thus the security of citizens, through various enforcement mechanisms, may be enforced uponunwilling nations by international organizations and other countries. This poses numerouspolitical and economic pragmatic implications that are frequently at the center of policy debates,however it concurrently raises several philosophical implications as well that should not go
unnoticed if Berlin’s assertions holds any value. An issue of considerable philosophical import is
if this new norm is grounded in a reasonable and compelling theory of justice, especially in itscall for forms of security to be distributed from states to another state even if they are opposed indoing so. This particular issue is a matter that in part falls under the philosophical jurisdiction of distributive justice since one must consider if this is a just or right way of allocating this good ina global society.In this paper I defend the em
erging international norm of the “Responsibility to Protect”
by turning to the concepts of distributive justice in Rawls
A Law of Peoples
. I argue that thelimited type of distributive justice in the law of peoples effectively justifies the distribution of security for humanitarian intervention without needing a worldwide overlapping consensus or aglobal adherence to liberal principles of distributive justice. The Responsibility to Protect is atheory that reflects the compelling portions of Rawls general theory of justice while also beingable to avoid the philosophical baggage that accompanies the ideological political principles that
persist in Rawls’ specific liberal
conception. Ultimately the principles of justice in the norm andthe law of people justify intervention without leading to a centralized global government or anunjust expansion of governmental power.
What is “The Responsibility to Protect” ?
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emerged as a legal norm that has swiftly beenendorsed extensively throughout the United Nations and international political community. Its