ABSTRACT

TITLE OF THESIS: Can Digital Images Be "Evidence" For National Security Policy? STUDENT: Edmond E. Seay III DATE: July 1998 THESIS COMMITTEE CHAIR: Mark G. Marshall

Since 1962, Americas policymakers have grown ever more dependent on imagery intelligence (IMINT) products to prove their case in international fora. Yet computer technology may have made it impossible to detect alterations to digital image files, meaning it is no longer possible to accept an image as evidence for national security policy use without reference to outside corroborative evidence. Now that U.S. IMINT relies almost exclusively on digital images instead of "standard", "wet" or "chemical" photography, the provenance of an image -- that is, where it came from, when and how -- will be suspect unless a tight chain of custody has been maintained over the image in question. Even then, it may not be possible to prove to the satisfaction of a skeptical observer that the image has not been tampered with. If this is so, the relationship between the Policy and Intelligence communities may be fundamentally -- and permanently -- changed. The primary research for this paper consisted of a series of interviews with key figures in the digital graphics, encryption, intelligence and law enforcement fields, and an extensive review of current literature (and software) in the areas of digital graphics and legal applications.

This thesis makes its arguments in the following way: Chapter 2 posits three standards of evidentiary use for IMINT: military, policy, and legal. Chapter 3 analyzes the Policy community's use of digital imagery since 1962. Chapter 4 examines the fundamental difference between chemical photography and digital imagery, then gives some reasons why intelligence veterans may find it hard to admit that there is a fundamental distinction between digital imagery and its chemical predecessor. Chapter 5 summarizes the evidence, makes the finding, discusses implications and makes recommendations for avoiding the pitfalls of over-reliance on digital imagery for national security policy use. With the wide availability and low cost of computer graphics software, almost anyone can forge a digital image. Given this state of affairs, the Policy community must wean itself from its dependence on digital imagery. This study recommends a new emphasis on all-source intelligence to verify digital imagery before such imagery is used to argue a case at the United Nations or other international policy forum. It further recommends that the Intelligence community undertake the education of senior-level Policy figures on the dangers of using sole-source imagery intelligence to prove a case in international fora.

CAN DIGITAL IMAGES BE "EVIDENCE" FOR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY?

by

Edmond E. Seay III Foreign Service Officer U.S. Department Of State

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Military Intelligence College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence July 1998

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of State or Defense, or of the U.S. Government

The images presented in this thesis were taken from public domain graphics files downloaded from the Internet (see bibliography for URL addresses). They were manipulated and retouched by the author using Microsoft Photo Editor 3.0 and Microsoft Paint 4.0, both of which are bundled with Microsoft Office 97.

CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES Chapter iii Page

1. ARE DIGITAL IMAGES CREDIBLE AS EVIDENCE?1 2. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIGITAL AGE..11 3. POLICY USE OF IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE SINCE 1962.........19 4. DIGITAL IS DIFFERENT..37 5. MAINTAINING CREDIBILITY IN A DIGITAL WORLD........52 Bibliography........57 .

ii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page

1. Anystani Jets at Pyramid..................2 2. Clinton in MiG.................4 3. The "Real" Pyramid...............6 4. Starfield -- The "Truth"............49 5. Starfield -- Lying by Addition........50 6. Starfield -- Lying by Subtraction...........51 7. Starfield -- Lying by Transposition........52

iii

CHAPTER 1: ARE DIGITAL IMAGES CREDIBLE AS EVIDENCE?

UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 21 JUNE 1999 President of the UN Security Council: I hereby call this emergency session of the Security Council to order, and recognize the Ambassador of the United States of America. U.S. Ambassador: Thank you, Mr. President. While I appreciate that the members of the Council were enjoying their summer break until this session was called this morning, my government has evidence of a terrible crime being committed against the common historical heritage of mankind -- one so important that it demands the immediate attention of this body. As you are all aware, the border dispute between Anystan and Pickastan has undergone a serious transformation in the last few days, and threatens to explode into all-out war. The prospect of these two neighbors destabilizing Southwest Asia is bad enough, but just this morning my government obtained evidence that the conflict is threatening one of the world's great historic sites, the Great Pyramid of Anystan. Our national technical means revealed the following situation (please turn your attention to the video screen) [Figure 1]. As you can see, the jets in the foreground, Anystan Air Force (AAF) Mirages, are parked at the very foot of the pyramid, in an obvious attempt to safeguard them by daring Pickastan to desecrate a world historical landmark by bombing the jets. This cynical ploy by the AAF to protect its few modern assets is an unacceptable danger to

Figure 1: Anystani Jets at the Pyramid

the Great Pyramid, and one which my government abhors. We call on this Council to

take immediate action against the Government of Anystan to force the removal of those jets. Thank you, Mr. President. President of the UN Security Council: I now recognize the Ambassador of Anystan. Anystan Ambassador: Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen of the Council, forgive my wry expression, but I am having a very hard time keeping a straight face when confronted by these ridiculous charges from the Americans. We all know which side the Americans are backing in our Holy War for water resources, and now here they are supporting the Pickastani swine with these absurd charges. I wish to demonstrate some startling charges of my own, with your indulgence, Mr. President. If you would all re-turn your attention to the video screen, my government has irrefutable proof of U.S. complicity with the militarist scum of Pickastan [Figure 2]. Here you can plainly see the lame duck Clinton in the cockpit of a Pickastani MiG-21, obviously taken during his recent tour of Asia. That this photograph was ever taken during a time of heightened tension with my peace-loving country is an intolerable provocation, and we demand an immediate apology from the warmongering Pickastanis and their American puppet-masters. Thank you, Mr. President. President of the UN Security Council: The American Ambassador has the floor. U.S. Ambassador: Mr. President, this is an outrage! My government has been slandered by the Ambassador of Anystan, whose obvious purpose is to distract attention away from the criminal acts his government is party to. The alleged photograph of President Clinton is an obvious forgery, and therefore beneath the contempt of this august body. I call for the immediate censure of the Anystani Ambassador.

Figure 2: President Clinton in MiG-21

President of the UN Security Council: That motion will be considered in a moment. Anystan? Anystan Ambassador: Mr. President, I hope this gracious and august body will forgive me my little deception, but I have a very serious point to make here. The previous slide was in fact a fabrication, but one undertaken for the sole purpose of demonstrating how easy such forgeries are to achieve these days. And I must emphasize, Mr. President, that the acknowledged masters of such fakery are the Americans themselves. To all of you who have seen the decadent film known as Forrest Gump, I ask one simple question: in this day and age, what does a photograph prove? In the case of the doctored American photograph of the Great Pyramid, it proves nothing, Mr. President. Please turn once more to the video screen, ladies and gentlemen, and this time I will not strain your credulity with any more Hollywood-style hocus-pocus [Figure 3]. Here is the truth, my friends and colleagues. Here is the Great Pyramid. There are no jets in sight, because there were never any jets parked at this holy place. Only the fevered imaginations of the Americans could produce such a blasphemy, and I insist, Mr. President, that this body immediately consider censure charges against the American representative for profaning one of the great religions of the world. I also call upon the Security Council to organize a trip to the Pyramid immediately, and invite all interested members to visit my country and learn the truth! President of the UN Security Council: (Shouting) Order! Order in the Council! Order! . . .

Figure 3: The "Real" Pyramid

Literature Review Most intelligence experts, although aware that digital imagery represents a technological breakthrough, have not thought out the implications of the new technology on image authentication; while those who write as experts on digital imagery, on the other hand, do not focus on the potential for trouble in the world of imagery intelligence (IMINT). Nor are these perceptions limited to experts. In an April 1996 press interview, then-Secretary of Defense William J. Perry told reporters he was making progress with Libya's neighbors in proving the existence of a Libyan chemical weapons facility: I showed [Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak] photographs and they demonstrate that the Libyans are not now producing chemical weapons but they have an extensive program underway to develop a chemical weapons production facility, and I provided him with some evidence to support that.1

An outstanding exception came in 1992, with the publication of The Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in the Post-Photographic Era by Professor William J. Mitchell of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Professor Mitchell's provocative thesis held that the chemical photograph is not only as different from a digital image as it is from an oil painting; it is also as outmoded as an oil painting as a medium for expressing "truth."2 Mitchell explored not only the technology of digital imagery, but the theory of visual perception and the persistent belief in the reliability of the photograph. Even Mitchell, however, only skimmed over the question of digital imagery's implications for the discipline of IMINT. As he carefully laid out arguments against the credibility of the digital image (described in Chapter 4 of this thesis), he

John Lancaster, "Perry Presses U.S. Charge Against Libya," Washington Post, 4 April 1996, A21. William J. Mitchell, The Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in the Post-Photographic Era (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
2

seemed to overlook the crucial role IMINT has come to play in the U.S. Policy establishment. The question of digital image malleability has entered the popular press and literature in the last few years. A recent exchange in the letter column of U.S. News & World Report illustrates the depth of confusion on the transformational capabilities of digital imagery: ...New computer software now makes it possible for the clumsiest amateur shutterbug to create photographic images top pros might spend a lifetime trying to capture -- if they ever do. Photos can be digitized and doctored to the point where even the most skilled editor cannot tell the difference between real and fake...Says National Geographic editor Bill Allen: "Technology is not taking us 3 closer to reality but further from it."

But the editor of Outdoor Photographer magazine was not convinced: The article's implication that technology means we can't trust anything would mean throwing out Ansel Adams's work and the black-and-white work of news photographers, which were done with enlargers. Computers give photographers 4 a chance to make images closer to the truth.

