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WNDI 2008 1

Federalism Adv

Federalism Adv
Indian Federalism Good
Federalism Adv...........................................................................................................................................................1
Federalism Adv...............................................................................................................................1
Indian Federalism Good- Economy FL ......................................................................................................................5
Indian Federalism Good- Economy FL .......................................................................................5
Indian Federalism Good- Ethnic Conflict...................................................................................................................6
Indian Federalism Good- Ethnic Conflict...................................................................................6
Indian Federalism Good- General...............................................................................................................................7
Indian Federalism Good- General................................................................................................7
Indian Federalism Good- Economy............................................................................................................................8
Indian Federalism Good- Economy.............................................................................................8
Indian Federalism Good- Solves Ethnic Conflict.......................................................................................................9
Indian Federalism Good- Solves Ethnic Conflict........................................................................9
Indian Federalism Bad- Spurs Ethnic Conflict.........................................................................................................10
Indian Federalism Bad- Spurs Ethnic Conflict.........................................................................10
Indian Federalism Bad- Leads to Conflict................................................................................................................11
Indian Federalism Bad- Leads to Conflict.................................................................................11
Indian Federalism Bad- Fails India...........................................................................................................................12
Indian Federalism Bad- Fails India...........................................................................................12
Indian Federalism Bad- Never Increase....................................................................................................................13
Indian Federalism Bad- Never Increase....................................................................................13
Indian Federalism Bad- Collapse approaching.........................................................................................................14
Indian Federalism Bad- Collapse approaching.........................................................................14
Indian Federalism Bad- Won’t Model US 1/2...........................................................................................................15
Indian Federalism Bad- Won’t Model US 1/2...........................................................................15
Indian Federalism Bad- Won’t Model US 2/2...........................................................................................................16
Indian Federalism Bad- Won’t Model US 2/2...........................................................................16
Nigerian Federalism Good- Stability FL..................................................................................................................17
Nigerian Federalism Good- Stability FL...................................................................................17
Nigerian Federalism Good- Ethnic Conflict.............................................................................................................18
Nigerian Federalism Good- Ethnic Conflict..............................................................................18
Nigerian Federalism Good- Squo Fails ....................................................................................................................19
Nigerian Federalism Good- Squo Fails .....................................................................................19
Nigerian Federalism Good- Squo Solves..................................................................................................................20
WNDI 2008 2
Federalism Adv

Nigerian Federalism Good- Squo Solves....................................................................................20


Nigerian Federalism Good- Stability........................................................................................................................21
Nigerian Federalism Good- Stability.........................................................................................21
Nigerian Federalism Good- Solves Ethnic Conflict..................................................................................................22
Nigerian Federalism Good- Solves Ethnic Conflict..................................................................22
Nigerian Federalism Good- Solves State Dissolution ..............................................................................................23
Nigerian Federalism Good- Solves State Dissolution ..............................................................23
Nigerian Federalism Bad- Civil War FL...................................................................................................................24
Nigerian Federalism Bad- Civil War FL....................................................................................24
Nigerian Federalism Bad- Oil Prices........................................................................................................................25
Nigerian Federalism Bad- Oil Prices..........................................................................................25
Russian Federalism Good- Economy FL..................................................................................................................26
Russian Federalism Good- Economy FL...................................................................................26
Russian Federalism Good- Democracy FL...............................................................................................................28
Russian Federalism Good- Democracy FL................................................................................28
Russian Federalism Good- Political Freedom..........................................................................................................29
Russian Federalism Good- Political Freedom...........................................................................29
Russian Federalism Good- Key to Survival..............................................................................................................30
Russian Federalism Good- Key to Survival...............................................................................30
Russian Federalism Good- Key to Economy (1/2)...................................................................................................31
Russian Federalism Good- Key to Economy (1/2)....................................................................31
Russian Federalism Good- Key to Economy (2/2)...................................................................................................32
Russian Federalism Good- Key to Economy (2/2)....................................................................32
Russian Federalism Good- Key Now (1/2)...............................................................................................................33
Russian Federalism Good- Key Now (1/2).................................................................................33
Russian Federalism Good- Key Now (2/2)...............................................................................................................34
Russian Federalism Good- Key Now (2/2).................................................................................34
Russian Federalism Good- Key to Democracy.........................................................................................................35
Russian Federalism Good- Key to Democracy..........................................................................35
Russian Federalism Good- Models America............................................................................................................36
Russian Federalism Good- Models America.............................................................................36
Russian Federalism Bad – Economy FL...................................................................................................................37
Russian Federalism Bad – Economy FL....................................................................................37
Russian Federalism Bad- Russia Refuses.................................................................................................................38
Russian Federalism Bad- Russia Refuses..................................................................................38
Russian Federalism Bad- Corruption........................................................................................................................39
WNDI 2008 3
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Bad- Corruption........................................................................................39


Russian Federalism Bad- Rejects Democracy (1/2).................................................................................................40
Russian Federalism Bad- Rejects Democracy (1/2)..................................................................40
Russian Federalism Bad- Rejects Democracy (2/2).................................................................................................41
Russian Federalism Bad- Rejects Democracy (2/2)..................................................................41
Russian Federalism Bad- Won't Model US...............................................................................................................42
Russian Federalism Bad- Won't Model US...............................................................................42
Russian Federalism Bad- Hurts Citizens .................................................................................................................43
Russian Federalism Bad- Hurts Citizens ..................................................................................43
Russian Federalism Bad- WMD’s.............................................................................................................................44
Russian Federalism Bad- WMD’s..............................................................................................44
Indonesian Federalism Good- Economy ..................................................................................................................45
Indonesian Federalism Good- Economy ...................................................................................45
Indonesian Federalism Good- War ...........................................................................................................................46
Indonesian Federalism Good- War ...........................................................................................46
Indonesian Federalism Good- General.....................................................................................................................47
Indonesian Federalism Good- General......................................................................................47
Indonesian Federalism Good- Solves Corruption.....................................................................................................48
Indonesian Federalism Good- Solves Corruption.....................................................................48
Indonesian Federalism Good– Economy (1/2).........................................................................................................49
Indonesian Federalism Good– Economy (1/2)..........................................................................49
Indonesian Federalism Good– Economy (2/2).........................................................................................................50
Indonesian Federalism Good– Economy (2/2)..........................................................................50
Indonesian Federalism Good- Key to Stop War........................................................................................................51
Indonesian Federalism Good- Key to Stop War.......................................................................51
Indonesian Federalism Good- Will Model US .........................................................................................................52
Indonesian Federalism Good- Will Model US ..........................................................................52
Indonesian Federalism Good- Works Well................................................................................................................53
Indonesian Federalism Good- Works Well................................................................................53
Indonesian Federalism Good- Now..........................................................................................................................54
Indonesian Federalism Good- Now............................................................................................54
Indonesian Federalism Good- Solves Financial Crisis ............................................................................................55
Indonesian Federalism Good- Solves Financial Crisis ............................................................55
Indonesian Federalism Bad- Collapses ASEAN FL.................................................................................................56
Indonesian Federalism Bad- Collapses ASEAN FL..................................................................56
Indonesian Federalism Bad- General (1/2)...............................................................................................................57
WNDI 2008 4
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Bad- General (1/2)................................................................................57


Indonesian Federalism Bad- General (2/2)...............................................................................................................58
Indonesian Federalism Bad- General (2/2)................................................................................58
Indonesian Federalism Bad- Fails to Work...............................................................................................................59
Indonesian Federalism Bad- Fails to Work...............................................................................59
WNDI 2008 5
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Good- Economy FL


A. Federalism facilitates India’s integration to the world’s economy
Rob Jenkins, Professor of Political Science at Birkbeck College, University of London. “How Federalism Influences
India’s Domestic Politics of WTO Engagement (and is Itself Affected in the Process)” 2003
<http://www.bbk.ac.uk/polsoc/staff/academic/rob-jenkins/how-federal-influe-indias-domestic-politics-wto> (CVD)
At the same time, certain aspects of Indian federalism have helped to facilitate India’s integration into
the global economy. Three are particularly important. Economically, competition for investment between
states can, in theory, drive down regulatory burdens to near-global levels. Administratively, best practice in
governance reform can be diffused through demonstration effects. Politically, divisions between state-
level political elites served to lessen the impact of anti-liberalisation constituencies, within and outside
the state, disrupting the potential for collective action from key groups, which could thwart reform.

B. Indian economic growth is key to stability in Kashmir and the Mideast


Garten 1995 (Jeffrey, Under Sec. Trade, “Moving beyond”, March 7, FDCH, p ln)
Paramount among those interests are the commercial opportunities that are increasingly at the heart of the
Clinton Administration's foreign policy. But it is impossible to separate those commercial interests from our
broader interests. Economic reforms enable our companies to take advantage of the opportunities within the
Indian market and enable Indian companies to better enter the global marketplace. Economic growth in
India is a powerful stabilizing force in a region of the world where stability is of supreme.importance.
Stability and growth in India are of enormous importance through southern Asia, from the Middle
East to Indochina. Peace and prosperity in that part of the world are essential to the peace and prosperity of
the world. The survival of Indian democracy is an important message to those who doubt the value of
democracy, particularly in large, complex, emerging societies. India is a regional powerhouse. Home of the
world's fourth largest navy. Home of a burgeoning space program. It would be hard to describe a nation that
could be more central to our interests in the century ahead -- or one with whom the promise of cooperation
and friendship is greater.

C. India Pakistan conflict ensures extinction


Ghulam Nabi Fai, Kashmiri American Council, July 8, 2001, Washington Times
The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to
aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and
illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It
has ignited two wars between the
estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening
the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central
intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear
worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense
budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

D. Mideast war escalates and goes nuclear


John Steinbach, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee, March 2002,
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious
implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war.
Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire
missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would
now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is
gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long
been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for
Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43)
(Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously
complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is
enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark
Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for
whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44).
WNDI 2008 6
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Good- Ethnic Conflict


Federalism contains and resolves ethnic conflicts
S.D. Muni, http://www.sagepub.com/authorDetails.nav?contribId=500667Jawaharlal Nehru University. "Ethnicity
and power in the contemporary world." 1996 http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu1
2ee/uu12ee00.htm#Contents
Based on federal experience in India, it may not be out of place to assume that the structure of federalism
and its inherent resilience can cope with the pressures of ethnicity and conflicts. It can even help
resolve, or at least contain, some of these pressures, if the imperatives of federal devolution of power and
obligations of mutual accommodation and adjustments are observed sincerely.
WNDI 2008 7
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Good- General


Federalism is fantastic
The Hindu, India’s National Newspaper. “Federalism is also good economics.” The Hindu 11/8/07
<http://www.thehindu.com/2007/11/08/stories/2007110856221300.htm> (CVD)
Noting that during the last few decades the spread of democracy and the relevance of federalism have
been growing in the world, President Pratibha Devisingh Patil on Wednesday said democracy and
federalism should be the guiding principles for a new world order. Describing federalism as a concept
rooted in ‘self-rule’, she said: “Federalism is not only good politics. It is also good economics.” She was
delivering the valedictory address at the 4th International Conference on Federalism here, organised by the
Inter-State Council Secretariat and Forum of Federations. The President said federalism went beyond being a
mere legal-constitutional mechanism for the distribution of powers, both legislative and fiscal, among
different levels of the government. “Power-sharing arrangements between different units of government
gives a sense of belonging to various groups within the political system. It facilitates the deepening and
widening of the democratic process. By equipping the different units to take appropriate decisions,
federalism helps in the judicious use of resources, increasing efficiency and better targeting of policies.
Federalism, thus, is not only good politics. It is also good economics,” the President told the delegates.
Outlining problems like poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and disease along with new challenges like the
effects of globalisation, climate change and international terrorism that face humankind, Ms. Patil favoured
using the federal system of governance as a strategic tool for the fight against inequality and for
building an equitable global order.

Federalism causes India to be at the forefront of developing democratic nations


RAMESH THAKUR, Distinguished fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. “India's
long awakening; A land of fabled and stoic resilience, it always picks itself up and keeps going.” The Globe and
Mail. 8/15/07. Lexis (CVD)
India is the world's most populous, and the developing world's most important democracy. And what
flaws it has are regularly exposed by its own democratic institutions, in particular a vociferous civil society,
an irreverent press, an inquisitive judiciary and vigorous opposition parties. Its election machinery, given
the scale and complexity of the task, is the best in the world: Florida take note. If and when Australia and
Canada become republics, they should study India's system of presidential election combines democracy
with federalism.
WNDI 2008 8
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Good- Economy


Federalism causes competition among Indian states for investments, thus causing a
stronger economy
Rob Jenkins, Professor of Political Science at Birkbeck College, University of London. “How Federalism Influences
India’s Domestic Politics of WTO Engagement (and is Itself Affected in the Process)” 2003
<http://www.bbk.ac.uk/polsoc/staff/academic/rob-jenkins/how-federal-influe-indias-domestic-politics-wto> (CVD)
Slightly less tenuous in nature are a number of other connections between the process of global economic
integration and facets of Indian federalism. Even these links are not particularly direct. Liberalised rules on
inward investment, part of a conscious strategy to increase India’s exposure to (and participation in)
global economic flows, have placed much de facto decision-making authority in the hands of state
governments. As former finance secretary Montek Singh Ahluwalia has argued, ‘liberalisation has reduced
the degree of control exercised by the centre in many areas, leaving much greater scope for state level
initiatives. This is particularly true as far as attracting investment…is concerned’ Official clearance from
New Delhi is still required for many foreign direct investments, but the relative importance of state
governments has increased dramatically since 1991. As a result, states must now compete with one
another for private investment, both Indian and foreign.
WNDI 2008 9
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Good- Solves Ethnic Conflict

Indian federalism keeps ethnic conflict in check.


