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Statcon2

Statcon2

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For Monday (STATCON)
Chapter 11 oftextbook1. National Housing Authority v. Reyes,123 SCRA 245 (1983)
2. Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137SCRA 717 (1985)
3. Eugenio v. Drilon, 252 SCRA 106(1996)
4. Gan v Reyes, G.R. No. 145527. May 28,20025.
Casela v CA, G.R. No. L-26754.October 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279
6. Rufino Lopez v. CTA, G.R. No. L-9274.February 1, 1957 100 PHIL 8507.
Cosico v NLRC, GR 118432, May23, 1997 272 SCRA 583
Alonzo v.CA, GR 72873, May 28, 1987 150 SCRA259
8. Pp v. Almuete, G.R. No. L-26551.February 27, 1976 69 SCRA 410
9. Rufino Lopez v. CTA, G.R. No. L-9274.February 1, 1957
Chartered Bank ofIndia v. Imperial, G.R. No. 17222.March 15, 1921
See10. Paras v. Comelec cited on page 241 ofAgpalo
11. Salvacion v. Rural Bank, G.R. No.94723. August 21, 1997 278 SCRA 27
 I suggest that the class google the IRACFormula. This stands for Issue, Rule,Application/Analysis, Conclusion. This willhelp in digesting and reciting on cases.-Atty. Tanada
June 29, 1983G.R. No. L-49439
NATIONAL HOUSINGAUTHORITY
, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLEPASTOR P. REYES, in his capacity asPresiding Judge (on detail), Court of AgrarianRelations, Seventh Regional District, BranchII, Cavite City, QUIRINO AUSTRIA andLUCIANO AUSTRIA
, respondents.
,
J.
:
 The undisputed fact that in this
certiorari 
 proceeding against respondent Judge for failureto comply with the provision of the PresidentialDecrees as to the amount to be paid by petitionerto entitle it to a writ of possession in anexpropriation proceeding, no question was raisedas to their validity, calls for the grant of theremedy sought.The controversy started with the filing of acomplaint with the then Court of AgrarianRelations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II,Cavite City, against private respondents, for theexpropriation, pursuant to Presidential DecreeNo. 757, of a parcel of land, with an area of25,000 square meters, owned and registered inthe name of respondent Quirino Austria, andneeded for the expansion of the DasmariñasResettlement Project. 1 Then came frompetitioner about a year later a motion for theissuance of a writ of possession. 2 Petitioner wasable to secure an order placing it in possession. 3Thereafter, private respondent Quirino Austriafiled a Motion to Withdraw Deposit in the amountof P6,600.00, a sum which was equivalent to thevalue of the property assessed for taxationpurposes and which was deposited by petitionerpursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42 . 4 Therewas an Opposition to the Motion to WithdrawDeposit by petitioner, citing Section 92 of
Presidential Decree No. 464 which states: ―Basis
for payment of just compensation in expropriationproceedings. In determining such compensationwhen private property is acquired by thegovernment for public use, the same shall notexceed the market value declared by the owneror administrator or anyone having legal interest inthe property, or such market value as determined
by the assessor, whichever is lower.‖ 5Petitioner‘s submission is that the owner‘s
declaration at P1,400.00 which is lower than the
assessor‘s assessment, is the just compensationfor the respondents‘ property, respondents thus
being precluded from withdrawing any amountmore than P1,400.00. 6 Respondent Judge,however, issued an order dated July 13, 1978which, according to petitioner, is clearly contraryto the letter and spirit of the aforecited laws. 7There was a Motion for Reconsideration datedJuly 21, 1978. 8 Its basis is the provision in
Presidential Decree No. 1224: ―In the
determination of just compensation for suchprivate lands and improvement to beexpropriated, the government shall choosebetween the value of the real property andimprovements thereon as declared by the owneror administrator thereof or the market valuedetermined by the City or provincial assessor,whichever is lower, at the time of the filing of the
expropriation complaint. ‖ 9 It was then submitted
that under the aforequoted statutory provision, the
owner‘s declared market value at P1,400.00
which is lower than that fixed by the assessor isthe just compensation of respondent Quirino
 Austria‘s property sought to be expropriated. The
 