The second writer does not appear to consider the implications of his own statement. If one has the power to "make images closer to the truth", one can also do the opposite. Whose Truth Will Prevail? The opening scenario at the United Nations may appear unlikely, even laughable. As this paper demonstrates, however, it is no longer possible (if it ever was) to accept an image as evidence for national security policy use without reference to outside corroborative evidence. Now that U.S. IMINT relies almost exclusively on digital images instead of "standard", "wet" or "chemical" photography, the provenance of an

Michael Satchell, "Antarctica and the polar bear," U.S. News & World Report, 12 January 1998, 48.
4

Rob Sheppard, Letter to the Editor, U.S. News & World Report, 23 February 1998, 4.

image -- that is, where it came from, when and how -- will be suspect unless a tight chain of custody has been maintained over the image data in question. Even then, it may not be possible to prove to the satisfaction of a skeptical observer that the image has not been tampered with. The potential implications for U.S. policymakers are serious: when we most need the support of the world community during a time of crisis, we may not have it. If, that is, we depend completely on digital imagery to "prove the case." To demonstrate that digital images cannot be authenticated for national security policy use to the satisfaction of a skeptical observer without reference to other evidence, the author conducted a series of interviews with experts in the field of digital imagery, IMINT and law enforcement (Chapters 2 and 4). In many cases, the sources consulted had expertise in more than one field: digital imagery and the law, or IMINT and computer programming, for example. Chapter 2 suggests there is a scale for image evidence: military, foreign policy, and legal. Chapter 3 analyzes the history of the use of IMINT by the Policy community since 1962. Chapter 4 lays out the differences between chemical and digital photography. Finally, Chapter 5 finds that digital image data are no longer acceptable as foreign policy evidence without reference to corroborating evidence, and suggests a corrective course of action for the Policy community. Definitions The author employs the following terms with these specific definitions: Digital imagery: Electro-optical data captured by charge-coupled devices and transmitted and stored as a series of binary digits (0's and 1's). Chemical, Standard or Wet Photography: Optical images recorded on film coated with silver halide or similar chemical emulsions, developed into a negative image through

chemical processing, and usually printed onto paper or as transparent positives using the negative "original" image. Policy Community: The President of the United States: members of his Cabinet; and key officials at their respective Federal agencies including the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Council, and parts of the Intelligence Community.

10

CHAPTER 2: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIGITAL AGE

A picture is a fact. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosphicus

That so eminent a philosopher as Wittgenstein would make such a bald statement about the "inherent" factual nature of pictures should come as no surprise -as will be described in Chapter 4, the photograph is commonly believed to reflect reality. It can be argued, however, that there are levels or layers of "reality". For example, there appear to be widely different standards for evidence in the legal, foreign policy and military fields. Each requires a different level of "proof" in order to take action. This in turn has implications for imagery: How does the legal system treat photographs? Are there special legal considerations for photographs in international law? More specifically, what standards of proof are necessary to "make a case" at an international forum like the UN? Finally, how does the military treat image evidence? Before proceeding, it is important to make a key distinction: The most useful place to start is with the traditional distinction between facts and evidence. A piece of evidence is a fact with significance in some context, a fact that has been pressed into service, used to support some claim or argument. It serves to tell us about something that happened in the past or is happening somewhere else or will happen in the future or is just too small to see or otherwise takes place in a setting to which we have no direct access. Photographs, then, present facts but are frequently used as evidence. Any

11

photograph might be used as evidence of many things, but it only becomes 5 evidence when somebody finds a way to put it to work.

Imagery as Legal Evidence Two different theories exist in U.S. case law for the introduction of photographs as evidence: as "explanatory" or "illustrative" material intended to give weight to other evidence, such as providing pictorial corroboration to a piece of testimony; or as a "silent witness"; that is, a picture which is considered to "speak for itself": It has become clear that an additional theory of admissibility of photographs is entitled to recognition. Thus, even though no human is capable of swearing that he personally perceived what a photograph purports to portray (so that it is not possible to satisfy the requirements of the "pictorial testimony" rationale) there may nevertheless be good warrant for receiving the photograph in evidence. Given an adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the process of producing 6 it, the photograph should then be received as so-called silent witness.

Thus, whether the photograph is admitted into evidence to corroborate the account of an eyewitness, or whether is stands alone as evidence (as in the case of bank cameras used to incriminate robbers), the important fact which an attorney is attempting to establish is that the photograph represents the truth about a particular moment in time and space. Laying this foundation for such evidence is considered vital in all cases, whether a photograph stands alone or accompanies verbal testimony. However, a connection to "real events" is not necessary for photographs to be admitted into evidence: A somewhat more troublesome problem is presented by posed or artificially reconstructed scenes, in which people, automobiles, and other objects are placed so as to conform to the descriptions of the original crime or collision given by the witnesses. When the posed photographs go no further than to portray the positions of persons and objects as reflected in the undisputed testimony, their
5

Mitchell, 193. (Emphasis in original.)

Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence (New York: Mathew Bender, 1989), 1001-17.

12

admission has long been generally approved. Frequently, however, a posed photograph will portray only the version of the facts supported by the testimony of the proponent's witness. The dangers inherent in this situation, i.e., the tendency of the photographs unduly to emphasize certain testimony and the possibility that the jury may confuse one party's reconstruction with objective 7 fact, have led some courts to exclude photographs of this type.

The danger of posed still photography has not only been recognized as a problem by U.S. courts, but in real life: Sometimes digital disguises are put on to feign the fit of a photograph to a story. In 1989 the Washington producers of ABC News photographed a staged scene of one man passing a briefcase to another, then electronically manipulated the image so that one of the anonymous protagonists appeared to be Felix Bloch, a diplomat who had been accused of espionage. An ABC News spokesperson -embarrassed by the revelation of this deception -- later said that the image had been intended for use as a "simulation" and that failure to identify it as such had 8 been an oversight.

The application of these rules of evidence has always been more of an art than a science. As a practitioner in this complex field, an expert like the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Douglas Goodin has learned to apply an abstract knowledge of legal precedent into practical terms while testifying: As an examiner in the FBI Laboratory's Special Photographic Unit, I am periodically called upon to examine photographic images to determine their origin and authenticity. At other times I am required to take evidentiary photographs of surveillances or crime scenes and authenticate these in court. With conventional photography, the ultimate evidence of authenticity (besides your testimony) has always been the actual photographic negative or slide. This piece of film was actually in the camera at the time and place you claimed. It was exposed to the light rays of the subject in question before the court. And its image was permanently fixed on film that could only be exposed and developed once. The film was not only the imaging sensor, it was the principle image 9 storage device.
7

John William Strong, ed., McCormick on Evidence (St. Paul, MN: West, 1992), 16. Mitchell, 210.

Douglas A. Goodin, "Image Security and Integrity," paper presented at a series of 1996 briefings on data security at FBI headquarters, (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1996), 1-2.

13

In addition to its permanence as a physical medium, the photographic negative also possessed other important properties as legal evidence: Its contiguity on a roll of film between other images which could be sequenced in space and time; the nearimpossibility of altering its silver halide/gelatin structure without leaving evidence of tampering; identifying marks or initials which the photographer could scratch into the film emulsion or write in indelible ink; frame markings placed on the film by the manufacturer, which if unbroken would show that the photo in question had not been inserted from a different roll; and finally, the unique, distinctive marks left on the edges of the exposed frames as the mask at the camera's film plane forms the border of the negative.10 Thus chemical photography leaves clues which can be exploited in court at the expert level to determine the authenticity of an image. In discussing image security and integrity, however, Goodin goes out of his way to mention the evidentiary limits of photography: This is not to say that photography is unbiased in its employ as evidence. It has always been subject to manipulation through exposure, camera angle, lens selection, and other techniques. A wide angle lens used for a lawsuit photograph of a small hole in a sidewalk can make it look like the Grand Canyon . . . . In the electronic realm I can photograph and print my yawning chasm just like I do with a conventional camera. The issue here is not one of making a case for an ambulance chaser, but one of whether or not the image taken at the scene (with all of its biased camera angles and exposure tricks) is the same one 11 presented in court. And if it isn't, how can the fraud be detected?

Finally, Goodin notes the statutes which control the admissibility of evidence in U.S. federal courts:

10

Goodin, 2. Goodin, 3.

11

14

Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 1001 through 1006 deal with photographic and computer generated evidence. Rule 1001 establishes definitions of writings and recordings to include "photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data compilation." It defines an original 12 photograph as the negative, or any print made from the negative.

One final legal consideration should be mentioned here: custody of evidence. Unless a clear chain of evidence can be maintained, it is possible to render useless even the most compelling evidence. The test of this proposition, given below, deals not with photographic evidence, which Goodin points out has always been open to a certain level of dispute, but with DNA evidence, the single most persuasive form of evidence available if the evidentiary chain can be maintained. DNA evidence appears to have shut the books on a great 20th century mystery. A woman who came to be known as Anna Anderson claimed for several decades to be the Grand Duchess Anastasia Romanovna, the only survivor of the Communist massacre of the Russian Imperial household in 1919. Her case was taken up by the general public in the 1920s, and remained a source of broad speculation until her death in the 1980s.13 Although a large amount of circumstantial evidence supporting her claims was gathered by her supporters over the years, definitive proof seemed out of the question. In the 1990s, however, a tissue sample of her liver was obtained from a hospital in the U.S. where it had been preserved after biopsy decades before. When the tissue sample was compared to one taken from the Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Philip of England (a close genetic relation of the Romanovs), the decisive proof was obtained: Anna Anderson was not Anastasia, but rather a delusional Polish refugee.14

12

Goodin, 10. Peter Kurth, Anastasia (New York: Fontana/Collins, 1985), 368-452.

13

Robert K. Massie, The Romanovs: The Final Chapter (New York: Random House, 1995), 276-290.