S.D. Muni, http://www.sagepub.com/authorDetails.nav?contribId=500667Jawaharlal Nehru University. “Ethnicity
and power in the contemporary world.” 1996
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee00.htm#Contents
The imperatives of federalism in India, particularly with linguistic states as a vital political category, have
encouraged and strengthened regional parties This has given impetus to the activation of ethnic identities
and has contributed to the process of conflict formation along ethnic lines. There has also been a positive
aspect, in the sense that no ethnic or regional party is capable of assuming power at the centre on its
own. Parties have therefore endeavoured to form alliances and coalitions with national parties to evolve
alternative and competing structures of power. Experiments like the Samyukt Vidhayak Dal of the 1960s, the
Janata Party of the 1970s, and the National Front since the 1980s are examples. These experiments have
tended to broaden and facilitate national consensus rather than hinder it.
WNDI 2008 10
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Bad- Spurs Ethnic Conflict


A. Indian federalism spurs ethnic tensions.
S.D. Muni, http://www.sagepub.com/authorDetails.nav?contribId=500667Jawaharlal Nehru University. "Ethnicity
and power in the contemporary world." 1996 http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu1
2ee/uu12ee00.htm#Contents
The functioning of federalism has nevertheless also had undesirable implications for the ethnic scene in
India. The linguistic reorganization of the states gave impetus to various groups of specific cultural markers
and ethnic identities to seek political expression and legitimacy. This was because ethnic identity was
provided a territory under the scheme of reorganization. The importance of ethnic territory in ethnic
conflict is very crucial, as can be gathered from recent developments in the Punjab and Kashmir and earlier
events in Assam. In the Punjab and Kashmir conflicts, along with the transformation of identities and issues,
the territorial base of ethnicity is being perfected by driving out Punjabi-speaking Hindus from the Punjab
and Kashmiri-speaking Hindus from Kashmir. The potential for conflict formation along ethnic identity
lines has thus been encouraged. This potential has been further sharpened because linguistic
reorganization in a vast and diverse country like India cannot be perfectly precise. On the periphery of
the newly formed linguistic states, unassimilated linguistic minorities continued to exist. Then many other
linguistic groups continued to remain in the larger Hindi-speaking states without being accommodated in the
new political arrangement. The dissatisfactions of some of the unrecognized minority linguistic groups also
continue to simmer. Such problems exist with regard to the Konkan region of Maharasthra/Goa, Nepali-
speaking groups of Darjeeling, Sikkim, and Assam, and Maithili and Avadhi language groups in Bihar. The
possibility of political movements and conflict formation arising out of these problems cannot be ruled
out. There are already several political parties which are ethnicity-based, and they will very willingly
build their strength by exploiting the linguistic frustrations of their constituencies. The Sarkaria
Commission (1988) clearly hinted at weaknesses of the linguistic reorganization of states in this respect when
it said: Very often, the sub-national sentiment which is initially based on linguistic, religious or ethnic
groupings, gains strength with a blend of economic issues, such as those relating to... economic
backwardness. One of the most significant developments has been the rise of linguistic chauvinism,
rearrangement of the boundaries of the States on linguistic basis... resulting in fissiparous tendencies

B. Impact: Mideast war escalates and goes nuclear


John Steinbach, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee, March 2002,
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious
implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war.
Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire
missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would
now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is
gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long
been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for
Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43)
(Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously
complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is
enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark
Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for
whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44).
WNDI 2008 11
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Bad- Leads to Conflict


The federal system hurts ethnic identity and leads to conflict
S.D. Muni, of http://www.sagepub.com/authorDetails.nav?contribId=500667Jawaharlal Nehru University, India.
1996. "Ethnicity and power in the contemporary world." Edited by: Kumar Rupesinghe and Valery A. Tishkov.
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu1 2ee/uu12ee00.htm#Contents
The functioning of federalism has nevertheless also had undesirable implications for the ethnic scene in
India. The linguistic reorganization of the states gave impetus to various groups of specific cultural
markers and ethnic identities to seek political expression and legitimacy. This was because ethnic
identity was provided a territory under the scheme of reorganization. The importance of ethnic
territory in ethnic conflict is very crucial, as can be gathered from recent developments in the Punjab and
Kashmir and earlier events in Assam. In the Punjab and Kashmir conflicts, along with the transformation of
identities and issues, the territorial base of ethnicity is being perfected by driving out Punjabi-speaking
Hindus from the Punjab and Kashmiri-speaking Hindus from Kashmir. The potential for conflict formation
along ethnic identity lines has thus been encouraged. In a very significant way, federalism has fuelled
ethnic conflict through the use of the Union's special provisions over the states.
WNDI 2008 12
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Bad- Fails India


Indian federalism fails in the squo
The World Bank “India: Fiscal Decentralization to Rural Governments.” 1/7/04
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSAREGTOPDECENTRALIZATION/Resources/496899-
1095189822590/521764-1095190669879/VolumeI.pdf
The stories of Karnataka and Kerala illustrate the variety of challenges that India faces in
implementing decentralization and achieving its benefits in terms of improved delivery of services to rural
communities. The two states came to their current stage of the decentralization process from 3 different
directions. Karnataka has had a long history of initiatives in support of decentralization, beginning in the
19th century, while Kerala came belatedly to its support. What distinguishes Kerala from the other states in
India is the “big-bang” approach it has taken. The strategy was to implement a significant fiscal
decentralization program and to “learn by doing”. As a result Kerala has now developed a decentralized
fiscal structure in terms of grant design and the empowerment of the gram panchayats. Karnataka’s is the
more cautious approach where the state government still holds the balance of fiscal decision-making power.
While there are important differences between the two states in some aspects of the systemic weaknesses
observed, there are also similar flaws. Neither approach has achieved effective empowerment of local
governments and neither appears to have substantially ratcheted up local government revenue raising,
although the Kerala model is more developed. Both states have weak, outdated and poorly functioning
financial management systems that debilitate the policy making and planning process, as well as the
management and accountability of the decentralized system. In the absence of reliable information on the
revenues and expenditures of local bodies, neither the states nor the center can lead a reasonable fiscal
decentralization program. This also raises questions regarding the validity of central and state finance
commission recommendations.

Indian federalism is very corrupted on a local level, thus failing the Indian people
Frontline, “Derailing decentralization.” 12/27/04 http://india.eu.org/2133.html
The fears about the future of the decentralisation experiment in Kerala are coming true. People are
staying away from the gram and ward sabhas in the invigorated panchayats, municipalities and corporations
in the State and, as a result, the most exciting programme to empower citizens is seemingly running into
trouble. In the majority of local bodies, attendance registers are being fudged regularly to fake the
quorum at gram/ward sabha meetings. Genuine local governance by the people, thought to be a dream
come true in Kerala under democratic decentralisation experiment, is thus being tampered with,
knowingly or unknowingly.
WNDI 2008 13
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Bad- Never Increase


India will never become more federalist
Robert Bejesky, Professor at Trinity University. Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 14 Temp.
Int'l & Comp. L.J. Fall 2000
Rather than reconfiguring India's territorial States' boundaries, a more mild position is to institutionally and
administratively decentralize central government institutions. Because India's central government has had
control over virtually the entire financial structure, including State resource transfers and institutions,
any return to a stronger federal structure would be an improvement but would require a distinct
political decision by political forces to relinquish more fiscal planning, government functions, and
political power to lower levels of government. 218 While there have been some legislative declarations to
undertake a systematic policy of decentralization, there have been few tangible moves in this direction,
especially when one considers that financial dependence is so extreme. 219 Any political decentralization in
India would require a delegation of much administrative, financial, and legal authority to the state level so
that party competition would have more at stake. 220
WNDI 2008 14
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Bad- Collapse approaching


Indian federalism is soon to collapse
Frontline “Derailing decentralization.” 12/x/04 http://india.eu.org/2133.html
As people’s interest in local governance wanes, slowly, but surely, the tendency towards centralisation
of powers is engulfing the panchayati raj system in the State. The Congress-led United Democratic Front
(UDF) government is increasingly becoming stingy in disbursing the promised, wholesome share of Plan
funds to the local bodies. Government departments are trying to impose parallel programmes over
development plans drawn up by the panchayats. State officials are trying to reclaim their lost notions of
power over the people. Politicians, including Ministers, Members of Parliament and the Legislative
Assemblies, and even members of the majority of local self-government institutions, have once again
started believing themselves as the all-powerful dispensers of "favours" to the people. A number of the
newly empowered local self-government institutions (LSGIs) are swaying under the onslaught. If the
unhealthy trends are not stemmed, India’s most effective experiment as yet of giving `power to the
people’ may soon come to naught.
WNDI 2008 15
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Bad- Won’t Model US 1/2


India refuses to model US court decisions, US v. Morrison backs us up
Brooke B. Grandle, Women's Rights Law Reporter, “Choosing to Help or to Advance Their Agenda: A
Comparative Look at How the Supreme Courts of India and the United States Approach Violence Against Women.”
Spring 2003
The second component of the Morrison decision, discussion of the Commerce Clause limitations, likewise
fails to provide a basis for a parallel ruling by the Indian Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of India
would have no need for the extensive debate that figured prominently in the United States Supreme
Court decision. Federalism does not play nearly the same pivotal role in India as it does in the United
States because of the strong centrist nature of the Indian government. 208 The Seventh Schedule of the
Indian Constitution sets forth the powers of the federal government, the powers of the state governments, and
then, notably the concurrent powers. 209 One of the concurrent powers is criminal law. 210 Therefore, the
Indian Supreme Court would not engage [*99] in the same vehement discussion as the United States
Supreme Court about which level of government is best situated to issue civil remedies. The Indian federal
government would have the unquestioned ability to legislate on the issue, and the Indian Supreme Court
would uphold the remedy in support of the typically inactive legislature's advocacy.

India and American federalism are unmatched


Bob Bejesky. Professor at Trinity University. “HEGEMONIC AND CENTRALIZED POLITICAL PARTY
SYSTEMS: UNDERMINING EGALITARIAN PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM? A CROSS-NATIONAL
COMPARISON OF INDIA, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES.” International and Comparative Law Journal.
Fall 2000
Like in India, a question was raised early in American history over the extent to which a unified
government would be achieved in America as differences in economic pursuits, governance, religion,
and rivalries were considered significant. However, these dissimilarities have not caused the number of
or gravity of conflicts in the United States as they have in India because of the use of one standard
language, greater economic prosperity, and the level of homogenization in the United States. People of
different backgrounds have been integrated through increases in technology, communications, and
transportation and created an accepted diversity that is enforced and promoted by law. Even if the United
States were to evolve more fully into a country with specific regional ideological and political power-bases,
it cannot be compared to India, which has had a populace exceedingly more diverse and regionalized for
many centuries. Territorial dissimilarities calling for stronger federalism based on concepts of equity have not
been persistent in the United States, even though re-fortifying the states has still been an important issue.

The Indian federalist system is different from the US model, thus Indian modeling can not
occur
S.D. Muni. http://www.sagepub.com/authorDetails.nav?contribId=500667Jawaharlal Nehru University. 1996.
“Ethnicity and power in the contemporary world.” 1996
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee00.htm#Contents
In 1992, the Sikkim Chief Minister and his regional party, the Sikkim Sangram Parishad, asked for membership in
the North-East Council (of NorthEast States and Tribal Areas) for this same purpose.31 Some scholars have
described the federal system in India as one of "coalition and administration," or one with a "high degree of
collaborative partnership."32 In addition, both at the central and state levels, a consciously followed
approach to preserve and promote the cultural specificities of diverse groups has helped such groups identify
with the national mainstream.33 All this has contributed to the secularization of ethnicity and has thus helped
strengthen integrative forces.
WNDI 2008 16
Federalism Adv

Indian Federalism Bad- Won’t Model US 2/2


Indian can’t model American federalism due to federal architecture
Sunita Parikh and Barry R. Weingast. “THE ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY:
RESPONSE: A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF FEDERALISM: INDIA.” Virginia Law Review . 10/x/97
Why do federal states differ so widely in their economic and political performance? Some federal states,
such as the United States, are among the richest and least corrupt in the world. Others, such as India
and Mexico, are very poor and are mired in slow or negative growth. Mexico has also been plagued by
considerable corruption. China, another de facto federal system, is very poor but is one of the fastest growing
economies in the world. To address this question, we develop a comparative theory of federal performance
and apply it to India. The performance of federal systems differs in part because federalism is not the only
relevant variable influencing a country's economic and political success. Nonetheless, we argue that
differential performance does reflect systematic differences among federal systems. Federalism is not a
single type of system, but a family of disparate systems. Although all such systems have a hierarchy of
governments, differences in federal architecture help to account for differential federal performance.
WNDI 2008 17
Federalism Adv

Nigerian Federalism Good- Stability FL


A.Federalism is key to Nigerian stability.
Rotimi Suberu, lecturer in politics at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. “Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in
Nigeria”. .2001.
Third, Nigeria’s current federal institutional structure has operated to protect the numerous ethnic
minorities from the direct hegemony of the bigger ethnic groups. Whereas the old regional system had
denied the minorities the security of their own states or regions, the current thirty-six—state structure
includes some fourteen states that are dominated by minority populations. Although it has not been possible
to give each minority group a state of its own—and strident agitations for new states have persisted in many
of the more ethnically heterogeneous minority-populated states—the multistate federal system has enabled
“a variety of ethnic minority states to play an increasingly active role in a more fluid and decentralized
polity.”12 This role of ethnic minorities has been particularly decisive in moderating and defusing the
traditional rivalries and tensions between the country’s three ethnic majority groups.

