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Table Of Contents

1. Introduction
2.1. Historical perspective on executive compensation research
2.2.1. Explicit contracts
2.2.2. Implicit contract approach
2.3. Trends in the use of accounting numbers for contracting with managers
2.4.1. Informativeness principle; creating incentives for effort; filtering common
2.4.2. Creating incentives to balance effort across managerial activities
2.5.1. Operationalizing the theory
2.5.2. Relative incentives weights on accounting and stock price measures
2.5.3. Relations between the valuation and governance roles of accounting
2.5.4. Estimating the relation between components of earnings and cash
2.5.5. Explicit choice of performance measures
2.5.6. Relative performance evaluation (RPE)
2.5.7. Contract design for business unit managers
2.6. Discussion and synthesis
3.1. Interactions across governance mechanisms
3.2. Financial accounting information and additional corporate control
3.3. Limits to accounting information and the endogenous formation of
4.1.1. Overview
4.1.2. Channels through which financial accounting information affects economic
4.1.3. Advantages of cross-country designs
4.2.1. Effects of financial accounting information on economic performance
4.2.2. Channels through which financial accounting information affects economic
4.2.3.1. Auditing regime. We expect the economic benefits of financial
4.2.3.2. Communication infrastructure. We expect the economic effects of
4.2.3.3. Financial analyst community. We expect the effects of financial
4.2.3.4. Financial system architecture. We expect the economic benefits of
4.2.3.5. Legal environment. We expect the economic benefits of financial
4.2.3.6. Other corporate control mechanisms. We expect the economic benefits
4.2.3.7. Industry concentration. We expect the economic benefits of financial
4.2.3.8. Political influence over business activities. We expect the economic
4.2.3.9. Human capital. Finally, we expect the economic benefits of financial
4.2.4. Properties of high-quality financial accounting regimes
4.3. Additional empirical design issues
5.1.1. Positive accounting theory
5.1.2. Managerial accounting research
5.1.3. Capital markets research
5.2. Research suggestions for exploring the connection between the governance
5.3. Additional implications of Figs. 1 and 2 for capital markets research
6. Summary
7–63
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Bushman and Smith 2001

Bushman and Smith 2001

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Published by: Rajesh Vijayaraghavan on May 24, 2012
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