Mill and the Utility of Liberty Author(s): Mark Strasser Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No.

134 (Jan., 1984), pp. 63-68 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical Quarterly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2218890 . Accessed: 19/04/2011 10:54
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MILL AND THE UTILITY OF LIBERTY

BY MARK STRASSER

as Yet of becauseMillwasa champion liberty a utilitarian personalliberty. itis precisely

take Mill'sdefence liberty of receives attention. Critics stances. usually oneoftwo Millis indeed true a defender liberty, of not although on utilitarian Theysaythat he utilitarian is no great who of Or champion say grounds. they that is a consistent our and that deserves praise respect. he is Millsays "the part the which amenable society, is to that only of conduct anyone of In part his which concerns others. the which concerns that himself, indepenmerely is absolute. himself, hisown over and the dence ofright, Over is, body mind, individual sovereign".' of actions an Mill's Somecritics consider categoryself-regarding tobenearly empty for actions which onehasever no set."Except a few trivial of very thoughtsuppressing, in allouractions affect will others some an provokes anger, the way.... [W]heneveract of of ordisgust others,clearly it affects and falls the resentment them, thus into category
conduct."2 other-regarding

Mill is This criticism, as accurate, notas telling itmight appear. himself although "I that a admit themischief which person doestohimself, seriously may says, fully with their and those both connected interests, nearly affect, through sympathies their at with to However, regard theselfhim,and in a minor degree, society large". hurts of "the others because their and (which injury sympathies interests), regarding isone can to for sake the inconvenience which good society affordbear, the of greater of A a and human freedom". society prohibit actions ifthey "violate distinct may only to other if is or obligationany (pp. person persons" 101-2).Thus, anaction assignable that Abigot a harmfulothers, doesnot warrant prohibition. cannot its to expect thereby he it because suffersthe at thoughtpeople's of to merely practising religion be outlawed (p. 104). and that as the Ten objects Millcannot, a consistent discount sympathies utilitarian, of "A such as the interests anyone. utilitarian disregard considerations distress cannot of to religious and others self-regarding and number caused the conduct, the bigot to by a whoareso affected. these make difference, sometimes All will a and perhaps people to to Ten'ssentiments. decisive seems share difference,hiscalculation."3 Stegenga if with interference liberty would desirable,more be Froma utilitarian ofview, point could produced be thereby.4 happiness and one maintain Milldoes)that promotionliberty the of Of course, might (as inthe this is utility-maximizing long run. Ten rejects explanation, But individuality is a "evenifthis true, gives misleading it account Mill'sposition....[I]n of saying:
tothis references ' 'On Liberty', S. Mill,Three (Oxford, p. 15(subsequent 1975) Essays inJ. edition). 2 C. L. Ten,MillonLiberty, (Oxford, 1980), 10. p. 3ibid.,p. 34. 4 James of of and of Stegenga, S. Mill'sConcept Liberty thePrinciple Utility", "J. Journal Value 7 Inquiry(1973), 281-89. pp.