B. Nigerian dissolution would be devastating – it would trigger massive oil shocks and the
U.S. would intervene in an attempt to protect oil supplies
Dan Gardner, “Western world ignoring demise of Nigeria”, The Ottawa Citizen, 3/23/06, lexis
Imagine a country that is one of the world's largest exporters of oil. Imagine a country in which ethnic and
sectarian violence has killed thousands and driven millions from their homes, a country so fragile that a recent report commissioned by
the CIA concluded there is a good chance it will collapse. Imagine a country that Osama bin Laden has declared to be "ripe for
liberation." This country is not in the Middle East. It's also not on the minds of western media or politicians, despite the
almost unimaginable havoc that would be unleashed if the feared collapse comes. It is Nigeria. A British invention, Nigeria is a
country made up of some 250 ethnic groups and countless tribal subdivisions sharing only a weak national identity. It is also a
country of intense and growing religious passions whose 132 million people are divided almost equally between Christians and
Muslims. Violent earthquakes can erupt along any of these fault lines. In February, Muslims in the north murdered 50 Christians.
Christians in the south retaliated by murdering Muslims. Thousands fled in terror. These latest clashes started with protests against the
Danish cartoons, but most have less exotic origins. People fight for land or God. They fight to control local governments. They fight to
avenge insults. In the Niger Delta, they fight for control of oil. Dozens die in one clash. Hundreds in another. It's low-grade warfare but
the toll steadily climbs. By one estimate, 20,000 Nigerians have been killed in fighting since 1999, when democracy was restored after
16 years of military rule. And for every corpse, more than a hundred people have been driven from their homes. "The magnitude, scope,
character and dimension of internally displaced persons in Nigeria is frightening," declared a report released last week by Nigeria's
National Commission for Refugees. Since 1999, the commission says, three million people have fled. Their plight represents one of the
gravest humanitarian crises in the world. It is also one of the most unrecognized. The bloody clashes in Nigeria almost never rate a
mention in the western media and western politicians pay even less attention to the country than they do to other African hot spots. As a
result, very few people in Canada realize how dangerous the situation has become. "While currently Nigeria's leaders are locked in a bad
marriage that all dislike but dare not leave," states a 2005 report commissioned by the CIA, an event such as a coup attempt could
spark open warfare and "outright collapse." AN OIL SHOCK The consequences would be immense. "If
Nigeria were to become a failed state," the report concluded, "it could drag down a large part of the West
African region." Millions would flee. There's also the matter of oil. Even now, world oil prices jump every time a bullet is
fired in the Niger Delta. If Nigeria were to collapse, there could be an oil shock the like of which we haven't
seen since the Iranian Revolution. And since the long-term energy strategy of the United States assumes rising
African oil production, chaos in the Niger Delta would almost certainly bring in the Marines.

C. This scenario is ripe for escalation into a great power war that goes nuclear
Dr. Jeffrey Deutsch, founder of the Rabid Tiger Project, a political risk consulting and related research firm, 11-
18-02, http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html
The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the
country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other
countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a
really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as
wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are
beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has
the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political
lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need
any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war
alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the
other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial,
scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
WNDI 2008 18
Federalism Adv

Nigerian Federalism Good- Ethnic Conflict

Nigerian federalism solves ethnic conflict and a violent revolution


Africa News, "True Federalism, Panacea to Ethno-Religious Conflicts – Speaker." , November 23, 2001.
<http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2001/11/23/20011123news28.html>
The Speaker of Osun House of Assembly, Dr Mojeed Alabi, has said that the institution of true federalism
is the only permanent solution to the various religious and ethnic conflicts threatening the nation's
democracy. In a lecture at the Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU), Ile-Ife, in Osun, on Wednesday, Alabi
noted that the hallmark of a successful federal state was the ability to manage conflicts. He said that to
ensure a stable polity in a heterogenous and multi-cultural society, federalism could best be adopted to
achieve the twin-goal of development and unity in diversity. According to him, "a conflict-ridden society
like Nigeria has two options to contend with -- it can pretend not to recognise the pressure of conflict
and, therefore, risk a violent revolution that would consume everything and everyone. "On the other
hand, the leadership of a society prone to constant and irreconcilable conflicts can decide to take the bull by
the horns.'' Alabi noted that no country could successfully manage its crises unless its leaders were
psychologically and emotionally detatched from the causes of the conflicts. The speaker warned that the
various religious and ethnic crises in the country portended dangerous trends that could defy known political
solutions. He stressed that conflict resolution was central to politics and politicking ``only when such
occasional crises are allowed to provide the leeway for stability''. Alabi said that all efforts made so far at
addressing the problem of ethnic hostilities in the country were at best half-hearted and lacked sincerity of
purpose.
WNDI 2008 19
Federalism Adv

Nigerian Federalism Good- Squo Fails

No true Nigerian federalism can be achieved until constitutional review occurs


Daily Trust, “Nigeria; Only Constitutional Review Can Lead to True Federalism.” Africa News. 11/6/07. Lexis
(CVD)
No true federalism can be achieved in the country until the 1999 constitution is reviewed, Vice President
Goodluck Jonathan said yesterday. Vice President Jonathan spoke at the 4th International Conference on
Federalism, in New Delhi, India. He emphasised that the solutions to the controversy over federalism in
the country, is the proposed review of the 1999 constitution "which flows from a military tradition with
its inherent problem of power relations between the Federal, the States, and the Local
governments."The vice president stated that long years of military rule in most African countries
weakened the federalist principles entrenched by their founding fathers. He identified poverty and
frustration arising from lack of access to resources, as a major threat to federalism in the continent.
WNDI 2008 20
Federalism Adv

Nigerian Federalism Good- Squo Solves


Status quo solves Nigeria’s federalism woes, review of 1999 constitution on planed in the
National Assembly
Leadership, “Nigeria; Country Not Structured to Reflect True Federalism” Africa News. 5/4/2008. Lexis.
(CVD)
Former Military President, Ibrahim Babaginda, has said that Nigeria had not been structured to reflect
true federalism. Babangida made this assertion while condoling with the family of the late Afenifere leader,
Chief Abraham Adesanya, during a visit in Lagos. He regretted that in spite of the efforts of people such as
Adesanya, Nigeria had not been able to achieve true federalism in line with the aspirations of its
founding fathers. However, he was delighted that there is now a foundation for a true federal structure
with the successful transition (civilian-to-civilian) last year, and the commitment of the National
Assembly to the review of the 1999 constitution. He described Adesanya as a true democrat and a
champion of the Yoruba race, who played a major role in the struggle to end military rule in the country.
"Abraham was a committed democrat, who stood firm and unshaken in matters of his convictions. The role
played by him in re-awakening the Yoruba had generated awareness and discourse in the polity. Only history
will gauge the role played by Pa Abraham in bringing about the end of military rule in our country and
ushering in the era of multi-party representative democracy," Babangida said. The News Agency of Nigeria
(NAN) reports that the former President was accompanied by a former AD presidential candidate, Chief Olu
Falae and some PDP chieftains. Meanwhile, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr Dimeji
Bankole, has said that Nigeria has lost one of her titans of democracy with Adesanya's death. "He is truly the
last of the titans. May his soul rest in perfect peace," Bankole said in his condolence which he wrote when he
visited the Adesanyas' Apapa family home yesterday.Adesanya, who died on April 27, at the age of 85, will
be buried on May 23 in his home town, Ijebu Igbo, Ogun state.

Nigerian federalism works now and is equally representative to all people


Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo “How To Strengthen Federal Institutions.” 3/5/05
http://www.dawodu.com/obas31.htm
Specifically, Nigerian federalism, paying attention to religious, ethnic and cultural diversity and
recognising that with over 350 languages and even more dialects, has in-built in the system, policies that
ensure that the various nationalities and regional groups feel that they are represented at the centre as
well as recognised as being part of the political equation. Hence, we have what we call "federal
character," which simply means that in practically everything that we do, from recruitment into federal
institutions and the armed forces, through location of industries and institutions, to ministerial appointments,
there must be a balance requiring that each state be represented and that no part of the country is
marginalised.
WNDI 2008 21
Federalism Adv

Nigerian Federalism Good- Stability


True federalism key to rapid transformation of Nigeria
This Day, “Nigeria; Daniel Harps On True Federalism.” Africa News. 11/30/07. Lexis (CVD)
Governor Gbenga Daniel of Ogun State yesterday said true fiscal federalism is the only panacea that will
make Nigerians experience rapid transformation. He said "most importantly, genuine federalism
presupposes that it is the federating units that should decide the nature, structure and functions of the
centre, not the other way round as is currently the case." According to him "Nigeria will experience
rapid transformation when true fiscal federalism is allowed to thrive and the Federal Government does
not casually and unilaterally foist unfunded mandates on the states. As the true federating units and the
constituent blocks of our federation, the states must regain their relative autonomy."

Nigeria needs federalism reform to create workable solutions


Leadership, “Nigeria; Equitable Resource Allocation, Key to Economic Growth.” Africa News. 3/26/08. Lexis
(CVD)
According to him (Minister of finance, Dr. Shamsuddeen Usman), Nigeria is "in need of prudent
principles to guide our journey towards more optimal and equitable state of fiscal federalism, and to
help us apply vital lessons from international experience to create workable solutions that suit our unique
Nigerian realities". The minister also noted that the concept of fiscal federalism encompasses the
institutional, political, financial and legislative aspects of intergovernmental fiscal collaboration in a
federal state such as Nigeria. He also observed that in the past, there has been a tendency to focus attention
exclusively on the revenue sharing aspects of Nigeria's federal system. "But our challenges go beyond
determining the appropriate revenue allocation formula, and extend to other equally important issues like
policy coordination, and promoting transparency and accountability in the management of resources
at all levels of government", he further argued.
WNDI 2008 22
Federalism Adv

Nigerian Federalism Good- Solves Ethnic Conflict


Nigerian federalism solves ethnic conflict
Rotimi Suberu, lecturer in politics at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. “Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in
Nigeria”. .2001.
First, by establishing the states (now thirty-six in number) as relatively autonomous arenas of political
authority and resource competition, federalism has served to devolve ethnic conflict away from the
federal government or a few regional centers to the various state capitals. This devolution, in turn, has
helped to localize ethnic conflicts in individual states and to lessen the possibility that such conflicts will
engulf other constituent units or overwhelm the national political system. Thus pressures by Nigeria’s
Muslims for full official recognition of Islamic law have been largely contained by constitutional provisions
that empower the states to establish Shari’a courts for their Muslim populations. Consequently, states in the
Muslim-dominated North have been able to institute fairly elaborate systems of Islamic courts without
provoking opposition from Christian or animist groups in other states or violating the basic secularity of the
common federal arena.
WNDI 2008 23
Federalism Adv

Nigerian Federalism Good- Solves State Dissolution


Nigerian federalism solves state dissolution.
Rotimi Suberu, lecturer in politics at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. “Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in
Nigeria”. .2001.
Second, multistate federalism in Nigeria has been used to fragment and crosscut the identities of each of
the three major ethnic formations of Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. Whereas the old regional system
had institutionalized the demographic and political dominance of one of these ethnic groups in each region,
the current thirty-six—state structure distributes the core population of each majority ethnicity among at least
five states. This distribution has served to expose or activate important historical, territorial, or subethnic
cleavages within the ethnic majority groups and to relegate them to smaller states that, unlike the old regions,
are not large enough or economically strong enough to challenge the federal government. Although the
major ethnic groups continue to demonstrate considerable internal cohesion as they compete with each
other in bidding for supremacy in national politics, this ethnic solidarity is significantly less incendiary
than the aggressive ethnic chauvinism that had expressed itself through the old regional system, fueled
secessionist tendencies, and brought the country to the brink of disintegration.
WNDI 2008 24
Federalism Adv

Nigerian Federalism Bad- Civil War FL


A. Nigerian federalism leads to civil war.
Tunde Babawale Professor of Political Science at the University of Lagos. “THE RISE OF ETHNIC MILITIAS,
DE-LEGITIMISATION OF THE STATE, AND THE THREAT TO NIGERIAN FEDERALISM.” 2001
http://www.westafricareview.com/vol3.1/babawale.html
Nigeria is an archetypal plural society characterised by divergent languages, cultures, ethnic groups
and geographic regions. The realisation that a society as diverse as Nigeria may be difficult to manage
administratively partly informed the decision to adopt the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954 which formally
inaugurated the practice of federalism in Nigeria. Unfortunately, the Nigerian federal structure so
inaugurated was and still is an unbalanced and lopsided one in which the northern region emerged as a
bigger entity than a combination of the entire populations of the eastern and western regions. The struggle for
power sharing was reduced to a struggle for hegemony among the three main ethnic groups namely, the
Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. In the course of this struggle, those who fall outside the three major groups
were regarded as minorities who were marginalised not only in the allocation of power but of resources as
well. Of the three major ethnic groups already mentioned, the Hausa-Fulani faction became the dominant
faction, which controlled the federal power structure for three decades. Consequently, the two other major
contenders have had cause to complain of marginalisation too. Indeed, such feelings of marginalisation
partly accounted for the civil war that nearly dismembered the country between 1967 and 1970.

