Drawn into the Fray 1 Running head: DRAWN INTO THE FRAY

Drawn into the Fray of Scientific Battle: Computational Theory, Modularity in the Mind, and Scientific Inquiry
21 May 2012 Darin L. Hammond Idaho State University

Drawn into the Fray 2 Table of Contents Introduction and Methodology................................................................................................................... Genesis of the Computational Model......................................................................................................... Chomskys Generative Grammar: A First Step........................................................................... Deconstructing Behaviorist Models of Language......................................................... Towards a Universal Grammar........................................................................................ Generative Building Blocks............................................................................................... Language Innateness.......................................................................................................... The Cognitive Machinery of Language: Generative Grammar and Binary Code.... Fast Forward to Computation and Modularity in Cognition: Fodor and Pinker................................ 3 4 5 5 5 6 7 8 9

Cognitive Computation................................................................................................................... 10 Cognitive Modularity....................................................................................................................... 11 Pinker Versus Fodor Round One--The Basics of Modularity.................................................. 12 Pinker Versus Fodor Round TwoHomunculi and Demons................................................ 19 Pinker Versus Fodor Final RoundHunger and Thirst........................................................... 20 Discussion: Assessing the Debate, Entering the Fray as a New Researcher........................................ 21 Conclusions: The Way Forward.................................................................................................................. 24. References....................................................................................................................................................... 25 List of Illustrations Figure 1............................................................................................................................................................ 9

Drawn into the Fray 3 Introduction and Methodology I suspect that most teachers in public schools and community colleges are like me and were not aware that there has been a cognitive revolution. However, beginning with Noam Chomskys(1957;1959;1965) refutation of Skinners 1957 explication of the behaviorist view of language acquisition and then his publications in the 1950s and 60s the world of cognition began to open up as a relative domain of knowledge, proliferating more specific disciplines that focused more narrowly on interrelated but distinct studies of mental processes. New departments were popping up on campuses across the United States and Europe, thriving upon Chomskys having opened up the black treasure box of the brain, at least as far as language is an entry point into the workings of the mind. He broke language apart and put the pieces back together again, analyzing how they separated and then came back together, meticulously studying and observing language as the means of acquiring empirical data, hypothesizing, and experimenting. With the means provided by his concepts of generative and universal grammar, scientists had the tools, the binary code of sorts, that would help others put together the theories of the computational and modular mind. The present study asks several critical questions as a means of assessing the current status of computational and modular models. How did theorists first make the leap from Chomskys generative and universal grammar to computational and modular mind? What are the different debates that researchers are arguing and grappling with and where will they go from there? Through a close review of several key authors in the fields of syntax, psycholinguistics, cognitive science, and evolutionary psychology, this study illustrates that generative and universal grammar were key in the genesis of the cognitive sciences because 1) the grammars provide an entry point into the brain through an examination of language processing and production, 2) the grammars predict an inheritable system of modules that innately prepare the brain to acquire a language, and 3) the grammars led to the x bar which clearly demonstrated how, with discrete pieces

Drawn into the Fray 4 in the lexicon, humans produce and combine phrase structures with infinite variety and that an infinite variety of grammatical sentences can be parsed and processed by another speaker of the language. These discrete pieces helped scientists to conceive the brain thinking and processing as a machine or computer might, though by analogy only rather than literally. The current status of the field of study is an environment of heated debate and relative stagnation compared to preceding decades. The debate is how the mind operates using modules that are specific to certain functions. In the conclusion, I suggest that while the arguing is frustrating at times, the independent and courageous voices within the sciences who resist easy answers and push other thinkers to analyze their own assumptions are essential to the progress of sciences in general, and modularity in the mind specifically. The path for the future is to follow the unique voices within the sciences while actively questioning the veracity of our own assumptions and those of other scholars. Given the current, immature status of these cognitive sciences, I speculate that the individual, specialized disciplines will remain un-integrated with the whole (the cognitive sciences collectively) until they gain a firm grasp on their narrow scope and as theorists continue to contest competing models of computation and modularity. So, fields like L2 acquisition and eye tracking that have not yet influenced one another significantly will do so more as the fields mature. I judge this to be healthy for new fields of study. Genesis of the Computational Model For a new theory to take hold in linguistics or any other science, a scholar must first create a need for new explanations based upon the inadequacies of the current models. When Noam Chomsky began publishing in the field of syntax, B.F. Skinners behaviorist model of language was in the spotlight, a natural extension from his studies in operant conditioning with pigeons. Skinners behaviorist view popularity gained prominence because it was so intuitive, and his ideas breathed life into a stagnating discipline that had no place to go since Saussures arbitrary signs demoted