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we that wished discount certain to satisfacconduct, saw Mill discussing self-regarding in It he tions certain and forms distress hiscalculation.is just of because disregarded of that be that over-all certain satisfactions hecould sosure the consequencesdevelopwould be ingindividuality indeed favourable".5 Milldoesnot that discount certain dissatisfactions hecanbe sure so that arbitrarily of theover-all and will consequences developing individuality liberty be favourable. it While is true he discounts that accusationsarbitrariness of arenot certain attitudes, Mill justified. holdsthat peopledo notvalueliberty highly enough; do not they that is understand libertya necessary ofcivilization, If education culture.they and part didso understand, "there then that would nodanger liberty be should undervalued, be of boundaries no andtheadjustmentthe between andsocial it control would present be that as as should difficulty" Millbelieves attitudeswell actions (p. 70). extraordinary in accord with principle utility. the of if do value Thus, people not sufficiently liberty their should be reinforced; example, unhappinessthe not for the of highly, attitudes not to government religious should be allowed dictate bigot policy. In someutilitarian the of a make difmight calculations, number bigoted people ofthe ference. all,if vast After the majority membersa particular arereligious of society thenmuchunhappiness be causedbyallowing will the bigots, peopleto follow in interestedmaximizing utility a the of Yet, religion. Millis notmerely offending He "I as society. says, regard utility theultimate appealon all ethical particular in but be on sense, questions; it must utility thelargest grounded thepermanent of interests manas a progressive which (p. being" 16).Ifwelookattheparagraphs this we Millis talking about and "mankind" "therace precede comment, see that of in itself". When talks utility thelargest he he of about utility the sense, is talking "theHumanRace,conceived a continuous as the the whole, including past, present the andthefuture".6 isusing same He standard hetalks the when of "moral perfection of the species",7 "conduciveness the happiness mankind",8 of to of and [of] of the "maximizing happiness allmankind".9 not about of Millwould beconcerned ensuring happiness ofa whole the even society is For when to happiness happiness insignificant compared the produced bigots. their of for countless tolerance. is not He generations the promotion religious by in that he the it. "discounting" bigot's happiness thesense he is ignoring Rather, is of with unhappiness countless the of future the comparing unhappiness thebigots suffer the from bigotry), finds the and that promotion (who ofbigotry generations would not would be utility-maximizing. a in largest that Ten offersdifferent sense'. suggests He of'utilitythe interpretation in sense isdetachable the that from growth "theultimate isnot really happinessany goal ofindividuality. inthe sense' to development ofindividuality refers the largest 'Utility anditsassociated pleasures".'0 of of not from growth True,the ultimategoalhappiness happens tobedetachable the be will, However, in individuality. Individualityinthe long-run,utility-maximizing. 'utility thelargest sense'doesnot to development ofindividuality. interpretarefer the Ten's a for to which tionofMill cannot correct, Millsays with be that regard the"injury which causesto society, conduct neither violates specific tothe by any person duty nor hurt individual the himself; except perceptible toany assignable public, occasions
6

Ten,op.cit., 78. p. and Comte Positivism," WorksJohn Stuart Vol.10,"Auguste Collected of Mill, p. 334. Works ohn Stuart Vol.10,"Bentham", 15. 7Collected Mill, p. of 8 A Bk. System ofLogic, 6,Ch. 12,Sec. 7,?4. 9 Utilitarianism,2, ?10. Ch. p. 'o Ten,op.cit., 78.

