Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
1Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
55001617 Legal Memorandum Sample

55001617 Legal Memorandum Sample

Ratings: (0)|Views: 52|Likes:
Published by reliszh

More info:

Published by: reliszh on Jun 22, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

06/22/2012

pdf

text

original

 
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila City
 JUANA DELA CRUZ,
Defendant-Petitioner,-versus-
CIVIL CASE NO. L-12345
For: Ejectment
 JANE DOE,
Plaintiff-Respondent.x-------------------------------------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUMCOME NOW PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
through the undersigned counsel,unto this Honorable Supreme Court most respectfully submit and present thisMemorandum in the above-titled case and aver that:
THE PARTIES
1.
Plaintiff-Respondent Jane Doe is of legal age, single, and residing on 1010Ginoo Boulevard, Pasay City, where she may be served with legal processes andnotices issued by this Honorable Court;
2.
Defendant-Petitioner Juana Dela Cruz is of legal age and residing on 123Binibini Street, Quezon City, and may be served with legal processes and other judicial notices thereto.
I.PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.
On February 11, 2008, herein Plaintiff-Respondent filed a Complaint forEjectment dated February 7, 2008 against Defendant-Petitioner;
2.
On December 22, 2008, an Answer dated December 15, 2008 was filed bythe Defendant-Petitioner;
3.
On February 3, 2009, a Decision was rendered by Branch 1 of Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City in favor of the Plaintiff-Respondent;
4.
On August 6, 2009, a Motion for Reconsideration filed July 5, 2009 byDefendant-Petitioner through legal counsel was denied by Judge Lorenzo Menzon of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court Pasay City;
5.
On September 14, 2009, a Petition for Review dated September 9, 2009was filed to the Court of Appeals by Defendant-Petitioner;
6.
On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff-Respondent through legal counsel filed aComment dated April 19, 2010;
7.
On May 13, 2010, as per Verification and Report from the Judicial RecordsDivision (JRD) no Reply was filed by the Defendant-Petitioner;
8.
On May 21, 2010, a Resolution was rendered by the Court of Appealsdenying Defendant-Petitioner’s Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO);
9.
Accordingly, the Honorable Court of Appeals ordered the parties to submittheir respective Memoranda fifteen (15) days from notice, otherwise regardlesswhether or not Memoranda were filed, the petition shall be submitted for decision;Hence, the filing of the instant Memorandum.
II.FACTUAL BACKGROUND
10.
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks that a parcel of land located at 123 BinibiniStreet, Pasay be returned to her possession, but due to Defendant-Petitioner’soccupancy thereat, the former cannot claim possession which left her with theoption of residing at 1010 Ginoo Boulevard, Pasay City. It is noteworthy to stressthat Plaintiff-Respondent is the registered owner of the land subject under TCT No.12345 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. The property was sold to them by thenow deceased original owners, Spouses Marcelo and Marcela del Pilar;
11.
Defendant-Petitioner, on the other hand, is an alleged lessee of the originalowners of the land since September 1955. They had repeatedly assailed the verbalcontract of lease for more than 50 years;
12.
Plaintiff-Respondent was not able to claim immediately the land for it waspreviously subject to a pending legal proceeding and that there was still no urgentnecessity of using and occupying it. When the event came that Plaintiff-Respondentwas able to enforce her right over the land, Defendant-Petitioner, despite earnestand peaceful efforts of the Plaintiff-Respondent still refused to vacate the land. Thisled her to seek help from the Barangay officials for mediation and/or conciliation inaccordance with law. However, the Defendant-Petitioner still persistently occupiedthe land without heed to the serious and constant demand of the Plaintiff-Respondent which rendered it unattainable to reach an agreement;
 
