(In a similar sense the gemara brings down in Babba Kamma (117a)
regarding a trappers net that two men were fighting overeach one
claimed it was his...one of them went and informed on his antagonist to the
government. Rava said- He went so far? and Rava said we excommunicate
him even though he himself knows that truth was on his side. Also
in Gemara Shvuot (30b) regarding a witness who knows his fellow Jew
(Plony) is a thief, the witness cannot join him (Plony) to testify (in some
other matters) even though he knows the testimony is truthful, that Plony
A owes Plony B money, and Beit Din would not be doing anything
wrong by accepting their testimony and telling Plony to pay since they
do not know that one of the witnesses is a thief. Nevertheless, being that
he knows that the other witness is not qualified to testify, he will end up
being a single witness testifying and therefore it is forbidden to testify
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together with him because in so doing their testimony could compel the
court to decide against Plony based on the testimony of two witnesses
(one of whom was not qualified to be a witness) and cause a loss to him.
But truthfully there was only one valid witness giving testimony (and
that is not sufficient to cause the court to extract money from Plony) as
Rashi explains there. And most certainly in our discussion Shimon is not
behaving according to the law since he is listening to the testimony of
only a single witness and it is absolutely forbidden for Reuven to cause a
loss like this to occur).
Hashem Yitbarach illuminated my eyes and I located an explicit gemara
that deals with our subject and with that gemara we can now understand all
of the details of this law. This is the language of Gemara Babba Kamma
(113b) Rava proclaimed- This Jew who knew testimony in favor of a
gentile and went (unsolicited) and gave that testimony in a gentile court
against a fellow Jew is to be excommunicated. Why?! Because they
(the gentile court) take money from a person based on the testimony of
one witness. This applies only to single-witness testimony but not to
the testimony of two witnesses. Please reference Rashi in the citation
there beginning with the words the testimony of one witness where he
comments what results is that the witness caused him a loss of money,
contrary to the law (quoted up until this point). So we see that even
though this witness himself knows that in truth he (the victim of the
Rechilut) does owe this money, nevertheless we excommunicate him (this
witness) because of what he did. Had the gentile gone to Beit Din together
with this victim, the court could not have extracted money from him
(since only a single witness was testifying) and now his verbal testimony
caused a financial loss (to a fellow Jew in a gentile court). And do not
challenge what I have said by arguing that the reason we excommunicate
this single witness is because he gave testimony in a gentile court! First,
it is apparent in that gemara that if two witnesses gave testimony in a
gentile court no excommunication would have been imposed on them. If
the reason for excommunication was because they appeared in a gentile
court, then why not? (Why werent they excommunicated?). Therefore
the reason must be as I stated it. And since testimony from two witnesses
would have extracted money from the defendant (the victim) also by
Jewish law, hence the witnesses did not cause any loss to the defendant.
Second, I found explicit support to the way I expressed this law in the
commentary of the Kenesset HaGedolah on Choshen Mishpat in section
#28 (the 9th Hagahah in sub-paragraph #10) and in the Responsa of the
Ramah, section #52, that since the plaintiff was a gentile and the defendant
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was a Jew the rule forbidding adjudication in a gentile court is irrelevant
since that rule was expressed only in the context of two Jews contending
their cases in their (in the gentile) court. This is also evident in Choshen
Mishpat, section #28, paragraph #3 and in the related commentary of the
Meirat Enayim (20th notation), please see that reference, that the essential
reason is because even though the witness himself knows the truth, that
the defendant \ victim owes the money and because of this reason he (the
defendant) is free from paying anything since he (the witness) could say- I
witnessed truthfully, as the cited Choshen Mishpat brings down (in the
Hagahah). Still, since based on the Torahs law it would not be possible to
extract money from the defendant based on single-witness testimony and
because of his verbal testimony in a gentile court he caused the defendant
to lose money, the law requires that he be excommunicated since he never
should have gone to the gentile court.
This is also the law in our case, that he transgressed a serious esur since he
(the speaker- Reuven) knows Shimons personality (the intended victim)
and knows he will not go with him (with Plony) to Beit Din but instead
he will rationalize to himself and take the law into his own hands and will
cause a loss to Plony without any court intervention (namely, the example
that we have used several times regarding a caretaker, that Shimon will fire
Plony from his position as the caretaker of his house (without consulting
with the Beit Din) and similarly in all of the other illustrations that will be
brought at the end of this sefer with Gds help; that he will immediately
terminate the relationship that he maintained until now with Plony whether
by breaking up a pending marriage or by reneging on a business deal,
and based on what we will explain with Gds help a little further on, or
(cause) some other kind of loss that results from something he said beyond
what the law would have required if it becomes evident that his testimony
was truthful) or because Shimons personality is such that he immediately
believes the bad that he heard (from Reuven) about Plony or because
he depends on Reuven and considers him to be as authoritative as two
witnesses. For any one of these reasons, since an action resulted from
Reuvens gossip that would not have occurred had the matter gone to (a
Jewish) court, that most certainly in a Jewish court it would not have been
possible for someone to be awarded a verdict granting him permission
to terminate a finalized deal that was made with Plony, or cause some
other loss to Plony just because he (Shimon) has a single witness whom
he believes \ trusts with the same authority as two witnesses, as we wrote
above in the first section of this sefer in the 7th Kelal, in the 15th notation
of the Beer Mayim Chayim quoting our Authorities. And based on his
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verbal report an outcome resulted (that caused Plony to lose money);
therefore most certainly this report is forbidden.
And do not attempt to refute what I have said by arguing that there the
reason (he was excommunicated) was because he testified in a gentile
court for the benefit of a gentile and that is why Chazal were so strict with
him even though he knew that the truth was on the side of the gentile. But
had he testified in front of a gentile court (in a scenario where two Jews
came to court) to help one Jew against anther Jew and the Jew lost the case
and paid out money he would not have been excommunicated since he
knows that the Jew he testified against was really liable. So too is the law
in our case, since the speaker (Reuven) knows that the report he is making
is true and if the Beit Din would also have known that the report was
true, they would have dissolved the partnership, then it is possible to say
Reuven did not transgress any sin (in making his report to Shimon). But
this is also not so! The Taz concluded the law there in Choshen Mishpat
section #28, paragraph #4 (citation beginning with the words and most
certainly) that the law is we do excommunicate this single witness even
if both contending parties (in the gentile court) are Jewish since because
of his testimony money was extracted from his fellow Jew in a way that is
contrary to the Torahs law even though he knew the truth was on the side
of the litigant (and the law is not like the Maharshal who ruled leniently
in this regard [that we do not excommunicate the speaker]). I have also
found support to the way I expressed this law in the Tummim in this
reference (Urim, sub-paragraph #12) who quotes the Ramahs response,
section #52, who concurs with the Tazs opinion. Subsequently, I also
found support in the Kenesset HaGedolah on Choshen Mishpat in the cited
paragraph (Hagahot HaTur, sub-paragraph #10) who quotes the responsa
of the Mishpat Tzedek (part 2, paragraph #68), as well as in other responsa
who all hold like the Taz. Please see that reference.
And that which I wrote above or if he has circumstantial evidence we
already wrote above in the first part of this sefer, in the 7th Kelal (12th
halacha) that from the perspective of law we cannot compel the defendant
to pay out money (to penalize the defendant) on this basis.
(RK9/5/4)-(18) .. two people: Since had they gone to (a Jewish)

court the judges decision would have resulted in the same outcome that
occurred (to Plony) as a result of the report that was conveyed to him
(to Shimon). A proof to this comes from Gemara Babba Kamma (114a)
cited above. The gemara there says this is the conclusion for one witness
(excommunication), but not for two. Please reference the Choshen
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Mishpat cited above (the 3rd and 4th paragraphs, in the Hagahah), that the
essential reason underlying this law is as I expressed it, and that being so,
then that is also the law in our discussion here.
(RK9/5/5)-(19) ..themselves saw the incident: Meaning that they

themselves saw the bad event that was the basis for permitting one
partner to dissolve the partnership with Plony. For example, in the case
of the caretaker (Plony), they witnessed Plony stealing and on this basis
the law allows terminating his employment if the theft (the loss) was made
known to him (through these witnesses) and similarly this same theme
runs throughout the coming examples and the law is applied based on the
specifics of these cases.
And the way I expressed this two people themselves saw the incident
means to exclude those cases where they only heard about the incident
from others, most certainly that would not help here (hearing is never
a basis for witness testimony). (Please see the responsa of the Shevut
Yaakov (part 1) in section # 174. Also see above in the 9th notation an
explanation if hearing information from others can be a basis for reporting
an incident before a partnership was completely formed). For here we
require that testimony be admissible in Beit Din (and if that criterion is
met) then it is permissible to report that incident to Shimon even outside
of the Beit Din. However, testimony conveyed in Beit Din by witnesses
who only heard from others has no value. Thus even (in an instance of
two witnesses appearing in Beit Din) if one saw the event and the second
only heard about the event from others, that too would be inadmissible
testimony. Also, the two witnesses may not be related to each other, and if
they are related their testimony is inadmissible even if each one witnessed
the events. This is explicitly brought down as law in Choshen Mishpat,
section #28 of the citation above.
(RK9/5/6)-(20).. their only motivation: Meaning that this is not

comparable to what we explained above several times, that it is forbidden
to speak Lashon Hara or gossip even if two speakers are conveying it
(outside of Beit Din) and even if what they are conveying is truthful. This
is all true in a circumstance where their motivation is to denigrate Plony.
But that is not the case here where their sole motivation is to achieve an
outcome that is beneficial to Shimon. And even though necessarily Plony
will be denigrated, the report conveyed to Shimon is immune from the
laws of esurei Lashon Hara and Rechilut as we explained above at the
beginning of this Kelal. The only other remaining detail is the issue that
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Plony may be penalized more than would have been the case had this
matter been decided by a Beit Din since he could not have made his report
to the Beit Din (as a sole witness). But that is not so if two men conveyed
that report (since they could have given that same testimony in Beit Din
and it would have been admissible testimony).
(RK9/5/7)-(21) .. other details: The issue of rebuking will be

explained with Gds help in the coming illustrative examples and the
Beer Mayim Chayim.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/6.
This entire leniency of allowing two people to convey

a report \ gossip in a case where Shimon, the person receiving that
gossip has the kind of a personality who takes matters into his own
hands, only helps to make them immune from the essential sin of
speaking Lashon Hara or Rechilut however they are not immune
from the esur of assisting someone in committing a sin (22) since
the esur, the conveying of their report \ gossip, was the impetus
for Shimons (illegal) reaction. The law is that it is forbidden (for
Shimon) to believe them and then to go and do something that
results in a loss to Plony as long as that report was not made in Beit
Din by two witnesses who testified against Plony and the Beit Din
subsequently gave Shimon permission to act against Plony, as was
explained in the 6th Kelal, in the 9th and 10th halachot. Apart from
all of this, it is very difficult to illustrate this law in a practical sense
(meaning it is difficult to illustrate the leniency allowing two men
to legally convey gossip to Shimon who then causes a loss to Plony)
because it is completely improbable to find two speakers who are
familiar with all of the details of the law that relates to this topic
and who can then assess the consequences of their report and that
Shimons subsequent reaction against Plony will be consistent with
the Torahs law. Therefore, one must be careful not to convey any
information to someone who is quick to react \ retaliate without the
consent of the Beit Din in order that he not become trapped in the
net of those people who speak Lashon Hara. Those who guard
their mouths \ speech protect their souls from tragedy (Mishle
21:23).
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/6/1)-(22) .. assisting someone in committing a sin: This is

evident in Gemara Kedushin (32a) in the Tosafot (citation beginning with
the words He forgives. Even if I know the truth that it is not forbidden,
since he does not know that, it is forbidden to cause him to do it. And all
the more so here in this case which is much worse for several reasons.
And that which is written in Choshen Mishpat section #28, paragraph #4
in the Hagahah, that Two witnesses can initiate testimony (in a gentile
court in favor of a gentile) is only in that specific instance where
he (the Jewish defendant) is contending against a gentile in which case
assisting someone in committing a sin is irrelevant. And that which we
learned from this in section #26 paragraph #2, in the Hagahah, that most
certainly you can testify in a gentile court on behalf of a Jewish litigant
(where the defendant was also Jewish), please reference in that citation the
commentary of the Vilna Goan (6th notation), who explains that this is only
under circumstances which permit someone to go to a gentile court.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/7. This is also the law regarding informing someone (Shimon)

