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Property Cases

Property Cases

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Published by: Riza Balid on Jun 21, 2012
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FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55729 March 28, 1983ANTONIO PUNSALAN, JR.,
petitioner,vs.
REMEDIOS VDA. DE LACSAMANA and THE HONORABLE JUDGE RODOLFO A.ORTIZ,
respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA,
J.:
The sole issue presented by petitioner for resolution is whether or not respondent Court erred indenying the Motion to Set Case for Pre-trial with respect to respondent Remedios Vda. de Lacsamanaas the case had been dismissed on the ground of improper venue upon motion of co-respondentPhilippine National Bank (PNB).It appears that petitioner, Antonio Punsalan, Jr., was the former registered owner of a parcel of landconsisting of 340 square meters situated in Bamban, Tarlac. In 1963, petitioner mortgaged said land torespondent PNB (Tarlac Branch) in the amount of P10,000.00, but for failure to pay said amount, the
 
property was foreclosed on December 16, 1970. Respondent PNB (Tarlac Branch) was the highestbidder in said foreclosure proceedings. However, the bank secured title thereto only on December 14,1977.In the meantime, in 1974, while the properly was still in the alleged possession of petitioner and withthe alleged acquiescence of respondent PNB (Tarlac Branch), and upon securing a permit from theMunicipal Mayor, petitioner constructed a warehouse on said property. Petitioner declared saidwarehouse for tax purposes for which he was issued Tax Declaration No. 5619. Petitioner then leasedthe warehouse to one Hermogenes Sibal for a period of 10 years starting January 1975.On July 26, 1978, a Deed of Sale was executed between respondent PNB (Tarlac Branch) andrespondent Lacsamana over the property. This contract was amended on July 31, 1978, particularly toinclude in the sale, the building and improvement thereon. By virtue of said instruments, respondent -Lacsamana secured title over the property in her name (TCT No. 173744) as well as separate taxdeclarations for the land and building.
1
On November 22, 1979, petitioner commenced suit for "Annulment of Deed of Sale with Damages"against herein respondents PNB and Lacsamana before respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal,
 
