Professional Documents
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POLITICAL LAW
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JUDGE FRANCISCO IBAY v. VIRGINIA LIM A.M. No. P-99-1309, September 11, 2000
Facts: Judge Ibay charged Virginia Lim, Stenographic Reporter, with serious neglect of duty and grave misconduct. Judge recommends that Lim be dismissed from service by reason of the following: 1. For conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (libel) against another judge; 2. For gross neglect of duty (failure to transcribe the stenographic notes of 31 proceedings in 18 inherited cases) 3. For grave misconduct (refusal to transcribe the stenographic notes) 4. For flagrant violation of an Administrative Circular (Lim traveled abroad despite her heavy backlog) The consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent Lim be dismissed from the service. The OCA adopted said recommendation. Issue: Whether respondent should be dismissed from service by reason of her conviction in the said charges. Held: She should be dismissed. No less than the Constitution mandates that all public officers and employees should serve with responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Indeed, public office is a public trust. In the case at bar, respondent Lim's performance as a court employee is clearly wanting. It is evident from the record that she has shown herself to be less than zealous in the performance of the duties of her office which demands utmost dedication and efficiency. Her lackadaisical attitude betrays her inefficiency and incompetence and amounts to gross misconduct. Respondent's unfitness for public service is further bolstered by her failure to manifest to his superior, herein complainant Judge Ibay, utmost respect and obedience to the latter's orders and instructions issued pursuant to the duties of the office the Judge holds by disregarding the latter's orders to transcribe the long-pending stenographic notes and choosing instead to go on leave, even when her application for leave has not been approved. This improper behavior of respondent betrays her abominable disrespect to the court itself. Such a demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official and employee. Respondent Lim failed to realize that the performance of her duties are essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice. Not only does her neglect delay the administration of justice; it also erodes public faith in the judiciary. Thus, there is no room in the court or government for that matter for respondent Lim's kind of an employee. All the foregoing considered, respondent must be meted the maximum penalty because all involved in the dispensation of justice must live up to the strictest standard of integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty and diligence in the public service. WHEREFORE, respondent Virginia G. Lim is found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, violation of administrative circulars of the Supreme Court and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and she is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
GAMINDE vs. COA G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000 Facts:
In 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. In her appointment paper, her term was supposed to expire on February 2, 1999. On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, opined that it would expire on February 02, 2000. Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, CSC Chairman de Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent. Correspondingly the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff were disallowed.
BASHER vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 139028 April 12, 2000
Facts: Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador Basher and Private Respondent Abulkair Ampatua were both candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur during the May 12, 1997 barangay election. The election was declared a failure and a special one was set for June 12, 1997. Again, the election failed and was reset to August 30, 1997. According to the Comelec, the voting started only around 9:00 p.m. on August 30, 1997 because of the prevailing tension in the said locality. Election Officer Diana Datu-Imam reported that she was allegedly advised by some religious leaders not to proceed with the election because "it might trigger bloodshed." She also claimed that the town mayor, "being too hysterical, yelled and threatened me to declare [a] failure of election in Maidan." Subsequently, the armed followers of the mayor pointed their guns at her and her military escorts, who responded in like manner towards the former. The parties were then pacified at the PNP headquarters. With the arrival of additional troops, the election officer proceeded to Maidan to conduct the election starting at 9:00 p.m. until the early morning of the following day. The holding of the election at that particular time was allegedly announced "over the mosque." The tally sheet for the said "election" showed the following results: private respondent 250 votes; petitioner 15 votes; and Baulo Abdul Razul, a third candidate 10 votes. Private respondent was proclaimed winner.
Dissenting Opinion
DE LEON, JR., J.
Respondent PAGCOR maintains that petitioners have no standing to file a taxpayer's suit since there is no showing that these cases involve expenditure of public funds. In Kilosbayan Incorporated vs. Morato, we have categorically stated that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators, as such, may bring suit only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions. Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional. Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of transcendental importance which must be settled early. While herein petitioners and intervenor claim illegal disbursement of public funds by PAGCOR in the resumption of the operations of jai alai games, there is nothing on record to show involvement of any expenditure of public money on the part of PAGCOR. In fact, what is essentially raised as an issue is whether PAGCOR has the requisite franchise to operate jai alai games and whether it is authorized under its charter to enter into joint venture agreements with private corporations. More specifically, under the joint venture Agreement dated June 17, 1999 3 it is private respondent corporations BELLE and FILGAME which will provide infrastructure facilities to PAGCOR on a rent free basis. I cannot see how the Court could treat the subject petitions as taxpayers' suits when there is nothing, apart from petitioners' bare allegations, to prove that the operations of jai alai would involve expenditure of public
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LABOR LAW
ABASOLO et.al. vs. NLRC G. R. No. 118475, November 29, 2000
Facts: Petitioners have been under the employ of LUTORCO for several years their employment was abruptly interrupted when TABACALERA took over LUTORCOS operations. Petitioners were caught unaware of the sudden change of ownership and its effect on the status of their employment due to the closure of LUTORCO as a result of the sale and turnover to TABACALERA. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint finding that petitioners are not entitled to the benefits under Article 283 of the Labor Code since LUTORCO ceased to operate due to serious business losses and, furthermore, TABACALERA has assumed the sonority rights of the petitioners and other employment liabilities of LUTORCO. Affirming the dismissal of the complaints, the NLRC held that petitioners are not entitled to the protection of Art. 283 of the Labor Code since there was no closure of establishment or termination of services to speak of. It declared that there was no dismissal but a non-hiring due mainly to [petitioners] own violation . Moreover, the benefits of Art. 283 apply only to regular employees, not seasonal workers like petitioners. Issues: 1. Whether or not Article 283 of the Labor Code is applicable 2. Whether petitioners are regular employees, as defined by law
Held: 1. The employment of petitioners with respondent LUTORCO was technically terminated when TABACALERA took over the formers tobacco-redrying operations in 1993. The records speak of a sale to TABACALERA in 1993 under conditions evidently so concealed that petitioners were not formally notified of the impending sale of LUTORCOs tobacco re-drying operations to TABACALERA and its attendant consequences with respect to their continued employment status under TABACALERA. They came to know of the fact of that sale only when TABACALERA took over the said tobacco re-dying operations.