(23) that someone else (Plony) stole from him or harmed him in
some way or did some other bad to him; it (conveying the report)
is not permitted until the speaker complies with all of the conditions
listed above (in RK9/2) and that he also first rebuked Plony and
Plony ignored him. But if the speaker is not in compliance with all
of these conditions, it is forbidden for him to convey that report to
Shimon, as I wrote above in the 1st Kelal, in the 3rd halacha. Please
see that reference. Another detail to be extremely careful about
is not to rationalize and immediately decide what the law should
be (in these kinds of cases and that one is allowed to convey his
report to Shimon). Rather, from the very outset he should consider
carefully whether or not he is in compliance with all of these rules,
because if he does not first think this through he will very likely
violate the Torahs Lav against conveying gossip.
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And when Yehoshua asked HaKadosh Baruch Hu - Tell me who the

sinner is, ostensibly there should not have been any greater mitzvah
than publicizing the identity of this man. Therefore HaKadosh Baruch Hu
answered Yehoshua- And do you think I Am an informer? Go and throw
lots to determine his identity, and He did not want to directly disclose his
(Achans) identity at all (and casting lots to determine the sinners identity
was a very flimsy alternative since Achan could argue that throwing dice
does not prove who committed this sin, as our Chazal have explained).
It was with great guile and cunning that Yehoshua was able to pressure
Achan to admit his guilt.
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/7/1)-(23) .. informing someone: Meaning, that up until now we

were discussing a partnership and that if this partnership was maintained
he would lose money, as I will illustrate in the coming examples. But
here we are discussing a case where someone generally stole from him or
harmed him (Plony stole from Shimon, etc.). And when I wrote or did
some other bad I meant that it is something that through disclosing it,
good could result, similar to the case of (disclosing) theft and damages.
But if not for this (useful outcome) the report is absolute Rechilut.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/8. Understand clearly that it make no difference (24) in any

of the laws in this Kelal that we have written if someone (Shimon)
pressures him (Reuven) to tell him (what Plony said) or if he
(Reuven) volunteers the information. If there was compliance with
all of the rules in this Kelal (25) even if he was not asked, still
Reuven is obligated to tell Shimon. And if he is not in compliance
with all of these rules, it is forbidden under any circumstances for
him to tell Shimon.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/8/1)-(24) .. it make no difference: This is obvious throughout

all of these conditions \ rules; please refer above to the 1st Kelal, the 5th
halacha. Apart from this, in the 4th condition, (if he can achieve that same
beneficial outcome without speaking Lashon Hara or Rechilut) the proof
comes from Yehoshua (After Israels army lost 36 soldiers in the battle of
Ai) when he (Yehoshua) asked HaKadosh Baruch Hu to reveal the identity
of the person who was responsible and HaKadosh Baruch Hu respondedand do you think that I would speak Lashon Hara (in revealing this mans
identity) (and instead, lots were cast to determine who was the cause of
the loss)23 as we wrote above in the first part of the sefer, in the 10th Kelal,
23 Quoting from the Mazal Elul edition in English translation of the Chafetz
Chayims Kuntres Zechor LeMiryam 25th chapter:
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Kelal Tet - Halachah 9-10
in the 11th notation quoting the Tanna DeVei Eliyahu. Also regarding
the 5th condition (only if Shimon was about to suffer a real loss) where a
proof was brought from Gemara Baba Kamma (as I cited that reference in
the 17th notation). There, the law was expressed in the Choshen Mishpat
paragraph #28 (sub-paragraph #3) even if he was summoned it would be
forbidden and this follows the text version of the Rif. Please see in that
reference the commentary of the Vilna Gaon (20th notation).
(RK9/8/2)-(25) .. in this Kelal: Meaning whether it was before the

partnership was formed, and the first five conditions must be satisfied,
or even after the partnership was formed and the motivation was to
save Shimon from suffering a loss, it is also necessary to satisfy the last
conditions. This subject was already explained at length in the first part of
this sefer in the 10th Kelal (4th halacha). Please see that reference.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/9. Understand clearly something else, one must be careful to

observe all of rules of this Kelal, even if he only wanted to convey
his gossip to someone else (an unrelated third party), since that
report is also Rechilut as we wrote in this section of the sefer in the
3rd Kelal in the 3rd halacha.
Leap Year- 1 Shevat, 10 Eyar, 20 Elul
RK9/10. Because in this regard it is so very easy to fall into

violating the esur of Rechilut, it is necessary to illustrate this esur
with several examples and to use them to elaborate on this subject
in order that people with understanding will generalize them (and
extend the lessons of these examples into their everyday lives). But
in order not to overburden the reader with an extensive discussion, I
will bring only one example here and with Gds help several more
examples at the end of this sefer.
If he (Reuven) sees someone (Shimon) anxious to go into a particular
store (Plonys store) to buy some merchandise and Reuven knows
Shimon is an honest straightforward person (meaning he is not
sharp enough to understand the tricks that salespeople play on their
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customers) and Reuven also knows this store owners (Plonys) entire
desire is dedicated to grabbing this kind of innocent and tricking
him, whether it be with the type of merchandise or the amount and
weight, or the sale price, Reuven is obligated to tell Shimon about
Plony and to warn Shimon not to step foot into Plonys store even if
Shimon already agreed to buy from Plony. Even more so is Reuven
obligated to warn Shimon if he sees Plony about to cheat Shimon,
either by virtue of the merchandise Plony wants to sell Shimon (that
Plony is misrepresenting the merchandise as being world renowned
and prestigious and Reuven knows it is a lie (26)) or to cheat Shimon
in the quantity or weight or worth of this merchandise. (Please
see the following Hagahah). Most certainly Reuven is obligated
to warn Shimon in order that he will not come to be cheated. But
one must be extremely careful not to neglect any of the conditions
written above in the 2nd halacha of this Kelal.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/10/1)-(26) .. Reuven knows it is a lie: Even if the merchandise

is worth the value for which Plony is selling it, it is just that Shimon does
not want to buy that merchandise, and all the more so if it is not worth
what Plony is selling it for.
Hagahah
For example, the merchandise is worth 5 golden pieces and Plony wants
to take 6 golden pieces for it (20% more than its market value). But if the
excess change above market value is less than one-sixth (16-2/3%)(27),
it is possible that one should not point this out to Shimon (because the
sale is legal). Please see the Beer Mayim Chayim. But where the issue
is weights or measures, then in all circumstances (28) Reuven must warn
Shimon.
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the Rosh expressed it, that even from the outset an excess charge of less
than one-sixth above market value is allowable, and consequently making
that disclosure to Shimon would be Lashon Hara.
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/10/2)-(27) .. less than one-sixth: Within this law I have a

problem that requires additional great thought and analysis; Does one say
that since from the very outset it is forbidden to trick this customer, even if
the excess charge is less than one-sixth, as is the law in Choshen Mishpat,
section #227, and then necessarily one must warn the customer or does one
say that because there is a doubt \ dispute in this law, as the Rosh brings
down in his commentary on Gemara Babba Metziah (4th perek, at the end
of the 20th paragraph) that it is possible to hold that even from the outset an
excess charge above market value of less than one-sixth is allowable, then
from the perspective of the law it would be forbidden to say anything to
Shimon and any such comments would be Lashon Hara. It is possible that
because this is an uncertainty in deciding a law of the Torah and in these
kinds of uncertainty we hold the law strictly in both ways: We consider the
(less than 16-2/3%) excess charge above market value to be a violation of
Torah law and we react strictly concerning Lashon Hara and not warn the
customer (Shimon).24
(RK9/10/3)-(28) .. then in all circumstances (28) Any

misrepresentation in a matter of measures or weights of even less than onesixth nullifies the transaction and Shimon must be notified (and any money
already paid must be returned). (Please see the following Hagahah).
Hagahah
Understand clearly that which I wrote above not to neglect any of the
conditions, ostensibly the 3rd condition, that Reuven cannot convey his
report to Shimon out of a sense of hatred for Plony, is relevant only within
the framework of the commentary of the Mehirat Enayim in Choshen
Mishpat, section #421, paragraph #28. Please see that reference where he
writes that if Reuvens motivation (in a scenario where Plony is beating
up Shimon and he (Reuven) wants to hit Plony in order to save Shimon)
is fueled by a hatred of Plony, then he is prohibited to hit Plony even
though he would be saving Shimon. However, according to the Taz in that
reference in the citation beginning with the words in order who holds
that since Reuven is performing a mitzvah in warning Shimon not to fall
prey to Plony, his motivation is irrelevant and ostensibly this 3rd condition
is unnecessary. But truthfully speaking, as one delves more rigorously
into this dispute, one will find that the Taz concedes this 3rd condition as
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necessary. That if Reuven conveyed his report out of a sense of hatred for
Plony (necessarily) he will not have complied with the other conditions of
this Kelal; he will have jumped to an immediate conclusion (and violated
the 1st condition), he will have exaggerated the event out of proportion
to what actually happened (and violated the 2nd condition) and he would
not have cared if Plony was harmed any more that a Beit Din would have
punished him had he gone to court (and he would have violated the 5th
condition). All this was outside the scope of the Tazs opinion in the case
described in that reference (saving someone from being hurt physically).
Regarding the 4th condition (that Reuven should not tell Shimon about
Plony if the results could be achieved in some other way) it seems to me
that if Reuven is familiar with the store owners (Plonys) personality, that
he constantly deceives people, then it is permissible in all circumstances to
disclose his behavior even though Reuven could have achieved that same
goal using some other strategy, in order to publicize the identity of these
flatterers \ manipulators so that they can no longer mislead other people.
But if Reuven only saw Plony misrepresent his merchandise only once and
Plony has no prior reputation for misrepresentation, it seems to me that it
is forbidden to warn Shimon about Plony if Reuven can achieve that same
outcome by some other technique.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/11.
All this applies if Reuven wants to stop Shimon from

being cheated. But if Shimon already took the merchandise and
Reuven knows that he was fooled by Plony, either because the
value was not equal to the sale price or some other reason, then
disclosure to Shimon is conditional: If according to Torah law
Shimon has no claim against Plony because the overcharge was less
than one-sixth (of the market value) or because there was already
more than enough time to show the merchandise to a merchant or
to his relative to authenticate the sale price or some other reason
(29) by which Shimon has halachically lost his chance to get back
his money from Plony, then under any of these circumstances if
someone was to disclose the incident and show Shimon how Plony
cheated him, most certainly he would be in violation of the esur of
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Rechilut since from the laws perspective at this moment there is

nothing Shimon could hold against Plony. Conveying that report
now is nothing but pointless rhetoric and Reuven is just like any
other gossipmonger that we have been discussing all along who
collects and transmits information from one person to another (30).
(Please see the following Hagahah.) Even if the person who was
cheated, Shimon, asks Reuven (under these circumstances) still,
Reuven should not tell Shimon (31) the truth and all the more so
if Reuven sees that in responding to Shimon it is likely that Plony
will suffer some loss. For example, that Shimon will grab from
him or Shimon will not pay Plony the balance of the money due
him for his purchase. Most certainly Reuven would have violated
a profound sin for having created this situation. But if Reuven sees
that the Torahs law supports Shimon (either because Shimon could
retract his obligation to buy this bad merchandise or that Plony was
obligated to return the amount overcharged) and if Shimon would
have known the truth he would not have agreed to the sale, Reuven
is obliged to tell Shimon the truth (32) just as it is in order to force
Plony to pay back the overcharge but he must be careful and alert to
these following guidelines (listed in RK9/12).
Hagahah
Please see what I wrote further on at the end of the 34th notation (of the
Beer Mayim Chayim of this Kelal) regarding Reuvens assessment of the
buyer. Please see that reference and the law here is the same.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/11/1)-(29) .. some other reason: This applies to all of the

problems addressed in this example. However, (if the excess charge above
market value is) less than one-sixth or if there was more than enough time
to show the merchandise to another merchant, these (two) circumstances
are not relevant to these other problems but only to the problem of being
cheated on the price, as is brought down in Choshen Mishpat, section #232
(paragraph #1).
337
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(R9/11/2)-(30) .. from one person to another: Because even if one

witness goes to Beit Din to testify against Plony, if this witness knows
from the outset that his testimony will not be admitted into court, even
in (monetary) matters that would (ordinarily compel an) oath, and this
can be illustrated with several examples, then it is forbidden for this
solitary witness to approach the court with his testimony, and if he does
(attempt to) give testimony he transgresses the Torahs Lav of a single
witness may not testify against his fellow Jew as this is brought down in
Choshen Mishpat, section #28 (in the Hagahah of the first paragraph) in
the commentary of the Vilna Gaon there (the 8th and 9th notations) quoting
the Sifri, and his testimony is characterized as Lashon Hara as is evident
to anyone who goes through this analysis carefully and we have already
elaborated above on this subject.
(RK9/11/3)-(31) .. Reuven should not tell Shimon: As we have

explained above in several places that the esur of Rechilut applies even
when Shimon pressures Reuven to tell him if Plony did something to him
or said anything about him as long as nothing useful can come from that
response.
(RK9/11/4)-(32) .. to tell Shimon the truth: A proof to this statement

comes from Gemara Babba Metziah (51a) We only learn this (a time limit
for someone who has been defrauded) with respect to the buyer...Why,
what is the reason it applies only to a buyer? (Answer) Wherever he goes
he shows off his purchase and people will tell him whether or not he made
a mistake. From here we can see that it is permitted to tell him. And do
not challenge what we have said above regarding sale charges of less than
one-sixth above market value because it is well known that this gemara
quoted above in Babba Metziah (51a) applies only to excess sales charges
that are one-sixth or more above market value. But if the excess sales
charge is less than one sixth, that excess is immediately forgiven (i.e.,
the sale stands and the excess need not be returned) as both Rashi and
the Tosafot explain there. Please see that reference. Understand further
that in all circumstances where it is permissible for Reuven to convey his
report to Shimon, that report is permitted even if it is unsolicited, as we
wrote above at the beginning of this Kelal. (Please see that reference).
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/12. (1) One may not exaggerate the problem or the

