Re-Imagining New Paths To Peace

AUTONOMY & PEACE REVIEW
A Quarterly Publication of the Institute for Autonomy and Governance

October- December 2011 ISSN 2243-8165-04
RE-IMAGINING NEW PATHS TO PEACE
ABOUT
THE
I NSTITUTE
FOR
AUTONOMY
AND
GOVERNANCE
The Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) is an independent and nonpartisan think tank founded in 2001 to generate ideas on making autonomy an effective vehicle for peace and development in the Southern Philippines. IAG views autonomy as a broad and evolving concept that encompasses any political structure that is less than an countrys independent state. It provides the countrys minority Muslim and Indigenous Peoples platforms to evolve self governance structures whether federal, autonomous or associative. IAG continues to conduct research, fora, roundtable autonomy, discussions, and conferences on the issues of autonomy, good governance and political settlements between the GRP and the Rebel Fronts (MNLF and MILF). It has published policy papers and journals on political, economic, and security issues that define the much needed measures to be undertaken for meaningful selfgovernance in the region. IAG also provides support to the ARMM Executive and the Iranon Development Council (Buldon, Barira, Matanog, Parang and Datu Blah Sinsuat), specifically in capacity-building with focus on the processes of policy formulation and legislation. IAG is an institutional partner of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in the Philippines. Center, University, IAG is located at the Alumni Center, Notre Dame University, City, Telefax Cotabato City, Philippines, Telefax (64)421-2071.Email: Website: www.iag.org.ph info@iag.org.ph and Website: www.iag.org.ph and www.iag2001.wordpress.com www.iag2001.wordpress.com
AUTONOMY
AND
P EACE R EVIEW
I NSTITUTE
FOR
A UTONOMY
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G OVERNANCE
KONRAD ADENAUER - STIFTUNG
C ONTENTS
E DITORIAL REVISITING THE DYNAMICS OF C ONFLICT AND E XCLUSION Francisco J. Lara and Phil Champain I MAGINING A C ONSTITUTIONAL A MENDMENT STA FOR A M ORO SUB-STATE Soliman M. Santos Jr. RANDOM T HOUGHTS ON R E - IMAGINING THE NATION:C ONSENSUS AND C ONFLICTS ON S OVEREIGNTY AND A UTONOMY Fr. Eliseo Jun Mercado, OMI ANNEX 1.R EPUBLIC A CT NO . 10153
An Act Providing for the synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for other Purposes
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2.S UPREME C OURT DECISION ON THE 2.S CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT 10153
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Editorial Board
Eliseo R. Mercado Jr., OMI Editor-in-Chief Institute for Autonomy and Governance Dr. Peter Koeppinger Country Representative Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Prof. Rommel Banlaoi Executive Director Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research Prof. Sheila Algabre Vice President for Mission and Identity Notre Dame University Amina Rasul Convenor Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy Alber Husin Professor Ateneo de Zamboanga University Ramie Toledo Communications Specialist Institute for Autonomy and Governance Omar Vicente D. Tadeja Layout Artist Institute for Autonomy and Governance
EDITORIAL EDITORIAL
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EDITORIAL
E LISEO J UN M ERCADO ,OMI
he present issue deals with varied ways of approaching the problematic in the Southern Philippines. The three papers attempt to unravel albeit from different perspectives the persistence of conflict and exclusion. The first article by Francisco Lara and Phil Champain of the International Alert is an attempt to revisit the dynamics of conflict and exclusion. It argues that at the core of the problem is the exclusionary political economy that is developed and sustained through a complex system of contest and violence. It presents two types of conflict. The first is the rebellion-related violence relating to the vertical armed challenges against the infrastructure of the state. The second is the inter- or intra-clan and group violence relating to horizontal armed challenges between and among families, clans, and tribes. These two types of conflict interact in ways that are poorly understood and which sustain conditions serving the interests of those with access to economic and political power and exclude the
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majority of those in Mindanao opportunities to improve their live s.
from
The second article is an attempt to respond to the MILF continuing demand for a substate as expression of the Bangsamoro selfdetermination. Judge Soliman Santos does it by way of imagining a constitutional amendment specifically addressing this erstwhile dream and aspiration of the Bangsamoro.The imagined constitutional amendment is an Article X-A to be inserted right after the existing Article X, Sections 1521 on Autonomous Regions. The reader may find the proposed Article X-A on the verbose side. The imagined constitutional amendment attempts to provide for a constitutional space, still within the republic and Philippine territory, for Bangsamoro minority to live out their distinct identity and way of life as well as their centuries-old longing for self-rule. The third article is simply random thoughts on re-imagining the 19 th century concept of nation-state. They are random thoughts simply because there is scarcity of debates and consensus on the subject and issue of nation states, sovereignty, territory and
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autonomy or self determination. Yet, they are the very core of the heated and fiery debates during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic liberation front in 2008. The understanding of nation state as a young construct is never put on the table. Yet particularly in this part of the globe, such construct is, indeed, very divisive. The Bangsa Filipino or Bangsa Indonesia or Bangsa Malayo or Bangsa Moro, Bangsa Aceh, Bangsa Pattani etc. are all relatively young constructs. The v e r y c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s o f t e r r i t o r y, sovereignty and other elements of the so-called nation states are products of colonial heritage that continues to exercise tyranny over our spirits even after the years of de-colonization. My article speaks of re-imagining nation states, and I am actually raising the fundamental issue whether the 19 th century construct of nation state is still valid today.
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REVISITING THE DYNAMICS CONFLICT AND EXCLUSION
OF
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Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion* Francisco J. Lara Jr. and Phil Champain 1 Introduction
usheera lugs most of her personal belongings wherever she goes. She is used to evacuating her children and her valuables at a moments notice, and like other Muslim women caught in the long conflict in Mindanao, she has witnessed the mindless violence and depredation caused by a conflict where there are no bystanders, only perpetrators and victims. She went through the same ordeal when she evacuated her family from Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte to Iligan City following a deadly attack on civilians by Muslim rebels in August 2008. Four years of working for peace has not diminished her fear of reprisals. Musheera provides psycho-social counseling to Muslims and Christians who have experienced the trauma of conflict. Sometimes the Christian victims could not bring themselves to trust a Muslim woman to help them recover from the trauma of violence.
* The full title of the article is Inclusive Peace in Muslim Mindanao:Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion by Francisco J.Lara Jr. and Phil Champain produced by International Alert, 346 Clapham Road, London, United Kingdom. Reprinted with permission.
We had been talking about peace in this municipality for more than ten years, engaging in countless rituals to promote solidarity and peace, but it only took a single day of cruelty and violence to bring back all the fear, anger, and suspicion that we thought we had left behind.
Makin used to join in rido (violent interand intra-clan feuds), believing that revenge was the only way his family could restore its honour and protect its interests when threatened by other clans or tribes. In his village, the rido are often due to land issues, but they can easily erupt out of jealousy, humiliation, and disrespect for the family. Its dangerous because you can get killed even if the problem involves a distant relative, so everyone in the clan is cautious and always prepared to fight. Makin confesses that his family was involved in a rido that led to several deaths. The violence prevented children from going to school and men from working in the fields. He nearly left school, but his father helped to settle the feud, enabling him to finish his studies. Thanks be to Allah if I had not finished school I would have no future. That would have led me to the path of the rebels, since my father was a rebel commander himself. Worse, it could have steered me to the
Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion
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criminal gangs here, Makin says. The stories of Musheera and Makin underscore the recurring violence that accompanies successful political settlements in the Philippines and other countries in Southeast Asia. Musheera and Makin reside in communities where violence was expected to subside after a peace agreement was signed between rebels and the government in 1996. However, a few years after the agreement was signed, a new war broke out and inter-clan conflicts intensified, exposing the fragility of the agreement and provoking a reexamination of strategies designed to ensure a lasting peace. The situation in Muslim Mindanao begs an important question: Why is there so much 3 conflict in the post-conflict moment? This paper examines the roots of persistent conflict by going beyond the original narrative of resistance and rebellion to shed light on the shifting political and economic conditions that explain their longevity. It distinguishes between the original causes of conflict ( onset ) and the emerging politicoeconomic conditions that underlie their 4 persistence ( duration ). The paper argues that a gap exists in current analysis of persistent
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conflict in Mindanao, which is based upon a traditional discourse of exclusion that fails to capture the regions shifting economic and political conditions and the emergence of new forces that shape the possibilities and limits for a lasting peace. This study offers a political economy and institutional approach to analysing conflict that can help various stakeholders, namely: civil society groups (including those from the business sector); local and national government executives; and, local and international development agencies engaged in creating conditions for a lasting peace in Mindanao. The paper is also relevant to other places that have witnessed enduring conflict in Southeast Asia and includes a brief review of the Mindanao conflict in relation to the dynamics of conflict and exclusion in Aceh, Indonesia. Injustice and exclusion at the onset of the Mindanao conflict Most studies of the Mindanao conflict highlight the injustices and grievances against the colonial and post-colonial Philippine state, tracing the roots of violence to the historical 5 resistance of the Bangsamoro (Moro Nation)
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people to foreign colonizers who ruled Mindanao bringing with them the Christian settlers and businessmen from the northern and central part of the Philippines, and the transnational companies that grabbed the lands farmed and occupied by the Muslims and 6 indigenous people. The theft of the Moros land was facilitated and reinforced by an externally (Spanish and American) imposed set of property rights institutions based on the colonial system of titling, transfer, and sale of land over the Moros traditional system of communal ownership and stewardship of property. The colonization of land was made worse by the official neglect of poor rural communities by the central state and local governments in Mindanao, accompanied by political repression, militarisation and discrimination towards Muslims and 7 indigenous people in the countryside. In comparison to the ethnic and identity-based struggles that mostly defined the nature of conflict in parts of Africa and South Asia, the scholarship on Mindanao paid little attention to ethno-religious differences as the basis of 8 conflict. Scholars pointed out how ethnoreligious identities were poor mobilising symbols for the secessionist movement, even
though the rebels used them to instrumentally project their legitimacy to the international community, particularly the Islamic states. In fact, ethno-religious discourse was often used to blur the failures of governance, especially at a time when local governments were falling under the control of Moro strong men or the rebels themselves. The current rationale for resistance and rebellion remains anchored to this historical discourse of injustice and discrimination, despite the shift in the economic balance of power, the changes in local political authority, and the different set of actors that play a role in governance. They resonate in the proposition that a solution to the historical injustice of land grabbing and economic exclusion perpetrated against the Bangsamoro is to be found in autonomous self-rule, which is critical to achieving peace and development, and is best addressed through the recognition 9 of their ancestral homeland. However, as we shall discuss later, the sources of unrest and the triggers of violence and conflict in the region have markedly changed. The Mindanao conflict is estimated to have resulted in at least 120,000 dead, and the displacement of an estimated two million
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people since it started in the early seventies. In 1996, a peace accord between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) paved the way for the former to govern an autonomous regional government called the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) a devolved political authority established in 1991 that provided for 11 autonomous rule by the Moro people. Autonomy was aimed at the development of the economy and improvement of the welfare of Muslim Mindanao, which includes the population residing in the five provinces and one city that elected to join the autonomous 12 region. Establishing a separate region dominated by Muslims was also expected to improve the targeting of programmes and services that would improve standards of living, and encourage the entry of domestic and foreign investors in the conflict-torn areas of the region. However, more than ten years after the 1996 agreement, economic growth, or the lack of it, has opened up new patterns of exclusion.
The continued economic exclusion of Muslim Mindanao There are at least two aspects in the current pattern of economic growth in Muslim Mindanao that create hostile conditions for a lasting peace.
a. Exclusion from benefits of national economic growth