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Termination of Employment; Loss of Trust and Confidence NOKOM v. NLRC G.R. No. 140043, July 18, 2000
Facts: Carmelita Nokom was employed as a manager by Rentokil for its Healthcare Division. Later, Rentokils officers received information that fictitious invoices were sent to Rentokils clients whose contracts have already been terminated. The fictitious invoices were allegedly made to inflate the gross revenues of said Division to make up for the shortfall in its target revenues. Initial findings showed that Nokom was involved in the anomaly so she was placed on preventive suspension. Thereafter, Nokom admitted the irregularities and, in her written explanation, she said that she had no explanation and that she was leaving her fate up to management. During the hearing conducted by Rentokil management, Nokom failed to appear despite notice. . After the investigation, it was found out that Nokom was aware, tolerated and in fact participated in the production of fictitious invoices. Thus, Nokoms employment was terminated. Nokom filed a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries against Rentokil before the Labor Arbiter and prayed for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and attorneys fees. LA ruled in favor of Nokom. On appeal, NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA. CA affirmed the NLRC decision holding that Nokom was legally dismissed for loss of confidence. Issue: 1. Whether the acts of Nokom constitute willful breach of trust that will justify her dismissal. 2. Whether she was afforded due process. Held: The dismissal is legal. To constitute a valid dismissal, two requisites must concur, namely: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided for in Article 282 of the Labor Code and (b) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and defend himself. 1. In the case at bar, Nokoms position demands a high degree of responsibility that necessarily includes unearthing of fraudulent and irregular activities. Nokoms failure to detect and report to Rentokil the fraudulent activities in her division as well as her failure to give a satisfactory explanation on the existence of the said irregularities constitute "fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on her by her employer or duly authorized representative" one of the just causes in terminating employment as provided for by paragraph c, Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended. Concomitantly, petitioner's actuations betrayed the utmost trust and confidence reposed on her by the respondent company. We cannot, therefore, compel Rentokil to retain the employment of herein petitioner who is shown to be lacking in candor, honesty and efficiency required of her position. Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee and proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct is not required to dismiss him on this charge. It is enough that there be 'some basis' for such loss of confidence, or that
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Termination of Employment; Management Prerogative LEONARDO et.al. vs. NLRC GR NO.125303, JUNE 16,2000
Facts: Aurelio Fuerte was originally employed by defendant REYNALDO'S MARKETING CORPORATION as a muffler specialist, receiving P45.00 per day. He was later appointed as supervisor with an increased compensation of P122.00 a day. On the other hand, Danilo Leonardo was hired by defendant as an auto-aircon mechanic at a salary rate of P35.00 per day. His pay was increased to P90.00 a day when he attained regular status six months later. Fuerte alleges that he was he was informed by the company's personnel manager that he would be transferred to its Sucat plant due to his failure to meet his sales quota, and for that reason, his supervisor's allowance would be withdrawn. For a short time, complainant reported for work at the Sucat plant; however, he protested his transfer, subsequently filing a complaint for illegal termination. On his part, Leonardo alleges that he was also approached by the same personnel manager who informed him that his services were no longer needed. He, too, filed a complaint for illegal termination. Issue: Whether the dismissal based on the failure to meet the sales quota is legal. Held: The practice of a company in laying off workers because they failed to make the work quota has been recognized in this jurisdiction. (Philippine American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and Garment Workers, 26 SCRA 634, 639). In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the permanent or probationary status of their employment. Failure to observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal. Such inefficiency is understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. This management prerogative of requiring standards may be availed of so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest.
Termination of Employment; Management Prerogative APARENTE vs. NLRC G.R. No. 117652, April 27, 2000
Facts: Petitioner was an employee by private respondent corporation until he was terminated for alleged violation of company rules and regulations, which was premised from the fact that, sometime prior his termination, petitioner while driving without drivers license sideswiped a ten-year old girl using the companys truck. Hospital expenses was shouldered by the company but was not reimbursed by the insurance company. Thereafter, private respondent conducted an investigation of the incident where petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and to defend himself, and in result thereof, petitioner was dismissed from employment for having violated the company rules and regulations for blatant disregard of established control procedures resulting in company damages of considerable amount. Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a case for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.
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Held: The dismissal is valid. Petitioners dismissal was justified by the companys rules and regulations. It is recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended, unilaterally or preferably through negotiation, by competent authority. The Court has upheld a company's management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. Also, under the Labor Code, in order that an employer may dismiss an employee on the ground of willful disobedience, there must be concurrence of at least two requisites: the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Which are present in this case, as evidenced by the willful act of petitioner in driving without a valid driver's license, which is a clear violation of the companys rules and regulations.
Right of Self-Organization; Coverage PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAGUESMA G.R. No. 101738, April 12, 2000
Facts: Complainant Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) is engaged in the manufacture of paper and timber products. It has over 9,000 employees, 944 of whom are supervisory and technical staff employees. More or less 487 of these supervisory and technical staff employees are signatory members of the private respondent PICOP-Bislig Supervisory and Technical Staff Employees Union (PBSTSEU). On August 9, 1989. PBSTSEU instituted a Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP for collective bargaining agreement (CBA) purposes. The Secretary of the Labor issued a Resolution which upheld the Med-Arbiter's Order dated September 17, 1989, with modification allowing the supervising and staff employees in Cebu, Davao and Iligan City to participate in the certification election. During the pre-election conference on January 18, 1990, PICOP questioned and objected to the inclusion of some section heads and supervisors in the list of voters whose positions it averred were reclassified as managerial employees in the light of the reorganization effected by it. Following the submission by the parties of their respective position papers and evidence on this issue, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order, holding that supervisors and section heads of the complainant are managerial employees and therefore excluded from the list of voters for purposes of certification election. Issue: Whether the managerial employees are disqualified from joining or forming a union represented by co-respondent PBSTSEU, in view of a supervening event brought about by the changes in the organizational structure. Held: They are disqualified. In United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, we had occasion to elucidate on the term "managerial employees." Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies while the task of First-Line Managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization. Under this distinction, "managerial employees" therefore fall in two (2) categories, namely, the "managers" per se composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the "supervisors" composed of First-Line Managers. Thus, the mere fact that an employee is designated manager" does not ipso facto make him one. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, for it is the job description that determines the nature of employment.