Drawn into the Fray 5 linguistics from a science to a pseudo-empirical investigation of the subjective nature of language. Skinners ideas were tangible and provided a simple explanation of language that could be tested empirically. While Chomsky was not the only linguist to attack Skinner, he was the most effective in large part because he had an alternative. His transformational grammar not only filled the void left after blowing Skinner out of the water, it described the complexity of human language, a complexity that mocked Skinners simple behaviorist explanation. Chomskys Generative Grammar: A First Step Deconstructing behaviorist models of language. In 1957, Chomsky wrote a scathing review of B. F. Skinners (1992, 1957) most important work on language, Verbal Behavior. In his short review Chomsky (2008) dismantled Skinners argument deftly, labeling the idea of language through reinforcement ... quite empty (p. 12), and then expounded his critique into book length two years later (Chomsky, 1959). The importance of Chomskys (1957) review work was to create room for the more impressive Syntactic Structures published the same year as Skinners work. His transformational and generative grammar was the real crushing blow for the behaviorists because this new model accounted so well for the complexity of human language. Chomskys work in the late 1950s established the transformational mechanisms that could manipulate words, phrases, and clauses into an indefinite number of structures that a normal speaker can both produce and process. The theoretical implications of this transformational system laid the foundation for Chomsky (1965) to elaborate his ideas of generative and universal grammars, especially in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Towards a universal grammar. While the three terms are used interchangeably, they differ in connotations transformational emphasizing the syntactic operations, generative stressing the infinite nature of the language possibilities, and universal emphasizing the (attempted) cross-language description of

Drawn into the Fray 6 language structures. The latter two are recent additions to linguistic terminology (Generative Grammar, 2000), but universal (or philosophical) grammar is a concept that goes as far back as 1751, referring to the same basic idea of creating a scheme of classification capable of including all the grammatical categories recognized in actual languages (Universal Grammar, 2000). Breaking the syntax of language into finite, fundamental units allowed Chomsky to push closer to an understanding of how language might work in the human mind. He hoped that this would lead to the ever illusive universal grammar (UG), representing the rules of structure that connect all human languages. In returning to the idea of a UG, Chomsky (2006) built upon the long forgotten foundation of the concept in the rationalist philosophy of language [which] merged with various other independent developments in the seventeenth century, leading to the first really significant general theory of linguistic structure (p. 12). The concept of a UG suggests a link to L2 acquisition as a common ground in languages across cultures should inform the way teach grammar to both L1 and L2 learners. UG provides hope in pointing to commonality between languages and cultures across the globe. Generative building blocks. Chomsky still strives describe and understand the UG (now through minimalism) provides a backdrop to the current study though an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of the current research. The generative aspect of Chomskys grammar represents a more explicit precursor to current computational models of the mind. Prior to Chomsky, no theory had been able to account for the generative and creative nature of language (especially not the behaviorism), but in the combinatorial transformations of discrete language units, Chomsky could parse a sentence into its smallest components, illustrating cognitive manipulations that had power to build utterances all the way from the phonological to the syntactic and semantic levels. Chomskys (1965) definition clarifies this:

Drawn into the Fray 7 By a generative grammar I mean simply a system of rules that in some explicit and welldefined way assigns structural descriptions to sentences. Obviously, every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of his language. This is not to say that he is aware of the rules of the grammar or even that he can become aware of them, or that his statements about his intuitive knowledge of the language are necessarily accurate. (p. 8) The system of rules describe the structure of sentences that, on the syntactic level of noun phrases, verb phrases, and clauses, form the surface structure of an utterance and correspond to a deep structure that comes closer to the mental representation of the components. Chomsky hints here at powerful abstractions that have become some of his most important and productive concepts. Language innateness. The definition of generative grammar above entails that humans are born with the cognitive machinery of language in place to a certain extent, suggesting that every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized ... his intuitive knowledge of the language (Chomsky, 1965, p. 12). The innateness of language accounts for the insufficient input feeding the behaviorist model. Chomsky (2006) breathes new life into Descartes concept of innate ideas stating, against strong opposition in some factions of the linguistic community that there are certain innate conditions on the form of grammar that determine what constitutes linguistic experience and what knowledge will arise on the basis of this experience (p. 159). The power in this model lies in the fact that establishes an intimate relationship between hidden cognition and tangible grammar. In other words, innateness suggests that by understanding the nature of generative grammar, linguists can begin to comprehend the workings of the mind. This grammar to brain connection revolutionized linguistics, but equally important, Chomsky gave birth to a multiplicity of completely new scientific disciplines that now held a conceptual link to the human brain: psycholinguistics, cognitive science, nuerolinguistics,

