seems clear to me that application
the standard set forth requires that severance be granted inthis case. The Federal Circuit's standard is that defendants should not be "joined under Rule 20'stransaction-or-occurrence test unless the facts underlying the claim
infringement assertedagainst each defendant share an aggregate
Further, "joinder is notappropriate where different products or processes are involved."
And, "independentlydeveloped products using differently sourced parts are not part
the same transaction, even
they are otherwise coincidentally identical."
There is no allegation in the complaint that alleges any connection between SAS and anyother defendant, or between SAS's products and any other defendant's products. Therefore, Iconclude that SAS is improperly joined, and I will sever the case against SAS.
The statutory authority for transferring the case is § 1404(a)
Title 28, which provides:"For the convenience
parties and witnesses, in the interest
ustice, a district court maytransfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
establishing the need for transfer is on the movant,
F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995), which in this case is SAS. The Third Circuit has set forththe framework for analysis:"[I]n ruling on defendants' motion the plaintiffs choice
venue should not belightly disturbed."In ruling
1404(a) motions, courts have not limited their consideration to thethree enumerated factors
1404(a) (convenience ofparties, convenience ofwitnesses,or interests
ustice), and, indeed, commentators have called on the courts to "consider
I would come to this conclusion even in the absence
Corp. See Ventronics
Civ. Act. No. 11-1114-RGA (D.Del. March 28, 2012) (D.I. 220, p. 44).
Section 1404 was amended subsequently to the filing