B. Impact: This scenario is ripe for escalation into a great power war that goes nuclear
Dr. Jeffrey Deutsch, founder of the Rabid Tiger Project, a political risk consulting and related research firm, 11-
18-02, http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html
The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the
country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other
countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a
really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk
being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few
countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she
also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in
Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers
unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very
quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a
much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been
facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go
fishing.
WNDI 2008 25
Federalism Adv

Nigerian Federalism Bad- Oil Prices


Nigerian federalism hurts oil profits.
John Ejobowah, Department of Global Studies Wilfrid Laurier University. “The New Political Economy of
Federal Preservation: Insights from the Nigerian Federal Practice.”2003.
http://www.queensu.ca/politics/rgonemc/EjobowahFederalismPaper2.pdf#search=%22%22the%20political%20capt
ure%20of%20the%20central%20bank%22%22
The political capture of the central bank (via intergovernmental transfer of oil revenue) induced intense
competition for federal attention, erased incentives to generate independent sources of revenue, generated
a culture of dependence on the centre, and stifled local enterprise. The states found themselves in a
condition of economic paralysis and decay, perhaps evidenced by nationwide declining trends in economic
indicators. Per capita income fell from an all time high of $870 in 1982 (when international oil prices were
very favorable) to $260 in 1998 while the national poverty rate in 2003 was 70%. With an external debt of
$33 billion that more than equals its GNP of $29.2 billion (1999), the country is listed among the world’s
heavily indebted poor countries (Imevbore undated; Nigeria 2003; World Bank 1999). Evidently, the
sharing of oil revenue has been a curse to Nigerian federalism.
WNDI 2008 26
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Good- Economy FL


A. Federalism Key to The Russian Economy
Alexei Sitnikov, senior researcher at the Institute of Open Economy in Moscow. “A Brief History of Russian
Federalism,” 2/4/05, Lexis
Second, economic diversity among the regions also demands a significant degree of fiscal federalism and
the ability for the regions to control their fiscal base. Right now, the regions bear huge responsibilities for
funding federal social programs but have hardly any say in how the taxes are distributed between the regions
and the center. Should social problems similar to the current benefits protests arise in the future, regional
leaders will have no other option but to transfer all responsibility to the federal government and the president.
According to a number of recent opinion polls, the majority of Russians consider governors safeguards
against the center's attempts to extract and redistribute regional resources. The appointment of
regional leaders will eliminate these safeguards and increase the hostility between the center and the
regions. Appointed governors will have no incentives to foster horizontal competition and create favorable
conditions for business and labor. The only incentive they will have is to serve their master well.

B. Russian economic collapse causes nuclear conflict


Steven David, Prof. of political science at Johns Hopkins, 1999, Foreign Affairs
If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the
GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with
many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line
(earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut
spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and
where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the
massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If
conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's
military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little
civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military
commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay,
housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the
military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who
dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger.
Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws
have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear
which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian
Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever
more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond
Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay
taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which
make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede
from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence
throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb
to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like
Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian
Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees
would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its
neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the
environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the
sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second
civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent
disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever
fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia
retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites
scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or
much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken,
making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such
dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to
think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil
war.
WNDI 2008 27
Federalism Adv
WNDI 2008 28
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Good- Democracy FL


A. Russian Federalism Key To Democracy Promotion
Daniel, Kempton, Associate professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Northern Illinois
University. “Unity Or Separation,” Greenwood Publishing Group. 2001
A third widely perceived benefit of federalism is the contention that it promotes democracy. At a
minimum, by institutionalizing competing groups of political elites and dividing power among them,
federalism makes tyranny more difficult. But even more than this, federalism admits the legitimacy of
conflicting interests and commits all sides to peaceful accommodation. In short, it accepts pluralism and
breeds tolerance for diverse interests that arc core requirements for the sustenance of democracy. It also
creates a second level for citizen participation in governance. Elazar argues that federalism also tends to raise
public attention to constitutional issues and “generates a continuing referendum on first principles”’3
Because the constitution serves as the demarcation of powers between the federal and component
governments, it attracts greater attention. Despite the advantages federalism holds for democracy, there is no
guarantee that the adoption of federalism will lead to democracy. (Whether democracy is itself a precondition
for federalism will be

B. Regional Governments are Corrupt, Democracy Promotion Key To Solve


Clifford, Kupchan, Director, Europe and Eurasia, at the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. “Devolution
Drives Russian Reform,” Washington quarterly Spring 2000. < http://www.twq.com/spring00/232kupchan.pdf>
A highly problematic aspect of devolution is wasteful spending, authoritarianism, and corruption at the
regional level. Combined regional and local spending increased its share of GDP from 12.4 percent to 15.8
percent between 1992 and 1997. Almost half of regional and local expenditures consist of subsidies,
especially wasteful across the- board housing and utility subsidies.8 The most common power structure in the
regions is that the governor rules in concert with the leading financial-industrial group or enterprise in the
region. This structure tends to encourage authoritarian rule, because political and economic power tends to
coalesce behind one person. The corporatist nature of regional government lessens the extent to which
devolution has brought to Russia the beneficial effects it has yielded elsewhere—increased
transparency and accountability. The regional administration usually, and increasingly, controls regional
media. Regional government can be an impediment to private sector growth, and sporadic human
rights violations have occurred.9 There have been allegations of links between some regional
governments and organized crime; corruption and organized crime are endemic in many regions.
What devolution has done is to expose the rot. The Soviet power structure left a legacy of corruption,
organized crime, authoritarian rule, and inefficiency. These are hardly new problems, although they are now
apparent on an unprecedented scale. What is new, however, is that these problems can no longer be hidden
behind the shadow of the center. To the contrary, devolution has given local voters a better view of the
problem. Exposure to democratic and market discipline is the best, perhaps the only, chance of reducing the
corruption, crime, and inefficiency that pervade Russian society. Democracy is thus the key vehicle to
promote change. One can only hope that over time, regional electorates will push out governors and mayors
who perpetuate a system that does nothing to improve their lives.
WNDI 2008 29
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Good- Political Freedom

Russian Devolution Key to Political Freedoms


Clifford, Kupchan, Director, Europe and Eurasia, at the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. “Devolution
Drives Russian Reform,” Washington quarterly Spring 2000. < http://www.twq.com/spring00/232kupchan.pdf>
In the Russian case, devolution has had a generally positive effect on reform. It has produced
some of the expected general effects of devolution, plus some beneficial effects unique to the political
process in Russia. Devolution has promoted institutions that enhance pluralism and check central
power, increased political freedoms, and strengthened civil society. Given Russia’s long authoritarian
history, these are not small achievements.
WNDI 2008 30
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Good- Key to Survival


Federalism Key to Russia’s Survival
Daniel, Kempton, Associate professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Northern Illinois
University . “Russian Federalism: Continuing Myth Or Political Salvation?” Demokratizatsiya, Spring 2001. <
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200104/ai_n8943252/pg_1>
Federalism has become fashionable because of its perceived benefits. It can accommodate diverse
minority groups within a single state. Federalism provides religious, ethnic, and cultural minority groups
with a safe political base in which they can control cultural and educational policies. Second, by giving
multiple minorities an entrenched political base federalism can promote pluralism and thus
democracy. Third, as with early federations and leagues, the component regions receive the benefits of
common defense without fully sacrificing their autonomy to the center. Fourth, like members of a free market
area, the components of a federal system receive the benefits of a common market without fully surrendering
economic autonomy. Finally, because federalism is based on the assumption of continual negotiation and
renegotiation--among the components and between the components and the center--it provides a highly
adaptable and flexible form of government. If federalism can provide even a few of those benefits to
contemporary Russia, it may well prove to be Russia's political salvation. It may explain Russia's
survival. The question, then, is whether federalism is Russia's political salvation or merely a continuing
myth?

Strong Russian Federalism Key to Avoid Disintegration


Gordon, Hahn, Senior Researcher for the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies. "Past, present, and future
of the Russian federal state," Demokratizatsiya, Summer 2003.
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200307/ai_n9282060>.
Where did Russia's federal state come from, where has it been, where is it going, and why does it matter
beyond a small circle of Russia specialists? Taking the last question first, the success or failure of Russia's
transformation into a stable market democracy will determine the degree of stability throughout
Eurasia. For such a large multinational state, successful political and economic development depends on
building an efficient democratic federal system. Indeed, one of the main institutional factors leading to the
demise of the Soviet partocratic regime and state was the considerably noninstitutionalized status of the
RSFSR (Russian Republic) in the Soviet Union's pseudofederal, national-territorial administrative structure.
Only a democratic federal system can hold together and effectively manage Russia's vast territory, the
awkward administrative structure inherited from the failed USSR, and hundreds of divergent ethnic,
linguistic, and religious interests. Dissolution or even any further weakening of Russia's federal state
could have dire consequences for Russian national and international security by weakening control
over its means of mass destruction.
WNDI 2008 31
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Good- Key to Economy (1/2)

Federalism Boosts Russian Economy


Olivier Blanchard and Andrei Shleifer, . “Federalism with and without political centralization. China versus
Russia,” 10/15/2000, < http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/682>
Before proceeding to look at the empirical evidence on the various parameters of the model, one may well
want to challenge the assumption that the central government is pro-growth, or at least more pro-growth than
local governments . Surely, both China and Russia provide numerous examples where the policies of the
central government destroyed the economy. In the context of transition and change however, the
assumption that the central government is less likely to be captured by initial rent holders than local
governments seems reasonable. Local governments are smaller relative to state and ex-state ¯rms, more
directly affected by the unemployment implications of the closing of a particular ¯rm, more likely to respond
favorably to requests for transfers or protection. Central governments may well be captured as well, but not
necessarily by groups opposed to growth. Capture by the oligarchs for example may well lead to a
massive redistribution of Federalism 6 wealth in their favor, but not necessarily to lower growth.

Devolution of Russia boosts economic growth


Clifford, Kupchan, Director, Europe and Eurasia, at the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. “Devolution
Drives Russian Reform,” Washington quarterly Spring 2000. < http://www.twq.com/spring00/232kupchan.pdf>
Devolution has hastened the breakup of the Soviet economic system and has created conditions under
which private entrepreneurship has a chance to take root and grow. The centrally planned economy of
the former Soviet Union left Russia with collective agriculture and huge enterprises, some of which
employed entire cities. Few of these enterprises can be salvaged or restructured to function in a market
economy. Their immediate closure, however, would result in massive unemployment and is simply not an
option. Russia's economic future thus depends on the emergence of new productive activities. Devolution
promotes market reform and new productive activities in several ways. It has allowed the creation of
successful regional models of economic reform. The process gives progressive ideas at the regional level a
better chance of being turned into policy. Indeed, the policies of forward-leaning regional leaders are creating
a canon of success stories and models for other regional governments. The best example is Governor Prusak
in Novgorod. Reform in Novgorod has produced a more favorable tax climate, more transparent
budget procedures, streamlined licensing procedures, and clear land titling. As a result, the number of
new small businesses and foreign investment has dramatically increased. Samara, where roughly 20
percent of the workforce is employed by small business, is also a success story. Governor Titov has strongly
championed small business and passed a groundbreaking law permitting the privatiza-tion of agricultural
land. The Siberian region of Tomsk is also implementing many of these same reforms.
WNDI 2008 32
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Good- Key to Economy (2/2)

Devolution Is Boosting the Russian Economy Now


Clifford, Kupchan, Director, Europe and Eurasia, at the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. “Devolution
Drives Russian Reform,” Washington quarterly Spring 2000. < http://www.twq.com/spring00/232kupchan.pdf>
Devolution has also helped to promote market reform by producing economic stratification and
competition among regions. Roughly 10 or so "winner regions" are emerging, either because of
reformist policies or the presence of natural resources. Stratification leads to competition, increased
efficiency, and the emulation of successful regions. At least 30 regions have sent delegations to Novgorod to
study the success of its reform. Anecdotal accounts indicate that success in Novgorod has led to competitive
innovations in Leningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg. Officials from many regions have also visited Samara
to study successful reforms.
WNDI 2008 33
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Good- Key Now (1/2)