deficiency any more than it actually is.
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(2) The primary motivation in conveying that report \ gossip must

be to strive to reach the truth and to assist the person who was
cheated and not to rejoice at the downfall of this cheater
(Plony) (33) even though Reuven clearly knows (with certainty)
that Plony cheated Shimon. This detail of law includes yet
another similar detail which is practically the same, namely,
that Reuven must assess that conveying his report will result
in an outcome that is beneficial to Shimon, meaning that his
report must benefit the cheated party. However, if Reuven
knows Shimons personality as being someone who is not
likely to take his grievance to Beit Din or to seek the help of
other people who can help him in this matter, but instead he will
absorb the hurt caused by learning what Plony did and he will
develop a hatred towards Plony, then Reuven should not tell
him (Shimon) (34). More than this, if Shimon asks Reuven to
respond, in this context as well as in the prior context, namely
in a situation where it is forbidden for Shimon to renege on
his purchase, it is a mitzvah to praise the merchandise in front
of Shimon and the praise has no aspect of stay away from a
lie (as Chazal have taught in Gemara Ketubot (17a) regarding
someone who made a bad purchase in the marketplace one
should praise the purchase in his eyes).
(3) If Reuven assesses that Plony will listen to his rebuke and
give back the amount of the overcharge, then Reuven should
privately rebuke Plony so that the excess charge will be returned
to Shimon and he may not tell Shimon what he did.
(4) If Reuven is able to accomplish this same beneficial outcome
using some other strategy (35) that does not involve denigrating
Plony, then he may not denigrate him.
(5) Shimon, the person to whom the report is being conveyed,
should not have the personality of a gossipmonger. If Reuven
recognizes this terrible character trait in Shimon and that most
likely Shimon will report what he said back to Plony, the seller,
that Reuven told him that his merchandise is bad or Reuven
told him that it is not worth what he paid for it, then the issue
341
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here requires more thought and analysis as to whether or not it

is permitted to tell the truth to Shimon since Reuven would be
leading Shimon into the sin of Rechilut. But if Reuven assesses
that if he warns Shimon and asks him not to reveal his identity,
Shimon will agree that he will not tell Plony who told him, then
that is what he should do.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/12/1)-(33) .. not to rejoice at the downfall of this cheater

(Plony): Even in instances of other people committing other kinds of
sins, where there is no possibility of giving them the benefit of a doubt,
we have written above several times (see the 3rd notation) that the speaker
must be very careful and disclose his information only on the basis of
this condition (i.e., not to rejoice) and all the more so in these kinds of
instances where it is very common that the cheater (the seller) himself
was not aware that he was overcharging the buyer because he thought the
sale price was fair market value or for any other reason that he felt the sale
price was justified.
(RK9/12/2)-(34) .. then Reuven should not tell Shimon: It is not

just good advice - not to tell him, it is forbidden to tell him. And from the
discussion in Gemara Ketubot (17a) From here we say that someone
who made a bad purchase in the marketplacefrom here Chazal have
said implying that it is only good advice. This is not so! There, the
gemara was talking about a crowded marketplace where there is no issue
of gossip because who should the buyer hate (because he was cheated by
the seller) since generally there he did not know which seller he bought it
from (because if he did know who he bought it from, the observer would
be obliged to tell the buyer the truth so that he could return it to the seller
and get back the overcharge or return the merchandise, as I wrote above.
And for this reason, the gemara was precise in its use of the expression in
the marketplace). But that is not the case here in our discussion where the
buyer does know the seller, and in Reuven conveying his report to Shimon,
Shimon will come to hate Plony. Therefore the law forbids telling Shimon.
However, if Reuven assesses Shimon, that if he does not warn Shimon he
is likely to return to Plonys store and be cheated again, then Reuven is
obliged to warn him since he has already complied with the other rules of
this Kelal.
343
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(RK9/12/3)-(35) .. this same beneficial outcome using some

other strategy: Meaning that it is possible to make Shimon aware of his
bad purchase without having to tell him, then that is what Reuven should
do and he should not report to Shimon. The proof comes from Gemara
Sanhedrin (11a) and do you think that I am an informer? Go and cast
lots as I wrote above in the first part of this sefer in the 10th Kelal, in the
11th notation. (Please see that reference). This advice is only relevant to
the conditions that exist in the discussion of this Kelal and in the first part
of this sefer in the 10th Kelal. But in all other instances of Lashon Hara or
gossip it is all forbidden, whether he told him explicitly or only alluded to
it, as I wrote above in the first part of this sefer, the 1st Kelal, the 8th halacha
and in the 3rd Kelal, the 4th halacha. (Please see those references).
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/13. Everything that we have said applies only if Reuven

recognizes Shimons personality, that if he tells him he was cheated,
Shimon will not take matters into his own hands but instead he will
go and file charges in Beit Din and take Plony, the cheater, to Beit
Din and follow the courts decision. But if Reuven recognizes
Shimon as someone who will take matters into his own hand and
seize the value of the overcharge or that Shimon will return the
merchandise to Plony or will not pay the balance of the money he
owes Plony without the courts permission, then Reuven must be
careful in reporting this gossip to Shimon and must conform to three
rules in order not to violate the esur of Lashon Hara or Rechilut: (1)
That both speakers (conveying this report to Shimon) must have
been first-hand witnesses to the overcharged sale. If they only
heard about the overcharge in the selling price of the merchandise
from others, it is forbidden for them to tell Shimon (36) (that he
was cheated). (2) There must be two speakers (37) (conveying this
report \ gossip to Shimon). (3) The consequences of their report to
Shimon may not cause any more damages to Plony that he would
have received if the case had gone to a Beit Din and the court found
Plony guilty (and penalized him to the extent that the law required).
But if these two speakers are familiar with Shimons personality
345
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(38) and they know that he will punish Plony more than the law
would have required, and that later on he would not comply with
the verdict of the Beit Din in favor of Plony, then it is forbidden for
them to report to Shimon that Plony cheated him.
With the inclusion of the first five conditions, there are now a total of
eight conditions (that must be fulfilled before allowing gossip) and
it is very unlikely to comply with all of them. Even if all of these
conditions were satisfied, it would only help to absolve the speakers
of the esur of Lashon Hara and Rechilut but it would not give them
immunity from the sin of assisting someone else in committing a
sin because from the perspective of the law it is forbidden for the
listener to launch an action based on their report. Even if many
people reported the same gossip to him, still it is forbidden for
Shimon to react on that basis as long as their testimony was not
brought in court and the Beit Din allowed him to proceed against
Plony, as I explained above in the 6th Kelal, in the 9th and 10th
halachot. Therefore, one must be very careful in what he reports to
a (cheated) person whose personality is to take the law into his own
hands without the permission of the Beit Din. Also, please see what
I wrote above in the 6th halacha.
And now my brother, please, please see, that because of the many
sins of society, how very many people make this terrible mistake.
That when someone buys something in a store and took it and
held it for himself (i.e., the buyer makes a Kinyan on the article
by lifting it up and in so doing acquires it) so that halachically it
becomes his and then shows it to his friend to see if what he bought
is worth the price he paid or not. It is not enough that this friend
does not praise his purchase but instead he degrades it (and incites
a quarrel) and tells him the seller cheated you badly, without
paying much attention to what he is saying at that moment to find
out what the actual current market price is for that item. And very
often the market price can change on short notice and the buyer
does not pay attention to how much he was overcharged and if
the Torahs definition of overcharge was exceeded, or precisely
when the overcharge occurred. Perhaps the time limit expired (the
allotted time the buyer has to return the merchandise to the place
347
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where he was overcharged) which is the time it takes to be able to

show the merchandise to another merchant or to his own relative,
and conveying that report \ gossip now to the buyer is pointless
and would only serve to provoke the buyer to hate the seller. The
speaker conveying this report is an absolute gossipmonger since he
transmits gossip from one person to another.
Quite often it happens that the speaker made his remarks out of a
sense of malice towards the seller and later it becomes apparent the
merchandise was bought at a fair price. Frequently the speakers
gossip results in a loss to this buyer as he pressures the buyer to return
the merchandise, telling this buyer- Take those goods back and tear
it into pieces25 in front of the seller and if you are embarrassed to do
it yourself, send them back with someone else and if the seller will
not take them back do not pay him or do not pay him the balance
you owe him for some other purchase. (Often this is illegal or is
literally stealing or extortion). And when this buyer attempts to
return these goods to the seller and the seller refuses to accept them
and he tells this buyer that he is trying to cause him a loss and he
is doing something the Torah considers to be illegal, they come to
argue and fight with each other.
See how much bad this gossipmonger caused. He violated the
Lav of Do not peddle gossip in society (if he is not careful to
observe the rules and conditions we wrote above) and the Lav
of Do not put a stumbling block in the path of a blind person,
since he advised the buyer to illegally return the merchandise or
caused the buyer some other loss and through him the buyer will
come to the point of dispute and controversy and will transgress
the Lav of each of you shall not aggrieve his fellow, and other
Laveen as well that evolve from controversy, Gd should protect
us from this tragedy. All this being so, how very careful must this
speaker be not to involve himself in these matters unless he first
thinks through everything we have said above and only then will he
receive Hashems guidance in preventing him from being the cause
of other peoples mistakes (sins).
25 Figuratively, tear it into pieces.
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(of Ruths standing in Jewish society) could have been decided by that
existent Beit Din (i.e., Shemuels Beit Din) the novella stands because no
one will lie about a matter that can be determined simply by asking the Beit
Din.
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/13/1)-(36) .. it is forbidden for them to tell Shimon: Even

if there are two speakers (it is forbidden to tell him- Shimon) and most
certainly if there is only one speaker, since from the perspective of the law
it is forbidden for the listener (the recipient of the report \ gossip, who is
Shimon in this translation rendering) to believe the gossip and conclude
an opinion, even if he heard it from many people, as long as their report
was not brought as testimony in Beit Din attesting to Shimon being cheated
by Plony. This law was quoted in the first section of this sefer, in the 7th
Kelal (3rd halacha), that it is forbidden to accept Lashon Hara as truth even
if many men convey it. The most Shimon is allowed is to suspect the
gossip might be true [The law does not permit believing the gossip on the
basis that people will not lie about anything that will eventually become
public knowledge (The law does not allow this!) because it seems that this
rule only applies to single-witness testimony when reporting the death of
a womans husband. Similarly it is apparent in Gemara Yevamot (77a)
that the gemara declared there (the case) is different since Shemuel (the
prophet) and his court were still existent. Please see Rashis commentary
there.26 Similarly in Gemara Kedushin (44a) Yes, (he can be trusted
since he was relating something that occurred nearby and he would not
lie [because someone could come right along and contradict him]).
Please see the Tosafots commentary there. Also, similarly in Gemara
Rosh HaShanah (22b) regarding the consecration of the new month, if
this witness lied in testifying to the appearance of the new moon it would
soon become evident that he lied because in that circumstance there is no
latitude to hide a lie and the lie would become evident. But that is not
the case here in our discussion (in matters that are more subjective), that
even if he really did lie, and an expert witness examined it and decided it
was worth more, still he could retort that he believes it really is not worth
more. Also for this same reason, the idea of then remove your clothes and
26 The gemara is discussing the issue of the legitimacy of the monarchy of David
HaMelech. Davids lineage was in doubt because he descended from Ruth
HaMoaviah. Amasa testified in the name of Shemuels Beit Din that the
woman of Moav could become converts and enter Jewish society as full Jews.
The gemara states that a rabbi cannot quote a novel law which will decide
an issue that demands an immediate resolution. However, in this instance
Shemuels Beit Din was still existent and Rashi explains that because the issue
351
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when contradicted. But the case in this gemara is an exception since the
witnesses testimony can easily be verified. The Kohein can simply show
the Beit Din whether or not he has a disqualifying blemish, and if he is
unwilling to do so, the presumption is the witness was telling the truth.
352
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show us27 is not relevant (see Gemara Kedushin 66b) that specifically in
cases of a mikveh (which is losing its volume of water through seepage)
or a handicapped person whose infirmity is obvious to everyone, lying is
pointless since those deficiencies will very quickly become evident; but
that is not so in our case]. And all the more so it is forbidden to tell others
whenever this speaker assesses that because of his report, the victim of
his gossip (the person who is the subject of this gossip) will suffer some
kind of a loss.
Moreover, we have already explained (in the 19th notation of the Beer
Mayim Chayim) that from the laws perspective this is characterized as
testimony conveyed from one witness to another, which is an inadequate
basis for the Beit Din to extract money from him. Then necessarily they
(these speakers) have no authority \ permission to compel a loss based
on their report \ gossip. All this is applicable even if the people who told
these witnesses are expert at assessing the merchandises value because
if not for this reason (that they are expert) then there is no need for any
of the reasons that we wrote (i.e., who said that it isnt really the market
value?!).
(RK9/13/2)-(37) .. two speakers: Since their testimony can affect an

actual loss, as we brought down above in the 17th notation several proofs
to this position that the testimony of a single witness does not have the
authority to bring about a conclusion that would similarly not have been
compelling had that same testimony been brought in Beit Din. Thus, had
this single-witness given testimony in Beit Din against Plony who cheated
Shimon, most certainly the Beit Din would not have penalized Plony
because of the overcharge.
Understand clearly that this detail of law is relevant only if there are
no experts in that locale who can assess the true market value of that
merchandise and who could decide that in fact Shimon was cheated.
Therefore it is forbidden for a single individual to tell Shimon that he was
cheated since that report could be the wrongful basis for Shimon to illegally
cause a monetary loss to Plony. But if the overcharge was a mistake that
was obvious to everyone and had they gone to court the Beit Din would
have found in favor of Shimon, then it is permissible to tell Shimon he was
cheated and even to tell that to him in private since that report is not the
basis for causing a loss to Plony and in any court Plony would have had
to compensate \ return the overcharge to Shimon. But all of this is helpful
only insofar as absolving the speaker of the esur of speaking Lashon Hara
353
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and Rechilut, notwithstanding the additional detail of the need for two
speakers, but all of the other conditions brought in the Kelal are relevant
and must be fulfilled before that gossip can be conveyed to Shimon.
(RK9/13/3)-(38).. are familiar with Shimons personality:

The application of this law is especially found in circumstances where
Reuven is aware that in different places (on several occasions) Shimon
defaulted on an obligation to pay for merchandise he purchased, and so he
is characterized as an evil borrower who does not repay his loans, and
he also owes money to this merchant. And it is known that if someone told
Shimon that Plony (the merchant) cheated him, he would launch into a rage
and retaliate against him doubled and redoubled the value he was cheated
without giving reasons for his actions. Most assuredly it is forbidden to
say anything to these kinds of people (i.e., to Shimon).
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/14. If something inappropriate was done (39) to Reuven

but he did not know who was the cause of it and Reuven went and
asked Shimon - Who did this to me? Even though Shimon senses
that Reuven thinks he was the cause, still it is forbidden for him to
disclose the identity of the person who was the cause even though
he was a first-hand witness to the event. Shimon should limit his
response to - I did not do this thing to you (please see the following
Hagahah) (unless it was the kind of inappropriate action for which
Shimon would be obliged to volunteer information even if he was
not suspect at all and Reuven did not question him, for example,
where all the conditions are in effect that are listed \ explained above
at the beginning of this Kelal in the 7th halacha) as I explained in
the first part of this sefer in the 10th Kelal in the 17th notation, in
the context of Lashon Hara. Please review that reference carefully
since all of the opinions brought there in the Mekor Chayim and
in the Beer Mayim Chayim both from the perspective of law and
from the perspective of satisfying ones obligation to Heaven (to
Gd) also apply here.
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Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/14/1)-(39) .. something inappropriate was done: Please see

above in the first part of this sefer in the 10th Kelal, in the 17th notation of
the Beer Mayim Chayim and you will understand this law and its sources
in all of its detail. All of the opinions that are relevant there in the context
of Lashon Hara are relevant here in the context of Rechilut.
Hagahah
However, one should be careful not to mistakenly hold to a leniency
based on this law when the speaker himself is a party to the event that
he is reporting. For example, there are situations that occasionally come
up in discussions among community leaders28 who observe, decide and
guide the ethical conduct of society, when one of these community leaders
disagrees (with the majoritys decision) and is of the opinion that his
colleagues decision was wrong in deciding against Reuven (the merchant,
in this example) but they were a majority and they overruled his opinion.
Later, Reuven approaches him and asked- Did you also have a hand in
this decision (even though Reuven suspects him)? Nevertheless, the law
forbids him (40) from responding, not even to say I did not agree with
this decision and all the more so not to respond with the names of the
community leaders who ruled against him. If he does respond, he is a
Rauchel, as we explained above in the first part of this sefer, in the 2nd
Kelal, in the 11th halacha. (Please review that reference carefully).
Beer Mayim, Chayim
(RK9/14/2) (40) .. the law forbids him: The source for this law can
be found in the first part of the sefer, in the 2nd Kelal, in the 11th notation
of the Beer Mayim Chayim.
Mekor Hachayim
RK9/15. Now we will explain a common mistake \ sin made by

28 , alternatively, city administrators. (Please see additionally the
11th halacha of the 2nd Kelal, where the subject of city administrators is
elaborated).
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many people. I will illustrate this with an example and from this
example people with understanding will be able to relate this to any
other similar event in their own lives.
Often a merchant will bring his goods to sell in a city and many
buyers will come to him. Frequently it happens that someone
without the money to pay for his purchase at that moment will
choose some merchandise and ask the merchant not to sell those
goods until he goes away and returns with the money. In the interim
other buyers come and intensely pressure this merchant to sell
them the same goods that were set aside for the first buyer and the
merchant accedes to them. Later, when the first buyer returns and
asks for his merchandise that was set aside for him by this merchant,
the merchant tells him: Plony came, I did not want to give him
those goods but he threw the money at me and took the merchandise
against my will. I had to accede to him because I did not want to
start an argument with him. In this way this merchant violates the
absolute Lav of Do not peddle gossip in society. Even though the
second buyer committed a serious sin (41) because he pressured
this merchant to give him merchandise that was already set aside
for the first buyer, nevertheless, since the merchant did sell it to
this second buyer and received money for the purchase (42) most
certainly the sale is valid and binding and no benefit whatsoever can
come from revealing the identity of the person who pressured him.
The only thing that disclosure of the second buyers identity would
accomplish would be to create hatred by this buyer for this person
and that disclosure is absolute Rechilut, as I wrote above in the first
Kelal in the 3rd halacha. This law is comparable in all of its details
to the 14th halacha written above.
But more than this, we find happening so often that this second
buyer did not pressure the merchant very much and the merchant
did not tell him that he concluded a deal with someone else for that
same merchandise. He simply sold the goods because he wanted to
help himself, for whatever reasons that he had (43). And in order
that the first buyer not have any complaints against him and say that
he reneged on his word (the merchant creates a fiction \ a lie) and
passes the blame from himself onto someone else. Most certainly
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this is an extremely profound sin since he is slandering him. All of

the Laveen and Aseen brought down in the Introduction are relevant
to this speaker (relevant to this merchant).
One must be extremely careful in these kinds of matters not to
disclose the identity of this second buyer even if this merchant takes
the blame himself, saying: I am the one who made a mistake in this
matter since he (the second buyer) did not know anything about the
deal that you and I agreed to, because it is very possible that this
admission will still provoke a sense of hatred in the heart of this first
buyer for the second buyer. He will think that this second buyer is
stealing his livelihood. The most the merchant should say to the
second buyer is: I mistakenly sold it to someone else.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(RK9/15/1)-(41) .. a serious sin: Please reference the Choshen

Mishpat, section #237 regarding the law pertaining to someone who steals
away another persons livelihood.
(RK9/15/2)-(42) .. since the merchant did sell it to this second

buyer and received money for the purchase: I chose this example
because it happens often. This same law applies even if it was legally sold
to the second buyer, even without having received payment for it.
More than this, it seems obvious that even if the seller (went and came)
was trying to get the money and the second buyer went to get the money,
still he should not disclose his identity to the first buyer since if this
second buyer brings this money within the time he specified, he would
retroactively have acquired that merchandise since he acquired it before
when he symbolically took it into his house, as the Choshen Mishpat
(section # 190, paragraph #16) lists this as a valid means of ownership
acquisition. Therefore necessarily at this moment nothing useful can
come from disclosing to him the name of the second buyer; only senseless
gossip.
(RK9/15/3)-(43) .. whatever reasons that he had (43): Sometimes

because this second buyer is an acquaintance or friend and sometimes
because this second buyer wants to buy from him a lot more other
merchandise together with this merchandise or because he paid the seller
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more than the first buyer or for other reasons that the seller finds himself
preferring to sell his merchandise to the second buyer before the first buyer
returns.
Understand clearly that everything we have written in this sefer on the
subject of how profoundly important it is to be careful not to commit this
sin of Lashon Hara, applies to those people who are called your brother
\ your fellow Jew. But regarding those people who repudiate Hashems
Torah, even one letter of the Torah, and those people who ridicule Chazal,
it is a mitzvah to publicize their lying words for everyone to see and to
openly disgrace them so that society will not learn to emulate their evil
ways.
End of Hilchot Esurei Rechilut
This completes all of the laws of Esurei Lashon Hara and Esurei
Rechilut.
Conclusion
Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara
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Ilustrative Examples
Example 1
Now I will offer several examples (illustrating the
application of the halacha) as I wrote I would do
several times in the Beer Mayim Chayim of the 9th
Kelal.
Mekor Hachayim
E1 First Illustrative example

I wrote this example above, in the second part of this sefer, in the
15th halacha of the 9th Kelal
E2/1 Second Illustrative Example

If an observer (Plony) sees that Reuven wants to join in a business
partnership with Shimon and Shimon is unaware of Reuvens
personality and Plony knows very well Reuvens carelessness \
indifference to other peoples money because of his evil personality.
Plony (must take the unsolicited initiative and he) must warn him
(Shimon) from the very outset not to become partners with Reuven
and this warning contains no aspect (is immune from the laws) of
Lashon Hara. However this observer, Plony, must be very careful
not to neglect fulfilling all of the details explained in the 2nd halacha
of the 9th Kelal. (Please see the following Hagahah).
Hagahah
My brother, be very careful not to make a mistake and rationalize for yourself
a leniency if you see someone (Shimon) wanting to form a partnership with
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Example 1
a fellow Jew (Reuven) but does not know him very well and you do know
him, and you know that he is poor now (that his financial condition is
very tenuous) and you want to go and tell this to (1) his (potential) partner
(Shimon) in order to discourage Shimon. This is a profound sin, as the
Rambam brings down in the 7th perek of Hilchot DeAut (the 5th halacha)
quoted as follows: People who convey information that if repeated from
one person to the next will cause physical or financial harm to a fellow
Jew or emotional hurt or suffering- this is Lashon Hara. This is in no
way comparable to other circumstances where an observer is obligated
to disclose (a potentially bad partnership) since in those circumstances
he is saving this potential partner from a fundamental loss or some other
bad outcome. But that is not the case here where we have no proof (2)
to conclude an opinion that this partnership will result in some kind of a
loss or some other bad outcome, as I explained this all in the Beer Mayim
Chayim (in the following second notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim).
Beer Mayim Chayim
(E2/1/1)-(1).. you want to go and tell this tothis is a profound

sin: Only if he specifically wants to volunteer his remarks, but if
Shimon approaches Plony and asks him to disclose what he knows about
Reuven and specifically to disclose Reuvens financial status, and Plony
understands from the question that Shimon is considering going into
partnership with Reuven, then it is possible that since Shimon indicated a
condition for forming that partnership is Reuvens financial strength and
that if his financial position is weak he would not form that partnership,
under that particular set of conditions it is permissible to disclose Reuvens
weak financial position to Shimon. But all this is true only if Plony clearly
knows that Reuvens financial position is very weak (and he is not making
this disclosure, Gd forbid, out of any sense of hatred for Reuven) and that
Plony assesses that word of his disclosure will not get back to Reuven.
But if both of these two conditions are not satisfied or if Plony surmises
that eventually word of his disclosure will get back to Reuven and that
report will provoke controversy and hatred, then most certainly it is
forbidden to respond to Shimon with any kind of statement that will hurt
this impoverished man (Reuven). It is much better under these kinds of
circumstances for Plony to limit his response to I do not know how to
advise you since I am not very familiar with Reuvens (financial) status.
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Example 1
(E2/1/2)-(2) .. we have no proof: (Do you think that) Just because