The lives of the poor and disadvantaged in Muslim Mindanao have not improved during the periods of economic growth that the country as a whole has enjoyed over the past decade. As the Philippines recovered from the 1997 Asian crisis and its GDP grew at an average of 4 percent, most of the Mindanao regions recovered except for four of five provinces within the ARMM, which remain at the bottom of the ten low-growth provinces in the country in terms of real per capita income. 13 This had a palpable effect on the human development indicators of Muslim Mindanao. The economic and social conditions in Muslim Mindanao lag behind other provinces and regions, evidenced by its poor record in terms of employment, poverty, and health (Table 1).
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Absolute poverty in Muslim Mindanao is 45 percent, compared to the national average of 36 percent. Unemployment is five times higher than the national average. Meanwhile, expected life at birth (ELB) in Muslim Mindanao is only 52 years, in comparison to the national average of 71 years for the Philippines. In addition, infant mortality is higher in Muslim Mindanao, where 55 infants die per thousand compared to 49 for the rest of the country. Muslim Mindanao displays a similar trend in terms of education. Twenty-six percent of children of school age participate in primary school compared to 43 percent in Mindanao and 45 percent for the rest of the country. Of those that are able to enter school, cohort survival rates are the lowest in the ARMM, with only 37 percent of students entering the elementary grade (Grade 1) making it to the sixth grade, versus 53 percent for Mindanao and 66 percent for the rest of the country.
Table 1. Human Development Indicators: Muslim Mindanao
Province/Country ELB ARMM Philippines 52 years 71 years Poverty 45% 36% Infant Mortality (per 1000 live births) 55 infants 49 infants Percentage of Unemployed 56% 10%
Sources: The study was done by the UNDPs PHDNetwork. Philippine Human Development Report (2005). Peace, human security, and human development in the Philippines. Makati City: Philippine Human Development Network, UNDP, NZAID; National Statistics Office (2008). Total population and annual population growth rates by region: Population censuses 1995, 2000, and 2007. Quezon
The divergence between provincial or regional figures and national indices expose the geographical exclusion of Muslim Mindanao from the gains of national economic growth and poverty reduction, despite the onset of a formal peace.
b. Unsustainable growth patterns

During the few instances when economic growth in Muslim Mindanao was comparable to, or exceeded the national pattern of growth, that growth has been unsustainable because it was based on reconstruction and electiondriven consumption spending. Economic growth in Muslim Mindanao is much lower than the national average, even though it followed the pattern of national growth except in 2000 and 2002 (Figure 1). The fall in economic growth in 2000 is traced to the all-out war between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the GRP.14 The spike in 2002 and the increase in 2004 can be traced to the infusion of reconstruction aid after the 20002001 war, and the growth in consumption during and after the regional and national elections during those years (1998 national elections, 2002 regional elections, 2004 national elections).
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Figure 1. Percentage Increase in Real GDP: Muslim Mindanao and the Philippines,19972007
Source: NEDA, 2008
Thus, except for the palpable increase in consumption spending in Muslim Mindanao following major political exercises and the onset of post-conflict aid and reconstruction, there is little improvement in terms of valueadded production and sectoral productivity. Statistics (Mindanao Economic Development Council, 2006) demonstrate that productivity gains from 20002005 were limited to fisheries and a few agricultural crops such as rice and corn. The unsustainable nature of ARMMs economic growth, coupled with the regions exclusion from the benefits of national growth,
make a durable peace more difficult to 15 achieve. Studies have shown how the type of economic growth that is directly caused by the massive infusion of aid and reconstruction expenditures, or by the exploitation of both lootable (e.g., valuable gems, drugs, timber, agricultural products) or non-lootable (e.g., oil and gas) resources in post-conflict areas opens up new arenas of competition and conflict, and 16 a rise in separatist or non-separatist violence. Understanding conflict Muslim Mindanao duration in
This paper differentiates between two types of violence in Muslim Mindanao: the first type is referred to in the conflict literature as separatist, political, rebellion-related, topdown, or conflict-related violence which pertains to the vertical armed challenges against the infrastructure of the state and the insurgent and rebel groups; the second is often called non-separatist, bottom-up, inter- or intra-ethnic, clan, or group violence which pertains to horizontal armed challenges between and among families, clans, and 17 tribes. For this paper, we shall use the terms rebellion-related violence and inter- or intrac l a n o r g r o u p v i o l e n c e , r e s p e c t i v e l y, i n
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distinguishing between these two types of conflict. Rebellion-related conflict in Mindanao is sub-national and separatist, while inter-or intra-clan or group conflict is community-based and non-separatist. Both can be products of resource disputes and politico-economic contestation at various levels. Rebellionrelated violence is the outcome of armed confrontation between the GRP and the MILF 18 and MNLF. On the other hand, inter-and intra-clan or group violence can take various 19 forms, of which rido is the most widespread. The two types intersect in terms of politicoeconomic foundations and the forms they take. Their persistence is tied to the capacity of protagonists to engage in armed, organised, and protracted violence. The two may also be distinguished in terms of their beneficiaries. Rebellion-related violence benefits the national or sub-national states or the insurgent and rebel infrastructure. Inter- and intra-clan or group violence benefits the families, clans, and tribes that emerge victorious after violence and 20 conflict subsides or ends. Other beneficiaries include business interests and specific ethnic or religious identity groups that alternately
support the state, the rebels, or both. Before the 1996 peace agreement, the previous administrations of the ARMM had been led by Muslim political elites backed by traditional clans with strong connections to the 21 central government. The entry of MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari to the ARMM governorship can therefore be viewed as a formal turn-over of power and resources from the traditional Muslim clans to the rebel 22 leadership of the MNLF. The transition of power was aided by Misuaris popularity as a symbol of the Bangsamoro resistance. Misuari had strong access to the central government under Ramos and he enjoyed international support and recognition from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Four years later in 2000, war was reignited between the GRP and another rebel group called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), after the then President Joseph Estrada implemented a more bellicose policy towards insurgents and ordered an attack against MILF camps across and beyond the ARMM. Armed conflict erupted again in 2003 and 2008 under the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
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The outbreak of hostilities in Muslim Mindanao during the second half of 2008 alone led to hundreds of fatalities and the 23 displacement of an estimated 250,000 people. These clashes were provoked by an aborted deal that was to provide for the recognition of the ancestral domain claims of the Moro people and the establishment of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was hammered out after years of negotiations between the MILF and GRP peace panels. But after the proposed agreement was declared unconstitutional by the Philippines Supreme Court after the deal was announced, the government panel was disbanded and peace negotiations were suspended. Negotiations have since resumed, though few expect any significant breakthrough until after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos term ends in 2010. The persistence of rebellion-related violence in Muslim Mindanao can be principally traced to the failure to reach an effective political settlement between the different rebel groups and the GRP. However, this sort of violence can also escalate when both the rebels and the military take sides among feuding clans and tribes engaged in fights over land, resources, or political office. This in turn
leads to a vicious cycle where continued armed challenges to the national and local government cause militarization and human rights violations that poison the formal peace 24 process. Studies have shown how the weaknesses i n g o v e r n a n c e u n d e r N u r M i s u a r i s administration created conditions for the 25 persistence of rebellion-related violence. The regional autonomous government was neither autonomous nor capable of governing from the start. The ARMM was weak and unable to deliver basic programmes and services in key areas such as health care and education. Tax and revenue-generating power was inadequate, and the ARMM was beset by numerous and increasing cases of graft and corruption. These problems partly explain why local and international aid and development agencies were directly involved in the provision of public goods and other developmental programmes and services. In addition, the ARMM did not wield effective command over the local police and armed forces. The failure to monopolize the states coercive power meant that the regional government had very little influence over the provision of security and the direction of
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internal security reforms. The ARMM could not even play an active part in preventing rido and other community-level conflicts. Part of the reason behind the failure of the post-1996 ARMM government was the absence of genuine powers required by the regional executive office and the regional assembly in such important areas as fiscal autonomy which 26 remained under central control. These had been part of the original agreement, but their implementation was blocked by Congress. At the same time, the new rebel-governors lacked the required skill and capacity to deal with the multiple evolving conditions in the field: where a new rebel challenger (MILF) was getting s t r o n g e r, c o m m u n i t y - l e v e l c o n f l i c t s w e r e erupting, and criminality was increasing. And not unlike the clan-based governors that preceded him, Misuari was faced with charges of mismanagement and corruption. I n r e a l i t y, t h e M i s u a r i - l e d r e g i o n a l government presided over the autonomous region under peace terms aimed at securing the short-term economic goals of the Ramos administration (19921998). The Ramos government created the political space necessary to undertake fiscal and economic reforms aimed at controlling growth in
expenditures and a refocusing of resources towards economic priorities such as infrastructure building and energy 27 generation. The strategy was successful and violence declined significantly in the period prior to and shortly after the conclusion of peace talks with the MNLF (Figure 2). The Ramos administration can also be credited with stemming rebellion-related violence by simultaneously entering into peace negotiations with the MILF, the Communist Party of the Philippines New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), and military rebels associated with the Reform Armed Forces Movement and the Young Officers Union (RAM-YOU).
Figure 2. Incidents of Rebellion-related violence
350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0
Source: Philippine Human Development Report (2005). Peace, human
security, and human development in the Philippines. Makati City:

Philippine Human Development Network, UNDP, NZAID. Compiled by P. Abinales and E. Ramos.
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However, a latent unrest continued to grow behind the peace bargains secured by the Ramos government. Indigenous groups, Christian settlers and politicians, and some of the traditional Muslim clans that were excluded from the GRP-MNLF peace processes saw their interests threatened and their needs unmet by the post-1996 rebel-led government which styled itself as a representative of the entire Bangsamoro people. This unrest was accompanied by a spike in hostilities between the GRP and the MILF and CPP-NPA after the end of Ramos term in 1998. As a result, business groups and investors continued to evade Muslim Mindanao, preferring to invest instead in the prosperous metropolitan centres of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, and General Santos, and the East Asian Growth Area (EAGA) business initiatives being promoted by 28 the Ramos government. Without a doubt, the intensification of rebellion-related violence after 1996 reinforced the causal relationship between social exclusion and conflict, but with a new twist. Whereas the original discourse of social exclusion was synonymous with the anti-statist political line advanced by the Moro separatists in the struggle for an independent state, the current discourse of exclusion is being wielded by
indigenous peoples, including local businessmen, Christian settlers and politicians, and the powerful Muslim clans against the rebel-separatists themselves. Their grievance economic and political exclusion from the outcome and benefits of the GRPMNLF and the GFP-MILF peace processes. Their target the Misuari-led ARMM, the current ARMM administration, and the MOAAD. This reverse antagonism holds the key to understanding the connections between political authority and the evolving shifts in the regions political economy. The regions underdevelopment can no longer be ascribed solely to the colonial and post-colonial exploitation of the region and discrimination towards Muslims and indigenous people, but must also be connected to the shifting balance of economic and political power within Bangsamoro society itself between those who prospered from the war and the ensuing peace, versus those who did not benefit, in particular the many who remain impoverished and vulnerable within the region. In reality, this represents a tug of war between the Muslim rebels and their advocates and followers on the one hand, and the Muslim aristocracy and the Christian settler-elites on
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the other. In the middle stand the mass of poor and vulnerable communities that were, and continue to be, excluded from the supposed benefits of the peace process. The traditional dichotomies underlying the Mindanao conflict have changed. In tandem with the central state, the powerful Muslim and Christian clans and the leaders of the MNLF must share part of the blame for the lingering violence, and the perpetual failure to generate wealth and prosperity within the region. The MILF will be facing the same challenges if a peace agreement is achieved, as inclusionary demands have started to rise among indigenous people, settlers, women, and local business groups in light of the aborted MOA-AD. The authenticity and urgency of local demands cannot be discounted as crucial socioeconomic issues have not been addressed. Access and secure rights to land, a just share i n t h e r e g i o n s n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s , t h e availability of employment and credit for livelihoods are fundamental demands which the different ARMM administrations failed to address, resulting in the steady deterioration of peoples standards of living. The growing economic and political diaspora from Muslim
Mindanao is recorded each year in the increased density of Muslim ghettoes in MetroManila, Cebu, Davao, Baguio, and other secondary urban centres. These ghettos offer a poignant reminder that the change in the regions leadership has not produced the desired development. Unequal access to key resources such as land continues to provoke unrest and violence. Large tracts of land continue to evade agrarian reform in the ARMM, which ranks second in terms of working scope (321,869 hectares) under the Philippines Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP) as of 2003, yet has the lowest accomplishment report (60%) in the transfer of private agricultural land (PAL) across Mindanao after more than a decade of agrarian reform implementation. Worse, almost all of the PAL areas that have been transferred were acquired through voluntary offers of sale or voluntary land transfer (VOS-VLT), a system of land transfer 29 rife with fraud and corruption. The persistence of land-based conflict and the inability to undertake an effective land reform programme creates a critical intersection between rebellion-related violence and inter- or intra-clan or group violence. The
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outbreak of hostilities between the MILF and the GRP in 2000, for example, was prompted by both parties taking sides in a local MuslimChristian conflict over control of a parcel of 30 land in Lanao del Norte. The confluence is manifested in inter- and intra-clan feuds which have escalated as a form of dispute settlement between competing clan and tribal interests during the post-1996 peace settlement period (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Column Chart of Rido Incidence, 1990 2004
The persistence of inter- and intra-clan or group violence in Muslim Mindanao is distinctly related to resource conflicts at the community level particularly on the issue of 31 land. Numerous studies have also pointed to the strong links between rido and the flawed institutional make-up of agrarian reform in the
region. Indeed, the imposition of a conventional, top-down agrarian reform programme in a region where specific cultural institutions of communal and clan ownership over land prevail is partly to blame for the 32 violence. An analysis of sources of rido confirms numerous cases where the survey and land titling processes undertaken under the CARP led to intra-family violence when individual titles encroached on land owned (through inheritance or pusaka ) by another 33 family member. Apart from land issues, election-related conflict constitutes a secondary but significant source of community-level violence, as it leads to control over political office that increases access to firepower, or determines entry into businesses that are part of the underground economy. This represents another convergence point between sub-national and communitylevel violence, namely electoral disputes and conflicts over the illegal economy, such as in the lucrative drug trade in Muslim Mindanao. It reveals the onset of a new dynamic of exclusion that is distinct from its earlier representations, and the emergence of new and powerful clans with access to new sources of economic power.
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Clans and conflict in Muslim Mindanao Studies have shown how the power of the clans that were a fixture of traditional Muslim society were held in check by the rebel forces of the MNLF and MILF in the long years of conflict from 1970 to 2001. Several Muslim families and clans were directly or indirectly involved in the conflict, offering material support and sending their young men and women to join and support the rebel armies. Other clans collaborated with the central state, strengthening their access to national resources in exchange for providing a security apparatus for the central state in the region. However, even the clans that colluded with the Marcos regime saw the need for peaceful coexistence with rebel forces in a bid to neutralize, and sometimes draw upon the 34 latters firepower. However, with the weaknesses of the Misuari government and its inability to control the violence that intensified following the increase in rido and the war between the MILF and the GRP, a window was opened for rival groups to step up to the plate and (re)acquire economic and political power. Misuaris demand for the national state to deliver on its commitments and his stab at another revolt
was a belated attempt at maintaining power. Misuari was arrested and imprisoned, paving the way for the restoration of clan politics and the resurgence of clan institutions such as rido , and the emergence of warlord clans that exercise power based upon their control over devolved political authority and a vast 35 underground economy. Clan control over the ARMM government and the informal economy in the region induces much of the same violent competition associated with the traditional clan control over land. Fund transfers between the central government to the ARMM in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRA) constitutes the bulk of funds placed under the control of the clans, amounting to an estimated 2.23 36 billion pesos in 2006 alone. This underscores the violent, winner-takes-all nature of e l e c t o r a l c o m p e t i t i o n . Wi t h g o v e r n m e n t consumption expenditures in the ARMM growing at a faster rate than the rest of Mindanao combined, it was clear that whoever 37 controlled the state would corner these sums. It also explains why every election year is alternately seen as a source of opportunity and danger by poor communities in Muslim Mindanao. Elections offer the chance to sell
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votes and influence in exchange for money and other resources such as firearms, but they also present countless dangers associated with the potential rido that can erupt if a family or clan relative runs for political office. The mode of electoral competition in Mindanao also creates a powerful link between rebellion-related violence and inter-clan violence, particularly when violent feuds between rival clans escalate when rebel groups and the police and military 38 support rival candidates. Apart from government-to-government transfers, a growing underground economy marked by the proliferation of illegal drugs, unlicensed firearms, control over small-scale and unlicensed mining activity and smuggling provides additional sources of revenue for local clans (Table 2). Earnings from illicit activities T 2 are deposited and laundered in commercial banks in the key cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Iligan, and Zamboanga 39 C i t y. A k e y a s p e c t o f t h e b o o m i n g underground economy is the existence of an informal market for arable agricultural land. This study uncovered several instances of land transferring ownership without any state law regulating the sale or generating the required taxes.
The violent mix between a spreading underground economy and electoral corruption also reflects the forces and relationships that bind the central Philippine state with Muslim Mindanao. Sub-national state building is ostensibly sacrificed for the central objective of sustaining the powerful coalitions at the national level in this case the government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The underground economy and a corrupt electoral system is permitted to exist, despite the loss of valuable revenues and the collapse of legitimate autonomous rule, in exchange for delivering votes to the ruling coalition during national elections. The end result is a vicious cycle of violence that shapes and is shaped by politico-economic forces that further embed the exclusionary structures that prevail in the region. Eventually these newly emerging politico-economic forces weigh upon the historical issues of unequal access to land and natural resources, discrimination, and economic neglect that have been the enduring sources of violent conflict in the region, and further weaken the cause of an enduring peace.
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Table 2. traditional and non-traditional sources of Revenues from the Informal economy
traditional sources of Revenue

Smuggling of goods from Sabah, etc. Trade in small arms and long weapons Unregistered transport of persons and goods Unregistered transfers of land Illegal logging
non-traditional sources of Revenue