14

15

The question to be answered, especially in the face of the body of evidence which supported Anderson's claim, however, was this: who maintained the chain of evidence in the Anastasia case? Was the tissue sample submitted to an English laboratory to be matched with Prince Philip's DNA really Anna Anderson's? If the answer is yes, then the mystery has been solved for all time. There is no evidence so strong, however, that it cannot be undermined if it can be demonstrated that the chain of custody was compromised. Imagery as Policy Evidence Apart from the strict evidentiary requirements of U.S. federal courts, there are standards of evidence for the international "court of world opinion." These are considerably less strict than formal legal standards. First of all, claims made to bodies like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) must pass the "laugh test". If a representative of a UN member state appeared before the UNSC to argue for increased space surveillance by the international community because aliens were devouring his country's livestock, it is hard to imagine that he would get a fair hearing. More generally, the standard which appears to apply in cases like the hypothetical in Chapter 1 we can call the "reasonable observer" rule: is the evidence sufficiently strong to convince a reasonable (and presumably disinterested) observer? As Chapter 3 will demonstrate, the Kennedy administration worked hard to convince a series of audiences that its evidence against the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis was solid and compelling. In the process of presenting photographic evidence to these audiences (foreign leaders, the press on background, and finally the UN Security Council), the Kennedy administration arguably invented the "reasonable observer" standard for Policy community use of IMINT.

16

Imagery as Military Evidence The final standard of evidence -- military -- is lower still than the Policy community's. The military uses digital images of, for example, battle damage assessments (BDAs) in order to fine-tune its operational requirements for the next day's bombing missions. At the tactical level, there is usually no parallel requirement to the legal and Policy necessity for proof beyond a certain level before action can be taken. If, for example, during Operation DESERT STORM an image showed an airfield in Iraq with what appeared to be Iraqi jets revetted near the runway, that was all the "proof" the U.S. commander needed before ordering airstrikes. This is not the case in the sphere of Policy use of IMINT, where it is always necessary to "sell" a course of action beforehand -- sometimes to a disinterested observer, sometimes to a skeptical one. In the legal sphere, we have seen that U.S. courts have always required the laying of a proper foundation before photographs could be admitted as evidence (the photographer could testify that she took the pictures in question on a certain date, at a certain place.) Authorities place great importance on their ability to demonstrate that their control and possession of an image have been continuous and unbroken -- that the so-called "chain of custody" of evidence has been maintained. In Policy use, the "court of world opinion" is not so formal in its evidentiary rules; but here, as well, the inability to prove continuous custody of an image could prove equally disastrous for a nation attempting to "prosecute" a case based on imagery evidence. As we shall see in Chapter 3, the U.S. was extremely careful to maintain such credibility in a number of instances where it needed to make its case before the UNSC and the "court of world opinion." Finally, the military, particularly at the tactical level, has a relatively low standard of evidence to meet before it can take action during wartime.

17

CHAPTER 3: POLICY USE OF IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE SINCE 1962

I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that is your decision, and I am also prepared to present the evidence to this room. Adlai Stevenson to Soviet Ambassador Zorin, 23 October 1962

How did the Policy community come to depend on imagery intelligence (IMINT)? When and where did IMINT become essential to the policymaking process, as well as vital ammunition in the war of public opinion during modern conflicts and crises? Answering these and related questions requires an examination of several crises of the last fifty years, starting with a brief history of modern IMINT and a detailed look at the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. This crisis is examined at greater length because decisions made by the Kennedy White House formed the archetype for subsequent Policy uses of IMINT. Comparisons are then made with those subsequent uses, including several incidents which occurred during the Carter and Reagan presidencies, Operation DESERT SHIELD, and the war in Bosnia. In each case the following factors are examined: the setting of the crisis, the imaging platform(s) employed, the audience for the imagery, how the chain of evidence was maintained, the level of debate over employing imagery, whether the imagery was used as "silent witness" and/or illustrative evidence in support of other testimony, and whether the use of IMINT would pass the military, policy or legal standards of evidence.

18

Case 1: Cuban missile crisis National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) analysts discovered Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba the night of 14-15 October 1962.
15

President Kennedy's first

reaction was to put together a subset of key National Security Council advisors dubbed the Executive Committee, or Ex-Comm, which met for the first time on 16 October, only three hours after Kennedy got the news. Opinion in the Ex-Comm quickly divided between hardliners advocating air strikes against the missile sites before they became operational (supported, if necessary, by an invasion of Cuba), and moderates calling for restraint. The moderates proposed a naval blockade in place of the air strike/invasion option; the meeting ended inconclusively.16 The full National Security Council (NSC) met on the afternoon of 20 October to review the blockade proposal. Arriving late, UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson attempted to reinsert himself in the debate, having been at the UN since 18 October. Stevenson's proposals, including a suggestion that the President offer to remove U.S. IRBMs in Turkey in exchange for a Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba, were poorly received: Stevenson's attitude brought him into a sharp collision with his colleagues in Washington. Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General] maintained an air of disgust . . . . Stevenson also incurred [Director of Central Intelligence John] McCone's wrath when he implied that the photographic evidence was not conclusive. McCone, a devout Catholic, later facetiously referred to Stevenson as "the St. Thomas of our generation."17

Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 1991), 205-208. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (New York: New Press, 1992), 360. The term "quarantine" quickly replaced "blockade" when it was pointed out that the latter was considered an act of war under international law -- see Hilsman, p. 73.
17 16

15

Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 317-318.

19

Surprisingly, this would be the only time during the crisis that the photographic evidence itself was challenged by a senior U.S. government official. The 20 October meeting also resulted in a decision to brief key Western allies on the crisis, especially since President Kennedy believed Khrushchev would make demands about Berlin in the event the U.S. proposed withdrawing the missiles from Cuba. McCone convinced the President to send senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials along to present and explain the U-2 photographs during the briefings in Ottawa, London, Paris and Bonn. In the case of Paris, Dean Acheson was chosen to convey the enormity of the situation to President Charles De Gaulle: When Acheson offered to show the photos to de Gaulle, he made a waving notion. A great nation such as yours would not take such a serious step if there was any doubt. I need no such evidence. For our purposes, the missiles were there. Then Acheson diplomatically rephrased the offer: Would the general as a military man care to look at the photographs to see the advancement that has been made in aerial reconnaissance? To this, de Gaulle consented . . . . The general asked at what altitude the pictures had been taken. When told fourteen miles, he said, Cest formidable! Cest formidable!18

The British proved more problematic. U.S. Ambassador David Bruce, accompanied by Chester Cooper, a senior CIA officer assigned to London, called on Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Douglas-Home, to show them the evidence NPIC discovered. Macmillan insisted that his government would be damaged severely if he were not allowed to show the U-2 photographs to the British public. It was absolutely essential that the photos be shown. Without hard evidence to show his public, Macmillan would not give Ambassador Bruce any indication

Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 293.

18

20

that he would support Kennedy in this crisis.

19

In a letter to Kennedy written immediately

after Bruce called on him, Macmillan noted his concerns: Many of us in Europe have lived so long in close proximity to the enemy's nuclear weapons of the most devastating kind that we have got accustomed to it. 20 So European opinion would need attention.

This position placed the Kennedy administration in some difficulty. There is no evidence that anyone in the administration was contemplating the public release of the U-2 imagery (Pierre Salinger, JFK's notoriously leak-prone press secretary, was only informed of the nature of the crisis on the morning of 21 October). Even those few foreign leaders who were briefed on U.S. IMINT evidence were not made aware of the source of the photos they viewed (from a recording made by President Kennedy at the 5:00 P.M. White House briefing of key Congressional leaders, Monday, 22 October 1962): [Sen. Thomas] Kuchel: My God. Are those pictures taken with a U-2? McCone: (The pictures of Soviet missile sites in Cuba) are taken with a U-2. And, Mr. President, I would just like to say for the advantage of...Everybody here knows we have briefed a number of people. We're just referring to pictures taken from military reconnaissance planes. We're making no reference to the U21 2s involved.

How, then, were calls for public release to be handled? The only previous release of U2 imagery occurred as a result of the Francis Gary Powers incident, when President

19

Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 329.

Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 269.
21

20

May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, 255.

21

Eisenhower went on national TV to demonstrate the quality of U-2 photos -- but even then, the image shown on TV was from a test flight over the U.S.
22

The briefings in Bonn and Ottawa were less eventful, although Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker did make one cogent observation: The Prime Minister added that it appeared to him that the real problem at the UN would be to get people to believe the charge without benefit of the NPIC intelligence briefing. He said he thought the best tactic would be for members of 23 the UN to actually go and see the sites for themselves.

Thus, two key allies were calling for public release of highly-classified IMINT to make the case for the U.S. government in the court of world opinion. With an increasing number of reporters sensing the crisis was more serious than they had been told as of the morning of 22 October,24 it was becoming obvious that the Presidents speech that night would be vital to winning the public opinion battle that was sure to follow; but would even a great speech be enough without the photographic evidence to back it? Secretary of Defense McNamara and State Department Legal Advisor Abram Chayes briefed the Washington press (off-the-record) on the significance of the NPIC photos that evening. McNamara instructed photographers not to take pictures of the NPIC briefing boards; when asked if the photos might be made public, McNamara replied that it might be possible at a later date.25 Public reaction to the Presidents speech was mixed: In the U.S., 84 percent of the public supported Kennedys actions, while only 4 percent opposed. In the UK,
22

Andrew, For The President's Eyes Only, 249. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 334. Chang and Kornbluh, 364. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 366.