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Termination of Employment; Management Prerogative OSS SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC. VS. NLRC 325 SCRA 157 G.R. NO. 112752 FEB. 9, 2000
Facts: Private Respondent Eden Legaspi worked as a lady security guard of OSS Security Agency from June 16, 1985 to January 16, 1986. On January 17, 1986 petitioner Vasquez acquired the assets and properties of OSS Security Agency and absorbed some of its personnel, including Legaspi. She was assigned to render security services at the VM condominium in Makati. In a memorandum addressed to petitioners company president, the building administrator of said condominium complained of the laxity of the guard in enforcing security measures. He requested to reorganize their guards assigned to the building. In compliance therewith, petitioner reassigned Legaspi and another lady security guard to other units or detachments where vacancy exists. Then again, Legaspi was reassigned to another company in Rizal. However, she did not report for duty at her new assignment. Legaspi filed her complaint for underpayment and constructive dismissed. The Labor arbiter rendered his decision declaring that Legaspis transfer was not sanctioned by law, hence illegal and tantamount to unjust dismissal. Private respondent appealed the decision to the NLRC who affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the LAs ruling that the transfer of assignment of Legaspi by petitioner was illegal tantamount to unjust dismissal Held: The transfer of an employee ordinarily is within the ambit of management prerogatives. However, a transfer amounts to a constructive dismissal when the transfer is unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, and it involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privilege. In the case at bar, nowhere in the record does it show that the transfer of OSS Security was anything but done in good faith, without grave abuse of discretion and in the best interest of the business. No Malice should be imputed form the fact that Legaspi was relieved of her assignment and, a day later, assigned a new post. When security guard is placed offdetail or on floating status, in security agency parlance, it means waiting to be posted, Legaspi has not even been off detail for a week when she filed her complaint. OSS Security, also proved that such transfer was effected in good faith to comply with the reasonable request of its client. Thus, there was no basis to order reinstatement and back wage inasmuch as Legaspi was not constructively dismissed. Neither is she entitled to the award of money claim for underpayment.
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CIVIL LAW
Partnership; Evidence HEIRS OF TAN ENG KEE vs. CA
Facts: Tan Eng Kee died September 13, 1984. His heirs filed suit against the decedent's brother Tan Eng Lay for accounting, liquidation and winding up of the alleged partnership formed after World War II between Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay. Allegedly, after the second World War, Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay, pooled their resources and industry together, entered into a partnership engaged in the business of selling lumber and hardware and construction supplies. They named their enterprise "Benguet Lumber" which they jointly managed until Tan Eng Kee's death. Petitioners claim that in 1981, Tan Eng Lay and his children caused the conversion of the partnership "Benguet Lumber" into a corporation called "Benguet Lumber Company", purportedly to deprive Tan Eng Kee and his heirs of their rightful participation in the profits of the business. The RTC declaring that Benguet Lumber as a joint venture akin to a particular partnership. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. Hence, the present petition. Issue: Whether Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay were partners in Benguet Lumber.
Held: In order to constitute a partnership, it must be established that (1) two or more persons bound themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, and (2) they intend to divide the profits among themselves. The agreement need not be formally reduced into writing, since statute allows the oral constitution of a partnership, save in two instances: (1) when immovable property or real rights are contributed, and (2) when the partnership has a capital of three thousand pesos or more. In both cases, a public instrument is required. An inventory to be signed by the parties and attached to the public instrument is also indispensable to the validity of the partnership whenever immovable property is contributed to the partnership. Undoubtedly, the best evidence would have been the contract of partnership itself, or the articles of partnership but there is none. Thus, we are asked to determine whether a partnership existed based purely on circumstantial evidence. A review of the record persuades us that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the decision of the trial court. The evidence presented by petitioners falls short of the quantum of proof required to establish a partnership. Petitioners failed to prove that Kee contributed his resources to a common fund for the purpose of establishing a partnership. Furthermore, despite the forty years the partnership was allegedly in existence, Kee never asked for an accounting. The essence of a partnership is that the partners share in the profits and losses. A demand for periodic accounting is evidence of a partnership. Petitioners failed to show how much their father received, if any, as his share in the profits of Benguet Lumber Company for any particular period. Hence, they failed to prove that Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay intended to divide the profits of the business between themselves, which is one of the essential features of a partnership. Hence, the Supreme Court found that Kee was only an employee, not a partner. Nevertheless, petitioners would still want us to infer or believe the alleged existence of a partnership from this set of circumstances: that Tan Eng Lay and Tan Eng Kee were commanding the employees; that both were supervising the employees; that both were the ones who determined the price at which the stocks were to be sold; and that both placed orders to the suppliers of the Benguet Lumber Company. They also point out that the families of the brothers Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay lived at the Benguet Lumber Company compound, a privilege not extended to its ordinary employees. Where circumstances taken singly may be inadequate to prove the intent to form a partnership, nevertheless, the collective effect of these circumstances may be such as to support a finding of the existence of the parties' intent. In the case at bench, even the aforesaid circumstances when taken together are not persuasive indicia of a partnership.