MILL AND THE UTILITY OF LABOUR

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is to the can inconvenience onewhich society afford bear,for sakeofthegreater goodof humanfreedom" 101). (p. Mill is weighing from consequences.He saysthatmoregood results preserving thanfrom freedom Yet, injuries. "the preventing contingent" strongest the ofall "merely the the with isthat it conduct, when does personal against interference public purely arguments of the are it and wrongly, inthe wrongplace italics]" 102). interfere, odds that interferes (p. [my than is Thus, evenmoreimportant "thegreater freedom", thefact that, goodofhuman in "cases ofpurely the to both of conduct", publictends actwrongly, interms personal when it choosesto intervene, in terms whatitdoes whenitintervenes. Ten and of If were correct aboutMill's emphasis liberty, theprotection liberty on then of wouldbe themostimportant reasonsupporting Itwouldnothavethe non-interference. society's it. which Mill assigns subordinate status Mill protects and because doingso is utility-maximizing for liberty individuality mankind. wouldbe a mistake maintain becausehe offersutilitarian to a It account that, ofwhyliberty he of mustbe protected, was nota champion liberty. as Cowling wellas Ten seemstomakethat that mistake. Mill's"detailed Cowling recognizes inOnLiberty, of in delimitation thepowerof society to is (and government) relation theindividual in to but to regard made,not view the of natural rights individualsbefree italics], from of [my the consequencesto the generalinterest imposing of limitations theexercise on of social pressure conform"."' to the of for Thus,Mill doesnotsupport protection liberty its own sake. Cowlingis further withregard which to displeasedby Mill's elitism "WhenMilluseshappiness, he notes, pleasureshe (Mill)saysarepraiseworthy. Cowling means the happinessthatrational reflection wouldapprove, anypleasurea man not happenstopursue".12 Mill does notdeserve reputation a champion individual his as of Cowlingclaimsthat on liberty twocounts: 1. He is selectiveabout whichpleasureshe thinks suitablemeans to are happiness. 2. He does notwishtoprotect for but for liberty itsownsake, rather thesakeof someother end,i.e. maximizing utility. It is somewhat that that of complains Mill doesnotapprove "any surprising Cowling wouldbe so pleasure a man happensto pursue".'3Veryfew,if any,philosophers if liberal-minded to approveof any pleasure.Indeed,one would be surprised as wouldapprove man'spursuing pleasure of whatsoever. ifany For, Cowlinghimself any then sadistic wouldbe permissible. pleasurewas acceptable, pleasures that the of he indeed, Cowlingdoes notdeny Millpraises protection personal liberty, citesthepassage in whichMill criticizes Comtefor realizing not "that who mankind, after are made up ofsingle all human obtain greater ofhappiness, a sum when beings, each pursueshisown".'4 Cowling realizes Mill,inhisAutobiography, that the expresses fearthat"theinevitable of and of growth socialequality thegovernmentpublic opinion ' an shouldimposeon mankind oppressive ofuniformity inopinion practice". and yoke aboutthepassagein OnLiberty above(note1). cited Cowlingevenknows Ten arguesconvincingly Millis,indeed, defender personal that a of and liberty'6 that
' Maurice Cowling, MillandLiberalism 1963),p. 41. (Cambridge, 13 op. Cowling, cit.,p. 32. op. cit.,p. 32. 14 "Auguste Comteand Positivism," 337. p. Works I, Autobiography, Cowling Stuart Mill: Collected Vol. I5 JohnRobson (ed.),John p. 259. values of of not talksaboutMill as fearing, thelimitation libertyper buttheimposition mediocre se, Mill 16 Ten, op. cit., 78. and attitudes. andLiberalism, . p. p.
12

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he is Ten out because merely Cowling'schargethat is illiberal undeserved. points that Mill prefers type pleasure another, notimply he is nota champion of to that does of one to As to the which personalliberty. longas Mill is willing allowothers pursue pleasures thenhe cannotfairly characterized one who wouldlimit be as others' theyprefer, that freedoms. one infers Cowling wouldremain However, despiteTen's eloquence, of unconvinced. all, (After Cowlingcitesin his ownbookmany thepassgestowhich Ten refers.) if The disagreement between them be two might easierto understand we identify separateissues: 1. Does Mill defend protection personal the of liberty? the of 2. Does Mill defend protection personal for reasons? liberty theright aboutbothissues.He seemstobe afraid utilitarians not do that Cowlingis worried at that is worried however, Cowling notonly respectpersonalliberty all. One infers, about thefirst issue. For,as Ten points (and as is shown thequotations out which by in of of rights. Cowlingcites),Mill argueseloquently favour theprotection individual a of as about"thenatural Cowlingenvisions truechampion individual rights talking If of to that have rights individuals be free".'7 one maintains individuals a natural right to be free,then,evenin cases wherethere a conflict of is between protection the the and of the to will right themaximization utility, right be free be protected. the of by Cowling,it seems,would prefer interpretations Mill offered Grayor Sartorius.Graysuggests that"Mill's doctrine liberty, of embodies paradox the then, thatan iteration the utility of of is (i.e. theprinciple liberty) on utilitarian principle over This formulaitself".'8 grounds italics]accordedpriority theutility principle [my in tionmight supported thefollowing Supposethat be there two are rules which way. by one could judge a particular thatone action,Rule A and Rule B. Rule A dictates the thatone refrain from it. perform action.Rule B dictates performing One must decide whichruletofollow. One waytochoosewouldbe todetermine whether Rule more following A promotes thandoes following Rule B, or viceversa.Indeed,Mill suggests in those that utility there a conflict is between moral cases inwhich one follow rule the which rules, should 9 that maximizes RuleA is theprinciple utility that of and RuleB utility. Graysupposes is the principle liberty. claimsthat, of He to Rule according Mill, following B would of Thus, theprinciple liberty (Rule B) shouldtakeprecedence produce moreutility. overtheprinciple utility of (Rule A). of here.First all,he is assuming theprinciples of that of Grayis guilty twomistakes are and utility comparable. to They are not,at leastaccording Mill. For,the liberty is rule by whicheverything judged.20 other All is principleof utility the primary of which which are, principles atbest,secondary. Theyarerules thumb helpus toknow actionswillbe utility-maximizing. between principle the of there conflict is If,indeed, of a the which action rule, rule, utility, primary and theprinciple liberty,secondary about must victorious. prove oughtbe performed, always utility his that there a conflict is He between Secondly,Grayis belying ownwords. claims in and a there moreutility following principle in is the of utility liberty, conflict which If thanin following principle utility. this so,then the of is has shown Gray merely liberty that haveoverlooked we someofthehidden in the of utilities following principle liberty.
7 op. cit.,p. 41. Nomos Mill on Liberty, Stuart and "John (1981),p. 95. Utility Rights," JohnGray, Ch. 19 Utilitarianism, 2, ?24. 20 A System Bk. ofLogic, 6, Ch. 12,Sec. 7, ?4.
18