Now is the key time for Russian federalism - failure to stop the current trend of power
centralization ensures violent Russian disintegration
Strobe, Talbott, President of the Brookings Institute. "The strains of Putin's clampdown," 9-27-04
<http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2004/0927russia_talbott.aspx>
George W. Bush last week expressed sympathy in his address at the United Nations for the victims and
outrage at the perpetrators of the recent hostage crisis in southern Russia that ended in the massacre of school
children. He said nothing, however, about the way Vladimir Putin has used the tragedy to step up a five-year
campaign to re-establish Russia as a highly centralised, vertical state with power concentrated in the Kremlin.
Mr Putin has decided to abolish the direct election of regional governors. From now on, he will
personally appoint governors, thereby calling into question Russia's self-designation asafederal state and
raising new concerns about the fate of pluralistic democracy there. On a recent visit to Russia, I found a
combination of alarm and resignation about how Mr Putin's latest move fits all too logically with his ongoing
effort to regulate and manipulate the dissemination of information. Russia no longer has an independent
national television station. Journalists worry that censorship already extends to the print media and may soon
reach the internet. Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of "glasnost", or openness, was crucial to the end of the
communist system, the USSR, the Soviet empire and the cold war. Now more than ever Russia needs
glasnost and a free press, not least as an antidote to corruption of the kind that permitted terrorists to bribe
their way past police checkpoints and into the doomed school. An inescapable and complicating fact about
the current situation is that Mr Putin is still very popular - not in spite of his authoritarian instincts, but partly
because of them. His clampdowns have not much affected the lives of ordinary Russians. Russian experts
on public opinion say that many feel his firm hand is necessary to preserve public security and national
unity from the twin threats of terrorism and secessionism.Meanwhile, the Russian economy is doing well,
earning support for Mr Putin from a growing middle class and from western businessmen who have been
investing in Russia for more than a decade. In their view, Mr Putin has administered a corrective dose of
stability and predictability to a country that seemed to be lurching toward chaos in the free-for-all 1990s
under Boris Yeltsin.In economic policy, Mr Putin still qualifies as a reformer. One reason is that he trusts the
team of liberals who are advising him in that area. He seems to be trying to replicate those ties of personal
loyalty in the political realm by appointing presidential proconsuls in the regional capitals. Mr Putin is
attempting a Russian version of the Chinese model, strengthening political controls while opening the
country up to market forces. He—and Russia—may not be able to have it both ways. Economic and political
freedom are inextricably linked. A genuine rule-of-law society, which is a precondition for economic
progress, requires a system of checks and balances that is impossible when power is concentrated in one
office.If Russia is to survive as a unitary state, it must resume its development as a federal and democratic
one. The essence of democratic federalism is maximum self-governance at the local or provincial level.
People are more likely to respect—and obey—authority if they feel it reflects their interests and is invested in
leaders they have chosen. Federalism makes a virtue of diversity. Russia is vastly diverse. The tsars and
the commissars tried to impose unity and order by a more brutal version of the methods Mr Putin is now
applying. They failed, and so may he. The proximate cause for the recent crisis is the decade-old war in
Chechnya. Mr Putin hopes to restore Moscow's writ over Chechnya and prevent other actual or potential
secessionists from following the Chechens' lead. On the first score, it is hard to imagine that Chechnya will
ever again, in any meaningful sense, be governed by Moscow. Whether it is too late for Ingushetia, Dagestan,
Karachaevo-Cherkessia and other corners of Russia's North Caucasus that are not yet household words—
whether Russians' nightmare of their country going the way of the Soviet Union comes true—depends on
how long Mr Putin's misguided experiment in hyper-centralisation lasts.That, in turn, could depend, in some
measure, on what Mr Putin hears from other leaders, especially fellow members of the Group of Eight—and
most of all from his counterpart in the White House. While Mr Putin is representative of a widespread
Russian resistance to westerners' "preaching", he still wants to be treated as a full member of this club of
leading democracies, and he regards the US as its de facto chairman. Officials in Moscow say that, despite
muted criticism from Washington, the policy of the Bush administration is more "understanding" than that of
the European Union. Mr Bush's UN speech confirmed their satisfaction on that score. The west has a huge
stake in how Russian democracy evolves in the coming years. If we learned nothing else from the 20th
century, it is that the nature of Russia's internal regime determines its external behaviour. A Russia that rules
its own people by force and edict rather than consent and enfranchisement is virtually certain,
WNDI 2008 34
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Good- Key Now (2/2)


sooner or later, to intimidate its neighbours and to make itself one of the world's problems rather than a
contributor to their solution.
WNDI 2008 35
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Good- Key to Democracy

Federalism Key to Democracy In Russia


Clifford, Kupchan, Director, Europe and Eurasia, at the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. “Devolution
Drives Russian Reform,” Washington quarterly Spring 2000. < http://www.twq.com/spring00/232kupchan.pdf>
Moreover, since devolution has been a primary agent in weakening the authoritarian state, it
has helped create and protect “political space” in Russia. Basic freedoms essential to democracy, and
unheard of in the Soviet Union only eight years ago, are now virtually taken for granted.
Examples include ready access to the Internet, unrestricted contacts with foreigners,
freedom to travel, freedom of artistic expression, and increased—if incomplete—freedom
of religion. Many Russian universities, including those in the regions, are centers of
creative and spontaneous thought.3 Since devolution checks central power, and since the center is
currently and is likely to continue to be very weak, this political space will be very difficult to take
away.
WNDI 2008 36
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Good- Models America

Russia models American federalism.


Publius, “Refederalizing Russia: debates on the idea of federalism in Russia,” 3/22/97.
<http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/27/2/187>
Many proponents of a territorial principle looked to the United States as a model of successful
federalism. Gavril Popov (at that time mayor of Moscow), for example, was one of several leading
"reformers" who proposed a system of territorial federalism in Russia that adhered to a United States
type model. He called for the creation of 10-15 large-scale regions and for the abolition of Russia's
ethno-federal hierarchy. In order to provide for the right of national self-determination, Popov also
proposed the formation of Councils of National Communities at both the regional and the federal levels for
organizing policies on non-Russian language education and the "development" of non-Russian cultures, for
example.(16) Another advocate of a Lander-basedmodel of Russian federalism was the nationalities minister,
Sergei Shakray, who supported the creation of a dozen administrative units. His "February Thesis" in 1993
proposed an eleven-point nationalities policy which stressed the importance of tackling national questions
outside of the federal structure of the Russian state.(17) Another, butless tolerant, view of territorial
restructuring was also provided by the leader of the "Liberal Democratic" party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky,who
proposed abolishing all the republics and national-formations in1991.(18)
WNDI 2008 37
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Russian Federalism Bad – Economy FL


A. Russian Federalism Hurts The Economy And Supports Corruption
Barry R. Weingast and Rui J. P. De Figueiredo Jr., Senior Fellow at Hoover Institution and Senior Fellow with
Expertise in Political economy and public policy, political foundation of markets and economic reform, U.S.
politics, regulation. “Russian Federalism: A Contradiction in Terms”. 2001.
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3475516.html>
Federalism, Russian Style We apply our approach to federalism, Russian style. Federalism in Russia
exhibits a range of pathologies. Most important, Russia’s federal structure fails to give subnational
government officials the incentive to foster local economic prosperity. First, subnational governments
have too little policymaking authority with which to tailor local policies to local conditions. Second,
significant welfare losses arise because the informal policy authority they have wrested from the center
does not conform to the assignment principle whereby policies are assigned to that level of government
that can most efficiently deliver them. Third, a soft budget constraint increases opportunities for
subnational government corruption, rent-seeking, and market intervention. Finally, the form of informal
autonomy allows subnational governments to force profitable enterprises to accept burdensome taxes,
regulations, and nonremunerative expenditures. Because subnational governments can extract more rents
from more-profitable enterprises, the Russian political system markedly decreases the economic incentives
for new investment. In striking contrast to the Chinese system, the structure of Russia’s fiscal federalism
provides few fiscal incentives for subnational governments to foster local economic prosperity.

B. Russian Federalism Will Fail to Promote Economic Prosperity


Barry R. Weingast and Rui J. P. De Figueiredo Jr., Senior Fellow at Hoover Institution and Senior Fellow with
Expertise in Political economy and public policy, political foundation of markets and economic reform, U.S.
politics, regulation. “Russian Federalism: A Contradiction in Terms”. 2001.
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3475516.html>
The center’s attempts to force conformity among subnational governments produce another bad feature of
federalism in Russia. In combination with acts of political opportunism, the central control generates
significant mistrust among the regions. In reaction, the regions resist the center—they hide their
activities, including their revenue. Further, they resist Moscow’s policies, often including those designed
to improve national welfare. The lack of cooperation not only generates a series of costs but hinders center
and region from solving a range of problems. Russia’s center also fails some of the minimally necessary
political aspects for economic growth. Russia fails to provide a stable political set of rules on which all can
depend. Rules that are subject to ex post adjustment allow a degree of opportunism. A confusing system of de
facto tax powers fosters the different levels of government to compete for taxes, often using the same taxes.
As economists show, this type of "competetive taxation" implies too large a tax burden on the economy. This
burden hinders both private and public investment. Further, the center’s apparent extractive tendencies
exacerbate mistrust and fear by the regions. Worse, this behavior penalizes economic success,
dramatically reducing the fiscal incentives of lower governments to promote local economic prosperity.
The center also fails to provide a range of basic public goods and services that are standard in Western
democracies. Rich regions can spend more than poor ones, exacerbating social inequality. Federal
control of social expenditures allows uniform spending across regions. Regions thus have poor fiscal
incentives to promote prosperity, and the soft budget constraint implies only weak fiscal penalties for costly
economic intervention and rent-seeking. Constraints on factor and product mobility hinder the competitive
process among lower jurisdictions, thus weakening this source of incentives for good performance by local
governments. In short, we judge Russian-style federalism to be pathological because it lacks a consistent,
credible, and financially sensible line of authority between center and regions. The result is a
misallocation of energy and resources and a substantial impediment to Russia’s transition to a market
economy. The substantial degree of mistrust and noncooperation represents a major impediment to Russia’s
attempts to improve citizen welfare. The problems identified here are emblematic of Russia’s systematic
failure to create a political system capable of promoting economic prosperity.
WNDI 2008 38
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Bad- Russia Refuses


Russian Federalism’s Attempt To Control The Government Fails
Barry R. Weingast and Rui J. P. De Figueiredo Jr., Senior Fellow at Hoover Institution and Senior Fellow with
Expertise in Political economy and public policy, political foundation of markets and economic reform, U.S.
politics, regulation. “Russian Federalism: A Contradiction in Terms”. 2001.
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3475516.html>
Federalism, Russian style, fails to conform to the assignment principle, the Tiebout principle, or those
associated with market-preserving federalism. The assignment of policies to different levels of government
has been based on political expediency rather than on a logical design conforming to standard principles. As
the economist Christine Wallich has observed, Russia’s assignment of taxation and policymaking
authority makes no economic sense. The center’s wide-ranging attempts to control regional government
behavior force a "one-size-fits-all" set of policies on a diverse economy with dramatically different
needs. These attempts violate the three classic principles of fiscal federalism. First, central control fails to
allow local jurisdictions the political freedom to adjust policy to fit local conditions. Economist Friedrich
von Hayek observed long ago that central control can never know enough to adjust policies to local
circumstances. Second, it vio lates the assignment principle, granting policy authority to the appropriate
level of government. Finally, these controls prevent the Tiebout mechanism allowing policy flexibility to
reflect local demand conditions and hence the political competition among local jurisdictions that is
important for their behavior.

Federalism In Russia Has Empirically Failed


Sukhov, Ivan, Political commentator for the Vremya Novostei newspaper. Covered regional conflicts, the
problems of federalism and relations between nationalities since the end of the 1990s. “Russian Federalism and
Evolution of Self-Determination”, 8/8/07. <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1127.html>
The history of Russian federalism is relatively short. Two attempts to hammer out a federal system
were tantamount to emergency landing maneuvers. The first one took place in 1917-1922 and
culminated in a de facto restoration of unitary rule. The second attempt started in the 1990s and it risks
sharing the fate of the previous attempt, despite the fact that the effective Constitution proclaims the principle
of federalism. Sadly enough, that principle got there as a fragment of the Soviet heritage, not as a product
of Russia’s new self-determination.

The Russian Constitution does not Support Federalism


Robert, Sharlet, Oxford University Press Stable. “The Prospects for Federalism in Russian Constitutional
Politics,” 1994 JSTOR
If a genuine federal system is to develop and eventually supersede the Russian unitary state, it will initially
do so under the penumbra of the Yeltsin constitution. To understand the possibilities as well as the potential
limitations, it is necessary to conceptualize and analyze the Constitution in several ways: (1) as text, (2) as
fundamental law, and (3) as metaphor. As text, the Yeltsin constitution is not particularly promising for
federalist development. This is not surprising, given the mood and concerns of the presiden- tial
draftspersons during the interregnum. Nearly all feared a replication of the Soviet collapse. The theme
running through center-periphery discussions at the summer Constitutional Convention, and again at the
reconvened fall sitting, was the need for stability and for maintaining the unity and integrity of the
Russian state.

