LEGAL PROFESSION

CAYETANO V MONSOD PARAS; September 3, 1991

NATURE Petition to review decision of Commission on Appointments FACTS - April 25, 1991 Atty. Christian Monsod was appointed by Pres. Aquino as Chairman of COMELEC - Rene Cayetano opposed such appointment as citizen and taxpayer because Monsod allegedly does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years - June 18, 1991 Monsod took his oath of office - Monsods credentials > member of Philippine Bar since 1960 > after bar, worked in law office of his father > 1963-1970 in World Bank Group as operations officer in Costa Rica and Panama involves getting acquainted with laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic and project work > 1970 in Meralco Group as CEO of investment bank > since 1986 rendered service to various companiesas legal and economic consultant or CEO > 1986-1987 secretary-general and national chairman of NAMFREL (election law) > co-chairman of Bishops Businessmens Conference for Human Development > 1990 - Davide Commission quasi-judicial body > 1986-1987 member of Constitutional Commission as Chairman on Accountability of Public Officers - AIX-C Sec1(1) - Commission on Elections chairman shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years - no jurisprudence on what constitutes the practice of law ISSUE WON Monsod is qualified as Chairman of COMELEC in fulfilling the requirement engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years HELD YES. Practice of Law means any activity, in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Monsod as lawyereconomist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, lawyernegotiator, and lawyer-negotiator is proof he is engaged in practice of law for more than 1- years - Blacks Law Dictionary > Rendition of service requiring the knowledge and application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent > not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and giving all legal advice to clients - Land Title Abstract and Trust Co v Dworken > one who in representative capacity engages in business of advising clients as to their rights under law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court - UP Law Center > advocacy, counseling, public service - Alexander SyCip > appearance of lawyer in litigation is most publicly familiar role of lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer > more legal work is transacted in law offices that in the courtrooms > business counseling than trying cases; as planner, diagnostician, trial lawyer, surgeon - article on Business Star > emerging trends in corporate law

A2010
NARVASA [concur]
- concur only in the result

PROF. JARDELEZA

PADILLA [dissent]
- Practice refers to actual performance of application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes active, habitual, repeated or customary action TF lawyer employed as business executive or corporate manager, other than head of Legal Department cannot be said to be in the practice of law - People v Villanueva > Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind - Commission on Appointments memorandum > practice of law requires habituality, compensation, application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure, and attorney-client relationship

CRUZ [dissent]
- sweeping definition of practice of law as to render the qualification practically toothless - there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe - performance of any acts in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law which tells us absolutely nothing

GUTIERREZ [dissent]
- practice is envisioned as active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal or extemporaneous - nothing in the bio-data even remotely indicates Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation - difficult if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law - Monsod was asked if he ever prepared contracts for parties in real-estate transaction; he answered very seldom - Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denominations of practice of law

SANTUYO V HIDALGO CORONA; January 17, 2005

NATURE Administrative case in SC for Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty FACTS - Petitioners Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and notarial law - In Dec 1991, couple purchased parcel of land covered by deed of sale - It was allegedly notarized by Hidalgo and entered in his notarial register - Six years later, couple had dispute with Danilo German over ownership of said land; German presented an affidavit executed by Hidalgo denying authenticity of his signature on deed of sale Petitioners' Claim - Hidalgo overlooked the fact that deed of sale contained ALL the legal formalities of a duly notarized document (including impression of his notarial dry seal) - Santuyos could not have forged the signature, not being learned in technicalities surrounding notarial act - They had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and they could not have made any imprint of his seal or signature.

SEPARATE OPINION

LEGAL PROFESSION
Respondents' Comments - He denied having notarized any deed of sale for disputed property. - He once worked as junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office; and admitted that he notarized several documents in that office. - As a matter of procedure, documents were scrutinized by senior lawyers, and only with their approval could notarization be done. - In some occasions, secretaries (by themselves) would affix dry seal of junior associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law firm. - He normally required parties to exhibit community tax certificates and to personally acknowledge documents before him as notary public. - He knew Editha, but only met Benjamin in Nov 1997 (Meeting was arranged by Editha so as to personally acknowledge another document) - His alleged signature on deed of sale was forged (strokes of a lady) - At time it was supposedly notarized, he was on vacation. ISSUES 1. WON the signature of respondent on the deed of sale was forged 2. WON respondent is guilty of negligence HELD 1. Yes. Ratio The alleged forged signature was different from Hidalgos signatures in other documents submitted during the investigation. Reasoning Santuyos did not state that they personally appeared before respondent. They were also not sure if he signed the document; only that his signature appeared on it. They had no personal knowledge as to who actually affixed the signature. 2. Yes. Ratio He was negligent for having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the office secretaries, including safekeeping of dry seal and making entries in notarial register. Reasoning Responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive, and respondent should have been more discreet and cautious. Disposition Atty. Hidalgo is suspended from his commission as notary public for two (2) years for negligence in the performance of duties as notary public.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

Goco. The check was received and cashed by the the latter by virtue of the SPA notarized by Ariola. Respondents' Comments - Respondent explained that as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Therefore, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it. - Moreover, the suit should be dismissed for forum shopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Which complaints were dismissed because the assailed act referred to violation of the IRR of the Commission on Audit. - The Court, in its resolution dated March 12, 2003, referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP recommended that respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year. ISSUES WON acts of respondent amounted to a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD Ratio The act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibits engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.. Reasoning The undisputed facts show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. The notarial acknowledgment of respondent declared that Benitez appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his clear and voluntary act. Clearly respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. - Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. Disposition WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman.

SICAT V ARIOLA, JR. PER CURIAM; April 15, 2005

NATURE Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS - In an affidavit-complaint, complainat Arturo Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney(SPA) purportedly executed by one Juanito C. Benitez According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000. - He alleged that prior to notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost houses(project worth=11M). For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of 3.7M, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar

UI V BONIFACIO DE LEON; June 8, 2000

NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS Mrs. Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Bonifacio on the ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying on an illicit relationship with her husband Mr. Ui. In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Bonifacio attached a photocopy of a marriage certificate that said that she and Mr. Ui got married in 1985, but according to the certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they were married in 1987. She claims that she entered the relationship with Mr. Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Mr. Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him. ISSUE WON Atty. Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law

LEGAL PROFESSION
HELD - No. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. One of the conditions prior to the admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice. Otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. - A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, which has been defined as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. Lawyers, as keepers of the public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their affairs with great caution. Atty. Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Mr. Ui, clothed as it was with what she believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. - A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also behave himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Atty. Bonifacios act of immediately distancing herself from Mr. Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she fad no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. On the matter of the falsified certificate of marriage, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable that she did not know the year of her marriage or that she failed to check that the information in the document which she attached to her Answer were correct. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the bar, free from misdeeds and acts of malpractice.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

ISSUE WON the facts constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of Barranco from the legal profession HELD No. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless acts which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. - Barrancos engaging in premarital sexual relations with Figueroa and promises to marry suggest a doubtful moral character on his part but it does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. - Barranco and Figueroa were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. - Respondent, at the time of this decision, is already 62. Disposition Petition is dismissed. Simeon Barranco, Jr. is allowed to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of proper fees.

BARRIOS V MARTINEZ PER CURIAM; November 12, 2004

FACTS - Atty. Martinez was convicted of a violation of BP 22 - Complainant submitted Resolution dated March 13, 1996, and the Entry of judgment dated March 20, 1996 in an action for disbarment against Martinez - July 3, 1996 the Court required respondent to comment on said petition within 10 days from notice - February 17, 1997 a second resolution was issued requiring respondent to show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to comply with the earlier Resolution and to submit Comment - July 7, 1997 the Court imposed a fine of P1000 for respondents failure to comply with previous resolution within 10 days - April 27, 1998 the Court fined the respondent an additional P2000 and required him to comply with the resolution under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of 5 days or until his compliance - February 3, 1999 the Court declared respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec 3(b) of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid resolution - April 5, 1999 NBI reported that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on March 26, 1999 but was subsequently released after having shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of February 17, 1997 and April 27, 1998 by remitting the amount of P2000 and submitting his overdue Comment: 1. He failed to respond to the Resolution dated February 17, 1997 as he was at that time undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte 2. Complainant passed away sometime in June 1997 3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in respondents favor. Respondent avers that as a result of his moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family of complainant, the latter filed the present administrative case - September 11, 1997 Robert Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter to the First Division Clerk of Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case before the RTC of Tacloban City, as well as a civil case involving the victims of the Dona Paz tragedy in 1987 for which the RTC of Basey, Samar rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed by the CA. - June 16, 1999 the Court referred the present case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation

FIGUEROA V BARRANCO, JR. ROMERO; July 31, 1997

FACTS - In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Barranco passed the 1970 bar exams on the fourth attempt. - Figueroa avers that she and Barranco had been sweethearts, that a child was born to them out of wedlock and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her. - Figueroa and Barranco were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo and were steadies since 1953. Figueroa first acceded to sexual congress in 1960. A son, Rafael Barranco, was born on Dec 11, 1964. Barranco promised to marry Figueroa after he passes the bar exams. Their relationship continued, with more than 20 or 30 promises of marriage. Barranco gave only P10 for the child on Rafaels birthdays. In 1971, Figueroa learned Barranco married another woman. - From 1972 to 1988, several motions to dismiss and comments were filed. - On Sept 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath. - Nov 17, 1988, the Court, in response to Figueroas opposition, resolved to cancel Barrancos scheduled oath-taking. - June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the IBP. On May 17, 1997, IBP recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath

LEGAL PROFESSION
- The report of IBP stated: 1. Respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died and that dismissal is warranted because the case filed by him does not survive due to his demise as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death. The IBP disagrees, pursuant to Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the SC or the IBP may initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer which requires disciplinary sanctions. 2. Propensity to disregard orders of the SC, as shown by respondent, is an utter lack of good moral character 3. Respondents conviction of a crime of moral turpitude clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him 4. It is recommended that respondent be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys immediately - September 27, 2003 the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner - December 3, 2003 Atty. Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation - January 14, 2004 the Court required the complainant to file a comment within 10 days - February 16, 2004 complainants daughter sent a Manifestation and Motion alleging they have not been furnished with a copy of respondents Motion ISSUE WON the crime respondent was convicted of is one involving moral turpitude HELD Yes. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. - The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law is also untenable. The practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. - Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice them. - The court is also disinclined to take respondents old age and the fact that he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, the respondent was held to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, and his conduct should be above reproach. - The Court based the determination of the penalty from previously decided cases, holding that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime of moral turpitude. Disposition Respondent was disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

Administrative Matter. Disbarment FACTS - Senator Aquilino Pimentel filed this disbarment case against Attys. Antonio Llorente (election officer of COMELEC and chairman of the Board) and Ligaya Salayon (ex officio vicechairman) for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust and violation of the lawyers oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. - Pimentel alleges that respondents: Respondents tampered with the votes he received Statement of votes show that other candidates were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received and his votes were reduced (dagdag-bawas =p) In 101 precints, Enriles votes were in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein The votes from 22 precints were twice recorded in 18 statements of votes. - PIMENTEL: The respondents committed a serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers oath by signing the statements of votes (SoVs) despite their knowledge that some of the entries were false. - RESPONDENTS: The errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight and /or fatigue. - IBP recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. - Pimentel also filed criminal charges against the two before the COMELEC which dismissed said charges for insufficiency of evidence. - The SC, upon Pimentels petition for certiorari, directed the COMELEC to file appropriate charges against respondents. ISSUE 1. WON a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139 B, section 12 C (within 15 day period) since the petition was filed late 2. WON the respondents are guilty of misconduct HELD 1. NO Reasoning - In Halimao v. Villanueva: Although Rule 139-B, sec 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. - It appears that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of the SC was received. It is the burden of the respondent to show that the complainant filed the petition was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it. - Even if Pimentel received the IBP resolution in question was filed 2 days late, the delay may be overlooked. - Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. - The complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest, in the outcome except as all citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy or prescription or with procedure like verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions have no application to disbarment proceedings. 2. YES Reasoning - In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clearly preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. - SC: What is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of erroneous figures in or two statements of votes but a systematic scheme to pad

PIMENTEL, HR V LLORENTE MENDOZA; August 29, 2000 (edel cruz)

NATURE

LEGAL PROFESSION
the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. - Despite the fact that these discrepancies were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. This constitutes misconduct. - Only the respondents had access to the SoVs and the CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies therein so it is irrelevant that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals. - A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharged of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. - By certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, the respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code, which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By lawyers express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as to do no falsehood. - As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to observe the basic tenet of the profession (to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor) because a public office is a public trust. Disposition Respondents participation in the irregularities reflects on the legal profession. This merits a suspension but since this is their first transgression, a fine is sufficient. Fine of 10,000 Php for each for misconduct.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, using the name Fely Cordova. - Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while failing to support his legitimate family. - On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig - Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family. - In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter along with him - Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complainants, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The RTC of Bislig, gave her custody of their children. - Notwithstanding respondent's promise to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family. ISSUE WON the recent reconciliation of the Cordovas and the failure of the complainant to pursue the case have dismissed the case. HELD The most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent earn carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. Ratio - An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. - The lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community. Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.

CORDOVA V CORDOVA PER CURIAM; November 29, 1989 (giulia pineda)

NATURE Administrative case in the SC for Immorality of a member of the Bar FACTS - Savacion Delizo Cordova sent an unsworn letter-complaint to then CJ Teehankee charging her husband Atty. Laurence Cordova with immorality and acts unbecoming of a member of the Bar. The complaint was forwarded to the IBP, Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and investigation. - The Commission required the complainant to submit a verified complain to which she complied and submitted on Sept 27, 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband. - On Dec 16, she was required to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte. She requested for the rescheduling several times. The hearings never took place as she failed to appear. - The respondent never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices were sent to him. - In a telegraphic message dated Apr 6, the complainant informed the commission that she and her husband have already reconciled. - In an order dated Apr 17, 1989, the Commission required the parties to appear before it for the confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and to file formal motion to dismiss the complaint. Neither responded and nothing was heard from either party since then. The findings of the IBP Board of Governors: - Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. - In 1985, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of RTC of Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado.

SORIANO V DIZON PER CURIAM; January 25, 2006 (romy ramirez)

NATURE Administrative case for disbarment FACTS - Respondent, Atty. Manuel Dizon, was convicted by final judgment by the RTC of Baguio City for frustrated murder. He applied and was granted probation by the said court based on several conditions which included among others the satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver who was rendered paralyzed on the left side of the body as a result of his being shot by the defendant.

LEGAL PROFESSION
- The defendant despite the condition that he pay the civil liabilities imposed on him as a condition for the probation, appealed said civil liability to the Court of Appeals. - From the records of the trial court, it appears that defendant was drunk at the time of the incident and that the case arose out of the apparent resentment of the defendant from having been overtaken by the victim who was then driving a taxi. From the testimony of a witness, it further appears that the taxi driver was merely defending himself and that defendant was the aggressor during said incident. - Upon the complaint for the disbarment filed by Soriano against Dizon, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines rendered its report and recommendation which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. The Commssion recommended the disbarment of the defendant for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for exhibiting an obvious lack of good moral character. ISSUES 1. WON Dizons crime of frustrated murder involves moral turpitude and that his guilt warrants disbarment HELD Ratio - The totality of the facts of the case unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. Given that membership in the legal profession demands a high degree of good moral character not only as a condition to admission but also a continuing requirement for the practice of law, the defendant has shown in all his actuations that he lacks the fitness to remain in the law profession. Reasoning - Not all cases involving homicide involves moral turpitude. The question as to what may be a crime involving moral turpitude would depend on the individual facts surrounding the case and the surrounding circumstances. - In the case at bar, it was shown that Dizon was the aggressor as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The actuations of the victim in this case can be considered as reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the attack of Dizon. - The defendants use of an unlicensed firearm and his refusal to satisfy his civil liability to the victim is a serious transgression of Canon 1 of the code of Professional Responsibility. - Defendant has continuously display his dishonest and duplicitous behavior by first seeking to arrive at an out of court settlement with the family and when the same failed, making it appear that it was the family would sought a conference with him. He also lied to the court by claiming that he incident was the result of the mauling he got at the hands of the victim and two other persons. This story was belied by the physical evidence as testified to by no less than three doctors. Disposition Manuel Dizon is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

complainants son. Since then, the respondent became a close family friend. -On January 7, 1994, the complainant and the respondent got married in a civil wedding, with all the essential and formal requisites present. -On the afternoon of their wedding day, the respondent fetched the complainant from her house in QC to stay in the respondents condo unit. There was a phone call and when the complainant answered, a woman was on the other end of the line offending the complainant with insulting remarks. The complainant confronted the respondent about the caller and the confrontation ended up in a heated exchange of words, to the point where the respondent said to the complainant, Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, 'yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko'. Get that marriage contract and have it burned." With that, the complainant left the respondent and after that, they never contacted each other again. -Several months after, in a bible study session, the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the bible group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between the respondent and a certain Lydia Geraldez. After hearing that, on June 6, 1995 the complainant filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A"). -On August 7, 1995, when complainant discovered that the respondent falsified his marriage contract (Exh C.) dated May 10, 1994 by stating that he is single, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1"). The complainant also presented the Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B"), the Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1"). Respondents claim The respondent claimed that he only voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract bet. Him and the complainant in an effort to help the complainant in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her legal researcher in 1993 and that their marriage was just a sham marriage -Also, he claims that when he got married to the complainant, his first marriage with Librada Pea was still subsisting because the decision declaring its annulment had not yet become final and executory (required publication not yet done), as certified by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4"). ISSUE WON the respondent is guilty of gross immorality and grave misconduct? HELD YES, respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. Ratio The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law Reasoning The respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. A former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong, if granted that he was just helping the complainant in the administrative case filed against her. -The respondent gave his voluntary consent to the marriage, and with all the legal requisites for the marriage present, he should have known that his marriage with the complainant was valid. -the respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Pea had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by

CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES V VILLALUZ REGALADO; June 19, 1997 (cha mendoza)
NATURE Petition for the disbarment on the grounds of grossly immoral and grave misconduct FACTS -Complainant is the presiding judge of Branch 108 of the RTC of Pasay City while respondent is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime Commission, and a retired justice of the Court of Appeals -Complainant was widowed by the presumption of death of her 1st husband, upon a decree of presumption of death after 16year absence -Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1977when respondent was the presiding judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig for the murder case involving the death of the

LEGAL PROFESSION
second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled. Disposition WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter. SO ORDERED.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN PER CURIAM; November 25, 2003 (boots tirol)

NATURE RESOLUTION of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court FACTS -Joseph Estrada, through Atty Alan Paguia, filed a Petition for Certiorari under the Rules of Court against Sandiganbayan, which prayed 1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding the petition; 2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and 3.That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. -Atty Paguia, speaking for Estrada, asserted that the inhibition of the members of the SC from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contended that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo is, according to petitioner, a patent mockery of justice and due process. -The SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit (Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion) and the SC warned Atty Paguia of his conduct -- his attacks on the Court and making public statements on the case (violating Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility). He was given 10 days SHOW CAUSE why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court. - On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court (for discussion on political partisanship please see original case), and continued to make public statements about Estradas case. ISSUES WON Atty Paguia should be suspended from the practice of law HELD YES. -Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice. -The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if wellfounded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of the peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by

those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines. -The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Courts well-meant admonition. The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed. Disposition Atty Paguia indefinitely suspended from the practice of law

ZALDIVAR V GONZALES PER CURIAM; October 7, 1988 (joey capones)

NATURE Petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan FACTS Enrique A. Zaldivar had a pending case for graft and corruption in the Sandiganbayan initiated by Tanodbayan Gonzalez. Zaldivar filed a petition in the SC alleging that Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence the information filed in his criminal cases were all null and void. The SC issued a temporary restraining order. Petitioner later filed another petition because Gonzalez filed additional criminal charges against petitioner and five other individuals. Gonzalez instituted another criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. Four days later, the SC issued another TRO. Zaldivar then filed a petition to cite in contempt Special Prosecutor Gonzalez for filing new information before the Sandiganbayan and for making contemptuous statements to the media. In a news art in the Phil Daily Globe, Gonzalez made the ff. statements: (1) while the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the SC, its difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course, (2) while Pres. Aquino had been prodding him to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty, the SC had been restraining him, (3) while he doesnt wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the SC, He was disturbed that the order can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial. The SC ordered the nullification of the criminal cases and for Gonzalez to cease and desist from further acting on Zaldivars case In the motion for reconsideration, Gonzales claimed that 3 handwritten notes, sent by some members of the SC interceding for cases pending before his office, were in his possession. He said that he doubts whether the judges will remain impartial to him, there being at least 4 members who definitely wont, and prayed that these 4 inhibit themselves in the deliberation. When this was denied, he filed a motion to transfer administrative proceedings to the IBP. He also released statements to the press saying, in effect, that the SC deliberately rendered an erroneous decision, that members of the SC have improperly pressured him to render decisions favorable to their friends and colleagues, and that the Sc dismisses judges without rhyme or reason and disbars lawyers without due process. Gonzalez didnt deny he said/wrote those statements. His defense is that he was just exercising his freedom of speech. ISSUES 1. WON the SC should punish Gonzalez for contempt of court and give administrative sanctions 2. WON Gonzales is not liable because he was just using his constitutional right of freedom of speech. HELD 1. YES

LEGAL PROFESSION
Ratio Statements which constitute gross disrespect of the Court, and degrade the SC and the entire system of justice are clearly contemptuous. The SC should exercise its disciplinary authority over the source. Reasoning The SC cited several cases wherein the Court held that the statements were contemptuous and warranting the exercise of the courts authority. These are: (1). Monteciollo v. Gica Atty del Mar moved to reconsider a decision of the CA with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President. He said the court knowingly rendered an unjust judgment thru negotiations. He was convicted of contempt of court. (2) Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel counsel asked CJ Concepcion and J Castro to inhibit themselves from judging the case since the brother of Castro was the VP of favored party and CJs son was the Secretary of the Board of Investments. He even threatened that if he didnt get a favorable decision, hed bring the case to the World Court and invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid to the Philippines. 3. In re Almacen the SC committed a great unjust to his client; justice administered by the SC wasnt only blind, but also deaf and dumb; hell argue the cause of his client in the peoples forum (published in Manilla Times). Almacen was suspended from the practice of law because he exceeded the boundaries of fair criticism. 4. Paragas v. Cruz counsel alleged that the SC violated the Constitution, which was a ground for impeachment; hoped that an incident wherein 2 SC employees were killed wouldnt happen again (covert threat upon the members of the Court) 5. In re Sotto a newspaper reporter refused to divulge his source and was sent to jail. Atty. Sotto published in a newspaper that the SC erroneously interpreted the law, theyre narrowminded, and that the members of the SC should be changed. He was held in contempt of Court. 6. Salcedo v. Hernandez Atty Francisco: the Courts resolution is erroneous and is a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls. 2. NO Ratio A lawyers right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. Reasoning The freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that the freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of the fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. The lawyers duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. [Discussion on the SCs power to discipline its lawyers] The SC, as the regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary auth over attorneys. This stems from the Courts Constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself. This is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. It also has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. This is necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice and not dependent upon the complaint of the litigant. There are two related powers here: (1) Courts inherent power to discipline attorneys broader than contempt power; lawyer doesnt need to be in contempt of court to be punished under this; (2) contempt power - may be committed by both lawyers and nonlawyers, in and out of court; if this is done by a lawyer, its usually accompanied with professional misconduct. A lawyer is not just a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act which tends to obstruct the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

disciplinary action against him and conduct warranting application of the contempt power. Disposition Atty. Raul M. Gonzales was found guilty of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. He was suspended from the practice of law indefinitely.

CASTANEDA V AGO CASTRO; July 30, 1975 (glaisa po)

NATURE - Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - 1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries. -1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson - 1961 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Agos motion denied, levy was made on Agos house and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC affirmed dismissal - Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied - 1963 sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem - 1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties - 1964 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued - 1966 Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition - Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. ISSUE WON the Agos controversy lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid

HELD - No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. - Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. - A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds his clients cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist

LEGAL PROFESSION
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

LEDESMA V CLIMACO FERNANDO; June 28, 1974 (mini bernardo)

NATURE Original action in the SC, Certiorari FACTS Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding. ISSUE WON a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as Election Registrar HELD No. 1. The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the case has been postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. 2. Ledesma's withdrawal would be an an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal. 3. The Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel..." ---manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. The right to be assisted by counsel is so important that it is not enough for the Court to apprise the accused of his right to an atty, but is essential that the court assign on de oficio for him if he desires/ is poor. Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. Disposition Petition for certiorari dismissed.

notary public (he can execute deed of sales, etc). He also admits that he wrote a letter to a lieutenant of his barrio asking him to inform the people in any town meetings that despite his election as member of the Board, he will still exercise his profession as a lawyer and notary public, even adding that he will only charge three pesos for registration of their land titles. ISSUES 1. WON Tagorda is guilty of malpractice employment 2. WON Tagorda should be disbarred for soliciting

HELD 1. YES. Sec 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Act 2828) states that "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally, or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide: 27- The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional... Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable. 28 -It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred. - The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. - With the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. 2. NO. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are: first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future.

ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC REGALADO; June 17, 1993 (dahls salamat)

FACTS - Petitioner prays that respondent cease and desist from issuing ads similar to annexes A and B and to prohibit them from making ads pertaining to the exercise of the law professions other than those allowed by law - Annex A SECRET MARRIAGE? P560 for a valid marriage Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Pls call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am-6pm 7F Victoria Bldg, UN Ave, Mla - Annex B GUAM DIVORCE

IN RE: TAGORDA MALCOLM; March 23, 1929 (boots tirol)

FACTS Luis Tagorda, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Provincial Board of Isabela admits that the previous election he used a card which states what he can do for the people as a lawyer and a

LEGAL PROFESSION
DON PARKINSON An Atty in Guam, is giving FREE BKS on Guam Divorce thru the Leg Clinic beg Mon-Fri during office hours Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Probs, Visa ext. Quota/Non-quota Res and Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Sp/Shil. Call Marivic THE LEGAL CLINIC, etc Petitioners Claim: -Ads are unethical and demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. -As a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the ads Respondents Comment: -They are not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of leg support services thru paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines - Even if they are leg services, the act of advertising them should be allowed under Bates v. State bar of Arizona ISSUES 1. WON the services offered by The Legal Clinic constitutes practice of law? 2. WON their services can be advertised? HELD 1. Yes. The Practice of law involves any activity, in or out of the court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and expertise - To engage in the practice is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession; to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge/skill - Not limited to the conduct of cases in court; includes legal advice and counsel and preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured regardless of WON theyre pending in court 3 types of legal profession activity: 1. legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations 2. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman 3. appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty and property according to law, in order to assist in proper inter and enforcement of law Respondents description of its services shows it falls within the practice of law: Giving info by paralegals to laymen and lawyers thru the use of comps and modern info tech - computerized legal research, document search, evidence gathering, locating parties/witnesses to a case, fact finding investigations, assistance to laymen in need of services from agencies like birth, marriage, prop, bus registrations, etc. *even if some of the services offered merely involve mechanical and technical know how like installing computer system for law offices, this doesnt make it an exception to the general rule - gives out leg info to laymen and lawyersnot non-advisory and non-diagnostic ex. foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption have to explain to client the intricacies of the law and advise him on the proper course of action - what its ads represent and what it will be paid for - It doesnt matter that they dont represent clients in court since practice of law isnt limited to ct appearances but also leg research, leg advice and drafting contracts Phil Star Art Rx for Leg Probs, int by proprietor Atty Nogales: - Takes care of probs as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic sit

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- lawyers, who like drs, are specialists in various fields and can take care of it (taxation, crim law, medico-leg probs, labor, litigation, fam law) - backed up by paralegals, counselors and attys - caters to clients who cant afford big firms - can prepare a simple deed of sale or affidavit of loss and also those w/ more extensive treatment -The fact that they employ paralegals to carry out its services doesnt matter; whats important is that its engaged in the practice of law cause of the nature of the services it renders, which brings it within the statutory prohibitions against ads only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and whos in good and regular standing is entitled to the practice of law - public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character to protect the public, court, client and bar from incompetence/dishonesty of those unlicensed to the practice and not subject to the discipline of court 2.No. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal services, shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective info/statement of facts - not supposed to use any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement re his qualifications/legal services - not supposed to pay representatives of the mass media in return for publicity to attract legal business Canons of professional Ethics (before CPR) provides that lawyers shouldnt resort to indirect ads for professional employment like furnishing newspaper comments, publishing his pictures with causes the lawyers been engaged in, importance of his position and other self-laudation Stands of legal profession condemn lawyers advertisement of his talents like a merchant does of his goods because of the fact that law is a profession. The canons of profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct Good and efficient service to a client and the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention; this shouldnt be done thru propaganda EXCEPTIONS: 1. expressly allowed publication in reputable law lists of informative data thats not misleading and may include only: name, professional assoc, adds, nos, branches of law practiced, date and place of birth and admission to the bar, schools attended w/ dates of grad, degrees , public offices, posts of honor, legal authorships, legal teaching positions, membership and offices in bar association, legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities, listings in other reputable law lists, names and adds of references with written consent and clients regularly represented - cant be mere supplemental feature of paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical thats published for other purposes - never in a law list that are calculated or likely to deceive/injure the public/the bar or lower the dignity/standing of the profession - ordinary simple professional card allowed name, law firm, add, no and special branch of law practiced - publication of simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or change in partnership, assoc, firm name or office add, for the convenience of the profession - have name listed in phone directory but not under designation of special branch of law 2. necessarily implied from the restrictions Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: allowed lawyer to publish a statement of leg fees for an initial consultation or give, upon request, a written schedule of fees or estimate for spec servicess as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers

LEGAL PROFESSION
- none expressly/impliedly provided for in the Canons of Professional Ethics or Code of Professional Responsibility *survey conducted by the American Bar Assoc on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing TC commercials pub opinion dropped significantly: Trustworthy 71-14% Professional 71-14% Honest 65-14% Dignified 45-14% With the present situation of our legal and judicial system, to allow the publication of like advertisements would aggravate whats already a deteriorating pub of the legal profession whose integritys been under attack by media and the community in general - all efforts should be made to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the leg profession Atty Nograles (prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of the Leg Clinic) is REPRIMANDED w/ a warning that a repetition will be dealt w/ more severely for misbehavior in advertising his servIces and aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

KHAN, JR. V SIMBILLO YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 19, 2003 (apple maramba)

NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court and SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. FACTS - Atty. Rizalino Simbillo publicized his legal services in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer via a paid advertisement which read: Annulment of Marriage Specialist 532-4333/521-2667. - A staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court took notice and called the number posing as an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who said that her husband was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, and that the fee was P48,000. - Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar ads were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Star. - Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. - The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. - IBP found respondent guilty - Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied - Hence, this petition for certiorari ISSUE WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court HELD Yes. Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Ratio The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is the primary consideration. Reasoning - Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

- Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. - Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. - The following elements distinguish legal profession from business: 1. A duty of public service 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. - Respondent advertised himself as an Annulment Specialist, and by this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage encouraging people who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained form dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. - Solicitation of legal business sis not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.

DACANAY V BAKER & MCKENZIE AQUINO; May 10, 1985 (ice baguilat)
NATURE Administrative Case FACTS Dacanay seeks to enjoin Torres and 9 other lawyers from practicing law under Baker & McKenzie (a law firm organized in Illinois, USA). Torres used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie on a letter to Rosie Clurman that asks her to release 87 shares of Cathay Products Intl. Inc. to HE Gabriel (a client). Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman and asked whether she is being represented by Baker & McKenzie as counsel as well as the purpose of the letterhead. No reply coming from Clurman thus this Administrative Case. ISSUE WON the lawyers should be enjoined from practicing law under Baker & McKenzie HELD Yes, they should be enjoined. Baker & McKenzie is an alien law firm and cannot practice law in the country. Using the name constitutes representation of being associated with the firm which is deemed to be unethical. Respondents are enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

SAMONTE V GATDULA GONZAGA-REYES; February 26, 1999 (athe odi)

NATURE Administrative matter. Grave Misconduct. FACTS

LEGAL PROFESSION
- The complainant, Julieta Borromeo Samonte charged Rolando R. Gatdula with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court. - The complainant represents her sister as plaintiff in a civil case for ejectment. Contrary to their expectation that execution will proceed, they instead received a temporary restraining order. Santos contends that the order was hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the application for preliminary injunction. - Gatdula, when asked by the complainant of the reason of the decision, blamed Santos lawyer for writing the address in the complaint for ejectment and told her that if she wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law office of respondent, at the same time giving his calling card with the name Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera. - The decision of the Court continued not to be favorable to Samonte, which cause her to file administrative complaint against Gatdula. ISSUE WON Gatdula is guilty of infraction HELD Yes. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7, subpar. (b)(2) of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which declares it unlawful for a public official or employees to, among others: (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constituion or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with official functions. Disposition Respondent is reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

Salva 3. WON Salva conducted the investigation property HELD 1. Yes. - SC believed Salva that it was Cruz who personally reqested to allow him to appear at the investigation. - Normally, when a criminal case handled by fiscal is tried and decided and appealed to a higher court, functions of fiscal have terminated. However, Salva has justified his reinvestigation bec in the orig case, one of the defendants (Salvador Realista y de Guzman) was not included in the trial. - The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent. - Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Investigation may continue. - Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted in part, denied in part. 2. No Under the law, Cruz had right to be present at the investigation but he need not be present. His presence is more of a right than a legal obligation. 3. No - Salva shld have done investigation privately in his office and not publicly in the session hall of Municipal Court of Pasay where microphones were installed and media people were present. He should also not have made the media people ask questions. SC was disturbed and annoyed by such publicity. - Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.

CRUZ V SALVA MONTEMAYOR; July 25, 1959 (chris capul)

NATURE Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction. FACTS - A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial. Castelo was again found guilty. Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned people and got confessions pointing to persons other than those convicted. - Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have the results of investigation made available to counsel for appellants. - Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and confessions. Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits and confessions. Cruz counsel questioned jurisdiction of the committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation bec the case was pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition. - Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation. - SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation. ISSUES 1. WON Salva and his committee can push through with the investigation 2. WON Cruz can be compelled to appear and testify before

COLLANTES V RENOMERON PER CURIAM; August 16, 1991 (aida villanueva)

FACTS - A complaint of disbarment is filed with a related administrative case against Renomeron of the Registrar of Deeds in Tacloban. - Collantes was the house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision and filed the case with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision in Jan 1987. - Feb 16, 1987 no action was made by Renomeron despite follow-ups made by Collantes. Renomeron requested Collantes to submit additional requirements which Collantes complied with. - Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance of V&G with certain special agreement between then that V&G would provide Renomeron with a weekly Tacloban-Manil round trip ticket with P2,000 pocket money. He said he would act favorably on their application if that agreement would be fulfilled. - Collantes sent plane fare (P800) to Renomeron through his niece. But pocket money was not given. - Renomeron then imposed additional requirements which angered Collantes, leading the latter to challenge Renomeron to act on the 163 pending applications by V&G within 24 hours. - May 22, 1987 Renomeron denied the application for ambiguity of the subject matter. - Collantes appealed for a reconsideration and elevated the matter to the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration. - The NLTDRA ruled that the documents were registrable. - The NLTDRA recommended Renomerons case to the DOJ and the Secretary of Justice found him guilty. The president then dismissed Renomeron from public service. - A disbarment case was then filed by Collantes against Renomeron. ISSUE

LEGAL PROFESSION
WON the disbarment case against Renomeron would prosper given the administrative case HELD - Yes, the administrative complaint has to do with his position in public service. The disbarment case has to do with his status as member of the Integrated Bar. - Renomeron violated the lawyers oath. - The Code of Professional Responsibility 1.01 forbids a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

PEOPLE V PINEDA SANCHEZ; July 21, 1967 (jojo mendoza)

FACTS - On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor children of the couple and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza. - Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres were indicted before the CFI of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases for murder. The five informations were based on facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his investigation. - Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases (Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo) moved for a consolidation thereof into one (1) criminal case. Their plea is that said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse. The respondent Judge approved the motion and directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information and drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought reconsideration thereof. The respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts complained of stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim; and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. Hence, this appeal to the Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs. ISSUE WON the City Fiscal shall file only one information HELD - YES, ruling Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (delito complejo). It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply the first half of Article 48, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law. The respondent Judge reasons out that consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied. Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five separate informations four for murder and one for frustrated murder. A rule of presumption long familiar is that official duty has been regularly performed. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments

thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope, the Court made the pronouncement that "it is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party." - The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid." Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just recited. Disposition The writ of certiorari is granted.

MISAMIN V SAN JUAN FERNANDO; August 31, 1976 (bry san juan)
FACTS - It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain. in the Metro Manila Police force and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non-appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught. - Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed. This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice. Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the

LEGAL PROFESSION
NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." ISSUE WON a lawyer-public officer may represent a private client during his tenure HELD NO, but since evidence is lacking to discipline Atty. Miguel San Juan, the case is dismissed. The Court noted that the Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. - The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. - This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

subparagraph b (22), Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent. - Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, was lodged - Complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for herself. - The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline concluded that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education. It was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent. - The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV2002-393, adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and Respondent was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years. ISSUE WON respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED. HELD YES. Ratio Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar. The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Reasoning Respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. - Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. - A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. - Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which

VITRIOLO V DASIG PER CURIAM; April 1, 2003 (lora alamin)

NATURE Administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). FACTS - Almost all complainants are high-ranking officers of the CHED. They allege that while respondent was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court - During her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office - Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed. Complainants charge respondent of transgressing

LEGAL PROFESSION
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Disposition Respondent was found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and was ordered DISBARRED.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

KEY ISSUE WON Rule 6.03 of the CPR applies to Atty. Mendoza. Rule 6.03: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. Obiter The History of Rule 6.03 -17th and 18th centuries: ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe; the principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. -colonial and early post-revolutionary America: The forms of lawyer regulation did not differ markedly from those in England. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. -19th century: the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States. -mid 19th century: American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways: (1) David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers; (2) legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. -As in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. -end of 19th century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. 2 primary sources of ethical guidance: academic discourses & the bar association codes -1887: Alabama - the 1st state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. -1917: Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. -1924: some ABA members start to question the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service. (a) Adverse-interest conflicts - exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. (b) Congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. -ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted to disqualify such lawyers both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts. Canon 36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity. A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN PUNO; April 12, 2005 (marge alias)

NATURE Special civil action in the SC. Certiorari and prohibition. FACTS -1976: General Bank and Trust Co. (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties, prompting the Central Bank to extend to it emergency loans reaching a total of P310 million. Despite this, Genbank failed to recover and the following year Central Bank had to issue a resolution declaring Genbank insolvent and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was held; Lucio Tan Group submitted the winning bid. -Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza field a petition with CFI praying for the courts assistance and supervision in the liquidation as mandated by RA 265, section 29. -After EDSA I, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, PCGG filed a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting, and damages against respondents Lucio Tan Group and the Marcos family. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the 2nd division of the Sandiganbayan (SB). In connection with this, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on the properties of the Lucio Tan Group. -Lucio Tan Group questioned the writs through petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with the SC. The latter referred the cases to the SB for proper disposition. In these cases docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 Lucio Tan Group was represented by their counsel, former SolGen Estelito Mendoza who has then resumed private practice. -05 Feb 1991: PCGG, invoking Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), filed motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0005 & 0096-0099. The motions allege that Atty. Mendoza intervened in the acquisition of Genbank by the Lucio Tan Group when, in his capacity as then SolGen, he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about Genbanks liquidation& appeared as counsel for the central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation. -22 April 1991: SB denied the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 for PCGGs failure to prove the existence of an inconsistency between Mendozas former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group; it also ruled that Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. PCGG did not file a MFR. -When Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the SBs 2nd Division to the 5th Division, the latter also denied the motion to disqualify. PCGGs MFR was denied. Hence this petition.

LEGAL PROFESSION
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. -1946: the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. -mid 20th century: growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. 1964: ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it with Canon 9 in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 9 states: A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. -The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility which was approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1969. Canon 9 was supplemented by Disciplinary Rule 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee. -Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards. -August 1983: ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, doing away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature. -1980: Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility which it submitted to SC for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. -21 June 1988: SC promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. CPR Rule 6.03 which deals particularly with former government lawyers retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. SUB-ISSUES 1. WON this case involves the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03 2. WON there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing the Lucio Tan Group. 2a. WON Atty. Mendozas act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate Genbank is included within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03 2b. WON the intervention of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is significant and substantial HELD 2a. NO. Ratio American Bar Association Formal Opinion 342s definition of matter : any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. Reasoning Based on PCGGs case for disqualification, the matter or the act of Atty. Mendoza as Solicitor General involved here is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. -The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, sec. 29. Said legal provision provides for the role of the SolGen in proceedings upon insolvency. -Also, CPR Rule 6.03 cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a SolGen in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 (liquidation of Genbank) is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096 (sequestration of the stocks in Allied Bank, the successor of Genbank, on the ground that they are ill-gotten). 2b. NO. Ratio in light of the history of CPR Rule 6.03, the 2nd meaning is more appropriate to give to the word

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

intervention. The intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Reasoning 2 interpretations of the intervene (basis: Webster): (a) intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. (b) intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. -The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by Atty. Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. The record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. -The principal role of the court in this proceeding for dissolution is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the Genbank. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government. Obiter Balancing Policy Considerations -CPR Rule 6.03 represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. It should not be interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. -At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. It is true that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. To make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter. -In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. -Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. -The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. -No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. -As well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. -Also the switching sides concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. The danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. There are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. In lawyering for the Lucio Tan Group, Atty. Mendoza is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating Genbank and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. Disposition Petition denied. No costs.

SEPARATE OPINION PANGANIBAN [dismiss]

-The petition should be dismissed on two grounds: (1) res judicata, specifically, conclusiveness of judgment; and (2) prescription.

LEGAL PROFESSION
-The material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty. Mendoza may still be barred from representing these respondents despite (1) a final Order in another case resolving the very same ground for disqualification involving the same parties and the same subject matter as the present case; and (2) the passage of a sufficient period of time from the date he ceased to be solicitor general to the date when the supposed disqualification (for violation of the CPR) was raised. -There is no need to delve into the question of whether Rule 6.03 has been transgressed; there is no need to discuss the merits of the questioned Sandiganbayan Resolutions allowing Atty. Mendoza to represent private respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. After all, a Resolution issued by the same court resolving the very same issue on the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza in a case involving the same parties and the same subject matter has already become final and immutable. It can no longer be altered or changed. -CPR Rule 6.03 does not expressly specify the period of its applicability or enforceability. But it cannot be inferred that the prohibition is absolute, perpetual and permanent. All civil actions have a prescriptive period. Unless a law makes an action imprescriptible or lays down no other period, the action is subject to a bar by prescription five years after the right of action accrued. (Arts. 1140-1149, Civil Code; Tolentino v CA)

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

-While financial considerations are important, they are not the sole factor affecting recruitment of lawyers to the government sector. I would like to think that serving in government is its own reward. One needs only to look at all of us members of this Court to know that money is not everything. All of us have, at one point in our legal careers, been tempted by the promise of financial success that private practice usually brings. But in the end, we decided to take the road less traveled and serve in government. And I would like to believe that each and everyone of us has made a difference. There is more to this mortal coil than the pursuit of material wealth.

CALLEJO, SR. [partially grant]

-The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes proverbial bad man who wants to know just how many corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play, without running into trouble with the law. Rather, it is drawn for the good man as a beacon to assist him in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of professional conduct. (General Motors Corp. v City of New York) -CPR establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal profession and the Court must not shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its provisions. The Court must not tolerate any departure from the straight and narrow path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession. -The Resolution denying PCGGs similar motion to disqualify Mendoza was an interlocutory order as it did not terminate or finally dispose of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or collateral matter arising therein. As such, it cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases. -Atty. Mendozas present engagement as counsel for Lucio Tan Group in Civil Case No. 0096 violates the ethical precept embodied in Rule 6.03. -The subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with or related to a matter, i.e. the liquidation of Genbank, in which Atty. Mendoza had intervened as the Solicitor General -Rule 6.03 applies even if Atty. Mendoza did not switch sides or did not take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendozas former government client (Central Bank) and his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.) -Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit temporal limitation since cases have to be resolved based on their peculiar circumstances. The peculiar circumstances of this case justify the strict application of said rule.

SANDOVAL-GUTTIERREZ [dismiss]
-In evaluating motions to disqualify a lawyer, our minds are not bound by stringent rules. There is room for consideration of the combined effect of a partys right to counsel of his own choice, an attorneys interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing disqualified counsel, and any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding. -An order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is final and, therefore, appealable. The issue of whether or not Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified from representing Tan et al. is separable from, independent of and collateral to the main issues in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099. In short, it is separable from the merits. Clearly, the present petition for certiorari is dismissible. -The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 constitutes a bar to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine of res judicata. The PCGG may not relitigate such issue of disqualification as it was actually litigated and finally decided in G.R. Nos. 112707-09. -Atty. Mendozas participation in the liquidation of GENBANK does not constitute intervention. CPR Rule 6.03 cannot apply to Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Special Proceedings No. 107812 is an intervention in a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

TINGA [partially grant]

-Section 6.03 cannot be made applicable in the present case to Atty. Mendoza, as to do so would be violative of his right to due process. Whether it be at the time then Solicitor General Mendoza participated in the process of the dissolution of General Bank in 1977, or at sometime in 1987 when he agreed to represent the respondents, the Code of Professional Responsibility had not yet been promulgated. -The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June 1988. Prior to its official adoption, there was no similar official body of rules or guidelines enacted by the Supreme Court other than the provisions on Legal Ethics in the Rules of Court. -Atty. Mendoza may have violated Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which some authorities deemed as a source of legal ethics prior to the Code of Professional Responsibility. But the prohibition under Canon 36 was not prescribed by this Court or by statute as a norm until the enactment of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 21 June 1988. Accordingly, when Atty. Mendoza agreed to represent the respondents, there was no definitive binding rule proscribing him from such engagement or penalizing him for such representation.

CARPIO-MORALES [grant]
-The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since in the case at bar, the question of whether the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza should be granted is undoubtedly a legal question. Also, this is the first time that the issue to disqualify Atty. Mendoza has been elevated before the SC. -We cannot characterize the denial of PCGGs motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as a final order. It is only interlocutory since it does not finally dispose of the case. -the prohibition in Rule 6.03 is perpetual. It does not prescribe in 5 yrs. -Atty. Mendozas lack of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK is immaterial. What is material is his role in facilitating the liquidation of GENBANK through his legal expertise. In advising the Central Bank, Atty. Mendoza did not just mechanically point to section 29 of Republic 265. As then Solicitor General, and as a lawyer known for his keen legal acumen, Atty. Mendoza synthesized facts, which by reason of his position he was privy to, and law with a view to successfully liquidate the bank. -While it is desirable to recruit competent lawyers into government service, this does not justify the disturbance of our mores. The canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility must be strictly construed.

LIM-SANTIAGO V SAGUCIO CARPIO; March 31, 2006 (maia reiza)

LEGAL PROFESSION
NATURE Disbarment case FACTS - Ruthie Lim-Santiago is the daughter and administratrix of the property of Alfonso Lim, the former president of Taggat Industries. After his death, Lim-Santiago took over the management of the company. Respondent Carlos Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, until he was appointed Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. - Some employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint against Lim-Santiago for withholding payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause for 1 year and 3 months (1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997). Sagucio, as the asst. Prov. Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He recommended the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Art288 of the labor code of the Philippines. - Lim-Santiago alleges that Sagucio is guilty of representing conflicting interests, a violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor, which is expressly prohibited in RA6713. Sagucio defends himself by saying that he accepted payment from Taggat even after his appointment as government prosecutor but said that such payments were not for representation but for consultancy services. Also, he contends that 5 years have passed since he was connected with the company, thus there was no conflict of interest. ISSUES 1. WON there are conflicting interests in this case 2. WON the private practice of law includes consultancy services 3. WON disbarment is the appropriate penalty HELD - There are no conflicting interests. Sagucio is not guilty of representing conflicting interests as prohibited in Rule 15.03 of CPR. He left Taggat in 1992, and the non-payment of wages occurred in 1996-1997, years after the relation to Taggat has been terminated. In a charge for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against the former client any CONFIDENTIAL information acquired through his previous employment. Although a lawyer owes a former client to maintain inviolate of the clients confidence, this responsibility does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. That he was a former personnel manager and the case is laborrelated is not sufficient basis to charge Sagucio of representing conflicting interests. - The payment for consultancy services conducted by Sagucio falls under the private practice of law which is specifically prohibited by RA6713 (the court applies the liberal definition of the practice of law as given in Cayetano v Monson). However, Sagucio cannot be punished for this violation under the CPR, for such violations are not subject to disciplinary action under the CPR. On the other hand, this violation is also a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 (a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), thus he can be punished for violating canon 1. The penalty is a suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year (basis is the Civil Service Law and Rules).

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

taking of the IBP officers=elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. FACTS - June 3, 1989, the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) was held at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC).The newly elected officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989, before the Supreme Court. However, because of widespread reports about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, the Supreme Court resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect to investigate. - the elections were led by the main candidates for the office of IBP President, namely Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon. - Among the allegations were the use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws. (poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates.) - Emil Jurado (Manila Standard) reported that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA, and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary. - There was also the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly wined and dined continuously, womened, and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes xxx which ranged from P15K to P20K, and on election day, to as much as P50K. - In a resolution calling for investigations, the Court called to mind that a basic postulate of the IBP xxx is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates and of the IBP officers. - Article I, Section 4 of IBP By-Laws emphasizes the strictly nonpolitical character of the IBP: SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. the IBP is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the government xxx shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the IBP or any chapter thereof. Section 14 of By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections: o Distribution of election campaign material; o Distribution of campaign material other that a statement of the biodata of candidate not more than one page of legal paper; o Campaigning for or against any candidate, whle holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutory office in Govt; o Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof; o For purpose of influencing a member, by payment of dues or other indebtedness of the member; giving of food, drink, entertainment, transpo, any article of value; making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made. - Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes the sanctions: o Violation of the by-laws of the IBP shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member xxx - Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250K during his three weeks of campaigning; Atty. Nisces hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216K ++, not including previous expenses for his campaign; Atty . Drilons campaign rang up over P600K in hotel bills (Westin). ISSUE WON the candidates are guilty of massive electioneering, inappropriate use of government resources, and vote-buying during the IBP national elections.

RE: 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES PER CURIAM; October 6, 1989 (anton arcilla)
NATURE An inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the integrated bar of the Philippines. The Supreme Court, en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolvd to suspend the oath-

LEGAL PROFESSION
HELD Ratio - IBP elections should be as they are annulled. - The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for direct election by the House Delegates of officers, IBP President, and exec. VP be repealed. - Former sstem of IBP President and Exec. VP elected by Board of Governors from among themselves should be restored. - At the end of Presidents 2-year term, the EVP shall automatically succeed to the office of the president. The incoming board of governors shall elect an EVP from among themselves. Reasoning - It is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections violated Sec. 14 of the IBP By-laws and made a travesty of the idea of a strictly nonpolitical IBP shrined in Sec. 4. - The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to: - Obey and uphold the constitutionand the laws; - Duty to promote respect for law and legal processes; - Abstain from activities aimed at defiance of law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. - It is speculated that the IBP ticket to the Judicial and Bar Council as provided in Art. VIII Sec. 8 may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. - The decision is meant to impress upon participant the seriousness of their misconduct, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

HELD 1.RA 7432 exempts him only from payment of taxes but not from payment of his association dues such as IBP dues. Since he openly admitted that he was still engaged in the practice of law eventhough his practice is already limited he is still subject to the payment of IBP dues and failure to do so would warrant his suspension under Sec 10 of Rule 139-A. He can only engage in the practice of law by paying his dues and it doesnt matter if his practice is limited. 2.By Indicationg IBP Rizal 259060 in his pleadings, he is guilty of misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he has paid his dues to IBP Rizal Chapter and of violating Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01-A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. CANON 10 A Lawyer owes candor,fairness nd goodfaith to the court. Rule 10.01- A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,nor consent to the doing of an court;nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Disposition Because of his old age, respondent was only suspended from practice of law for one year or until he pays his dues.

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS PER CURIAM; February 4, 2004 (chris lao)
NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Bar Scandal. FACTS - On September 22, 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. He then reported to Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and to the other members of the Court, recommending that the examination on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith. - On September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another exam on the said subject against which petitions were filed. The petitions voiced out the support to nullifying the exam on the said subject and not to take another exam due to the emotional, physical and financial burdens it will cause the barristers. Alternative proposals were submitted to the Court. The Court moved to nullify and to spread out the weight of the Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar subjects. - The Court resolved also to create a Committee composed of three retired members of the Court that would conduct a thorough investigation of the incident subject of the September 23, 2003 resolution. The Investigating Committee found that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions which the examinee, Atty. Balgos had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose Vitug. His questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as Atty. Balgos, 71 years old, proposed. - The circumstances that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions prepared by Atty. Balgos proves conclusively that the leakage originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug. Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer. Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer without the latters knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Atty. Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily

SANTOS V LLAMAS MENDOZA; January 20, 2000 (dahls salamat)

FACTS Petitioners Claim: -Llamas has not indicated proper PTR and IBP OR No and data in his pleadings, he merely indicates IBP Rizal 259060 as his PTS and IBP OR No for 3 years as shown in various court pleadings. -Llamas last payment of IBP dues, as certified by IBP pres, was in 1991 --in the context of Rule 138 section 1 that only a duly admitted member of the bar who is in good and regular stnding is entitled to practice law and Rule 139-A,Section 10 which provides that default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the integrated bar,and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys -respondents track record shows that he was once dismissed as Pasay City Judge, and was convicted of estafa. Respondents Comment: -SC has already dismissed the case for his dismissal as well as the criminal case, and he was in fact promoted as RTC Judge, -Respondent is engaged only in a limited practice of law,his principal occupation being a farmer -Being a senior citizen he is exempt from payment of taxes,and he honestly believes that his dues with the IBP is covered by such exemption -in fact he does not exercise his rights to vote as an IBP member -he is willing to pay his dues should he be in fact not exempt from payment thereof ISSUES 1.WON RA 7432 (Senior Citizen) exempts respondent from payment of his dues with the IBP 2.WON respondent is guilty of misleading the court of his standing with the IBP for using the same IBP OR number for at least six years

LEGAL PROFESSION
confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his secretary Villasis to his frat brods in Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, namely, Garvida, Arlan, and Erwin Tan. In turn, Garvida faxed the test questions to Iigo and Bugain. Iigo passed a copy or copies to other Betan Guiapal who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigmas Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald Collado who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs 30 bar candidates. - Atty De Guzmans act of downloading Balgos test questions in mercantile law from the latters computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property. - Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Balgos right to privacy of communication and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search and seizurerights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. - De Guzman also violated rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide: Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. - He is guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. Also, the Investigating committee does not believe that he acted alone. Palma, secretary of Atty. Balgos and Atienza knew of the password. Certain brods should also be investigated. The committee does not believe De Guzman did this out of love for the fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he very well knows, covers the bar examinations. - Atty. Balgos is also negligent.He could have just used the typewriter considering his lack of adeptness with the computer. ISSUE WON Danilo De Guzman should be disbarred HELD YES. He should be disbarred plus he ought to make a public apology and pay damages to the Supreme Court - Atty. Balgos should be reprimanded by the Court and make a written apology as a result of his negligence. He is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject. - Further examination of the others should be held to show accountability and also to find out how De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the Supreme Courts CALR database without the courts permission.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

was in the Civil Service and when working abroad, entitles him to exemption from payment of IBP dues. HELD Ratio No. Reasoning - The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire law population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the SC. This is toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they themselves belong. - Membership in the bar is a privilege (as opposed to a property right) burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants. Disposition Wherefore, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues for the years 1977-2005 is Denied within 10 days from receipt of this decision, failure to do so will merit suspension from the practice of law.