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Mortgage; Accomodation Mortgagor; Redemption Price SPOUSES BELO vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and SPOUSES ESLABON G.R. No. 134330, March 1, 2001
Facts: Eduarda Belo owned an agricultural land. She leased a portion of the said tract of land to respondents spouses Marcos and Arsenia Eslabon in connection with the said spouses' sugar plantation business.The Eslabons obtained a loan from respondent PNB secured by a real estate mortgage on their own four residential houses, as well as on the agricultural land. The assent of Eduarda to the mortgage was acquired through a special power of attorney which she executed in favor of respondent Marcos Eslabon. Spouses Eslabon failed to pay their loan obligation, thus, extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged properties were instituted by PNB. At the auction sale on June 10, 1991, PNB was the highest bidder of the foreclosed properties. PNB appraised Eduarda of the sale at public auction of her land as well as the registration of the Certificate of Sheriff's Sale in its favor, and the one-year period to redeem the land.
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Held: By law, the vendee is bound to accept the delivery and to pay the price of the thing sold at the time and place stipulated in the contract. In the case at bench, petitioner's obligation to pay arose as soon as the deed of sale was registered and a clean title was issued. However, petitioner justifies non-payment on respondents' breach of several stipulations in the contract. We have examined these alleged violations vis-avis the pertinent provisions of the deed of sale, keeping in mind that only a substantial breach of the terms and conditions thereof will warrant rescission. Whether a breach is substantial is largely determined by the attendant circumstances. Petitioner's argument was that it was not obliged to pay until respondents compact the lots. Taking into account the facts of the case, we find that particular argument of petitioner to be well-taken. The use to which the parcels of land was to be devoted was no secret between the parties. The consolidated estate, which incorporated the lots sold by respondents to petitioner, was intended as the site of petitioner's regional office. The project had its peculiar requirements, not the least of which was that since a substantial edifice was to be built on the property, the site had to be made suitable for the purpose. Thus, petitioner specified that the lots be filled up in the manner specified in paragraph 4 of the contract. The importance thereof could not have been lost on respondents. Evidently then, respondents were guilty of non-performance of said stipulation. The deed of sale expressly stipulated that the vendors were to undertake the filling. This was to be accomplished upon the signing of the contract and insofar as petitioner was concerned, respondents obligation was demandable at once. Respondents should not be allowed to rescind the contract where they themselves did not perform their essential obligation thereunder. It should be emphasized that a contract of sale involves reciprocity between the parties. Since respondents were in bad faith, they may not seek the rescission of the agreement they themselves breached.
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Sales; Inadequacy of the Price ABAPO vs. CA G.R. No. 128677, March 2, 2000
Facts: The late spouses Victoriano and Placida Abapo owned a parcel of land in Cebu. Of the 5 children the spouses left behind, only Santiago Abapo and Crispula Abapo-Bacalso have heirs who are currently the antagonists in this case. In 1967, Santiago and Crispula executed a deed of sale under pacto de retro on the land in favor of Teodulfo Quimada. The land was sold for P500 with right to repurchase within 5 years failing which the conveyance would become absolute and irrevocable without the necessity of drawing up a new deed. No redemption was done within the 5 year period. More than 7 years later, Quimada through a notarized deed of absolute sale sold the land to Crispula and her husband for P500. Since then until their death, the spouses Bacalso had possession, enjoyed the fruits of the land and paid the real estate taxes to the exclusion of Santiago. On Feb 1990, the heirs of Crispula executed an "extrajudicial declaration of heirs" and allotted unto themselves the land. On April 1990, Santiago instituted a petition for reconstitution of the original certificate of title over the land in the name of his father Victoriano. It was granted. Upon discovery of the said reconstitution of title, Crispula's heirs interposed a petition to surrender owner's copy of the reconstituted OCT in the hands of Santiago. The trial court denied such petition. Thus Crispula's heirs instituted a complaint for "Quieting of Title with Damages" against Santiago. Santiago assailed the due execution of both the deed of sale under pacto de retro and the deed of absolute sale. He vehemently swore that he never sold in 1967 his interest in the land. Issue: 1.Whether the deed of sale under pacto de retro is an equitable mortgage in view of the unusually inadequate consideration of P500. 2. Whether the deed of absolute sale is illegal and void. Held: 1. The price of P500 is not unusually inadequate. The extant record reveals that the assessed value of the land in 1970 was only P400. Thus, at the time of the sale in 1967 the price of P500 is undisputably over and above the assessed value of P400. Besides, the mere fact that the price is inadequate does not support the conclusion that the contract was a loan or that the property was not at all sold to Quimada. The price fixed in a sale with right to repurchase is not necessarily the true value of the land sold. The rationale is that the vendor has the right to repurchase the land. It is the practice to fix a relatively reduced price, although not a grossly inadequate one, in order to afford the vendor a retro every facility to redeem the land. Thus inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set aside a sale unless it is grossly inadequate or purely shocking to the conscience. 2. The deed of absolute sale having been executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public is a public document. As such, they are evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. They have the presumption of regularity, which Santiago failed to overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence.
Property; Extrajudicial Partition; Builder in Good Faith KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000
Facts: During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, owner of the land in dispute, his halfbrother, Feliciano Pada obtained permission from him to build a house on the disputed land. When Feliciano died, his son survived him, who was in turn survived by his sons daughter, the petitioner herein.
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Held: 1. The extrajudicial partition is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims and to serve as constructive notice to others. Thus, the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, noncompliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. The 1951 extrajudicial partition being legal and effective as among his heirs, there was a valid transfer of ownership rights over the involved property. 2. Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is wellsettled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. As such, petitioners cannot be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.