Russia Refuses Federalism


Leon Aron, Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. “Ideological Drift,” 6/29/06.
<http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24614,filter.all/pub_detail.asp>
Traditional postulates carried the day again: what is good for the state is automatically good for the
country; strengthening of statehood is strengthening of society, etc. The Kremlin decided that
decentralization of politics and economy in the 1990s had been inadequate and even harmful. Let us
therefore reanimate the role of the state, occupy "commanding heights" in economy again, repossess the
"jewels" in the "economy's crown," and put the executive branch of the government above all the other
branches, permanently.
WNDI 2008 39
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Russian Federalism Bad- Corruption


Federalism Corrupts Russia's Governments
Fredrik, Sjöholm, Department Of Economics at National University of Singapore. “Economic Recovery In
Indonesia: The Challenge Of Combining FDI And Regional Development,” 12/9/99.
<http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0347.pdf>
A related issue is whether decentralization may increase competition between
provinces and thereby force through good economic policies in Indonesia. It has been argued
that federalism (decentralization) may improve economic performance by, firstly, limit the
discretion of the central government and, secondly, by fostering competition between
provinces (Qian and Weingast, 1997). The amount of resources available to the central
government for inter-regional transfer may not diminish if decentralization increases
economic growth. The crucial question is whether increased economic efficiency can be
expected from the current decentralization. The first limited evidence do not suggest that
efficiency has increased. For instance, Antlöv (1999) argues that the reform has simply
decentralized corruption, and strengthened the autonomous decision making of local power
holders. Such development may be caused by inadequate institutional capacity at the local
level (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000, p.11). However, it may be too early to evaluate the
reform and there is some international experience of successful decentralization. For instance,
China decentralized during the 1980s and 90s when provinces gained large authority in
economic matters. The decentralization led to a competitive situation between provinces,
resulting in the implementation of good economic policies. (Montinola, Qian & Weingast,
1995). Still, there are differences between Indonesia and China that has to be taken in to
account. Whereas China is a relatively homogenous country, Indonesia is, again, a very
heterogeneous country. Even spatial development is therefore of greater importance in
Indonesia, and although China has experienced increased growth, it has been accompanied by
increased regional inequalities (Wei, 1999, p. 53). Finally, there seems to be international
examples of decentralization less encouraging than in the case of China. Decentralization in
countries such as Russia, the Philippines, and Thailand led local governments to fall into the hands of
vested interests, comprising of local business interests, bureaucrats, and even
criminal gangs (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000, Dick, 2000).

A Centralized Russian Is Corrupt


Alexei Sitnikov, senior researcher at the Institute of Open Economy in Moscow. “A Brief History of Russian
Federalism,” 2/4/05, Lexis
Could Russia be governed as a unitary state? The answer is a definitive no. First, the sheer size of the
country calls for some degree of regional autonomy. This autonomy should not be limited to everyday
management but should give regions enough room to maneuver in domestic policy matters within
constitutional boundaries. Regional leaders should be elected by direct popular vote. Supporters of
centralization argue that elections are corrupt. However, even an incomplete electoral contract with a
regional leader serves the interests of the people better than a hierarchical system of bureaucratic
subordination.

Federalism Is Corrupt.
Alexei Sitnikov, senior researcher at the Institute of Open Economy in Moscow. “A Brief History of Russian
Federalism,” 2/4/05, Lexis
However strong the centralization trend might appear, the history of Russian federalism is hardly over. Many
of the current policy choices are made in an ad hoc manner, without broad societal discussion and consent.
The power vertical, so cherished by the administration, will begin to buckle under the weight of
corruption, popular dissent and administrative inefficiencies. Then the authorities will realize that
central control is not the best governing option. For now, the rules of the game have changed. But the
game itself is far from over.
WNDI 2008 40
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Bad- Rejects Democracy (1/2)


The Russian government rejects democracy
David, Frum, Senior Editor at The American Prospect, Previously a Senior Writer at The Washington City Paper.
“Russian democracy is dying,” 3/10/07 Lexis
But we do know that over the past half dozen years, Vladimir Putin's government has extinguished all of
Russia's independent broadcast media and severely curbed most print media. We do know that Putin has
ended elections for local government and centralized all power in the Kremlin. We do know that he has
used administrative powers to seize some of Russia's largest corporations and transfer ownership to his
supporters -- and to confiscate gas fields leased to foreign investors. And now we have a clearer idea of how
Putin has been able to get away with these dangerous moves toward dictatorship: The Russian people
support him. Last week, the EU-Russia Centre released the results of a major new survey of Russian
public opinion. Only 16% of those surveyed identified the "Western model" of democracy as the ideal.
More than twice as many, 35%, said they "prefer the Soviet system before the 1990s." Only 10% of Russians
regarded their country as belonging to the West. 71% said that Russia was not part of Europe. Almost half of
Russians, 45%, regard Europe as a threat. The pollsters read a series of words to respondents. They asked:
Did those words have positive or negative associations. Only 33% of Russians had positive associations with
the word "freedom." Even the word "democracy" had surprisingly strong negative associations: Up to
one quarter of less affluent and less educated Russians associated "democracy" with concepts like (to
use the pollsters' words): "chaos, demagoguery and pointless chattering." The EU-Russia Centre notes that
Russians responded much more positively to democracy and freedom in the mid-1990s than they do today.
But those first post-Soviet years also suffered a collapse of living standards and political chaos -- unleashing
Soviet nostalgia in many Russians. Putin's authoritarian rule, by contrast, has coincided with a time of rising
prices for Russian oil and gas, and thus with improving living standards.

Russia rejects the US's call for democracy.


BBC Worldwide Monitoring, "Russian ministry source sees hypocrisy in words of USA's new envoy to
Moscow," 6/21/08 Lexis
Text of report by Russian state news agency RIA Novosti Moscow, 21 June: The Russian Foreign Ministry
hopes that the work of new US ambassador to Russia John Beyrle will help to strengthen bilateral relations
without any prior conditions imposed by the USA, a source in the ministry has told RIA Novosti. During a
hearing in the US Senate on Thursday [19 June] to confirm his appointment to the diplomatic posting, Beyrle
said that the USA recognized Russia's important role in the world as a great power and had an interest
in cooperating with Russia, but at the same time would trust Russia more if it became a democratic
country. "We work from the assumption that the new ambassador, in line with the duty of any ambassador,
will work to help US-Russian relations to develop positively, which will help increase mutual trust between
us. But at the same time there should be no 'if - then' type conditions," said the source. "Frankly, it grates to
hear reproaches from Mr Beyrle that the USA would trust Russia more if it were a democratic and market
country," he added. "Several issues immediately come to mind," he said. "That's to say, one can
understand that trust is made dependent on the American assessment of our democracy and market.
One way or the other, one gets the sense that the view of these issues is distorted by a negative prism," he
added. "But if we consider some of Mr Beyrle's advice that Russia should use its influence so as 'not to
heighten regional tension, and make a contribution to peace and stability,' or 'make energy deals on a
transparent, market-based and mutually advantageous basis', then that cannot help but provoke certain
associations," said the source. The USA is hardly an ideal model of this for us, he said. "We do not think, for
example, that the military campaign in Iraq against which we offered honest warnings was a 'contribution to
regional stability'. The way US firms win energy contracts there can hardly serve as a model of
transparency," he added. He continued: "And of course, we are developing democracy and a market based on
our own national interests and the needs of our country and society, certainly not for the sake of various
assessments imposed from abroad. We hope that objective reality will be visible - it's clearer in Moscow than
from Capitol Hill."
WNDI 2008 41
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Russian Federalism Bad- Rejects Democracy (2/2)


Russia rejects the US's call for democracy.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, "Russian ministry source sees hypocrisy in words of USA's new envoy to
Moscow," 6/21/08 Lexis
Text of report by Russian state news agency RIA Novosti Moscow, 21 June: The Russian Foreign Ministry
hopes that the work of new US ambassador to Russia John Beyrle will help to strengthen bilateral relations
without any prior conditions imposed by the USA, a source in the ministry has told RIA Novosti. During a
hearing in the US Senate on Thursday [19 June] to confirm his appointment to the diplomatic posting, Beyrle
said that the USA recognized Russia's important role in the world as a great power and had an interest
in cooperating with Russia, but at the same time would trust Russia more if it became a democratic
country. "We work from the assumption that the new ambassador, in line with the duty of any ambassador,
will work to help US-Russian relations to develop positively, which will help increase mutual trust between
us. But at the same time there should be no 'if - then' type conditions," said the source. "Frankly, it grates to
hear reproaches from Mr Beyrle that the USA would trust Russia more if it were a democratic and market
country," he added. "Several issues immediately come to mind," he said. "That's to say, one can
understand that trust is made dependent on the American assessment of our democracy and market.
One way or the other, one gets the sense that the view of these issues is distorted by a negative prism," he
added. "But if we consider some of Mr Beyrle's advice that Russia should use its influence so as 'not to
heighten regional tension, and make a contribution to peace and stability,' or 'make energy deals on a
transparent, market-based and mutually advantageous basis', then that cannot help but provoke certain
associations," said the source. The USA is hardly an ideal model of this for us, he said. "We do not think, for
example, that the military campaign in Iraq against which we offered honest warnings was a 'contribution to
regional stability'. The way US firms win energy contracts there can hardly serve as a model of
transparency," he added. He continued: "And of course, we are developing democracy and a market based on
our own national interests and the needs of our country and society, certainly not for the sake of various
assessments imposed from abroad. We hope that objective reality will be visible - it's clearer in Moscow than
from Capitol Hill."

Russian rejection of Democracy could lead to dangerous alliances with Iran, Syria, and
China
David Frum, Senior Editor at The American Prospect, Previously a Senior Writer at The Washington City Paper.
"Russian democracy is dying," 3/10/07, Lexis
But this explanation goes only so far. Even in the mid-1990s, only 25% of Russians regarded Western
democracy as the ideal system for Russia. Russians have been debilitated by 70- plus years of communism
into feelings of personal helplessness that leads them to crave a strong boss. Virtually every Russian
surveyed, 94%, said they felt they had zero influence on events in their country; 82% felt they bore no
responsibility. It's as if they are saying: Let Putin kill his enemies -- there's nothing we can do, and so
it's not our fault. As an institution, Russian democracy is dying. Inside the minds of the Russians, it is
already dead. We have no shortage of things to worry about in our troubled world: Islamic extremism,
Chinese aggression, European weakness, American isolation. Now add one more. A potentially great
power, endowed with vast energy wealth and inheriting a vast nuclear arsenal, is deliberately and with the
approval of the majority of its people turning its back on democracy and freedom. Instead of joining the
West, Russia is finding its way to dangerous alliances with Iran, Syria, China, and who knows what
other sinister forces. This grouping of anti-democratic states is extending its reach around the world -- even
perhaps to the suburbs of Washington D.C.
WNDI 2008 42
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Bad- Won't Model US


Russia Won't Model American Federalism
Evgueni Vladimirovich Pershin, second director of the Analytical Department of the Federation Council
Apparatus. Kazan Federalist. “Issues in the improvement of Russian federalism.” 2003.
<http://www.kazanfed.ru/en/publications/kazanfederalist/n8/4/>
The current state of federal relations in Russia requires practical steps aimed at its fundamental
modernization. However, we should not forget that Russian federalism is a national product. It will not
and should not look like the American or German models. Understanding of the foreign experience is
important only to produce an essentially new model of federal relations at the next stage of self-development,
which the researchers will later call “the Russian model of federalism.”

Russia will Model Britain Federalism, Not American


Evgueni Vladimirovich Pershin, second director of the Analytical Department of the Federation Council
Apparatus. Kazan Federalist. “Issues in the improvement of Russian federalism.” 2003.
<http://www.kazanfed.ru/en/publications/kazanfederalist/n8/4/>
If we can find the optimal variant of territorial power organization for Russia in the vast foreign
experience, it would probably be the devolution processes that are on the way in Great Britain, Spain
and a number of other states. This experience is much closer to Russia than the experience of federal state in
Germany or America. Devolution is also not a panacea but a way or a method to solve state building
problems.

Russia Modeling US will only Fail


Evgueni Vladimirovich Pershin, second director of the Analytical Department of the Federation Council
Apparatus. Kazan Federalist. “Issues in the improvement of Russian federalism.” 2003.
<http://www.kazanfed.ru/en/publications/kazanfederalist/n8/4/>
It is also high time to reevaluate the problem of borrowing foreign experience. This process largely follows
two directions in our country. The first is to find (in our opinion) positive examples in foreign experience and
declare them a panacea, a universal cure for all our problems. The “positive” foreign experience provokes
animated social-political discussion, which leads to establishing new legal norms and institutions. However,
it turns out in a short period of time that they do not work. Such a state of affairs is usually caused by the
lack of a systemic approach to the foreign experience. The formation of legal institutions which function
effectively in developed Western democracies was taking place under totally different historical,
political, economic, social-psychological and ethnic circumstances. Their transfer to the Russian
circumstance usually causes the opposite effect. Such an approach is unproductive, primarily because of
the territorial organization of public power. The attempts to borrow separate fragments of whole federal
relations models that were successful in Western countries usually lead to the deterioration of the
already unfavorable political and social-economic situation in Russia.