at this moment his (Reuvens) financial position is weak that proves the
partnership will not flourish? Gd forbid! In fact just the opposite is likely.
Perhaps Hashem will have compassion for this man (for Reuven and the
partnership will succeed splendidly). More than this, we find (brought
down as a matter of law) in Yoreh Dehah, section #247, paragraph #2
that nothing bad nor any harm can come from extending charity \ justice,
as the prophet Yeshayahu teaches us (Yeshayah 32:17) the outcome of
charity \ justice is peace. To join into partnership with this type of person
is the first (highest) level on a scale of eight levels of extending charity
that is brought down in that cited Yoreh Dehah (section #249, paragraph
#6). Even though that was not Shimons intention, still he is blessed for
implementing that partnership, as the Torat Kohanim brings down (in
Diburah DeChataaut, the 12th parshatah, 13th paragraph, in perashat
Vayikrah) that even if someone loses money (in the street, for example)
and a poor person finds it, he is blessed for that, since ultimately the poor
person benefited from his money. So too in our case.
But if his (Reuvens) integrity is suspect because of the pressures of his
struggling financial status, that suspicion is also irrelevant. (Do you think
that) Among people such as these who are in a weak financial position
one cannot find trustworthy people who strive with all of their abilities to
protect the assets of their fellow Jew just as a rich person would protect
those same assets and even more?! (Do you think that) Just because a
man happened to have fallen onto tough times he loses his presumption of
legitimacy?! Besides this (do you think that just) because of these weak,
flimsy reasons we can presume with certainty this partnership will end
up losing money and for that reason we will allow forbidden gossip to be
said about one person to another?! (If the concern is only the possibility
of some loss occurring, then most certainly the disclosure \ the report is
forbidden as we wrote above in several places What makes you think that
this mans blood is any more red than the other mans blood? Maybe the
other mans blood is redder? In this circumstance he is reacting passively
towards one person and proactively towards the other person, and we
have already proven that this is forbidden. However if Shimon is a Torah
Scholar, then the issue of disclosing Reuvens financial standing requires
more thought and analysis. Please see the Gemara Babba Batra (174b)
regarding the incident involving Moshe Bar Atzri).
Come and learn just how strict the Torah is in this regard. Even if the
Sabbatical Year is close at hand and he (a lender) refrains from extending
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Example 2
a loan to a poor person fearing the culmination of that Sabbatical Year will
automatically annul the loan and the lender might very well lose his money,
still, the Torah characterizes this lender as someone who is unrestrained by
the laws of the Torah, as the pasuk cautions us (Devarim 15:9) Be very
wary not tounrestrained, saying the Sabbatical Year is approaching. In
this regard, Chazal teach in Gemara Gittin (36a) that lenders refrained from
extending loans and were in violation of the Torahs warning of Be very
wary. Please see Rabbeinu Yonahs commentary in Shaare Teshuvah (3rd
shaar) section #67. And how much even more so (must the speaker be
wary not to discourage \ obstruct the formation of a partnership between
Shimon and Reuven) a man with whom he has no interest at all. The
speaker must restrain himself and not do anything to hinder Shimon from
partnering with this impoverished person. And what of it if Reuven did
not disclose his financial standing to Shimon? His financial circumstances
pressured him (to remain silent and not say anything), his reasoning being
that if he (Reuven himself) disclosed the truth to Shimon (that his financial
position was very weak), Shimon would not want to partner with him.
Maybe Reuven accepted upon himself that from the time he partners with
this wealthy man he will not take any personal gain for himself but instead
he partnered for some other reason that he had. All of this is obvious to
me in my humble opinion.
But I still have an unresolved issue that requires more thought and
analysis. If the speaker knows that Reuven already caused financial losses
to several prior partners because of the extent, the depth of his poverty, and
this wealthy man (Shimon) is unaware of this, (my unresolved question is)
should he be told or not? But it is obvious that if Shimon inquires about
Reuven, one must respond truthfully. My doubt revolves around whether
or not to volunteer this information and this matter requires more thought
and analysis. All of this is relevant even if the speaker conforms to all of
the conditions listed above in the 2nd halacha of the 9th Kelal, because if he
does not comply with all of those conditions, most certainly any disclosure
is forbidden.
Mekor Hachayim
E2/2 If he (Shimon) already joined in partnership with him (Reuven)

and Shimon was not aware of him (of Reuvens past history) and he
(the speaker - the observer) knows very well the character of Reuven,
as I wrote above, (the speakers disclosure of Reuvens background
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Example 2
to Shimon is) conditional upon the following: If the speaker knows

Shimon will believe his report only up to the point of suspecting
Reuven, meaning that Shimon will not rely on the speakers report
and that he will not depend on Reuven in his business dealings or
trustworthiness at all, but rather that Shimon will now (also) control
every aspect of this partnership in order that he may not come to
suffer a financial loss, then under these circumstances the speaker
is obligated to warn Shimon. However, the speaker must be very
careful not to omit any of the conditions for disclosure as written
above in the first halacha. But if the speaker sees that Shimon will
likely believe his disclosure and that will result in a loss to Reuven,
meaning Shimon will unilaterally break the partnership (3) or cause
him some other loss, then it is forbidden to tell him (4).
Beer Mayim Chayim
(E2/2/1)-(3) ..unilaterally break the partnership: Meaning without

the permission of Beit Din.
(E2/2/2)-(4) .. it is forbidden to tell him: As a single individual most

certainly the speaker is committing a great sin in disclosing his remarks, as
I wrote above. And even if two people (two observers) are familiar with
this issue, also, from the perspective of the law, it is forbidden for them to
make that disclosure (of Reuvens background) (apart from that, they are
inherently assisting someone else in committing a sin, as I wrote above
at the end of the 2nd halacha) since in order to allow this kind of leniency
\ disclosure Shimon must conform to the law (meaning, the decision that
would have been issued by the Beit Din) just as Shimon is now doing
based on that report. In this particular circumstance it is very difficult to
illustrate a case, that if witnesses testified about someone (Reuven) who was
once suspect of wrongdoing with someone elses money, the partnership
he formed with another man would be terminated (by the Beit Din), as
long as we do not see now in the context of this present partnership any
kind of wrongdoing on his (Reuvens) part. Therefore I expressed myself
(expressed this law) in a general sense and said that it is forbidden.
If it should happen that they (these two observers \ speakers) acquired
their knowledge of Reuven, meaning, they are aware of his behavior up
until now and how he handles other peoples money, and if they would
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Example 3
have brought that information \ that testimony to court the partnership
would hve been halachically annulled, then this would set the precedent
for all of the Kelalim written above in the first and second halachot (in the
beginning of the 9th Kelal).
So too is the law if we see now that Reuven is behaving in this partnership
in a way that will result in serious financial loss to his partner (to Shimon)
and Shimon is unaware of it and if he did know about it he would not want
to continue the partnership, then all of the rules written above would apply
(in the beginning of the 9th Kelal) here to this case. Please review very
carefully all of the conditions written in the 2nd halacha.
Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 6 Shevat, 15 Eyar, 25 Elul
Mekor Hachayim
E2/3. Understand something else, one must be very careful not to

advise Reuven to join in a partnership with Shimon if he is aware
of any problem that can develop as a result of that partnership; for
example, his (Shimons) poverty and all the more so if he is not so
reliable \ trustworthy. This same law applies to a potential marital
match or to a craftsman or to anything else that is comparable.
Even in a situation where it is forbidden to go and disclose \ convey
a report about Shimon, for example to go and say about him in
front of Reuven that he is not financially stable, as I wrote above
and similarly in the context of a marital match or a craftsman (each
according to the particulars of that situation), that is to specifically
go and cause that person harm. This is forbidden in any and
all circumstances because the conveyance of that disclosure is
Rechilut.
But in the reversed case, to proactively cause a loss to Reuven
by advising him to form a partnership with Shimon or to marry a
particular woman (or something comparable) knowing that if he
was in Reuvens position, that he was in need of the same thing
Reuven is seeking, he would stay far away from the relationship
\ from people like that, giving that advice is an absolute esur, a
serious sin, and he violates the Torahs Lav of (Vayikrah 19:14)
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Example 4-5
Do not place a stumbling block in the path of a blind person.

Chazal have taught (in the Torat Kohanim commentary on sefer
Vayikrah 19:14) not to give anyone advice that is inappropriate for
them. Yet there are people who commit this very sin because of
some personal interest and this is a profound sin. Their drive for
money leads them to violate this Lav of the Torah.
E3/4 - Third Illustrative Example: If he (the observer) sees someone

(Reuven) wanting to marry someone and the observer knows
Reuven has a serious shortcoming, as I will define the term serious
shortcoming further on in the 6th example, and the future brides
father is unaware of this problem, and if he became aware of it he
would not go forward with the marriage, the observer can make that
disclosure to him. However, someone who studies this carefully
has to pay close attention because there are many conditions that
must be satisfied before the observer can allow himself the license
to make this disclosure as I will explain further on. Also one may
not rationalize for himself and transpose this leniency from one
situation to another situation.
Before beginning an explanation of this law in all of its detail I will
first remove all the common misconceptions people have (about
what they are permitted to say without violating any of the laws
of forbidden speech). Truthfully, even though they need not be
written in book form because they are so very obvious and require
no knowledge of Talmud or specific reasoning, still, because of the
enormity of the damage that is caused by it, that people believe that
it is permissible and that they have license to say whatever they
want, I am compelled to explain the enormous (self-) deception
of habitual speakers of Lashon Hara in this matter. Perhaps with
Gds help this will help to remove some of the magnitude of this
blindness. This is the task that I have set for myself here with
Gds help.
E3/5. (Emphatically) How so very much must a person be wary

of bad character traits, that people routinely defame one side (of
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Example 5
a relationship) right in front of their counterpart over matters that

are completely insignificant. For example, if the prospective
bridegroom is a quiet, simple straightforward person who is not
very sharp and does not pick up on the strategies and tricks people
play as they deceive each other. Or he does not want to get involved
with scoffing and ridicule as other young men his age do, and so
they publicize him throughout society as being a simpleton and a
fool to the point where that perception becomes the reason (for the
brides family deciding) not to go ahead with the engagement or to
break off the engagement (or some other comparably bad outcome).
Gd should annihilate all of these smooth talkers because of this.
It is not enough that they are categorized as habitual speakers of
Lashon Hara because there is not in their futile conversation the
fulfillment of even one single condition listed above in the 9th Kelal,
in the 2nd halacha. Moreover, the Torah characterizes these people
as slanderers since they are lying about this man, as we discussed
this subject above in the first part of this sefer in the 1st halalcha of
the 1st Kelal, and in the 2nd halacha of the 5th Kelal. Even if what
they said is absolutely true, these speakers still must fulfill all of the
conditions listed above (5) (in the 9th Kelal).
[Truthfully, these people are also characterized as provocateurs
who cause society to sin. Because of their evil personalities to
rush to ridicule \ scoff at this person and to vent their insults and
defamation onto him, they influence \ sway honest people who are
wholehearted and straightforward to follow them into their evil
lifestyle. Initially these (wholehearted) people are pressured (to
follow these evil men) in order that these evil scoffers \ cynics and
habitual speakers of Lashon Hara not label them as men who are
imbeciles or fools or not the wholehearted people they appear to be.
Later, these people are drawn to follow their lead and eventually
this lifestyle becomes second nature to them. Chazals teachings are
very well known in this regard: The Gemara Avodah Zara instructs
us (18b) If someone walks by them, eventually he will stand next
to them and if he stands next to them, eventually he will sit with
them. One must strengthen oneself very much and overcome this
human inclination and not allow even the slightest opening for these
evil people; not even to argue with them. Just fortify yourself very
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Example 5
much not to associate with them at all. Regarding this, Shelomo

HaMelech teaches us in Mishle (1:11-16) If they tell you- Follow
usturn your feet away from their direction because their feet carry
them only to run to do evil. Chazal teach in Mishnayot Eduyot (5th
perek, 6th mishnah) better for someone to be called a fool all of his
life and not allow himself to be a Rasha for even one moment in
Gds presence, and it (the mishnah) uses the expression called
based on the circumstances that are relevant there. But truthfully
it is correct and appropriate to even do something (apparently)
preposterous, literally, and not earn for himself a reputation for
being a Rasha for even one moment in the eyes of Hashem. We have
found this idea expressed in Tehilim (34:1) [Shemuel I 21:14] David
HaMelech put on an act, appearing to be an imbecile when captured
by AviMelech in order (to deceive him and) not be captured by him.
By a logical deduction how much even more so in the presence
of The King Of All Kings, HaKadosh Baruch Hu (must one feign
ignorance in order not to fall into the category of an evil person
in the eyes of Hashem). Chazal have also taught in Gemara Chulin
(5b) commenting on the pasuk (Tehilim 36:7) both mankind and
animals are saved by Hashem, these are the people who are very
smart \ clever who make themselves appear to others as (dumb)
animals. Please reference (Chazals teachings in) Gemara Berachot
(19b) Someone who walks out into the marketplace while wearing
a mixture of wool and linen in his garments must take off those
garments immediately (because while wearing those garments he
violates a Lav of the Torah Kilayim). What is the reason? (Mishle
21:30) There can be no wisdom or understanding or advice that
is contrary to Hashem]. And to go and humiliate (one side in a
relationship) by defaming the actions of their fathers (6) is also
inclusive of Lahson Hara, as I explained above in the first part of
this sefer in the 4th Kalal, in the 1st halacha.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(E3/5/1) (5) .. .all of the conditions listed above: One who goes
through this carefully should know that in this context it is improbable to
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Example 6
fulfill all of these conditions. And even if it happened that these conditions
were fulfilled, that gossip could only be reported if the marital match has
not yet been made. But if the engagement already took place it is forbidden
to say anything at all about it because (at that point) in a likely sense he
(this particular groom) is exactly what he (the brides father) wanted for
whatever reasons he had.
(E3/5/2)-(6) .. defaming the actions of their fathers: Please review

very carefully the Shulchan Aruch Ehven HaEzer, section #50, paragraph
#5 and the related commentary there of the Beit Shemuel, notation #11.
Mekor Hachayim
E3/6. Now to return to explain the leniency we permitted at the

beginning of the third example (E3/4) regarding a bridegroom who
has a serious shortcoming since there are many practical different
outcomes possible depending on the specific shortcoming. For
example, if the shortcoming is a serious medical condition and
the brides side in unaware of it because the grooms condition is
internal and is hidden and not obvious to everyone, in this case
the speaker who is reporting this problem to the brides side has
no culpability whatsoever (his disclosure is immune) for violating
the esur of Rechilut (7). However he may not neglect to comply
with all of the conditions listed above (8) in the 2nd halacha of the
9th Kelal as I have explained them again here in this Beer Mayim
Chayim. There is also a second situation that obligates an observer
to disclose what he knows to the brides side and that is if he
hears the bridegroom is a heretic (that he has heretical ideas), Gd
forbid; he must disclose this (9) (it is not optional). Regarding this
situation the Torah places these two imperatives in the same pasuk
(Vayikrah 19: 16) Do not peddle gossip in society and Do not
stand by passively while your fellow Jew is in mortal danger, I am
Hashem!
But if the shortcoming is the grooms limited knowledge of Torah,
one may not disclose this since the father of the bride caused this
problem himself. He should have gone to a Torah Scholar who
could have tested this groom and assessed his level of wisdom and
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Example 6
understanding of Torah. (And if the father did go to rabbis to assess