23

24

25

22

however, the British press, still smarting from U.S. handling of the 1956 Suez crisis (when Eisenhower had forced Her Majesty's Government to hand back the Suez Canal to Egypt) skeptically referred to the NPIC photos as pictures of so-called missiles. Later, when Macmillan had British photo-interpreters go over the NPIC photos, they confirmed the U.S. experts analysis in every detail.26 In the meantime, however, the British government was under tremendous pressure to release the NPIC photos in order to confirm the American charges. In the Ex-Comm, meanwhile, the first proposal was made to allow public viewing of the U-2 evidence: Bundy: Mr. President, may I comment to that? Because the question of evidence is becoming of great importance to the international debate...we have an immediate question of what to say about what we now know. For example, our position currently has been that we will show pictures without leaving them in people's hands and not making them available for publication. We showed them to friends and to newspapermen, but not in the Security Council. I, myself, think we are now ready to take the view that the pictures can be shown in the Security 27 Council...

Thus the ground shifted slightly -- the U-2 evidence would be used to make the U.S. case for offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba at the Security Council, and the British government would be permitted simultaneous release of the same images to their public and press. At 7:30 P.M. Washington time on 23 October, Secretary McNamara gave an onthe-record press conference on the particulars of the naval quarantine of Cuba, which had begun at 11:00 that morning. McNamara was surprised when asked by reporters for copies of the aerial photos they had seen at the 22 October off-the-record press briefing. Unaware that the U-2 photos had been released to the British press,

26

Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 380. May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, 303.

27

23

McNamara contended that security officers at the Pentagon felt that certain of the photographs should not be released because they might provide valuable state-of-theart information on U.S. reconnaissance capabilities. When told the British were that same day featuring the aerial photos over the BBC television network, McNamara was stunned.28 As it turns out, Macmillan, U.S. Ambassador Bruce, and UK Ambassador to Washington Sir David Ormsby-Gore had all kept the pressure on the White House to release the NPIC photos to the British press. It appears the British took an agreement by JFK to allow simultaneous public release in the U.S. and UK to be permission to release the photos right away. (According to Chester Cooper of CIA, McGeorge Bundy's aide Michael Forrestal actually gave permission for the release.29) Nor does it appear that the consequences of public release, including the concerns raised by McNamara at the 23 October press conference, were fully thought through by the Kennedy administration. To help an ally in trouble with its own media, the Kennedy White House authorized the publication of images which were previously only available at the codeword level.30 Elements of the Case In reviewing the Cuban missile crisis, the important elements were as follows: during October 1962, President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev engaged in a test of wills over the placement of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba. The IMINT platform involved in the crisis was the U-2 (although other images were obtained

28

Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, 296. Andrew, For The President's Eyes Only, 588.

29

24

by low-flying aircraft as well). The target audience for the images was, first, the UN Security Council, then the world. The chain of custody of the images was maintained by NPIC, the White House, and the U.S. Mission to the UN. The images used were accepted as "silent witness"; that is, images that proved a thing (the missile sites in Cuba) in and of themselves. There was almost no internal U.S. debate. The images were also released to the court of world opinion, and passed the "reasonable observer" test. The images met not only the standards for military action and Policy support, but even the legal standard. Imagery use from Johnson to Ford

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 established two facts about IMINT: First, as the U-2 photos used by the U.S. government to convince a skeptical world about the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuba demonstrated, such images could be powerful persuaders; and second, as soon as people were aware such images could be taken, the demand for them increased dramatically. That demand curve has not yet slackened. In fact, it can safely be said that in the 1990s, the demand is greater than ever. Yet in the period immediately following the Cuban missile crisis, the demand for public use of IMINT was extremely limited. While partly a result of historical circumstances (i.e., the Vietnam conflict provided little scope or need for the public release of IMINT products), the dearth of demand for such images was also a result of the highly-classified nature of the supply. The Intelligence Community (IC), which had begun to develop reconnaissance uses for satellites almost as soon as there were satellites, strongly resisted public release of satellite imagery. As a result, the space

30

Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 392. See, however, Hilsman 108-109, where he claims

25

reconnaissance function of the IC remained highly classified (if a fairly open secret) until the end of the 1970s. Even as Francis Gary Powers was shot out of the sky in 1960, work was well underway to make U-2 overflights of Soviet nuclear facilities unnecessary. The development of satellite reconnaissance platforms had revolutionary implications for intelligence work. As with all revolutions, questions of law which had never been raised before began to crop up within the first few years of the satellite era. Could states overfly their neighbors and take photographs without those neighbors permission? That question was partly answered in treaty law, and partly in international practice. The United States and the Soviet Union, the first two nations to develop satellite reconnaissance, established early on the legitimacy of satellite overflights: while a U-2 was fair game, the Soviets would waste no time complaining about a platform they had no hope of shooting down. By 1967, that practical point of view was codified in international law with the entry into force of the Outer Space Treaty. Satellites could be used for peaceful purposes, including reconnaissance, even when an aerial version of the same mission would violate international law. The sovereignty of national airspace was unchallenged, but did not extend indefinitely out into space.31 With the legality of space reconnaissance established, and with both superpowers in possession of spy satellites , a sort of balance of reconnaissance developed in the 1960s and 1970s. Each superpower could observe what the other
32

JFK intended to release the U-2 images to the public "within the next few days" (from 22 October). 31 G. C. M. Riejnen, "Remote Sensing by Satellites and Legality," in Legal Implications of Remote Sensing From Outer Space, eds. Nicholas Matte and Hamilton DeSaussure (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1976), 23. Commander Cecil B. Jones, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired) "Photographic Satellite Reconnaissance," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute 106, no. 6 (June 1980), 45.
32

26

was up to; this transparency, in turn, had the effect of preventing overreaction and hairtrigger responses during times of crisis. Case 2: The Carter Administration One necessary precursor to the use of satellite imagery in international fora such as the UN was the public acknowledgment of its existence by President Carter. Like the decision to publicize the imagery of Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962, politics played an important role in the decision: [Carters] announcement was part of the preparation for the expected battle with the Senate over approval of the SALT II agreement. It was anticipated that the battle might eventually include the release of photographic satellite reconnaissance materials to establish both the verifiability of the provisions of the 33 SALT II treaty and the reasonableness of some of the treatys provisions.

President Carter spoke at the John F. Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral 1 October 1978, at a medal ceremony for NASA personnel. In the course of presenting the awards, he paid tribute to Americas satellite reconnaissance program: Photo-reconnaissance satellites have become an important stabilizing factor in world affairs in the monitoring of arms control agreements. They make an immense contribution to the security of all nations. We shall continue to develop them. [Carters speech represented] formal declassification of the satellite program. It was the Presidents intent that U.S. representatives and legislative supporters of SALT be able to talk about their use in assuring the United States 34 that the Soviets were not cheating on the provisions of the treaty.

The line was drawn, however, when it came to releasing actual images from the U.S. satellite constellation. Objections included the possibility that seeing the state of the art in U.S. IMINT technology would allow the Soviets to take effective countermeasures. Others believed that publishing such images would be rubbing their

33

Jones, 42.

Jeffrey T. Richelson, America's Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 140.

34

27

noses in it, to the point where the Soviets might take action. Most persuasively, it was argued that one published IMINT photo would lead to a flood of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, which would require a moderate-sized army of staff just to refuse properly: There was no enthusiasm for a course of action that had the potential to significantly divert personnel to the FOIA search-and-review process. Even the need to publish overhead photographs in pursuit of foreign policy objectives did not change the decision. When the United States wanted to provide evidence of a Soviet naval base at Berbera, Somalia, an SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft was 35 used to re-photograph the target already photographed by KEYHOLE satellites.

Thus, the ability to use IMINT products from satellites in international fora remained forbidden even policy-makers had to respect the limits imposed by the need to protect sources and methods. Elements of the Case Platforms available to President Carter included IMINT satellites and U-2 and SR-71 aircraft. In the instance of SALT II, the audience for the imagery which would prove the verifiability of the treaty was a skeptical Congress. In the case of the Soviet base at Berbera, the UN Security Council and the general public were the audience. Both sets of images were intended as silent witness. In both cases the chain of custody was maintained by the IC. Carter released only the fact of satellite capability to the court of world opinion. Both uses of IMINT met even the legal standard of evidence. Case 3: The Reagan Years e The decade of the 1980s included a number of incidents of the use of IMINTderived products to prove Soviet noncompliance -- and compliance with arms control

Richelson, 143. NOTE: Even though the term "Keyhole" in reference to satellite reconnaissance was classified at the codeword level until 1995, Richelson fought and won several court battles allowing him to publish information which entered the public domain as a result of the 1979 Kampiles espionage trial.

35

28

agreements. Despite extensive Soviet denial and deception (maskirovka) efforts, the U.S. IMINT systems were able to discover Soviet attempts to get around various agreements, including, notably, the ABM Treaty: The photos showed a ballistic missile detection radar under construction near Abalakova, north of Krasnoyarsk in south-central Siberia, near a spur line running north from the Trans-Siberian Railroad . . . what was so disturbing was that the radar was approximately 400 miles inside the nearest Soviet border. Adding to the concern was the fact that the radar was located near three SS-18 missile fields, exactly the type of installation that an ABM system might be used 36 to protect.

Faced with the photographic evidence, even in private, the Soviets eventually agreed to dismantle the facility, which was in clear violation of the ABM Treaty of 1972. Satellite imagery also played an important role, however, in confirming when the Soviets were complying: The atmosphere between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has changed dramatically since 1985, but the notion of supplying more information about certain international events remains valid. Future KEYHOLE photography can serve to reassure the public that the Soviet Union is complying with terms of arms control agreements or can make it clear that it is not . . . it can show Soviet 37 Bison bombers with tails cut off in compliance with SALT II (as in 1985).