13.
Due to the foregoing failure to claim the parcel of land attributed to theobstinate refusal of the Defendant-Petitioner, Plaintiff-Respondent was compelled tohire the services of a legal counsel to commence the enforcement of ejection underthe wings of the courts of law.
III.ISSUES OF THE CASEA.) WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ACTEDCORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION ON THEBASIS OF THE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT HADRAISED IN DEFENSE THE LESSEE’S RIGHTS UNDER P.D. 1517, P.D.2016, APD 1-12 – PASAY CITY;B.)WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THEBONA FIDE LESSEE’S RIGHT TO AVAIL THE PRIVILEGES ANDBENEFITS PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF P.D. 1517;C.)WHETHER OR NOT IN DETERMINING THE COVERAGE OF AREASFOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT (APD), REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TOTHE LIST OF THE STREETS SUBJECT TO THE ZONAL DEVELOPMENTAND NOT TO THE AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METESAND BOUNDS AS INDICATED IN THE PROCLAMATION ITSELF.IV.ARGUMENTS
A.)
The court committed no error in deciding that an unlawful detaineraction be enforced upon herein Defendant-Petitioner despite theassailed contention of the former under P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016.B.)There is no bar in this instant case for an unlawful detainer to availthe benefits and privileges provided by Section 6 P.D. 1517provided it is applicable.
C.)
The determination of the scope and limitation of Areas for PriorityDevelopment shall be based on the list of specific areas prescribedby the proclamation.V.DISCUSSION
A.)
It is necessary to emphasize that the Plaintiff-Respondent is the bona fideowner of the parcel of land located at 123 Binibini Street, Pasay City under TCT No,12345 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City. In the Philippines, the presentation of avalid certificate of title of the real property is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the person whose name the certificate of title is entitled to.Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, it provides that“the original certificates in the registration book, any copy thereof duly certifiedunder the signature of the clerk, or of the register of deeds of the province or citywhere the land is situated, and the seal of the court, and also the owner’s duplicatecertificate, shall be received as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands andshall be conclusive as
to all matters
contained therein except so far as otherwiseprovided in this Act.”Recognized jurisprudence also uphold the significance of a certificate of title inproving valid ownership of a land. In the decision of the case of 
Spouses Pascual v.Spouses Coronel
, the ponente cited two cases which highlight the significance of avalid certificate of title in claiming ownership over a land. It was held that “…in therecent case of 
Umpoc v. Mercado
, the Court declared that the trial court did not errin giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent
vis--vis
thecontested unregistered Deed of Sale. Later in
 Arambulo v. Gungab
, the Court heldthat the registered owner is preferred to possess the property subject of theunlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Titleover a land is entitled to possession thereof.” The ruling of Dizon v. Court of Appeals was also used as basis for this argument.It was stated that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership and thequestionability of the title is immaterial in an ejectment suit. Futhermore, Article 428of the New Civil Code enumerates the rights of an owner. “The owner has the rightto enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations other than thoseestablished by law.
The owner has right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
It is indubitable that the certificate of title of 123 Binibini Street, Pasay Cityunder TCT No. 12345 which is registered in the Register of Deeds of Pasay Cityentitles Petitioner-Respondent the right to exercise the aforementioned rights,specifically, in this instant case, the right of action against the holder and possessorof the thing in order to recover the land. The contention of the Defendant-Petitioner that the verbal lease agreementthey had made with the now deceased original owners Marcelo and Marcela Del Pilarfor over 50 years shall entitle them to the privileges under P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016(Annex “A” and “B”, respectively) is untenable. It is expressly stated that Section 6of P.D. 1517 grants lessees the right of first refusal before they may be ejected froma land, but this is only feasible under certain conditions. It is an indispensablequalification that the land is included in the list of Areas for Priority Development(APD) before an owner can be granted of the right of first refusal. The land subject of this case is clearly not included in the specific areas enumerated in the list of APD. To reiterate the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. No. CV 12345: “Insofar as theproperty in litigation, appellant Jane Doe is, consequently, correct in objecting toappellee’s exercise of the right of first refusal granted under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517. The fact that it is not included in the areas for prioritydevelopment specifically identified under Proclamation No. 1967 indicates thatappellee have no cause of action for annulment of sale, reconveyance, andpreliminary injunction against appellants.”
B.)
 The Plaintiff-Respondent’s argument in this issue is intimately connectedwith the preceding argument. Defendant-Petitioner vigorously assails that there isno bar to the availability of the privileges and benefits conferred to bona fide lesseewhenever there is an unlawful detainer action. It is however true. But this is subjectto circumstances that may qualify a lessee to the privileges and benefits underSection 6 of P.D. No. 1516 such as the right of first refusal. Unfortunately, the landpossessed by the Defendant-Petitioner does not fall under the ambit of Section 6 of 
 
