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What Next for NATO

What Next for NATO

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This policy brief looks at current and future challenges for NATO from a variety of perspectives.
This policy brief looks at current and future challenges for NATO from a variety of perspectives.

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Categories:Types, Research
Published by: German Marshall Fund of the United States on May 23, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


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Sarah Raine on TransatlanticDefense ...........................................2Javid Ahmad on Afghanistan .......3Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer onFrance ..............................................4Joshua W. Walker on Turkey ........4Emiliano Alessandri on the MiddleEast and North Africa ....................5Andrew Small on China ................6Dhruva Jaishankar on GlobalPartnerships ...................................7
Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brie 
What Next for NATO
1744 R Street NWWashington, DC 200091 202 745 3950F 1 202 265 1662E ino@gmus.org
May 2012
What Did We Learn in Chicago?
Mark R. Jacobson, Senior Transatlantic Fellow 
I nothing else, this past weekend’sgathering in Chicago o NAO Alliesand partners demonstrated the typeo political resolve and commitmentthat has been the core o the Alliance’sability to keep its members secureor over 60 years. While Aghani-stan clearly dominated the issues atthe summit, NAO endorsed key proposals on deense capabilities, theneed to streamline and modernizein a time o budget constraints, andstrengthening NAO’s partnershipsoutside the 28-nation alliance. Inshort, there were no surprises.In act, despite the political turbulencethat oen makes headlines, popula-tions remain steadast in their supportor their nations’ membership inthe Alliance. According to the nd-ings o ransatlantic rends surveysbetween 2002 and 2011, majoritiesin the United States and EuropeanUnion agreed that the NAO alliancehad been essential or their coun-tries’ security. Majorities also agreedthat NAO must be prepared to actoutside o Europe. Tey were alsoreluctant to cut deense spending,even as they supported reductions inoverall government spending. NeitherEuropeans nor Americans were opti-mistic about the prospects o stability in post-intervention Libya, and solidmajorities in the EU and United Statessupported reducing troop levels inAghanistan.Even with all the challenges acingthe Alliance today, however, it isimportant that NAO look to theuture so it can anticipate and copewith the uncertainties o the secu-rity landscape. As Secretary GeneralRasmussen stated on the secondday o the summit, NAO has beensuccessul at keeping member nationssecure because it continually reas-sess its strengths and weaknesses andocuses on “getting ready to ace thenext challenge.” Indeed, while NAOhas work to do to better synchronizeand streamline its orces, i there isone issue that stands out as the Alli-ance looks ahead to a summit in 2014,it is the need to understand that utureAlliance security challenges will mostlikely arise rom outside o Europe,and that previous conceptualizationso “out o area” must be shed or theAlliance to remain relevant.Te pieces that ollow reect the chal-lenges and opportunities or NAOas it looks ahead to 2014 and beyond.First, two pieces, by Sarah Raine andJavid Ahmad, address the “unnishedbusiness” that NAO must addresssuch as a commitment to sucient
Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief 
levels o deense spending by the European members o NAO and the need to resource a sustained training andadvisory mission in Aghanistan. Alexandra de HoopSchefer asks what kind o ally France will be in the Allianceunder Hollande’s presidency and Josh Walker describes theincreasing signicance o urkey and the decisive role thecould play given instability in the Middle East. Te nal seto essays ocuses on partnership and emerging challengesor NAO. Emiliano Allessandri argues or the need tostrengthen NAO’s partnerships in the Mediterranean andAndrew Small writes about the need or NAO to think about developing relations — as an alliance — with China.Finally, Dhruva Jaishankar reminds us that NAO mustthink about the global” challenges presented by the mari-time and cyber dimensions, as well as a need or NAO toconsider a leading role with regards to space.
Escaping European Shortsightedness and U.S. Impatience
Sarah Raine, Non-resident Fellow 
NAO members meeting in Chicago aced a crowdedagenda, but one item — while not ormally eatured — castan important and ever-present shadow over the summit.More than one year aer then-U.S. Secretary o DeenseRobert Gates publicly berated NAO’s European membersor their diminishing deense capabilities and commit-ments, observers in the United States and beyond are rightto be wondering whether Europe got the message.Aer a decade o underinvestment in European deense— with spending alling by more than €24 billion in thelast three years alone — are Europe’s NAO member statesready to see past the capability gaps so obviously exposedby their intervention in Libya? While Washington under-stands that its European allies are probably unable to spendmore on deense, the question may be whether they areprepared to spend smarter, even i this means addressingsensitive issues such as national sovereignty. Te 20 or socollaborative deense projects announced at Chicago underthe Smart Deense initiative o NAO Secretary-GeneralAnders Fogh Rasmussen are just a start. As stand-aloneannouncements, they all well short o the mark. With thenotable exception o ballistic missile deense, these proj-ects