Branch XXXI, Quezon City, essentially impugning the validity of the sale of the building as embodied inthe Amended Deed of Sale. In this connection, petitioner alleged:xxx xxx xxx22. That defendant, Philippine National Bank, through its Branch Manager ... byvirtue of the request of defendant ... executed a document dated July 31, 1978,entitled Amendment to Deed of Absolute Sale ... wherein said defendant bank asVendor sold to defendant Lacsamana the building owned by the plaintiff under Tax Declaration No. 5619, notwithstanding the fact that said building is not ownedby the bank either by virtue of the public auction sale conducted by the Sheriff and sold to the Philippine National Bank or by virtue of the Deed of Sale executedby the bank itself in its favor on September 21, 1977 ...;23. That said defendant bank fraudulently mentioned ... that the sale in its favor should likewise have included the building, notwithstanding no legal basis for thesame and despite full knowledge that the Certificate of Sale executed by thesheriff in its favor ... only limited the sale to the land, hence, by selling the buildingwhich never became the property of defendant, they have violated the principleagainst 'pactum commisorium'.Petitioner prayed that the Deed of Sale of the building in favor of respondent Lacsamana be declarednull and void and that damages in the total sum of P230,000.00, more or less, be awarded to him.
2
In her Answer filed on March 4, 1980,-respondent Lacsamana averred the affirmative defense of lackof cause of action in that she was a purchaser for value and invoked the principle in Civil Law that the"accessory follows the principal".
3
On March 14, 1980, respondent PNB filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that venue wasimproperly laid considering that the building was real property under article 415 (1) of the New CivilCode and therefore section 2(a) of Rule 4 should apply.
4
Opposing said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner contended that the action for annulment of deed of salewith damages is in the nature of a personal action, which seeks to recover not the title nor possessionof the property but to compel payment of damages, which is not an action affecting title to realproperty.On April 25, 1980, respondent Court granted respondent PNB's Motion to Dismiss as follows: Acting upon the 'Motion to Dismiss' of the defendant Philippine National Bankdated March 13, 1980, considered against the plaintiff's opposition thereto dated April 1, 1980, including the reply therewith of said defendant, this Court resolvesto DISMISS the plaintiff's complaint for improper venue considering that theplaintiff's complaint which seeks for the declaration as null and void, theamendment to Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the defendant PhilippineNational Bank in favor of the defendant Remedios T. Vda. de Lacsamana, on July31, 1978, involves a warehouse allegedly owned and constructed by the plaintiff on the land of the defendant Philippine National Bank situated in the Municipalityof Bamban, Province of Tarlac, which warehouse is an immovable propertypursuant to Article 415, No. 1 of the New Civil Code; and, as such the action of the plaintiff is a real action affecting title to real property which, under Section 2,Rule 4 of the New Rules of Court, must be tried in the province where theproperty or any part thereof lies.
5
In his Motion for Reconsideration of the aforestated Order, petitioner reiterated the argument that theaction to annul does not involve ownership or title to property but is limited to the validity of the deed of sale and emphasized that the case should proceed with or without respondent PNB as respondentLacsamana had already filed her Answer to the Complaint and no issue on venue had been raised bythe latter.On September 1, 1980,.respondent Court denied reconsideration for lack of merit.Petitioner then filed a Motion to Set Case for Pre-trial, in so far as respondent Lacsamana wasconcerned, as the issues had already been joined with the filing of respondent Lacsamana's Answer.In the Order of November 10, 1980 respondent Court denied said Motion to Set Case for Pre-trial asthe case was already dismissed in the previous Orders of April 25, 1980 and September 1, 1980.Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, to which we gave due course.We affirm respondent Court's Order denying the setting for pre-trial.The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property as provided inarticle 415(l) of the Civil Code.
6
Buildings are always immovable under the Code.
7
A building treatedseparately from the land on which it stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a
 
contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wisechanged its character as immovable property.
8
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the propertyin question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with theissue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, therecovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for theannulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental andprime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
9
Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue(Section 2, Rule 4)
10
, which was timely raised (Section 1, Rule 16)
11
.Petitioner's other contention that the case should proceed in so far as respondent Lacsamana isconcerned as she had already filed an Answer, which did not allege improper venue and, therefore,issues had already been joined, is likewise untenable. Respondent PNB is an indispensable party asthe validity of the Amended Contract of Sale between the former and respondent Lacsamana is inissue. It would, indeed, be futile to proceed with the case against respondent Lacsamana alone.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied without prejudice to the refiling of the case by petitioner  Antonio Punsalan, Jr. in the proper forum.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50008 August 31, 1987PRUDENTIAL BANK,
petitioner,vs.
HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS, Presiding Judge of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City; FERNANDO MAGCALE & TEODULA BALUYUT-MAGCALE,
respondents. 
PARAS,
J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the November 13, 1978 Decision
*
of the then Court of FirstInstance of Zambales and Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 2443-0 entitled "Spouses Fernando A.Magcale and Teodula Baluyut-Magcale vs. Hon. Ramon Y. Pardo and Prudential Bank" declaring thatthe deeds of real estate mortgage executed by respondent spouses in favor of petitioner bank are nulland void.The undisputed facts of this case by stipulation of the parties are as follows:... on November 19, 1971, plaintiffs-spouses Fernando A. Magcale and TeodulaBaluyut Magcale secured a loan in the sum of P70,000.00 from the defendantPrudential Bank. To secure payment of this loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of defendant on the aforesaid date a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over thefollowing described properties:l. A 2-STOREY, SEMI-CONCRETE, residential building with warehouse spacescontaining a total floor area of 263 sq. meters, more or less, generally constructedof mixed hard wood and concrete materials, under a roofing of cor. g. i. sheets;declared and assessed in the name of FERNANDO MAGCALE under TaxDeclaration No. 21109, issued by the Assessor of Olongapo City with anassessed value of P35,290.00. This building is the only improvement of the lot.2. THE PROPERTY hereby conveyed by way of MORTGAGE includes the rightof occupancy on the lot where the above property is erected, and moreparticularly described and bounded, as follows: A first class residential land Identffied as Lot No. 720, (Ts-308,Olongapo Townsite Subdivision) Ardoin Street, East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City,containing an area of 465 sq. m. more or less, declared and assessed in thename of FERNANDO MAGCALE under Tax Duration No. 19595 issued by the Assessor of Olongapo City with an assessed value of P1,860.00; bounded on theNORTH: By No. 6, Ardoin StreetSOUTH: By No. 2, Ardoin StreetEAST: By 37Canda Street, andWEST: By ArdoinStreet. All corners of the lot marked by conc. cylindrical monuments of theBureau of Lands as visible limits. ( Exhibit "A, " also Exhibit "1" for defendant). Apart from the stipulations in the printed portion of the aforestated deed of mortgage, thereappears a rider typed at the bottom of the reverse side of the document under the lists of theproperties mortgaged which reads, as follows: AND IT IS FURTHER AGREED that in the event the Sales Patent onthe lot applied for by the Mortgagors as herein stated is released or issued by the Bureau of Lands, the Mortgagors hereby authorize theRegister of Deeds to hold the Registration of same until this Mortgageis cancelled, or to annotate this encumbrance on the Title uponauthority from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,which title with annotation, shall be released in favor of the hereinMortgage.From the aforequoted stipulation, it is obvious that themortgagee (defendant Prudential Bank) was at the outsetaware of the fact that the mortgagors (plaintiffs) have alreadyfiled a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot,possessory rights over which, were mortgaged to it.Exhibit "A" (Real Estate Mortgage) was registered under theProvisions of Act 3344 with the Registry of Deeds of Zambales on November 23, 1971.
 