There were inklings of the problems of the pending Digital Age as far back as 1989, as this incident at the UN demonstrated: On 4 January 1989, U.S. Navy fighters shot down two Libyan MiG-23s over the Mediterranean near the Libyan coast. Libya denounced the action and called for an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council to condemn it . . . . Later, U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walters exhibited blurred photographs of what he claimed was one of the MiGs visibly armed with air-to-air missiles. "Do you think this is a bouquet of roses hanging under the wing?" he demanded . . . . (Libyan) Ambassador Muntasser chose not to dismiss the photographs as simply meaningless. Instead, he made the more damning suggestion that they were false evidence -- fabrications produced to deceive the gullible by trading on the photograph's privileged connection to reality. This suggestion is by no means
36

Richelson, 188. Richelson, 266.

37

29

technically implausible: anybody with access to some pictures of aircraft, an image-capture device, and a personal computer with inexpensive image38 processing software could produce this sort of image in a few minutes. Elements of the Case Two specific uses of IMINT are presented above. During the Krasnoyarsk dispute in the early 1980s, the platform was an IMINT satellite, the target audience was the Kremlin, the chain of custody was maintained by the IC, and the images were intended to act as "silent witness." In 1989, the images were taken by U.S. Navy F-14 gun cameras, they were intended for UN release, the chain of custody was maintained by the military and the State Department, and the images were used as illustrative evidence to support the "testimony" of radio recordings and eyewitnesses. In both cases, the evidence passed the "laugh test"; however, while the Krasnoyarsk evidence met the military, policy and legal standards, the F-14 evidence failed to meet the "reasonable observer" test, since the evidence was too blurry to be indisputable to a disinterested observer without reference to other evidence. Thus the F-14 evidence really only met the military standard for action, not the policy or legal standards. Case 4: Operation DESERT SHIELD The most important opportunity for policy use of IMINT products in international fora since the Cuban missile crisis began 1 August 1990 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The broad spectrum of U.S. IMINT assets were directed at Iraq and Kuwait within days of the invasion, and were enhanced with the arrival of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. The pressure from policy-makers to release imagery demonstrating Iraqi deceptions and atrocities was intense; the workload at the State Departments imagery coordination office in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) more than doubled for the duration of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM as policymakers requested
38

Mitchell, 24.

30

images for use in briefings to foreign ambassadors, key Congressional figures, and offthe-record sessions with news media.
39

When Saddam Hussein parked MiGs in the shadows of Babylonian ruins in an attempt to shield them from air strikes, the satellite imagery evidence was on the desk of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council within 24 hours.40 At first, some attempts were made to disguise image sources, by either substituting line drawings for the original images, or by degrading the quality of the image using computer technology. The line drawings were rejected by the international press as inconclusive; the image degradation efforts were more successful, but it often took too long to get timely release of the degraded images. As a result, there was great pressure to release advanced imagery to the public during the war.41 DESERT STORM was a public war, in a way which obviously influenced the decision of the Bush administration to handle requests for imagery. With the Cable News Network (CNN) on the air around the clock, and many open sources available for everything from videotape to commercial satellite imagery, it would have been bad public relations to deny every request for IMINT. Indeed, the Bush White House was the most accommodating in history when it came to the number of release requests which were granted before and during the war.42

Peter Modley, Chief of the Collections Guidance Center in the Office of Intelligence Resources, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/IRE/CGC), interview by author, 31 May 1996. An unclassified source, retired mid-level intelligence professional formerly seconded to the United States Mission to the United Nations, who wishes to remain anonymous, interview by author, 27 June 1996.
41 40

39

Modley interview. Modley interview.

42

31

Elements of the Case President Bush and his Policy team used IMINT to reinforce claims of atrocity and crimes against humanity by Saddam Hussein. Platforms included IMINT satellites, U-2s, and cameras aboard tactical aircraft. Due to concerns about revealing sources and methods, only the latter images were released to the general public; the classified imagery was only briefed to private audiences of diplomats and Congressmen. The images were used as both silent witness and illustrative evidence. The chain of custody in each case ran through the IC and/or the military to the State Department and the White House. The only debate about IMINT use centered on substituting line drawings for classified imagery. The use of imagery generally met all three standards for use of evidence. Case 5: IMINT and Bosnia The Bosnian tragedy has had a specific component involving the U.S. IMINT establishment. Efforts in late 1995 and early 1996 to unearth the mass graves of Muslims massacred after the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995 have received front-page publicity around the world. The role of IMINT in the policy process is almost as well known. At a UN Security Council meeting on 9 August 1995, then-U.S. UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright displayed before and after photos of a field near Srebrenica showing pristine grass before the enclave fell to Bosnian Serb forces, and freshly turned earth a few days later. Subsequent discovery of mass graves under that disturbed earth have fueled repeated calls for more energetic prosecution of war criminals.43 What is not as well known is the role that U.S. IMINT could have played, but did not. According to an investigative report published in the New York Review Of Books on
43

Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, "Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Us," New York Review of Books, 9 May 1996, 1.

32

9 May 1996, U.S. intelligence officials were aware of earlier massacres of Muslims by Serbs in Brcko in 1992, but chose not to share that information, either with the UN or with the International Committee of the Red Cross: During the late spring and early summer of 1992, some three thousand Muslims in the northern town of Brcko were herded by Serb troops into an abandoned warehouse, tortured, and put to death. A U.S. intelligence satellite orbiting over the former Yugoslavia photographed part of the slaughter. They have photos of trucks going into Brcko with bodies standing upright, and pictures of trucks coming out of Brcko carrying bodies lying horizontally, stacked like cordwood, an investigator working outside the U.S. government who has seen the pictures told us. In 1993, U.S. officials allowed members of a United Nations Commission of Experts on War Crimes in Bosnia (the precursor organization to todays International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague), to inspect this evidence. But they were forbidden to make it public or even to keep or copy it because, they were told, to do so would jeopardize the classified methods by which it was obtained. Unlike Albrights pictures, the photographs of the blood 44 bath in Brcko remain unpublished to this day.

Elements of the Case In 1995, UN Ambassador Albright displayed images of Serbian massacres to the UN Security Council. The platform was the U-2. The chain of custody ran from the U.S. military command in Europe to the U.S. Mission to the UN. The images were intended as illustrative evidence to corroborate eyewitness accounts of the massacres. There was considerable internal debate about releasing the imagery. The images passed the "reasonable observer" test, and in fact met all three standards for use of evidence. Changes Over 36 years of IMINT Use From a Policy community point of view, then, the overall trend has been one of increasing willingness to release highly sensitive imagery intelligence for public inspection. This is only natural, and reflects other information breakthroughs, such as the Internet, which have tended to ease access to information which was formerly either classified or so obscure it could safely hide on library shelves. Now there is global 2444

Lane and Shanker, 2.

33

hour access to an astonishing wealth of words, sounds and pictures; it would be difficult to justify continued over-sensitivity to classification of IMINT products under the circumstances. In addition, the technological development of commercial imagery continues to accelerate. It is now possible to buy commercial images from space that no amount of money could have purchased in the 1970s.45 This is not to say, however, that release of IMINT can be assumed these days -- as the case of Brcko demonstrates, there are pressures not to release even during the 1990's. Today we are discovering that the possession of good intelligence-gathering capabilities leads some observers to expect perfection, not only in collection, but in analysis, dissemination, and the ability to predict and give warning. Every time pictures of the misdeeds of rogue states and terrorist groups are shown in public, it raises the expectation that such images will always be available when we need them. Even if there were such a thing as perfect intelligence collection, there is no guarantee that such information would be received by policymakers in time to make a difference in every case. The Policy community can fairly be blamed for the current state of high expectations concerning IMINT. As we have seen in this chapter, IMINT has been used for Allies and against enemies; for both foreign and domestic audiences; from both airplane and satellite platforms; and in theaters of war as varied as northern Russia and the Kuwaiti desert. The one universal seems to be that parties shown IMINT have accepted it as evidence (whether Libyan Ambassador Muntasser truly believed his country's MiGs were armed with under-wing roses is immaterial). We have, as a

Capt. Marc A. Viola, "Verification Implications of Commercial Satellite Imagery (U)," Studies in Intelligence 41, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 15.

45

34

consequence, played the Policy-use-of-IMINT card very often. We can thus be accused, with some justification, of causing our own problems. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the problems have only been compounded by vast improvements in computer and digital image technology.

35

CHAPTER 4: DIGITAL IS DIFFERENT

In his prophetic novel 1984 George Orwell imagined a sinister Records Department containing "elaborately equipped studios for the faking of photographs." What really happened in the 1980s was that elaborately equipped studios became unnecessary. It became possible for anybody with a personal computer to fake photographs. William J. Mitchell, The Reconfigured Eye

How far has technology taken digital imagery? Has the continuous advance in computer number-crunching power over the last four decades made a significant difference in digital image production? There has been an amazing increase in computing power available to the general public, which has had a major impact on the field of digital imagery. As a result, playing with reality has never been simpler for image-makers. The age-old concept that "seeing is believing" is under attack due to this digital revolution. This chapter examines some of the epistemological forces underlying our assumptions about images and reality. Finally, it examines some reasons why seasoned image experts might resist the idea that digital imagery is, in fact, different. Recent journal articles outline the changes in the profession of photography brought on by the digital revolution: It's been three and a half years since American Photo published its first special issue on the digital revolution in photography. In that issue, we spoke of the paradigm shift digital photography was bringing to the art and the industry of photography. Today we can say that the digital revolution is over. Technology and ideas that seemed exotic in 1994 are now mundane. As one commercial photographer told us recently, "A couple of years ago I couldn't imagine what I would do with a computer; now I can't imagine what I would do without one. Almost every other photographer I know has sunk $10,000 or more into digital

equipment." The paradigm has shifted, and there's no going back. The full implication of that change is only now becoming clear. As image-makers become more sophisticated at digitally altering pictures into seamless constructions that have nothing to do with reality, the objective "truth" of 46 photographs has become something of a quaint concept.