are really only consequential i they mark a shi in themindset o European deense establishments and industries,bringing genuine political sponsorship to the pooling andsharing o resources.Likewise, during discussions in Chicago on Aghanistanaer 2014, concerns will remain about the contributionand role o European NAO states. Te United States hasmade its expectations clear. Te Aghan National Security Forces will require $4.1 billion in nancial support peryear, o which $1.3 billion must be met by non-U.S. NAOmembers and their partners. But the math didn’t add up inChicago. Hopeully, the signals will be more positive or thedonors’ conerence in okyo this July.NAO’s declarations at Chicago on subjects rangingrom Aghanistan to the Middle East matter because they are made by a powerul and successul security alliance.Beyond Chicago, NAO’s European members will need todemonstrate to the United States that they understand therole they are required to play in the uture projection o NAO power. Meanwhile, the United States will need to doa better job at appreciating the contributions its Europeanallies are already ofering, not just on the provision o hardsecurity capabilities but on issues such as crisis manage-ment and the support o security sector reorm.It is sometimes said that NAO is in danger o becominga victim o its own success. But the truth is that there is noshortage o work out there or the alliance. Instead, the realchallenge or NAO is to avoid becoming a victim o Euro-pean shortsightedness and U.S. impatience.
The United States will need to doa better job at appreciating thecontributions its European alliesare already offering.
Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief 
Seeking Better Support for Afghanistan’s Security Forces
 Javid Ahmad, Program Coordinator — Asia
As NAO prepares to wind down its Aghan mission in2014, the allies ace the goal o transerring all combat oper-ations across the country to Kabul while U.S. and NAOorces move into a support role. With the demanding time-table in mind, ensuring continued and sustained undingand training or the Aghan National Security Forces(ANSF) — which includes the army, police, and specialorces — is absolutely imperative. Having conronted thechallenges o under-enrollment, ethnic disproportionality,illiteracy, and corruption, the ANSF has come a long way over the years, and will lead security eforts in 75 percent o the country in the next six months. Te orce is currently comprised o more than 330,000 trained soldiers, and willsoon reach its peak size o 352,000. Yet many key chal-lenges remain, not the least o which is the ANSF’s nan-cial sustainability post-2014 and Kabul’s ability to take ullcontrol o Aghanistan’s security.At present, there is no unctional plan in place that stipu-lates the size, structure, and cost o the ANSF over the long-term. Te Aghan Deense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak recently announced that the ANSF’s strength will be cut by roughly 120,000 starting in 2015 to make it more aford-able. While natural attrition and a reduction o recruitingeforts will take care o some downsizing, the plannedcutback may also mean putting trained Aghan soldiers intoa dim job market where they could easily become vulner-able to recruitment by the aliban and criminal networks.NAO and its Aghan partners must ensure that there is aproper alternative employment plan in place or those whoare demobilized. Similarly, while Aghan Special Forceshave recently stepped up to the plate, Aghanistan’s post-transition security cannot be maintained by Special Forcesalone. Teir numbers remain small, and they still requiresupport rom international troops to be efective.Financing the ANSF will also remain a challenge. Wash-ington has ocused on an arrangement to provide the ANSFabout $4.1 billion annually until at least 2024, a commit-ment recently reinorced by the signing o the U.S.-Aghanstrategic partnership agreement. Britain and Germany havealso pledged $110 million and $190 million, respectively,per year as have other Allies — a small step towards the$1.31 billion required rom Allies. Te Aghan governmentitsel will provide $500 million and it has been orgingbilateral strategic agreements with some NAO countriesover the past months to urther augment support. Toughthe price tag may seem high, training and nancingANSF costs much less than sustaining NAO troops onthe ground. And while NAO’s support remains invalu-able, Chicago largely ignored encouraging and engagingmajor non-NAO allies such as Japan, Korea, and theGul States to shoulder some o the costs. However, theassurance portrayed through the Chicago Declarationthat NAO will retain a presence beyond 2014 through arobust training mission in Aghanistan to train and adviseANSF is a welcoming sign. Tis new non-combat missionis a good venue to engage key non-NAO partners inburden-sharing responsibilities by integrating them intotraining missions in Aghanistan that will not only helpstrengthen ANSF but also give them a modicum o controlin Aghanistan to saeguard the many hard-won years longachievements. NAO must also speciy the names andresponsibilities o all partner countries that will engage inthe non-combat mission, and explain the actual ramework or spending the $4.1 billion.As we move beyond Chicago, it will be crucial to relay theright narrative regarding NAO’s uture support o theANSF or rallying public support or Aghanistan, not leastbecause it will have implications or the uture o the alli-ance. Like Libya, Aghanistan continues to be regarded as akey test or NAO’s uture.
At present, there is no functionalplan in place that stipulates thesize, structure, and cost of theANSF over the long-term.

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