On May 2, 1973, plaintiffs secured an additional loan fromdefendant Prudential Bank in the sum of P20,000.00. Tosecure payment of this additional loan, plaintiffs executed infavor of the said defendant another deed of Real EstateMortgage over the same properties previously mortgaged inExhibit "A." (Exhibit "B;" also Exhibit "2" for defendant). Thissecond deed of Real Estate Mortgage was likewiseregistered with the Registry of Deeds, this time in OlongapoCity, on May 2,1973.On April 24, 1973, the Secretary of Agriculture issued Miscellaneous Sales PatentNo. 4776 over the parcel of land, possessory rights over which were mortgaged todefendant Prudential Bank, in favor of plaintiffs. On the basis of the aforesaidPatent, and upon its transcription in the Registration Book of the Province of Zambales, Original Certificate of Title No. P-2554 was issued in the name of Plaintiff Fernando Magcale, by the Ex-Oficio Register of Deeds of Zambales, onMay 15, 1972.For failure of plaintiffs to pay their obligation to defendant Bank after it becamedue, and upon application of said defendant, the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage(Exhibits "A" and "B") were extrajudicially foreclosed. Consequent to theforeclosure was the sale of the properties therein mortgaged to defendant as thehighest bidder in a public auction sale conducted by the defendant City Sheriff on April 12, 1978 (Exhibit "E"). The auction sale aforesaid was held despite writtenrequest from plaintiffs through counsel dated March 29, 1978, for the defendantCity Sheriff to desist from going with the scheduled public auction sale (Exhibit"D")." (Decision, Civil Case No. 2443-0, Rollo, pp. 29-31).Respondent Court, in a Decision dated November 3, 1978 declared the deeds of Real EstateMortgage as null and void (
Ibid.
, p. 35).On December 14, 1978, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (
Ibid.
, pp. 41-53), opposed byprivate respondents on January 5, 1979 (
Ibid.
, pp. 54-62), and in an Order dated January 10, 1979(
Ibid.
, p. 63), the Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition(
Ibid.
, pp. 5-28).The first Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated March 9, 1979, resolved to require therespondents to comment (
Ibid.
, p. 65), which order was complied with the Resolution dated May18,1979, (
Ibid.
, p. 100), petitioner filed its Reply on June 2,1979 (
Ibid.
, pp. 101-112).Thereafter, in the Resolution dated June 13, 1979, the petition was given due course and the partieswere required to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. (
Ibid.
, p. 114).On July 18, 1979, petitioner filed its Memorandum (
Ibid.
, pp. 116-144), while private respondents filedtheir Memorandum on August 1, 1979 (
Ibid.
, pp. 146-155).In a Resolution dated August 10, 1979, this case was considered submitted for decision (
Ibid.
, P. 158).In its Memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues:1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEEDS OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE ARE VALID; AND2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPERVENING ISSUANCE IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTSOF MISCELLANEOUS SALES PATENT NO. 4776 ON APRIL 24, 1972 UNDER ACT NO. 730 ANDTHE COVERING ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-2554 ON MAY 15,1972 HAVE THEEFFECT OF INVALIDATING THE DEEDS OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE. (Memorandum for Petitioner, Rollo, p. 122).This petition is impressed with merit.The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on thebuilding erected on the land belonging to another.The answer is in the affirmative.In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, this Court ruledthat, "it is obvious that the inclusion of "building" separate and distinct from the land, in said provisionof law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property." (Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr., et al., L-10817-18, Feb. 28, 1958; Associated Inc. and Surety Co., Inc. vs. Iya, et al., L-10837-38, May30,1958).Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of theimprovements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land onwhich it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for the building wouldstill be considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land (LeungYee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644). In the same manner, this Court has also established thatpossessory rights over said properties before title is vested on the grantee, may be validly transferredor conveyed as in a deed of mortgage (Vda. de Bautista vs. Marcos, 3 SCRA 438 [1961]).Coming back to the case at bar, the records show, as aforestated that the original mortgage deed onthe 2-storey semi-concrete residential building with warehouse and on the right of occupancy on the lotwhere the building was erected, was executed on November 19, 1971 and registered under theprovisions of Act 3344 with the Register of Deeds of Zambales on November 23, 1971. MiscellaneousSales Patent No. 4776 on the land was issued on April 24, 1972, on the basis of which OCT No. 2554was issued in the name of private respondent Fernando Magcale on May 15, 1972. It is thereforewithout question that the original mortgage was executed before the issuance of the final patent andbefore the government was divested of its title to the land, an event which takes effect only on theissuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds(Visayan Realty Inc. vs. Meer, 96 Phil. 515; Director of Lands vs. De Leon, 110 Phil. 28; Director of Lands vs. Jurado, L-14702, May 23, 1961; Pena "Law on Natural Resources", p. 49). Under theforegoing considerations, it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his ownbuilding which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intents and purposes a
 
valid mortgage. As to restrictions expressly mentioned on the face of respondents' OCT No. P-2554, it will be notedthat Sections 121, 122 and 124 of the Public Land Act, refer to land already acquired under the PublicLand Act, or any improvement thereon and therefore have no application to the assailed mortgage inthe case at bar which was executed before such eventuality. Likewise, Section 2 of Republic Act No.730, also a restriction appearing on the face of private respondent's title has likewise no application inthe instant case, despite its reference to encumbrance or alienation before the patent is issuedbecause it refers specifically to encumbrance or alienation on the land itself and does not mentionanything regarding the improvements existing thereon.But it is a different matter, as regards the second mortgage executed over the same properties on May2, 1973 for an additional loan of P20,000.00 which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City on the same date. Relative thereto, it is evident that such mortgage executed after theissuance of the sales patent and of the Original Certificate of Title, falls squarely under the prohibitionsstated in Sections 121, 122 and 124 of the Public Land Act and Section 2 of Republic Act 730, and istherefore null and void.

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