Smuggling of goods from Hong Kong, China, etc. Drug production, distribution, and export Illegal reproduction and sale of CDs, DVDs, etc. Extortionary sale of right-of-way privileges, illegal tollgates Kidnap for ransom (KFR) activities Trade in armaments, explosives, and other munitions (especially before and after elections) Jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling Small-scale illegal mining activities Carjacking and gun for hire Smuggling of oil and fuel Illegal and undocumented export of labour Forgery and sale of official documents, including certificates of live birth, police clearances, etc.
Clans and Conflict Rsurgence in 2008 The resurgent violence in the second half of 2008 demonstrates the aforementioned role of clan institutions as an endogenous factor that plays a decisive role in the outbreak of violence. When the government scuttled a draft memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain (MOA-AD), some base commands of the MILF went on a rampage, leading to the indiscriminate killing and injury of hundreds of civilians in some coastal towns of Lanao del
Norte. These attacks provided the justification for the reversal of the GRPs original position to support the MOA-AD, and the launch of major offensive operations against the MILF in Northern and Central Mindanao. The confrontation between the GRP and the MILF did not exist in a vacuum, but was aided by forces outside the main protagonists in the conflict. As war began to rear its head, preparations for the scheduled elections for the regional leadership of the autonomous region were underway. The MILF publicly called for a suspension of the ARMM elections. On the other hand, the clans wanted the elections to proceed, hoping that it would provide a barrier to the eventual creation of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), as called for in the agreement. The current ARMM governor comes from a strong clan in Central Mindanao, known for its firepower and political influence that 41 stretches beyond central Mindanao. The same clan retains strong ties with the central government, and is alleged to have played a key role in the electoral fraud and violence 42 associated with the 2004 and 2007 elections. The formation of a BJE posed a genuine threat
40
[43]
to the traditional clans at a time when both the political leadership of the ARMM regional government and several key provinces within the region were under their control. The collusion between regional power-brokers and specific national agencies in spurious land deals would also be affected by a successful 43 MOA-AD. A conjuncture was reached when the interests of the ARMM-based clans and the local government officials near the region converged, with the latter engaging in armed actions against MILF field commands in the 44 provinces adjacent to the ARMM. The MOAAD cast some uncertainty over the future of investments in Mindanao and was ostensibly a threat to the economic and political base of the Christian political elites who stood to lose part of their territory to an expanded BJE. The inflammatory rhetoric coming from several local government officials went unabated precisely because they enjoyed the support of local big business and the landed elite in 45 Mindanao. Their actions during the tense few days following the announcement, combined with a reciprocal vehemence against the MOAAD from among the national political elite, has been repeatedly cited as a major cause for the rush to arms, and was subsequently used by
several base commands of the MILF to justify 46 their attacks. Accounts of the recent turmoil in Mindanao provide evidence that validates the analysis of the links between emerging economic sources of power and intensified social exclusion in Muslim Mindanao, namely: The interests of the powerful Muslim clans and Christian politicians converged in a manner that made it easy to scuttle the draft agreement on ancestral domain, aided by the national government which withdrew from the agreement after encountering widespread opposition. While there is no evidence of direct collusion between the Christian and Muslim clans, their responses to the threat of a BJE coincided to undermine the agreement. The scholarship on Muslim Mindanao has pointed to the role of local strong men who can either facilitate or delay peace processes. A similar situation occurred in the events leading to the signing of the MOA-AD, except that this time the Muslim clans had a stronger influence over the central state. Their enhanced leverage derives from the strategic role that they have played in shaping national electoral outcomes. Apprehension over the loss of control over territory and the revenue streams from
[45]
business and investments, coupled with the huge income from the illegal economy played a central part in the parallel moves of the traditional Christian and Muslim aristocracy to scuttle the agreement and in fomenting violence in the events leading to the explosion of full-blown conflict. As aforementioned, the importance of controlling political office is intertwined with the economic foundations of power in Muslim Mindanao, i.e., successful electoral struggles enable the control of formal political authority that is required to corner the proceeds from both the expansion in local and foreign investments, government-togovernment transfers, and the expanding 47 underground economy. The peace process actually excluded several groups that could have rallied behind the agreement, including the local business and church leaders sympathetic to the cause of a lasting peace in Mindanao. In addition to the social exclusion experienced by poor Muslims, there exists an equally deep experience of exclusion amongst women and the indigenous people of Mindanao, whose constituencies contain widespread support for lasting peace. Indeed, women take on additional burdens in securing the household and the family in the course of conflict-related
violence, often taking the lead during times of forced displacement, and seeing to the needs of the family in evacuation camps. They have not been effectively drawn into peace processes, despite the fact that they play a key role in negotiating an end to community-level violence, and often confront the risks and dangers associated with inter- and intra-clan violence ( rido ). Not only does this fail to harness womens potential contribution, it contravenes UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which stresses, amongst other things, supporting womens political, economic and social participation in peacebuilding at all levels. The same is true for indigenous groups such as the Higaonon, Teduray, Iranun, and Subanen tribes who are often displaced when conflict-related violence erupts in areas which t h e y o c c u p y. T h e y p o s s e s s d e e p - s e a t e d animosities towards rebel leaders who make instrumental claims that a consensus exists among the Bangsamoro people over the future of the ARMM, despite their exclusion from the negotiations. They have repeatedly warned of a new front opening in the Mindanao conflict if the MOA-AD were approved. While some tribes have been Islamised, the influence of tribal traditions and the distinct tribal claims
[47]
over land and areas which they claim as part of their ancestral domain prevent them from complying with the outcomes of any peace agreement between the central state and Muslim rebels unless they are directly involved. The poor and vulnerable peasant communities (mostly Muslim), women, and indigenous people are the new faces of social exclusion in Muslim Mindanao, and their continued marginalisation from the peace processes and the benefits of economic growth present formidable barriers to the cause of a lasting peace. A regional perspective: the case of aceh Persistent violence afflicts other places in Southeast Asia where political settlements have been achieved between rebel forces and the central state that led to devolved political authority. The 2005 Peace Accords that ended the civil war between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (RI) have produced a fragile peace punctuated by violence between ex-combatants of GAM and between different 48 ethnic and political groups. Evidence has also emerged that some elements of the Indonesian
armed forces (TNI) are unwilling to recognise the legitimacy of GAM and its leaders, which adds to the distrust and growing unrest under Acehs new leaders. What was a tentative peace began to unravel soon after the agreement was reached. Conflict erupted even before the holding of the first democratic elections in the autonomous province in 2005. Tensions arose within the rebel forces over who should run as Aceh governor, originating from a factional split within GAM before the peace agreement was signed. An official break-up then emerged after 49 Yusuf Irwandi was elected governor. The split within the GAM led to the exclusion of a significant number of excombatants from the financial benefits of the reintegration programme, with several exGAM commanders being left out from the reinsertion and reintegration assistance that was cornered by the dominant faction within GAM. The struggles within the rebels ranks spilled over to the allocation of choice political posts within the province. Meanwhile, some excombatants who were excluded tried to get their share by bullying local government officials into giving them contracts during the post-tsunami reconstruction.
[49]
The unequal access to land and postconflict reintegration benefits by excombatants, including the thousands of Acehnese victimised by conflict, partly explains the persistence of violence. However, there are other drivers of violence, including the continued exclusion of poor communities from revenues derived from Acehs natural resources, the weakness of devolved governance institutions, and the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups especially those residing in the central highlands. Aceh demonstrates a paradigm of democratisation that has turned violent, as political and inter-ethnic rivalries erupted soon after the Helsinki agreement was signed in 2005. These should have been anticipated, as 50 previous studies have called attention to the likely consequences of a hastily-imposed western-type democracy on ethnically diverse communities. Aceh saw western-style democracy and devolution imposed on a cauldron of interethnic and inter-political animosities, resulting in the hardening of ethnic and political divisions. As a result, poor rural and urban communities remained vulnerable to sudden outbursts of ethno-political violence especially
during the period before and after the 2009 51 national legislative elections. Indeed, Indonesia faces several ethnopolitical conflicts within its borders, including in places such as West Java, North Maluku, Central and Southern Sulawesi, where lingering problems with the system of democratic and electoral competition are bound to worsen. In a similar way to the Philippines, constitutional reforms to address economic and political issues that affect local conflict have arrived slowly due to competing agendas for 52 charter change in both countries. As with Muslim Mindanao, Aceh has been excluded from growth during the past decade (in this case Indonesias). Human development indicators expose the lagging state of health and employment in the province (See Table 3).
Table 3: human development Indicators: aceh and Indonesia
Province/ country
ELB
Poverty
Infant Mortality (per 1000 live births)

42 infants 35 infants
unemployme nt rate
Aceh Indonesia
55 years 67 years
35% 27%
29% 12.5%
Source: World Bank, 2008
[51]
H o w e v e r, u n l i k e M u s l i m M i n d a n a o , Acehs source of domestic economic growth is showing some signs of value-added production in agriculture. This has been the product of the massive post-tsunami infrastructure reconstruction work that helped to facilitate the flow of agricultural goods. Data on Aceh is limited to the period 20012007, but the figures demonstrate positive growth arising from farm productivity (See Figure 4).
Figure 4: comparative Real gdP growth in aceh and Indonesia 20012007 (Percentage Increase )
Source: World Bank, 2008
However, a marked depletion in oil and gas reserves threatens to impact negatively on this pattern of growth. If the overall decline in the value of these resources were included, Acehs economy would actually register a contraction of 2%. Moreover, while the increase in Acehs share in the revenues accruing from
oil and gas reserves flowed into the provincial government in the period prior to and following the armed conflict, few benefits trickled down to the grassroots level, as evidenced by the wide gap that remains between standards of living in Aceh compared to other provinces in the North Sumatra region. As in the case of Muslim Mindanao, research has also unveiled the spread of an underground economy in Aceh, manifested in the spread of loose firearms, bribery, and extortion activities, particularly in the transport sector. This has had a substantial effect on the costs of the post-tsunami and post53 conflict reconstruction process. Nevertheless, the economic sources of conflict in Aceh are eclipsed by the problems of democratisation that accompanied the creation of a devolved authority within the province. This is underscored by two factors in particular. First, the worsening division amongst the Acehnese is depicted in the formation of six local political parties, which joined 34 other national parties in vying for electoral posts in the recent elections. Second, the actions of the central Indonesian state that tried to favour one group within GAM to the detriment of the others.
[53]
As in the case of Muslim Mindanao, democratisation and devolution was marked by a winner takes all process of political competition, as control over political office carried with it control over government-togovernment transfers, revenues from the oil and gas reserves, and reconstruction benefits. The GAM-affiliated Partai Aceh has attained a significant victory in the 2009 elections, but the political crevices that led to outbreaks of violence in the provincial capital remain as wide as ever. These flashpoints intertwine with the unsettled issues and claims of ex-combatants dissatisfied with the postconflict reintegration process and the demands of indigenous people in the central highlands and the southeastern part of the province, where armed groups continue to organise adherents and foment secessionist demands. The unrest is further stoked by a rise in unemployment as the post-tsunami reconstruction phase begins to wind down, and as oil and gas production declines with resources drying up along Acehs east coast. Placing the entire post-tsunami and postconflict reconstruction process under the control of a provincial government controlled by a dominant faction within GAM has been a source of continuing tensions.
In conclusion, a confluence of events occurring at the same time as the peace process provides the core of a crisis that threatens to engulf the province. Conclusion: Fostering an Inclusive Peace This study has pointed to newly emerging sources of violence and conflict in Muslim Mindanao and focuses on the resurgence of clan politics, the recurrent property rights issues that fuel rido , and the expansion of an informal economy that provokes both rebellion-related and inter-clan or group conflict. The study emphasises the decisive role played by electoral politics in determining access to and control over government-to-government budget transfers and the vast informal economy. The paper highlights the persistent social exclusion that is being nurtured by the rapid changes in the regions political economy. And to enable an initial analysis of conflict from the Southeast Asian regional perspective, a brief comparison has been undertaken between Muslim Mindanao and Aceh. Previous studies have pointed to the exclusion that Muslims in Mindanao and Aceh experience as the cause of the long wars between rebel challengers and the nation-state
[55]
in the Philippines and Indonesia. These studies have also shown how the secessionist cause often fails to gain strong adherents at the local level. While the language of secession has been replaced by a discourse on autonomy, the original claims of social exclusion continue to resonate at the local level as the gains from growth and autonomy fail to lead to a significant change in peoples standards of living. Exclusion then remains an often-used term at the heart of explanations of violent conflict in Mindanao and elsewhere. But exclusion is not a straightforward concept, and cannot be understood solely in terms of Muslim identity. For identity at the local level in Mindanao is more complex than this. Exclusion is also determined by other aspects of identity s u c h a s g e n d e r, c l a n a n d a g e , a n d b y relationships and networks which either enable access to political and economic power or not. As the sources and expressions of exclusion have changed and become more complex since the onset of the struggle for a Bangsamoro homeland (see Table 2 above for example), so has it become more urgent to dig deeper into questions of who the excluded are, what they are excluded from, by whom, and
why? These are difficult questions to answer given a multitude of different actors and agendas. They can also be dangerous questions to ask given that they lead swiftly to an exploration of who holds power and the nature of this power. This paper posits the presence of a blocked transition towards a lasting peace in Mindanao and Aceh. The literature describes a blocked transition as a situation where the government directly or indirectly condones the use of violence against independent political 54 actions undertaken by the poor majority . In the particular case of Muslim Mindanao, we refer to a blocked transition as a situation where traditional local elites and the central state collude and condone the continued spread of violence as a hedge against the political actions of opposition groups and armed rebels, and is most pronounced during electoral struggles. In the case of Aceh, the continued use of violence against other claimants in the post-conflict process is inextricably linked to the process of shoring up one rebel faction to the exclusion of others. In both cases, the continuation of violence intimidates political opposition and cripples the ability of devolved and autonomous political authority to end widespread violent conflict.
[57]
Part of the limitation of current approaches to peacebuilding is that these approaches often frame violent conflict predominantly as armed, rebellion-related conflict. However, as this paper has sought to illustrate, the armed conflict between the MILF/MNLF and the GRP armed forces both feeds and draws on inter- and intra-clan conflict ( rido ). This conflict cocktail, with its roots in exclusionary politics and economics, creates new opportunities for those benefiting from exclusion. It underlines the lingering plight of people like Musheera and Makin, who live under the terms of a formal peace that exists only on paper. International and local efforts to end armed rebellion and that call for immediate c e a s e f i r e s , e l e c t i o n s , a u t o n o m y, a n d decentralisation as the key instruments for lasting peace and development are left wanting. They are inadequate not because these are the wrong aspirations, but because they do not engage strategically with the less visible yet vital dynamics of inter- and intraclan conflict and do not enable understanding of how these dynamics are inextricably linked to key issues such as the unsettled property rights framework that governs access to land, the mode of democratic electoral competition,
the expansion of an underground economy, and the relationships between this economy and local clan politics. Without the full picture, a full solution is not possible. Certainly, the informal economy may provide livelihoods for the poor and vulnerable in conditions of uncertainty and insecurity, but it also brings with it risk of local conflict, and ultimately weakens the administrative capacity of the state. Peacebuilding strategies must, therefore, include consideration of local community conflict dynamics and the ways in which armed rebellion interacts with them. This consideration will inevitably lead to a closer exploration of the informal economy and the contestation for political influence that brings control of this economy. Such a process requires dialogue with particular characteristics. Dialogue that operates at the nexus between armed rebellion and local community conflict; that engages those towards both ends of the excluded/included spectrum in order to confront and unpack current patterns of power and control; that can draw in the private sector since this sector is key to the delivery of jobs and incomes; that develops practical and strategic reforms since dialogue in and of itself is only a means to an end; that operates
[59]
at multiple levels since managing conflict is the responsibility of many; and that can sustain momentum over an extended time period since societal change takes time. If this peacebuilding approach can be strengthened and successfully complement others then it is more likely that the resources for equitable and sustainable development in Mindanao can be used effectively, to bring about the transition from persistent violence and underdevelopment to peace and prosperity for all. Like a stone dropped into a pond, dialogue between different stakeholders, if characterised as above, can create changes in attitudes and behaviours that, like ripples, spread out to influence institutions and policies, gradually creating a new environment in which inclusion can eventually trump exclusion (Figure 5). Such an inclusive state would depend upon an open and fair process of political competition, and a political and economic infrastructure based upon the absolute control by local states of the means of coercion. The challenges are many. Such a situation may not be favourable for national elites who
seek to utilise weak electoral systems for their benefit. A representative state may also be vulnerable to the legitimate claims and grievances of a dominant group that may see few benefits from a discourse that is representative of all sectors and a practice accountable to all citizens. Furthermore, identity-based regimes in the post-conflict period such as the GAM-led provincial government, or the MNLF-led ARMM and MILF-proposed BJE would have to deny themselves the armed strength that is necessary for their armed groups to survive. This truism remains at the core of the problem of continued violence, i.e., an identity-based and instrumentalist regime possesses the seeds of its own instability and insecurity.
Figure 5: The Peacebuilding Ripple
Source: International Alert
[61]
I n the face of these challenges, new and
innovative interventions are required to stem continuing violence. These interventions must be owned by those with a stake in the required transition from conflict to peace, and informed by an honest dialogue exploring the current expressions of exclusionary political and economic practices. They must build on the learning of past and present dialogue initiatives, drawing on experience already gained. International agencies must support such a dialogue process which promises to develop a new template for development assistance based on an understanding of the links between armed rebellion and local community conflict. Such a template will result in interventions that will enable vulnerable groups to adapt to conditions of conflict and provide the building blocks for the settlement of fundamental issues such as land ownership, ancestral domain, and natural resource distribution. Only then will Musheera be able to live without the constant fear of displacement, and Makin bring up his children without the need to protect them from rido, as his father had to do for him. Only then will the principle of inclusion, the key to lasting peace, become a reality.
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[68] Autonomy and Peace Review Endnotes