Drawn into the Fray 8 nuerophilosophy, computer science, artificial intelligence, etc. The generative ability of language innateness to broaden the scope of science so productively provides a proof of generative grammar. Few theorists have so positively affected a human science as Chomsky. The cognitive machinery of language: generative grammar and binary code. With the mind-language connection established, another feature of generative grammar accelerated an understanding of cognition. Since linguists could breakdown utterances from the surface structure of syntax down through phonology, they began to think about language in unique and productive ways. Looking at grammar through the generative lens made the pieces look more like code that could be manipulated by the human brain and by a computer. By analogy, researchers began to think of the processes of the human mind as a subject for empirical observation and analysis. This was shocking to the scientific climate of psychology as Barrett and Kurzban (2006) capture saying: Prior to the cognitive revolution of the 1960s, it was popular to view the mind as a kind of black box and to view conjectures about its contents as unscientific. The cognitive revolution reversed this climate, rendering the search the contents of the black boxa description of its internal structure that could account for the systematic relationships between information inputs and behavioral outputsa key scientific objective of psychologists. (p. 628) The cognitive revolution initiated by Chomsky began to morph the metaphor of the black box into the white box of a computer monitor, the brain becoming increasingly understandable as linguistics, the new cognitive and nuero-sciences, biology, and medicine converged on the common target of the mind. And, the computer metaphor actually became the new framework for thinking about the mind.

Drawn into the Fray 9 Fast Forward to Computation and Modularity in Cognition: Fodor and Pinker Here my account shifts from Chomsky to several threads that extend from his ground breaking theoretical work, a necessarily abridged account as the field quickly became crowded with researchers following his lead. Historically, Chomsky shifted as well, moving to language in the realm of politics and ideologies while still keeping his finger linguistics (most recently with minimalism). In the realm of syntax, Ray Jackendoff (1977) clarified and simplified Chomskys generative/transformational grammar with the x-bar theory that mapped phrase structure with artistic simplicity in his seminal X Syntax : A Study of Phrase Structure

XP

Specifier

Figure 1: A representation of the basic, repeatable pattern of Jackendoffs (1977) x theory of phrase structure where x corresponds to a lexical entry such as a noun, verb, or adjective (I created this graphic).

(see figure 1). The sleekness of the basic phrase structure theory assisted those who were beginning to see the mind at work in combining finite elements to create infinite unique utterances. Jackendoffs x theory certainly meets Chomskys (1965) standard to generate an indefinitely large number of structures (pp. 15, 16). The small phrases are easy to manipulate, and the x theory allows for movements such as the wh trace. The structure also allows embedded and relative clauses as well as clauses joined by conjunctions. As the smallest unit in the grammar moves all the way down to phrases, one can visualize the relative ease in producing and processing the chunks that fit together hierarchically which moves the language closer to the language of computation and computers, the bits of data being combined by a language user in an infinite variety of ways. Also, Chomsky (1965) and Jackendoff (1977)both point to the even more discrete studies of phonology and morphology that are busy analyzing words into their smallest units, and one can follow the x chain up from phonemes to the higher levels of semantics, pragmatics, and discourse analysis. The important concept here is that language can be broken down into bits and built up into discourse. The manipulation of large number of small units closely resemble the binary 1s and 0s of computer

Drawn into the Fray 10 code. The x theory attracted masses of researchers who were now able, with Jackendoffs framework, to visualize how the brain might be able to manipulate the pieces of data in the way that a computer processes input. Cognitive computation. Jackendoff accelerated the study of syntax and also the proliferation of original research seeking to understand first the parsing method, and then what this theory of language revealed about the human brain. However, scholars had already begun work to think through the nature of the mind. Specifically, Pinker (1997) refers to Alan Turings research published beginning in 1950, even before scientists mastered the science that would give birth to computers (pp. 67, 68). Turing (1950) theorized that a machine could be invented that would think through basic information processing, computations, and information production. He actually constructed a basic machine drawing from this vision which succeeded in computing simple data by processing the input and then computing and producing the response. The machine did not really serve any useful purpose as it could not do much and computers were on the way, but the key was that Turing proved that a machine, in a very basic way, could act like a simple process of computation in the brain (Pinker, 1997 p. 69). Chronologically, the Turing (1950) machine came almost 10 years before Chomsky started to publish work on generative grammar which shows that some psychologists were moving in the direction of seeing the brain as a powerful computational organ even before the analysis of language became an important body of evidence. When Chomsky, and later Jackendoff, provided the basic structure, scientists were already waiting to put it to the test. For the purpose of this study, I am going to fast forward through the intermediary stages development of a complex model of the computational mind in order to assess the current status in what has become the fields of cognitive science and psycholinguistics. The inner workings of the human mind had been a tough nut to crack as there were very few scientific methods available to

