REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY
2. REPORT DATE
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Risky Invasions: Decisions Made by the Argentine Junta Regarding DisputedIslands, 1978–1982
5. FUNDING NUMBERS6. AUTHOR(S)
Daniel G. Upp.
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, CA 93943-5000
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
10. SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policyor position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number _______N/A_________.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
In 1978, Argentina and Chile were poised at the brink of war over disputed possession of the Beagle Channel islandslocated near the southern tip of South America. Despite provocative military maneuvering and inflammatory rhetoricfrom both sides, Argentina’s ruling military junta pulled back just short of attacking the territory occupied by Chile,and eventually both sides reached a peaceful settlement.Only four years later, Argentina launched a surprise invasion of the British-held Falkland Islands in the SouthAtlantic. Why did Argentina choose to go to war with Britain in 1982 but not with Chile in 1978? What factors led toa grab for the Falklands instead of the Beagle Channel islands?Prospect theory, borrowed from cognitive psychology, may hold the answer. This theory proposes that decision-makers tend to be more risk-averse when they are facing a potential gain and more willing to take risks when they areconfronting a potential loss. Therefore, the junta refrained from invading the Beagle Channel islands because theywere more secure in their political position and therefore facing a potential gain, but chose to invade the Falklandsbecause they were insecure in their position and facing the loss of political power.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Argentina, Chile, Territorial Disputes, Beagle Channel, Falkland Islands,Malvinas, Junta, Governmental Decision Making, Prospect Theory
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19. SECURITYCLASSIFICATION OFABSTRACT
20. LIMITATION OFABSTRACT
tandard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18