1
F rancisco Lara Jr. is Research Associate at the Crisis
States Research Centre of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Phil Champain is Director of Programmes for Asia and Eurasia regions at International Alert.
2 3
Not their real names. T his puzzle is taken from Moxhams (2007) paradoxical
challenge in the case of Timor-Leste, which in turn is based on a study of the post-conflict moment in Afghanistan by C. Cramer and J. Goodhand (2002).
4
Writing on conflict in Aceh, Collier and Sambanis (2005,
p.53) have pointed to the looting of resources that contributed to the duration , rather than the onset of conflict.
5
The term bangsa is a Malay term with Sanskrit roots
that refers to nations, castes, races, lines of descent, and estates (Buendia, 2005). The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) popularized the term bangsamoro to promote their advocacy for an independent Moro nation. See Noble (1976), Jubair (1999), Muslim (1994), and Lingga (2007).
6
T .J.S. George, 1980; Ahmad, 1999; Muslim, 1994; Jubair, Mercado, 1984; Ahmad, 1999. A binales, 2000; Buendia, 2005; Mc Kenna, 1998. The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain reads:
1999.
7 8 9
It is essential to lay the foundation of the Bangsamoro
homeland in order to address the Bangsamoro peoples

humanitarian and economic needs as well as their political
[69]
aspirations. (No. 2, Concepts and Principles, Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRPMILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001.)
10 11
Schiavo-Ocampo and Judd, 2005. The first series of negotiations in the seventies led to the
Tripoli Agreement of 1976, which caused the MNLF to drop their claim for independence and to agree to autonomy. After the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, peace talks were revived by President Corazon Aquino in 1986. The creation of an autonomous region was eventually passed as a law in 1987 named The Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao or Republic Act 6734 of 1987, and in 1989 a plebiscite was held to determine the cities and provinces that would join the autonomous region. See Cagoco-Guiam (2006) and Iribani (2006).
12
The ARMM covers 27,500 square kilometers and has a
population of 2.7 million. In this article, we abbreviate the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to Muslim Mindanao, a region carved out of Western, Central, and Northern Mindanao and comprising the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, and the Islamic City of Marawi.
13
These provinces are Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and
Basilan. Their incomes amounted to an average of 11,668pesos (166.00), or only a third of the real per capita income of the Northern Luzon province of Nueva Viscaya (2005 Human Development Report, p.101).
14
The MILF is a breakaway faction from the MNLF that was
established in 1984 by Hashim Salamat, a devout Muslim scholar who was part of the MNLF leadership. Salamat died

in 2003. The MILF was not a party to the peace agreement signed between the MNLF and the Philippine government (GRP) in 1996.
15
The sort of economic growth experienced by Muslim
Mindanao further marginalises poor communities that did not have access to reconstruction and reintegration funds, nor the spoils from electoral contests. Studies show that some post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) policies and programmes that leverage one group over another may harden ethnic divisions (See Berman, 1998; and Snyder, 2000).
16
Often referred to as the resource curse, some scholars
have pointed to the connection between lootable resources and non-separatist violence, and between non-lootable resources and separatist violence (Ross, 2003, pp.4767).
17 18
Reno, 2000; Tilly, 2003; Keen, 2008. Interviews conducted for this study validate the presence
of the Communist Party of the Philippines New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA) regulars operating in villages adjacent to or within the ARMM, with frequent reports of tactical cooperation among MILF and NPA field commanders in the past. Meanwhile, another armed group that has captured national and foreign attention is the Abu Sayyaf, which claims to adhere to an ideological and political platform, though its armed actions have focused on hostage-taking for ransom, intimidation and extortion. It is more appropriate to describe the latter as engaged in criminal violence. See Gutierrez (1999, p.349).
19
There are unwritten rules in rido that separate women and
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children from being the objects of violence. However, recent cases of rido appear unmindful of these rules (See Durante et al., 2007; UNYPAD, 2007).
20
Inter-and intra-clan and tribal conflicts are sometimes
unresolved, though the violence may dissipate after a major confrontation as each side weighs the costs of escalating the violence. Without a settlement of the original causes of conflict, the feud is passed on to succeeding generations.
21
The first ARMM governor was Zacarias Candao (1991
1993), who comes from a powerful clan in Maguindanao with close ties to the Aquino government. The second governor was Liningning Pangamdaman (19931996), who comes from a prominent clan in Lanao del Sur with political connections to the Ramos government.
22
Danguilan-Vitug and Gloria (2000) note that apart from
Nur Misuari, more than 30 members of the MNLF senior leadership joined the ARMM regional government in 1996. Other MNLF central committee members such as Cotabato Mayor Muslimin Sema sought electoral office.
23
Clashes between government troops and MILF rebels in
August 2008 occurred following charges and counter-charges of deception and indiscriminate killing by both sides. Renewed fighting actually erupted following a court injunctionthat prevented the signing of a memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain (International Crisis Group, 23rd October 2008, Policy Briefing , Jakarta and Brussels).
24
A review of security and militarization and their consequent
effects on the civilian population in Muslim Mindanao is available in the 2005 UNDP report (Peace, Human Security, and Human Development in the Philippines).

25 26 27
Gutierrez and Danguilan-Vitug, 1999; Guiam, 2006. Rasul, 2007. Ramos assumed the presidency in the midst of a fiscal
crisis and the breakdown of basic services such as water and electricity. See Danguilan-Vitug and Gloria (2000).
28
While ostensibly promoting peacebuilding in Mindanao, the
Ramos government had few incentives within the EAGA to attract investments to the conflict-affected areas within the ARMM, preferring to promote instead the major urban centres of Mindanao.
29 30
Dela Rosa and Abreu, 2003. Community-level conflict between Muslim and Christian
peasants over the right of use to a 30-hectare coconut farm in Linamon, Lanao del Norte became the first flashpoint in the 2000 war, as the AFP sided with the Christians while the MILF defended the Muslims. Interview with Musa Sanguila, Executive Director of Pakigdait Inc. (2007).
31
A n extensive study on the causes and effects of rido showed
that land disputes were the principal sources of communitylevel violence, followed by electoral competition.
32 33 34
D urante et al., 2007. Matuan, 2007. Interviews and focus group discussions conducted for this
study revealed the close links between the powerful clans and rebel forces. The Lanao clans (Alonto-Lucman) including that of the late Ali Dimaporo, were said to have been in constant contact with some leaders of the MNLF in the 70s. The respondents also revealed that some powerful clans in Maguindanao and Lanao provided significant financial and material support to the MILF, particularly during the

leadership of the late MILF leader Hashim Salamat.
35
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Misuari was toppled from the ARMM leadership in 2001
by the so-called Group of 13 headed by Dr. Parouk Hussein, who became the next ARMM governor. The Group of 13 is composed of key leaders of the MNLF who were dissatisfied with Misuaris leadership. The Hussein-led ARMM was a brief preface to the eventual take-over of the ARMM by the powerful Ampatuan clan of Maguindanao.
36
Newsbreak and UNDP (2007) IRA Distribution by Provinces
2006, in Democracy and Governance in the Philippines Project. Interview with Suharto Ambolodto, ARMM Judicial Reform Activity Manager, USAID.
37 38 39
National Statistical Coordination Board, GRP, 2008. Torres, 2007, The Asia Foundation. Interview with a senior bank officer (anonymous) of one of
the largest commercial banks in the Philippines in charge of supervising regional fund transfers across Mindanao.
40
The head of the MILF negotiating panel, Mohagher Iqbal,
denounced the indiscriminate killing of civilians in Kolambugan, Linamon, and Kauswagan, and announced publicly that an investigation would be internally conducted by the MILF to determine the responsibility of base commands under MILF commanders Umbra Kato and Bravo.
41
A mong the groups affected were the Ampatuans. The
Ampatuan family is an important political force in Muslim Mindanao. Andal Ampatuan is the former governor of Maguindanao, while his son Zaldy Ampatuan was reelected in 2008 as governor of the ARMM. See Philippine Daily
Inquirer , 13th August 2008 and 14th March 2007.