ZAGUIRRE V CASTILLO PER CURIAM; MARCH 6, 2003 (sarah Cabrera)

NATURE Petition for Disbarment on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct (Adulterous Relationship). FACTS - Complainant and respondent met while working in the NBI. Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to be single. Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. During their affair, respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar. - It was only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her about her relationship with respondent. - On September 10, 1997, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. - On December 09, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa. By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support. - Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was already married and with children.; complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew beforehand that he is already married; the child borne by complainant is not his, because the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were having an affair. He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that complainant was seeing other men. - The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law. ISSUES 1. WON respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct 2. WON it is relevant to this case if the complainant knew he was married 3. WON the respondent should be disbarred HELD 1. YES - The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES CHICO-NAZARIO; May 9, 2005 (keefe dela cruz)
NATURE Bar Matter in the Supreme Court. Request for Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues. FACTS - Petitioner, Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., is being assessed P12,035 in IBP dues for the years 1977-2005 - After admittance to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Phil Civil Service from 1962 to 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the US from 1986 to his retirement in 2003. ISSUES WON Petitioners inactivity in the practice of law that is, when he

LEGAL PROFESSION
IBP. The Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Immoral conduct has been defined as: xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. *Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to selfstultification. - This Court has repeatedly held: as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. *Complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that men by nature are polygamous, and that what happened between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire. The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent. 2. NO *That complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital status does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondents fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him. In Mortel vs. Aspiras: In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts. *The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession. 3. NO Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly. *As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment could be given. Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of respondents effort to mend his ways or that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Disposition Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.

TAN V SABANDAL MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 24, 1992 (jat tabamo)

FACTS - Nov. 29, 1983 - Court sustained charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and denied the latters petition to be allowed to take oath as member of the Phil. Bar and to sign the roll of attorneys. - From 1984-1988 - Sabandal filed motions for reconsideration all of which either denied or noted without action. - Feb. 10, 1989 Court finally allowed Sabandal to take the lawyers oath after consideration of his plea for mercy and forgiveness, willingness to reform and several testimonies attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. However, before a date could be set for Sabandals oath taking, complainants Dagpin, Tan and Boquia each filed motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of Feb, 10, 1989. - Complainant Tan contests the testimonial of IBP Zamboanga Del Norte Chapter (ZDN) certifying that respondent was acting with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the community. Tan claims that said testimonial was signed only by the then President of that IBP chapter, without authorization from its Board of Officers. Attached to her motion was a certification signed by the current IBP ZDN Chapter President Atty. Nuevas, stating that the present Board of Officers had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic consciousness of Sabandal. Tan later on desisted and informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has already been restored, as he had asked her forgiveness and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him, even recommending his admission to the legal profession. - Complainants Boquia and Dagpin submitted their own comments vehemently contesting the Courts Resolution setting the date for respondents oath-taking and filed a separate comment as regards complainant Tans personal disposition, questioning whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate their cases - The Executive Judge of ZBN RTC, Judge Pelagio Lachica, in a separate comment stated that he is not well acquainted personally with the respondent and unaware of any acts committed by him so as to disqualify him from admission to the Bar. Said Judge also mentioned that there is a Civil Case, Rep. of the Phil. v. Sabandal which was pending in the Supreme Court. The IBP ZBN chapter also submitted a certification that Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime and that there is no pending criminal case against him, therefore finding no reason to disqualify him from admission to the Bar. - The Court then deferred setting the date of the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform the Court of the outcome of the case Republic v. Sabandal. Judge Pacifico Garcia, who succeeded Judge Lachica, informed the Court on Dec. 12, 1990, that Sabandals case was already considered closed and terminated, and that the principal parties have reached an amicable settlement approved by the trial court. Judge Garcias letter was noted in the Resolution of Jan.

LEGAL PROFESSION
29, 1991, where complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on said Judges letter. - On Dec. 20, 1990, a certification was sent by Exec. Judge Jesus Angeles of RTC of ZDN upon request of Sabandal, certifying that he has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Bar. - Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyers oath in a motion dated June 8, 1991. The Court again deferred action on the motion pending the complainants compliance with the Jan. 29, 1991 resolution. - Only complainant Tan complied, and stated in a comment dated Aug. 29, 1991, that the termination of Sabandals civil case is proof of his sincere reformation, and repentance. - Finally, in a Manifestation, dated Dec. 6, 1991, Sabandal reiterated his plea to be allowed to take the lawyers oath. ISSUE WON Respondent Sabandal should be allowed to take the lawyers oath HELD Ratio The practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. Although the term good moral character admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as including at least common honesty. It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor. No. The Resolution of Feb. 10, 1989, allowing Sabandal to take the oath 10 years after passing the Bar, was prior to the Court receiving the objections by complainants, and before it had become aware of the gravity of the civil case against him. - As it turned out, the case of Republic v. Sabandal was brought about when Sabandal, by way of his employment as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands procured a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to public domain (which he could not but have known to be public land), which he used as security for mortgage in order to obtain a loan. The Case was eventually settled when respondent surrendered the bogus certificate of title to the government and paid-off the mortgagor. The Solicitor General did not object to the approval of the settlement and even stated that, the amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant. The Court found it manipulative on his part to take advantage of his employment to facilitate such an act and a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be cannot be erased by termination of his case where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. - The Court also noted that at the time the case was instituted, Sabandal had already been filing motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character without mentioning the pendency of the civil case against him. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several motions for reconsideration reveals his lack of candor and truthfulness. - As to the testimonials attesting to his good moral character, they were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character. - That complainants, namely, Boquia and Dagpin have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter. Disposition Respondent Sabandal found to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, Courts Resolution of Feb. 10, 1989 is

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

recalled and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyers oath is denied.

TAPUCAR V TAPUCAR PER CURIAM; July 30, 1998 (terry ridon)

FACTS - Complainant Remedios Tapucar seeks the disbarment of husband, Atty. Lauro Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with Elena Pena under scandalous circumstances. - Prior to complaint, he has already been charged four times for conduct unbecoming of an officer, and has already been suspended, and dismissed from being a CFI judge - The suspension and dismissal on immorality did not stop him from continue living with Elena and leaving Remedios and her 11 children. He and Elena even moved back to Antipolo from GenSan, where they got married despite the subsistence of a previous marriage - His lawyer-daughter filed the disbarment proceedings, represented her mother, from which the IBP recommended his disbarment ISSUE WON the recommendation for disbarment is justified HELD - The recommendation by the IBP is sufficient to justify his disbarment as a good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession but must remain intact in order to maintain good standing in the profession. It is essential that we have a high-toned sense of morality - CPR Rule 7.03 is clear that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public of private life behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession - Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, especially Tapucar as he was once a member of the bench who must be free from impropriety; like judges, lawyers are invested with public trust, that faith and confidence by the public to the law is ensured - As such, the court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct whether in his professional or personal capacity, but this is only exercised if there is a clear case of misconduct - In case at bar, despite the previous sanctions, he still persisted in his illicit relations and arrogant even, in the face of charges against him. All of these are violative of the lawyers oath and in great disregard of the law

BUGARING V ESPANOL DE LEON; January 19, 2001 (ricky cantre)

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court. FACTS - The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Royal Becthel Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al., for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores S. Espaol of the RTC of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.

LEGAL PROFESSION
- Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of Court. - During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following incident transpired (pls see case for full stenographic record of incident): [discussing Deputy Reg of Deeds manifestation that the receiving clerk did not inform him of the court order] ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we will be [filing] a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties concerned. COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video recording at this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court that such proceedings should be taken. ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just accompanied me this morning. COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the permission of this Court. ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape. COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots should be done. ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could prove your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why he took video tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor please. COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority or permission should be secured. ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor. COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape. ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that is personal to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being . COURT: That is very shallow, dont give that alibi. ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence as part of our motion for contempt, your Honor please. COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter? ATTY. CONCEPCION (Deputy Reg of Deeds): Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this contempt you are talking. I am willing now to testify. ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal. ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal. COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of Deeds. .................... ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records. ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark our documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and thereafter your Honor please. COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to go over the record of this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile. ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor. -----------------COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga? ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I noticed [quite a long manifestation followed but irrelevant to this case] ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our documentary evidence. COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to have an orderly proceedings in this case. ATTY. BARZAGA: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated [continued manifestation Judge Espaol making intermittent comments] ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that we will be marking first our documentary evidence because this is set for hearing for today, your Honor please. COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet what are we going to receive as evidence. ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the submission of the comment. ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for contempt was copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion. COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. This should be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a Court of record the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put up by the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly. ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time furnished of this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should have filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and present to this Court, your Honor. COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen! ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor. COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order. ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers of the Court, your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your Honor. COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and then do whatever you want. ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the Court to this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put on record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court. COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel) ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in town. COURT: Do that right away. ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we

LEGAL PROFESSION
are deprive to present our witness. COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented. ATTY. BUGARING: I did not. COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his comment. ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I dont want to comment on anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case. COURT: You can do whatever you want. ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor. COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules. ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules. COURT: Yes, you know your rules thats why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse. ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, Ive been challenged by this Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, Ive been winning in many certiorari cases, your Honor. COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff) ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please. COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of this Court. ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am protecting my client, your Honor. COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail. - Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence and paid the fine of P3,000. The CA found that it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent too argumentative to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court. It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of P3,000 exceeded the limit of P2,000 prescribed by the ROC and ordered the excess of P1,000 returned to petitioner. ISSUE WON the contempt order by Judge Espaol had factual basis HELD Yes Ratio The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge and can be punished summarily without hearing. Reasoning Petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during the hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day. Petitioners alleged deference to the trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as your Honor please throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein: 1. The veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. 2. The hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other party is against Rule 11.04,

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. 3. Behaving without due regard to the trial courts order to maintain order in the proceedings is in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyers duty to maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude in order to maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. 4. Behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and 5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness with fairness and due consideration, and Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioners use of the phrase your honor please. For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings. A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his clients cause. He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility. He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons. Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty. Disposition Decision of the CA affirmed. RTC ordered to return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000 out of the original fine of P3,000.

CAMACHO V PANGULAYAN VITUG; March 22, 2000 (kiyo miura)

NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional Ethics FACTS - 9 students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC), all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, allegedly published certain objectionable features - the Student Disciplinary Tribunal found them guilty and the students were expelled - the 9 students appealed but were denied by the AMACC President giving rise to a civil case calling for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Camacho as their counsel and Pangulayan and associates representing the defendant, AMACC

LEGAL PROFESSION
- while the case was pending, letters of apology and readmission agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of the students by their parents - following this, the Pangulayan Law Offices filed a Manifestation stating, among other things, that 4 of the students had acknowledged their guilt and agreed to terminate all proceedings - apparently, Pangulayan procured and effected the re-admission agreements through negotiations with said students and their parents without communicating with Camacho ISSUE WON Pangulayan is guilty of disregarding professional ethics HELD YES, this action violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which states: A lawyer should not in anyway communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law. - respondent violated professional ethics and disregarded a duty owing to his colleague - the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution suspending Pangulayan for 6 months and dismissed the case against the other respondents since they took no part in it - the court concurred with IBPs findings but reduced the suspension to 3 months

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

SUAREZ V SALAZAR RESOLUTION; September 29, 1999 (rean balisi)

NATURE Motion to Expunge All Pleading Filed by Atty. Filemon A. Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court or to Dismiss Petion FACTS At the hearing on the same date, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan admitted that he is not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the Philippines. He is also the same Filemon A. Manangan who was found by the Court in Filemon Manangan v. CFI Nueva Vizcaya, Br.28, decided on August 30, 1999, to be in reality Andres Culanag who is not a member of the Philippine Bar. ISSUE WON Filemon Manangan / Andres Culanag should be held in indirect contempt of the Court HELD Yes. Despite the facts as found by the Court, he has continued to misrepresent himself to be an attorney-at-law and has appeared as counsel for petitioners in this case. Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who is in reality Andres Culanag, is hereby declared in indirect contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he is hereby sentenced to 3 months imprisonment to be served at the Headquarters of the National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Ave., Manila, until further orders of this Court.

- On May 21, 2001, one day before respondent Edwin Rana participated the oath-taking of successful bar examinees as member of the Philippine bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar on the ground of unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. - The Court allowed respondent to take the oath, but did not allow him to sign the Roll of Attorneys. - The complainant charges him with unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct since she claims that he already appeared as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate of Mandaon, Masbate, George Bunan before the Municipal Board of Canvassers. She also claims that he signed the pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of ViceMayor as counsel for the said candidate. - On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that the respondent is a municipal government employee and as such, he is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body. - On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel George Bunan without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate. - Respondent claims though George Bunan sought his specific assistance, he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. He also admitted signing the pleading, but not as a lawyer. - In reply to the charge of violation of law, he claims that he already resigned from the said government post May 11, 2001. He further claims that the complaint is politically charged since the complainant is the daughter of the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. - In the complainants reply to the respondents comments, she further alleges that on May 19, Emily Estipona-Hao filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor wherein the respondent signed as counsel for her. - On July 17, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confident (OBC). The OBC found that the respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan, as seen in the minutes of the MBEC proceedings. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. ISSUE WON the respondent should be denied admission to the Philippine Bar HELD Yes. Records show that he indeed appeared as lawyer for Bunan. He also signed the pleading as his lawyer. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself also wrote to the MBEC that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies. - Emily Estipona-Hao also wrote to the MBEC that the respondent will be the legal counsel for her party. The respondent also signed the pleading as their lawyer. - All these happened before he took his lawyers oath. It is clear that he engaged in the practice of law. - It is also irrelevant the respondent has already passed the bar and taken his oath, for it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys which makes one a full-fledged lawyer. - As for the charge of violation of law, it is clear that the respondent has already resigned from the said position before appearing as counsel. - On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar

AGUIRRE V RANA CARPIO; June 10, 2003 (monch bacani)

NATURE Administrative matter on unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law and grave misrepresentation FACTS

LEGAL PROFESSION
bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law. Disposition Respondent is denied admission to the Philippine Bar

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V LADAGA KAPUNAN; January 26, 2001 (jonas azura)
NATURE This is an administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the practice of their profession. FACTS Respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati, represented his cousin Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga as pro bono counsel in a criminal case for falsification of public document. The Court denied respondents request for authorization to appear as counsel and directed the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization. In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who belong to a powerless family from an impoverished town in Surigao del Norte. Ms. Ladaga had supported and guided respondent from childhood until he finished his law degree. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and advice when she was charged in a criminal case by Lisa Payoyo Andres. Respondent claims that Ms. Andres only purpose in filing the case was to seek vengeance on Ms. Ladaga. He explains that the discord between his cousin and Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot 3 children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that he felt it was his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel as she could not pay for the services of a lawyer and he was the only lawyer in the family. Respondent also pointed out that in 7 years of government service he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged for helping a close relative by giving free legal assistance for a humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the MTC of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. Respondent also stressed that during his court appearances, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications. ISSUES 1. WON respondent violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees by appearing as counsel 2. WON respondent obtained written permission from the head of the department as required by Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules HELD 1. No. Private practice of a profession, specifically the law profession, does not refer to an isolated court appearance. It contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. The isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin does not constitute the private practice of the law profession as contemplated by law. 2. No. It is true that respondent filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court, which were approved. However, the presiding judge of the court to which

respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law. Disposition Respondent is REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.

HALILI V COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS MAKASIAR; April 30, 1985 (eva sison)
FACTS - initial cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than 500 bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit; litigation initially commenced with the filing of a complaint for the overtime with the defunct CIR on August 1958; disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an agreement on Dec. 1974 - under the agreement: the Administratrix would transfer to the employees title to the tract of land containing an area of 33,952 sq.m. in San Bartolome, Caloocan and pay in addition the cash amount of P25,000 in full and final satisfaction of all the claims and causes of action of all of the employees against the estate of Fortunato Halili; the union shall withdraw and dismiss the case; the transfer of title and the cash release and quitclaim Halili Enterprises, Halili Transit, Fortunato Halili, his estate, his heirs and successors - a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property was executed - on Aug. 1982, the Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor and Employment requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the propertymotion was granted - prospective buyer, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, however, had apprehensions regarding the authority of the Union to sell. So, Atty. Pineda filed a motion with the SC on Dec. 1982 - but, in an order dated Feb. 1983 Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela granted the motion; so the sale was consummated on June 1983 and the purchase price was deposited with the Manila Bank-Cubao - When Atty. Jose Espinas, the principal counsel, learned of the sale and apportionment of the proceeds, he requested Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records. He was told, however, that the records were missing; it was located for him by Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC - Atty. Espinas filed the urgent motion with prayer for a temporary mandatory restraining order on August 1983 questions the legality of the orders dated Sept. 1982 and Feb. 1983 issued by Labor Arbiter Valenzuela which authorized the sale of the awarded property and the distribution of the proceeds - Movants Union and Espinas prayed for the court to: require Atty. Pineda to deposit with NLRC the amount paid to him representing 35% attorneys fees; require the Halili Drivers and Conductors Union through Domingo Cabading or any of his reps to deposit with the NLRC the 6% union expenses paid to them; implead the Manila Bank-Cubao to require it to prevent further withdrawals of amount deposited in the name of Pineda and the Union; that the order of Valenzuela be nullified insofar as it allows Pineda 35% attorneys fees; NLRC to equitably dispose 20% as fees to all lawyers who participated and any excess amounts to be distributed to the workers - Aug. 1983 Espinas filed a supplement to urgent motion praying for the nullification of Valenzuelas order - the court issued a temporary mandatory restraining order: enjoined Pineda to deposit with NLRC the amount representing 35% attorneys fees (P712,992); directed the Union to deposit with the NLRC 6% union expenses; ordered NLRC and Manila Bank not to allow withdrawals -Union, through Pineda said that the subject matter sought to be enjoined or mandated by the restraining order is moot and academic - Espinas filed a manifestation and motion to require Atty. Pineda and the union to comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order

LEGAL PROFESSION
- Solicitor General filed his comment with the recommendations that the orders of Valenzuela be nullified, that the case must be remanded to the NLRC, and that the TRO issued by the court on Sept.1983 be maintained pending final resolution by NLRC - on the mandatory restraining order, Pineda claims that as of Oct. 1983 he had a balance of P2,000 in his account with Manila Bank - resolution of court dated Oct. 1983, the court set aside as null and void the orders of Valenzuela, directed the Manila Bank, Pineda and the Union to comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order issued on Sept. 1983, and remanded cases to NLRC - Oct. 1983 motion was filed to cite Pineda, Union and Bank in contempt - Dec. 1983- rejoinder reiterating plea to declare Pineda and Capuno of the union in contempt of court and to mere out the proper penalty - crucial facts which have surfaced: > then Union President Amado Lopez informed JC Espinas and Associates that the general membership of the said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm > Espinas, the original counsel, established the award of 897 workers claimnotice of judgment in 1968 was served on JC Espinas & Associates; and a notice of judgment in 1970 was sent to Atty. BC Pineda and Associates under the same address as the Espinas firm > when Pineda appeared for the Union, still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name BC Pineda and Associates, giving the impression that he was the principal lawyer in the cases > Pineda did not reveal to his partners that he had a retainers contract entered into on Jan. 1967; he did not divulge, only the Union officers knew of the contract > the retainers contract between Pineda and the Union appears anomalous and even illegal: only 14% of the total membership was represented which is a violation of Art.242 of the Labor Code; contingent fees worked to the prejudice of those who were no longer working (Pineda knew that all the workers would be out of work because Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila); contract was not notarized > the decision of Manila Memorial Park cemetery to stop questioning the Unions authority to sell and the expeditious manner by which Valenzuela granted motion for such authority make the entire transaction dubious and irregular ISSUE WON Atty. Benjamin Pineda, Ricardo Capuno and Manila BankCubao should be cited in contempt for the alleged failure to comply with the temporary mandatory order and the resolution issued by the SC HELD Ratio a. Atty. Pineda: Atty. Pineda should be cited for indirect contempt. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court, any abuse of or any interference with the proceedings of a court, and any improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice shall be punished as indirect contempts in order to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to enforce judgments, orders and mandates of the court. Atty. Pineda should likewise be subject to disbarment proceedings. The Court may suspend or debar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. b. Manila Banking Corporation: Manila Banking Corporation is not liable for contempt. When there is a sufficient compliance with the courts order, a party can no longer be liable for contempt of court. c. The Union and its officers are dropped from the within contempt charge. Reasoning a. the court already nullified the orders of the labor arbiter as violative of the due process clause

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- the act of Pineda of filing a motion in the SC for authority to sell property in question was by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the authority to sell the property and that the SC was the proper body which had the power to grant such authority - he did not wait for such valid authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize - the 45% attorneys lien on award of those union members who were no longer working and the 30% lien on the benefits of those who were still working as provided for in the retainers contract are very exorbitant and unconscionable (under sec.11 rule VIII of Book III, attorneys fees should not exceed 10% of the amount awarded) - the pleadings show a deceitful pattern on the part of Pineda - contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and admin of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation - the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts - exercise of this power has a twofold aspect: the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order, and to compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform---> due to this twofold aspect, contempts are classified as civil or criminal - civil: failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party -criminal: conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in lawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of a court or of a judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act - where the punishment imposed is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by fine or by imprisonment or both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal case - if made before final decree, contempt judgment will be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory order; if made after the final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on appeal from the final decree - whether civil or criminal does not affect the power of a court to punish it - On Disbarment sec.27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court: attorneys may be removed or suspended for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, for any violation of the lawyers oath, for a willful disobedience of a lawful order of a superior court... - a lawyer may be criminally liable for breach of professional duty, and under the Anti-Graft Act for knowingly inducing a public official to commit an offense b. the bank had transmitted to the NLRC the remaining balance which was a sufficient compliance c. Mr. Capuno clarified that with regard to attorneys fees, Pineda made the Union officers believe that he would be the one to pay the fees of Espinas and Lopez for which reason the 35% increased fees was approved by the Unions board in good faith - Union was aware that Espinas was the principal counsel - they knew of the original contract for 20% attorneys fees Disposition Atty. Pineda is found guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT of court. He is sentenced to imprisonment until the orders of the court are complied with. He is also directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred.

TING-DUMALI V TORRES PER CURIAM; April 14, 2004 (eva sison)

NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Presentation of false testimony, participation in, consent to, and failure to adduce against, the forgery of complainants signature, and gross misrepresentation.

LEGAL PROFESSION
FACTS - complainant-affidavit filed on Oct. 22, 1999 where complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando Torres with presentation of false testimony, participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from it, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics. - complainant is one of six children of late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. - siblings involved are Miriam Saria, Marcelina Rivera and Felicisima Torres who is married to respondent - parents died intestate, leaving 3 parcels of land Complainants Claim - respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them - Felicisima and Miriam executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate where they made it appear that they were the sole heirs; respondent participated in, consented to and failed to advise against this act; he presented said document to the Register of Deeds for the transfer of the title in the names of his wife and Miriam (involving lot 1586) - complainants signature was forged in another Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement involving a different lot to enable Felicisima and Miriam to transfer the title in their names, thus enabling them to sell the land (which they did, to Antel Holdings, Inc); respondent, again, consented to and participated in this act (involving lot 1603) - respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of deceased spouses in the petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy of a title covering the last parcel of land (lot 1605) - made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer of the last parcel of land to release the full payment under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on August 1997 (he said this to buyer on Nov. 1996) Respondents Comment - denies the allegations - lot 1586: his wife and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit the sale; he had no part in the execution of the document; he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the lot; if ever complainants signature was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith - admits he was counsel in the reconstitution case; the false testimony of Marcelina could not be faulted on him because it was a clear oversight - regarding gross and false misrepresentation that the reconstitution order would be released within a month, assurance was made by the Clerk of Court -believes the complainant intends to harass him Complainants Reply -denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother because her mom met a sudden death, when she died four siblings were still minors, and on Feb 2000 Eliseo wrote his siblings, denying the existence of a toka Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP - on june 2000, SC referred the case to IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision - on Jan 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.1 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility - recommended the disbarment of respondent - in its resolution, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted San Juans report, but reduced the penalty to a 6year suspension

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

ISSUES 1. WON respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession 2. WON disbarment is the imposable disciplinary sanction

HELD 1. Yes, respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. A lawyer is a servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. Thus, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and he should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Reasoning the lawyers oath is a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times - the oath is reflected in CPR (Canon 1, 7, 10); they underscore the role of a lawyer as a vanguard of our legal systemin this covenant, respondent miserably failed - respondent knew of his wifes siblings, yet he presented the document stating that his wife and Miriam are the only children to the Register of Deeds - the falsification of complainants signature in the document which contains a waiver by the complainant of her right over the property, a matter consulted to respondent, is tantamount to falsification of a public document; he presented such document, therefore, he himself may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant - respondent did not advise his wife from doing acts which are contrary to law; he must have kept in mind that it is his duty to uphold the Consti and obey the laws of the land - regarding respondents argument that the non-declaration of other siblings was an oversight does not deserve credence because the petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners and because during the hearing when respondent asked Marcelina WON she has bros and sis, latter said none - he allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony in court and he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony - under canon 10, lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court; this was openly violated by respondent - respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession 2. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Reasoning - In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. - given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, it is found that respondents gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life Disposition We find respondent guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law.