Drawn into the Fray 11 analyze the brain at work. Even when more neurophysiologists discovered how neurons fire and transmit signals, cognitive scientists had to puzzle through the processes involved in computation. Scholars are still mystified by the complexity and multiplicity of tasks the human brain can compute its way through to completion, and a single organ doing all these distinct types of processing seemed beyond the realm of plausible. With sensory information processing, abstract thinking, math calculating, muscle stimulating and controlling, and language production and processing, just to name a few mental processes, a single organ would have to be miraculous in order to be capable of processing such specific tasks with such a broad array functions. The answer that cognitive scientists are clarifying and debating requires that scientists look at the brain using an entirely different frame. Cognitive modularity. Complex tasks, Jerry Fodor (1983) reasoned, require a complex machinery and architecture, something far more intricate than the Turing machine or even the most powerful computer. With a background from MIT in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics prepared him to create a new vision of the brain at work. By 1981, Fodor had written many in-depth books on the computational mind and language (Fodor & Katz, 1964; Fodor, Bever, & Garrett, 1974; Fodor, 1975; Fodor, 1981), and it is likely that this early work lead him to re-conceptualize the human brain. As he researched and theorized, he began to re-envision the mind not as a single organ, but as multiple organs or modules which culminated in the publication of The Modularity of Mind : An Essay on Faculty Psychology (Fodor, 1983). With multiple modules that are able to specialize in the various operations required of the brain, the mind gains processing power exponentially. Modules in the brain laid the foundational architecture for the extremely complex multitasking required (to varying degrees), so the brain can, for example, manage involuntary needs of the human anatomy and physiology, see a person, and communicate with her through language, all simultaneously and with ease. Fodors vision of modularity quickly caught hold in cognitive (and all related) sciences, and as he tested and further

Drawn into the Fray 12 developed his theory, other researchers jumped in to explore the functionality of Fodors model. Almost immediately, divisions among the scholars emerged as they conceived different possibilities for a modular mind, and to this day they are still arguing and probably will be as the intricacies of the mind resist interpretation (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006, pp. 628-631). The initial model Fodor proposed was too small for theorists such as Pinker (1994; 1997; 2007), Tooby, Cosmides, and Barret1, and Jackendoff (2003) who have rejected, or rather replaced, what they see as a narrow scope of modularity. Fodor (1983), in his initial publication qualified the modularity with nine features that he described as characteristics of modules. Two of these, domain specificity, [and] encapsulation (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006, p. 629) are the most contentious as the philosophy of the mind is virtually inseparable from the cognitive science, and Fodors features, therefore, have profound philosophical implications. Fodor introduced modularity to handle many processes of the brain that were of a very specific kindreflex like, hardwired devices that process narrow types of information in highly stereotyped ways (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006, p. 628). This has been labeled as the narrow conception of modularity, and despite the fact that Fodor said that these features were not set in stone when he published, many dominant thinkers in the computational and modular mind envision a massive modularity (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006). Fodor has dug in his heals resisting this shift as you will see. Pinker versus Fodor round onethe basics of modularity. The battle began in the academic journals after the publication of Fodors precedent setting 1983 book. Steven Pinker (1997)then from MIT, now at Harvardwith his experience in psycholinguistics, cognitive science, and the relatively new field of evolutionary psychology, sees the processes of natural selection in the brain as he attempts to reverse engineer the selections that have been made through evolution in the human brain. By reverse engineering, evolutionary
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Found in The Innate Mind (Carruthers, Laurence, & Stich, 2005).

Drawn into the Fray 13 psychologists like Pinker (Daniel Dannett, Jared Diamond, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides are some others)2 look at natural forces that might have shaped the mind into a modular organ. He claims that the proper approach would be to look at the functional specialization (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006, p. 629) that shaped the modules and attempt to describe the processes at work rather than prescribe characteristics that the modules must have (referring to Fodors list of nine features).3 The functional specialization that the evolutionary psychologists look for in the modules are the mental processes that work in a specific way to accomplish tasks, and so the focus is on possible functions of a module rather than on delineating the boundaries that define the module (1997). Using the angle of his perspective in evolutionary psychology, Pinker (1997) published How the Mind Works as compendium of his view of computation and modularity (he does not use the label massive that Fodor applied to this model). Though not explicitly stated by Pinker, his book is an extended response to Fodors ideas which Pinker gives him credit for. He criticizes Fodor for remaining fixed with his initial model while evolutionary and linguistic evidence suggest that he does not have it quite right. Pinker claims that scientists should expect to find a huge number of modules within the brain because each module will be specialized as shaped by natural selection, a process that leads to specialization (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006, p. 629). Natural selection, as supposed by the evolutionary psychologists, has evolved the brain that human beings now possess, and to neglect the shaping forces of selection over time that create the modules that do the computing in the brain is to ignore the essence of the function of the mental organs. Pinker (1997) defends this view:

The title evolutionary psychologist, it turns out, is currently a malleable job description. Since the science is newly defined by these scholars, their credentials and initial disciplines varyPinker, psycholinguistics; Daniel Dennett, philosophy; Jared Diamond, physiology and membrane biophysics; John Tooby, anthropology; Leda Cosmides, psychology. 3 According to Barrett and Kurzban (2006) these are: domain specificity, encapsulation, mandatory operation (automaticity), inaccessibility to consciousness, speed, shallow outputs, fixed neural localization, and characteristic breakdown patterns (p. 629).
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Drawn into the Fray 14 Natural selection cannot directly endow an organism with information about its environment, or with the computational networks, demons, modules, faculties, representations, or mental organs that process the information. It can only select among genes. But genes build brains, and different genes build brains that process information in different ways. The evolution of information processing has to be accomplished at the nutsand-bolts level by selection of genes that affect the brain-assembly process. (p. 176) Pinker responds here to the criticism by Fodor that he lacks any sort of proof to justify that natural selection can foster modularity, and that without evidence, his claim is mere speculation without support (Fodor, 2005). Pinker counters by dodging the criticism and repeating the claim, genes build brains and natural selection determines genes to be perpetuated. He provides an unusual support later, based upon artificial intelligence. Computer scientists have been able to create genetic algorithms that mimic the natural selection process. So, virtual creatures in the form of software programs are made to reproduce or duplicate while inserting random deviations in the programming with each generation. This is analogous to random gene mutations in organisms as they reproduce over generations. In these experiments, the reproduction was accelerated so that they could observe in a short amount of time what would take thousands of years in an organism. Their objective was to test whether this algorithm would tend toward more sophistication or intelligence, and they have found that after many cycles of computation, selection, mutation, and reproduction, the surviving programs are often better than anything a human programmer could have designed (pp. 176-177). Pinker reports that they have attempted to create this same type of evolutionary migration by modeling neural networks on a computer program and accelerating the process of natural selection by virtual reproduction, merging gene halves (analogous to the male and female genetic contribution), and causing random mutations. He claims that the modeling works, that the networks tend toward complexity and a higher intelligence over generations. Oddly, in the end of his

Drawn into the Fray 15 argument Pinker harkens back to the behaviorists that Chomsky refuted in the infancy of modern linguistics and cognitive science. He invokes B. F. Skinner to show that learned behaviors can lead to a better selection potential (p. 180). Retrieving this idea of learned behavior as inheritable by offspring, I agree is a stretch and smells pseudo-scientific and pseudo-Darwinian. Natural selection, the evolutionary mechanism that both Darwin and Pinker champion, operates on the principle of random mutations that have a selection advantage and are therefore perpetuated. While peripherally this behaviorist leap might hold true, but it seems that nature will select the most fit that pass on genes, not the learned behavior, and the evolutionary migration is effect of random mutation rather than any mechanism connected with behavior. In reference to this portion of the argument, despite clever types of evidence such as the software analogy, I agree that there is a lack of evolutionary evidence to support the natural selection of modularity in the human mind. Grasping at Skinners failures as a source of evidence seems misguided. But, on the other hand, what sort of evidence could Pinker present that what satisfy Fodors criteria? Reverse engineering the natural selection process can, after all, only be a thought (or computer) experiment unless Fodor wants some sort of old school phrenology study. To say that More to the heart of the issue, Fodor will not accept any evidence short of empirical data, observable and repeatable, so he appears to distrust the methodology used by evolutionary psychologists (the two terms paired, after all, do seem to be an oxymoron) which may be a valid concern, but he skirts the issue of defining what methodologies are acceptable in this sciencethe study of modularity and computation in the human mind. Fodor himself can only go so far in his theorizing, yet somehow he has the power to forward his claims as valid without evidence but nobody can. Fodors complaint of his is the problem of black box, the metaphor for the mind discussed previously. The black box, in many ways, will always remain closed and resistant to certain kinds of observation and analysis. Pinker says that we can speculate (using reverse engineering for

Drawn into the Fray 16 example) with reasonable assumptions and creative evidence from fields that are not restricted to linguistics and psychology. Fodor rejoins that this is not empirical science; that is speculation. In the end, perhaps they both are right. Continuing the fight, Fodor (2001) published The Mind Doesn't Work That Way : The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology (TMD, the authors initialism that I will use from here on) as an obvious rejection of Pinkers (1997) How The Mind Works (HTMW , again the authors initialism). Fodor, in addition to massive modularity, adds a new label to the faction that supports the function and specialization as shapers of many modules that merely operate in syntactic language, the modules hierarchically ordered in some cases, The New Synthesis (Fodor, 2001) . Fodor disparagingly describes the: Turing architecture of syntactically structured mental representations and syntactically driven computational operations defined on these representations. The New Synthesis thus shares with traditional rationalism its emphasis on innate content; but it has added Turing's idea that mental architecture is computational in the proprietary syntactic sense. (p. 19) Not only is the title of his book polemic, but the argument from the beginning is disparaging, Fodor labeling Pinker with Turings (1950) machine as if it were a primary piece of evidence. Pinker is obviously giving a historical overview of computation in HTMW, and he sees as significant Turings step forward conceptually to conceive the mind as operating in a machine-like fashion (1997). Turing even built the mechanism to prove his point, and Pinker uses him to trace the history and provide a visual, concrete example of what he is explaining. After all, if Pinkers primary aim with the Turing example was create a realistic model for brain function, he would have simply chosen a powerful computer which would be a more apt analogy to processing in the brain. Pinker does look at computers and electronics throughout HTMW as examples of how the brain might function in an analogous biological way. Pinker (2005) restates this, perhaps more clearly in a later article saying