CRIMINAL LAW
PEOPLE v. CANONIGO G.R. No. 133649 August 4, 2000
Facts: Canonigo was 18 years old when he raped Carla Malanay, then under 12 yrs of age, in front of her sister (aged 5). In the information filed against him, it was stated that the victim was 12 years of age. However, it was not alleged that the crime of rape was committed in full view of a relative within the 3rd degree of consanguinity.. Nonetheless, the RTC found Canonigo guilty of the crime of statutory rape and sentenced him to death. From this decision, Canonigo appealed. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty since the information filed against the accused did not allege the qualifying circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of a relative within the third degree of consanguinity of the victim. Held: Yes. Canonigo should only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 21
PEOPLE vs. RIGLOS and RIGLOS G.R. No. 134763, September 4, 2000
Facts: Camilo Valdez was sitting at the terrace of house when respondent Lamberto Riglos arrived. Lamberto asked money from Camilo but the latter refused, and instead, told him to go home. Suddenly, Lamberto slapped Camilo on the face several times, which caused the latter to push Lamberto away. Lamberto then pulled Camilo's hand and the latter fell to the ground. Swiftly, Lamberto drew a .38 caliber gun from his waist and shot Camilo. The first shot missed Camilo. Lamberto fired a second shot hitting Camilo on the chest.. Camilo managed to slowly enter the house and proceed to their room while Lamberto just stayed at the terrace After the first shot, respondent Wilfredo, who was at a neighbor's house proceeded to the residence of Camilo. Then Wilfredo went to where Lamberto was and said: "Let us get inside and kill him, brother." The two entered the house and went to the bedroom. Upon seeing the wounded Camilo sitting on the bed, Lamberto and Wilfredo shot him several times. They trial court convicted the respondent of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and dwelling and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Respondent appealed contending that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength are absent, since the act of aggression was preceded by a violent quarrel between him and the victim. Issue: 1. Whether the appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of treachery was proper. 2. Whether the appreciation of abuse of superior strength was proper. Held: 1. In the instant case, there are two stages of the act of aggression committed against the victim. The first one was preceded by a heated argument when the victim refused to give money to accused Lamberto, which led the latter to shoot the victim on the chest. The aggression against the victim, Camilo, had already ceased when after the second shot that hit him on the chest, he slowly retreated to the bedroom in their house. However, the subsequent act was definitely treacherous. Upon the arrival of accusedappellant Wilfredo, he uttered these words to Lamberto, "Let us get inside and kill him, brother", and then they immediately went inside the victim's house, and at the entrance of the door leading to the couple's bedroom, they saw the wounded Camilo sitting on the bed and shot him several times. The attack was a total surprise to the victim as he did not expect any from accused-appellant Wilfredo with whom he had no quarrel. Furthermore, the suddenness of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself. The victim was totally defenseless when both accused attacked him. Treachery
22
Held: The trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death on the respondent. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides: xxx xxx xxx The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. . . . The attendant circumstances enumerated partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances since the same are punishable by the single indivisible penalty of death and not reclusion perpetua to death. It has been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances. Due to the absence of allegation in each of the criminal complaints in these cases that the private complainant was a minor, the respondent can be held liable for three (3) counts of simple rape only and for which the impossible penalty is reclusion perpetua. Incomplete Self Defense
23
Malversation of Public Funds ESTRELLA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN GR No. 125160 June 20, 2000
Facts: On July 1, 1975, petitioner was appointed as Municipal Cashier 2 in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, with a bond in the amount of P28,000.00. 3 Per Audit Assignment Order No. LGAD 86-1 dated January 28, 1986 issued by the Commission on Audit (COA), Regional Office XII, he was audited of his cash and accounts for the period from March 18 to 24, 1986 only. 4 For reasons unknown, the cash and accounts of the petitioner were not audited for the period from July 1, 1975, the date of his appointment, up to March 17, 1986. All in all, petitioner received cash advances totalling P249,829.25. Of the P249,829.25, petitioner was able to liquidate on November 20, 1985 the amount of P29,083.57 18 only. The amount of P2,395.69 resulting from the liquidation of petitioner's cash collections was added to P29,083.57, thus, petitioner's accountability was reduced to P218,349.99. After establishing the amount of the shortage as reflected in Exhibit "D", the OIC Municipal Treasurer submitted his progress report demonstrating further restitution of petitioner's disallowed cash advances and vouchers in the amount of P14,406.00 and P12,303.00 or a total of P26,709.00, 26 thereby further reducing his liability to P191,640.99. While petitioner admitted his accountability to be only P64,538.95, he doubted the accuracy of the said amount for the reason that in his perception, his liability was allegedly between P30,000.00 and P40,000.00 only. 27 Resultantly, petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds in the Information filed with respondent Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision convicting petitioner. There being no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court imposes on the accused the indeterminate penalty from TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of reclusion temporal as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum, the fine equal to TWO HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY NINE PESOS AND NINETY-NINE CENTAVOS (P218,349.99), the amount malversed, and perpetual special disqualification. 30 Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Held: Yes. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code holds liable for malversation a public officer who shall appropriate public funds or property for which he is accountable, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property. Furthermore, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. The elements of malversation of public funds are (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he had custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of
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REMEDIAL LAW
Civil Procedure; Amendment to Conform to Evidence MAUNLAD SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NUBLA G.R. No. 114942, November 27, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner instituted a complaint for a sum of money against private respondent Nubla and his brother on the basis of a promissory note allegedly executed by them to secure a loan, which they failed to pay, and continuously defaulted. In their Answer the defendants admitted that they executed the promissory note but denied any liability thereunder, alleging that they did not receive any value out of the transaction nor did the said document reflect the real agreement between the parties. However, the said Answer was not under oath. Maunlad Savings presented its evidence relying on the admission by the Nublas of the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory note, inasmuch as their Answer was not under oath as required by Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Subsequently, Nubla testified that the loan documents and the promissory note did not embody the real agreement of the parties because they signed blank documents on the understanding that they were signing as mere representatives of Ever-Rise, and not in their personal capacity. The petitioner raised no objection. The Nublas filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer citing Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which allows the amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidence. Petitioner filed its opposition to the said motion. Both motions were denied ratiocinating that the proposed amendment in the amended answer will ultimately change or alter the theory of the defense and thus cannot be allowed under Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether the amended answer of herein respondent, made after the presentation of evidence can be admitted, thus altering the theory of the case to the prejudice of the petitioner. 2. Whether the objection was timely made. HELD: 1. Under Sec. 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, when the cause of action is anchored on a document, the genuineness or due execution of the said document shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless the defendant, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts. Said rule should be read in conjunction with Sec. 9 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which provides, in substance, that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing they have made such writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived or abandoned, unless he puts in issue that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not
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Civil Procedure; Service of Summons BANCO DO BRASIL vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. Nos. 121576-78, June 16, 2000
Facts: An abandoned vessel was seized by the Bureau of Customs. Prior to the seizure, its authorized representative had entered into a salvage agreement with private respondent URBINO to secure and repair the vessel. To enforce its preferred salvors lien, URBINO filed with the RTC of Manila a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the seizure. Private respondent amended its petition to include Banco Do Brasil as defendant being one of the claimants of the vessel. Upon motion of the private respondent, the trial court allowed summons by publication to be served upon defendants who were not residents and had no direct representative in the country. Private respondent testified during the presentation of evidence that, for being a nuisance defendant, petitioner caused irreparable damage to private respondent in the amount of $300,000. The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondent and awarded the damage sought. The petitioner questioned its liability for damages, on the ground that there was no valid service of summons as service was on the wrong party the ambassador of Brazil. Hence, it argued, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner. Petitioner now contends that the action filed against it is an action for damages, as such it is an action in personam which requires personal service of summons. Issue: Whether a valid service of summons was made upon the petitioner.