MASINSIN V ALBANO VITUG; May 31, 1994 (javi bautista)

LEGAL PROFESSION
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition. FACTS This case emerged from an ejectment suit filed by Vicente Caneda against Miguel and Thelma Masinsin. As a result of the case, the trial court ordered the spouses to vacate the premises and to remove their house/apartment an surrender possession of the subject land; to pay the sum of P100 a month from January 1987 as compensation for the use of the premises until the land is actually vacated. No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On August 22 1985, the Masinsins filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Manila seeking the annulment of the decision of the ejectment case and to set aside the order of its execution. Petition was dismissed. On October 7 1985, petitioners filed a complaint for Annulment of the judgment, Lease Contract and Damages was filed by the Masinsins asking for the nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed due to res judicata. Petitioners appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. When petitioners refused to remove their house, a demolition order was issued. But before the completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by the RTC following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and for declaratory relief. Petition again was denied. Petitioners again filed the same suit before a different branch of the Manila RTC. Petition was ultimately dismissed on August 23 1990. In this present petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila has lost jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit, when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority development by the National Housing Authority on December 1 1987 by authority of PD 2016. ISSUE WON MTC of Manila lost its jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit due to PD 2016 HELD No. according to a report by manager of the Metro Manila Project Department of the National Housing Authority, pursuant to PD No. 1967 (which after amendments became PD No. 2016), the disputed lot is not for acquisition by the NHA. It is located outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal Improvement Project. The NHA is definitely not acquiring the said land and therefore is not part of PD 2016. Thus the MTC of Manila has jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment case. - What immediately catches ones attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners, through different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this court has been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complainants and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final and executory. The petitioners through different counsels tried to nullify the same MTC decision before different branches of the court. The lawyers oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable. The pertinent part of the lawyers oath involved in this case: I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any mans cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. In no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power. Disposition Petition is dismissed. Petitioners counsel of record is strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyers oath in the future will be dealt with mot severely.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

YOUNG V BATUEGAS YNARES-SANTIAGO; May 9, 2003 (owen ricalde)

NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS - On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young, private prosecutor in People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr., pending in RTC Manila, filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyers oath. - On December 13, 2000, Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention. Upon personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly surrendered, Young learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of Detention - Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects, namely > lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant > violation of the three-day notice rule > failure to attach the Certificate of Detention - According to respondents on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender but due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000 TF there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI. - WRT the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that Young was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court. - In August 13, 2001, referred to IBP for investigation, report and recommendation or decision. - On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted a report and recommended Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6) months ISSUE WON Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood HELD YES. Ratio To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception. Reasoning - Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice. - A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. - a lawyer should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion

LEGAL PROFESSION
- courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them - while a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. - Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. - In Comia vs. Antona, we held: It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same date tentatively scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court. - In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the nonobservance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Disposition Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU V THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD. CASTRO; January 30, 1971 (rach mayuga)
NATURE Appeal by certiorari to review a decision and resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dismissing the Unions complaint FACTS - The following UNIONS (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd, Employees Assn-NATU; FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Assn-NATU; Insular Life Bldg Employees Assn-NATU) while still members of the Federation of Free Workers, entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with these COMPANIES (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd; FGU Insurance Group) - Lawyers of the Unions include Enaje and Garcia (Sec-treasurer of FFW). When they left FFW, the Companies then hired them and Garcia became Asst. Corporate Sec and Legal Asst in the Legal Dept, and Enaje became personnel manager of the Companies. He was also made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Co. in the CBA with the Unions. - Sept 16, 1957 Unions jointly submitted proposals for a modified renewal of their respective CBA contracts w/c were due to expire on 9/30 - Sept/Oct 1957 - negotiations were conducted but snagged by deadlock on issue of union shop; Unions then filed on 01/27/1958 notice of strike for deadlock on collective bargaining - April 15, 1958 Unions dropped their demands regarding security but the Companies still refused to negotiate - Apr 25 to May 6 They tried negotiating but with no satisfactory results - May 15, 1958 Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered as unfair labor practices - May 20, 1958 Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of Insular Life Bldg

- May 21, 1958 Companies through the Acting Manager Olbes sent to each of the strikers a letter specifying incentives should they decide to go back to work - Garcia and Abella (Chief of Personnel Records Section) tried to penetrate the picket lines. When Garcia approached the picket line, he engaged into a fight with one of the strikers and both of them suffered injuries. - Companies organized 3 bus-loads of employees, including a photographer who succeeded in penetrating the picket lines causing injuries to picketers. - Alleging that some non-strikers were injured, the Companies filed criminal charges against strikers and they also filed a petition for injunction. - May 31, 1958 CFI Mla granted injunction. Companies sent individually to the strikers another letter which states If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges against you, we are giving you until June 2 to report for work at the home office. Otherwise, we may be forced to obtain your replacement. - All of the more than 120 crim charges, except for 3, were dismissed. But employees decided to call of the strike and to report back to work on June 2. - Before readmitting, Companies required them to secure clearances from the City Fiscals Office and to be screened by a management committee - July 29, 1958 CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice - Aug 17, 1965 CIR dismissed the complaint Relevant to the assigned topic (read pages 277-280!) - Martinez, the Presiding Judge of the CIR, misquoted a SC decision in the case of Lopez Sr v. Chronicle Publication Employees Assn: (1) 60 words of the paragraph quoted by Martinez do NOT appear in the original; (2) Martinez used For it is settled that...; the original reads, For it must be remembered... (3) Last sentence in the quoted paragraph of Martinez is actually part of the immediately succeeding paragraph in the SC decision. - In the respondents brief, counsels for respondents quoted the CIRs decision ISSUES 1. WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice a) In sending out letters individually directed to the strikers b) For discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmitting employees after the strike c) For dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side 2. WON the officials and members of the Unions are to be reinstated with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to date of actual reinstatement 3. WON Presiding Judge Martinez and counsels of respondents are to be cited for contempt for misquoting a Supreme Court decision HELD 1.a) YES. Ratio It is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate with his employees individually, in connection with the changes in the agreement. Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under the obligation to bargain with the union as the employees bargaining representative. Reasoning It is an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a specific time, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. The first letter contains promises of benefits to employees; the second letter contains threats to obtain replacements. Free speech protection under the Constitution is

LEGAL PROFESSION
inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats or reprisal. - The circumstance that strikers later decided to return to work on account of injunction cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters which tended to interfere with the employees right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of strike. - Totality of Conduct Doctrine: Expressions of opinion by an employer, though innocent in themselves, were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered. (1) Before Unions submission of proposals for renewal of CBAs, respondents hired former legal counsels of petitioners; (2) After notice to strike was served on the Companies, they reclassified 87 employees as supervisors, compelling them to resign from unions; (3) During negotiations in Dept of Labor, they refused to answer the Unions demands en toto; (4) Strikers were individually sent letters inducing them to return to work with promises of special privileges; (5) Three truckloads of nonstrikers crashed through the picket line, which resulted in injuries on the part of picketers; (6) Criminal charges were brought upon picketers; (7) An injunction was obtained from CFI; (8) Another letter was sent individually and by registered special delivery mail threatening them with dismissal if they didnt report for work on June 2; (9) When they did report for work, a screening committee refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on ground of pending criminal charges; (10) When almost all were cleared by fiscals office, they were still refused admission; but all non-strikers were readmitted immediately. It is clear that the main reason for the strike was when it became clear that management will not negotiate in good faith. 1.b) YES. Ratio The companies are guilty of discrimination in their process of rehiring. They refused to readmit strikers with pending criminal charges, even after these employees have secured the required clearances. At the same time, the Companies readily readmitted non-strikers who also had criminal charges, without requiring clearances. They even separated active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Reasoning There are 3 conditions for readmission of the strikers: (1) he must be interested in continuing his work with the companies; (2) no criminal charges against him; (3) report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. All employees are considered to have complied with first and third condition. - In an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in rehiring, they even delegated the power to readmit to a committee composed of Abella and Garcia. Both were involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike, and the mere act of placing the power of reinstatement in their hands is a form of discrimination. 1.c) YES. Ratio The Companies refused to take the employees back on account of their acts of misconduct even if all, except three, were able to secure the required clearances. Record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges. 2. YES. Ratio The members and officials of the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the Companies. They are now entitled to reinstatement with back pay because when they reported back for work, upon the invitation of their employers, they were discriminatorily dismissed. 3. NO. Ratio The misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. Counsels of respondents have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the Judges decision, to copy it verbatim and to incorporate it in their brief. Import of sentences in the quotation is substantially the same as the cited decision. Impt: In citing SCs decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. This

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

is because only the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction. (Miiranda v. Imperial) - Ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of SC may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. Also, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, and be saved precious time in finding out whether citations are correct. Disposition Decision of the CIR is reversed and set aside. Respondents are ordered to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions with back wages.

IN RE SOTTO FERIA; January 21, 1949 (bri bauza)

NATURE Original action in Supreme Court. Contempt FACTS - On December 7, 1948, Respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto was required by this Court to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court for having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows: As author of the Press Freedom Law (RA 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who has now to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the souce of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constituted a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. - Respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court. But he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and a law has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive. - He also alleges in his answer that in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, nor intended to attack the honesty or integrity of anyone. ISSUES WON the Supreme Court may hold respondent guilty for contempt of court.

LEGAL PROFESSION
HELD Ratio Any publication; pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. The summary power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land. (In re Kelly) Reasoning In re Kelly lays down the doctrine of the power of courts to hold contempt proceedings. - Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court. But in his above-quoted statement, he not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with a presentation of a bill in the next congressional session, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow-minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into the disrepute and degrading the administration of justice. - The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law in their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos may be the result. - As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. - As Justice Holmes very appropriately said in U.S. v Sullens: The administration of justice and freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the constitution and laws, form which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. Disposition In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine P1000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred from practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following statements made by him during the pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court. The respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause for criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

GUERRERO V VILLAMOR FERNAN; NOVEMBER 13, 1989 (jaja estoy)

NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Subprovince of Biliran, Leyte, Br. 16. FACTS - Consequent to the dismissal of five criminal cases for qualified theft against Naval by respondent Judge Villamor, the offended party, petitioner Carlos, through his lawyer and co-petitioner Guerrero filed before the RTC Br. 21 of Cebu City an action for damages against respondent Judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in the aforesaid consolidated criminal cases. Consequently, respondent Judge issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N0989-0993 an Order of Direct Contempt of Court against petitioners, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt and sentencing them both to imprisonment of five days and a fine of P500 for degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court. - The derogatory and contemptuous language adverted to by respondent judge are the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 reading: "12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990, 0991, 0992 and 0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly without circumspection-without any moral or legal basis-a case of knowingly rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal was tantamount to acquittal of the accused Gloria P. Naval who is now beyond the reach of criminal and civil liability-all because the defendant Hon. Adriano R. Villamor was bent backwards with his eyes and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances which demanded the scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion free from bias x x x;" "xxx xxx xxx "14. By the standard of a public official and a private person the conduct of defendant Honorable Judge-not only shocking, but appalling-in giving the plaintiff before his court the run-around is at the very least distasteful, distressing and mortifying and moral damages therefore would warrant on this kind of reprehensible behaviour x x x "15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations, defendant judge should also visit upon him x x x for reducing plaintiff his agonizing victim of his disdain and contempt for the former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also humiliated and spitefully scorned. - Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have been committed against respondent Judge in the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 6478 because whatever was mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent Judge while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore, petitioners contend that the words used in the subject complaint were ISSUE WON petitioners committed direct contempt of court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court justifying the award of damages being sought HELD 1. No. Direct contempt could not have been committed against respondent Judge in the complaint for damages because whatever was mentioned therein was not made before respondent judge while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the court while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore, the words they used In the subject complaint were merely words descriptive of the plaintiffs cause of action based on his reaction and remorse and the willful infliction of injury on him and that the same are all privileged communications made in the course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant

LEGAL PROFESSION
to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous. Strong words were used to lay stress on the gravity and degree of moral anguish suffered by petitioner as a result of the dismissal of the subject criminal merely words descriptive of plaintiffs cause of action based on his reaction and remorse and the wilfull infliction of the injury on him and that the same are all privileged communications made in the course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous. - In his Comment, respondent Judge maintains that petitioners harp too much on the fact that the five criminal cases are closed cases and therefore the language or words employed to describe, opine, criticize or condemn the dismissal of said criminal cases in no way obstruct or hamper, ruin or disturb the dignity and authority of the court presided over by respondent judge, as said court was no longer functioning as such in the dispensation of justice. This, according to respondent Judge, is a very dangerous perception for then the court becomes vulnerable to all forms of verbal assaults, which would shake the foundation of judicial authority and even of democratic stability, so that the absence of such proceedings should not be made a shield to sully the court's prestige. - The Court sustains petitioners contention that the alleged derogatory language employed in the complaint in the civil case did not constitute direct contempt but may only, if at all, constitute indirect contempt subject to defenses that may be raised by said petitioners in the proper proceedings. Stress must be placed on the fact that the subject pleading was not submitted to respondent Judge nor in the criminal cases from which the contempt order was issued but was filed in another court presided by another judge and involving a separate action: the civil case for damages against respondent Judge. Although the allegations in the complaint for damages criticized the wisdom of respondent Judges act of dismissing the criminal cases, such criticism was directed to him when he was no longer in the process of performing judicial functions in connection with the subject criminal cases so as to constitute such criticisms as direct contempt of court. - The power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, so much so that judges should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, the power being intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. Any abuse of the contempt citation powers will therefore be curtailed and corrected. - Be that as it may, lawyers, on the other hand, should bear in mind their basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and x x x (to) insist on similar conduct by others." This respectful attitude towards the court is to be observed, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." And it is "through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance of the respect due to the courts and judicial officers x x x."

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

IN RE ALMACEN RUIZ CASTRO; Feb 18, 1970 (kooky talon)

NATURE Proceedings For Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen FACTS - Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant in the civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero. The trial court tendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision, and on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court

denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. - CA, citing Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co. dismissed the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. Inc. vs. Bain Construction At Co.), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time." - Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. - Atty. Almacen then appealed to the SC by certiorari. SC refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the said date was ordered expunged from the records. - Atty. Almacen then filed his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks, against the Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional. The petition was filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts the Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "people by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violation of the Constitution with impunity." His client, he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the' altar of hypocrisy.'' In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of the Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members, of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that ". . . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession." - Sept 28, 1967, SC resolved to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. When nothing came from him, Atty. Almacen was reminded to turn over his certificate so that the Court could act on his petition. - To said reminder Atty. Almacen manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory"; that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to 'pursue the negative act." - Nov 17, 1967 SC resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the Nov 17 resolution, Atty.

LEGAL PROFESSION
Almacen asked for permission to give reasons and cause in an open and public hearing. The Court required Atty. Almacen to state his reasons for such request, to which he manifested that since the Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that the Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no, time to hear him in person." He was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument. - Atty. Almacens written answer offered no apology. Far from being contrite, Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeated his jeremiad of lamentations, abundant with sarcasm and innuendo1. ISSUE WON the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions HELD - Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity. - CA had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of Atty. Almacens appeal in light of the law and applicable decisions of the SC. As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew - or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). Atty. Almacens own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. There is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts. - Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. - As citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. It is his right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. - By constitutional mandate, it is the SCs solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. - A critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.
1

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- NOTE: disciplinary proceedings like the present are Sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. It may be initiated by the Court motu proptio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. Disposition Accordingly, it is the sense of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

SORIANO V COURT OF APPEALS PARDO; August 28, 2001 (yella bautista)

FACTS Deogracias and Rosalina Reyes pleaded that they were employed by Socorro as manager and administrative assistant of her property and real estate in 1968. As payment for their services, in 1973, Socorro gave them one apartment unit to use as their dwelling for the duration of their lifetime and a token monthly rental on P150 was imposed. In the same building, another unit was occupied by the spouses which was improved and converted by them into a pub and restaurant. For the use of the premises, the token amount of P1500 monthly was imposed. On October 17, 1988, Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina notice to vacate the said two units Deogracias and Rosalina owned two commercial lots with improvements. On May 28, 1968, they became indebted to Socorro in the amount of P638,635.36. The parties agreed to pay for the debt by selling the two lots for P2.5M. While looking for a buyer, Deogracias and Rosalina conveyed the property to Socorro by way of first mortgage. A deed of absolute sale was executed in place of a real estate mortgage. Action was initiated by the spouses but the court released the two lots in favor of Socorro having presented the deed of absolute sale in her name. On October 28, 1988, the spouses paid the filing fee and legal research. On November 29, 1988, Socorro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: 1. the first cause of action was barred by the pendency of an ejectment case between the same parties over the same parties 2. the second cause of action was premature On December 8, 1988, the Carmelite Sisters on behalf of their benefactress filed with the trial court an urgent ex-parte motion for restraining order. They talked to respondent judge Naval in his chambers and requested him to immediately act on Socorros urgent ex-parte motion for a restraining order. On December 16, 1988, the TC denied the motion. On January 16, 1989, Socorro through counsel Atty. Padilla filed a motion to inhibit Judge Naval 1. while still a law practitioner and politician, he was a frequent customer of the restaurant of the spouses and was a good friend of his 2. he was also a good friend of the attorney of the spouses TC denied motion to inhibit

Refer to the case for Atty. Almacens written answer. The way he addressed the Court and how he laid down his points should be a matter of interest. As the court said, this is a matter unprecedented and unprofessional. One paragraph reads: Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.

LEGAL PROFESSION
On April 17, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina filed a motion to admit attached supplemental complaint which pleaded that they have already paid their debt to Socorro but the latter refused to accept said payment without just cause thus was a clear move on her part to let the 3 year period provided in their MOA elapse TC admitted the supplemental complaint Socorro moved to dismiss supplemental complaint TC denied motion to dismiss supplemental complaint TC ordered Deogracias and Rosalina to pay a deficiency in the docket fees Socorro moved for an extension to file a responsive pleading to the supplemental complaint and to reset pre-trial Deogracias and Rosalina complied with the order and paid additional filing fees TC granted Socorros motion for an extension Socorro again moved for another extension and resetting of the pre-trial The TC granted the second motion Socorro again moved for another extension on which the TC did not act upon Socorros counsel Atty. Padilla filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of various orders of the respondent court Deogracias and Rosalina filed an opposition The TC denied Socorros motion The TC directed Atty. Padilla to show cause whey he should not be cited for contempt of court. He consequently failed to do so and the court declared Socorro in default and Atty. Padilla was sentenced to 5 days imprisonment with a P100 fine for direct contempt of court. Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus with temporary restraining order assailing the orders of Judge Naval.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

4.

has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in his exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Yes. The supplemental complaint contains matters directly different from and even contrary to the cause of action stated in the original complaint. The rule allowing amendments to a pleading is subject to the general limitation that the cause of action shall not be substantially changed or that the theory of the case shall not be altered. The CA erred when it stated that a certiorari proceeding assailing the judgment of direct contempt was not proper as Atty. Padilla may have appealed therefrom. Rule 71, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: A person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The court also erred when it affirmed the trial courts finding of direct contempt of court against Atty. Padilla (see comments made by Atty. Padilla in the original text of the case) Atty. Padillas innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to the court. The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.

5.

MACEDA V VASQUEZ NOCON; April 22, 1993 (edel cruz)

NATURE Petition for Certiorari of the order of the ombudsman FACTS - This is a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order for the Office of the Ombudsman to stop it from entertaining a criminal complaint regarding the alleged falsification of a judges certification submitted to the SC. - Petitioner Judge Maceda was accused of falsification of Certificate of Service, and now seeks to review orders of the Ombudsman - Napoleon Abiera of PAO alleged that the petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decisions have been determined and decided on or before Jan 31 1989 when in truth 15 cases were still to be determined. (Abiera alleges Maceda lied that he finished the cases but he hasnt yet.) ISSUES 1. WON Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case despite the Courts ruling in Orap v. Sandiganbayan 2. WON the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all the inferior courts HELD 1. NO. There is nothing in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of Service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and inefficiency. And criminally liable to the state under the RPC for his felonious act. 2. YES. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation of the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

ISSUES 1. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to restrain or to remedy the forcible seizure by the plaintiffs of the property subject of the litigation 2. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to order the payment of the correct fling fee upon failure to pay the same, to dismiss the case 3. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to inhibit 4. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in admitting the supplemental complaint with a theory directly contrary to the original complaint and in not dismissing it upon motion of defendant. 5. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in finding Atty. Padilla, Jr. guilty of direct contempt 6. WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in sanctioning the orders of the TC except the Order admitting the supplemental complaint HELD 1. 2. No. The issue has already become moot and academic since the parties had already entered the premises in question. No. There was no intention on the part of Deogracias and Rosalina to degraud the government. They were in good faith and relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court. No. Rule 137, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides only the following grounds for the disqualification of judges- No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he

3.

LEGAL PROFESSION
- ART VIII, sec 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests on the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the SC. - The Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners certificates of service to the SC for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load. (SO admin case first before criminal.) Disposition Petition granted. Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the complaint filed by the public respondent.2

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

MALONSO V PRINCIPE TINGA; December 16, 2004 (giulia pineda)

NATURE Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS In the early part of 1997, Napocor instituted expropriation proceedings against several lot owners in Bulacan including the complainant in this case. - April 1, 1997, a Contract of Legal Services was entered into between the law firm Principe Villano and Clemente Law Offices and SANDAMA, Inc. represented by its President Danilo V. Elfa. SANDAMA is the organization of lot owners affected by the expropriation proceedings. Complainant is a member of this organization. - November 27, 1997, complainant executed a Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay Kapangyarihan in favor of Danilo Elfa appointing the latter as the attorney-in-fact of the complainant on the matter of negotiation with the NPC. - December 21, 1999, NPCs Board of Directors approved the amicable settlement of the expropriation cases by paying all the lot owners the total of One Hundred Three Million Four Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P103,413,200.00). - More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were instituted and while complainant was represented therein by Atty. Benjamin Mendoza, or on January 18, 2000, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From Selling Price Between Plaintiffs and Defendants. - About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate legal fees, respondent filed his Notice of Entry of Appearance (dated January 28, 2000) claiming that respondent is the legal counsel of the complainant, a defendant in said case. - February 12, 2000, (69) lot owners including the complainant wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to hire the services of the respondents law firm to represent them in the expropriation cases. - February 17, 2000, complainant filed an Opposition to respondents entry of appearance and motion to separate legal fees. - March 7, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien claiming 40% of the selling price of the properties being expropriated by NPC. - April 10, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of Bulacan claiming 40% of the rights, title and interest of the lot owners over their lots being expropriated including that of complainant. - November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in the expropriation case claiming to be a co-owner of the property being expropriated.

- February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the Compromise Agreement submitted by the lot owners and NPC for court approval. Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution of the decision approving the compromise agreement between the lot owners and the NPC was delayed - June 6, 2001 - a complaint for disbarment was filed before the IBP. Julian Malonso claimed that Atty Principe, without authority entered his appearance as Malonsos counsel in the expropriation proceedings initiated by Napocor. After illegally representing him, Pincipe claimed 40% of the selling price of his land by way of attorneys fees and in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a co-owner of Malonsos property. - In the respondets anawer, he claims that the services of his law office was engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR (SANDAMA) through its president, Danilo Elfa, as embodied in the Contract of Legal Services executed on April 1, 19973. Respondent claims that Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that the said member executed an SPA in favor of Elfa which served as Elfas authority to act in behalf of Malonso - In Malonsos reply, he claimed that he did not authorize Elfa as the SPA was executed after the Contract of Legal Services. He also claims that he also had his own lawyer, Atty. Benjamin Mendoza. - Principe counters this argument saying that the agreement is a continuing one, hence Malonso was within the coverage of the contract. - According to the findings of the IBP investigator, the Contract of Legal Services is between SANDAMA as a corporate being and the respondents law firm. SANDAMA is not a party in all of the expropriation proceedings instituted by Napocor, neither does it claim co-ownership of the properties being expropriated. It was also found that the SPA was executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa after the Contract of Legal Services, and the right of coownership cannot be derived from the said documents. A contract of legal services between a lawyer and his client is personal and cannot be performed through intermediaries. From the evidence presented by both parties, the Investigating Commissioner found Principe guilty of misrepresentation. He was found to have violated Canon3, Rule 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04. the report recommended the penalty of a 2 year suspension. - October 25, 2003 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors suspended him for 1 year - In his Appeal Memorandum, respondent claims that the Resolution has no factual and legal basis, the complaint having been motivated by pure selfishness and greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply with Rule 139-B of the RoC. According to the respondent, the Investigating Commissioner continued to investigate the instant case despite the lapse of three months provided under Section 8 of Rule 139B, without any extension granted by the SC. Moreover, in the subsequent review made by the IBP Board of Governors, no actual voting took place but a mere consensus, and the required number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured
3
The Contract states in part: The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows: I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their lawyer of the collection, claim, and/ or payment of just compensation of its members with the NAPOCOR; II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on the following conditions: A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to court proceedings and other related activities; B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees, appearance and liaison fees; C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY: 1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between NAPOCOR and the SANDAMA members; this forty (40%) [percent] is the maximum rate and may be negotiated depending on the volume of work involved; 2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover: i.) Attorneys Fees of FIRST PARTY; ii.) His representation expenses and commitment expenses; iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc. D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or secure the best price from NAPOCOR.

NOTE: Lawyer has a duty to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack, irrespective of whether he loses or wins a case in a judges sala. But a lawyer can file admin complaints against erring judges. SC- ADMIN CASES (THROUGH COURT ADMINISTRATOR) OMBUDSMAN CRIMINAL CASE

LEGAL PROFESSION
considering that there were only five (5) governors present. Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board were aimed at preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP National President. ISSUES 1. WON Atty. Principes suspension in the practice of law properly arrived at 2. WON Principe illegally represented the petitioners HELD 1. Ratio Before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law by the IBP, there should be (1) a review of the investigators report; (2) a formal voting; and (3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this rule is simple: a decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the official decision of the Board as a body and not merely as the collective view of the individual members thereof. Without a vote having been taken, the Resolution is void and has no effect. - Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand of the case. However, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case, or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. In view of the delay in resolving the instant complaint against the respondent, the Court opts to resolve the same based on the records before it. 2. Ratio - The duty of the courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. - It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his behavior towards the court, his client, his peers in the profession and the public. However, the duty of the Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty of misconduct, but also to protecting the reputation of those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully found guilty. - On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of the standards of the law profession, the improvement of the administration of justice, and the enabling of the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Despite its duty to police the ranks, the IBP is not exempt from the duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules formulated for their observance. Reasoning - There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination by the courts of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken which relates to the valuation thereof. But as it frequently happens, the public purpose dimension is not as fiercely contested. Moreover, in their quest to secure what they believe to be the fair compensation of their property, the owners seek inroads to the leverages of executive power where compensation compromises are commenced and given imprimatur. In this dimension, the services of lawyers different from the ordinary litigator may prove to be handy or even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of court and reliant on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness of the negotiator. - In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the properties subject of the expropriation, the same order which is subject of the appeal filed by the

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

NAPOCOR. Aware that it might take a long time before the said appeal is finally resolved, and in view of the delay in the adjudication of the case, the landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for a compromise agreement. To assist them, the landowners, through SANDAMA and its president, Danilo Elfa, engaged the services of a lawyer in the person of respondent. It is clear that respondent was hired precisely for the negotiation phase of the case. - As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders or members and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. Thus, property belonging to a corporation cannot be attached to satisfy the debt of a stockholder and vice versa, the latter having only an indirect interest in the assets and business of the former. Thus, as summed by the IBP investigator, respondent is the lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of the expropriation cases; thus respondent had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings involving the members. But things are not as simple as that. - A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to believe that he can intervene and claim from the individual landowners. For one, the incorporation of the landowners into SANDAMA was made and initiated by respondents firm so as to make negotiations with NAPOCOR easier and more organized. SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit corporation aimed towards the promotion of the landowners common interest. It presented a unified front which was far easier to manage and represent than the individual owners. In effect, respondent still dealt with the members, albeit in a collective manner. - Second, respondent relied on the representation of Danilo Elfa, former SANDAMA president and attorney-in-fact of the members, with whom he entered into a contract for legal services. Respondent could not have doubted the authority of Elfa to contract his firms services. After all, Elfa was armed with a Board Resolution from SANDAMA, and more importantly, individual grants of authority from the SANDAMA members, including Malonso. - Third, the contract for legal services clearly indicated a contingent fee of forty percent (40%) of the selling price of the lands to be expropriated, the same amount which was reflected in the deed of assignment made by the individual members of SANDAMA. Respondent could have easily and naturally assumed that the same figure assigned to SANDAMA was the same amount earmarked for its legal services as indicated in their service contract. Being a non-stock, non-profit corporation, where else would SANDAMA get the funds to pay for the legal fees due to respondent and his firm but from the contribution of its members. - Lastly, respondents legal services were disengaged by SANDAMAs new President Yolanda Bautista around the same time when the SANDAMA members abandoned and disauthorized former SANDAMA president Elfa, just when the negotiations bore fruit. With all these circumstances, respondent, rightly or wrongly, perceived that he was also about to be deprived of his lawful compensation for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its members. With the prevailing attitude of the SANDAMA officers and members, respondent saw the immediate need to protect his interests in the individual properties of the landowners. - The Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct or practice justifying the penalty recommended. While filing the claim for attorneys fees against the individual members may not be the proper remedy for respondent, the Court believes that he instituted the same out of his honest belief that it was the best way to protect his interests. After all, SANDAMA procured his firms services and was led to believe that he would be paid for the same. There is evidence which tend to show that respondent and his firm rendered legal and even extra-legal services in order to assist the landowners get a favorable valuation of their properties. They facilitated the incorporation of the landowners to expedite the negotiations between the owners, the appraisers, and NAPOCOR. They sought the

LEGAL PROFESSION
assistance of several political personalities to get some leverage in their bargaining with NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just after concluding the compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of the compromise agreement for the courts approval, SANDAMA disengaged the services of respondents law firm. - With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and having rendered legal service for years without having received anything in return, and with the prospect of not getting any compensation for all the services it has rendered to SANDAMA and its members, respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. It is but natural that he protects his interest, most especially when his fee is on a contingent basis. - Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a compromise agreement was entered into by the lot owners and NAPOCOR. Its motions for separate legal fees as well as for intervention were dismissed by the trial court. Presiding from the ultimate outcome of an independent action to recover attorneys fees, the Court does not see any obstacle to respondent filing such action against SANDAMA or any of its members. - The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent fees does not make the contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved party. Disposition WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and considered CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is enjoined to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the recover of the balance of the judgment amounting to P11,574.38 with interest at seven percent per annum. - The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of his right to redeem the first property resold by PNB, the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment. - The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by the bank through one of its officer, a certain Mr. Pecson. - Hence this appeal ISSUES 1. WON PNB condoned the balance of the judgment 2. WON a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the same case HELD 1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain testimony of the defendant, that the bank did in fact agree to the condonation. Even if the SC grants that Mr. Pecson did agree to the condonation, there is not evidence presented that Mr. Pecson was authorized by the bank through its board of directors or persons authorized by the said board to bind the bank to the agreement. 2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both counsel and witness in a trial is not strictly prohibited. The SC however stated that it would be preferable if the lawyer in this case can appear only as one or the other. In other words, if they are to testify as required by the case, they should withdraw from the active management of the case. This is embodied in Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics. Disposition The decision of the CFI is reversed and the defendant is ordered to pay PNB the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of seven percent per annum to be reckoned from August 1, 1930. Costs for the defendant.

NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC. VS. SANCHEZ PER CURIAM; SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 (cha mendoza)
NATURE Resolution FACTS - During the period July 8-10, 1987, members of the respondent labor unions (Union of Filipino Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia) intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers. - These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fenian as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring the leaders of the respondent union leaders to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.

PNB V UY TENG PIAO VICKERS; 1932 (romy ramirez)

NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila FACTS - Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non payment of obligations at the CFI of Manila and said court rendered judgment in favor of PNB on September 9, 1934 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest of seven percent per annum from June 1, 1924. The court ordered the defendant appellant to deposit the money due with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of judgment. In case of failure to pay, the mortgage properties should be sold at auction in accordance with law and the proceeds to be applied to the payment of the judgment. - The defendant failed to comply with the payment order and the properties were auctioned by the sheriff of Manila for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the buyer. - On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of the latters right to redeem one of the properties described as TCT no. 8274 and thereafter sold the same to one Mariano Santos for P8,600. - The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and the proceeds was credited to the account of Uy. The total amount generated with the resale of the lots amonted to P 11, 300.

LEGAL PROFESSION
- On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, apologizing for their actions described and assuring that the acts would not be repeated. Atty. Espinas likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mang. gagawa as Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor union. - Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cam is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution. - To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they win abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July 17, 1987 ISSUE WON the respondents and Atty. Espinas should be held in direct contempt of Court HELD NO. Contempt charges dismissed. Ratio The respondents who are nonlawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. It is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members. Reasoning The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice. - courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. Disposition WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts. SO ORDERED.

A2010
(joey capones)

PROF. JARDELEZA

NATURE Administrative case for disqualification FACTS The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors was set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003 in compliance with IBP by laws. Later on, the outgoing IBP Board reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention. Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letterrequesting the IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) IBP By Laws require the holding of the election of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national convention of the IBP to prevent it from being politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in the IBP By Laws. Motion was denied. After the IBP national convention had been adjourned, Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez filed a Petition before the IBP Board seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region. IBP denied petition stating that there was no compelling justification for the postponement of the elections and that the petition for disqualification was premature. Petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those sought in their Petition before the IBP. The SC issued a TRO, directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao. Petitioners Claim De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter because he coveted the IBP presidency. [Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the EVP. The EVP will automatically succeed the President in the next term] De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. He was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on the aconstitutionality of the plunder law. He also could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his clients funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice law. De Vera actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws Respondents Comments Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy: the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter Petitioners have no legal standing because there is no disqualification in the by laws. Only election protests are provided for but only qualified nominees can file protest. Petitioners are not among qualified nominees.

IN RE DE VERA TINGA; December 11, 2003

An IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership. It was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership. It is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was

LEGAL PROFESSION
done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship He denies exhibiting disrespect to the Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification to run for the position as there is no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge On the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National Convention, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century Park Hotel ISSUES 1. WON this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy 2. WON petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues, namely: a. WON the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under the IBP By-Laws b. WON the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit; 3. WON the present Petition is premature 4. Assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not premature, WON respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region HELD 1. Ratio As there exists a clear constitutional grant of power to the SC to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, the SC has jurisdiction over the present controversy. Reasoning Sec. 5, Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution confers power to SC to supervise all activities of the IBP. The IBP by-laws also recognize the full range of the power of supervision of the SC over the IBP. 2A. Ratio Since the IBP By-laws do not provide for disqualification of candidates for IBP governor, petition to disqualify is not the proper remedy. Reasoning Petition has no firm ground to stand on. Changes previously adopted by the Court simplified the election process and made it less controversial. The grounds for disqualification were thus removed in the present by-laws. 2B. Ratio With the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP ByLaws to the present petition, petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit. Reasoning As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds therefore. only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election. 3. Ratio Petition to seek disqualification of a person is premature when the person has not yet even been nominated. Reasoning Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

4. Ratio As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. Reasoning The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the IBP, 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs, (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or cycle, and (4) he is not in the government service. With regards to his transfer of membership the same is valid having been made 17 months prior election, The only condition required under the rules is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude. The contempt ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude (an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.) On the administrative complaint in California, no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. On the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court Disposition Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED.

PEREZ V ESTRADA VITUG; June 29, 2001 (glaisa po)

FACTS - KBP, an association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." - The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. - The Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition; public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation. - In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino: Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court

LEGAL PROFESSION
proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated." ISSUE WON live radio and television coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against Pres. Estrada should be allowed HELD - NO. The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. - Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence10 but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. - An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. - A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. - The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process17 which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 Apri1 2001, expressed its own concern on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers. - Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live television and radio coverage of their proceedings. - The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as they do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has left a still divided nation. - The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to turn a blind eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.

A2010
(boots tirol)

PROF. JARDELEZA

NATURE Resolution of the Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of the San Carlos City Court FACTS - a petition for certiorari entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the SC. Due to noncompliance with the requirements, specifically the nonpayment of the legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge, the SC dismissed the petition. -On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. This time, the amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied with finality. - On January 22, 1990 the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a strongly-worded complaint filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." - Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct by reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court. -On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed his "Opposition." In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned. Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such order." Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." ISSUE WON Atty Castellano is guilty of improper conduct and be punished for contempt HELD YES. In filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division with the Office of the President, even the most basic tenet of our government system-the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches-has been lost on Atty. Castellano. The Supreme Court is supreme-the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.' Not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts. -Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices" is but an effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of having

MAGLASANG V PEOPLE PER CURIAM; November 4, 1990

LEGAL PROFESSION
complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law. Disposition Atty. Castellano found guilty of improper conduct and contempt of court and fined P1,000.00 and suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months

A2010
1.

PROF. JARDELEZA

HORNILLA V SALUNAT SANTIAGO; July 1, 2003 (dahls salamat)

FACTS -Complainant : Benedicto Hornilla, Atty. FedericoRicafort (members of PPSTA) -Respondent : Atty. Erneto Salunat (member of ASSA Law Firm-> Retained counsel of Philippine Public School Teachers Association) -Complainants filed an intracorpoate case against members of the Board of Directors for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 for unlawful spending and undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. -Respondent appeared as counsel for PPSTA Board Members in the said case. -Respondent in PPSTS v 1992-1995 Board of Directors of PPSTA, appeared as counsel for respondent despite being part of ASSA Law Firm the retained counsel of PPSTA Petitioners Claim -respondent is guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by PPSTA and was being paid out of its corporate funds to which they have contributed. -respondent violated rule 15.06 of the code of professional responsibility when he assured PPSTA Board Members in a meeting that he will win the PPSTA case Respondents Comment -He entered his appearance as counsel or the PPSTA Board members for and in behalf of ASSA Law and Associates. -His relationship with Aurelio Salunat is immaterial -He denies assuring victory of the PPSTA Board in the case but merely assured them the truth will come out. -Averred by way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that Atty. Ricafort himself was guilty of gross violation of his oath amounting to gross misconduct ,malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped up charges against him, and prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed and complainant be disciplined or disbarred. IBP Commission on Bar and Discipline recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation. ISSUE WON a lawyer engaged by a corporation can defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit HELD No. A Lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. -Pertinent rule of the CPR: Rule 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. -There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. -TESTS FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST:

WON in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for a issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for another client. 2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. Derivative suit: Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders. -Respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests and was ADMONISHED to observe higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.

ILUSORIO V LOKIN,JR. CARPIO MORALES; December 14, 2005 (apple maramba)

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors FACTS On July 15, 1991, Potenciano Ilusorio, engaged the services of the law office of Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009, of which Ilusorio was one of the defendants -In that civil case, the Republic was claiming shareholdings in Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) 99% of the shares of which appeared to be owned by POTC. Atty Luis Lokin, Jr., together with Attorneys Demaree Raval and Salvador Hizon, actively handled the case for Ilusorio -While the case was pending, Ilusorio, with the assistance of the law firm of Raval and Lokin (successor to Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin), entered into a Compromise Agreement with the Republic, where it was settled that the Republic was to get 4,727 POTC shares while Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares. -During the special stockholders meeting of PHILCOMSAT held on August 27, 1998, which was supposed to be a mere informal gathering to introduce the newly appointed government nominees for PHILCOMSAT to the private stockholders of POTC, the gathering, through the high-handed and deceitful maneuvers of respondent, was suddenly and without notice transformed into a Special Stockholders Meeting at which directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT were elected. -Ilusorio then contested the validity of the meeting by filing before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint, against Manuel Nieto, et al. who were purportedly elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT, in which SEC case respondent Lokin, Jr. appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al., contrary to his oath not to represent conflicting interests. -However, on account of the death of Ilusorio and the failure of his children, namely, Maximo Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, and Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner (herein petitioner), to establish their qualification to substitute for him, his complaint was dismissed -Petitioner filed a new complaint against respondent -After hearing both parties, IBP Investigating Commissioner San Juan found merit in petitioners complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended for three months. -The IBP Board of Governors set aside the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and dismissed the complaint -No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon petitioner. Petitioner, nonetheless, learned about the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and the setting aside thereof by the Board of Governors - On March 10, 2004 petitioner wrote a letter to the Board in her own name requesting that the Board take up the matter once more and asking for the remanding of the case against Atty. Luis Lokin to the Board of Governors.

LEGAL PROFESSION
- By letter of April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors said that it constrained to deny [petitioners] request for a remanding or a reconsideration of the case as there was no provision for a reconsideration of any such case either in Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court or in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. -Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Samuel Divina, then wrote a letter of July 19, 2004 to Atty. Jose Anselmo Cadiz, Chairman of the IBP Board of Governors and concurrently National President of the IBP, informing him that petitioner had not been notified of any final action on her complaint - Replying, the Board Chairman, by letter dated August 11, 2004, stated that the Board could no longer act on petitioners July 19, 2004 letter, otherwise it would, in effect, be considering the letter as a motion for reconsideration which is not provided for by the rules of procedure for cases of the kind. - Petitioner thus filed the present petition on September 2, 2004 ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the petition was filed within the 15-day reglamentary period 2. WON the case should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper, it being based not on a resolution of the IBP Board 3. WON personal knowledge of the petitioner of the facts alleged in the complaint is required to pursue the complaint Substantive WON the respondent is guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD Procedural Reasoning 1. Respondent contends that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, as petitioner should be deemed to have received notice of the challenged IBP resolution, not on August 17, 2004 when her counsel received the August 11, 2004 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, but on March 10, 2004 when she wrote the Board admitting having acquired knowledge of the reversal of Commissioner San Juans recommendation. Hence, respondent claims, petitioner had only until March 25, 2004 to file a petition for review. - Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states: (c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complaint or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. - The notice of resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers not to an unofficial information that may be gathered by the parties, nor to any letter from the IBP Board Chairman or even of the Board, but to the official notice of resolution that is supposed to be issued by the Board, copy of which is given to all parties and transmitted to this Court. - Respondent IBP admits that no such notice has been sent to petitioner - Since no notice has been sent to petitioner, at least at the time this petition was filed, as the August 11, 2004 letter from the IBP Board Chairman cannot be deemed a notice of resolution, the present petition has been timely filed. 2. While, generally, a party who desires to appeal from the IBPs dismissal of a disciplinary case should await the notice of resolution, it bears noting in this instance that the Board, despite issuing a resolution on the subject complaint on February 27, 2004, failed to send a notice of resolution to petitioner. -The IBP has given no reason for the delay other than the nebulous explanation that records were still being completed. -In view thereof, petitioner, who had already confirmed that her complaint was dismissed through a letter coming from the IBP Board Chairman, cannot be faulted for appealing to this Court notwithstanding the absence of an official notice of resolution

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

3. Section 1, Rule 139-B states: SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. -Personal knowledge is not a requisite for filing a disbarment complaint. Clearly, personal knowledge is required, not of the complainant, but of her witnesses, if there are any. Substantive Reasoning Respondent denies representing conflicting interests on the ground that SB Case No. 009 and SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 are totally distinct from each other -Nowhere is the conflict of interest clearer than in respondents Memorandum dated September 28, 1998 filed with the SEC wherein he argued in behalf of Nieto, et al. as follows: A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a subsequent disposition of the instant Petition by this Honorable Commission would pre-empt the resolution by the Sandiganbayan of the disputed shares. It would in fact affirm the ownership by the Petitioners of the said shares subject of the Sandiganbayan case. This Petition is a premature action to enforce the Compromise Agreement entered into by Mr. Ilusorio. Clearly, this is beyond the jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission. Any right to be derived from the Compromise Agreement is clearly inchoate at this point in time. -Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an interest hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had priorly negotiated for Ilusorio Disposition The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated February 27, 2004 is SET ASIDE. Respondent Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

GONZALES V CABUCANA, JR. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; 2006 (ice baguilat)

NATURE Administrative Case FACTS Gonzales being counseled by the law firm Cabucana, Cabucana, De Guzman and Cabucana Law Office, filed a civil case that was awarded to them in a judicial ruling and asked Gatcheco to execute such however Gatcheco failed to do so and Gonzales filed a complaint. Gatcheco harassed Gonzales and subsequently Gonzales filed a criminal case. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr., represented Gatcheco. Gonzales filed an administrative case saying that Cabucana violated the lawyer-client relationship due to conflict of interest. ISSUE WON there is a violation of the Responsibility for conflict of interest Code of Professional

HELD Yes, the rule is that the lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Even the fact of appearing to be treacherous and double-dealing is discouraged because people are expected to entrust their secrets to their lawyers. Acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.

LEGAL PROFESSION
Although the firm was the one who represented the civil case the person is still in representation of the firm. It at the least invite suspicion of double-dealing. It is however mitigated by the fact that the case was done in good faith and with no malice as supported by the findings of IBP Commissioner Reyes and Gonzales move of withdrawing the case. Disposition Respondent fined and given a stern warning

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

DE GUZMAN V DE DIOS PARDO; January 26, 2001 (athe odi)

NATURE Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. De Dios on the ground of violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. FACTS - De Guzman sought the assistance of Atty De Dios in forming a corporation engaged in hotel and restaurant business. They were able to have Suzuki Beach Hotel Incorporated (SBHI) registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Atty. De Dios was retained by De Guzman. - De Guzman was the majority stockholder. She subscribed to 29,800 shares, she paid up P745,000.00 during the stage of incorporation. However, the remaining 22,250 shares amounting to P2,235,000.00 was left unpaid. - The corporation, upon the advice of Atty. De Dios required De Guzman to pay the unliquidated shares. Later, they were auctioned and acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the incorporators of SBHI. Because of this, De Guzman was ousted from the corporation completely. While Atty. De Dios rose to be the president of the corporation. - In defense, Atty. De Dios argued that she represents the corporation, not De Guzman in her personal capacity. Moreover, what she did was for the best interest of the corporation, which was on the verge of bankruptcy then. ISSUE WON Atty. De Dios is guilty of representing conflicting interest. HELD Yes. Reasoning 1. Granting that the sale of her delinquent shares was valid, De Guzman still has original shares of P745,00.00, enough for her not to be ousted from the corporation. 2. There was an atty-client relationship between De Dios and De Guzman. The latter was the one who retained her as counsel not the corporation. 3. There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent. De Dios became the president a clear case of conflict of interest of the respondent. Disposition Atty. De Dios was SUSPENDED for 6 months.

circumstances. In this case, ACCRA lawyers acted as nomineesstockholders of said corps involved in sequestration proceedings. PCGG filed Third Amended Complaint w/c excluded pvt respondent Raul Roco bec he promised to reveal identity of principal/s for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder - ACCRA lawyers said it was in furtherance of legit lawyering and they became holders of shares of stock only as incorporating or acquiring stockholders, and as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in said shares. - Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who separated fr ACCRA, filed a separate answer. - ACCRA lawyers filed a counter-motion that PCGG also exclude them as parties-defendant as it did to Roco. PCGG set conditions for exclusion of the petitioners: - disclosure of identity of clients submission of docs substantiating lawyer-client relationship - submission of deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. - PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the said conditions. - Sandiganbayan denied exclusion of petitioners fr the PCGG case. That denial is now being questioned. ISSUES 1. WON lawyer-client confidentiality applies in this case 2. WON Roco and the ACCRA lawyers are similarly situated, thus, making the denial of the ACCRA lawyers exclusion from the PCGG case a violation of equal protection clause. HELD 1. Yes - PCGG is not really after the petitioners but the bigger fish. This is clear fr the PCGGs willingness to cut a deal w/ petitioners the names of clients in exchange for exclusion fr complaint. - Lawyer-client relationship is based on contract of lease of svcs and contract of agency. But it is more than relationship of principal-agent and lessor-lessee. An atty possesses special powers of trust given by client. He also occupies quasi-judicial ofc since he is an officer of the court. - Old Code of Civil Procedure forbids counsel w/o authority of client to reveal communication or advise given in course of professional employment. This was passed on into the Rules of Court. - Canon 17 of Code of Professional Responsibility says that a lawyer owes fidelity to cause of his client. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also speaks of the devotion of a lawyer to the interest of the client. - The right to counsel of an accused is also involved in this issue. If client were made to choose bet legal representation w/o effective communication and disclosure and legal representation w/ all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled to stay away fr judicial system or lose right to counsel. - GENERAL RULE: - Court has right to know that client whose privileged info is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. - Privilege exists only after atty-client relationship has been established. It does not attach until there is a client. - Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of the relationship. - Due process requires that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. - EXCEPTIONS - Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for w/c he sought the lawyers advice. - It is also privileged where disclosure would open the client to civil liability. - It is also privileged when govts lawyers have no case against an attys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would

REGALA V SANDIGANBAYAN KAPUNAN; September 20, 1996 (chris capul)

NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - This is an offshoot of the complaint before the Sandiganbayan through the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth including shares of stocks in certain corporations. - ACCRA Law Firm performs legal svcs incl. organization and acquisition of business associations/orgs. Sometimes, members of the firm act as incorporators or stockholders. They acquire info relative to assets of clients and their personal/biz

LEGAL PROFESSION
be necessary to convict an individual of a crime. - Apart fr the exceptions above, other situations could qualify as exceptions. Info relating to the identity of client may fall w/in privilege when clients name itself has independent significance such that disclosure would reveal client confidence. - The instant case FALLS UNDER AT LEAST 2 EXCEPTIONS. First, disclosure would lead to establish the clients connection w/ the very fact in issue. Also, the link bet the offense and the legal advice/svc was duly established by no less than the PCGG itself. Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them. Revelation of the name would provide the link for prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. - It is diff when the client consults atty for illicit purposes, seeking advice on how to around the law. In this case, a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults atty abt it. - Court is trying to avoid fishing expedition by the prosecution. After all, there are alternative sources of info available to prosecutor w/c does not depend on utilizing a defendants counsel as convenient and readily available source of info. - Lawyer-client confidentiality and loyalty exists not only during relationship but even after termination of the relationship. 2. Yes - Respondents failed to show that Roco actually revealed the identity of his clients. PCGG shld show that Roco was treated as a species apart fr the ACCRA lawyers on basis of classification w/c made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist. RESOLUTIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ARE ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.

A2010
(aida villanueva)
NATURE Special civil action in the SC

PROF. JARDELEZA

FACTS - The annulment of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan is being sought, with the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to utilize Atty. Sansaet as state witness. - Honrada was a clerk of court in a municipality in Agusan del Sur. Paredes was the provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur who later became governor and congressman. - Sansaet was a lawyer who served as counsel for Parades in several instances petinent to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse. - 1976 Paredes applied for a free patent over a piece of land. His application was approved and a title was issued to him. - 1985 Director of Lands cancelled the patent of Paredes, saying that the land had already been designated and reserved as a school site. - It was also discovered that Paredes got the lot through fraudulent means. - An information for perjury was filed against Paredes. Another allegation was that he had used his position to get what he wanted. Sansaet was still Paredes counsel. - Gelacio, a taxpayer, wrote the Ombudsman and asked for the investigation of Sansaet, Honrada and Paredes. According to him, he conspired with the other two. ISSUES 1. WON projected testimony of Sansaet is barred by the attyclient relationship 2. WON Sansaet qualified as particeps criminis (accomplice to the crime) for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State HELD 1. NO Ratio If a client seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime he committed, it is given the virtual confessional seal. This does not apply to a crime which a client intends to commit. Reasoning A distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already crimes and future crimes intended to be committed. - The period is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney. - Paredes was planning to commit the crime of falsification. - But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. - The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan - Sansaet himself was a conspirator and it is settled that for the atty-client privilege to apply in communication, it must be for a lawful purpose. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the attachment of the privilege. 2. YES Ratio Despite his involvement in the crime, Sansaet fulfills all the requirements needed for his discharge as state witness. Reasoning Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification and in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. One of the requirements for state witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty (not that he is the least guilty as to what has been erroneously interpreted in some instances).

SEPARATE OPINION VITUG

- I find it unreasonable for Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of incrimination.

DAVIDE [dissent]
- The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially vested in plaintiff (PCGG in this case). There has been an agreement/compromise settlement bet PCGG and Roco. If Rocos revelation violated confidentiality of lawyerclient, he would be solely answerable to his principals/clients and probably to the Court. - For ACCRA lawyers to be excluded, they must perform certain obligations as Roco did. - Confidentiality is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a witness and may be invoked at an appropriate time. None of the lawyers in this case is being required to testify. - State has right to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials/employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees. - Rules of Court requires that complaint be against all persons who appear to be responsible. - Privilege does not extend to further criminal conduct. - Disclosure of clients identity is necessary proof of existence of lawyer-client relationship and is not privileged info.

PUNO [dissent]
- Person claiming atty-client privilege must present underlying facts. Without proofs, Court has no factual basis to determine whether petitioners fall w/in exception to the general rule.

PEOPLE V SANDIGANBAYAN REGALADO; July 16, 1997

LEGAL PROFESSION
- It is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and warrants an imposition of the same penalty. - In the case of People v Ocemar: And by most guilty we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense. - The other requisites for the discharge of Sansaet as state witness are present. - Sansaet is the only cooperative witness to the actual commission of the crime of falsification. - There is absolute necessity for Sansaets testimony because the prosecution has no direct evidence available. - He does not appear to be the most guilty. - His testimony can be corroborated by reputable witnesses. - Sansaet has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- Similar to the petitioners in Regala, petitioner is not a mere witness. He is a co-principal in the case for recovery of ill-gotten wealth. He has made his position clear from the very beginning that he is not willing to testify and he cannot be compelled to testify in view of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and of his fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality. - Since the doctrine of adherence to judicial precedents or stare decisis is provided in Art. 8 of the Civil Code, Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude petitioner Gregorio Castillo as party defendant in the case RP v Enriquez.

DALISAY V MAURICIO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; January 23, 2006 (bry san juan)

NATURE Motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. FACTS - On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00044, entitled Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent, pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused. - On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent. She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed. On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in toto Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation. On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision. Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial courts Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that the tax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainant charging her with violations of Article 171 and 172 and/or Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence. - In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments. First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree. Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was considered submitted for decision as early as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence, he could not have done anything anymore about it. Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him from doing his job. And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. - In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that:: (1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her

CASTILLO V SANDIGANBAYAN BUENA; February 21, 2002 (jojo mendoza)

NATURE Petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. FACTS On July 23, 1987, the Republic of the Philipines Filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against several persons, one of which is petitioner. The complaint alleges that- defendant Gregorio Castilo acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent of defendants Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, et al in establishing Hotel Properties, Inc. in order to acquire beneficial interest and control, and conceal ownership, of Silahis Hotel; defendant Gregorio Castillo signed all pertinent documents as attorney-in-fact of the defendants Enriquezes and Panlilio. - On October 1992, petitioner died. - On October 15, 1996, petitioner, represented by his heirs, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint against him is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and must be dismissed pursuant to the Supreme Courts decision in Regala v Sandiganbayan. - On November 26, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss. Respondent contends that the ruling in Regala does not apply to the present case, because in said case, there was a clear finding that the ACCRA lawyers were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients as shown by PCGGs willingness to cut a deal with the ACCRA lawyers the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. In this case, the petitioner is being sued as a principal defendant for being in conspiracy with other defendants in the commission of the acts complained of and he is not being required to name his clients. ISSUE WON petitioners inclusion in the complaint violates the lawyerclient confidentiality privilege HELD YES. While it is true that unlike in Regala, petitioner in not being required to name his clients, the case of Regala is still applicable in the present case because the two cases are the same in more important aspects. - The fact of the lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and defendants Enriquezes and Panlilios was immediately raised by petitioner as one of his affirmative defenses. In the same vein, in Regala, the professional relationship was raised merely as a defense by defendant lawyers and was not yet proven during the trial. This not withstanding, the court struck out the complaint against the lawyers.

LEGAL PROFESSION
documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Courts directive constitutes contempt. ISSUE WON respondent lawyer should be disciplined for failing to render services despite payment of his client HELD YES. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion. - Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to show that he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he initiated new petitions. - Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process. The present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondents previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondents inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court. - At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondents services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,[10] we held that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand. Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money. - Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already submitted for decision does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should have returned complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing. - In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to complainant. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides: Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. - As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her. Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her retainer. It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.

DEE V COURT OF APPEALS REGALADO; August 24, 1983 (lora alamin)

NATURE Petition for a writ of certiorari to overturn Court of Appeals resolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the decision of May 9, 1986. FACTS - Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private respondent, accompanied by the latter's cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar's Palace, a wellknown gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Petitioner's father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey, having heard of a link between the mafia and Caesar's Palace and the possibility that his son may be harmed at the instance of the latter. - Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into the matter, after which his services were reportedly contracted for P100,000.00. From his residence, private respondent called up Caesar's Palace and, thereafter, several long distance telephone calls and two trips to Las Vegas by him elicited the information that Dewey Dee's outstanding account was around $1,000,000.00. Further investigations, however, revealed that said account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey Dee merely signing for the chits.

