THE PHILIPPINES: LOCAL POLITICS IN THE SULUARCHIPELAGO AND THE PEACE PROCESS
Asia Report N°225 – 15 May 2012
TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... iI.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
II.
AIMS OF CONVERGENCE AND STAKEHOLDER REACTIONS ......................... 3
A.
P
OLITICS OF THE
C
ONVERGENCE
S
TRATEGY
................................................................................ 3
B.
R
EACTION OF THE
S
ULU
-B
ASILAN
E
LITE
..................................................................................... 5
III.
POWER SHIFT ON BASILAN ....................................................................................... 7
A.
T
HE
R
ISE AND
F
ALL OF
W
AHAB
A
KBAR
...................................................................................... 7
B.
T
HE
2010
E
LECTIONS AND
ARMM
R
EFORM
............................................................................... 9
C.
T
HE AL
-B
ARKA
I
NCIDENT
.......................................................................................................... 10
D.
L
OOKING
A
HEAD TO
2013 ......................................................................................................... 11
IV.
CONSOLIDATING POWER IN SULU ....................................................................... 12
A.
R
EALIGNMENT
A
HEAD OF THE
2010
E
LECTION
.......................................................................... 12
B.
T
HE
MNLF
AND
ASG
F
ACTOR
.................................................................................................. 14
C.
G
OVERNOR
T
AN AND THE
C
ONVERGENCE
S
TRATEGY
................................................................ 15
D.
S
CENARIOS FOR
2013 ................................................................................................................. 16
V.
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 18
APPENDICES
A.
M
AP OF THE
S
OUTHERN
P
HILIPPINES
............................................................................................... 19
B.
M
AP OF
B
ASILAN
............................................................................................................................. 20
C.
M
AP OF
S
ULU
.................................................................................................................................. 21
D.
A
BOUT THE
I
NTERNATIONAL
C
RISIS
G
ROUP
.................................................................................... 22
E.
C
RISIS
G
ROUP
R
EPORTS AND
B
RIEFINGS ON
A
SIA SINCE
2009 ......................................................... 23
F.
C
RISIS
G
ROUP
B
OARD OF
T
RUSTEES
................................................................................................ 25
Asia Report N°225 15 May 2012
THE PHILIPPINES: LOCAL POLITICS IN THE SULUARCHIPELAGO AND THE PEACE PROCESSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Politics in the Sulu archipelago could be an unforeseenstumbling block for a negotiated peace with the Moro Is-lamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines.So far the presumed spoilers have been Christian settlers,conservative nationalists, and recalcitrant members of theother insurgency in the Muslim south, the Moro NationalLiberation Front (MNLF). The islands off the coast of Mindanao have been all but forgotten. But the provincialgovernors of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, although Mus-lim, are wary of any agreement that would allow the MILF,dominated by ethnically distinct groups from CentralMindanao, to extend its sway and jeopardise the patron-age system they enjoy with Manila. The challenge for thegovernment of President Benigno Aquino III is to find away to offer more meaningful autonomy to the MILF andovercome differences between the MILF and MNLF with-out alienating powerful clan leaders from the Sulu archi- pelago with a capacity to make trouble.The Aquino government’s peace strategy is based on the principle of convergence, bringing three components to-gether: a peace agreement with the MILF; reform of thedysfunctional government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the threearchipelagic provinces – Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi – as well as Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur in Central Min-danao; and review of the 1996 final peace agreement withthe MNLF. The latter two components are more accepta- ble to the elite of the archipelago than the first. They seeARMM as a corrupt and unnecessary layer of bureaucracyand administration between them and Manila but as longas they have equal access to leadership positions, they arewilling to try reform. From their perspective, the danger of a peace agreement with the MILF is that it would ulti-mately replace ARMM with a new, expanded, more pow-erful regional government that would favour CentralMindanao, the MILF’s stronghold, and its clans, over thearchipelago and its politicians. At stake is access to power and money.The governors from the archipelago need to be accommo-dated because the provinces of Sulu and Basilan are par-ticularly prone to conflict. They are home to the violentextremists of the Abu Sayyaf Group, armed elements of the MNLF that engage in periodic clashes with the gov-ernment, and a handful of foreign jihadis. Sprawling ex-tended families, often with private armies and ill-gottenwealth, dominate local politics, controlling towns and even provinces for years by securing the victory of their rela-tives in local elections. The interests of these politicianssometimes, but not always, overlap with the non-statearmed actors.Basilan poses less of a problem to the MILF peace pro-cess than the province of Sulu. President Aquino enjoys agood relationship with one of Basilan’s clans, the Hata-mans, but this has increased tensions with a rival family,the Akbars. Because Manila is partnering with the Hata-mans to carry out its convergence strategy, it is empower-ing them at the expense of their rivals. This could raise therisk of violence between the two clans. But these dynam-ics are local and are unlikely to spill over in ways thatcould disrupt negotiations.Sulu provincial governor Sakur Tan is more of a problem.In response to Manila’s overtures, Tan has styled himself asthe leader of the five provincial governors within ARMM.He is backing governance reform and the review of theMNLF agreement, while questioning whether a deal withthe MILF will benefit the archipelago. The governmenthopes to conclude negotiations with the MILF by the endof 2012. In anticipation, traditional politicians are manoeu-vring to protect their interests ahead of the 2013 mid-term polls. The provincial governors from the islands and theelite of Sulu province seem to believe their interests are best served by aligning themselves with Governor Tan,who is sceptical of a peace agreement that gives too much power to the MILF. If this alliance holds, the politicallandscape within ARMM may be less favourable to a ne-gotiated peace and divisions among the Bangsamoro, asthe Muslims of the southern Philippines are known, may become deeper than ever.The clan-based politicians in the archipelago are amongthe most important players in the Muslim south. Despitethe ties many of them have to non-state armed groups,
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The Philippines: Local politics in the Sulu archipelago and the peace process
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