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack ofmerit. Hence, this petition.On January 4, 1979, the Court issued thefollowing reso
lution: ―Considering the allegations
contained, the issues raised and the argumentsadduced in the petition for
certiorari 
and
mandamus 
with preliminary injunction with prayerfor a restraining order, the Court Resolved withoutgiving due course to the petition to require therespondents to comment, not to file a motion todismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. TheCourt further Resolved to issue a temporaryrestraining order, effective as of this date andcontinuing until otherwise ordered by the Court
.‖
10 The comment was thereafter submitted byprivate respondents Quirino Austria and LucianoAustria.Private respondents stress that while there maybe basis for the allegation that respondent Judgedid not follow Presidential Decree No. 76 asamended by Presidential Decree No. 464, asfurther amended by Presidential Decree Nos.794, 1224 and 1259, the matter is still subject tohis final disposition, he having been vested withthe original and competent authority to exercisehis judicial discretion in the light of theconstitutional provisions. 11 There was acomment likewise submitted by counsel on behalfof respondent Judge but again, there was noquestion raised as to the validity of theaforementioned Decrees. Such comments wereconsidered as answers. The case was originallysubmitted to the Second Division, and in aresolution of February 21, 1979, it referred thiscase to the Court
en banc 
.Under the state of the pleadings as submitted tothis Court, it is evident why, as noted at theoutset,
certiorari 
lies.1. One of the basic postulates in constitutionallaw is the presumption of validity of legislative orexecutive acts. In Angara v. ElectoralCommission 12 the leading case on the subjectuntil now, Justice Laurel, in speaking of judicialreview, made clear that it is not for the judiciary to
―pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.‖ 13 His landmarkopinion continues: ―More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislativeenactments, not only because the legislature ispresumed to abide by the Constitution but alsobecause the judiciary in the determination ofactual cases and controversies must reflect thewisdom and justice of the people as expressedthrough their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government. ‖ 14
As pointed out in Ermita-Malate Hotel & MotelOperators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila: 15 ―Primarily what calls for a reversal of 
such a decision is the absence of any evidence tooffset the presumption of validity that attaches toa challenged statute or ordinance. As was
expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: ―Thepresumption is all in favor of validity …‖ 16 As of 
this stage in this particular case, there is a failureto challenge the validity of such legislation. Bothpublic and private respondents in their commentsconsidered as answers raised no suchconstitutional question. Even for it, therefore, asof this stage of litigation, and under the concededfacts, there should be a recognition that the lawas it stands must be applied. The Decree havingspoken so clearly and unequivocally calls forobedience. It is repeating a common place tostate that on a matter where the applicable lawspeaks in no uncertain language, the Court hasno choice except to yield to its command.2. Nor is there any choice for petitioner NationalHousing Authority for precisely it was created for
the laudable purpose of ―urban land reform.‖ 17
The first whereas clause speaks of the
―magnitude of the housing problem of the country‖which ―has grown into such proportions that only
a purposeful, determined, organized masshousing development program can meet the
needs of Filipino families‖ for decent housing. 18
Moreover, the Presidential Decree is mandatedby the Constitution which requires the State to
―establish, maintain, and ensure adequate socialservices in the field of … housing …‖ as well as―to guarantee the enjoyment of the people of adecent standard of living.‖ 19 The very first
section of the Decree speaks of the following:
―Pursuant to the mandate of the New
Constitution, there shall be developed acomprehensive and integrated housing programwhich shall embrace, among others, housingdevelopment and resettlement, sources andschemes of financing, and delineation ofgovernment and private sector participation. Theprogram shall specify the priorities and targets inaccordance with the integrated national humansettlements plan prepared by the Human
Settlements Commission. ‖ 20 In view of the
urgency of the housing problem the variousdecrees mentioned earlier were issued for thepurpose of assuring that the government wouldbe in a financial position to cope with such basichuman need which in the Philippines, under thewelfare state concept, and according to theexpress language of the Constitution, is anobligation cast upon the State. The memorandum
 