LEGAL PROFESSION
- In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the president of Caesar's Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated from liability for the account. Upon private respondent's return to Manila, he conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. - In August, 1981, private respondent brought to Caesar's Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino never bothered him. - Having thus settled the account of petitioner's brother, private respondent sent several demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner, however, ignored said letters. Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the collection of attorney's fees and refund of transport fare and other expenses. - Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the services he rendered were professional services which a lawyer renders to a client. - Petitioner, however, denied the existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between him and private respondent. He admits that he and his father visited private respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee's gambling account. However, he insists that such visit was merely an informal one and that private respondent had not been specifically contracted to handle the problem. On the contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his services "as a friend of defendant's family" to see what he could do about the situation. As for the P50,000.00 inceptively given to private respondent, petitioner claims that it was not in the nature of attorney's fees but merely "pocket money" solicited by the former for his trips to Las Vegas and the said amount of P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneraion for his strictly voluntary services. - After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 with interest thereon. - On appeal, said judgment was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court on May 9, 1986. - Petitioner, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Appellate Court overlooked two important and decisive factors, to wit: (1) At the time private respondent was ostensibly rendering services to petitioner and his father, he was actually working "in the interest" and "to the advantage" of Caesar's Palace of which he was an agent and a consultant, hence the interests of the casino and private respondent were united in their objective to collect from the debtor; and (2) Private respondent is not justified in claiming that he rendered legal services to petitioner and his father in view of the conflicting interests involved. - In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court reconsidered its decision and held that the sum of P50,000.00 already paid by petitioner to private respondent was commensurate to the services he rendered, considering that at the time he was acting as counsel for petitioner he was also acting as the collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving compensation from, Caesar's Palace. - However, upon a motion for reconsideration thereafter filed by private respondent, the present respondent Court of Appeals issued another resolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the aforesaid decision of May 9, 1986. ISSUE WON there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and private respondent

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

HELD YES. Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their findings that there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and private respondent Mutuc. The Court found no reason to interfere with the factual finding. There may be instances when there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client relationship has been created. The issue may be raised in the trial court, but once the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that there was such a relationship the Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding of fact, absent cogent reasons therefor. Ratio The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter. Reasoning There is no question that professional services were actually rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his family. Through his efforts, the account of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, with Caesars Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed from the apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and this right cannot be occluded by petitioner's pretension that at the time private respondent rendered such services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine consultant of Caesar's Palace. - On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services of respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner for the purposes hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial payments totaling P50,000.00 made by petitioner to respondent Mutuc and the tenor of the demand letters sent by said private respondent to petitioner, the receipt thereof being acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably prove three facts, viz: that petitioner hired the services of private respondent Mutuc; that there was a prior agreement as to the amount of attorney's fees to be given to the latter; and there was still a balance due and payable on said fees. - On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, it is also not completely accurate to judge private respondent's position by petitioner's assumption that the interests of Caesar's Palace were adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the casino was a creditor but that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since the latter, as verifications revealed, was not the debtor. Hence, private respondent's representations in behalf of petitioner were not in resistance to the casino's claim but were actually geared toward proving that fact by establishing the liability of the true debtor, Ramon Sy, from whom payment was ultimately and correctly exacted. - Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained, private respondent's role therein was not ethically or legally indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending positions. However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties. A common representation may work to the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate positions, may well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation and confidence of said parties. - Even indulging petitioner in his theory that private respondent was during the period in question an agent of Caesar's Palace, petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he actually consented to and cannot now decry the dual representation that he

LEGAL PROFESSION
postulates. A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services rendered at the special instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just feeds. Disposition The resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating its original decision of May 9, 1986 was AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

NAKPIL V VALDES PUNO; March 4, 1998 (marge alias)

NATURE -Administrative case in the SC. Misconduct. -This case involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in connection with the property of his client. FACTS -1965: Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested long time friend (family business consultant, lawyer and accountant) Atty. Carlos J. Valdes to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that Atty. Valdes would keep the property in trust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained 2 loans from a bank amounting to P140k which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was issued in Atty. Valdes name but it was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. -When Jose Nakpil died, Atty. Valdes acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow Imelda Nakpil whom the Court appointed as the estate administratix. Respondents law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Joses estate. -The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Atty. Valdes excluded the Moran property from the inventory. He even transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation. -March 29, 1979: Imelda sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the Baguio City CFI an action for reconveyance with damages against Atty. Valdes (&his corporation) who claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it. -During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, Imelda filed this administrative case to disbar the respondent. Petitioners Claim Atty. Valdes violated professional ethics when he: 1. assigned to his family corporation the Moran property which belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor. 2. excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties he prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to the said property to his family corporation. 3. prepared & defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its counsel and auditor. Preliminaries - CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. CA reversed. - OSG relying on CA decision recommended dismissal of admin charge. - CA decision in reconveyance case has been reversed by SC. Factual Issues (as settled in the reconveyance case) 1. Ownership of the Moran property: Atty. Valdes and the late Jose Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of Imelda and the intestate court, Atty. Valdes later transferred it to his corporation. 2. Loan of P140k: Atty. Valdes, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans as liability of the estate, after obtaining

said loans for the purchase and renovation of the property he claimed for himself. It is clear that the information available to the accounting firm as to how these two loans should be treated could have only come from Atty. Valdes himself as the said loans were in his name. 3. Resignation from law firm not supported by any documentary proof 4. Resignation from accounting firm in 1972 and 1974 is proven. But when Atty. Valdes transferred the Moran property to his corporation, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court. He could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case. ISSUES 1. WON Atty, Valdes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility 2. WON Atty. Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests 3. WON Atty. Valdes can be administratively charged before SC given that his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting practice HELD 1. YES. When he subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain, he clearly violated CPR Canon 17 which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his clients cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. -A lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. No presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor. Atty. Valdes misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical. 2. YES. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants (Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc) who are creditors of the estate. -The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed only after full disclosure of facts and informed consent of the clients. There is nothing in the records to show that Atty. Valdes or his law firm explained the legal situation and its consequences to Imelda. -When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to the estate. The relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict of interest. -The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest. 3. YES. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. -Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. Respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings/transactions with his clients. Disposition Atty. Carlos J. Valdes found guilty of misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for one year with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

QUIAMBAO V BAMBA DAVIDE; August 25, 2005 (maia rieza)

NATURE RESOLUTION on administrative case for disbarment FACTS

LEGAL PROFESSION
Felicitas Quiambao used to be the president of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-owned security and investigation agency. She procured the services of respondent Atty. Nestor Bamba for the corporate affairs of AIB, but also used his services for a personal case (an ejectment case wherein respondent is the counsel of record). After, Quiambao resigned as president. Six months later, AIB, through Bamba, filed a complaint for replevin and damages against Quiambao to recover a car assigned to Quiambao as a service vehicle by AIB. Bamba filed this latter complaint without withdrawing as counsel in the ejectment case, which was still pending. Quiambao then filed for disbarment and charged Bamba with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. Complainants arguments -that she resigned as president because Bamba proposed that she organize her own security agency, and that he will assist in its organization. -that such security agency was organized and Bamba was a silent partner -that while serving as a silent partner, Bamba convinced Quiambaos brother to organize another security agency (yes, hobby nilang gumawa ng security agencies) where respondent served as incorporator, stockholder, and president. Respondents arguments -although he admits representing Quiambao in the ejectment case, he claims that he was made to believe that it was part of his function as counsel for AIB to handle even the personal cases of its officers -that the ejectment case and replevin case were unrelated cases, thus privileged information that may have been gathered from one case would have no use in the other -that he was never a silent partner in the security agency organized by Quiambao -that he serves AIB and the agency organized with Quiambaos brother in different capacities: in AIB, as legal counsel, while in the latter, as president ISSUE WON respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests (WON there was representation of conflicting interests) HELD Yes, respondent is guilty Ratio Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for something which duty to another client requires them to oppose. There are various tests in determining conflicting interests, few of which are: whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment - While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15. - That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative. Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act either as an adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become their client. They have the right to decline such employment. - That he served in different capacities in two competing agencies does not justify the involvement in conflicting interests. In the process of determining whether there is a conflict of

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

interest, an important criterion is probability, not certainty, of conflict. Loyalty to AIB becomes dubious with his interest as the president in another security agency. - The nature of a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It requires lawyers to remain inviolate of the clients confidence and to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. - Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Disposition Guilty for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15. Suspended for 1 year.

BERBANO V BARCELONA PER CURIAM; September 23, 2003 (anton arcilla)

NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court re: Disbarment. FACTS - A case was pending regarding a 244-hectare lot situated at Alabang, Muntinlupa, owned by Rufino Estaban Hilapo. Petitioner Felicitas Berbano is one of the heirs of REH, and the heirs chose Atty. Porfiro Daen as their attorney-in-fact. - January 26, 1999: Mr. Daen was arrested by Muntinlupa police, and subsequently detained at Muntinlupa City Jail until his release on February 18, 1999. - Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a lawyer for his release. The heirs (including petitioner) approached Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona to assist them. Mr. Daen has engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona to facilitate Daens release. - Barcelona asked for P50K to cause the release of Daen from prison the following day. Barcelona declared that he was going to see a justice from the Supreme Court who could help the release of Daen. - At a meeting in Maxs restaurant, Barcelona reported that he just came from the Supreme Court where he fixed the case of Daen, but did not show any documents supporting the claim. - Barcelona continued to asked for money on several occasions. Petitioner gave him P10K and P15K on different times. Petitioner also gave Barcelona P1000 for gasoline. - February 18, 1999 petitioner and Barcelona met at Putatan, Muntinlupa. There Barcelona promised that he will return entire amount of P64 on February 18, 1999. Petitioner never saw Barcelona since then. - Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP required respondent to submit his answer to the complaint, but despite due notice respondent fail to file his answer. Upon a motion to declare respondent in default, Investigating Commissioner again required respondent to answer. Barcelona failed to appear despite due receipt of notice. - IBP Board of Governors found Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional responsibility, but reduced the penalty to suspension from practice of law for 6 years. ISSUE WON Barcelona should be disbarred or merely suspended HELD Ratio Wenceslao C. Barcelona is barred from the practice of law for gross misconduct. Reasoning The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the

LEGAL PROFESSION
public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession persons unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them. - Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are neither purely civil nor purely criminal. - Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of the following Canons:

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

CANON 1a lawyer shall xxx promote respect for law and for legal processes. CANON 7a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. CANON 11a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers xxx. CANON 16a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that ma come into his possession.

feelings and social humiliation arising from the unfounded administrative case filed against her since as borne out by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of Licuanan - It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by complainant, wrote respondent a letter on May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the money to complainant, that he accounted for it -Respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals from complainant's tenant, but explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals ISSUE WON the respondent is guilty of violating paragraph 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and breaching the Lawyers Oath HELD Reasoning The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by him on behalf of his client, the complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics particularly: 11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client Money the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstance be commingled with his own or be used by him. - By his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which should characterize an attorneyclient relationship and the practice of law. By reason thereof complainant was compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant against her by force of circumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services of another counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which respondent withheld from her. - The court is constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest punishment. Disposition Consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. (Paragraph 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics referred to is reiterated in Rules 16.01. 16.02 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June 1988).

Rule 16.01a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received fro or from the client. - Barcelona was previously charged with and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer, when he misrepresented to the complainant that eh could secure the restructuring of the complainants loan with PNB through his connection with a certain Mericullo (who did not really exist). - In addition, the Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice. A member of the legal profession who invites mistrust on the judicial system with irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated.

LICUANAN V MELO PER CURIAM; February 9, 1989 (apple maramba)

NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS Melo (respondent) was hired as counsel by Licuanan (petitioner) in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, Aida Pineda -On August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Pineda whereby the latter was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October, 1978 and succeeding months thereafter. - When several months had elapsed without them hearing a word from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to take the necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of his client - Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to respondent's office and paid him P3,060.00 for rental payments for October, 1978 to February, 1980 at the rate of P180.00 per month. -Pineda continued paying her obligations religiously to Melo, covering the period between March 1980-January 1981. -During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, he did not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained the money -On April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent had been receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted an administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged failure to pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to pay her just obligation -Pineda brought an action against Licuanan for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded

HERNANDEZ V GO PER CURIAM; January 31, 2005 (chris lao)

NATURE Resolution of the verified letter-complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose C. Go dated June 23, 1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased) FACTS - Both parties are from Zamboanga City.

LEGAL PROFESSION
- The allegations in the letter-complaint are: Sometime in 1961, complainants husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her husbands numerous creditors demanded payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for sums of money against her, complainant engaged the legal services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent. - Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors. - Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute deeds of sale involving those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to complainant. - Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon. Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her real properties worth millions. - In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was required to file his comment on the complaint. - Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is premature since there is pending before the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City Civil Case No. 1781 for recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by complainant against him involving the subject lots. - On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying respondents motion and requiring him to submit his answer. - In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the allegations in the instant complaint. He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainants lots to various buyers, including himself, for valuable consideration. On several occasions, he extended financial assistance to complainant and even invited her to live with his family. His children used to call her Lola due to her frequent visits to his residence. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. - On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation. - It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and 26 days that the OSG filed a motion to refer the instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies of complainants witnesses and the submission of its report and recommendation. - On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. - The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A. Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as follows: A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties showed that all the properties of the complainant are presently owned by the respondent by virtue of several deeds of sale executed by the complainant in favor of the respondent without monetary consideration except Lot 849-D situated in Tomas Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the complainant on September 5, 1974. - It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who notarized the documents involving the said properties redeemed or repurchased by the complainant from her creditors which ended up in respondents name like in the deed of sale executed by Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria Hernandez over Lots 1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon on September 3, 1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of absolute sale executed by Francisco Esperat over the Curuan properties on November 9, 1971 and the cancellation of the mortgage executed by Alfonso Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the Tomas Claudio properties.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to his having discussed, advised and gave solutions to complainants legal problems and liabilities to her creditors and even requested her creditors for extension of time to pay complainants accounts constitute practice of law as legal counsel for consultation aside from representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client relations between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent. - It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the complainant on how he paid complainants creditors without selling her properties. Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his own funds; then later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of complainants properties in utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the respondent concerning the value of the said sale of complainants properties. - As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation and duty as complainants legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting complainants properties in his name and possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member be furnished a copy of the same for implementation hereof, subject to the approval of the Honorable Members of the Board of Governors. - On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-39 adopting and approving the Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in the sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to three (3) years. ISSUE WON the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility be sustained HELD Yes. However, we have to modify its recommended penalty. - Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction, provides: A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. - Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself complainants lots entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name and honor of the legal profession. He violated this Courts mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. - Canon 17 of the same Code states: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. - The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and confidence in herein respondent, that when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent, however, abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself and spent his own money to pay her obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to the complainant on how much he sold the latters lots and the amounts paid to her creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant

LEGAL PROFESSION
could have earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount from respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainants counsel. - Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. - In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, we ordered the disbarment of lawyer when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later refused to return the same despite demand. In Navarro vs. Meneses III, we disbarred a member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to account for the P50,000.00 he received from a client to settle a case. In Docena vs. Limson, we expelled from the brotherhood of lawyers, an attorney who extorted money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation. In Busios vs. Ricafort, an attorney was stripped of his license to practice law for misappropriating his clients money. - Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. Disposition Respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- Code of Professional Responsibility - Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. - Canon 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession - Canon 11 - Respect due to courts respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer's oath, he became a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair an impartial administration of justice a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. Reasoning Respondent's transgressions caused dishonor, not merely to respondent, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. Disposition Consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

QUILBAN V ROBINOL PER CURIAM; April 10, 1989 (sarah cabrera)

NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS - The Colegio de San Jose, through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, sold a land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966. In 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc suggested to Father Escaler the idea of donating or selling the land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala", with Bernabe Martin as President. - But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samaban members. The land was ultimately sold to Rivera at a cheap price of PI5 per square meter or a total consideration of P41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P1 00 to P1 20 per square meter. Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property. - In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed the case against Rivera, et. al. The CFI, however, dismissed the case. - To prosecute the appea in the CAl, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P2,000.00 as attorney's fees on. Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing. - On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. - To raise the amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan collected, little by

BUSINOS V RICAFORT PER CURIAM; December 22, 1997 (keefe dela cruz)
NATURE Complaint for disbarment against Atty. Francisco Ricafort FACTS - Respondent Atty. Ricafort was entrusted P30,000 by complainant Businos to deposit in the bank account of complainants husband, which amount respondent used for himself and delayed in payment. - Respondent required a bond of P2,000 from Businos supposedly for one of her Civil Cases when no such bond was required. - Hence, Businos filed a complaint for disbarment against Ricafort - The court required respondent to comment on the complaint time and again. But respondent failed to comply. As such, the court considered his right waived, and referred the complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant. - The Office ordered respondent suspended for 1 year. ISSUE WON the 1-year suspension is commensurate sanction for the offenses committed by respondent Atty. Ricafort HELD NO. Ratio With dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior, and palpable disregard of: - Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court - unlawful retention of clients funds

LEGAL PROFESSION
little, P2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. - On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and P2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P2,500.00, or a total of P75,000.00. - After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivers. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution bad not yet been issued by the CFI of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all. - On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol. The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. AnacIeto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the document containing the consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P75,000.00 deposited with him. Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the same tenor was similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol. - On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in a civil case as counsel for the plaintiffs, vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five officers. Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs. At the hearing of the Motion for Execution, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor. - Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus, another document labelled the a second consensus" was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor. - Administrative Case No. 2144: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the investigation of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. - Administrative Case No. 2180: Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel. - Court referred administrative cases to the Sol. Gen. who recommended: 1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more severe penalty will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to return to the plaintiffs, the sum of P75,000.00. 2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, be dismissed, since he has not committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty. Robinol. ISSUES 1. WON Atty. Robinol should be suspended 2. WON Atty. Montemayor should be disbarred HELD 1. YES Reasoning Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

continue in the practice of the profession. After the CA had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them. - Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to pro. tect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose-the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners. - The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this is the more credible. And that he had, in fact, received the total sum of P75,000-00. Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a lifetime ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own. 2. NO Reasoning In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs.There is no doubt that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their prerogative. In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, the same is absolutely without merit. Disposition - Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs. - Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

BARNACHEA V QUIOCHO CALLEJO; March 11, 2003 (jat tabamo)

NATURE Administrative matter. Breach of Lawyer-Client Relations FACTS - Complainant Ruby Barnachea sought the services of respondent Atty. Edwin Quiocho, a lawyer who has stopped practicing for some time and was only in the second month of resuming practice, to cause the transfer under her name the title over a property previously owned by her sister. She paid P

LEGAL PROFESSION
41, 280 for the expenses for said transfer and for respondents legal services. - Respondent failed to cause the transfer and consequently, complainant demanded that she be refunded and that the documents she entrusted to respondent to cause the transfer be returned to her. Respondent failed to comply with the demands. - On Nov. 1, 2001, Respondent wrote complainant a letter saying he failed and that he would return the documents and the title entrusted to him as well as refund the P 41, 280 through a personal check. He however failed to fund the check despite the demands of complainant. - In his answer to the complaint, respondent: 1. Denied that complainant contracted his legal services. Received the P 41, 280 payment but claimed they were for actual and incidental expenses and not for legal services 2. Asserted that he acted in good faith as shown by the fact that he returned the documents with an explanatory letter and refunded complainant by issuing a personal check. 3. Alleged that his failure was caused by his difficulty in making good the claimed amount, along with the fact that he was afflicted with diabetes and loss of sight of his right eye. 4. Claimed that he only agreed to help complainant with the condition that his task was merely to go through the regular process of presenting available documents, paying taxes and fees, and following up on the transfer, a task that a non-lawyer familiar with the procedure can perform. 5. Claimed to have discovered that the original copy of the transfer certificate of title had been burned and that complainants copy therefore needed to be reconstituted before it can be cancelled and transferred. During this time, communication between both parties broke down, as respondents mobile phone was stolen, he has no home phone and that phone calls between him and complainant at his work place had been cute due to souring relationship with his co-workers. - A formal investigation was conducted by IBP thereafter and it found that the complainant engaged the legal services of the respondent as admitted by respondent himself in his letter to the complainant; that respondent was not able to meet his financial obligations due to financial difficulties and that he was in good faith in his failure. The IBP Investigation Commissioner also recommended that he be ordered to repay his client within 90 days from receipt of notice and warned that a repetition would be dealt with more severely. - The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners recommendations with an additional sanction of reprimand. ISSUE WON the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors corresponds to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent HELD No. The Court finds that the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent. Ratio 1: Respondents claim that complainant did not retain his legal services flies in the face of his letter to complainant. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties Reasoning In this case, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking for almost two months. Worse, despite demands of complainant, he failed to refund the amount of P 41, 280 and to return to complainant the deed of absolute sale and title over the property. Respondents claim that complainant could not contact him because he did not have any landline at his residence and that his mobile phone was stolen in October 2001, is hard to believe. He failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove that his telephone at the business center was cut or that his mobile phone had been stolen. Even then, respondent could have easily contacted the complainant at her residence or could

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

have written her a letter informing her that the original copy of TCT No. 324411 in the custody of the Register of Deeds was burned when the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire and that there was a need for the reconstitution of said title. Neither did respondent adduce evidence that he had been sick with diabetes and had lost his sight in his right eye. Respondent simply refused to adduce evidence to prove his allegations in his Answer to the complaint. Ratio 2: A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon demand therefor. Reasoning The lawyers failure to return the money of his client upon demand gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Ratio 3: The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character. A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client. Reasoning In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the exacting standard expected of him. Although the Court is led to believe that respondents failure to cause the transfer of the title of the property under the name of complainant was due to a financial problem that beset him shortly after he received the checks from complainant. It can easily be inferred from respondents letter that he used complainants money to alleviate if not solve his financial woes. What compounded respondents unethical conduct was his drawing of a personal check and delivering the same to complainant without sufficient funds in his bank account to cover the check. Even as he promised to fund his account with the drawee bank, respondent failed to do so when the check became due. In this case, respondent intransigently refused to return to the complainant the amount of P 41,280 which he received for the expenses for the transfer to her of the title of the property and for his professional fees. His dishonest conduct was compounded by his interjection of flimsy excuses for his obstinate refusal to refund the amount to complainant Disposition Respondent Atty. Quiocho is found guilty of violating Canons 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for 1 year with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. He is also directed to restitute the complainant the full amount of 41,280 within 10 days from notice. - If respondent fails to restitute the said amount within the aforesaid period, he shall be meted an additional suspension of 3 months for every month or fraction thereof of delay until he shall have paid the said amount in full. In case a subsidiary penalty of suspension for his failure to restitute the said amount shall be necessary, respondent shall serve successively the penalty of his one year suspension and the subsidiary penalty.

RUBIAS V BATILLER TEEHANKEE; May 29, 1973

FACTS - On August 31, 1964, plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lot located in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956 against its present occupant defendant, Isaias Batiller, who illegally entered said portions of the lot on two occasions in 1945 and in 1959.

LEGAL PROFESSION
In his answer with counter-claim defendant claims that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question. Unfortunately, his title - Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in the Barrio of General Luna, municipality of Barotac Viejo province of Iloilo, which he caused to be surveyed on July 18-31, 1934 - Before WWII, Francisco Militante filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for the registration of the title of the land but was opposed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and other oppositors. During WWII, the record of the case was lost. After the war, Francisco Militante petitioned this court to reconstitute the record of the case but in the end, the registration was denied. - He appealed but pending the decision (which was denied in the end), Francisco Militante sold to the plaintiff, Domingo Rubias the land, and was registered in the Registry of Deeds - Soon after, both Rubias and Militante were declaring the land for taxation purposes - On April 22, 1960, the plaintiff filed forcible Entry and Detainer case against Isaias Batiller in the Justice of the Peace Court of Barotac Viejo Province of Iloilo - During the trial of this case on the merit, the plaintiff will prove by competent evidence the following: > That the land he purchased from Francisco Militante under Exh. "A" was formerly owned and possessed by Liberato Demontao but that on September 6, 1919 the land was sold at public auction by virtue of a judgment in a Civil Case entitled "Edw J. Pflieder plaintiff vs. Liberato Demontao Francisco Balladeros and Gregorio Yulo, defendants", of which Yap Pongco was the purchaser (Exh. "1-3"). The sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on August 4, 1920, under Primary Entry No. 69 (Exh. "1"), and a definite Deed of Sale was executed by Constantino A. Canto, provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, on Jan. 19, 1934 in favor of Yap Pongco (Exh. "I"), the sale having been registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on February 10, 1934 (Exh. "1-1"). > On September 22, 1934, Yap Pongco sold this land to Francisco Militante as evidenced by a notarial deed (Exh. "J") which was registered in the Registry of Deeds on May 13, 1940 (Exh. "J-1"). - Defendants, on the other hand will prove by competent evidence during the trial of this case the following facts: > That lot No. 2 of the Psu-1552 it (Exh. '5') was originally owned and possessed by Felipe Batiller, grandfather of the defendant Basilio Batiller, on the death of the former in 1920, as his sole heir. Isaias Batiller succeeded his father , Basilio Batiller, in the ownership and possession of the land in the year 1930, and since then up to the present, the land remains in the possession of the defendant, his possession being actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous in the concept of an owner, exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants. > That the alleged predecessors in interest of the plaintiff have never been in the actual possession of the land and that they never had any title thereto. > That Lot No. 2, Psu 155241, the subject of Free Patent application of the defendant has been approved. - On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that before any trial on the merit of the case could proceed he would file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he did, alleging that plaintiff does not have cause of action against him because the property in dispute which he (plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante was the subject matter of LRC No. 695 filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case was brought on appeal to this Court and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid case plaintiff was the counsel on record of his father-in-law, Francisco Militante. - Invoking Arts. 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code which reads: > Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: (7) Those expressly prohibited by law.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

> ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire any purchase, even at a public auction, either in person of through the mediation of another: . + (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights of in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring an assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. - Defendant claims that plaintiff could not have acquired any interest in the property in dispute as the contract he (plaintiff) had with Francisco Militante was inexistent and void. (See pp. 22-31, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff strongly opposed defendant's motion to dismiss claiming that defendant can not invoke Articles 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code as Article 1422 of the same Code provides that 'The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected' (See pp. 32-35 Record on Appeal). - On October 18, 1965, the lower court issued an order disclaiming plaintiffs complaint (pp. 42-49, Record on Appeal.) In the aforesaid order of dismissal the lower court practically agreed with defendant's contention that the contract (Exh. A) between plaintiff and Francism Militante was null and void. ISSUES WON the contract of sale between appellant and his father-inlaw, the late Francisco Militante over the property subject of Plan Psu-99791 was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute HELD YES. - The purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Article 1491 paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil Code, reproduced supra; 6 and that consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation from his client (assuming that his client could sell the same since as already shown above, his client's claim to the property was defeated and rejected) was void and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts "expressly prohibited or declared void by law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived." - In a case, the Court ordered the issuance of a writ of possession for the return of the land by the lawyer to the adverse parties without reimbursement of the price paid by him and other expenses, and ruled that counsel is a lawyer and is presumed to know the law. He must, therefore, from the beginning, have been well aware of the defect in his title and is, consequently, a possessor in bad faith." - Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law. - New Civil Code recognizes absolute nullity of contracts "whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy" or which are "expressly prohibited or declared void by law" and declares such contracts "inexistent and void from the beginning." - nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent

LEGAL PROFESSION
disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract." - As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly acted upon defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's alleged purchase of the land, since its juridical effects and plaintiff's alleged cause of action founded thereon were being asserted against defendant-appellant.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

CANTILLER V POTENCIANO PER CURIAM; December 18, 1989 (ricky cantre)

