opportunity to develop a skill they would need to use when confronting just such upsetting scenesin their future work. In another of our scenarios, the subjects had a chance to take and keep $50 if they could convince the interrogator they’ had not taken the
Those subjects who did nottake the money could earn $10 if the interrogator believed them when they’ said they had not takenthe $50. In our last scenario, we first identified the social issues the subjects felt most stronglyabout, and then asked them to describe that
honestly (and earn $10 if believed) or claim tohave the opposite of their true opinion (and earn $50 if believed).In our most recent work we gave some of our subjects the choice as to whether to lie or tellthe truth, as people have in real life. There are many reasons why some people choose not to lie,one of which is their own knowledge, based on past experience, that they are almost alwayscaught. Including in the sample of liars such terrible liars, people who would not choose to lieunless forced to do so by the experimenter, could inflate the detection rate. In virtually all previousresearch, on either interpersonal deception or polygraph lie detection, subjects were not given thechoice as to whether to lie or be truthful. One exception is the study of the polygraph by Ginton,Daie, Elaad, and Ben-Shakhar (1982), in which they were able to know which policemen hadcheated on a test for eligibility for promotion; Stiff, Corman, Knizek, and Snider (1994) in asimilar fashion knew which students cheated on a quiz. Bradley (1988) also allowed subjects tochoose whether to lie or tell the truth in a polygraph study.Another unique feature of our recent experiments is that we told the subjects that they would be punished, and it was a considerable punishment, if the interrogator judged them to be lying.Both the truthful person mistakenly judged to be lying and the liar who was detected would receivethe same punishment. Thus, for the first time in research on lying, both the truthful person and theliar might be afraid—of being disbelieved if telling the truth, of being caught if lying. If it is onlythe liar who might be afraid of being accused of lying, it is too easy’ for the lie catcher and notrelevant to most of real life. And if neither liar nor the truthful person fear punishment, it shouldhave little relevance to the lies that occur in the criminal justice world or in national security, letalone in marital disputes, parent-child conflicts, and so on.Although our recent experiments can claim to have more ecological validity than our older studies, or than most of the literature on either interpersonal deceit or polygraph lie detection, thefindings about detectability were not much different. Most of those who saw the videotapes andmade their judgments operated at a chance level or only slightly better than chance. Before proceeding to consider why people do so poorly as lie-catchers, let us consider some limitations of our research which could have led us to underestimate the ability to detect lies from demeanor.For the most part, the observers who judged who was lying and who was telling the truth hadno vital interest at stake in achieving accuracy. They were not offered higher pay if they were moreaccurate. And catching liars was not intrinsically rewarding, for most of these people did not makea living catching liars. This limitation was addressed in our (Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991) studyand work by other research groups (Kraut and Poe, 1980; DePaulo and Pfeifer, 1986) which didstudy professionals concerned with catching liars. We found that customs officials, policemen, trialcourt judges, F.B.I., C.I.A., B.A.T.F., D.E.A., forensic psychiatrists, and trial lawyers were notmuch better than chance.