42
See Philippine Daily Inquirer , 14th May 2007.

43
Interview with a ranking official of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DA R) (anonymous) in Manila reveals that several powerful clans in Maguindanao were directly engaged in anomalous voluntary offers of sale (VOS ) of land and right-of-way transactions. These irregularities, he claims, are the reason why the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) indefinitely suspended the payment of VOS claims.
44
C ongressional hearings after the August 2008 attacks
reported an increase in armed encounters between paramilitary militias and MILF elements prior to the announcement of the MOA -AD.
45
Local officials who were stridently opposed to the MOA -
AD included Vice-Governor Manuel Pinol (Cotabato) and Mayor Celso Lobregat (Zamboanga City).
46
Focus group discussions indicate a deepening of distrust
among ordinary Muslims towards national politicians and parties that took the lead in blocking the MOA -AD.
47 48
Lara, 2007. GA M control over the Aceh Reconstruction Agency (KPA) F ormer GA M head Irwandi was elected in 2005 as governor S nyder, 2000; Berman, 1998. International monitoring groups have reported a surge in
fuels most of the distrust ( Jakarta Post , 6th March 2009).

49
of Aceh.
50 51
violence as the nation approaches national elections in 2009.Several Partai Aceh candidates have been gunned down, while candidates from other contending parties in Aceh have been harassed and intimidated. The Associated Press , 13th February 2009; World Bank, July-August 2008.

52
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Lara, 2008, 2009.
53 Studies reveal that illegal payments along the main route between Banda Aceh and Medan substantially increase the cost of business in Aceh (World Bank, 2006).
54
Lara and Morales, 1990.
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IMAGINING A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT FOR A MORO SUB-STATE
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Imagining a Constitutional for a Moro sub-state

