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Paul Ekman - Why Dont We Catch Liars

Paul Ekman - Why Dont We Catch Liars

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Published by: Stanely Chtchar on Jun 18, 2012
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Social Research, Vol. 63, No. 3, 801-817 (Fall 1996)Paul Ekman’s research is supported by a Research Scientist Award fromthe National Institute of Mental Health (MH06092).
Why Don’t We Catch Liars?Paul Ekman
Our research (Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1990; Frank and Ekman, forthcoming; Ekman, Frank, andO’Sullivan, forthcoming) suggests that most people cannot tell from demeanor whether someone islying or telling the truth. Such poor performance is not because lies are told flawlessly. Most liarsmake mistakes which could be detected but usually are missed. Both perpetrating a lie anddetecting a lie, in most people, seem to be poorly developed skills. In this article, I consider sixexplanations for why most of us do not catch liars from demeanor. I will first explain how Idistinguish lying from other forms of deceit, and then discuss the evidence which suggests that people are such poor lie catchers.The intent of the liar is one of the two criteria I (Ekman, [1985] 1992) use to distinguish liesfrom other kinds of deception. The liar 
chooses to mislead the target. Liars mayactually tell the truth, but that is not their intent. And truthful people may provide false information —bad advice from a stock broker—but that is not their intent. The~ liar has a choice; the liar couldchose not to lie. We are all tempted to lie, but we do not always do so. Lying is not irresistible; itis, by my definition, a conscious, considered choice. I do recognize that lying can become a habitand then performed with little consideration, but, at least initially, all such habits began asconsidered choices about whether or not to do so. Presumably, a pathological liar is compelled tolie and by my definition, therefore, is not a liar.The second criterion for distinguishing lies from other deceptions is that the target is not notifiedabout the liar’s intention to mislead. A magician is not a liar by this criterion, but Uri Geller is aliar, since Geller claimed his tricks were not magic. An actor is not a liar, but an impostor is. Letthe buyer beware is one example of an explicit warning that products or services may not be whatthey are presented to be. (Of course, that warning does not appear in advertisements, nearly all of which are designed to convey the opposite message.) Poker is still another situation in which therules of the game sanction and notify the players that deception will occur, and, therefore, onecannot consider bluffing to be a lie.Sometimes notification of an intention to mislead is implicit in the framing, to use Goffman’s(1974) term, of the situation. In real estate transactions, the potential buyer is implicitly notifiedthat the seller’s asking price is not the actual price the seller would accept. Various forms of  politeness are other instances in which the nature of the situation notifies the target that the truthmay not be spoken. The host would not properly’ scrutinize the dinner guest to determine if theguest’s claim to have enjoyed the evening is true anymore than the aunt should worry whether thenephew is lying when he says that he appreciated being given a tie for Christmas. Deception isexpected; even if the target might suspect that the truth is not being told, it is improper to questionit. Only certain types of deception may be allowable: the poker player cannot use marked cards; thehome seller cannot conceal a known defect.
In courtship, it is ambiguous whether the parties should expect truthfulness. The saying “all’sfair in love and war” would seem to warn lovers not to believe all they are told. Recent publicopinion polls suggest that lies that downplay the number of previous sexual partners are commonamong college-aged adults. Yet I expect that lovers want to believe in the truthfulness of their lover. Many popular songs testify to the betrayal felt when lies are discovered (although some dowarn that lies may be expected). Romantic love requires collusive efforts to develop and maintainmyths about each other and the nature of the relationship.I differ from Bok (1982), who only considers false statements to be lies. I (Ekman, [1985] 1992)argued that one can falsify without words, and one need not falsify, verbally or nonverbally, to lie.Concealment is just as much a lie as falsification, if there is an expectation that information will berevealed. When filling out a job application that asks for a listing of all previous employment,omitting the one from which one was fired would be a concealment lie, for there is an obligation toreveal. In personal relationships it is not always so clear cut, and the liar, once discovered, and thetarget of the lie may disagree about whether or not an obligation to reveal the concealedinformation was in force.Concealment and falsification are different techniques for accomplishing the same objective.The issue is the motive, not the technique employed to accomplish it. If the motive is to mislead,then the choice between falsifying or concealing is simply a matter of which technique will work  better in a given instance. Elsewhere (Ekman, [198531992) I have explained why most liars would prefer to conceal rather than falsify if the situation will allow it and also described some other techniques for implementing a lie. Now let us consider what we know about how