the grooms level of Torah achievement, they are obligated to report
back truthfully to the brides father because from the very outset this
is what both of them want (10) (the groom and the brides father)
and since this father did not require the testing of this groom, that
is just what he wanted (meaning, he wants the groom just as he is).
[Setting this all aside, an observer who wants the license to report
what he knows about this groom to the brides father because he
cannot bear watching an injustice about to be committed against his
fellow Jew, since the matchmakers completely deceived the brides
father, this observer must first assess the veracity of the brides
fathers commitment regarding the dowry the father is giving, the
level at which he promised to support this couple and the extent of
the clothing he promised to buy them. He must assess whether or
not it is accurate \ true and that the father will not hold back or renege
any part of the dowry pledged to the groom. In a routine sense, one
should not rush into this permissibility (and disclose anything to
the father) because many of these fathers do not keep their (entire)
word and this idea of injustice is irrelevant since just as the groom
is deceiving the brides father, so too is the brides father deceiving
the groom and each deception cancels out the other. In conclusion,
apart from all of this, the observer is obligated to conform to all of
the conditions listed above in the 9th Kelal, in the 2nd halacha].
Beer Mayim Chayim
(E3/6/1)-(7) .. no culpability whatsoever (his disclosure is

immune) for violating the esur of Rechilut: Even if (his disclosure
is voluntary \ unsolicited) and the other side \ the brides side did not ask
him at all.
(E3/6/2)-(8) .. all of the conditions listed above: Because damage

is more likely to occur under these circumstances, I will repeat them here
explicitly with some additional elaboration: (1) The observer must clearly
know the grooms significant shortcoming is an actual medical illness,
meaning to exclude the groom who is only physically weak by nature, as
Chazal teach in Gemara Nedarim (49b) the ill and the weak among the
rabbis...(i.e., weak from learning) is not categorized as sickness. (2)
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Example 7
The extent of the medical condition should not be exaggerated. (3) The
observers intent in conveying that information must be to benefit \ assist
the brides side and not out of any sense of hatred for the groom. This
last detail is inclusive of yet another concern: The observer must first
think through what he is about to say and determine if the outcome of
that report will be helpful, meaning, to exclude the possibility that his
report will be ignored and the engagement \ wedding will go forward
(which would then put his report in the category of Rechilut). This
scenario is found very often in negotiating marital matches, as we wrote
above in the Beer Mayim Chayim of the 9th Kelal, in the 4th notation.
(E3/6/3)-(9) .. he must disclose this: The fulfillment of any prior

conditions is unnecessary. The first condition, that he determines the event
is truly bad, is obviously irrelevant here (since the heretic is obviously
bad). The second condition, that the bad not be exaggerated, is similarly
irrelevant. Even if the groom, Gd forbid, has the slightest taint of heresy,
he is no longer characterized as your brother. However, one must be
very careful that if he only knows about the grooms heresy because he
heard it from someone else, this observer may not say that he has first-hand
knowledge of the grooms heresy since he himself cannot do anything more
for the purpose of protecting himself and others than suspect that what he
heard might be true, so then how could he say he knows himself firsthand about the grooms heresy? The third condition, that his motivation
is to achieve a beneficial outcome, and the fourth condition, that if another
strategy is available it should be used to convey this information, are both
similarly not relevant, as I wrote above in the first half of this sefer, in the
8th Kelal, in the 5th halacha. Please see that reference.
(E3/6/4)-(10) .. this is what both of them want: Here too in this

circumstance, the men who are testing the extent of the grooms Torah
knowledge must carefully make their assessment in the context of this
specific marital match; just how much Torah knowledge must this groom
have achieved in order to satisfy the demands of the brides side? They
may not exaggerate the extent of the groooms lack of knowledge because
if they are not careful in their assessment of the grooms abilities, it is very
likely they will have violated the Torahs Lav prohibiting Lashon Hara.
Mekor Hachayim
E3/7. Similarly, this same law applies regarding the disclosure

of information to the groom regarding the bride \ the prospective
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Example 8
father in law, namely, if this observer is aware of the brides internal

medical condition and this condition is hidden from the groom,
this observer in disclosing the problem to the groom is not suspect
at all for violating the esur of Rechilut, however the speaker may
not neglect to conform to all of the conditions listed above (in the
9th Kelal) and (as I repeated them) in the 8th notation of the Beer
Mayim Chayim. Similarly, if this observer hears that this brides
family is not restrained (to follow the laws of the Torah, meaning
they are irreligious) and it is well known that this is a significant
obstacle to the marriage, the observer is obligated to tell this to the
groom and there is no need to conform to the conditions listed above
(in the 9th Kelal) (see what I wrote in the 9th notation of this Beer
Mayim Chayim) except for the condition that the speaker must first
assess the reaction to his disclosure and decide whether or not the
groom will accept his report \ that the groom will listen to him.
Very often in an engagement we find these kinds of remarks will not
be accepted, that the other side will not pay any attention to what
he said and those remarks will inevitably only lead to Rechilut (for
which the speaker now becomes culpable).
E3/8. But if this observer \ speaker realizes from the circumstances

of the engagement that the prospective father in law is deceiving the
groom, either in the size of the dowry or the amount of support he will
give the couple, it is very, very, important to first think through this
entire matter before disclosing this to the groom. Many conditions
must first be satisfied (before this disclosure can be made). (1) The
observer \ speaker must first carefully consider whether or not the
prospective father in law is really deceiving the groom. Meaning,
that the observer clearly knows the personality of the prospective
father in law and knows he has an evil nature or that he is very poor
or that he clearly heard from him explicitly that his promises are
only a front (that he lied about his intentions to support the couple).
(The observer should not make a snap judgment that just because
this father is relatively poor he certainly will not be able to fulfill
his dowry obligation or his pledge to support the couple. Often in
these circumstance we see these kinds of men honor their pledge
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Example 9
more so than someone who has more means). (2) The observer
must have the foreknowledge that the groom would not go ahead
with the engagement if he learned of this information, since often
we find that the grooms intent in marrying this girl is only to try to
get as much as he could out of her father and that the engagement
does not depend at all on that information. In this circumstance it
is obvious that this leniency allowing the observer to go and tell
the groom what he knows is not relevant (the report is forbidden)
(unless he realizes that the report will be beneficial to the groom
(11), that the groom will seek advice on how to obtain from his
father in law the security for his promised pledges). (3) From the
grooms perspective, there is no deception in this approach; that
if the groom was deceiving the brides father in some issue, the
one deception offsets the other deception and it is obvious that
disclosure of that report to the groom is forbidden. Besides, in this
circumstance one must fulfill all of the remaining conditions (12)
written above. Therefore one should not rush to make these kinds
of disclosures unless all of the conditions for disclosure are first
reviewed and satisfied.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(E3/8/1)-(11) .. beneficial to the groom: Also, in this case, one must

first fulfill all of the conditions discussed above in the 2nd halacha of the 9th
Kelal. It also seems to me that he must additionally conform to the next
(third) condition mentioned above in the Mekor Chayim.
(E3/8/2) (12) ..all of the remaining conditions: Namely, not to

exaggerate the deception and that his motivation must be to benefit the
groom and not for reasons of personal hatred. The remaining conditions
(to be fulfilled) were mentioned there in the 9th Kelal, in the 2nd halacha.
The first condition listed there is included in these three conditions written
here.
Mekor Hachayim
E3/9. If the engagement has already taken place and the observer
\ speaker realizes from the circumstances that the prospective
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Example 9
father in law is going to deceive the groom regarding the dowry

or his promised level of support for the couple, then the observers
report to the groom is conditional. If he determines (13) his report
will be accepted by the groom but only in regard to suspecting the
veracity of the report, meaning that he will seek advice to counter
the father(s deception) so that he will not be able to cheat him,
or that the groom will not initiate any action himself except to
follow the decision of the Beit Din, (then under these conditions)
it is permissible to make this disclosure to the groom. However,
the speaker must be careful not to neglect any of the conditions
described above in the 2nd halacha of the 9th Kelal. Also, it seems to
me that the speaker must fulfill the third condition described above,
namely that he knows there is no deception on the part of the groom.
But if this observer \ speaker foresees the groom will completely
believe his report and because of that report he will unilaterally
break off the engagement without any valid halachic claim, then the
speaker is forbidden to report anything to the groom (14) since it is
not possible to fulfill all of the conditions for disclosure. Please see
Beer Mayim Chayim
(E3/9/1)-(13) .. If he determines: Please reference above the Beer

Mayim Chayim of the 9th Kelal, in the 16th notation.
(E3/9/2)- (14) .. then the speaker is forbidden to report

anything to the groom: Even if all of the conditions of the 2nd halacha
in the 9th Kelal are fulfilled, nevertheless, in the context of this situation
it still is not possible to formulate an example where disclosure would
be permitted. Even if the observer \ speaker heard directly the (brides)
father say- Everything I promised is only a front and he has no intention
to honor his pledges, still, it is forbidden to disclose this to the groom
since the speaker must be sure beforehand that as a result of his report the
groom will not do anything more than a Beit Din would have done if this
observer had reported his testimony to the court, as I wrote above using
clear, explicit proofs, in the second part of this sefer, in the 9th Kelal, in
the 5th and 6th halachot and in the 10th Kelal of the first part of this sefer,
in the 12th notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim using explicit proofs. It
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Example 9
is obvious that if this case came before the Beit Din the court would not
have broken off the engagement based on what the father said outside of
the Beit Din (as long as the father did not say this in the Beit Din, that
he had no intention of keeping his word to the groom) since the father
had already obligated himself to legally fulfill his promise with a formal,
legally binding guarantee (known as a Kinyan Gamoor), his subsequent
remarks are meaningless. The groom can legally force the father to fulfill
\ implement all of the promises he made to him in that Kinyan Gamoor.
Moreover, this is comparable to someone who says- I am going to go
and cut down (lit., kill) Plonys date-palm tree, that Chazal teach in
Gemara Shevuot (46a) People often exaggerate their intentions but do
not implement them. Even though it is obviously permissible to tell the
owner of the date-palm tree the threat made by Plony in order that he
should protect that tree, as we have already explained in the second half
of this sefer at the beginning of the 9th Kelal (1st notation in the Beer
Mayim Chayim), that the Torahs Lav of Do not stand by passively while
your fellow Jews life is in danger also applies to his financial assets (and
not just literally to his life) but only when we know beforehand that after
hearing the report he will not react (in a way that would be inconsistent
with the way a Beit Din would have decided) except to protect himself
(his date-palm tree). But in our discussion, where we are speaking of a
case where he (the groom) will react to the speakers report (contrary to
the way a Beit Din would react), as I discussed above, Chazals reasoning
is obviously applicable people tend to exaggerate their intentions but do
not generally implement their threats, meaning (that Chazal reason that)
people generally regret the threats they made and will not implement any
action that is contrary to the Torah. Therefore, most certainly it is forbidden
for the speaker to (disclose his report to the groom and subsequently)
cause any damage or loss, even if he conforms to all of the conditions listed
in the 9th Kelal since a Beit Din would not have broken the engagement
based on this report and if the groom does break the engagement because
of the report, he would have done more than the Beit Din would have
done under similar circumstances. [This case is comparable to Rabbeinu
Yonahs commentary in Shaare Teshuvah, in the 3rd shaar, section #215,
that if someone sees a person commit a sin, it is forbidden to disclose it
to other people because perhaps this person subsequently did Teshuvah.
Even though Rabbeinu Yonah was only addressing an issue between man
and his personal relationship with Gd, that is because when dealing with
monetary matters we cannot assume that person did Teshuvah until he
first returns the money \ the assets he took back to their proper owner, as
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Example 10
Chazal teach in Gemara Berachot (19a). But if we see that peson has not
committed any crime \ not reneged on his promises and that he was only
venting nonsense, obviously one must presume that later he regretted what
he had said and it would be forbidden to cause a loss to him]. And even
more so it would be forbidden to disclose those remarks if this observer
did not hear them expressed first hand by the father but rather was told
about the remarks by others or that he only suspects the that the father in
law will not keep his promises because of his evil disposition or something
comparable; most certainly the observer should not get involved in this
matter once the engagement has already taken place.
Mekor Hachayim
E3/10. However there are occasions when it is permissible to

disclose this information \ gossip (15), for example, the observer
knows the bride has an internal medical problem that is not obvious
that is not generally known and the groom is unaware of it. The
observer is obligated to disclose this information to the groom
but he must be careful to conform to all of the conditions listed
above in the second halacha of the 9th Kelal. But if this observer
only learned about her condition because he heard it from others,
he may not disclose it to the groom (16) except if he assesses the
groom will not take matters into his own hands and unilaterally
break off the engagement but instead the groom will only suspect
the report might be true and he will then launch his own thorough
investigation. In this case too the observer is obliged to conform
to all of the conditions listed above in the 9th Kelal, in the second
halacha.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(E3/10/1)-(15) .. it is permissible to disclose this information \