Soliman M. Santos, Jr. 1
amendment
s this not putting the cart before the horse? Why n o t w a i t f o r t h e C o m p r e h e n s i v e Compact outcome of the GPH-MILF peace negotiations first? F o r a l l w e k n o w, constitutional amendments may not be necessary. But actually, we already know that they will be necessary if there is to be an enabling core framework that would be qualitative better in terms of self-governance than the existing constitutional provisions Article X, Sections 15-21 on autonomous regions. We already know from existing drafts and statements of the MILF that the form of self-determination that they seek has been expressed through catch words like notably sub-state juridical entity, asymmetrical state-substate relationship, asymmetrical structure through compact of free association,
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. has been a long-time Bicolano human rights and IHL lawyer; legislative consultant and legal scholar; peace advocate, researcher and writer esp. for and on the Mindanao peace process, with several books on this, inc. The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process (UP Press, 2001; with 2nd printing, 2009), where he has long made the first full argument for charter change for that peace process. He is presently Presiding Judge of the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Nabua-Bato, and Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Balatan, both in Camarines Sur
1
free association of state or union, associative relationship, free associated state, associated free state and the like which are unfortunately not readily understandable. What is really important is not these catch words but the actual structural power and sovereign relationship between the state and sub-state (or by whatever term the beast is called) as would be detailed in the Comprehensive Compact. Although there are several models of free association or associated states, including the U.S.-sponsored 1935-46 Commonwealth of the Philippines (which was preparation for independence), whatever Bangsamoro sub-state to be created, will perforce have its own unique configuration arising mainly from the present-day Philippine context. In any case, all indications are, from the MILF drafts, that they envision a high degree of self-governance short of independence certainly much higher than the low intensity and failed autonomy of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which has a structural level that ultimately limits whatever reforms and new officials are put into place. It therefore makes some sense to try to imagine how the Bangsamoro sub-state
Imagining a Constitutional Amendment for a Moro Sub-state
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might look when articulated as a part of the Constitution of its parent Philippine state. This is an attempt to answer in a more substantive and constructive way rather than an argumentative and rhetorical way the valid question Substate, whats this beast? If we try to answer this in more readily understandable terms, such as in the form and language of a proposed constitutional amendment (which is what it will take for the beast to be born, if ever), then perhaps it becomes clearer what this sub-state it. And for this purpose, our proposed constitutional amendment deliberately avoids using the aforesaid catchwords. B e t h a t a s i t m a y, o u r p r o p o s e d constitutional amendment is guided mainly by the content of several MILF drafts in order to attempt to capture the essence of their envisioned asymmetrical state-substate (associative) relationship. But our proposed constitutional amendment is also guided by several GRP/GPH drafts and established parameters and positions, most definitely that the sub-state must not be on its way to independence. F i n a l l y, o u r p r o p o s e d constitutional amendment likewise draws from the work of various independent civil society peace advocates and academics, including that
o f t h e a u t h o r. The latter takes full responsibility though for the balancing, choices, formulations, nuances, omissions and own ideas that he has worked into the proposed constitutional amendment, based on his understanding of MILF, GPH and civil society perspectives. More important than just answering Substate, whats this beast?, our proposed constitutional amendment is offered as an input in aid of the peace negotiations. One idea in putting this proposed constitutional amendment cart before the Comprehensive Compact horse is to help simplify the increasingly complicated and difficult discussions on the Comprehensive Compact subject matter, including the MILFs long and complexly-worded draft amendatory Article on Bangsamoro State to the Constitution. There may be a need in the negotiations to focus on finding the mutually acceptable core framework for a negotiated political settlement that would likely also entail a negotiated constitutional settlement. Without usurping constituent powers, the two peace panels must necessarily engage in discussions of a constitutional nature since what is really involved here is restructuring the power or sovereign relationship between the Philippine
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republic and the Bangsamoro people within its polity. It thus deals with the constitutional association between two nations or peoples within one country. In other words, it partakes of no less than re-defining the Philippine State, re-imagining the Filipino nation, and rewriting a new Filipino-Moro social compact. Finding that mutually acceptable core framework is like cutting the proverbial Gordian knot of an increasingly complicated and difficult process and substance of negotiations. The core framework mutually agreed to be worked on until its entrenchment as a constitutional amendment would be like the key link in that whole process, facilitating whatever remaining necessary legislative, executive, administrative and even judicial measures. Otherwise, the tendency in the process, especially on the part of the GPH, would be to often piecemeal address specific MILF proposals in its draft Comprehensive Compact through the prism of the Constitution and national laws. And often enough, the latter constitute blockages to those proposals because of the different frameworks they are respectively coming from, including the constitutional ARMM framework on the GPH side. In fact, supposedly implementing legislation of peace agreements, without first
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework, may end up putting in place measures that are not really aligned to the right core framework, and which may have to be undone, thus further complicating the process. The same might be said regarding unduly cumbersome transitional arrangements and an unduly long interim period, as proposed by the MILF. Simplify, dont complicate, the already complicated. Time is flying. Our proposed constitutional amendment is offered as an independent civil society initiative for both parties. More of this sort of initiative, including an independent civil society draft Comprehensive Compact and d r a f t B a n g s a m o r o B a s i c L a w, m a y b e necessary to help break impasses where both panels insist on their own drafts to be the working draft because of strong attachment to its framing, concepts and even language. The MILF has proposed an amendatory Article on Bangsamoro State to be appended as an Ordinance to the Constitution, similar to the first (1939) and second (1947) ordinances appended to the 1935 Philippine Constitution which dealt with transitory U.S.-Philippine relations, including the infamous Parity Amendment. That could be one possible form,
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although it has been commented that such form may be more suitable for only transitory arrangements. Our proposed constitutional amendment is instead an Article X-A to be inserted right after the existing Article X, Sections 15-21 on Autonomous Regions. This indicates better the constitutional-historical sequence or segue from the ARMM to what we call generically the Bangsamoro selfgoverning region (BSR, for those who are acronym-conscious). The reader may find the following proposed Article X-A on the verbose side. Better for a draft to err on the side of verbosity, elucidation and clarity. As it is, certain terms are defined and, most importantly, certain rationales for the proposed new region are stated. In any case, the draft can be pared down, as desired, aside from further refinement. Or, it could even be added to where there may have been significant omissions. It is definitely not prefect but here it is, gratis et amore :
ARTICLE X-A BANGSAMORO SELF-GOVERNING REGION [Basic Concept of the Section 1. Region ad Nature of its Relationship with the Republic. ] In lieu of but building on the existing and reformed Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), there shall be created a Bangsamoro self-governing region, to meet the aspiration for a system of life and governance suitable and acceptable to the Bangsamoro people. This region shall exercise a high degree of self-rule short of independence and not leading to it, exercising its own legislative, executive and judicial powers, subject to this Article X-A. There shall be in this region a fair and just balancing of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines, on one hand, and the Bangsamoro peoples right of selfdetermination, on the other. The national territory shall remain intact, with this region as an integral part of it. The national sovereignty in this region shall reside in and be shared by both the Filipino and Bangsamoro peoples through their respective levels of government authority in accordance with the sharing of government
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powers provided in this Article X-A. The Bangsamoro people have the right to selfgovernment in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their self-governing functions. The object of such self-government is to secure the Bangsamoro identity and way of life, protect their homeland and its resources, and establish a system of governance as a people possessing a unique history and culture. S e c . 2 . [ I d e n t i t y, N a t i o n a l i t y a n d y, Citizenship. ] The Bangsamoro people are the collective nation of the largely Islamized thirteen ethno-linguistic groups of the Maranaw, Maguindanao, Tausug, Samal, Yakan, Sangil, Palawani, Badjao, Kalibugan, Jama-Mapun, Iranun, Kalagan, and Molbog in the Southwestern Philippines, as well as those who choose to identify themselves as Bangsamoro. They are a historically and culturally significant and distinct nation and portion of the entire population of the Philippine State. This Bangsamoro nationality is recognized even while retaining their Philippine citizenship. Their historic precolonial sultanates and subsequent role in the resistance to colonialism are likewise recognized, as well as their historical and systematic marginalization and minoritization
in their ancestral homeland in the Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan islands. Social justice calls for the acknowledgement and correction of the historical injustices against the Bangsamoro people, in particular the injustices to the territorial integrity of their ancestral homeland, as well as to their identity, political sovereignty and integral development consistent with their distinct Moro Islamic way of life. The creation herein of a Bangsamoro self-governing region is itself a measure of social justice which redresses those legitimate and core Moro grievances by restructuring the power or sovereign relationship between the Philippine republic and the Bangsamoro people within its polity, as the key measure towards enhancing the totality of relationships, including between the Filipino and Bangsamoro peoples and among the tripeoples of Mindanao. Their relationships shall be based on parity of esteem, full equality, and mutual recognition, respect, amity, cooperation and assistance. 3. Territory erritory, Sec. 3 [ Political Territory, Accession Thereto, and Homeland. ] The core or initial territory of the Bangsamoro self-governing region shall be the present geographic area of
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the ARMM, plus the municipalities of Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagaloan and Tangkal in the province of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite, and the cities of Cotabato and Isabela in the provinces of Maguindanao and Basilan, respectively, which are already part of the ARMM. There shall be developed jointly, by the appropriate government authorities both of the republic and of the region, a democratic process for the accession to this region of additional geographic areas, including barangays, of predominantly Muslim or ethnic Moro population, preferably but not necessarily always contiguous to the region. Similar authorities of both the republic and the region shall likewise determine the demarcation and status of territorial waters of the region based mainly on the archipelagic principle. The Bangsamoro homeland is the historical and traditional territory in the Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan islands that had been inhabited, occupied and ruled by the Bangsamoro people particularly during the time of their pre-colonial sultanates and principalties. This historic homeland or
ancestral territoriality constitutes a basis for Bangsamoro self-governance, but such historical sovereignty over these geographical areas, while an important territorial criterion for possible expansion of the region, shall now have to be subject to the free and genuine expression of the will of their contemporary inhabitants. [Legislative Sec. 4. Powers: Exclusive, Concurrent, and Residual.] Within its political territory or territorial jurisdiction and subject to this Article X-A, the Bangsamoro self-governing region shall have legislative powers over all matters except the following reserved exclusively for the National Government: Defense and external security; Foreign relations and policy; Territorial integrity; Citizenship and naturalization; Coinage and monetary policy; Postal system; and Common market and global trade. There shall be concurrent legislative powers between the Congress and the regions legislature on the following matters: Public welfare and humanitarian institutions; Social welfare, charities and charitable trusts; Public health and social services; Education and skills training; Registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces; Registration of
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changes of residence; Cadastral land surveys; Land registration and distribution and water regime; Agriculture and forest management; Inland waterways and coastal shipping; Inland fisheries and coastal preservation; Aqua culture and marine matters; Protection regarding the marketing of food, drink and tobacco; Tr a n s p o r t planning and infrastructure; Tourism development; Ports, harbors and foreshores; Coast guards and border patrols; Urban and rural development; Regional economic structures; Nature conservation and preservation of historical and cultural sites; Waste disposal and noise abatement; and the equitable sharing of common wealth. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not otherwise granted exclusively or concurrently in this Article X-A to the National Government shall be vested in the region. Notwithstanding the aforesaid limitation on the legislative powers of the region, it may enact laws that promote the general welfare of the Bangsamoro people. 5. Sec. 5 [ Legal Regime, Human Rights, and Legal Pluralism. ] The legal regime in the Bangsamoro self-governing region shall be governed principally by the following legal
sources: this Article X-A; the Bangsamoro Basic Law as organic act to be drafted by a constituent assembly of the Bangsamoro people; by international human rights law and generally accepted principles of international law which are both deemed adopted as part of the law of the region; and the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution. The other Articles of the Constitution as well as national laws shall apply in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent herewith. The constitutional principle of separation of Church and State, and the related nonestablishment of religion clause, in particular shall not be applicable to a Moro Islamic system as may be established in the region. The protection and respect of human rights, shall be guaranteed in the region, especially the following international human rights treated in a unified way: the right to equality and non-discrimination; the right of minorities to preserve their own culture, religion and language; the right of indigenous populations to preserve their traditions, as well as their special rights to land and its natural resources; and the right of peoples to selfdetermination. Among others, civil liberties, religious freedom, womens rights, vested
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property rights, and the rights to selfdetermination and ancestral domain of indigenous highlander tribes, as well as their freedom of choice, shall be recognized and respected, including as provided in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the MamaluTabunaway Pact between the Teduray and Maguindanaon tribes. While the Bangsamoro Basic Law shall be the main governing law in the region, the legal regime therein shall allow for a measure of legal pluralism or a plural legal order in which diverse co-existing legal regimes are superimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed. These include Philippine law, international law, shariah or Islamic law, customary adat law, and indigenous tribal customary law. The regional legislature may adopt, in whole or in part, national laws as well as Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Acts of the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly, without necessarily thereby impliedly adopting their constitutional and legal bases. The appropriate authorities both of the republic and of the region, as well as of the concerned indigenous highlander tribes within the region, shall develop jointly internal conflict-of-laws
mechanisms for situations or disputes where both Bangsamoro nationals and non-nationals are involved, with international human rights as main common ground and normative standard for conflict resolution. Sec. 6. [ Institutions and Structures of Governance, Co-Relation with and Representation in the National The Bangsamoro selfGovernment.] governing region shall be empowered to build, develop and maintain its own institutions of governance, inclusive of legislative, civil service, electoral, legal, judicial, police and internal security, correctional, educational, economic, financial and banking institutions, necessary for a progressive and modern Bangsamoro society, including in co-relation with national institutions of governance within the Philippine polity. The structure of the regional legislature, executive and judiciary may be different from that of the National Government. Local governments shall be governed by the legal regime in the region which shall provide for appropriate mechanisms for their representation in and consultation by the regional government. The latter through its legislature may provide for an appropriate structure and configuration for the more effective and viable governance of the
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two (2) main geographical parts, i.e. the central mainland part and the southwestern islands part, of the region, even as the latter level shall remain the center of gravity for selfgovernance. The appropriate government authorities both of the republic and of the region shall develop jointly the mechanisms for coordination, adjustments and conflict resolution such as where there may be overlapping jurisdictions, especially in the matters of administration of justice and of local government units. Among the major such mechanisms shall be representation in the National Government and veto-type mechanisms in case of national measures that would unduly prejudice the self-governance and welfare of the region. The representation mechanisms shall include two (2) additional Senate seats and three (3) additional House seats for the region with the concerned Senators and Representatives to be voted at large only in the region. Any Congressional change in the configuration or status of the congressional districts and local government units in the region shall require the concurrence of the regional legislature. Other mechanisms of representation as well as of veto shall be provided by Congress, including in its
internal rules, and by the appropriate measures of the executive, administrative and judicial departments of the National Government, in consultation and concurrence with the proper regional authorities. Sec. 7. [ Ancestral Domain, Resource U t i l i z a t i o n , a n d We a l t h - S h a r i n g . ] We The Bangsamoro ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain but encompasses ancestral, communal and customary lands, maritime, fluvial and alluvial domains as well as all natural resources therein that have inured or vested ancestral rights on the basis of native title to the Bangsamoro people in their historic homeland, established not only through occupation, possession and dominion since time immemorial but also by cultural bond, customary law, historic rights and legal titles. This special concept of ancestral domain shall apply only within the political territory or territorial jurisdiction of the Bangsamoro self-governing region. The region shall, among others, exercise power or authority over the natural resources, including subterranean natural resources and strategic minerals, within its territorial jurisdiction. The exploration, development, and utilization of these natural resources shall reinforce the r e g i o n s e c o n o m i c s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y w h i l e
