the victim of child abuse. Marsh’s conviction was set asideand he was released.After his release, Marsh sued the County of San Diego andthe medical personnel who conducted Phillip’s autopsy. Dur-ing this proceeding, Marsh’s attorneys deposed Jay S.Coulter, the San Diego Deputy District Attorney who hadprosecuted Marsh for murder in 1983. Coulter disclosed that,while he was Deputy District Attorney, he photocopied six-teen autopsy photographs of Phillip’s corpse. Coulter alsomentioned that, after he retired, he kept one of these as a “me-mento of cases that I handled.” Coulter eventually gave acopy of this photograph, along with a memorandum he wrotetitled “What Really Happened to Phillip Buell?”, to a newspa-per and a television station.Brenda Marsh sued Coulter and the County of San Diegounder 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the copying and dissemi-nation of Phillip’s autopsy photographs violated her Four-teenth Amendment Due Process rights. Defendants moved todismiss the claims relating to Coulter’s conduct after heretired, which the district court granted. The parties thencross-moved for summary judgment, which the district courtgranted in favor of defendants. Marsh appeals. We review denovo.
City of Oakland
, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9thCir. 2001) (motion to dismiss);
Deloitte, Haskins &Sells
, 921 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment).II. ANALYSISTo prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must provethat he was “deprived of a right secured by the Constitutionor laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivationwas committed under color of state law.”
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins.Co.
, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). A plaintiff mustalso show that the federal right was “clearly established” atthe time of the violation, otherwise government officials are