well people can detect lies from demeanor. Theevidence that most people do poorly in catching lies comes from the following type of experiment.Students are recruited to lie or tell the truth about something which usually does not matter muchto them. It has no relevance to their past or their expected future life. Sometimes in a weak (in my judgment) attempt to motivate them, they are told it is important to be able to lie, or that smart or successful people succeed in this task. Videotapes of their behavior are shown to other studentswho are asked to identify who is lying and who is telling the truth. Typically, most of those tryingto catch the liars perform at chance or just slightly better than chance. Our (Ekman and Friesen,1974; Ekman, Frank, and O’Sullivan, forthcoming) research has differed in a number of ways.We have tried to make the lies relevant to their lives and to set the stakes for success or failureas high as we could. We attempted this for two reasons. It is only in high stake lies that emotionsabout lying (fear, guilt, excitement, or what I have called duping delight) are likely to be arousedand betray the lie. It is not just the leakage of these strong emotions which provide behavioral cluesto deceit, but these strong emotions also max’ disruPt the liar’s cognitive processing and result inevasive, implausible, and stumbling accounts. A second reason for studying high stake lies is thatthese are the lies with which society is most concerned.In one of our experimental scenarios, we examined how well nurses could conceal thenegative
they felt when witnessing films showing amputations and burns. They werehighly motivated to succeed in this lie, because they thought our experiment offered them the
opportunity to develop a skill they would need to use when confronting just such upsetting scenesin their future work. In another of our scenarios, the subjects had a chance to take and keep $50 if they could convince the interrogator they’ had not taken the
Those subjects who did nottake the money could earn $10 if the interrogator believed them when they’ said they had not takenthe $50. In our last scenario, we first identified the social issues the subjects felt most stronglyabout, and then asked them to describe that
honestly (and earn $10 if believed) or claim tohave the opposite of their true opinion (and earn $50 if believed).In our most recent work we gave some of our subjects the choice as to whether to lie or tellthe truth, as people have in real life. There are many reasons why some people choose not to lie,one of which is their own knowledge, based on past experience, that they are almost alwayscaught. Including in the sample of liars such terrible liars, people who would not choose to lieunless forced to do so by the experimenter, could inflate the detection rate. In virtually all previousresearch, on either interpersonal deception or polygraph lie detection, subjects were not given thechoice as to whether to lie or be truthful. One exception is the study of the polygraph by Ginton,Daie, Elaad, and Ben-Shakhar (1982), in which they were able to know which policemen hadcheated on a test for eligibility for promotion; Stiff, Corman, Knizek, and Snider (1994) in asimilar fashion knew which students cheated on a quiz. Bradley (1988) also allowed subjects tochoose whether to lie or tell the truth in a polygraph study.Another unique feature of our recent experiments is that we told the subjects that they would be punished, and it was a considerable punishment, if the interrogator judged them to be lying.Both the truthful person mistakenly judged to be lying and the liar who was detected would receivethe same punishment. Thus, for the first time in research on lying, both the truthful person and theliar might be afraid—of being disbelieved if telling the truth, of being caught if lying. If it is onlythe liar who might be afraid of being accused of lying, it is too easy’ for the lie catcher and notrelevant to most of real life. And if neither liar nor the truthful person fear punishment, it shouldhave little relevance to the lies that occur in the criminal justice world or in national security, letalone in marital disputes, parent-child conflicts, and so on.Although our recent experiments can claim to have more ecological validity than our older studies, or than most of the literature on either interpersonal deceit or polygraph lie detection, thefindings about detectability were not much different. Most of those who saw the videotapes andmade their judgments operated at a chance level or only slightly better than chance. Before proceeding to consider why people do so poorly as lie-catchers, let us consider some limitations of our research which could have led us to underestimate the ability to detect lies from demeanor.For the most part, the observers who judged who was lying and who was telling the truth hadno vital interest at stake in achieving accuracy. They were not offered higher pay if they were moreaccurate. And catching liars was not intrinsically rewarding, for most of these people did not makea living catching liars. This limitation was addressed in our (Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991) studyand work by other research groups (Kraut and Poe, 1980; DePaulo and Pfeifer, 1986) which didstudy professionals concerned with catching liars. We found that customs officials, policemen, trialcourt judges, F.B.I., C.I.A., B.A.T.F., D.E.A., forensic psychiatrists, and trial lawyers were notmuch better than chance.

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