MILL AND THE UTILITY OF LABOUR

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of and We think there a conflict is between principlesliberty utility. the that However, is there norealconflict. Themain of isto is deal utility inprotecting that point OnLiberty show there a great of no if to However,heis going Thus,Gray just surprises onebyclaiming this. liberty. show theprinciple liberty that of should given be over principle utility, of priority the then must he show itshould accorded be the that so priority, despite fact doing is why notutility-maximizing. utilitymaximized respecting is then is For,if by liberty, Gray that conflict between and is apparent. merely liberty utilityonly asserting the which could used support to a be that Sartorius makes claim Gray's position, namely, to "If there sometimes inbarring is choose appeals utility. they utility [act-utilitarians] tosupportconventional norm a moral the and of concerning making keeping promises to to which direct bars the abdicated right decide appeals utility, have thereby they not utilitarian but eachcaseonitsdirect restructured radical tobe (ina merits, merely way, which determine the considerations will where merits sure)thesetofconsequentialist in lie."21 too,Gray act-utilitarians bardirect to claim, So, might appeals utility might of and those casesinwhich principlesliberty utility conflict. the might either here. Sartorius be positions On theone might presenting oftwodifferent that sit and out be hand,he might suggesting oneneedn't down figure therelative of ornot an action utilities performing performing time one a make every that must decision what do.Thisinterpretation to issupported hissaying, "What about must by that be shown, at some rules then, morality tocontain least ought granting conventional to which direct is of forms of (1) prohibit appeals utility,that The rightnessvarious inthe of can on act-utilitarian rules bebased the participation support such principle, and(2) The would the consequences to such when have best can be right violate rules sodoing retained theindividual [my Moralnorms would taken be by agent italics]."22 very in extreme they beviolated. basically Mill cases, can However, certain seriously. agrees with a policy, that says rules conduct in he that of such out mannerwhich in it "point the will least be to where ormeans not do exist analyzing actual time for the perilous act, ofthe in circumstances case,orwhere cannot ourjudgmentestimating we trust them. Butthey not allsupercede do at the (when propriety through circumstances the of going permit) a which course action utilityis scientific requisite framingrule seeing process for of [i.e. the data theparticular case us".23 then, maximizing]from of before Sartorius's position, does notbar(where means 'bar' direct to his allows Rather, position prohibit) appeals utility. onetorefrain making from direct to appeals utility. On the other Sartorius tobemaking seems a much claim. that hand, stronger He says ifallowed interfere liberties, interfere to with would atimproper times. governments, to attributes point Mill). the "an Thus, Sartorius, absoluteprohibition (He correctly says on governmental interference" be justified, the and justification be made on may may utilitarian issurely admits "one that Yet, For, grounds. such reasoning wrong. Sartorius canofcourse think specific in of instanceswhich interferencewould ... governmental havegoodconsequences". he is sincere this If in then the admission, surely obvious should allowed. willhaveto setup goodsafeguards prevent be We to exceptions no unless interferences interferences, allowing interferences such are, improper e.g. "ofcourse" With there be effect" justified. adequate safeguards, would no" "chilling ingeneral... stemming [a]fear the from that power would abused".24 be Wenote Sartoriusnot that is presenting same of as the sort position Haredoes. Hare claims that it for to casesinwhich, instance, although is logically possible imagine
21 22 23

A System Bk. ofLogic, 6,Ch. 12,Sec. 3, ?3.