Another article highlights just how far the computer itself has advanced in the past decade: Tera is a prefix that means "trillion," which is a million million, and FLOPS is the abbreviation for "floating-point operations." Thus teraflops is computerese for "one trillion calculations." A one-teraflops computer performs one trillion calculations per second, which is mind-bogglingly fast in any language. Yet a machine three times as fast -- a three-teraflops supercomputer -- is now (1997) being developed by Cray Research and Silicon Graphics for the Department of Energy's famed Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. The new threeteraflops system will be the fastest computer on earth. Indeed, it will deliver more than 30 times the peak performance of all the Cray supercomputers sold in 1990. . . . The DOE has announced that its goal over the next decade is to have a computer system in place that can perform 100 trillion calculations per 47 second.

The fact that Silicon Graphics has purchased Cray Research and is now at the forefront of world supercomputing technology takes on added significance when one considers that Silicon Graphics is also at the forefront of digital graphic manipulation and its sister discipline, digital animation.48 Today's computer graphic effects will pale by comparison if and when Silicon Graphics/Cray Research brings a 100 teraflops machine on line. But is even such mind-numbing computing speed really significant? Are not digital images just a newer kind of photograph? Understanding the difference between

David Schonauer, "The Future Of Photography 1997," American Photo, November/December 1997, 47. Douglas Cruikshank, "The Fastest Computer on Earth," IRIS Universe 39 (Spring 1997): 16.
48 47

46

Randall Lane, "The Magician," Forbes, 11 March 1996, 128.

37

chemical photography and digital imagery is key to grasping the nature of the "digital revolution" that American Photo's editors referred to: Although a digital image may look just like a photograph when it is published in a newspaper, it actually differs as profoundly from a traditional photograph as does a photograph from a painting . . .The basic technical distinction between analog (continuous) and digital (discrete) representations is crucial here. Rolling down a ramp is continuous motion, but walking down stairs is a sequence of discrete steps -- so you can count the number of steps, but not the number of levels on the ramp . . . . A photograph is an analog representation of the differentiation of space in a scene: it varies continuously, both spatially and tonally . . . . But images are encoded digitally by uniformly subdividing the picture plane into a finite Cartesian grid of cells (known as pixels) and specifying the intensity or color of each cell by means of an integer number drawn from 49 some limited range.

This distinction is important enough to emphasize in detail: There is an indefinite amount of information in a continuous-tone photograph, so enlargement usually reveals more detail but yields a fuzzier and grainier picture. A digital image, on the other hand, has precisely limited spatial and tonal resolution and contains a fixed amount of information. Once a digital image is enlarged to the point where its gridded microstructure becomes visual, further enlargement will reveal nothing new: the discrete pixels retain their crisp, square 50 shapes and their original colors, and they simply become more prominent.

One important difference between analog and digital images relates to the relative difficulty of duplicating each type: The continuous spatial and tonal variation of analog pictures is not exactly replicable, so such images cannot be transmitted or copied without degradation . . . . But discrete images can be replicated precisely, so a digital image that is a thousand generations away from the original is indistinguishable in quality from any one of its progenitors. A digital copy is not a debased descendant but is 51 absolutely indistinguishable from the original.

49

William Mitchell, The Reconfigured Eye (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 5. Mitchell, 6. Mitchell, 6.

50

51

38

This in turn leads to another important difference, which arises from the quantized, discrete nature of the information stored in digital images: Here photography and digital imaging diverge strikingly, for the stored array of integers has none of the fragility and recalcitrance of the photograph's emulsioncoated surface . . . the essential characteristic of digital information is that it can be manipulated easily and very rapidly by computer. It is simply a matter of substituting new digits for old. Digital images are, in fact, much more susceptible to alteration than photographs, drawings, paintings, or any other kinds of 52 images.

In other words, the digital image is perfectly reproduceable: at will, at high speeds, and with no loss of quality from the first through the nth generation of copies. It is also malleable in a way that chemical photography is not: quickly and easily, using widely-available image-editing software packages. Playing With Reality These qualities have been repeatedly demonstrated in recent years as digital technology has increasingly pervaded the mass media. During the 1996 Virginia race for the U.S. Senate, Senator John Warner's re-election campaign ran a television (TV) ad in which challenger Mark Warner's head was superimposed on the body of Democratic Senator Charles Robb, making it appear that Mark Warner was shaking hands with former Governor Douglas Wilder and with President Clinton.53 In another example, Washington TV station WJLA superimposed "virtual" advertising images on the walls of Robert F. Kennedy Stadium during their transmission of a Redskins game.54 In Europe, whole TV series are being televised using "virtual sets" created by computer

52

Mitchell, 7.

Dan Lowrey, "Advertisement Grabs Attention in Senate Race," Loudon Times-Mirror, 16 October 1996, A8. Lorraine Woellert and Eric Fisher, "Preseason Projections Look Good For TV-only Ads," Washington Times, 6 August 1997, A1+.
54

53

39

in place of expensive studio sets. recent Jodie Foster film Contact.

55

President Clinton himself was inserted into the The witnesses in Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson's

56

civil trial got involved in the digital debate: Former FBI photo analyst Gerald Richards testified earlier that he could find no evidence that 31 pictures (of Simpson allegedly wearing the infamous Bruno Magli shoes) -- taken by two different photographers -- had been altered or substituted. But he acknowledged that someone with motivation could create 57 phony pictures impossible to detect.

Thus we can see that the doubts cast on photography's reliability by the availability of digital technology are already accepted public knowledge. When Is Seeing Believing? Why is it that the photograph has such power to convince? What is the source of what Professor Mitchell calls "the extraordinary tenacity of the camera's claims to credibility?"58 Or as he states: A photograph is fossilized light, and its aura of superior evidential efficacy has frequently been ascribed to the special bond between fugitive reality and permanent image that is formed at the instant of exposure. It is a direct physical imprint, like a fingerprint left at the scene of a crime or lipstick traces on your 59 collar. The correspondence with reality is thus causally established.

The analogy of a photograph to a fingerprint has long been accepted in courts -at least, that is, in the case of chemical photography, SSA Goodin of the FBI (Chapter 2) writes:
55

Francis Hamit, "Broadcasting's 'Virtual Studio': Virtual Sets Get Interactive," Advanced Imaging, March 1997, 10. Paul Bedard, "Clinton's Movie Role Rates a Thumbs Down At The White House," Washington Times, 15 July 1997, A1+.
57 56

"Testimony Ends in Simpson Trial," Washington Times, 17 January 1997, A1. Mitchell, 24. Mitchell, 24.

58

59

40

As a photographer and law enforcement officer I have a number of ways to maintain and prove the integrity of the image I am presenting in court. Also through the same tests I may challenge the authenticity of other images introduced as evidence. The reliability of conventional photography has led it to be termed the "silent witness" in court, and be admitted as evidence without collateral testimony. To admit a photograph into evidence, all that is needed is the testimony of a witness (not necessarily the photographer) who saw what was photographed and can affirm that it is a true and accurate representation of the 60 scene in question.

As Goodin points out, the camera has earned a special place in the courtroom. More generally, though, the photograph has achieved a special status among all types of representation -- sculpture, drawing, painting, etching, and others -- based on the claim to represent a moment in reality which Mitchell discusses. This in turn stems from the structure of human learning -- the mechanisms by which we absorb information, process it, and use it to our advantage in life. A Problem of Epistemology The power of the photograph stems from the nature of epistemology -- that is, of the way in which we learn. In an important study in 1984, David Kolb of Case Western Reserve University laid out his theory of "experiential learning": The process of experiential learning can be described as a four-stage cycle involving four adaptive learning modes -- concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization, and active experimentation. In this model, concrete experience/abstract conceptualization and active experimentation/reflective observation are two distinct dimensions, each representing two dialectically opposed adaptive orientations. The structural bases of the learning process lie in the transactions among these four adaptive modes and the way in which the adaptive dialectics get resolved. To begin with, notice that the abstract/concrete dialectic is one of prehension, representing two different and opposed processes of grasping or taking hold of experience in the world -- either through reliance on conceptual interpretation and symbolic representation, a process I will call comprehension, or through reliance on tangible, felt qualities of immediate experience, what I will call apprehension. The active/reflective dialectic, on the other hand, is one of transformation, representing two opposed ways of transforming that grasp or
60

Goodin, 2-3.

41

"figurative representation" of experience -- either through internal reflection, a process I will call intention, or active external manipulation of the external world, 61 here called extension.

Thus Kolb views learning as an eternal cycle of these four stages. The concrete experience we gain in life leads us to reflective observation, which in turn stimulates abstract conceptualization, which leads us to undertake active experimentation, which in turn provides us with new concrete experience: The central idea here is that learning, and therefore knowing, requires both a grasp or figurative representation of experience and some transformation of that representation. Either the figurative grasp or operative transformation alone is not sufficient. The simple perception of experience is not sufficient for learning; something must be done with it. Similarly, transformation alone cannot represent learning, for there must be something to be transformed, some state or experience that is being acted upon . . . . That there are two distinct modes of grasping experience may not be readily apparent, but it is a fact that can be easily demonstrated with but a little effort. What you see, hear, and feel around you are those sensations, colors, textures, and sounds that are so basic and reliable that we call them reality. All these things and many others you know instantaneously without need for rational inquiry or analytical confirmation. They are simply there, grasped through a mode of knowing here called 62 apprehension. The seminal (and understandable) mistake we make about imagery is, therefore, that we believe we apprehend reality when we view a photograph. This was never the case; it is much less so now that the digital revolution has occurred. Ultimately, it lies at the root of all misconceptions of the difference between chemical photography and digital imagery. Defending The Rice Bowl In the course of researching this thesis, the author encountered surprising resistance to the idea that IMINT is somehow susceptible to manipulation through image-editing technology, especially among long-serving IMINT professionals. As
61

David A. Kolb, Experiential Learning (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984) 40-41. Kolb, 42-43.