for petitioner submitted by Government CorporateCounsel, now likewise the Presidential LegalAssistant, Justice Manuel M. Lazaro, pursues thematter further in prose impressed with force and
clarity: ―The issue in this petition for 
certiorari 
and
mandamus 
involves the application of a ruleintroduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated insubsequent decrees that not only promotes social justice but also ends the baneful and one-sidedpractice abetted by the collusive acquiescence ofgovernment officials and employees, of underdeclaring properties for the purpose of taxationbut ballooning the price thereof when the sameproperties are to be acquired by the governmentfor public purposes. Put to the test, therefore, isthe power of the government to introducerationality in the laws and to discourage adeceitful practice that is not only ruinous to thegovernment coffers but also undermines itsefforts at awakening a democraticresponsiveness of the citizenry toward goodgovernment and its economic and socialprograms. The courts should recognize that therule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated insubsequent decrees does not upset theestablished concepts of justice or theconstitutional provision on just compensation for,precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own
valuation of his property.‖ 21
 WHEREFORE, the writ of
certiorari 
is grantedand the order of respondent Judge of July 13,1978 is hereby nullified and set aside. Therestraining order issued by this Court on January4, 1979 is hereby made permanent. The case isremanded to the lower court for further actionconformably to law and to the above opinion. Nocosts.July 22, 1985G.R. No. L-69500
JOSE ANTONIO U.GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINOBROCKA, JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q.SAGUISAG
, petitioners,
vs.
CHAIRMANMARIA KALAW KATIGBAK, GENERALWILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.), and THEBOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURESAND TELEVISION (BRMPT)
, respondents.
Irene R. Cortes, Perfecto V. Fernandez, Haydee Yorac and Joker P. Arroyo for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
 
Fernando,
J.
:
 In this case of first impression, a
certiorari 
 proceeding filed on January 10, 1985, there is apersuasive ring to the invocation of theconstitutional right to freedom of expression 1 ofan artist-and for that matter a man of letters too-as the basis for a ruling on the scope of the powerof respondent Board of Review for MotionPictures and Television and how it should beexercised. The dispute between the parties hasbeen narrowed down. The motion picture in
question, Kapit sa Patalim was classified ―For  Adults Only.‖ There is the further issue then, also
one of first impression, as to the proper test ofwhat constitutes obscenity in view of theobjections raised. Thus the relevance of this
constitutional command: ―Arts and letters shall be
under the patronage of the State. 2The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U.Gonzalez, 3 President of the Malaya Films, amovie production outfit duly registered as a singleproprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic Trade.The respondent is the Board of Review for MotionPictures and Television, with Maria KalawKatigbak as its Chairman and Brig. Gen. WilfredoC. Estrada as its Vice-Chairman, also namedrespondents.In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondentBoard of October 23, 1984, a permit to exhibit the
film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification ―For  Adults Only,‖ with certain changes and deletion
senumerated was granted. A motion forreconsideration was filed by petitioners stating
that the classification of the film ―For Adults Only‖
was without basis. 4 Then on November 12,1984, respondent Board released its decision:
―Acting on the applicant‘s
Motion forReconsideration dated 29 October 1984, theBoard, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee and an examination of the film,Resolves to affirm
in toto 
the ruling of the sub-committee. Considering, however, certain vitaldeficiencies in the application, the Board furtherResolves to direct the Chairman of the Board toWithheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit untilthese deficiencies are supplied. 5 Hence thispetition.This Court, in a resolution of January 12, 1985,required respondent to answer. In such pleadingsubmitted on January 21, 1985, as one of itsspecial and affirmative defenses, it was alleged
that the petition is moot as ―respondent Board has
revoked its questioned resolution, replacing it withone immediately granting petitioner company apermit to exhibit the film Kapit without anydeletion or cut [thus an] adjudication of thequestions presented above would be academic
on the case.‖ 6 Further: ―The modified resolution
of the Board, of course, classifies Kapit as for-adults-only, but the petition does not raise anyissue as to the validity of this classification. Allthat petitioners assail as arbitrary on the part of

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