60-1. ibid.,pp.

RolfSartorius, Individual Conduct SocialNorms, and (California, 1975),p. 119.

24

Sartorius, cit., 154. op. p.

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For to torture would be justified, oughtto prohibit torture. we are too likely we all if at torture Hare is denying inreality, will there that, wrongly we allowanytorture all.25 the to Our is be cases inwhich, course, prisoner of ought be tortured. judgment tooeasily us of cloudedfor tobe certain ourownobjectivity. in Had Sartorius beeninterested saying blanket that are prohibitions acceptmerely havethedegreeofcertainty for able because we never activities required certain (e.g. or of would then interference), hisclaims particular types government torturing other not be paradoxical.The paradoxariseswhenhe saysthatthereare cases in which that interference ofcourse is i.e. and justified, we know it is justified, yet government the is nonetheless interference oughtnotoccur.Evenwhenour judgment goodand of and reliable,we stillmustdenythe dictates our judgment prohibit government interference. thanHare's. If man wereto claim is muchstronger We notice thatSartorius's and to becomeable tomakeobjective, reliable evaluations during even times progress of stress, of torture. thenHare wouldhaveto allowoccasional instances government to such government activities. Sartoriuswould stillbe claiming prohibit (For, even i.e. which interferences which ofcoursejustified, eveninterferences areobjectively are justified, be prohibited.) may the involved. For if government Sartoriusseems to have miscalculated utilities one had takenintoaccountthe disutility maximizes interference (even after utility of then increased by feelings insecurity), theinterference promoted (evenunwarranted) an cannot justified be without act-utilitarian frameis justified. Absolute prohibitions work(at least,notin thewaythat Sartorius explains). is He Mill clearlybelievesthatthe preservation individual of liberty important. in thatliberty shouldbe preserved because there utility doingso is thinks, however, in "theemphasis Mill'sjustificationfreedom, of is notesthat correctly (p. 16). Cowling on nor manmay haveinitsnatural neither itsintrinsic belief rightness, goodness on any than one to that individual more is buton thefact a free likely anunfree tocontributethe Mill principle. highercultivation".25 pointsout thattherecan be onlyone ultimate course action of in there wouldbe no waytodecidewhich Otherwise, cases ofconflict, of to take.That principle thePrinciple Utility, which facets Lifeshould of all is be by is within Mill's utilitarianismthatnonjudged.26The only"absoluteprohibition" actions maynotbe performed. utility-maximizing to for that Yet Ten is correct chastise Cowling implying Millwas illiberal. Ten and in of Nor to primacy theprinciple liberty. couldMill Grayarebothincorrect attributing ever accept Sartorius'ssuggestion thatappeals to the ultimate (i.e. the principle of could be barred wherecircumstances suchan appeal(i.e. permit principle utility) wherethereis sufficient and objectivity makea decision).If,somehow, time to the that principle of of and wereto conflict, wouldassert Mill the principles liberty utility conflicts between must upheld.His genius inshowing apparent be utility lay why utility as of is due and liberty werenotreal.His greatness a defender liberty precisely tohis to be on must protected utilitarian grounds. liberty ability showwhy that mustbe valuedaboveall Had Mill been someonewhosimply asserted liberty would simply (and manynon-libertarians) else, then utilitarians rejecthis basic who the of of he However, speaksas a utilitarian admits primacy theprinciple principle. for but and of argueseloquently convincingly thepreservation utility, whononetheless liberty. Illinois StateUniversity 25 andReason R. M. Hare, Freedom (Oxford, 1963), 43-44. pp. 27 26 A SystemLogic, 6,Ch. 12,Sec. 7,?4. Bk. Cowling, cit., 41. of op. p.