NATURE Administrative complaint versus Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano. FACTS - Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V. Potenciano, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer of the court. - Complainant is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an action for "ejectment" before the MTC of Manila, Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila. Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was then pending before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig, Metro Manila for "reconveyance with damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit being rented by Cantiller and her sister. When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the losing party. The civil case for reconveyance was ordered dismissed by the RTC on June 9, 1987 while the civil case for ejectment was decided by the MTC against her. - On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in the civil case for ejectment, Cantiller and Peregrina were served a notice to vacate the rented premises within four (4) days from receipt of notice. Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them to Potenciano. After such introduction, the parties "impliedly agreed" that Potenciano would handle their case. - A petition entitled "Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of Sale and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Order, etc." was prepared by Potenciano to forestall the execution of the order to vacate. In the afternoon of October 9, 1987, Cantiller was made to sign by Potenciano what she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed" petition for annulment of judgment. Cantiller alleges that Potenciano promised her that the necessary restraining order would be secured if only because the judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close friend). Potenciano demanded from Cantiller P1,000 as attorney's fee which the latter paid that same afternoon. However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge asked Potenciano to withdraw as counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship. - On October 11, 1987, Potenciano went to the house of Cantiller and asked her to be ready with P2,000 to be given to another judge who will issue the restraining order in the ejectment case. Cantiller and her sister were only able to raise the amount of

P1,000 which they immediately gave to Potenciano. Later Potenciano informed Cantiller and her sister that he could not locate the judge who would issue the restraining order. The parties, then, instead went to the Max's Restaurant where Potenciano ordered some food-including two plastic bags of food allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the restraining order. At this juncture, Potenciano asked for the remaining balance of the P2,000 which he earlier demanded. Cantiller gave her last money-a ten dollar ($10.00) bill. - Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, Potenciano informed complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to file another case with the RTC to enable them to retain possession of the apartment. For this purpose, Potenciano told complainant to prepare the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and another P1,000 to cover the expenses of the suit. Potenciano stressed to the complainant the need and urgency of filing the new complaint. Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through the kindness of some friends and relatives. On October 26, 1987, the money was handed over to the respondent. - At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on October 30, 1987, Potenciano, contrary to his promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the order to vacate was eventually enforced and executed. - Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really no need to make a deposit of P10,000 relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After another inquiry, she found out that in fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on December 23, 1987, complainant sent a demand letter to Potenciano asking for the return of the total amount of P11,000 which the former earlier gave to the latter. However, this letter was never answered and the money was never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this administrative complaint against herein respondent. - Potenciano in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in good faith and that the allegations of complainant relative to the administrative charge against him are all lies, product of one's imagination and only intended to harrass him. ISSUE WON Potenciano is guilty if the charges against him HELD Yes. Ratio When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. Reasoning The acts of Potenciano in this case violate the most elementary principles of professional ethics. Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance explains the public concern for the maintenance of an untarnished standard of conduct by every attorney towards his client. The Court finds that Potenciano failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests. Potenciano had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, Potenciano took no steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact. Even assuming that Potenciano had no previous knowledge that he would be asked

LEGAL PROFESSION
to withdraw, the record is quite clear that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 Potenciano already filed a motion therein withdrawing as complainant's counsel interposing as reason therefore his frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, Potenciano failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire another lawyer in his stead. This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 appear to be poorly prepared and written. Having represented himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the apparently lost cause of complainant Potenciano should have carefully prepared the pleadings if only to establish the justness of his representation. The little time involved is no excuse. Complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file the best pleading within his capability. Apparently Potenciano was more interested in getting the most out of the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged about his closeness to the judge concerned in one case and talked about the need to "buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got P10,000.00 as alleged deposit in court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the same. The pattern to milk the complainant dry is obvious. The allegation of Potenciano that the P10,000 was given to him as fee for his services, is simply incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with the service he actually rendered. And his failure to return even a portion of the amount upon demand of complainant all the more bolsters the protestation of complainant that Potenciano does not deserve to remain as an officer of the court. Disposition Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law. Respondent is ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of P11,000 with legal interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- Jalandoon claims he only discovered his previous professional relationship with Sales during the pre-trial on Oct. 6, 1972 ISSUE WON Jalandoon is guilty of non-disclosure to client of adverse or conflicting interest

ALISBO V JALINDOON GRINO-AQUINO; July 18, 1991 (kiyo miura)

FACTS - 3/16/70: Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Atty. Jalandoon as his counsel in an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased sps Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma w/c had been adjudicated to him under the judgment of CC No. 4963 because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of judgment in his favor w/in the reglementary 5-year period. The salient provisions of the Contract for Professional Services (Exhibit A) between Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon were the following: 1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for the recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share 2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and 3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid 50% of the value of the property recovered. - 4/18/70: respondent prepared a complaint w/ Ramon, Teotimo, and Pacifico Alisbo as plaintiffs and Carlito Sales as defendant signed by him alone (CC No. 9559); on the same day, he withdrew it and replaced it with a complaint w/ Ramon as sole plaintiff and Teotimo and Pacifico impleaded as defendants w/c respondent and Atty. Pablo signed as counsel - 12/8/71: an amended complaint was filed w/ Ramon, his judicial guardian Norberto, and eight others as plaintiffs, signed by Atty. Pablo alone (10 years after final judgment) - 8/21/73: defendant Sales filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed - 10/3/73: the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the case on the ground of prescription (though Ramon filed the complaint w/in the ten-year prescriptive period, it was null and void since Ramon was insane and hence w/o capacity to sue) - 1/2/74: complainants charged Jalandoon w/ having deliberately caused the dismissal of CC No. 9559 and concealing the fact that he had been the former legal counsel of Sales

HELD - YES because: 1. Before filing the complaint, he had several interviews w/ Ramon and Norberto re: CC No. 4963 2. He must have done research on the court records of CC No. 4963 3. For CC No. 9559, he had to inform himself of the personal circumstances of defendant Sales -w/ this knowledge, he should have declined employment by Alisbo due to conflict of interest - The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1 and 2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide: 6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. (pp. 14-15, Solicitor General's Report.) -Jalandoon had delayed the filing of CC No. 9559, instead asking the court to resolve the pending incidents in CC No. 4963. The first complaint w/ Ramon and his brothers was only partially defective due to Ramons insanity; by making Ramon the sole plaintiff in the second complaint, it was rendered wholly defective and ineffectual in stopping the prescriptive period - Jalandoon alleges to have only found out about Ramons incapacity on July 17, 1971, he only amended the complaint impleading his guardian as plaintiff 5 months . later when it had prescribed Disposition It was more than simple negligence; the Court found respondent guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity and was suspended for a period of 2 years.

NGAYAN V TUGADE PER CURIAM; February 7, 1991 (rean balisi)

NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Violation of subparagraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court FACTS - Respondent, Atty. Faustino Tugade, had been complainants (Fulgencio, Tomasa and Bella Aurora Ngayan) counsel for a number of cases prior to this complaint. Complainants asked Atty. Tugade to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido as a consequence of the latter's unauthorized entry into complainants' dwelling. Without thoroughly reading the same, Mrs. Tomasa A. Ngayan allegedly signed it because she was rushed to do the same. After signing, Mrs. Ngayan noted a paragraph which did not mention Leonido was with Soriano when both suddenly barged into complainants' residence. Mrs. Ngayan allegedly told respondent about his omission and in front of her, Atty Tugade crossed out the paragraph she complained about and promised to make another affidavit. Respondent was subsequently discharged by complainants as counsel. After discharging respondent they found out that the name of Robert Leonido was not included in the charge. This omission was however remedied by their new counsel. When the adverse

LEGAL PROFESSION
parties Soriano and Leonido filed a motion for reinvestigation of their case against herein complainants, Soriano and Leonido presented Ngayans first affidavit which contained herein respondents omission. This was allegedly made by Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a former classmate of respondent. It appears then that Atty. Tugade submitted an affidavit to the Court favorable to the cause of Soriano and Leonido. Further, it was found out that herein respondent attorney was also a lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance company.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- The Superior Court of Guam suspended Atty. Mosquera from the practice of law for 2 years as he acquired his clients property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his clients case. It was in violation of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in Guam. - The IBP on the other hand, concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no evidence to establish that he committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines. However, they suspended him indefinitely for failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP. ISSUE WON Maqueras acts in Guam constitute as grounds for suspension in the Philippines HELD Yes. - Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension - The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his clients property by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyers acquisition by assignment of the clients property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption. - The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. - Mosqueras acts are violative of a lawyers sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 and Rule 1.01. Disposition Atty. Mosquera is required to show cause within 15 days why he should not be suspended or disbarred. For the meantime, he is suspended from the practice of law for 1 year or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.

ISSUE WON Atty. Tugade violation of subparagraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.4 Simply put, whether he failed to uphold the trust and confidence conferred to him by his clients HELD YES. [a] Respondent's act of executing and submitting an affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano advancing facts prejudicial to the case of his former clients demonstrates clearly an act of offensive personality against complainants, violative of the first part of paragraph (f), Section 20, Rate 138, Rules of Court. Likewise, respondent's act of joining the adverse parties in celebrating their victory over the dismissal of the case against them shows not only his bias against the complainants but also constitutes a degrading act on the part of a lawyer. It was meant only to titillate the anger of complainants. [b] Respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful order, of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW TINGA; July 30, 2004 (monch bacani)
FACTS - On August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castros counsel in said case. Castros property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the property for one year. The right of redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid period. - At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for $500.00, the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him. - On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maqueras legal services in the civil case involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. - On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castros right of redemption by paying Benavente $525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name. - On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for $320,000.00
4
Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: "(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval; "(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged"

SOLATAN V INOCENTES TINGA; August 9, 2005 (jonas azura)

NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court FACTS - Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes. The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments. - Complainants sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. It appears that she left for the States and her apartment was used by members of her family. A complaint for ejectment for nonpayment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises. - Complainant was occupying said apartment when he learned of the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to

LEGAL PROFESSION
arrange the execution of a new lease contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which complainant agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded attorneys fees and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorneys fees. - Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment. Acting on Atty. Camanos advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the sheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying. - complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty. Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1 year and to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for exercising command responsibility. ISSUES 1. WON Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility 2. WON Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

LEGARDA V COURT OF APPEALS PER CURIAM; June 10, 1992 (ajang pineda)
FACTS Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for a specific performance with damages filed by private respondent New Cathay House Inc (NCHI). The complaint is aimed at compelling Victoria Legarda to sign a lease contract involving her house and lot which Cathay House Inc. intended to use in operating a restaurant. As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a TRO enjoining Victoria Legarda and her agents from stopping the renovation of the property. Thereafter, Antonio Coronel of the Coronel Law office entered his appearance as counsel for Legarda. He filed an urgent motion for extension of 10 days which was granted by the court. However, Legarda was not able to file her answer within the 10 days given so she was declared in default, thereby paving way for the presentation of evidence ex parte The lower court then rendered a decision by default leaving Legarda on the losing end. Upon appeal, the CA found the petition unmeritorious and dismissed it. It said, It is our belief that this case is one of pure and simple negligence on the part of the defendants counsel, who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of the defendant. But inspite of the CAs tirade on his professional competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file a motion for reconsideration, neither did he initiate moves towards an appeal on the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to his client. Thus the CA decision became final. Victoria Legarda then got a new lawyer and won the case. The court then required Atty. Coronel to show cause w/in 10 days from notice why he should not be held administratively liable for his acts and omissions w/c resulted in grave injustice to petitioner.

HELD 1. YES Ratio An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a person without being retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case. Reasoning Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all lawyers to observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients. Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the advice given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the rightful owner of the incorrectly levied properties was in consonance with his duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being in conflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest over the properties. The act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned upon showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his clients but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal. 2. YES Ratio His failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. Reasoning Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latters dealings with complainant. This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof. Partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge. Disposition Petition granted. Sanction on Atty. Camano is affirmed. Atty. Inocentes is admonished with the warning that repetition of the same or similar omission will be dealt with more severely.

He filed for another 30-day extension. Then another 30-day extension. Not filed in time, the 2nd motion was denied

ISSUE WON Atty. Colorado was negligent thus violating Canon 18 of the Professional Code of Responsibility HELD Yes. -

Ratio

Atty. Colorado violated Canon 18 which states that A lawyer shall serve his client w/ competence and diligence specifically Canon 18.03, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. This is not the only case wherein in dealing w/ the courts orders, Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence, inattention to his obligations as counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In Imelda Marcos vs PCGG, the court imposed a fine on him after he was found guilty of negligence Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance w/ ones oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative. Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing w/ their clients. The profession is not synonymous w. an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

LEGAL PROFESSION
ENDAYA V OCA TINGA; September 3, 2003 (ajang pineda)
NATURE A complaint filed by Artemio Andaya against Atty. Wilfredo Oca for violation of the lawers oath and for professional delinquency or infidelity FACTS Nov. 7, 1991 - a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Endaya and his spouse, Patrosenia Endaya. The complaint was filed by Apolonia Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez Dec. 13, 1991 the Endaya couple filed their answer which was prepared by a certain Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary conference was conducted w/c the couple attended w/o counsel. During the conference, complainant categorically admitted that plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes of the land involved in the case Thereafter, the complainant couple sought services of the public attorneys office in Batangas City wherein the respondent attorney was assigned to handle the case At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent appeared as counsel; he also moved for the amendment of the answer previously filed by the couple, but his motion was denied the court thereafter ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and position papers w/in 10 days from receipt of order but the respondent failed to do so. Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest The plaintiffs appealed the decision. The RTC directed the parties to file their memoranda. Once again, the respondent failed to do so. The courts original decision was reversed and set aside. Petitioners' Claim Having lost the case, the complainant filed this administrative issue for professional delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings. The complainants contend that due to respondents inaction, he lost the opportunity to present his cause and ultimately, the case itself Respondents' Comments respondent denies this and stresses that he was not the original counsel of the couple he avers that when he agreed to represent complainant at the continuation of the preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking leave of court to file an amended answer bec, he was made to believe that it was made by a non-lawyer. When found out that it was actually made by lawyer, he asked the court to relieve him as the couples counsel, but he was denied. He also asserts that he purposely did not file a rejoinder believing in good faith that it wasnt anymore necessary ISSUE WON Atty. Oca (respondent) violated the lawyers oath through his professional deliquency HELD Yes.

A2010
Ratio

PROF. JARDELEZA

did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of the authority of the court Respondents stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced again when he did not file a rejoinder to complainants reply The lawyers oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyers duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other preliminary action Canon 18: A lawyer shall serve his client w/ competence and diligence Much is demanded from those who engage in the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. The lawyers diligence and dedication to his work and profession not only promote the interest of his client, it likewise help attain the ends of justice by contributing to the proper and speedy administration of cases, maintain respect to the legal profession. The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondents failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer

BLANZA V ARCANGEL BENGZON; September 5, 1967 (javi bautista)

NATURE Original Proceeding in the Supreme Court. Disciplinary action. FACTS - On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection with the death of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers. They handed Arcangel pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. After which, they noticed that respondent lost interest and no progress was made. After 6 years they finally asked respondent to return the said documents but the latter refused. Upon questioning by Fiscal Rana to whom the case was referred by the Solicitor General respondent admitted having received the documents but explained that it was for photostating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them was due to complainants refusal to hand him money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing the documents. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over the documents to the fiscal. - Fiscal found respondents explanation satisfactory and recommended the respondents exoneration. However, Sol Gen feels that respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand considering 1) his failure to attend to complainants pension claims for 6 years; 2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands upon him, and 3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly all of her documents. ISSUE WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of professional non-feasance HELD No. Respondents explanation for the delay in filing the claims in returning the documents has not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him any money. Hence, complainants are partly to blame. Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during the fiscals investigation with him paying for the photostating costs himself. As for the alleged failure of the respondent to all her documents to complainant Pasion, the former denies this. the affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.

His failure to file the affidavits did not prejudice his clients for the court nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to them. But failure to do so per se is a violation of Rule 18.03 The respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper when required by the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed up, he

LEGAL PROFESSION
Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her charges in a hearing but she let it go. Neither she nor her counsel of record appeared. Thus, the Curt refused to take disciplinary action against respondent due to lack of clear preponderance of evidence substantiating the accusations against him. - Nevertheless the Court also stated that we cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services. Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait and hope, for 6 long years in their pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, he should have terminated their professional relationship rather than keep them hanging. And although we voted that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen profession require of him.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

was to file appropriate complaints, he allowed the period to submit NITs Appellants Brief to lapse 4. although NIT did not pay his legal fees or reimburse him for his expenses, he still faithfully performed his duty during the entire time he served as its counsel - April 24, 2003 IBP Report by San Juan found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility because: 1. not able to justify his failure to file the brief. > if respondent actually believed it was futile to pursue the appeal, why did he request from CA numerous extensions of time to file 2. Montesino admits that after he advised NIT and herein complainant on the futility of pursuing the appeal, the latter expressed the wish to continue the appeal > should have given due importance to the decision of his client to avail of a legal remedy available to it under the legal system 3. recommended suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months, with a warning that a harsher penalty would be meted out for a similar infraction in the future ISSUE WON pursuing methods not according to the clients wish and consent deserves sanction HELD YES and SC agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Reasoning - The legal profession is invested with public trust. Its goal is to render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession, as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Any conduct found wanting in these considerations, whether in their professional or private capacity, shall subject them to disciplinary action. Failure of respondent to file the appellants brief was a clear violation of his professional duty to his client - The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence. Rules 18.03 and 18.04 specifically provide: Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. - Client and lawyer disagreed on the legal course to be taken regarding the appealed case. The lawyer advised the client to abandon the appeal and to consider the other available remedies but the client wanted to pursue it. Feeling that he was unjustly adamant in wanting to do so, the lawyer contrary to the desire of the client deemed it wise to abandon the appeal without informing his client and not filing an appellants brief is prejudicial because such failure could result in the dismissal of the appeal. - The conduct of shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and that he had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the former of the latters cause made him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in him. Even if respondent was honestly and sincerely protecting the interests of complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the latters knowledge and consent. - If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to continue his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer. - Moreover, the appellate court noted that respondent failed to file the appellants brief despite being granted several extensions of time to file it. He therefore violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without

ABAY V MONTESINO PANGANIBAN; December 4, 2003

NATURE Original Proceeding in the Supreme Court. Disciplinary action. FACTS - June 21, 2002 - Eduardo T. Abay charges Atty. Raul T. Montesino with gross negligence, gross incompetence and evident bad faith, in violation of his oath as a member of the Philippine bar - Negros Institute of Technology (NIT), of which Abay is a stockholder, hired Montesino as counsel in an action for Cancellation of Title of Ownership, Recovery of Ownership and Possession and Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the estate of Vicente T. Galo - April 27, 1995 - RTC dismissed the civil case. - November 3, 1995 - Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of dismissal was denied by the trial court - Although Montesino filed a Notice of Appeal with CA, he failed to submit an appellants brief and in March 19, 1999, CA dismissed the appeal with the following admonition: We made a warning in our Resolution dated as early as October 20, 1998 that no further extension will be entertained. Precisely because of non-submission of the Brief, we directed, on January 8, 1998, the dismissal of the appeal. This is not to mention the fact that a total of 120 days extension, over and above the 45-day reglementary period, had already been granted We cannot see any reason why the courts admonishing for a limited time to do compliance does not apply to this case now before Us. - Abay attributes the failure of Montesino to submit the brief to the latters gross negligence and evident bad faith - Montesino allegedly abandoned the appeal without the knowledge and consent of the NIT and supposedly never told NIT that its appeal had already been dismissed thus the complaint - Montesino answered (October 29, 2002) that 1. pending appeal, he discovered that the property that it was seeking to recover had been the subject of another case which was a result of the overlapping transfers of rights effected by the heirs of Vicente Galo 2. he felt that to pursue the appeal would be dilatory, expensive, frivolous and taxing to the precious time of the CA and it was wise to advise the stockholders of the NIT to abandon the appeal and instead file appropriate Complaints against Grandea, et al to recover NITs claimed properties 3. complainant was unjustly adamant in his demand to continue with the appeal despite legal advice and since he sincerely felt that the best way to protect the rights of NIT

LEGAL PROFESSION
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so - We emphasize that all lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause. Regardless of their personal views, they must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause. Disposition Atty. Raul T. Montesino is found guilty of negligence and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

QUIRANTE V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT REGALADO; January 31, 1989

NATURE Appeal by certiorari to review the judgment of the IAC FACTS - Atty. John QUIRANTE is the counsel of Dr. Indalecio CASASOLA in a case involving a contract with a building contractor named Norman GUERRERO, who failed to perform his part of the contract within the period specified. Dr. Casasola also sued PHILAMGEN, (The Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc.) which acted as bondsman for Guerrero. - Oct 16, 1981 RTC Manila ruled in favor of CASASOLA by rescinding the contract. It ordered Guerrero and Philamgen to pay actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, liquidated damages, amount of surety bond, and attorneys fees (P30T). It also denied MFR filed by Philamgen on Nov 4, 1982. (During this period, Dr. CASASOLA died, leaving his widow and several children as survivors.) - Philamgen brought the case to the appellate court, and the IAC, on May 4, 1983, dismissed petition for quashal of the writ of execution. The case was then elevated to SC and is now still pending. - June 18, 1983 QUIRANTE filed a motion for the confirmation of his attorneys fees, which was granted by the RTC. RTC also denied MFR filed by the opposing party. But the IAC reversed the decision of RTC (IAC granted petition for certiorari filed CASASOLA heirs.) Hence, QUIRANTE filed this appeal by certiorari in the SC. Petitioners Claims - There was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased, Mely Garcia and Virginia Nazareno. - The attorney's fees would then be computed as follows: (A). In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00. (B). In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz. IACs ruling - Firstly, there is still pending in the Supreme Court a petition which may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Casasola family of the total amount of damages given by RTC. Hence the award of damages may be premature. Secondly, assuming that the grant of damages to the family is eventually ratified, the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees will not and should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto. ISSUES 1. WON confirmation of attorneys fees is premature 2. WON IAC correctly ruled that the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees would not be binding on all heirs HELD 1. YES

Ratio An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. Reasoning Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety and amount of attorneys fees should be held in abeyance. This is especially true given the subsequent developments in the civil case against Guerrero and PHILAMGEN: On May 21, 1987, the SC rendered judgment setting aside the May 1983 decision of IAC. - Also, the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees provides that the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject to certain contingencies. Obiter Counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered. Also, there is the assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. - However, what is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors. - In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same action. This is also a proper remedy under our jurisprudence. 2. NO Reasoning This decision is also pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court. The orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise determined by the trial court inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's fees. Disposition Decision of IAC is affirmed except for the portion which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto.

TANHUECO V DE DUMO PER CURIAM; April 25, 1989

NATURE Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS - On February 24, 1975, complainant Hilaria Tanhueco filed before the Court a petition for Disbarment against respondent Justininao G. de Dumo for having violated the Canons of Professional Ethics by his a0 refusal to remit her money collected by him from debtors of the complainant; and b) refusal to return documents entrusted to him as counsel of complainant in certain collection cases. SOLICITOR-GENERALS REPORT: Evidence for Complainant - Complainant secured the legal services of respondent to collect indebtedness from her different debtors. Although she offered to execute a document evidencing their lawyer-client relationship, respondent told her that it was not necessary. She nonetheless offered to give him 15% of what he may be able to collect from the debtors. - Complainant also declared that respondent borrowed from her P2,000.00, P1,300.00 and P3,000.00 on three separate

LEGAL PROFESSION
occasions, but she could not remember when she gave those amounts. Respondent did not pay those loans. - Respondent filed cases against her debtors and that one of them, Constancia Manosca, paid P12,500.00 to respondent. Informed of such payment by Manosca herself, complainant confronted respondent but the latter denied having received payment from any of her debtors. Complainant then brought the matter to the attention of Malacanang which referred her to Camp Crame. Notwithstanding subsequent demands of complainant for the money, respondent had refused to give her the amount. Evidence for Respondent - Complainant indeed secured services of respondent to collect from her debtors, with the agreement that he gets 50% of what he may be able to collect. He thus filed cases against Tipace, Manosca, Morena, Jr., and others, and was able to obtain favorable judgment in the cases against Manosca, Tipace and Leonila Mendoza. The initial payments made by these judgmentdebtors were all given to complainant. With respect to Manosca, respondent obtained a judgment for P19,000.00 although the debt was only P12,000.00. - Respondent also declared that complainant was influenced by her debtors, who were also her friends, into distrusting him. Ultimately, because comlainant filed a complaint against him, he terminated his relationship with complainant and demanded his attorneys fees equivalent to 50% of what he had collected. Complainant refused to pay him, hence, he did not also turn over to her the P12,000.00 initial payment of Manosca, which he considered, or applied, as part payment of his attorneys fee. Respondent estimated his attorneys fee due from complainant in the amount of P17,000.00 - Respondent denied having borrowed the amounts of P2,000.00, P1,300.00, P3,000.00 and P1,000.00, pointing out that complainant did not even have money to pay him so that he handled the cases for her on contingent basis. He also denied having received documentary evidence from the complainant. What evidence he had were all gathered by him on his initiative. Findings and Recommendation - Both respondent and complainant admit of an attorney-client relationship between them. - Respondent also admitted having received P12,000.00 from judgment-debtor Constancia Manosca, without turning over the amount to his client, complainant herein, and applying it instead as part of his attorneys fees. - Undoubtedly, respondents failure to account for the P12,000.00, representing payment of the judgment-debt of Manosca constitutes unprofessional conduct and subjects him to disciplinary action. - As regards the charges that respondent received documents evidencing the debts to complainant and had refused to return them to the latter, and that respondent also borrowed some amounts from her, there is no competent, conclusive evidence to support them. Perforce, such allegations have no factual basis. - It is recommended that respondent be severely reprimanded and admonished that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. (To this recommendation, the Court does not agree) ISSUES 1. WON respondent violated Canon 11 (now Canon 16) regarding trust of clients moneys 2. WON respondent violated Canon 13 (now Canon 20) regarding attorneys fees. HELD 1) Ratio Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client, constitute trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. Reasoning When respondent withheld and refused to deliver the money received by him for his client, the deceased complainant Hilaria Tanhueco, he breached the trust reposed upon him. The fact that a lawyer ahs a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client, does not relieve him from his

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

duty to promptly account for the moneys received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. In the present case, what respondent could have properly done was to make an accounting with his client, the complainant, deduct his attorneys fees due in respect of the amount actually collected by him, and turn over the remaining balance to the complainant. 2) Ratio Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. But when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party. Reasoning Respondent claimed that he charged complainant, his client, a contingent fee of 1) 50% of the sum of principal and interest collected from different debtors; and 2) attorneys fees charged to the defendant and not to be included in the computation. Under this scheme, respondent was actually collecting as attorneys fees more than half of the total amount due from defendant debtors. The contingent fee here is grossly excessive. And there is reason to believe that fraud was committed complainant was an old and sickly woman and, in respondents words, penniless. She was already 76 yrs. old when she filed the complaint. In her circumstance, and given her desire to realize debts owed to her before death took over, she would easily succumb to the demands of respondent attorney regarding his attorneys fees. In Mambulao Lumber Company v PNB, it was explained that the principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorneys fees whenever it is found under the circumstances of the case that the same is unreasonable is deeply rooted in this jurisdiction. A lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved that: 1. respondent is guilty of violation of the attorneys oath and of serious professional misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with; 2. the attorneys fees that respondent is entitled to in respect of collection cases here involved shall be an amount equivalent to fifteen percent of the total amount collected by respondent from the debtors in those cases; 3. respondent shall return forthwith to the estate of complainant Hilaria Tanhueco, the P12,000.00 respondent received on behalf of his client less attorneys fees due to him in respect of that amount (P12,000.00 less fifteen percent thereof) or a net amount of P10,200.00; and 4. respondent shall return to the estate of complainant Hilaria Tanhueco any documents and papers received by him from the deceased complainant in connection with the collection cases for which he was retained. If he has in fact made any other collections from deceased complainants debtors, he shall promptly account therefore to complainants estate and shall be entitled to receive in respect thereof the fifteen percent attorneys fees provided for herein. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

ALBANO V COLOMA FERNANDO; OCTOBER 11, 1967

NATURE Original Action in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS Coloma was the counsel of Albano and his mother during the Japanese occupation. Albano alleged that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized Coloma failed to expedite the hearing and termination of their civil case, as a

LEGAL PROFESSION
result of which they had themselves represented by another lawyer. He also claimed that Coloma intervened in the case to collect her attorneys fees. Coloma denied that she did nothing to expedite the hearing and termination of the civil case as the record would show that she filed more than 20 papers and pleadings; went to trial for several days and, with the assistance of her sister who was also a lawyer, obtained a favorable judgment in the Court of First Instance for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs; and filed with the Court of Appeals a 35-page brief, finished after careful, conscientious, and exhaustive study and preparation. She likewise denied that she could have been removed for her failure to comply with the obligations as counsel as she served faithfully, efficiently, continuously, and to the best of her knowledge and capacity. Her dismissal then, according to her, was made without just cause and without her consent and only when she had already won the case for them in the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals. ISSUE WON Coloma may recover attorneys fees HELD Yes. Any counsel who is worthy of his hire is entitled to be fully recompensated for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsels services to deprive him of his hardearned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

Sec 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to 25% of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties, as attorneys fees. - Alejandro et al filed a motion to dismiss their complaints, which lower court granted. - May 28, 1984, private respondent filed motion to fix its attorneys fees, based on quantum meruit. Metrobank manifested it had fully paid private respondent. Private respondent, however, countered that the P50,000 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including P14000 paid on Dec 15, 1980. It also appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with Metrobank in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount of P600,000 but negotiations were unsuccessful. - Oct 15, 1984, RTC issued an order granting payment of attorneys fees, P936,000, to private respondent. Respondent CA affirmed trial courts order. ISSUES 1. WON private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorneys fees. 2. WON a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien 3. WON private respondent is entitled to 25% of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis. HELD 1. NO. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorneys fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. - in this case, the dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner. Private respondents supposed charging lien is thus without legal basis. - an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his client form the adverse party in nay action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation. An attorney merely defeating recovery against his client as e defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the clients title to property already in the clients possession. 2. NO. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. - an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. This, however, applies only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable. 3. The Court refrained from resolving the third issue so as not to preempt or interfere with the authority and adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper proceeding which may be brought by private respondent. NOTE: in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy (2) extent of services rendered (3) professional standing of lawyer . Disposition Petition for review is granted, decision of CA is reversed and set aside, without prejudice to appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to attorneys fees and the amount thereof.