Drawn into the Fray 17 computation in this context does not refer to what a commercially available digital computer does but to a more generic notion of mechanical rationality, a concept that Fodor himself has done much to elucidate (Fodor, 1968; 1975; 1981; 1994) (p. 2). Fodor intentionally misreads the function of Pinkers evidence and overextends it in hyperbolic fashion in order to deride and discredit Pinker. Such a blatant attempt to manipulate information and misguide his readers with a biased appeal to pathos, makes Fodors credibility questionable. Turing after all appears in only three pages of HTMW, while the name occupies lines 19 times in TNHTMWs first chapter as he tries to make the label stick. In the same chapter, he uses variations on syntax 46 times, and rationalist. New Synthesis (Fodors capitalization), by contrast, only appears 13 times (see Fodor, 2001, Ch. 1). The only reason I counted these was because they stand out so dramatically on the page, distracting visually and creating the effect in the reader of being beaten over the head with a baton. They are all similar in the sense that Fodor uses them pejoratively to characterize and dismiss the kind of research and theory Pinker is working on. For example, he coins the term New Synthesis to label Pinkers revival of the rationalist philosophy or psychology (Fodor actually interchanges all of these terms as if synonymous) that describes the innate ideas and concepts in language4 that might be transformed through the mechanism of mutation and inherited by offspring. Pinker draws from Chomskys (1965) ideas on innateness and syntax in the UG, the tool box for learning language that all children posses in any culture of the world. Fodor uses Chomsky (only 16 times) and syntax interchangeable referring to the computational language or software that the brain runs on in the Turing model of the mind. From the outset, Fodor attempts to subvert Pinkers argument by bombarding him with labels while bludgeoning the reader with the

Pinkers books The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (2002) and The Stuff of Thought: Language As a Window into Human Nature (2007) develop in much more detail, the ideas of innate language, concepts, and metaphors (drawing from Lakoff) and the connection to human nature and behavior.
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Drawn into the Fray 18 same rhetorical force. This is the form stereotyping the politicians use to smear other candidates, a low tactic. Fodor also errs in ignoring Pinkers careful linking of pieces throughout the book as lines of support that are coherent as a whole and merit the term evidence in the realm of empirical science. In Chapter 4 The Minds Eye, for example, Pinker meticulously explores in-depth knowledge from diverse disciplines in an attempt to thoroughly examine and describe the modules that function to create stereovision, 3D (pp. 211-298). He uses visual, cognitive, linguistic, anatomical, physiological, nuerophysiological, neurophilosophical, etc. research to reason through how stereovision functions so that he can, in turn describe the modules themselves. Pinker provides evidence through specific, descriptive, and empirical example repeatedly in HTMW to illustrate and support his view of computation and modularity. To ignore these as evidence is an injustice. Fodor is correct that Pinker advocates the innate language structures and modules, and this actually becomes a point of departure for Pinker in his book publications, the next two discussing in great depth this innateness and human nature (footnote 3). Many other would-be psycholinguists have jumped ship as well, following the lead of Pinker and perhaps Chomsky in his radical politics and assessment of human nature of the last 30 years, migrating toward several connected hotly debated topics grounded in natural selection and human nature in evolutionary psychology. Im not sure that it is Fodors harsh rhetoric and territorial behavior that has turned these scholars away from modularity of the mind, but I am sure the current climate of the discipline makes psycholinguistics and cognitive science unappealing which is unfortunate. This is a shame since the more great minds we have at work to discover and delineate the processes and structures of the mind, the most complex biological (or mechanical) organ, the more progress will be made.

Drawn into the Fray 19 Pinker versus Fodor round twohomunculi and demons. This is not Fodors only line of argumentation, but it is the most striking, and establishes a negative precedent in the dialogue between the two scholars. In contrast, Pinker praises Fodor for the concept of modularity though he differs with him on some of the details. One hotspot that Pinker (1997) creates is the need for, what have been called, homunculi (Pinker likes the term demons) in massive modularity that function as messengers or processors in the brain. He later adopts the term access-consciousness to give the idea of high level processors a more formal feel than demons (pp. 138-148), processors of some sort that manage at a higher level of thought than, say, vision in order to remember, synthesize, and govern input and output from the nervous system at large (pp. 136-148). The two scholars have gone the rounds on this issue more than any other because Fodor (2001) negates Pinkers access-consciousness as reminiscent of the antique idea variously termed the ghost in the machine, demons, or homunculi. These terms refer pejoratively to a little being within the brain that must be necessary in order to make the incredible complexity of the mind possible (Fodor, 2001), but to be fair, Pinker (1997) explicitly addresses and satisfactorily resolves this problem, essentially by saying that it can wait until later (pp. 79-99). He takes on the role of reporting the data and research available that inform the lower level cognition in the model of the computational and modular mind (Pinker, 1997, pp. 91-93). In the role of evolutionary psychologist, his role for the moment is to try and describe the features of potential module(s) to lay the foundation for work that can be done later, once modules are better understood (after description has been accumulated, classified, critiqued, etc.) (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006, pp. 628-647). Essentially, this access-consciousness is an x value, a variable that can be defined and articulated later.