Their universal model of American federalism doesn’t solve Russian internal problems.
Evgueni Vladimirovich Pershin, second director of the Analytical Department of the Federation Council
Apparatus. Kazan Federalist. “Issues in the improvement of Russian federalism.” 2003.
<http://www.kazanfed.ru/en/publications/kazanfederalist/n8/4/>
All of this leads to the conclusion that federalism, as shown by Western experiences, is not a universal
solution for all internal political problems. Not all internal political problems can be solved through
federalization of the state. For instance, ethnic and confessional problems are such that they are not directly
connected with federal organization. There are many non-federal countries where such problems are
solved successfully through other means and methods.
WNDI 2008 43
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Bad- Hurts Citizens


Russian federalism weakens power of the center
Clifford, Kupchan, Director, Europe and Eurasia, at the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. “Devolution
Drives Russian Reform,” Washington quarterly Spring 2000. < http://www.twq.com/spring00/232kupchan.pdf>
In the Russian case, devolution has had a generally positive effect on reform. It has produced some of the
expected general effects of devolution, plus some beneficial effects unique to the political process in Russia.
Devolution has promoted institutions that enhance pluralism and check central power, increased political
freedoms, and strengthened civil society. Given Russia's long authoritarian history, these are not small
achievements. The flow of power to Russia's regions (and to a lesser extent, its cities) has promoted diverse
regional interests and checks on central power in four different areas. First, democratically elected
governors have been effective at articulating regional interests. By law, all of Russia's governors had to
stand for election by the end of 1996; many gubernatorial elections will occur again in the year 2000. The
elections produced stronger, legitimized governors who often oppose the government's policies and are
an alternative repository of power. Second, mechanisms to represent regional interests in Russia's
parliament have helped check the center. Each of the governors automatically receives a seat in the
Federation Council (upper house), which is a bastion of regional interests. Also, regional governors played a
key role in the December 1999 Duma elections (lower house). Candidates backed by strong governors
generally did well. As a result, the new Duma is likely to be more regionally oriented.

Russian Disintegration Won't Happen


Clifford, Kupchan, Director, Europe and Eurasia, at the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. “Devolution
Drives Russian Reform,” Washington quarterly Spring 2000. < http://www.twq.com/spring00/232kupchan.pdf>
Despite the gloomy data, the chances are low that Russia during the next decade will become a failed state
or disintegrate. Some weak states, such as Zaire, putter on for decades but then fragment. Other weak
central governments, such as India and Brazil, last indefinitely. Russia is likely to resemble the latter cases. A
number of factors work against fragmentation. Opinion polls show that the vast majority of Russians--82
percent of whom are ethnic Russian--want their country to remain intact. Governors in the Far East, in
Siberia, in the Volga region, and across Russia are concerned about the proper balance of power with
Moscow, but have no interest in going their own way. Regional elites in fact often aspire not to secession
but to positions in the federal government. Chechnya is the aberration. Chechens have been bucking
Moscow's yoke for centuries; their fundamentalist orientation has attracted outside support; and their external
border makes independence at least a possibility. Yet few of Russia's 88 other regions have even one of these
attributes; none have all three. In any case, there is no evidence that secessionist aspirations have spread to
other regions. Moreover, Moscow retains an important, if diminished, redistributive function. Roughly 2
percent of GDP is still recycled through Moscow, and governors fight for their share. Russian capital is
highly centralized in Moscow, meaning that private economic power is more concentrated than political
power. 6 Natural monopolies and production systems serve to tie regions together. 7 What new political and
economic relationships will form--what the new "connective tissue" will look like--is unclear. But
disintegration of the Russian Federation is very unlikely.
WNDI 2008 44
Federalism Adv

Russian Federalism Bad- WMD’s

Russian Federalism Hooks The World Up with WMD's


Clifford, Kupchan, Director, Europe and Eurasia, at the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. “Devolution
Drives Russian Reform,” Washington quarterly Spring 2000. < http://www.twq.com/spring00/232kupchan.pdf>
Devolution of power does pose some formidable security threats to Russia and the international
community. The weakening of central control, combined with the 1998 financial crisis, has led to an
increased risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The most immediate threats
are the sale of WMD technology, potential emigration of WMD scientists to rogue states, and insecure
storage of fissile material. Russia's financial ability to meet current and possible future arms control
agreements is also in question. The central government is not capable of (some would argue not interested
in) fully managing these security responsibilities, and the regional governments have no capacity or
historic responsibility for them.
WNDI 2008 45
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good- Economy


A. The Best Way to Combat the Root Cause of Indonesia’s Economic instability Is to
Promote Federalism
Dana, Dillon, Former Senior Policy Analyst of Asian Studies Center. “Indonesia and Separatism: Finding a
Federalist Solution,” Heritage Foundation, April 19, 2000,
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/EM670.cfm>
To increase stability in the region and reduce the threat of separatism, more emphasis should be placed on
strengthening the newly elected provincial parliaments and governors and devolving more power to the
provinces. To assist Indonesia in this effort, the United States should: Promote substantive devolution of
power to the provinces. The United States, as the world's foremost constitutionally based federal republic,
must clearly articulate its support of federalism. Public diplomacy that promotes devolution of power to
the levels of government closest to the people will have the most significant long-term effects. Continue the
President's September 1999 ban on military-to-military engagement. The U.S. military should not resume
activities with the Indonesian military, which has lost respect with the people because of repression and
illegal activities, until it has dismantled its regional security apparatus and divested its business interests.
Encourage the formation of local police forces. Police units under the control of the provincial and local
governments would enable these authorities to enforce local laws and reduce the role of national police.
Promoting federalism is the best way to reinvigorate Indonesia's economy and address the root causes
of the current instability.
WNDI 2008 46
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good- War


A. Full-scale War in Chechnya prove, Only Indonesian balance of Federalism Can Solve
Nicholas Lynn and Alexie Nivokov, “Refederalizing Russia: Debates on the idea of federalism in Russia,”
1997, ProQuest
A process of refederalization has been taking place in Russia since 1991, whereby the regions, the republics,
and the central authorities have tried to establish a system of intergovernmental relations
characterized by a degree of cooperation, balance, and compromise. This involves a shift away from the
pseudo-federalism of the Soviet era and comprises a fundamental aspect of Russia's more general democratic
transition from authoritarian rule. To a certain extent, the different parties appear to have been successful in
refederalizing center-region relations. The process of regional disintegration, which continued after the 1990
parade of sovereignty, has largely diminished, and the bitter disputes between regional legislatures and
governors that dominated Boris Yeltsin's first term as Russian president also appear to have died down
somewhat. However, the ease with which the conflict in Chechnya was blown up into a full-scale war
highlights the tensions still inherent in post-Soviet Russia's federal relations, and the political crisis in the
Primorskii region in the Russian Far East reveals the very real limits that exist on federal authority during
the transition period.' At this stage of the process, therefore, Russia has reached something of a
"crossroads."2 It faces a choice between different models of federalism and federal relations. It is our
aim to investigate its potential options by examining the nature of debates over the idea of federalism in
Russia itself.
WNDI 2008 47
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good- General


Federalism is critical to prevent Indonesian disintegration
Paul, Dibb, Head Asian Studies - Australian National University. “Indonesia’s Grim Outlook,” 9/22/01.
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-43YY6YG-
C&_user=345268&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000017419&_version=1&_urlVersi
on=0&_userid=345268&md5=1c1fa91397d81e9e1f248027cc9f3ea9.>
"It is important for Australians to appreciate that Indonesia is going through a traumatic period. The
smoothly functioning democratic process that is taken for granted in Australia has yet to be established in
Indonesia. …The recent tragic events in East Timor have been played out against a background of this great
national effort to form a new government to bring Indonesia into the family of democratic nations. It is
important that Australians understand that the institutions they have built up over 100 years of nationhood—a
democratic electoral process; a strong and independent judiciary; a free and reasonably responsible
press; a largely non-corrupt and highly competent civil service; and a decentralised system of
government in which strong States counterbalance the strength of the national government—are
things we Indonesians aspire to and are just beginning to enjoy. The turmoil wracking their vast neighbor
has made many Australians appreciate their own institutions more keenly, not least the oft-maligned federal
system that imposes eight provincial administrations along with the national government on a country of
barely 20 million people. Above all else, it is the lack of an effective federal system that will ultimately be
to blame should Indonesia disintegrate.

Indonesian Federalism is key to solving killing, kidnapping, and destruction of property.


Dana Dillon, writer for the Heritage Foundation. "INDONESIA AND SEPARATISM: FINDING A FEDERALIST
SOLUTION." April 19, 2000. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/EM670.cfm>
The repression of civilians by the army and the national police has made them the country's most hated and
distrusted institutions. However, none of the insurgent groups that arose to battle the injustices has met with much
success. In some cases, insurgents have practiced indiscriminate killing, kidnapping, and intimidation of
innocent civilians and destruction of foreign-owned property and businesses. Rather than build support for their
causes, this behavior strengthens the hand of Jakarta. Separatist grievances focus on access to revenue and the
inability of the provinces to pass and enforce local civil and criminal laws. Relieving the causes of the endemic
insurrections will be difficult, but not an insurmountable task. The adoption of a system based on federalism
could resolve the grievances and weaken the insurrection movements.
WNDI 2008 48
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good- Solves Corruption


Indonesian federalism is necessary to stop corruption, promotes democracy, and avoids
dissolving the country
JCA Journal of Contemporary Asia, “The challenge of combining FDI and regional development in
Indonesia.(foreign direct investment)”, August 1, 2002. <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-
25837997_ITM>
However, there are also political factors that may suggest that decentralization is necessary. For instance, a large
degree of regional independence is anticipated among different parts of Indonesia and may be necessary for
avoiding the country to dissolve. The old centralized system is largely associated with the Suharto regime and
therefore unacceptable to a large share of the population. One main complaint on the old regime was the
widespread corruption and nepotism among the Jakarta based elites. A smaller economic role for the center may
presumably decrease the possibility for this elite to enrich itself. (13) Finally, decentralization may also
promote democracy by reducing the distance between the population and the decision makers.
WNDI 2008 49
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good– Economy (1/2)

Federalism in Indonesia Will Boost the Economy


Fredrik, Sjöholm, Department Of Economics at National University of Singapore. “Economic Recovery In
Indonesia: The Challenge Of Combining FDI And Regional Development,” 12/9/99.
<http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0347.pdf>
A related issue is whether decentralization may increase competition between
provinces and thereby force through good economic policies in Indonesia. It has been argued
that federalism (decentralization) may improve economic performance by, firstly, limit the
discretion of the central government and, secondly, by fostering competition between
provinces (Qian and Weingast, 1997). The amount of resources available to the central
government for inter-regional transfer may not diminish if decentralization increases
economic growth. The crucial question is whether increased economic efficiency can be
expected from the current decentralization. The first limited evidence do not suggest that
efficiency has increased. For instance, Antlöv (1999) argues that the reform has simply
decentralized corruption, and strengthened the autonomous decision making of local power
holders. Such development may be caused by inadequate institutional capacity at the local
level (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000, p.11). However, it may be too early to evaluate the
reform and there is some international experience of successful decentralization. For instance,
China decentralized during the 1980s and 90s when provinces gained large authority in
economic matters. The decentralization led to a competitive situation between provinces,
resulting in the implementation of good economic policies. (Montinola, Qian & Weingast,
1995). Still, there are differences between Indonesia and China that has to be taken in to
account. Whereas China is a relatively homogenous country, Indonesia is, again, a very
heterogeneous country. Even spatial development is therefore of greater importance in
Indonesia, and although China has experienced increased growth, it has been accompanied by
increased regional inequalities (Wei, 1999, p. 53). Finally, there seems to be international
examples of decentralization less encouraging than in the case of China. Decentralization in
countries such as Russia, the Philippines, and Thailand led local governments to fall into the hands of vested
interests, comprising of local business interests, bureaucrats, and even
criminal gangs (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000, Dick, 2000).
WNDI 2008 50
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good– Economy (2/2)


An unstable Indonesian Economy Will bring down all of Asia
Samantha F. Ravich, fellow in the Asian Studies Program at CSIS. “Eyeing Indonesia through the Lens of Aceh,”
The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2000. <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-
28180245_ITM>
But what if the reforms fail? Quite simply, Indonesia will be swallowed by an extinction-level event.
Foreign investment, which has slowly returned to the country over the last year, will flee. Foreign donors
(most notably the International Monetary Fund) will likely suspend their loans, and foreign lenders will
refuse to restructure the $ 70 billion of sovereign debt under which Indonesia struggles. The National Unity
cabinet, already showing signs of fracturing, may implode and the military, seeking an opportunity to strike
back against those who humiliated it during the last two years, could try to orchestrate a coup. Into this
mix, some of the outlying provinces (Aceh, Riau, and Irian Jaya) could attempt to formally secede, leading to
the dissolution of the republic. Aside from Indonesia being lost in an economic and political collapse, a
black hole would be created in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, a country of 210 million people, would begin
to siphon off the hopes of smaller countries in the region that wish to regain their economic prowess of
the early 1990s. Foreign investors would become skittish about Indonesia exporting economic instability
beyond its borders and pull their money out of the entire region. Regional governments would be destabilized
by thousands, perhaps millions, of Indonesian refugees flooding the coastlines. The regional organizations
established to handle problems in the area would crumble from infighting and blame-laying over who forgot
to establish the contingency plan. For those who doubt this last point, post-East Timor discussions at the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum have ratcheted up tensions among
participant states.
WNDI 2008 51
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good- Key to Stop War