gossip: Even if he is the only (solitary) person making this disclosure (to
the groom), the disclosure possibly might be permitted. And the necessary
condition posed in the 9th Kelal, in the 5th halacha, that specifically two
people are required to make that disclosure (in the framework where he
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Example 11
is very familiar with the listeners personality and knows that he will take
matters into his own hands and will act based on what he hears), that is only
where he (where only one person) has no license to provoke an outcome
based on his report that a Beit Din would not have implemented in that same
situation; please see that referenced halacha. But here in our discussion,
even if only a solitary witness testified about someone in Beit Din and said
that she (the bride) had a significant medical illness, still, it is possible that
there is no prohibition barring the groom from breaking the engagement
based on the witness \ the speakers report and there is no obligation
on his (the grooms) part to compensate the bride (the brides family) for
any embarrassment they may have suffered because the engagement was
broken. (Regarding compensation) Please see Ehven HaEzer, section #50
and the commentary there by our Later Authorities (referencing the Pitchei
Teshuvah, sub paragraph #14), regarding a situation where the bride wants
to break off an engagement claiming that the groom became abhorrant
to her because of a rumor that surfaced about him. Therefore, even if
he terminated the engagement because of the speakers report, he (the
listener) was within the law in what he did. But because I have some
doubts regarding this subject, I did not write above the report is permitted
even if the speaker is certain the groom will unilaterally break off the
engagement without any valid halachic claim, instead I only expressed
this law in a general sense (there are occasions when it is permissible to
disclose information).
(E3/10/2)-(16) .. he may not disclose it to the groom: This is

obvious. Since the speaker does not know this information firsthand but
only learned about it from others, how can he possibly rely on this second
hand information and (potentially) cause a loss to the bride? Maybe the
information was a lie! Even if the speaker tells the groom- I do not
have first hand knowledge of this, but I heard about her medical condition
from someone else, still, if the speaker knows it is very possible the
groom will rely on this (second hand) report and unilaterally break off
his engagement without any investigation of the reports veracity, it also
seems to me that this too would be forbidden to disclose to the groom.
Mekor Hachayim
E3/11. If an observer knows the brides family is unrestrained

(by the Torahs laws, meaning the family is irreligious or not Gd
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Example 11
fearing), he is obligated to disclose this information to the groom

(it is not optional) (and of course if he knows about any heresy or
heretical ideas the groom has, most certainly disclosing this report
is a mitzvah (17)) and he need not conform to any of the conditions
(18) listed above. Even if the observer comes by this information
second hand because someone told it to him, still, he is obligated to
report this to the other side (it is not optional). However he must
be careful in the way he expresses his report and not imply he has
first-hand knowledge of this information. He should only express
it in a general sense: I heard such and such about him \ her. Even
though there is no basis for believing the report at this moment
and concluding a definitive opinion, still, one must investigate (the
brides side or the grooms side, depending on the situation) and
inquire about these charges.
Beer Mayim Chayim
(E3/11/1)-(17) .. disclosing this report is a mitzvah: Even if the

speaker assesses the groom will certainly break off the engagement because
of that report, still, he (the speaker) need not be concerned about that at all.
The law is the same in a case where the speaker knows a particular teacher
(a childrens tutor is a heretic), an apikoros, it is a mitzvah to disclose
this information to the childrens parents and he need not be concerned
at all about causing a financial loss to this teacher. If the speaker knows
about this teachers heresy only because someone else told him, he is still
obligated to make this disclosure to the parents as long as he prefaces his
report with I heard, just as in the case of a groom.
(E3/11/2)-(18) .. he need not conform to any of the conditions:

Please see above, the 9th notation of the Beer Mayim Chayim.
Mekor Hachayim
I had in mind to illustrate yet more examples involving dealings with
an expert craftsman or an employee or a (household) attendant, etc., but
because of the pressures of the cost of printing \ publication, because they
are very substantial and because of the pressures of the time involved, I
decided against it. But the general guideline to follow is that man must be
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Example 11
aware at all times of the consequences of his actions and in particular the
words that come out of his mouth. Man should not get involved in matters
of other peoples interpersonal affairs unless he clearly knows all of the
circumstances and details of those affairs and that his sole intention is to
help matters reach an amicable outcome without engendering any hatred.
He should (clearly) foresee that the consequences of his report would
not take him (or anyone else) outside of the boundaries of the law, Gd
forbid. Only then will Hashem be his security and will not allow him to
fall into the trap of the Yetzer Harea. The Rock of Israel will save us (all)
from mistakes and He will show us wonders from His Torah.
This completes the Illustrative Examples illuminating the halachot of
Blessed is Hashem forever and forever, Amen and Amen.
This completes the second part of Sefer Chafetz Chayim.
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The Response of the Chavot Yair

Quoting from the end of the Preface & Introduction
to Sefer Chafetz Chayim:
In light of the profound esur of Lashon Hara and
verbal oppression, our reader should not wonder
in amazement how we find written in the gemara
instances where one Amora seemingly uses language
that insults his colleague, and so I added a responsum
by the Chavot Yair at the end of this commentary
to explain those remarks. Within this commentary
I have also answered many other (questions that
evolve from) statements made by Chazal.
I will now quote here the answer given by the Chavot Yair to the
question posed at the end of the Preface & Introduction. This
quotation is taken from Sefer (Shut) Chavot Yair, section #152.
Question: Given that Kohelet teaches (9:17) The gentle words of
our sages are heard (above the shouts of kings over fools) and the
Mishnah in Avot (2:10) teaches the honor \ prestige of your fellow
Jew should be just as precious to you as your own, how is it that
we find the sages of the Talmud angering \ provoking and belittling
one another? For example, there are several places in Shas (in
Gemara Yevamot, 24b, and similarly in other places) where Rav
Shehshat said: Rav must have been drowsing and then went to
sleep when he delivered his lecture (because of the weakness of
the lessons Rav was teaching).
Answer: You have asked a good question. Even though the Torah
Scholars of Bavel are called attackers (for their aggressive style
of learning) (egs., in Gemara Babba Batra and in Gemara Sanhedrin
24a), that characterization is not because of their sparring and loud,
emotional shouting and hand-to-hand blows as though they were
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fighting with each other or because of their angering or belittling
each other, Gd forbid. It was not because of this style that David
HaMelech said (Tehilim 127:5) when they talk to their enemies at
the gate, a father with his son, a teacher with his student, that they
would become enemies (Gemara Kedushin 30b) but instead it was
only from the perspective that they were opposing their antagonists
logical reasoning and proofs (in attempting to defend their view of
the halacha).
Regarding Rav Shehshats comment about Rav (Gemara Yevamot
24b) Rav must have been drowsing, the truth will lead us in the
right direction since this statement is not derogatory but rather an
incredibly great praise (of Rav), that based on his great standing and
prestige, it is not possible to even imagine that he made a mistake
in this matter (being discussed by the gemara) if not for the fact that
Rav Shehshat said at the time Rav was beginning to drowse and
fall asleep and he did not say as he was sleeping and drowsing.
The Tosafot in Gemarah Niddah (63a) (citation beginning with the
words Drowsing) quote the 10th chapter of Gemara Pesachim
(120b), where they explain that there are two stages of sleep; one at
the beginning of the sleep cycle and the other at the end. At the end
of the sleep cycle, even though (in that state of quasi-awareness) he
may say something and make a mistake, later, when he awakens,
he will realize his mistake and correct it. But that would not be the
case if he first drowses and then sleeps.
Regarding Rebbes criticism of (his student) Levi (Gemara Yevamot
9a) It seems to me you do not have a brain in your head, meaning
that a teacher can sternly reprimand his student using strong
language in order to impress upon him the need to study more
intensively and closely in order to understand the subject matter
correctly and not make any mistakes. Levi was Rebbes student as
the gemara brings down in the first perek in Sanhedrin (17b) They
were learning in the presence of their rabbis Levi from Rebbe. It
seems to me in my humble opinion that based on the words Rebbe
spoke to Levi, the Rambam derived the law he expressed in Hilchot
Talmud Torah (4th perek, 5th halacha), that a teacher is obligated to
become angry with his student if he sees his student not performing
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29 The Tosafot in Bechorot (18a) (in the citation beginning with the words
While you were eating Kafnayatah in Bavel) explain Rashis commentary
as meaning While you were enjoying yourself eating dates in Bavel, we
were toiling in the yeshivah Tosafot disagree with Rashis approach
which connotes Kafnayatah as literally being unripened dates [the
Aruch explains Kafnayata as being dates that can never ripen] and they
explain Rebbe Yochanans admonition more generically as meaning It
would have been better if you were with me trying hard to understand the
gemara rather than wasting your time doing something else.
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in his studies at the level of his ability. This law is brought down
in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh DehAh paragraph #246, sub-paragraph
#11. Therefore, since Rebbe knew Levi was a great man, incredible
in his learning abilities and the mistake (in learning) that Levi made
was totally inconsistent with his abilities because he slacked off
in his concentration on his studies. (Regarding this) The gemara
teaches at the end of Sotah (49a) when Rebbe passed away,
humility ceased to exist in the world.
Occasionally this type of language was used in a sarcastic (mocking),
joking way as Rebbe Yochanan said to Rebbe Chiyyah Bar Abba in
Gemara Babba Batra (107b) and Gemara Bechorot (18a) While you
were eating Kafnayatah in Bavel and there, in Gemara Bechorot,
Tosafot explain in the citation beginning with the words While
you were eating that Kafnayatah are bad (unripened) dates.29 It
seems to me, using the approach of our sage (and commentator
on mishnayot) Rabbeinu MBartanura at the end of the first perek
of Mishnayot Orlah, explaining the word Kafnayot (plural) that
they are unripened fruit and that this is what Rebbe Yochanan said
to Rebbe Chiyyah Bar Abba: Bavel is a very low-lying country,
the deepest in the entire world, and most certainly the dates there
are exceedingly good, as the mishnah in the first perek of Bikurim
informs us (in the 10th mishnah), except that one must wait until
they have ripened before eating them. Someone who rushes to eat
these dates before they are ripe will obviously be eating bad dates.
Here too, Chiyyah Bar Abba (was too hasty and) did not delve into
the core of this mishnah (and made mistakes) and that is why Rebbe
Yochanan told him in two places in Shas You should have learned
the meaning of the Mishnah from its conclusion.
Similarly in Gemara Gittin (41a) (regarding Ami Shapir Naeh,
his name, which translates as Ami Good Looking, meaning) just
because he is called Ami Shapir Naeh it does not mean that what
he was saying is good. We see Amoraim calling their colleagues
Tardah / foolish person as that is how Rabbah addressed Rav
Amram in Babba Metziah at the end of the first perek (20a) and how
Rebbe Chiyyah addressed Rebbe Zerah (Gemara Zevachim 25b).
409
volume 4
, " " ,'

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410
volume 4

In a similar sense Rashi explains Tadorah as meaning heartless
(i.e., you have no heart meaning, no mind with which to understand)
as Rava said to Rav Amram in Babba Kamma (105b). The common
thread throughout all of these references is that the older speakers
(these teachers \ rebbes) had colleagues younger than they were and
although these younger scholars were addressed sternly they were
not upset by it.
The expression (in Gemara Yevamot 76a) (Rav Pappi said to
his student Rav Bibi Bar Abaye who was a descendent of Ely
HaKohein) You came from Mulaei (Rashi the name of this
family: Because you come from the family of Ely (whose lives)
are cut short, therefore the things you say follow a similar theme
and they are cut short) (Tosafot Mulaei the name of a place:
Because you come from that place inhabited by the descendents of
Ely you say things that are not correct). In that reference (Gemara
Yevamot 76a) the Tosafot explain in the citation beginning with
the words from Mulaei, that Mulaei is the name of a place
and the Aruch concurs. In the sefer written by the pious great sage
Shneh LuChaut HaBrit (in the section on The Oral Torah)
which he composed in a style that follows the aleph-bet alphabet
in discussing various topics in Shas (Kelal Peh Kadosh), he also
alluded this same theme. (Please see that reference). The sage Rav
Mehirat Enayim wrote based on the words of our Chazal (Gemara
Yevamot 105a) [regarding the curse that the men of the House of
Ely HaKohein would die at a young age] Atonement for the House
of Ely does not come from the sacrifices and meal offerings brought
in the Beit HaMikdash but rather it comes from (learning and
practicing) the words of the Torah. Therefore it is appropriate that
he (Rav Bibi Bar Abaye) should learn with more care and precision
in order to remedy his liability. (Please see that reference).
Yet the subject requires more thought and analysis regarding the
way in which Rebbe Zerah addressed Rebbe Abahu (Sanhedrin 59b)
when he asked him If something with the appearance of a donkey
fell from the sky (would it be permitted to eat it) and Rebbe Abahu
answered back to his student Yaarod Nahalah which Rashi
explains as meaning a demented bird that is in constant state of
411
volume 4
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30 Gemara Babba Metziah 85a: Rebbe Zerah fasted 100 times to merit learning
in the style of the Yerushalmi without interfering thoughts provoked by the
Bavli style of learning that he was accustomed to. He fasted 100 times
praying that Rebbe Elazar would not die and the task of resolving societys
problems would fall to him. Rebbe Zerah fasted another 100 times praying
that the fires of Gehinnom would not affect him.
412
volume 4