Drawn into the Fray 20 Pinker versus Fodor final roundhunger and thirst. The debate that Pinker (1997) ignites in HTMW continues today, but the flurry of reviews and replies that followed Fodors 2001 publication TMD, dialogues between the two from a distance, make up the heated, exhausted battle to the end of the fight (Deborah Tannen (1999)could have a hay-day with the militaristic language of these two). Pinker (2005) first responds to Fodors (2001) blatant mockery in The Mind Doesnt Work That Way (emphasis added) with a defense, disguised as a review of the book, to Fodors vicious rhetoric. Pinker (2005) asks the puzzled and stunned question So How Does the Mind Work? (Pinkers italics). I think that he is genuinely confused by what he perceives, correctly as Fodor flipping to argue the other side, in opposition to his ground breaking work on modularity. Fodor, more than anyone, says Pinker (2005) has defended the computational theory of mind ... specialization ... [and] evolution as a shaping force in the modular mind (p. 2). At this point, Pinker still argues that Fodor and himself have much in common in their writing on the computational and modular theories. And yet, with all this agreement, here is the trail of blood that follows Pinker and Fodor from the beginning, each written in response to the other (except Fodors initial book on modularity): 1981-- The Modularity of Mind : An Essay on Faculty Psychology 1997Pinker, How the Mind Works 2001Fodor, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology 2005Pinker, So How Does the Mind Work? 2005Fodor, Reply to Steven Pinker So How Does the Mind Work? 2005Pinker, A Reply to Jerry Fodor on How the Mind Works 2006Fodor, How the Mind Works: What We Still Dont Know

Drawn into the Fray 21 In these pieces, they are sometimes angry and sometimes humorous. They rehash the same arguments, make the same claims, provide the same evidence. However, in the restating and rethinking of argumentation, both sides begin to become more focused. In responding to the question at the core of all this debate, Fodor (2005) reveals a fundamental truth that has been revealed: So how does the mind work? [authors bold and italics] I dont know. You dont know. Pinker doesnt know. And I rather suspect, such is the current state of the art, that if God were to tell us, we wouldnt understand him. (p. 31) Fodors tone is still a bit playful with the question and answer set up, the short witty response. But his tone is also serious and almost dark. The anger, perhaps, seeps out of his language in the heat of the debate, and invoking God seems odd and out of place. Knowing that Pinker is an ardent atheist, as Im sure Fodor does, he seems to be provoking Pinker as if Pinker may be about to quit the fight so Fodor has to fuel the fire again. Discussion: Assessing the Debate, Entering the Fray as a New Researcher Is this polemic rhetoric effective in moving science forward? Jackendoff (2003) and the research team of Barret and Kurzban(2006) do not think so. As a novice researcher in the field of psycholinguistics and cognitive science, I feel as if I have been sucked into the complexity of this debate against my will. In fact, I have. The researchers I have discussed subverted my initial methodology for this study, or at least I allowed them to. Originally I had intended to ground myself in the theories of modularity and the computational mind so that I could then see how eye tracking studies and reading fit into the work of the scholars I discuss here. I have done all the reading and research for that kind of a paper, and I have found that at this point they fit together very loosely, not at all integrated into a nice map of the brain module for reading. I have done the research with L2 acquisition (Clahsen, & Felser, 2006a; 2006b; Cook, 1999; Friesen & Jared, 2007;