Held: It is invalid. When a defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially. However, extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem. This is so inasmuch as, in such actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. However, where the action is in personam jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary. When the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. It must be stressed that any relief granted in rem or quasi in rem actions must be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against the defendant. Clearly, the publication of summons effected by private respondent is invalid and ineffective for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, since by seeking to recover damages from petitioner, private respondents action became in personam. Bearing in mind the in personam nature of the action, personal or, if not
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Civil Procedure; Compromise CALLA vs. MAGLALANG G.R. No. 140276, February 9, 2000
Facts: Through the years, petitioners' occupancy and possession of their respective residential units were in the concept of an owners pursuant to the agreement, albeit verbal, that they had with Felipe Maglalang that their monthly payments shall be treated and considered as installment payments for the purchase of said units. When Felipe Maglalang died, herein petitioners continued to pay their monthly installments to the herein respondent, being one of the successors-in-interest of the late Felipe Maglalang. Subsequently, complaints for ejectment were filed allegedly by the respondent against each of the petitioners. When the case reached the Supreme Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, which states in part: COMPROMISE AGREEMENT "In compliance with the oral agreement made between the herein petitioners and the respondent's deceased father during his lifetime, the latter agrees to relinquish and forever waives all his rights and interests including that of his siblings over the residential houses/units and presently occupied by the petitioners. "All their payments made in the past for more than twenty five (25) years shall be considered as installment payments and in full satisfaction of the purchase price thereof; xxx xxx xxx "Respondent undertakes not to disturb or interfere with the petitioners' actual occupation/possession of the subject residential houses/units. "That PARTIES forever waive all their causes of action against each other and consider the Judgment/Resolution/Order to be issued on this Compromise Agreement as final and executory. Issue: Whether the Compromise Agreement is legally acceptable. Held: The said Compromise Agreement is legally acceptable as nothing therein is contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy, and the same having been freely and intelligently executed by and between petitioners and respondent, judicial approval thereof is in order.
Criminal Procedure; Arrests CUEVAS vs. MUOZ G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000
Facts: On Aug 23, 1997, the Hong Kong Magistrate's Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a warrant for the arrest of respondent for seven (7) counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud. On Sept 13, 1999, the Philippine Dept. of Justice (RP DOJ) received a request for the provisional arrest of the respondent from the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law Division of the Hong Kong Dept. of Justice (HK DOJ) pursuant to Article 11(1) of the Agreement Between The Govt Of RP And The Govt Of Hong Kong For The Surrender Of Accused And Convicted Persons" (RP-HK Extradition Agreement). The RP DOJ forwarded the request for provisional arrest to the Anti-Graft Division of the NBI. On Sept 17, 1999, for and in behalf of the Govt of Hong Kong, the NBI filed an application for the provisional arrest of respondent with the RTC of Manila, which granted the application and issued the corresponding Order of Arrest. Respondent was arrested and detained at the NBI detention cell.
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The Order of Arrest is valid. First. There was urgency for the provisional arrest of the respondent. Section 20(a) of P.D. No. 1069 reads as follows:
Provisional Arrest (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition made in accordance with Section 4 of this Decree xxx.
At the time the request for provisional arrest was made, respondent's pending application for the discharge of a restraint order over certain assets held in relation to the offenses charged, was set to be heard by the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong on Sept 17, 1999. The HK DOJ was concerned that the pending request for the extradition of the respondent would be disclosed to the latter during the said proceedings, and would motivate respondent to flee the Philippines before the request could be made. Also, considering the charges against the respondent, for each count of which, if found guilty, he may be punished with seven (7) and fourteen (14) years imprisonment, respectively. Undoubtedly, the gravity of the imposable penalty is a factor to consider in determining the likelihood that the accused will abscond if allowed provisional liberty. It is, after all, but human to fear a lengthy, if not a lifetime, incarceration. Furthermore, it has also not escaped the attention of this Court that respondent appears to be affluent and possessed of sufficient resources to facilitate an escape from this jurisdiction. Second. The request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents are valid despite lack of authentication. There is no requirement under PD No. 1069 and in the RP-HK Extradition Agreement for the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and its accompanying documents. Last. There was sufficient factual and legal basis for the determination of probable cause as a requisite for the issuance of the Order of Arrest. We have defined probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as "the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested." The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. Such is the mandate of our Constitution which provides that a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The request for the respondent's provisional arrest was accompanied by facsimile copies of the outstanding warrant of arrest issued by the Hong Kong government, a summary of the facts of the case against respondent, particulars of his birth and address, an intention to request his provisional arrest and the reason therefor. The said documents were appended to the application for respondent's provisional arrest filed in the RTC, and formed the basis of the judge's finding of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent.