mourning. Superficially this seems to be a terrible defamation, to
address his student using the name of a cruel, heartless, demented
bird.
After studying this intensively, based on my humble opinion of
this subject, this too was in fact a great praise. Rebbe Abahu and
Rebbe Zerah each held to a different opinion, just as Amoraim
argue in law regarding someone who assumes a (non-obligatory)
fast (Gemara Taanit 11a); Is he characterized as a holy person or
as a sinner? The Rambam cites this argument (in the first perek of
Hilchot DeAut, in the first halacha) and derogatorily characterizing
those who deprive themselves with excessive, self-imposed fasts,
that the simple, straightforward understanding of the text (in sefer
Yirmiyahu 22:15) (emphatically is) but your father ate and drank
(and what right do you have to behave contrary to your father!)
therefore this Nazir is called a sinner.
The Yerushalmi relates at the end of Mishnayot Kedushin (4th perek)
that in the future (every) man will have to give an accounting (to
Hashem) for all of the times he could have benefited from the good
that Gd created for him yet he did not (allow himself) to enjoy the
benefit of that good, and this was the motivation underlying Rebbe
Abahus comment to Rebbe Zerah. Similarly, in Masechet Ketubot
(62a), the gemara relates that Rebbe Abahu was in a bathhouse
with two servants attending him when the floor of the bathhouse
collapsed under them. He grabbed onto a pillar and pulled himself
up together with his two servants. Rashi explains that he was healthy
and handsome because he took care of himself whereas Rebbe Zerah
was just the opposite. Rebbe Zerah purposefully afflicted his body,
and because of the depth \ extent of his deprivation he moved to
Eretz Yisrael, as the Gemara Babba Metziah (85a) relates, where he
fasted 300 times.30 Every 30 days he would examine himself closely
to see if he remained immune from fire by entering an oven to see
if he would get burned. Because of his great love for the Land of
Israel he referred to the students in Bavel as foolish Babylonians
(in Gemara Nedarim 49b). We wrote this in order that, Gd forbid,
one should not dismiss Rebbe Zerahs great piety and self sacrifice
413
volume 4
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414
volume 4

in abstaining from the materialism of the world, and it is possible
that because of his many fasts his face became gaunt \ uncomely
and blackened. Therefore, when the rabbis gave him ordination
(Semicha) they lauded him with song (Gemara Sanhedrin 14a):
Without eye shadow, without blush, without braids she still exudes
grace, meaning, Rebbe Zerah was beautiful through the beauty of
his Torah learning (even though his physical appearance was gaunt)
although he was always in a state of pain, affliction and agony as is
related in Gemara Niddah 23a: (Thus, because of his appearance and
disposition) Rebbe Yochanan tried to get Rebbe Zerah to laugh and
he would not laugh. In a similar sense, the Gemara Nedarim (50b)
relates, On the day Rebbe would laugh, misfortune would come
to the world. It is possible that Rebbe Abahu considered Rebbe
Zerahs piety to be false piety but he still did not mean anything
derogatory by his comment. His intent was merely to point out
Rebbe Zerahs ascetic, secluded lifestyle and constant sorry state.
Now we can understand the precision of Rashis words: Yaarod
Nahalah \ A demented bird who constantly mourns which is a
questionable characterization; where does mourning enter into this
characterization?
According to what we wrote, everything is now consistent (lit.,
beautiful) and flows very well. Rebbe Zerah was cruel to
his body in afflicting himself and he was constantly in a state of
mourning and worry over his sins and shortcomings. He considered
his righteousness and Torah not to be on par with those people who
were perfect in their service to Hashem. In contrast to this attitude,
Rebbe Abahu believed that because of Rebbe Zeras chastisements
and afflictions he was depriving himself of his own strength and
together with that, the ability to think clearly and decisively using
sound judgment. Thus, Rebbe Abahus answer to Rebbe Zerahs
question about the likeness of a donkey falling out of the sky was
consistent with his assessment of Rebbe Zerahs state of being; he
characterized Rebbe Zerah as Yaarod Nahalah. This explanation
is not far fetched, as we find other examples alluding to this type
of lifestyle. For example, (Yeshaya 13:22) serpents in their
chambers, and (Yirmiyah 9:10, 10:22, 51:37) The dwelling place
415
volume 4
" ' '

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31 1. That Rebbe Yannai was addressing Rebbe Yochanan harshly (Gemara

Shabbat 140a), or
2. That Heaven was repaying Rebbe Yochanan for inappropriately
)addressing Isi (Gemara Chulin 137b
416
volume 4

of serpents, and (Eicha 4:3) even serpents open their breasts.
These pesukim all refer to a person who is in a state of solitude with
little thought to expressions of mercy and compassion (for his own
wellbeing).
Similarly, we can explain Rebbe Yannais response to his student,
Rebbe Yochanan (Gemara Shabbat 140a) (namely, If you think
I am wrong, then) What is the difference between me and you
(implying that he is greater than his student) but it was not said in
a haughty or arrogant manner to disgrace his student, yet it was
said because a rebbe is permitted to speak harshly to his student
over his lack of understanding and for acting (thoughtlessly) out
of laziness. In addressing his student harshly perhaps Heaven was
repaying Rav Yochanan for using the same harsh expression that
Rebbe Yochanan used to addressed Isi (Gemara Chulin 137b). In
both references Rashi explained that (Rebbe Yannai was saying to
Rebbe Yochanan and Rebbe Yochanan was saying to Isi that) I
know the mishnah better than you. Yet this statement of Rashi needs
analysis, because in both references31 their response was not based
on an explanation of the mishnah, but rather it was an answer that
was based on a learning tradition they received from their teachers.
If not for the words from the holy mouth of Rashi (in presenting
these two scenarios), I (i.e., the Chavot Yair) would have explained
his (Rebbe Yannais) comment (to Rebbe Yochanan) as being
said in humility, as if to lift up the level of his student or (Rebbe
Yochanans comment to Isi, his) friend by saying that This is what I
have learned from a tradition but if I would not have heard this from
my rabbis and not have served them as much as I did and received
many traditions from them, then what is the difference between me
and you, meaning, that from the perspective of understanding,
analytical ability and knowledge there is no difference between you
and me.
Alternatively, when he (Rebbe Yannai) literally said (to Rebbe
Yochanan) What is the difference between to me (Hebrew:
Lee) and to you (Hebrew: Lecha), of course we know there
was a big difference between them, Rebbe Yannai merely meant
417
volume 4

," .
' , " .
'

418
volume 4

What is the difference between what is brought to me and what
is brought to you, denoting something being brought from
some other place to a person. Meaning, I (Rebbe Yannai) have
served my rabbis and learned more from them than you (Rebbe
Yochanan) learned from your rabbis, but not that I am greater than
you, because if what Rebbe Yannai meant was literally between
me and you, the text should have expressed it more appropriately
as between me and you (Hebrew: Beni LeBencha). All of this is
simple to understand. There are some also other difficult comments
to understand which we have explained.
These are the words of the busy one, Chayim Yair Bachrach.
End of the quotation from the holy Chavot Yair.
Baruch Adonai LeOlam, Amen vAmen
419
volume 4
My Notes
"
A word of thanks to everyone who supported the publication of this
sefer
(Gemara Babba Batra 73b)
Rabba Bar Bar Chanah said- Once I
saw a frog that was the size of the city
of Hegroniah. How big is the city of
Hegroniah? Sixty houses! A serpent
came and swallowed it and then a
raven came and swallowed the serpent.
It then flew up and rested in a tree.
Come and see just how strong that tree
was. Rav Pappa Bar Shemuel said if
I wasnt there myself to see it I would
never have believed it.
):(

?
!

.

.
In this midrash taught by the Tanaim who are the baalei aggada of the
gemara, Chazal are praising the benefactors of Torah who carry their
great responsibility despite the pressures of an alien society. Moshe
Rabbeinu blesses them in his beracha to Zevulun (Devarim 33:18) as
" "
and to Zevulun he (Moshe) said- rejoice Zevulun as you leave

to which Rashi comments
" "
success as you leave to conduct business
These willing partners of HaKadosh Baruch Hu give generously and
graciously to promote Torah and in so doing fulfill the words of the
Navi (Yeshayahu 11:9)
" " '
and (it will be a time when) the world will be filled with a knowledge
of Hashem as (vast as) the waters that cover the seas
We wish to express Hashems blessings and our heartfelt thanks to all of
those sponsors who made possible the printing and distribution of this
sefer. With Hashems help, their zechut \ their merit will inevitably help
bring Mashiach and end our galut.
Dedicated in memory of
Mazal Bat Frieda AH

by an anonymous donor

' "
In loving memory of
Mary Saka AH
by her children
and grandchildren

' "

'
' ", , ,"
In memory of our father
Gabriel Shehebar
and in honor of our mother
Marcelle
from their children
Albert, Isaac, Jack,

Joseph and Giselle
Compliments of
Steve & Beryl Reich

and their son
Ezra Reich
and their granddaughter
Orah Rose Reich
In loving memory of my father
Ezra (Earl) Falack AH

In honor of my mother
Mrs. Mollie Falack

And a refuah shelemah for
Rachel Ziona Bat Leah

"
Dedicated for the

Refuah Shleimah of
Efrayim Yehoshua
Ben Chayim Amumah AH
and in memory of
Shelomo Ben Rivka AH

and
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Bat Chana AH
by Freddy and Solomon
In sincere appreciation
of the
Sephardic Bikur Holim

Its terrific staff
And it wonderful supporters and benefactors
In honor of
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May Hashem bless him and his entire family
for all of the kindness he does
dedicated by his friends
Dedicated anonymously
In memory of
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Dovid ben Yehuda
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May it please Hashem that learning

this sefer should be a zechut for

Printed in Eretz Yisrael

Distributed by Feldheim Publishers

Masha Zeeva Bat Cima Miriam AH

Dedicated in loving memory of

Luach Halacha Yomi

P. Daily Halacha: 7 Tishri

Leap Year- 7 Tishri

K4/3. D. Halacha: 12 Cheshvan, 11 Adar, 11 Tammuz; L.Y.- 12 Cheshvan, 21 Adar I, 1 Tammuz

245 K5/1. D. Halacha:

Leap Year-18 Cheshvan, 27 Adar I, 7 Tammuz

Leap Year-20 Cheshvan, 29 Adar I, 9 Tammuz

K7/9. Daily Halacha: 1 Kislev, 1 Nissan, 1 Av;

Leap Year-3 Kislev, 12 Adar II, 22Tammuz

K7/10. Daily Halacha: 2 Kislev, 2 Nissan, 2 Av;

Leap Year-4 Kislev, 13 Adar II, 23Tammuz

K7/11. Daily Halacha: Leap Year-5 Kislev, 14 Adar II, 24Tammuz

K7/13. Daily Halacha: 3 Kislev, 3 Nissan, 3 Av;

K8/1. D. Halacha: 4 Kislev, 4 Nissan, 4 Av;

Leap Year-6 Kislev, 15 Adar II, 25Tammuz

219 K8/12. Daily Halacha: 9 Kislev, 9 Nissan, 9 Av;

Leap Year- 13 Kislev, 22 Adar II, 3 Av

RK1/3. Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 30 Kislev, 10 Nissan, 20 Av

RK3/2. Daily Halacha: 1 Tevet, 1 Eyar, 1 Elul;

Leap Year- 8 Tevet, 18 Nissan, 28 Av

RK4/1. Daily Halacha: 2 Tevet, 2 Eyar, 2 Elul;

Leap Year- 9 Tevet, 19 Nissan, 29 Av

RK6/7. Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 17 Tevet, 27 Nissan, 7 Elul

RK6/10. Daily Halacha:

Leap Year- 19 Tevet, 29 Nissan, 9 Elul

E2/3. Daily Halacha: Leap Year- 6 Shevat, 15 Eyar, 25 Elul

Mekor Hachayim - Page 29

with Beer Mayim Chayim - 185

(RK5 - 5th chapter)

Mekor Hachayim - Page 39

with Beer Mayim Chayim - 207

(RK6 - 6th chapter)

Mekor Hachayim - Page 55

with Beer Mayim Chayim - 249

(RK7 - 7th chapter)

An explanation of the different circumstances when Rechilut is forbidden. There

Mekor Hachayim - Page 63

with Beer Mayim Chayim - 261

(RK8 - 8th chapter)

Mekor Hachayim - Page 67

with Beer Mayim Chayim - 271

(RK9 - 9th chapter)

An explanation of when gossip is permitted as the conditions of this Kelal are

Hilchot Esurei Rechilut

with Beer Mayim Chayim - 99

Mekor Hachayim - Page 15

with Beer Mayim Chayim - 133

(RK2- 2nd chapter)

The law as it relates to the leniency of In the presence of three people in a

Mekor Hachayim - Page 21

with Beer Mayim Chayim - 145

Mekor Hachayim - Page 25

with Beer Mayim Chayim - 169

(RK4 - 4th chapter)

Sefer Chafetz Chayim

Hilchot Esurei Rechilut

The esur of Rechilut, meaning, that gossip is

RK1/1. Someone who gossips about someone else (1) violates

Translators note: For purposes of this translation, in this context of Rechilut,

Sefer Chafetz Chayim

RK1/2. What is (the definition of) a gossip? Someone who conveys