METROBANK V CA REGALADO; January 23, 1990

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari impugning the decision of CA affirming order of RTC, fixing attorneys fees and directing petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) to pay its attorneys, private respondent Arturo Alafriz and Associates, the amount of P936,000 as attorneys fees on a quantum meruit5 basis. FACTS - Private respondent handled civil cases for the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages, in behalf of Metrobank from March 1974 to September 1983. - Celedenio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al. These were mortgaged by Javier with Metrobank to secure a loan obligation of Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. Obligors defaulted and Metrobank foreclosed the mortgages. - Alejandro brought suit against Javier and included Metrobank as defendant, alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier. - it was during the pendency of these suits that the lands were sold by Metrobank to its sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation, for P600,000. On same day, properties were resold to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation for P2.5M. Herby then mortgaged the same properties to Banco de Oro for P9.2M. Private respondent did not have knowledge of such transactions. - Aug 16, 1983 private respondent then filed a motion to enter the charging lien6 in the records of the civil cases, pursuant to
51

quantum meruit - (lit. so much as he deserved) cause of action for reasonable value of services rendered, or occasionally of goods or materials provided, under circumstances in which there was no enforceable contract to pay for them but it would be unfair to leave plaintiff uncompensated. 6 Charging lien or attorneys lien a lien on money, papers, and property of a client in the hands of an attorney, or a lien that an attorney may request from a court on a fund or judgment obtained for the client by the attorneys efforts, to secure payment

ROXAS V DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.

of attorneys fees.

LEGAL PROFESSION
CHICO-NAZARIO: January 31, 2006
FACTS - 1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the Zuzuarreguis for parcels of land belonging to them situated in Antipolo, Rizal with a total land area of 1, 790, 570.36 - The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor - They executed a Letter-Agreement dated April 22, 1983 which indicated that the contingent fees that the lawyers will receive at P11 or more per square meter is thirty percent of the just compensation - The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued and on October 29, 1984, a Partial Decision was rendered fixing the just compensation to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis at P30 per square meter - The NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the lowering of the amount of just compensation in accordance with applicable laws - Pending the resolution of the MFR filed by the NHA, a joint special power of attorney was executed by the Zuzuarreguis in favor of Attys. Roxas and Pastor - On December 10, 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and between the Zuzuarreguis and Attys. Roxas and Pastor which fixed the just compensation due the Zuzuarreguis at P17, and anything in excess of that shall be the contingent fees of Attys. Roxas and Pastor for their legal services - Resolution No. 1174 dated December 16, 1985, issued by the NHA, stated that the property would be acquired at a cost of P19.50 per square meter and that it will be paid in NHA Bonds which the yield would be based on the Central Bank rate at the time of the payment - As a result of the NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement was executed and it was approved by the Court in a Decision dated December 20, 1985. - Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34, 916, 122. The total amount released by the NHA was P54, 500, 00. The difference of P19, 583, 878 is, undoubtedly, the yield of the bonds. - The amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30, 520, 000 in NHA bonds - On August 25, 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis new counsel to Attys. Roxas and Pastor demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action - Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered stating that the amount that they go seems huge from the surface but it just actually passed their hands. - On September 29, 1987, a letter was again sent to Attys. Roxas and Pastor formally terminating their services - The Zuzuarreguis then filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages, they demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be turned over to them - The RTC dismissed the complaint - The Zuzuarreguis filed a Notice of Appeal - The Court of Appeals ordered Attys. Roxas and Pastor to return to the plaintiffs the amount of P12, 596, 425, already deducting the reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P4,4 76,426.275 - Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a MFR - The Zuzuarreguis also filed a MFR - The NHA and Pedrosa also filed a MFR - All MFRs were denied for lack of merit - Attys. Roxas and Pastor then filed a petition for certiorari ISSUES 1. WON the letter-agreement executed by the parties should stand as law between them 2. WON the contingent fees were reasonable HELD

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

1. Yes. A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them who sent the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all matters which they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties. 2. No. Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their professional services. Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states: a contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject t o the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states the guidelines by which a lawyer should determine his fees (see original) - Indubitably entwined with the lawyers duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorneys fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable (Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. Therefore, the power to determine the reasonableness of attorneys fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts. - In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which is equal to 44% of the just compensation paid by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is undeniably excessive. In the opinion of the Court, 87.17% of the yields of the bond should go to the Zuzuarreguis computing from the amounts stipulated in the Letter-Agreement. The remaining amount is what is due to Attys. Roxas and Pastor. The SC affirms the decision of CA with modification in the computation of the attorneys contingent fees.

URBAN BANK, INC. V ATTY. MAGDALENO M. PEA PUNO; September 7, 2001

NATURE Administrative Matter. Disbarment FACTS - Complainant charges that respondent is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in violation of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court. - 1 December 1994, Complainant bought a parcel of land located along Roxas Boulevard from the Isabela Sugar Company (ISC for brevity). - One of the conditions of the sale was for ISC to cause the eviction of all the occupants found in said property. This condition was incorporated in the Contract to Sell and adopted in the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between ISC and Complainant. - ISC hired Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea. He proceeded to take the necessary steps to evict the occupants of the property subject of the sale. - During the eviction process, Complainant was informed by ISC and Pea about the necessity of a letter of authority in favor of the latter, granting him the authority to represent the bank in maintaining possession of the aforesaid property and to represent the bank in any court action that may be instituted in connection with the exercise of said duty. - Complainant acceded to the request and issued a letterauthority dated 15 December 1994, but only after making it very clear to Pea. that it was ISC which contracted his services and not Complainant. - Pea then requested for a modification of said letter of

LEGAL PROFESSION
authority by furnishing Complainant with a draft containing the desired wordings (including the date, i.e., 19 December 1994) and asking Complainant to modify the previous letter by issuing a new one similarly worded as his draft. - If only to expedite and facilitate matters, Complainant willingly obliged and re-issued a new letter of authority to Respondent, this time incorporating some of Pea s suggestions. - Eventually, the eviction of the occupants of the property in question was successfully carried out. - After the lapse of more than thirteen (13) months, Pea filed a collection suit against herein Complainant and its senior officers for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages and attorneys fees on the basis of the letter given to him for the purposes of evicting the occupants. - According to Complainant: Pea, knowing fully well the circumstances surrounding the issuance of said letter of authority, constitutes deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said provision enumerates the grounds for the suspension and disbarment of lawyers, namely: Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court, on what grounds, - A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath of which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without any authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied) - Pea denied all the allegations and moved to dismiss the complaint. - He added that there was no reason for him to deceive complainant into writing a letter of authority because he knew very well that the verbal agreement was sufficient to constitute an attorney-client relationship. - We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. - The IBP decided in favor of Pea and recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE WON Pea should be disbarred on the ground of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct HELD NO. Reasoning ***Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest, undertaken for public welfare and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of the persons unfit to practice them. - Complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent really induced it, through machination or other deceitful means, to issue the December 19 letter of authority ostensibly for the purpose of evicting illegal occupants, then using the very same letter for demanding agents compensation. - No evidence in respect of the supposed deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct was adduced by the complainant. It is one thing to allege deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct, and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same. - The letter, from respondents own admission, just served to officially confirm a done deal. It was, hence, utilized solely as documentary evidence to buttress respondents assertion regarding the existence of the agency agreement. (Respondent here is not suing by virtue of the letter of authority as what the Complainant is saying, but grounded on the oral contract of agency the two purportedly entered into.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

- Indeed, respondent, with or without the letter, could have instituted a suit against the complainant. There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is sufficient to create an attorneyclient relationship. - Respondent can hardly be faulted and accused of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct for invoking the aid of the court in recovering recompense for legal services which he claims he undertook for the complainant, and which the latter does not deny to have benefited from. Indeed, what he did was a lawful exercise of a right. Disposition The disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit

CORPUZ V CA DAVIDE; January 26, 1998

NATURE Petition to set aside the decision of CA which reversed the resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the latter declaring that petitioners separation from the service as Atty V in the MTRCB was not in order and directed that he be automatically restored to his position. FACTS - Atty Corpuz was appointed MTRCBs legal counsel Prosecutor and Investigation Services (Supervising Legal Staff Officer). The appointment was approved by the Asst Regional Director of the CSC-NCR. Subsequently, he was designated Attorney V under the Salary Standardization Law. - August 1991, the MTRCB passed MTRCB Resolution No. 8-1-91 5 entitled "An Act To Declare The Appointments Of The Administrative And Subordinate Employees Of This Board As Null And Void." This undated resolution noted that the past and present Chairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit for approval the appointments of administrative and subordinate employees to the MTRCB before forwarding them to the CSC, in violation of Section 5 of P.D. No. 876-A, and later, P.D. No. 1986. - CORPUZ was unaware of the promulgation of Resolution No. 81-91 as he was then on leave. The Resolution was likewise kept secret and it was only on 12 March 1993 that an announcement 8 of its contents was posted by an Ad Hoc Committee on the MTRCB bulletin board. This announcement invited the submission of any information concerning the appointments involved therein to the Committee. It appears, however, that nothing was immediately done to implement Resolution No. 8-191. - At the MTRCB meeting of 19 January 1993, MTRCB Chair Mendez was informed about Resolution No. 8-1-91. An Ad Hoc Committee composed of MTRCB members was then constituted to look into the appointments extended by former Chairman Morato, as well as the qualifications of the appointees. - The Committee resolved to recommend to the MTRCB the approval of the appointments, except that of Corpuz and seven others - On 27 July 1993, Corpuz and one Larry Rigor filed a complaint with the CSC requesting a formal investigation and hearing. In her comment to the complaint, Mendez stated that she discovered that the appointments extended by Morato were not submitted to the MTRCB for approval pursuant to Section 5(c) of P.D. No. 1986; hence to cure the defect, she submitted the appointments to the MTRCB. - On 31 August 1993, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 933509 granting the MTRCB authority to fill up positions vacated in the agency due to appointments, which were not submitted to the MTRCB for approval. In the Resolution of the CSC dated December 23, 1993, they ruled that: The appointment of Atty. Corpuz, if defective, could have been the subject of a direct action for revocation or recall which may be brought to the Commission within a reasonable period of time after its approval. . . Since no such action was filed with the Commission, we can safely state that Corpuz had already acquired security of tenure in the said position. Hence, the Commission can not allow the current Board's disapproval of the said appointment to produce any effect. Atty. Corpuz can no longer be separated from the

LEGAL PROFESSION
service except for cause and after observing the requirements of due process. - The MTRCB filed with us a special civil action for certiorari, which we referred to the CA in view of Republic Act No. 7902. In its decision, the CA declared null and void Resolution No. 935964 of the CSC, ruling that since the appointment of Corpuz was not approved by the MTRCB, the appointment was invalid and he could not invoke security of tenure. The record shows that the appointment of Corpuz was not approved by the Board, as mandated by PD 1986 Sec16. As such, he cannot invoke the security of tenure, even if he has rendered service for a number of years. - Corpuz filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed an instant petition under Rule 45 RoC and asked the Court to reverse the decision of CA on the ground that: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF PETITIONER ATTY. DAVID B. CORPUZ DID NOT HAVE THE APPROVAL OF THE MTRCB BOARD WHICH IF NOT CORRECTED, IS TANTAMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO SECURITY OF TENURE - In his memorandum, he declared that he is no longer seeking reinstatement but for the continuity of his government service from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time he was permanently employed with the Office of the Ombudsman. ISSUE WON Corpuz can invoke security of tenure HELD Ratio No, he cannot invoke security of tenure. Reasoning - There are two stages in the process of appointing MTRCB personnel, other than its Secretary, namely: (a) recommendation by the Chairman which is accomplished by the signing of the appointment paper, which is among his powers under Section 5(d); and (b) approval or disapproval by the MTRCB of the appointment. - It is long settled in the law of public offices and officers that where the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the commission can issue or the appointment may be complete only when such assent or confirmation is obtained. In either case, the appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power is performed. Until the process is completed, the appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor invoke security of tenure. - A public official or employee who assumed office under an incomplete appointment is merely a de facto officer for the duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that he assumed office under color of a known appointment which is void by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise. Undeniably, under the facts here, CORPUZ was such a de facto officer. Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of 13 October 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP-No. 37694 is AFFIRMED.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

advised her that her case cannot prosper on the basis of what was told him by her. - In any case, Hilado brought to his office documents related to the case. Francisco claims that these documents were received by his assistant. Atty Agrava. When advised of the same, he instructed Atty. Agrava to return the documents as the firm will not handle her case against Assad. - Atty Agrava thought that in returning the documents a proper explanation be made as to why the firm is not taking her case. Atty. Francisco signed the letter to Hilado without reading the same. - On January 28, 1946, Atty Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for Assad in the case instituted by Hilado. - On May 29, 1946, the lawyers of Hilado wrote Francisco urging him to discontinue representing Assad on the grounds that he was consulted by Hilado with regard to her case. and that during the consultation, certain documents were turned over to him. - When Francisco did not reply, Hilados lawyers, on her behalf, filed this original action. ISSUE WON Francisco should be disqualified from representing his clients against Hilado HELD Ratio - Yes. Based on the facts, a relationship of attorney and client between Francisco and Hilado ensued when he issued the written opinion to Hilado. The letter binds and estops him in acting for others against Hilado. Reasoning - The SC noted that it is in the interest in the administration of justice that lawyers are viewed without reproach in their actuations. Hence, even if it were true that what was given to Francisco were facts that were already public knowledge, there is no way of knowing if this was in fact the case. - In citing jurisprudence on the matter, the court held that a lawyer is engaged professionally when he is just in fact listening to a clients preliminary statement of his case or when he is giving advice thereon. That formality is not the essence of employment. - The fact that the action against Francisco was brought four months after he filed in appearing in the case does not operate as a waiver of Hilados right to ask for his disqualification. The confidence once reposed cannot be divested by expiration of professional employment. The Court also stated that in matters of the practice of law the jurisdiction of the court is pervasive. This flows from the fact that lawyers are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration of justice and as such are subject to the disciplinary authority of the court. - The Court then expounded on the nature of the retaining fee as a means of compensating the lawyer who was asked to give professional advise to the detriment of the lawyer not being able to act as counsel for the other side, even if he has declined to perform the services required by the original client. The fee is separate from the fee that a client is obligated to pay the lawyer for the services which he was retained to perform.

HILADO V DAVID TUASON;1949

NATURE Original action. Certiorari FACTS - Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action Against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed by her now deceased husband during the Japanese occupation. - In the course of the case, Hilado consulted respondent Vicente J. Francisco with regard the case filed against Assad despite the fact that she had previously retained a different set of lawyers to act on her behalf. Francisco claims that at the time, he already

GENATO V SILAPAN PUNO, July 14, 2003

NATURE Complaint for disbarment FACTS Complainants Side - July 1992, respondent allegedly asked the complainant if he could rent a small office space in complainants building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainants retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building and made him handle some of complainants cases.

LEGAL PROFESSION
- Respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from complainant which he intended to use as down payment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds. - The respondent bought the car but the document of sale was issued in the complainants name and financed through City Trust Company. - January 1993: respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero who wanted to borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this transaction, respondent earned commission in the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay respondents arrears with the car financing firm. - Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondents postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondents account therein was already closed. - Respondent failed to heed complainants repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. - In the foreclosure case, the respondent alleged that the complainant is engaged in buy and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and shady deals, and has many cases pending in court, which the complainant denied, adding that the allegations were libelous and were irrelevant to the foreclosure case. A particular allegation states that in one case, the complainant would only give the respondent the document of sale of the car if the latter would bribe the review committee of the DOJ for a case of the complainant. According to the complainant, the allegation was, aside from being false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to defame him, the respondent was also guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively liable. - the complainant then filed this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative sanction be meted against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check Respondents Side - It was complainant who offered him an office space in his building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22 case filed against complainant. - There was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and his revelation of complainants desire to bribe government officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit complainants credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation. - Respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of complainant without consideration and only as a formal requirement so he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not surrender his title over the mortgaged property to complainant. - Respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for value, but only: (a) to serve as some kind of acknowledgment that he already received in advance a portion of his attorneys fees from the complainant for the legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not abandon the cases he was handling for complainant. - Respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romeros loan which he allegedly helped facilitate, alleging that the amount paid to him was for attorneys fees. He used this amount to pay his arrears with the car financing firm. On

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

January 29, 1993, before paying the next amortization on the car, he asked complainant to execute a deed of sale transferring ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted that he would transfer ownership of the car only after the termination of his criminal case which respondent was handling as his defense lawyer. Consequently, respondent stopped paying the amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury case against complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him. - October 27, 1993: the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. - August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the investigating commissioner finding the respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. ISSUES 1. WON the court has the jurisdiction to sanction respondent for his issuance of the bouncing check 2. WON the respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainants alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection with a pending case, and thus would be sanctioned HELD 1. NO, it is not for the Court to sanction respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check, which would be determined by the trial court. Ratio We shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and civil cases pending between the parties. It is for the trial courts handling these cases to ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations made therein. 2. YES, respondents allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. Ratio A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness. Reasoning Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. -The obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. -However, the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainants alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense. -The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondents professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case.

LEGAL PROFESSION
Disposition IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

DOMINGO V AQUINO TEEHANKEE; April 29, 1971

NATURE An original action for certiorari challenging a judgment of the Court of Appeals as null and void for having been allegedly entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion. FACTS Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria and Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. were appointed co-special administrators of the estate of Luis Domingo, Sr. Pedro Aquino filed a money claim on the estate. CFI approved the money claim of Aquino. Both parties appealed to the CA. CA affirmed CFI judgment with modifications in favor of Aquino (allowed compounded interest). The estate's counsel in the CA, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez filed on March 9, 1967, with the CA an "Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment," stating that Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria had long resigned as special administratrix with the permission of the intestate court, that Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the prosecution of the appeal) was removed from his trust by the intestate court, for having squandered cash funds of the estate, that, as a consequence, she was appointed judicial administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone; that as judicial administratrix, she wished to file a motion for reconsideration and that the clerk of court be directed to serve copy of said judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson and praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former joint administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the CAs decision. CA denied motion for reconsideration. After almost 5 mos. and after respondent had filed in the intestate court a motion for execution of the judgment, petitioner filed this petition alleging that CA decision was entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion. This was opposed by Aquino on the ground of finality. ISSUE WON CAs decision has become final HELD YES Ratio CA decision has become final and executory in accordance with the Rules of Court and since no appeal was filed. Reasoning Motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and delay was without legal basis. Petitioners motion for substitution filed with the appellate court after its decision recognized the fact that the appellate court had already duly handed down its adverse decision and petitioner merely expressed her wish to belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the petitioner estate. She was apparently resigned to the futility of filing any such motion, in view of the finality of the appellate court's decision for such motion was never filed. She cannot use as an excuse the substitution of administrators/counsels. The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the counsel on record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court and never filed any withdrawal as such counsel. He was representing the estate and not the administrator, Luis Domingo,

Jr., so that even after latters removal, the former remains to be counsel of estate. No withdrawal as counsel or petition for change of counsel was filed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Notice and copy of the CA's decision were duly served by registered mail on the estate's counsel of record at his address of record in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the Rules of Court. And in accordance with said Rule, service by registered mail of the appellate court's decision upon the petitioner's counsel of record was deemed completed and effected upon the addressee's failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the postmaster. The present administratrix gives no satisfactory explanation as to her failure to substitute herself vice Luis Domingo, Jr., since the latter's removal or to then engage new counsel vice Atty. Unson in the appellate court. Disposition Petition dismissed; petitioners counsel shall pay treble costs for falsely representing to the SC that the CA had granted new and further relief to Aquino when, in fact, he had duly prayed for the relief awarded and for filing unmeritorious cases that clog the court dockets; writ of preliminary injunction issued on Nov. 7, 1967 is dissolved.

MONTANO V IBP KAPUNAN, May 21, 2001

FACTS Montano hired the services of Atty. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant. The parties agreed upon attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000, 50% of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500 Even before Atty. Dealca had prepared the appellants brief and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant. Complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000. Prior to the filing of the appellants brief, Atty. Dealca again demand payment of the remaining balance of 3,500. When complainant was unable to do so, lawyer withdrew his appearance as complainants counsel without his prior knowledge and/or conformity.

Montano claimed that such conduct exceeded the ethical standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment. IBP conducted investigation, report and recommendation. It found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and recommended that he be severely reprimanded. IBP Board of Governors resolved that the penalty be amended to 3 months suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Dealca sought reconsideration saying: > Complainant went to him just to prepare and submit complainants appellants brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its completion > He was able to finish the appellants brief ahead of its deadline, so he advised the complainant about its completion with the request that the remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid. > Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay the P3,500.00 tomorrow or on later particular date. This promise-non-payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the brief. > Even without being paid completely, he, of his own free will and accord, filed complainants brief on time; Such P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now ISSUE

LEGAL PROFESSION
WON Atty. Dealcas conduct just and proper HELD No. We find Atty. Dealcas conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. - Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA

Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorneys fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. - Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. - Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. Reprimand is deemed sufficient.

- that the probate of the Will had not been decided on the merits did not change the fact that the probate court had removed Petitioner Obando as coadministrator. Petitioners' Claim -Assignment of Errors: Simply stated, the following issues are raised by the petitioners: (1) whether the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record; (2) whether a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings were already made can still be granted; (3) whether the conviction of Petitioner Obando for estafa through falsification and the revocation of his appointment as administrator, both of which are on appeal, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the civil case; and (4) whether there was a conflict between the Order dismissing the civil case and the previous actions of the trial court. ISSUES 1. WON the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record 2. WON a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings were already made can still be granted 3. WON that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss the civil case because Obando's conviction for estafa through falsification was still on appeal 4. WON trial court whimsically and capriciously departed from its previous rulings when, in its Resolution dated February 11, 1993, it granted Eduardo's later Motion to Dismiss HELD 1. the lawyer was still Eduardos counsel of record. Ratio Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of RoC. Counsel may be substituted only with the ff requisites: (1) new counsel files a written application for Substitution; (2) the clients written consent is obtained; (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured Reasoning Eduardo did not dismiss his Atty (Yuseco). The Motion to Dismiss was beneficial to respondent Eduardo, he had no reason to complain. At the discretion of the court, an atty. who has been dismissed by a client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect the clients rights. In this case, any irregularity should have been raised by respondent Eduardo, and not the petitioners. 2. YES Ratio if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. Reasoning The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case. Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction,22 (2) litis pendentia,23 (3) lack of cause of action,24 and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.25 Except for lack of cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of Rule 16 may be waived. If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed at all within the reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules.26 - the respondents did not waive their right to move for the dismissal of the civil case based Petitioner Obando's lack of legal capacity. It was only after he had been convicted of estafa through falsification that the probate court divested him of his representation of the Figueras estates. It was only then that this ground became available to the respondents. Hence, it could not be said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to Dismiss

OBANDO V FIGUERAS NARVASA; 1990

NATURE Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the RoC, seeking to annul a Decision of the CA which affirmed dismissal, without prejudice, of Petitioner Felizardo Obandos action for annulment of contract and reconveyance earlier ordered by the RTC of QC. FACTS - 1964: Alegria Figueras and her stepsons Eduardo and Francisco filed a Petition for settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband Jose Figueras. - pending settlement of the estate, Alegria died. Eduardo assumed administration of the joint estates of Jose and Alegria. - Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of what purported to be Alegrias Last Will and Testament, filed by Felizardo Obando, Alegrias nephew (herein petitioner) - the alleged Will bequeathed to Obando properties left by the Figueras couple, including 2 parcels of land in Quezon City. - Probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings, and Obando was appointed as Eduardos co-administrator of the joint estates. - upon investigation, the NBI found the Will was a forgery, which led to the conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of a public document - 1990: probate court denied Eduardos Motion for authority to sell the parcels of land. Despite denial, he sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation, on the strength of an Order issued by the probate court in 1991. New titles were issued in the name of Amigo Realty. - 1992: Petitioner Obando, as co-administrator and universal heir of Alegria, filed Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty (respondents), for the nullification of the sale. - 1997: the probate court removed Obando from his office as coadministrator. - Consequently, respondents filed Motion to Dismiss, based on Obandos loss of his legal standing to pursue the case. - 1993: Trial Court granted the Motion and dismissed the civil case - Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Denied. - CA dismissed Obandos Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus - rejected Obandos contention: that he did not lose his legal personality to prosecute the civil case, since there was no categorical statement that the purported will was a forgery, and its probate was still pending - affirmed the dismissal of the action because the probate courts Order alluded to the fact that the Will was a forgery.

LEGAL PROFESSION
filed after their Answer was submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. 3. NO. Ratio When an appointment as co-administrator of an estate is revoked by a probate court, a final conviction in a criminal case has nothing to do with such revocation. Reasoning This argument has no bearing at all on the dismissal of the civil case. Petitioner Obando derived his power to represent the estate of the deceased couple from his appointment as co-administrator.27 When the probate court removed him from office, he lost that authority. Since he lacked the legal capacity to sue on behalf of the Figueras estates, he could not continue prosecuting the civil case.28 Thus the trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.29 Whether a final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is necessary to remove him from his administration is not a proper issue in this Petition. He should raise the matter in his appeal of the Decision removing him from administration of the Figueras estates. 4. NO. There is no conflict between these court rulings. Reasoning they were based on different grounds. The first Motion to Dismiss was denied because, at the time, Petitioner Obando still had legal capacity to sue as co-administrator of the Figueras estates. The second Motion was granted because the probate court had already removed him from his office as coadministrator. The change in his legal capacity accounts for the difference in the adjudication of the trial court. Disposition the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

A2010

PROF. JARDELEZA