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29
Evidence PEOPLE vs. ALVAREZ and VILLAS G.R. No. 121769, November 22, 2000
Facts: The trial court declared accused ALVAREZ and VILLAS guilty of Murder beyond reasonable doubt, as principal. For insufficiency of evidence co-accused BUENAVENTURA VILLAS was acquitted. The appellants contend that their co-accused were acquitted by the trial court after it rejected the respective identifications made and uncorroborated testimony of Nenita, the prosecution witness. A fortiori, appellants claim they can not be convicted on the basis of the same uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution witness which the trial court has characterized as "undeserving of any belief for being inherently incredible," "beyond any common human experience," "inherently improbable," "patently incredible," "gravely doubtful and unconvincing" and "undeserving of faith and credence". Issue: Whether a conviction of an accused can be based upon a testimony which was the same basis for the acquittal of the co-accused. Held: Notably, the trial court did not accord full faith and credence to the identification made by the witness of erstwhile accused Buenaventura Villas as one of the perpetrators of the crime. That fact, however, does not entirely impugn her credibility as a witness relative to the other aspects of the case. The trial court found as sufficiently convincing the testimony of Nenita as regards her identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. The settled rule is that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part as the corroborative evidence or improbabilities
30
Evidence; Credibility of a Witness PEOPLE vs. ESPERO G.R. No. 117749, December 1, 2000
Facts: Appellant was found guilty of murder. He contends that the lone prosecution eyewitness, Roderick, is biased for the reason that the deceased victim was his uncle and that he had a grudge against the appellant, and thus said witness wanted to exact revenge. He also contends that Roderick gave inconsistent testimonies. Issue: Whether the witness lacks credibility because of his relation to the victim and grudge against the accused Held: The kinship existing between the deceased victim and prosecution witness Roderick Perez as well as the latter's alleged hostile attitude toward the appellant does not militate against the credibility of the said prosecution eyewitness. It has been held that revenge is a normal reaction of one betrayed, harmed or otherwise of one who has lost a loved one, but it does not follow that the desire to avenge such betrayal, harm or loss would include implicating even innocent persons. After a thorough review of the case, We find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing Tababan. Prosecution eyewitness Roderick gave a clear and convincing account of the stabbing incident which sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt the liability of the appellant for the death of the victim. His presence at the scene of the crime was not successfully disputed by the appellant. On the other hand, appellant's uncorroborated defense of alibi is not persuasive and the same pales in the light of the positive identification made by Roderick.
31
Evidence; Credibility of a Witness; Alibi DITCHE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TAM G.R. No. 110899, March 7, 2000
Facts: At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Tam, his wife, son and a farm helper were on their way home. While riding a motorcycle driven by Tam they were ambushed at Bgy. San Roque. Tam continued to negotiate the road amid the gunfire. Ten meters away from the ambush site, Tam looked back and this time he saw 4 men firing and chasing them. He positively identified 2 of the 4 men as petitioner Ditche and the now deceased Espaa. Petitioner's defense is basically alibi. His testimony was corroborated by defense witness Gilbuena, his Barangay Secretary. On cross-examination, witness Gilbuena admitted that petitioner Ditche requested him to testify on his behalf. The trial court convicted petitioner of Frustrated Murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts decision, in that the petitioner is only guilty of Attempted Murder. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for New Trial praying that the case be remanded to the lower court for the reception of the testimonies of new witnesses to the effect that at the time relevant to this case, they were residing within the vicinity of the ambush site and that when the shooting incident took place, it was already dark as it was already, in their estimate, 7:00 o'clock and not 6:00 o'clock in the evening as declared by the prosecution witnesses. The Court of Appeals denied both Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial. Issue: 1. Whether the Motion for New Trial should be granted on the basis of allegedly newly discovered evidence. 2. Whether the defense of alibi should prosper. Held: 1. It was correctly dismissed. Not only is such allegedly newly discovered evidence necessarily predicated on the alleged incredulousness of the prosecution witness, whose credibility has in fact already been determined by the trial court, but more importantly, it merely attempts to corroborate the earlier defense of the petitioner on the alleged impossibility of positive identification. Hence, the additional evidence sought to be presented by the defense is not really a newly discovered evidence as contemplated by law and therefore will not change the result of the case. The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge over an appellate court in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. Considering that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were straightforward, consistent and replete with details, aside from the fact that there is nothing in the record which shows that the witnesses were moved by any improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not biased and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credence. 2. We reject the alibi of petitioner that he was in his house preparing the minutes of the Association of Barangay Council of Asturias. When averring alibi, two essential requirements must be strictly met in order that the same may be of value to the defense, namely, (1) that the accused was not present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and (2) that it was physically impossible for him to be there at the time.
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Evidence; Credibility PEOPLE vs. QUIBIDO G.R. No. 136113, August 23, 2000
Facts: Montemayor and his co-accused Quibido, was charged of the crime of robbery with homicide. Berganio, one of the accused, disclosed to the police his knowledge involving the killing of Sofio Verguela when he was arrested. He confessed that he was in the company of herein appellants when the said crime was committed. Berganio agreed to testify for the prosecution upon advice of his father after having been assured of immunity from the instant criminal complaint by the prosecution. True to his undertaking, he narrated during the trial a detailed account of the facts and circumstances before, during and after the commission of the crime, subject of the instant criminal case. After analyzing the evidence, the trial court found as follows: It is clear from the testimony of prosecution witness Berganio that he was certain that Montemayor as one of those who robbed and killed Sofio Verguela. Thus, the defense of alibi clearly appears nothing but a mere fabrication designed to exculpate him of the crime charged. Quibido did not put up a defense; instead, he opted to escape from detention. His escape even during the pendency of the case is therefore a clear indication of his guilt. Issues: 1. Whether the testimony of Berganio, a co-conspirator is credible; 2. Whether the defense of alibi is to appreciated.