Full-scale War in Chechnya prove, Only Indonesian balance of Federalism Can Solve
Nicholas Lynn and Alexie Nivokov, “Refederalizing Russia: Debates on the idea of federalism in Russia,”
1997, ProQuest
A process of refederalization has been taking place in Russia since 1991, whereby the regions, the republics,
and the central authorities have tried to establish a system of intergovernmental relations
characterized by a degree of cooperation, balance, and compromise. This involves a shift away from the
pseudo-federalism of the Soviet era and comprises a fundamental aspect of Russia's more general democratic
transition from authoritarian rule. To a certain extent, the different parties appear to have been successful in
refederalizing center-region relations. The process of regional disintegration, which continued after the 1990
parade of sovereignty, has largely diminished, and the bitter disputes between regional legislatures and
governors that dominated Boris Yeltsin's first term as Russian president also appear to have died down
somewhat. However, the ease with which the conflict in Chechnya was blown up into a full-scale war
highlights the tensions still inherent in post-Soviet Russia's federal relations, and the political crisis in the
Primorskii region in the Russian Far East reveals the very real limits that exist on federal authority during
the transition period.' At this stage of the process, therefore, Russia has reached something of a
"crossroads."2 It faces a choice between different models of federalism and federal relations. It is our
aim to investigate its potential options by examining the nature of debates over the idea of federalism in
Russia itself.
WNDI 2008 52
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good- Will Model US


Herbert, London, President of the Hudson Institute and Professor Emeritus at NYU. “The Enemy Within,”
4/1/2001 <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=1398&pubType=HI_Articles>
Fourth, the United States possesses a sense of moral universalism that exists nowhere else. When one talks
about some sort of example—a model of human rights, constitutionalism, subsidiarity, rule of law, and
property rights—the United States stands alone. It is the model. Not long ago several Hudson Institute
scholars had the opportunity to spend some time in Indonesia, and we found that Indonesia does not turn
for its models to China or Japan; it looks to the United States. The new Indonesian president is very
keen on establishing a form of federalism. What does he look to? The American Constitution. Fifth and
last, the rest of the world looks to the United States for answers. Very recently, an American deputy
secretary of state said, “Everyone’s crisis is America’s crisis.” Why? Because the world looks to the
United States as its model. As a consequence, there is no question that the United States will maintain its
extraordinary leadership.
WNDI 2008 53
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good- Works Well


Federalism Works In Indonesia
Roland White and Paul Smoke, Senior Public Sector Specialist with the World Bank And Associate Professor
of Public Finance and Planning at NYU Wagner. “Making Local Government Work,” The World Bank Report,
2005. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf>
In many countries initial progress is encouraging. Where decentralization “leaps” have been attempted, as
in Indonesia and the Philippines, they have gone fairly smoothly. Intergovernmental fiscal systems have
been institutionalized. Workers have been transferred from central ministries to local governments without
significant disruptions. And local authorities have taken up their service- delivery functions reasonably
effectively. Where decentralization has proceeded more gradually, as in Cambodia and Vietnam, it has
produced some gains in service delivery and public participation at the local level. Decentralization has also
unleashed local initiative and energy. New service-delivery models have begun to emerge, and the
potential for continued improvement and innovation has become tangible.
WNDI 2008 54
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good- Now


Federalism in Indonesia Now
Paul Smoke, Associate Professor of Public Finance and Planning at NYU Wagner. “Making Local Government
Work,” The World Bank Report, 2005, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-
report.pdf>
Decentralization reforms in Indonesia include both devolution of authority and, to a lesser extent,
deconcentration of functions. Deconcentration to provincial authorities was the dominant form of
decentralization before 1999, when the emphasis shifted to devolution to city and district governments. Local
governments have broad functions and receive substantial intergovernmental transfers, but have
limited revenue authority. The country has increasingly developed the legal framework (most recently
through Laws 32 and 33 of 2004), but functional responsibilities and subnational revenues require
further elaboration and regulation.
WNDI 2008 55
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Good- Solves Financial Crisis


Indonesian decentralization key to solve the financial crisis
JCA Journal of Contemporary Asia, “The challenge of combining FDI and regional development in
Indonesia.(foreign direct investment)”, August 1, 2002. <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-
25837997_ITM>
Hence, there are many political arguments for decentralization but also, as we have discussed, obvious
economic risks. It therefore seems warranted with some carefulness in the present decentralization. One possibility
is a long transition period with a gradual decentralization, together with a close monitoring of the effects on regional
inequalities. The importance of own revenue in regions' incomes has slowly increased since the mid 1980s (Erawan,
1999). One possible development strategy would be to continue this trend without any abrupt policy changes. A
gradual process would have the benefit of giving other policy measures time to affect the location of manufacturing
and FDI to the outer provinces. As an additional advantage, it gives the government time to solve the financial
crisis and release resources for future inter-regional reference.
WNDI 2008 56
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Bad- Collapses ASEAN FL


A. Indonesian Dissolution collapses ASEAN
Catharin E. Dalpino, fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. "Indonesia at the
Crossroads."Brookings Institution, Policy Brief #89.September 2001.
<http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2001/09southeastasia_dalpino.aspx?rssid=southeast%20asia>
Strengthen Southeast Asian regional cooperation as a way of supporting Indonesian reform. Reclaiming Jakarta's
leadership in Southeast Asia is dependent in great part upon Indonesia's ability to restore internal political
stability in the midst of democratic change and regain economic health. In the interim, the United States can
help shore up regional cooperation and support Indonesian reform indirectly with greater attention to
ASEAN. Although the group of ten Southeast Asian nations continues to give rhetorical backing to the ASEAN
tradition of non-interference in the affairs of member states, in reality it is keenly aware of the prospects for
economic and political contagion, and the need to find regional solutions to common problems. The United States
should help ASEAN in the transition to more active cooperation by providing technical support for key ASEAN
initiatives. The two most important are the planned ASEAN Free Trade Area and the ASEAN Human Rights
Working Group, the latter charged by the governments with developing a regional code of human rights. However,
an effective policy will require that the United States support regional cooperation in Southeast Asia for its own
sake, rather than simply as a meeting ground for dialogue with the major powers of the Asia-Pacific region through
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

B. Impact: ASEAN collapse results in Nuclear War


S. RAJARATNAM, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Singapore “ASEAN The Way Ahead,” Association of
southeast asain nations, 9/1/1992, <http://www.aseansec.org/13991.htm>
Should regionalism collapse, then ASEAN too will go the way of earlier regional attempts like SEATO, ASA and
MAPHlLlNDO. All that remains today of these earlier experiments are their bleached bones. Should the new
regional efforts collapse, then globalism, the final stage of historical development, will also fall apart. Then we
will inevitably enter another Dark Ages and World War III, fought this time not with gun-powder, but with
nuclear weapons far more devastating than those exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Modern technology
and science are pushing the world simultaneously in the direction of regionalism and globalism. What is responsible
for today's economic disintegration, disorder and violence is the resistance offered by nationalism to the irresistible
counter-pressures of regionalism and globalism.
WNDI 2008 57
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Bad- General (1/2)


Indonesian Federalism Leads to military backlash
The Jakarta Post, “THE MYSTIFICATION OF THE UNITARY STATE OF INDONESIA.” 10/14/05
<http://www.freelists.org/archives/ppi/10-2005/msg00217.html>
However, the mystification of NKRI under Soeharto is regaining momentum again now. The military's
strong perception of the nation as essentially constituting a spatial entity with a clear geographic
boundaries that should be jealously guarded from external threats has become the underlying factor in
mystifying NKRI as a sacred cow with all its taboos From this narrow nationalistic view point the
possible implementation local autonomy in Aceh and Papua, or federalism as a logical political
alternative for a future Indonesia, has always been resisted by the ruling elites

Indonesia federalism Results in confusion


Samuel S. Lieberman, Staff Associate at the Center for Policy Studies of the Population Council. Joseph J.
Capuno and Hoang Van Minh, Assistant Professor at the University of the Philippines School of Economics
and Vietnamese Doctor. “Making Local Government Work.” The World Bank Report, 2005
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf>
The Big Bang approach has its merits, but experiences in Indonesia and the Philippines reveal its
disadvantages. In Indonesia, decentralization laws and rules and regulations do not provide enough
detail on functional and operational responsibilities, resulting in confusion and divergence between
provinces and districts. For instance, provinces are supposed to handle cross-district tasks, but no
definitive finding tells them how to apply that rule. The laws and regulations governing
decentralization are also often inconsistent with other laws, especially civil service rules. This
inconsistency has limited the ability of local governments to rightsize inherited health bureaucracies and
anticipate personnel matters.

Indonesian Federalism Destroys Public Services


Jose Edgardo Campos and, Joel S. Hellman, Senior Strategy Advisor for Public Sector Reforms, Department
of Budget and Management, the Philippines AND Political Counsellor at the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. “Making Local Government Work.”, the World Bank Report, 2005.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf>
The World Bank’s engagement in decentralization has highlighted the lack of information on regional
performance, which is essential to promoting a race to the top among regions. Decentralization— especially
the initial shift of control over civil servants to local governments—has undermined Indonesia’s regional
information systems. The problem is particularly severe in key decentralized public service sectors
such as health and education. Minimum service standards mandated in the decentralization laws have
not yet been developed. Only a small minority of districts have submitted the required performance self-
assessments based on annual and five-year plans. Districts send only a small share of laws and decrees to
the center for official review, and the Ministry of Home Affairs does not have a system for analyzing
and cataloging this material. While several civil society groups have begun to develop systems for
comparing performance across districts, especially regarding the investment climate, these efforts do not yet
serve as a reliable basis for monitoring districts. As a result, little information about regional
performance is available to stimulate competition and disseminate good and bad practices.
WNDI 2008 58
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Bad- General (2/2)


Federalism Undermines Health Care
Samuel S. Lieberman, Joseph J. Capuno, and Hoang Van Minh, Staff Associate at the Center for Policy
Studies of the Population Council and Assistant Professor at the University of the Philippines School of Economics
and Vietnamese Doctor. “Making Local Government Work,” The World Bank Report, 2005
Indonesia has not clarified the health roles and responsibilities of central and lower governments after
three years of decentralization. Nor has the country moved to emphasize core public health functions, or
seen marked improvements in specific areas such as infectious disease control, pharmaceuticals, and human
resources. Sectors besides health also have indeterminate policies, prompting advice to clarify assignments
across levels of government and sectors (World Bank 2003a). Two strands of thinking on decentralization are
evident within the Ministry of Health. The first is distilled in a 2003 decree that lists 29 strategic issues
related to core public health functions and adds key steps to address them, such as minimum service
standards (MSS), partnerships with NGOs, and services for the poor. The decree points to accountability
mechanisms and traditional commandand- control instruments to limit the risks of service disruption. The
former include the use of MSS to elicit district commitment, including assistance in funding core public
health functions. The Ministry of Health has been relatively assertive in exerting its authority in
responding to infectious disease outbreaks such as severe acute respiratory system (SARS), and
overseeing surveillance of and programs to combat diseases of national importance and involving
international obligations, such as tuberculosis and HIV. The Ministry of Health depends on central and
donor funding to achieve these ends, though each is unreliable, and has looked for district support, seeing
MSS as targets for district spending.13 The decree assigns key responsibility to district chief executives, and
states that efforts to attain MSS should rely entirely on district budgets, with central and provincial
governments providing technical help, supervision, and oversight. This approach is risky. Detailed,
extensive MSS could undermine decentralization, and poorer districts could reject them because of
limited fiscal capacity. Most MSS have been set at high levels, imposed on rather than owned by local
governments, with the means of enforcement and penalties for noncompliance undisclosed. MSS would be
better seen as medium-term goals rather than performance requirements that trigger funding and require
enforcement. The Ministry of Health needs to develop ways of boosting district ownership of efforts to
prevent and control infectious diseases.

Decentralization hurts the government


Jose Edgardo Campos and, Joel S. Hellman, Senior Strategy Advisor for Public Sector Reforms, Department
of Budget and Management, the Philippines AND Political Counsellor at the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. “Making Local Government Work.”, the World Bank Report, 2005.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf>
As mentioned, a major factor weakening the impact of decentralization on governance is uncertainty
about the proper role of different levels of government and the resulting conflicts. In Indonesia, despite
recent revisions to the main decentralization laws (formerly Laws 22 and 25 of 1999; now Laws 32 and 33 of
2004), the roles and responsibilities of district governments have not been fully clarified. The role of
provincial governments in decentralization is also poorly defined. Moreover, the oversight functions of
different central ministries— especially the ministries of Home Affairs and Finance—remain unclear.
This has led to constant conflict, as different levels of government and competing agencies stake their
claims over vaguely defined roles and powers. This conflict is reaching a crescendo with recent
proposals to further revise the main decentralization laws. The boundaries of decentralization in Indonesia
have thus been in a permanent state of renegotiation since Big Bang decentralization began in 2001. Not
surprisingly, decentralization has exerted its most negative impact on policy uncertainty.
WNDI 2008 59
Federalism Adv

Indonesian Federalism Bad- Fails to Work


Indonesia fails to implement Federalism
Paul Smoke, Associate Professor of Public Finance and Planning at NYU Wagner. “Making Local Government
Work,” The World Bank Report, 2005 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-
report.pdf>
Indonesia and Cambodia also have weak implementation strategies. Decentralization was adopted
quickly and with little debate in both cases. In Indonesia this occurred in a crisis situation, while
Cambodia’s efforts might be characterized as a case of political opportunism. Because Indonesia’s reforms
emerged from crisis, the general framework was pushed urgently, without much thought given to how to
make it work. The country’s decentralization is often referred to as a “Big Bang” because significant
resources and functions were devolved so quickly. A substantial portion of the resources, however, are
used to pay for staff who were transferred to local governments, suggesting a possible conscious effort to
reduce the effects of major reform shocks. Operational details on many of the legally devolved functions still
have to be specified, and the above-noted weak coordination of the national agencies involved constrains
the development of a genuine strategy.

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