Drawn into the Fray 22 Fukkink, Hulstijn, & Simis, 2005; Koda, 2007) and eye tracking (Reichle, Liversedge, Pollatsek, & Rayner, 2009; Reichle, Warren, & McConnell, 2009; Reichle, Rayner, & Pollatsek, 2003; Reichle, 2006; Kliegl, Nuthmann, & Engbert, 2006; Rayner, 1993; Rayner, Pollatsek, Drieghe, Slattery, & Reichle, 2007; Rayner, 2009; Rayner, Smith, Malcolm, & Henderson, 2009) as well, applying eye tracking research to the pedagogy in this domain and reading closely what few studies there are in L2 reading that apply eye tracking research (Duyck, Vanderelst, Desmet, & Hartsuiker, 2008; ElstonGttler & Friederici, 2007; Keating, 2009; Us & Martnez, 2006; Yamada, 2009). However, these fields are not as interconnected as I innocently thought they would be. The domains I have studied are new disciplines tackling perhaps the largest problems ever confronted by scientists, with the tools necessary for discovery in many instances withdrawn because, in contrast to the metaphor of the black box, the container of the human brain holds the living tissue of a sentient being who would not appreciate their gray matter being poked and prodded. The domains and disciplines will converge I suppose, based upon the research, but I discovered that this is a slow process. The individual disciplines such as L2 acquisition and eye tracking have to figure out precisely the nature of their science before they integrate and discover how the separate modules of science operate within the mind of science as a whole. Perhaps, this type of research on my part is valuable because I am in the trenches and can apply the bits and pieces I discover and learn and integrate them into my classroom. After all, looking back over this subject matter I have covered, what here does not have pedagogical implications for the English and SLA classrooms? For that matter, this is what all education is about. Figuring out how to encourage students to discover their mind and how it works. Helping them to see how developing the modules with their brains will benefit their communities and societies as they are more productive and effective in all that they do, showing them through literature or science, or any other discipline that developing their thinking skills will help them to live more satisfactory, happier lives.

Drawn into the Fray 23 Chomsky first aroused my interest in the idea of UG and innateness, the language of human beings reflecting the operations and processes of the mind. The fact that a UG could be passed on intrigued me because I could not see initially how that could happen. Unconsciously, I have always believed the erroneous concept of babies being born with a blank slate, Lockes blank slate (Stuhr, 2000), but as I began to read Jackendoff and then Pinker, I could see the real complexity of a language and its acquisition by human beings. The evidence these three scholars who tend to think in similar veins persuaded me that the process of learning a whole language and grammar by the age eight (or at least 13) would be an impossible feat without some sort of jump start (see Pinker, 1994). As many before me, I became enamored with the eloquence of Pinker, the simplicity of Jackendoff (in a positive sense), and the radicalism of Chomsky. I could not hold myself back as pieces of the mysteries that have always intrigued me were revealed by each of these authors. My view was utopian in a sense because I believed naively that Pinker could guide me through all of the unknown, shedding light on sentience, consciousness, and the mind. Fodor, however, opened my mind to the complexity and contentiousness of the matter, the insolvability of some problems. I read the documents I describe above almost chronologically with the exception of reading Pinkers (1997) HTMW before I read Fodor.5 While still moving through Pinkers works, I discovered Fodor (1983) as the father of modularity and jumped back to review his work The Modularity of Mind. All was well until I moved on to Fodors TMD where I felt attacked along with Pinker, my new ideas feeling threatened. Pinker was my psycholinguistic hero by this point. At times, Fodor was witty and humorous, but Pinker (2005) rightly describes his attitude toward the dialogue of academia saying at critical junctures, Fodor refuses to offer arguments for his convictions, opting instead for peremptory sarcasm (p. 33). However, to understand Fodor, I

This actually benefited me as a new researcher because Pinker addresses a wider audience and is easier to read. Also, Fodor has a cantankerous relationship with his intended audience which becomes annoying and discouraging.

Drawn into the Fray 24 have found is to understand the need for resistance to the popular trends in scientific thought. Knowing our ignorance pushes us towards discovery, and Fodor (2006) insightfully reveals this in the last of his exchanges: One could make a case that the history of cognitive science, insofar as its been any sort of success, has consisted largely of finding more and more things about cognition that we didnt know and didnt know that we didnt. Throwing some light on how much dark there is, as Ive put it elsewhere. The professional cognitive scientist has a lot of perplexity to endure, but he can be pretty sure that hes gotten in on the ground floor. (p. 86) Whether this is an attempt at reconciliation with Pinker or justification of his role in the dialogue, Fodor hits on a truth about science and linguistics in generalthere is always more to be done. Language, computational processes, and modularity are, at best, only vaguely understood, and the nature of the work in this field is difficult. Researchers must find creative entries into the black box, meticulously describe functions and processes, and walk down costly, dark, dead-end paths, but the progress comes with costs at times as I have found in this study. Not only are scholars hungry for new knowledge and discovery as they research and publish, they are just hungry, and dead-end paths, though necessary to the science, do not put food on the table. Therefore, the rhetoric in our debates is heated and life threatening, our adrenal causing us to devour research, observation, and, sometimes, other researchers, as if they were things to be consumed. Conclusions: The Way Forward The reality of the battle between Fodor and Pinker is that they are on the upper crust of academia, the very top of the ivory tower with a sky view, and a few of the things keeping them on track, keeping them human and humane (and perhaps sane), are their ethics and integrity as scientists and scholars. Recognition of their imperfections as they pursue and create knowledge may be absolutely necessary to maintain the true scientific mind, and someone who emphasizes what is

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