62

42

Modley, a 25-year veteran of the Intelligence Community (IC) put it, such defensiveness was natural: the author appeared to be "attacking my rice bowl."
63

According to

Modley, alterations to digital images could be detected: "The problem existed in the days of wet film, too; alteration might be easier these days, but after all, you don't let high-quality forgery stop you from printing legitimate currency."64 Asked how alterations could best be detected, the subject replied "through 'ground truth' -- by cross-checking suspect images against other sources for date and time sequence."65 An intermediate view exists, which holds that while trained image analysts can spot image alteration, the average person cannot: To untrained public opinion, however, photographic images constitute "undeniable proof." This "seeing is believing" philosophy is dangerous if anomalous assessments are allowed to affect national policy decisionmakers. Trained imagery interpreters, exploitation specialists, and analysts are the only 66 ones qualified to judge that what is perceived in an image is, in fact, real.

Another who shares this view is Dino Brugioni, a pioneer of image interpretation and author of the seminal work on the role of NPIC during the Cuban missile crisis (Chapter 3): The basic criteria for accurate photographic analysis have not changed. The imagery interpreter must apply all of his acumen and often a variety of sources to verify what he sees on the imagery before reporting his results. Above all, he must be sure of the facts. It is all too evident that the media in reporting recent events using aerial photography and multisensor imagery have done an extremely poor job. Aerial photography and multisensor imagery are too

63

Modley interview. Modley interview. Modley interview. Viola, 16.

64

65

66

43

important sources of information and credibility for the analysis to be left to 67 amateurs.

Both authors are correct: the diffusion of commercially-available imagery into the inexpert hands of the news media can lead to real problems of blundered analysis. Ignoring for the moment the point that, with one-meter resolution overhead imagery now available commercially, the "amateurs" will soon be second-guessing everything the IMINT community does, it must be pointed out that both authors have missed the forest for the trees. Yes, experts can do a better job of interpreting imagery than can the news media; but can even experts spot an expert digital alteration? William Melvin, an image analyst at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), who had been working with digital enhancement techniques for the past seven years as a daily part of his job, has his doubts. Asked if digital manipulation could be detected after the fact, he responded: Maybe. Unless we (NPIC) are doing the manipulation. You'd want to do an analysis of the area surrounding the suspect portion of an image, to reveal any statistically-significant differences between the foreground and background. If NPIC did the job, on the other hand, it might not be detectable by anybody.68

Asked how available the tools for digital manipulation were to the general public, he replied, "Your local computer store. Ask the Baltimore Orioles -- theyre doing realtime full-motion video substitution of ads on the outfield wall on TV monitors at Camden Yard."69 (For example, while Pepsi might be paying for wall signage at the park itself, Coke might hold video advertising rights -- so a Coke ad could get digitally
Dino Brugioni, "Satellite Images on TV: The Camera Can Lie," Washington Post, 14 December 1986, H1. William Melvin, image scientist at National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), interview by author, 8 May 1996.
69 68 67

Melvin interview.

44

superimposed over the Pepsi sign in right-center field for the benefit of cable viewers) Asked what security features or encryption technologies might be used to authenticate digital images, Melvin answered "None. Anything that can be done to authenticate an image digitally can be undone digitally. There are no automatic safeguards."70 This is not the same as the old "any code can be broken" argument. The contention here is that, because there is no verifiable original of a digital data file, substitutions can occur after an image has, for example, been transmitted from a satellite to a ground station and authenticated, but before it is released for Policy use. One set of 1's and 0's is as good as another, if there is no immediate opportunity to check the "ground truth."

New Digits For Old Another expert, Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems (co-inventor of private-key encryption for e-mail and Internet transmissions) agreed substantively with the NPIC image scientist. According to Diffie, the "authenticatibility" of a digital file lasts only until it arrives at a computer terminal -- after that, such a file is inherently suspect. If an image file is received from a satellite, for example, it must often be enhanced by applying various corrective algorithms before it can be understood as a picture. The very act of "enhancing" such a file, however, is indistinguishable from the act of fundamentally altering the content of the image.71 As Mitchell put it, it is simply a matter of substituting new digits for old: The self-authenticating nature of images is vanishing; in that sense, imagery is returning to a "state of nature." We're left with a separate mechanism for authentication, such as a digital signature (a packet of data which precedes

70

Melvin interview.

Whitfield Diffie, cryptographic and authentication expert at Sun Microsystems, telephone interview by author, 7 August 1995.

71

45

and/or follows the actual image file). Our confidence in the image then becomes 72 a function of our confidence in the digital signature process.

Even then, however, Diffie acknowledges problems: "Unfortunately, all you can 'sign' digitally is the raw data -- which must be enhanced to be of any use visually, which leaves us back at Square One."73 Diffie views the process as another step in the longterm evolution of society: We're building new societal structures, and we're going to need them soon. Early viewers of photographs in the 19th Century had to be educated about the evidentiary value of the new medium -- now we have to decrease the amount of trust we have in certain institutions, such as the image. What authentication comes down to now is trust. The person who controls the chain of evidence has great power to persuade. We're in a situation now where no one can "check the footnotes", because they can be erased and substituted. The provenance of a 74 computer file is impossible to determine once the chain of custody is broken.

The Forms of Fakery There are three sorts of fraud when altering images: adding, deleting or interchanging identifying elements. The figures which follow correspond to these three types of fakery. Figure 4 (page 49) is a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) image, taken from the Hubble Space Telescope, of a "starfield" where galaxies are being born. Figure 5 (page 50) demonstrates how the "truth" of the previous figure (which must in any event be taken on faith to represent current "truth", as the light which reaches the Hubble telescope from this particular starfield is over seven thousand years old) can be changed through addition -- by creating more stars than are actually there. Figure 6 (page 51) is the opposite effect, lying by subtraction: whole galaxies have been digitally erased. Figure 7 (page 52) demonstrates that transposition of elements
72

Diffie interview. Diffie interview. Diffie interview.

73

74

46

can also produce a lie, by moving the star formations relative to each other with a digital cut-and-paste function. Having reviewed the legal standards for image evidence, the history of IMINT use by the Policy community, and the implications of the digital revolution in photography, the remaining question to be answered is how society must learn to adapt to the realities of the digital age -- after all, as an IMINT expert noted above, expert forgery is no reason to abandon legitimate currency. Neither, of course, is it any reason to ignore the technologies available for detecting fakes -- in currency or images.

47

Figure 4: Starfield

48

Figure 5: Addition

49

Figure 6: Subtraction

50

Figure 7: Transposition

51

CHAPTER 5: MAINTAINING CREDIBILITY IN A DIGITAL WORLD

We understand that the artist is projecting a possible world, not reporting on the actual one. Like Sir Phillip Sydney's poet, "he nothing affirms, and therefore never lieth." William J. Mitchell, The Reconfigured Eye

Synthesis and Findings The preceding chapters have attempted to demonstrate that it is no longer possible to accept an image as evidence for national security policy use without reference to outside corroborative evidence. To summarize, there are three standards for the use of IMINT as evidence: military, policy and legal. The policy standard has been characterized by the "reasonable observer" test for use of IMINT before an international forum such as the UN Security Council. Digital imagery, however, has negated the "reasonable observer" test. Due to advances in computing power and digital imagery technology, it is no longer possible for even an expert observer to tell whether a given image has been manipulated. Thus, any use of IMINT in front of the "court of world opinion" without corroborating evidence may be rejected by skeptical observers familiar with the state of the digital imagery art. Implications The questions raised by digital technology are having repercussions throughout society. From a philosophical point of view, the new digital medium can have remarkable consequences:

52

Thus (digital images) can be used to yield new forms of understanding, but they can also disturb and disorient by blurring comfortable boundaries and by encouraging transgression of rules on which we have come to rely . . . (digital imagery) is relentlessly destabilizing the old photographic orthodoxy, denaturing the established rules of graphic communication, and disrupting the familiar practices of image production and exchange. For a century and a half photographic evidence seemed unassailably probative. Chemical photography's temporary standardization and stabilization of the process of image making served the purposes of an era dominated by science, exploration, and industrialization . . . but the emergence of digital imaging has irrevocably subverted these certainties, forcing us to adopt a far more wary and more vigilant interpretive stance . . . an interlude of false innocence has 75 passed.

In the legal field, the same "new forms of understanding" are having more concrete effects: Christine A. Gilshan, in her article "A Picture is Worth A Thousand Lies: Electronic Imaging and the Future of the Admissibility of Photographs Into Evidence," sees so much potential mischief in digital cameras and computerbased processing that (she believes) a change of the Federal Rules of Evidence is in order. The possibility of creating virtually undetectable changes in an evidentiary photograph should result in allowing into evidence only photographs 76 that can be authenticated by the photographer.

Thus the solution to the digital dilemma is, in the short term, a greater reliance on all-source intelligence to back up the claims made by IMINT. Where possible, it will be necessary to provide multiple credible sources to establish the authenticity of a given image. Or to view it another way, the image will now support other forms of testimony, reverting to its original illustrative role as evidence, its usefulness as "silent witness" destroyed by the revolution in digital imagery manipulation. The one area where digital imagery has made no difference in employing standards of evidence is the military arena, where digital imagery has simply meant getting targeting data to the warfighter much faster. The standard of evidence remains
75

Mitchell, The Reconfigured Eye, 223-225.