P.D. No. 1517. Therefore, the Defendant-Petitioner has no cause of action in thisissue.
C.)
 The third issue questions the coverage of the APD prescribed by theproclamation, whether or not it refers to the list of streets subject to the ZonalDevelopment or to the areas included in the delineation of the metes and boundsindicated.Reiteration is therefore necessary to lay emphasis on the decision of the Courtof Appeals that in the List of Areas for Priority Development (APD’s), labeled as theSouth Sector of Pasay City, the area for priority development was defined as TramoLines along Barangays San Isidro, San Roque, and Santa Clara. It was thereafterspecifically enumerated the list of covered sub-areas (please refer to Annex “C” fordiagram) which are the following: 1) F. Victor, 2) Ventanilla Street, c) Juan LunaStreet, d) D. Jorge Street, e) Viscarra Street, f) Conchita Street, g) Dolores Street, h)Leonardo Street, i) Alvarez Street, j) Basilio Street, k) Rodriguez Street, and i) VillaBarbara.
 
“There is consequently no gainsaying the fact that with its Binibini Streetlocation, the property in litigation is not included among the sites identified as Areasfor Priority Development in Pasay City.”The mere fact that the list does not includeBinibini Street necessarily implies that it is deemed excluded from it.Citing Solanada Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, it made a profound analysis of Section 6 of P.D. 1517 (as found in Annex “A” of this Memorandum) based onstatutory construction:“We agree. A close reading of Proclamation No. 1967 reveals that, beforea preemptive right can be exercised, the disputed land should besituated in an area declared to be both an APD and a ULRZ.An urban tenant's right of first refusal is set forth in Section 6, PD 1517,as follows:Sec. 6.
Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas
. Withinthe Urban Zones[,] legitimate tenants who have residedon the land for ten years or more [,] who have built theirhomes on the land[,] and residents who have legallyoccupied the lands by contract, continuously for the lastten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shallbe allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the samewithin a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, underterms and conditions to be determined by the UrbanZone Expropriation and Land Management Committeecreated by Section 8 of this Decree.Proclamation No. 1967 further delimited the areas or zones wherein thispreemptive right could be availed of 
viz 
.:WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 1893 was issued on 11 September1979, pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1517, declaring the entireMetropolitan Manila area as Urban Land Reform Zone.WHEREAS, It is now necessary and appropriate to identify specificsites covered by urban land reform in Metropolitan Manila forpurposes of making specific the applicability of P.D. Nos. 1517,1640 and 1642 and of LOI No. 935.NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of thePhilippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by theConstitution and existing laws, and in relation to Proclamation No.1893 declaring the entire Metropolitan Manila area as an UrbanLand Reform Zone, and LOI 935, hereby amend Proclamation No.1893 by declaring 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas forPriority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones as describedin the attached annex.“The provisions of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and 1642 and of LOI No.935 shall apply only to the above[-]mentioned Areas of PriorityDevelopment and Urban Land Reform Zones.xxx xxx xxx” The aforecited
whereas
clauses express a clear intent to limit theoperation of PD 1517 to specific areas declared to be located in both anAPD and a ULRZ. The conjunctive
and
in the last sentence of the quotedprovision confirms this intention.
 And
in statutory construction impliesconjunction, joinder or union.
 
As understood from the common and usualmeaning of the conjunction
and,
the provisions of PD 1517 apply only toareas declared to be located within both an APD and a ULRZ.”With the foregoing recognized jurisprudence said, the Defendant-Petitioner’s actionwould necessarily lead to futility for no cause of action.
PRAYERWHEREFORE,
premise considered, it respectfully prayed for that thisHonorable Supreme Court that Defendant-Petitioner’s prayer for writ of injunction be
DENIED
for having no cause of action and the petition
DISMISSED
for being clearlyunmeritorious.Other just and equitable relief under the foregoing are likewise beingprayed for.Respectfully submitted.Makati City for Manila City, Philippines. April 8, 2011.
AZURIN BUHAIN BONTUYAN AND ARICAYOS LAWOFFICES
Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->