The Monitor and the DOJ's Power Under the Proposed Agreement
In the definition section of the proposed agreement, the DOJ defines the“Monitor” as a person or team of people who shall be selected to assess and report onDefendant’s implementation of this agreement. (pg. 10) Before that definition, the DOJ initiallydescribes the “Monitor” as having “the opportunity to review and approve all new guidelines and plans before their implementation by the MCSO.” (pg. 2) However, the “Monitor’s” role and powers exceed the mere opportunity to review.As specifically stated in the proposed agreement:
“All new and revised policies, procedures, processes and training must beapproved by the Monitor and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) prior to implementation.”
(pg. 3) (emphasis added)Thus, the “Monitor” and the DOJ possess the authority to veto Sheriff Arpaio’sand the MCSO’s proposals for new and revised policies, procedures, processes and training.That veto equates to broad control over the MCSO and the elected statutory and constitutionallyempowered Maricopa County Sheriff, Joseph M. Arpaio. Consider the broad definition of policies and procedures as defined by the DOJ.The policies and procedures under the proposed agreement are defined as:ss) “Policies and Procedures” means written regulations or directives, regardless of the name of the regulation or directive,describing the duties, functions, and obligations of MCSO personnel, and providing specific direction in how to fulfill thoseduties, functions, or obligations. All policies and proceduresshould be available in hardcopy and electronically. (pg. 11)Despite the detailed definition of "policies" and "procedures," , the proposedagreement does not define “processes.” However, “processes” according to the applicabledefinition in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary entails a series of actions or operations. Thus,under the DOJ’s proposal, the monitor and the DOJ have final approval over MCSO operations.Make no mistake, the true power of the “Monitor” starkly contrasts the onesentence in the proposed agreement that stated that the “Monitor” does not replace the Sheriff.(pg. 115, pp. 322)
This "Monitor" is by the DOJ's own definition a usurpation of Sheriff Arpaio’s authority, and certainly exceeds the power to conduct interim reviews of MCSOcompliance and to issue corresponding reports.
Overview of Monitor, DOJ and Office of Inspector General Powers
Re: Overview of Monitor, DOJ and Office of Inspector General PowersPage 2
2851135.1
Office of Inspector General
Not only does this DOJ definition of “Monitor” exceed the common definition of the term “monitor,” the DOJ also desires to create an entirely new Office of Inspector General(“OIG”). According to the proposed agreement, the OIG is to have “sustained oversight” to provide “the community with the information necessary to accurately assess the policies, procedures, and practices of MCSO.” (pgs. 2-3) With this sustained oversight comesextraordinary power.In much of the proposed agreement, the OIG initially seems to possess powerscompletely redundant of the review powers of the “Monitor,” until later in the proposedagreement when the OIG’s powers are fully revealed.
The OIG provides additional,unprecedented control of the Maricopa County Sheriff and the MCSO
.Aside from the County having to create and fund the OIG, the OIG is appointedfor five year, renewable terms. While the OIG does not possess powers of the implementation of policies, revised policies, procedures, and processes like the “Monitor,” its powers are significantand intrusive, also. As stated in the proposed agreement:275.Constitutional policing rests on consistent and unbiasedassessment of a law enforcement agency’s policies and practices.To that end, the County shall establish an Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) to ensure MCSO’s continued compliance withconstitutional policing. The OIG shall carry out its responsibilitiesthrough three distinct areas of activity: Compliance Audits,Complaint Investigation and Adjudication, and Public Reporting.(pg. 102)What’s more, the OIG cannot be removed absent substantial neglect of duty, grossmisconduct in office, or inability to discharge the duties of the office. (pg. 102)The power of the OIG is truly significant:279.While this Agreement is in effect, the OIG shall beempowered to initiate and conduct independent investigations of MCSO regarding any incident, policy, pattern or practice related tocompliance with the terms of this agreement. The OIG shall be an“Officer of the MCSO” for the purposes of having full access torecords and otherwise independent of MCSO, the Sheriff, and theCounty Attorney. The OIG shall report directly to the Court andthe Maricopa County Board of Supervisors.(pg. 102-103)
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