53

unchanged as a result of the digital revolution -- the warfighter bombs on suspicion, not after accumulating a preponderance of evidence. A final implication was suggested during the research for this thesis -- the ability to grasp the meaning of the digital revolution may vary by generation. The average age of the digital experts consulted tended to be 10-15 years younger than that of their intelligence counterparts who had spent long careers working with "wet film". This is a natural consequence of the development of the microcomputer industry in the 1980's and the first appearance of commercial digital cameras at affordable prices in the early 1990's -- just as digital image technology is young, so are many of its proponents. This may have something to do with the varying receptivity of groups of experts from different disciplines to the thesis question. Suggested Actions How are the Intelligence and Policy Communities to cope with the "new forms of understanding" that Mitchell refers to? As Mitchell and Goodin argue above, some changes are in order. If it is no longer safe to assume that a photograph is telling the truth, then society will have to react to the new circumstances. Before the 1920s, photographs rarely appeared in newspapers. Instead, artists were employed to draw (sometimes fanciful) renderings of everything from the Jesse James gang to the sinking of the USS Maine in 1898. It may be necessary for the public to learn to view digital images the same way readers once regarded the newspaper drawings -- as something which points to the truth, but cannot be assumed to represent it perfectly. The IC's choices are somewhat more difficult. Speaking truth to power is not only a clich for the proper role of Intelligence -- it is arguably its only legitimate role. An IMINT product must be above suspicion; yet as Mitchell and others have demonstrated,

76

Goodin, 11-12.

54

a digital image in and of itself cannot be trusted. Despite what "rice bowl" imagery experts think, the proposed solution is not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Rather, it lies in understanding that imagery has "fallen back into the pack" of intelligence disciplines. An image will no longer be sufficient in many cases to prove a fact to a skeptical observer -- corroboration will not be a useful luxury, but rather an absolute essential. Where circumstances render it impossible to present more than IMINT as proof in international fora, it will be necessary to rely on our reputation for telling the truth in such cases. This will not be sufficient for all potential "jurors," but may be all we have left to rely on in the absence of corroborative evidence. Again, this is largely our own fault for having developed the technical wizardry needed to make a series of 1's and 0's show whatever we want them to. Relying on our track record of credibility also depends on maintaining that credibility. The first time the U.S. government is caught distorting the truth in such circumstances, our 36 years of truthfulness displaying IMINT in the UN Security Council and other fora will be undone. A necessary first step to changing the over-reliance of the Policy community on IMINT will involve a major educational effort by the IC, directed in the first instance at the NSC and senior State Department officials. Once policymakers understand the hazards of sole-source intelligence, much of the danger will have been eliminated.

55

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahn, Peter. Image Enhancement Techniques for Electro-Optical Sensors. M.E. Thesis. Pomona, CA: California State Polytechnic University, 1989. Air Force Photo Web Site. URL: <http://www.af.mil/photos/>. Accessed 22 January 1998. Andrew, Christopher. For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush. New York: HarperCollins, 1995. Banner, Allen V., Andrew J. Young, and Keith W. Hall. Aerial Reconnaissance for Verification of Arms Limitation Agreements. New York: United Nations, 1990. Barlow, Horace, Colin Blakemore, and Miranda Weston-Smith, eds. Images and Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Bedard, Paul. "Clinton's Movie Role Rates a Thumbs Down At The White House." Washington Times, 15 July 1997, A1+. Benson, Robert L. and Michael Warner (eds.) Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response 1939-1957. Washington. National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Betts, Richard K. Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. Washington: Brookings, 1982. Bloomer, Carolyn M. Principles of Visual Perception. New York: Design Press, 1990. Brugioni, Dino A. "Satellite Images on TV: The Camera Can Lie." The Washington Post, 14 December 1986, H1. . Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile crisis. New York: Random House, 1991. Central Imagery Office. U.S. Imagery Service Policy Update (U). 15 June1995. 1-3. Central Intelligence Agency. "Verification Implications of Commercial Satellite Imagery (U)." Studies in Intelligence 41, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 15-19. Chang, Lawrence and Peter Kornbluh (eds.) The Cuban Missile crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader. New York: New Press, 1992.

56

Claflin, Edward B. (ed.) JFK Wants to Know: Memos From the President's Office 19611963. New York: William Morrow, 1991. Cruikshank, Douglas. The Fastest Computer on Earth. IRIS Universe 39 (Spring 1997): 16-18. Desert Storm Imagery Gallery. URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/desert/htm>. Accessed 30 July 1997. Diffie, Whitfield. Cryptographic and authentication expert at Sun Microsystems. Telephone interview by author, 7 August 1995. Goodin, Douglas A. Image Security and Integrity. Paper presented at a series of 1996 briefings on data security at FBI headquarters. Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1996. . Imagery authentication and data security expert at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Telephone interview by author, 12 March 1997. Green, William B. Head of digital processing laboratory at NASAs Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Interview with author, 21 April 1997. Hamit, Francis. "Broadcasting's 'Virtual Studio': Virtual Sets Get Interactive." Advanced Imaging, March 1997: 10-14. Heikal, Mohamed. The Road to Ramadan. New York: Quadrangle, 1975. Hilsman, Roger. The Cuban Missile crisis: The Struggle Over Policy. Westport, CN: Praeger, 1996. Hungarian MiG-21 Homepage. URL: <http://www.edasz.hu/cgi-bin/pirit/mig21>. Accessed 30 July 1997. Jensen, John R. Introductory Digital Image Processing. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986. Jones, CDR Cecil B. Jr., USN (Ret.) "Photographic Satellite Reconnaissance." Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute 106, no. 6 (June 1980): 42-51. Kissinger, Henry A. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Kolb, David A. Experiential Learning. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984. Kurth, Peter. Anastasia: The Life of Anna Anderson. New York: Fontana/Collins, 1985. Lancaster, John. Perry Presses U.S. Charges Against Libya. Washington Post, 4 April 1996, Sec. A21.

57

Lane, Charles, and Thom Shanker. Bosnia: What the CIA Didnt Tell Us. New York Review of Books, 9 May 1996, 14-17. Lane, Randall. The Magician. Forbes, 11 March 1996, 123-128. Language of Images, The. Ed. William J. Mitchell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Lillesand, Thomas M., and Ralph W. Kiefer. Remote Sensing and Image Interpretation. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979. Lohr, Steve. Woody and Buzz, The Untold Story: Could Pixar Make it Without Disney? New York Times, 24 February 1997, Sec. B1-4. Lorre, Jean J. Application of Digital Image Processing Techniques to Astronomical Imagery. Pasadena, CA: NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1977. Lowrey, Dan. "Advertisement Grabs Attention in Senate Race." Loudon Times-Mirror, 16 October 1996, A8. Massie, Robert K. The Romanovs: The Final Chapter. New York: Random House, 1995. Matte, Nicolas Mateesco, and Hamilton DeSaussure, eds. Legal Implications of Remote Sensing From Outer Space. Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1976. May, Ernest R., and Philip Zelikow. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile crisis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. Melvin, William. Image analyst at National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Interview by author, 8 May 1996. Mitchell, William J. The Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in the Post-Photographic Era. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992. Modley, Peter. Chief of the Collections Guidance Center in the Office of Intelligence Resources, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/IRE/CGC). Interview by author, 31 May 1996. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Jet Propulsion Laboratory Regional Planetary Image Facilities. URL: <http://wwwpds.wust1.edu/rpif/>. Accessed 24 May 1996. . Jet Propulsion Laboratory Science Data Processing Systems Section. URL: <http://www-mipl.jpl.nasa.gov/~skl/HOME388/home388.html>. Accessed 14 May 1997. Naugle, B. I. Digital Image Enhancement of Satellite Data. Vicksburg, MS: U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, 1991.

58

OHandley, Douglas A., and William B. Green. Recent Developments in Digital Image Processing at the Image Processing Laboratory at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Proc. IEEE 60 (July 1972): 821-828. Paola, Justin, D. Neural Networks for Multispectral Image Classification. URL: http//www-dial.ece.arizona.edu/dial-home.html (accessed 20 February 1996). . Digital Image expert at University of Arizonas Digital Imagery Analytical Laboratory (DIAL). Telephone Interview by author, 7 March 1996. Richelson, Jeffrey T. America's Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program. New York: Harper & Row, 1990. Ruffner, Kevin C. "CORONA and the Intelligence Community." Studies in Intelligence, online version, URL: <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies /96unclas/corona.htm>. Accessed 14 January 1998. Schonauer, David. "The Future of Photography 1997." American Photo, November/December 1997, 47. Sheppard, Rob. Letter to the Editor. U.S. News & World Report, 23 February 1998, 4. Sherbert, Linda. Camera Obscura. Or Else. Washington Post, 20 August 1995, Sec. F. Simpson, Lindsay. The Lying Eye. Melbourne Age Good Weekend, 31 July 1993, pp. 18-22. An unclassified source, retired mid-level intelligence professional formerly seconded to the United States Mission to the United Nations, who wishes to remain anonymous. Interview by author, 27 June 1996. Strong, John William, ed. McCormick on Evidence. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1992. "Testimony ends in Simpson Trial." Washington Times, 17 January 1997, A1. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary. DoD Policy on Alteration of Official Photographic and Video Imagery. Issued as ALDODACT 03-95, 032030Z FEB 95. Varieties of Thinking. Ed. V. A. Howard. New York: Routledge, 1990. Viola, Marc A., Capt, USAF. "Verification Implications of Commercial Satellite Imagery." Studies In Intelligence 41, no. 2 (1997): 15-19. Weinstein, Jack B., and Margaret A. Berger. Weinsteins Evidence. New York: Mathew Bender, 1989.

59

Woellert, Lorraine, and Eric Fisher. Preseason Projections Look Good for TV-Only Ads. Washington Times, 6 August 1997, A1. Zeki, Semir. "The Visual Image in Mind and Brain." Scientific American, September 1992, 69-159.

60