Held: It is a well-settled rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. The test to determine the value or credibility of testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in conformity with common knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. The fact that the prosecution witness may have been a co- conspirator in the commission of the offense is not in itself sufficient to dilute the credibility of, much less a ground to disregard altogether, his testimony. The general rule is that the testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for conviction unless supported by other evidence. The reason is that it comes from a polluted source. It must be received with caution because, as is usual with human nature, a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame as far as possible on others rather than himself. By way of exception, the testimony of a co-conspirator may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself, because given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and is full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. 2. The trial court correctly rejected the defense of alibi of the appellant for the reason that he was positively identified by Berganio who does not appear to have any motive against him to fabricate evidence. Also, the distance of the alleged whereabouts of the appellant in relation to the scene of the crime does not preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Decision affirmed.
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LEGAL ETHICS
Lawyers Conduct; Direct Contempt BUGARING vs. ESPAOL G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001
Facts: Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, declaring petitioner Efren Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court. Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case of his client by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judge's contrary order he did so in the honest belief
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2. Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under SC Adm. Circ. No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended. It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision
Judicial Conduct MANIO v. FERNANDO A.M. No. RTJ-00-1589, September 29, 2000
Facts: Jeanet Manio charged Judge Fernando with "giving me a hard time" by freezing "all my accounts (time deposits and Savings Account) at the bank," thus preventing her from withdrawing money needed "to buy a parcel of land." Because of her complaint against respondent Judge, the latter filed a case for perjury against her. To her surprise, a warrant of arrest was served upon her. Thereafter, Manio requested that her complaint against respondent Judge be dismissed. In another letter dated on the same day, she stated that she is withdrawing her complaint since it was out of ignorance and her anger at respondent Judge that she complained against him. The case was referred to a consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to conduct the necessary investigation, report and recommendation. However, no investigation ensued since on the dates the case was set for hearing, complainant did not appear.
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Judicial Conduct; Issuance of Order of Release SANTIAGO vs. JUDGE JOVELLANOS A.M. No. MTJ-00-1289, August 1, 2000
Facts: Complainant Jesusa M. Santiago alleges that she is the private complainant in several criminal cases, all entitled: "People of the Philippines vs. Violeta Madera," Upon failure of the accused to appear at the scheduled hearing of the criminal cases, she was arrested on July 2, 1996 pursuant to a bench warrant issued against her and detained at the municipal jail of San Ildefonso, Bulacan. She was released the following day pursuant to the Order of Release dated April 3, 1996 issued by respondent Judge Jovellanos. Complainant Santiago questions the propriety of the said Order of Release on two (2) grounds: first, the authority of Judge Jovellanos to issue the said Order of Release and, second, the date of issuance thereof. Santiago points out that Madera was arrested and detained in San Ildefonso, Bulacan and her cases were pending before the MTC of said municipality but it was respondent judge from the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan which issued the Order of Release. Also, while Madera was arrested on July 2, 1996, the Order of Release was dated April 3, 1996. An investigation was ensued against Judge Jovellanos and the investigating committee found out that the judge deliberately lied when he said he cancelled the property bond posted by the accused for her failure to register the property within ten (10) days to the proper office. No property bond had reached the Court that issued the warrant of arrest. Judge Jovellanos had taken advantage of his position as Presiding Judge, MCTC, Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, knowing fully well that he issued an order for the release of a detained person, even without the approved property bond. Issue: Whether Judge Jovellanos issuance of the Order of Release was proper.
Held: This Court agrees with the factual findings of the investigating judge and the Office of the Court Administrator. In Victorino Cruz v. Judge Reynold Q. Yaneza, Section 35 of BP Blg. 129 and Sections 17 and 19 of Rule 114 are to be construed and applied in conjunction with each other. The abovecited rules do not give the Metropolitan Trial Judge blanket authority to grant applications for bail. There are prerequisites to be complied with. First, the application for bail must be filed in the court where the case is pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, the application for bail may be filed with another branch of the same court within the province or city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed with any regional trial court of the place. If no judge thereof is available, then with any metropolitan trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein. It is clear from this Court's disquisition in Yaneza that Judge Jovellanos' reliance on Section 19, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is misplaced. Yaneza, in fact, only highlights that Judge Jovellanos, contrary to prescribed procedures, approved the applications for bail of accused whose cases were not only pending in other courts but who were likewise arrested and detained outside his territorial jurisdiction. It also does not appear from the records of these cases that the judges having jurisdiction over the accused were absent or otherwise unavailable to act upon their applications for bail. Worse, Judge Jovellanos ordered the release of Madera without the corresponding bail bond being posted. Judge Jovellanos' invocation of good faith and his plea that he was only moved by humanitarian considerations cannot excuse his conduct. We have often stressed that
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Disbarment UI vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO ADM. CASE No. 3319, June 8, 2000
Facts: Complainant Leslie Ui was married to Carlos Ui. They had four children. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio, a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982 with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together. This illicit relationship was admitted by Carlos to his wife. Consequently, complainant went to respondents office and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos. Respondent, on the other hand, told the complainant that her relationship with the complainants husband was over. However, after quite sometime, complainant learned that the illicit relationship continues and that respondent had another child. A complaint for disbarment, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided in, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio was, however reprimanded. Issue: Whether the alleged illicit relationship with a married man constitutes grossly immoral conduct. Held: We agree with the findings. A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straightlaced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him. Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness
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