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safeguarding environmental security and integrity for sustainable development. The general percentage ratio of wealth sharing between the region and the National Government shall be 75:25 in favor of the region. The ownership and use of land as well as various forms of land tenure, rights, claims and reform shall be governed by the plural legal and property regime in the region, with due regard to vested property rights and legitimate private property. There shall be a thorough review of the public land acts and land tenure system as these have impacted on the region, with a view to more effectively accommodating customary and indigenous land rights and law as well as adopting modern international trends of best practices and systems here. Sec. 8. [ Tr a n s i t i o n a l J u s t i c e , The Reparation, and Reconciliation.] historic and legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from unjust dispossession of their territorial, proprietary and tenurial rights, as well as from their systematic marginalization and minoritization, is acknowledged by the Philippine State. Where land restitution is no longer possible, the National Government shall
take measures of adequate reparation or compensation collectively beneficial to the Bangsamoro people, in such quality, quantity and form to be determined mutually by the appropriate government authorities of both the region and the republic. Transitional justice and reparation or compensation shall also be justly due to the civilian victims of war crimes and gross violations of human rights committed by both sides. There shall likewise be both substantive and symbolic measures of transitional and restorative justice as well as of national reconciliation to heal inter-people relationships and deep social, cultural and religious cleavages, including through special intervention of affirmative action for Muslims or ethnic Moros in diasporas outside the region and no less than a review, rewriting and reteaching of Philippine and Mindanao history. Sec. 9. [Shared Security Arrangements .] The preservation of peace and order within the Bangsamoro selfgoverning region shall be its responsibility which shall be exercised through its police and internal security force. The external defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government
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which shall exercise it through the Armed Forces of the Philippines which, as the protector of the people and the State, is also a protector of the Bangsamoro people, since the AFP exists to protect the human rights of every Filipino citizen. There shall be in the region an effective program for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, or whatever it may be called, for the Moro liberation armed forces. This program shall also purposively deal with demilitarization and normalization, dismantling of paramilitary forces and private armies, and small arms and light weapons control. It shall co-relate with national and Mindanao-level efforts at security sector reform, as well as peace education and culture of peace efforts to address the culture of the gun. Sec. 10. [ Mechanisms and Time Frame Transition, for Transition, and Future Amendments .] Within thirty (30) days from the ratification of this Article X-A in a plebiscite called for the purpose of voting on proposed constitutional amendments, a Bangsamoro constituent assembly, to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law as the organic act of the Bangsamoro selfgoverning region, shall be convened pursuant to an executive order to be issued by the President, the groundwork for which would
have been laid by the broad-based Mindanao peace process, including the peace negotiations and agreements with the two (2) main Moro liberation fronts. Within six (6) months from the time of organization of the Bangsamoro constituent assembly, it shall complete its work of drafting the Basangmoro Basic Law consistent with this Article X-A, and with the assistance and participation of adequate crosscommunity, multi-ethnic and multi-party stakeholder consultation mechanisms to be provided in the executive order. Within forty-five (45) to sixty (60) days from the completion of the draft Bangsamoro B a s i c L a w, i t s h a l l b e s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Bangsamoro people for ratification or otherwise in a referendum/plebiscite called for the purpose in the core or initial territory indicated in Sec. 3 above, with the majority vote thereon to be reckoned on the basis of that whole territory. Upon such majority vote of approval, the Bangsamoro Basic Law shall come into force and effect, and the Bangsamoro self-governing region shall be deemed created. The existing Organic Act for the ARMM shall, however, continue to be in force and effect as the main governing law of the existing ARMM Regional Government which shall continue to function, albeit mainly to assist in the
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transition in support of transitional mechanisms and bodies to be provided in the executive order, until the election of the new Bangsamoro Regional Government under the Bangsamoro Basic Law. This election shall be conducted within another forty-five (45) to sixty (60) days from the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. Upon the election of and soonest assumption of office by the new Bangsamoro Regional Government, the existing ARMM Regional Government shall cease to function and the ARMM Organic Act shall be deemed repealed. Any future amendments to this Article XA shall require only the concurrence of Congress and the Bangsamoro self-governing regions legislature on a co-equal basis as the primary sovereign representative bodies of the sovereign Filipino and Bangsamoro peoples, respectively, in their herein provided shared sovereignty over the region. Final Remarks We l l , s u b j e c t t o r e f i n e m e n t s t o t h i s proposed constitutional amendment in the form of an Article X-A, the question to the Filipino majority who would have to ratify it, if ever, is this: Is this something we can live with? It
clearly provides for a constitutional space, still w i t h i n o u r r e p u b l i c a n d t e r r i t o r y, f o r Bangsamoro minority to live out their distinct (from our) identity and way of life as well as their centuries-old longing for self-rule (even if not anymore their preferred original aspiration of independence, just like we had gained from Spain and the U.S.). If we can say yes to this constitutional space, which is also like reaching out to our Moro brothers and sisters, then we have given a great chance to ourselves and all concerned to finally see peace in Muslim Mindanao in our time, which is also for the sake of future generations of Filipinos and Moros. If both peoples can say yes and make it happen, we should in the process both come out better as we bring out the best in each other. We would show that Moro nationbuilding and substate-building need not undermine but can instead enhance Filipino nation-building and state-building.
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RANDOM THOUGHTS ON REI M A G I N I N G T H E N AT I O N -S TAT E : CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT ON S OVEREIGNTY AND A UTONOMY
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Random Thoughts on Re-imagining the Nation-State: Consensus and Conflict on Sovereignty and Autonomy
Fr. Eliseo Jun Mercado, OMI Director-Institute for Autonomy and Governance
say random thoughts simply because there is scarcity of debates and consensus on the subject and issue of nation states, sovereignty, territory and autonomy or self determination. Yet, the debates before, during and post MOA AD imbroglio have caught us unprepared. I never thought that Mindanao or a portion of the island would be subject of passionate debates nationwide. Suddenly, we hear peoples from all walks of life being interviewed about the specter of an independent sub-state. True or false hardly matters when peoples got entangled along the traditional religious and ethnic fault lines that have marred the physical and geographic contours of the country and nation. The theme of the convention has intrigued me and it is for this sole reason that I have accepted to insert in my busy schedule your convention. More than twenty years ago, I attended and addressed a similar convention of social and political scientists organized by the Malaysian Association of Social Scientists.
There were five Filipinos invited to the said convention - two from the imperial Manila, the venerable Renato Constantino, Dodong N e m e n z o a n d Te m y R i v e r a a n d f r o m Mindanao, Nagasura Madale and myself expounded on the politics of separatism espoused by the MNLF. The conventions theme was the politics of separatism in Southeast Asia. Experts from various countries of SEA tried to analyze the root causes of politics of separatism beyond the usual culprits that a more traditional social scientists and policy makers point. The triple culprits are poverty, politics of exclusion and injustice perceived or real as the causes of internal conflicts. This analysis has led not a few scholars to think and believe that the economic causes explain the recurrence and even the sustainability of internal conflict. (Cf. P a u l C o l l i e r s S t u d i e s : P o l i c y f o r P o s t conflict Societies: Reducing the Risks of renewed Conflict : March 2000; Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy : June 2000; Greed War and Grievance in Civil War : October 2001; and Doing Well out of War : April 1999 WB Well War Web Site). But tragically, a peacemaking solely based on these analyses has still to produce a
Random Thoughts on Re-imagining the Nation:Consensus [107] and Conflicts on Sovereignty and Autonomy
success story of peacemaking and peacebuilding. The very understanding of nation state as a very young construct was never put on the table. Yet particularly in this part of the globe, such construct is, indeed, very young. The Bangsa Filipino or Bangsa Indonesia or Bangsa Malayo or Bangsa Moro, Bangsa Aceh, Bangsa Pattani etc. are all relatively young constructs. In fact the very controversial issues of territory, sovereignty and other elements of the so-called nation states were products of colonial heritage that continues to exercise tyranny over our spirits even after the years of de-colonization. Then and now but more specifically in our present discourse, we need to point out that nation state and all its claims of people, sovereignty, territory and government are young constructs that continue to evolve. They were not natural in the sense that they were there from the very beginning a sort of a mythical illo tempore or one of the origin myths of society. In a more radical way of speaking but perhaps closer to truth, the Filipino nationhood that our Gat Andres Bonifacio
conceived in 1896 did not go beyond the Katagalogan or by beyond the communities and peoples that the eight rays of the sun symbolize in our flag. In a similar vein the so called Republica ng Pilipinas that Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo proclaimed in 1898 covered more or less the peoples and communities that were subjects of Spain. I do not believe even for the sake of argument that Gen. Aguinaldo claimed sovereign power over the Moros and or the so called non-Christians tribes including the peoples of the Cordillera. Our claim then and now to nationhood is akin to yet another slogan that is now written in the plate numbers of motor vehicles Matatag na Republika . This reminds me of the late Sec. Ricardo Glorias rhetoric for quality education. He ordered the words quality education painted in the roof tops of all public schools. And there remained our quality education. Then globalization has come People begin to talk of bigger things, wider arena, all kinds of unions associations and federations came to being European Community which began with three became six countries then ten, and then 25 and now we have the mega European Union that continues to expand and
grow. In the Pacific Basin, we hear of APEC Summitry, in North America, it is NAFTA. In our own backyard, we have our own ASEAN that has emerged from the original Maphilindo. All these refer to something bigger and larger identities and belonging across diverse nationalities, cultures and physical boundaries established by the 18 th century construct aka nation states. The decade of the 90s that preceded the new millennium had seen what was then described as dramatic advances not only in science and technology but also of the fast movements of peoples and capitals across borders and frontiers. The whole concept of virtual world and plural communities brought about by fast movement of peoples and populations are new elements in the equation that shake the traditional understanding of t e r r i t o r y, s o v e r e i g n t y, peoples and governments. The roles for the states and governments are evolving vis--vis these developments. And if they do not change, they will be like dinosaurs condemned to extinction in the years to come. When we speak of re-imagining nation states, we are actually raising the fundamental issue whether the 19 th century construct of
nation state is still valid today. It is a more specific and pointed challenge to the traditional view and it asks the question whether we are rightly reading and interpreting the ethnic and sectarian conflicts out there in the neighborhood, in the local community, in short on the ground by offering the 19 th century construct that is expiring or gasping for its last breath. A newer and more interesting challenge to the 19 th century nation state construct comes from the trajectory or school more associated with the late Prof. Samuel Huntington. He made attempts to locate the path to social cohesion or the mode of coming together that will give people confidence and trust in one another. He cited these in pairs, the one is blood and the other is belief or, correspondingly, family and faith. In terms of these two elements we live, develop our horizon, elaborate our values and have confidence in one another and in our life as a community or nation. Consequently, the possibilities of coming together gravitate around these two elements of family relationships or blood and of faith or religion (Cf. S. Huntingtons The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of W orld World Order ).
In this light Prof. Huntington sees seven major civilizations that are characterized by certain consanguinity and a basic belief system. His theory indicates that through these civilizations, peoples will share understanding, concerns, a belief system and worldview. And these are the natural ways for people to come together. This is not something that is often misunderstood as a return to the pre-rational and the superstitious stage. Instead it points to a post rationalist period in which a new set of human sensibilities and an urgent and promising new agenda is emerging. In a similar vein, Prof. Francis Fukuyama (cf. his two works: The End of History and Virtues Trust, Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity) notes that for prosperity in business there is need for trust between people. He acknowledges sets of values cited by Weber a s k e y s to ca pita lism: di l i genc e, s avi ng, rationality, innovation, risk-taking, etc But Fukuyama opines that these will not work in the economic order unless they are undergirded by a sense of honesty, reliability, cooperation and responsibility. If those are lacking and there is no trust, then initiative cannot go forward nor will it achieve its reward. This foundational set of virtues comes from the cultures, which in turn are grounded in faith.
It is very interesting that the two most popular and thought-provoking thinkers today view the future by pointing that rationality has not been enough and will not be enough, and that there is need for an undergirding confidence and trust in culture built upon family and faith. M o r e o v e r, b o t h H u n t i n g t o n a n d Fukuyama seem to point out the shifting focus from the economic and political concerns to selfidentity and its religious roots in terms of values, cultures, religions and civilizations. The same shift appears in various fora and bodies that include the UN, the White House and the Capitol Hill, the EU and the International Financial Institutions. This is particularly discernable in various World Social Forum (WSF), WTO, and the Summit Meetings and Conference in Rio on the Environment, Kyoto on Climate change, Johannesburg on Sustainable Development, Cairo on the Family and Beijing on Women. Our departure from Huntington is the fact that we hold that values, cultures, the selfidentity of cultures and religions that generate civilizations need not be conflictual . But this will require a new hermeneutic of ethnicity, religion and civilization. It is a hermeneutic
that reads and interprets various ethnicity and civilizations albeit their diversities as able to contribute one to another. It also provides the capacity to the secularists, both in the academe and the halls of power, who have neither the capability to deal with religious differences or people who for their own purposes manipulate religions. The present incapacity is a result of enlightenment prejudice and the seeming blind commitment to a 19th century nation state construct in international relations that exclude ethnicity, religions and civilizations from the equation. Thus a new hermeneutic makes possible new attitudes and paradigm in the construction of new relations between nations and civilization, which are most important in addressing social fault lines and reconstruction work. The magic word in negotiating new paradigm is dialogue There are three basic steps that will help us walk this new path of dialogue. First is the recognition that our life, future and destiny are bound up with each other. No, we cannot espouse a politics of separatism, culture of exclusivism, nor act as sole proprietors of the land.
Second is to be open, that is, Ephpheta/Iftah, to each other learning not only from each other but more so to live and work as partners in shaping our common lives and destiny in peace, justice and care of the earth. Yes, we must not be afraid or hesitate to accept, to trust and to work with each other as partners. Third is our commitment and involvement in the promotion and guarantee of the rights and dignity of every person regardless of faith, gender, culture and color within our society/community.
The basis of this commitment is our belief that all peoples even though they belong to different religions, nations, etc. all form ONE human family, created by the ONE and same God, living in the same world/community, and destined for a common end. Openness is NOT a universal element in human relations. It has to be slowly, patiently and sometimes painfully built through time. Certain premises need to be articulated at the very outset of this journey
First, First it is our belief that the 19th century nation state construct is inadequate to address and understand the dynamics of war and peace making. The nation state theory, which attributes to poverty, politics of exclusion, injustices and greed as the bases, does not fully explain the relations that are involved in the conflicts neither they alone contribute to the solutions to the conflicts. Second, Second we reiterate that in social cohesion, the needed social capital is the capital we create not with our money or legislation, but essentially by working together and participating in a civic way in negotiating peace and working for reconstruction. Peace and reconstruction is not simply a matter of politics and economics, but more importantly, it is a matter of belief and trust which is the foundation of meaningful relationships in the community and society, including the civic life of the citizens. Third, Third religion has proved to be the enduring and stubborn inheritance of humankind both to believers and secularized modern peoples albeit acknowledged grudgingly. Notwithstanding the legacy of the enlightenment, religion continues to assert its role in the public domain. Despite the disputes (as in the EU Constitution) regarding its public role, religion shall continue to persist and often puts in disarray the secularized construct of what is or should be in the peace equation. It is
not simply neither thick nor thin but the very basis and glue of a faith-based peacemaking and peacebuilding without which all attempts to peace are rendered incomplete or futile or doomed to fail. Why? The answer is simple. Peacemaking and peoples basic rights as well are not simple liberal constructs in Res Publica. These values, too, constitute the religious and moral grammar of human interaction. And in a plural society enriched by religious understanding, we need a kind of religious literacy not a bracketing of religions to be able to navigate the many metaphors, stories, myths and modes of telling them that dominate the relationships between our differing religious families. Fourth, there is a need to re-appreciate and perhaps even re-construct the stories of conflict and war as well as peacemaking and peacebuilding, in the present age now labeled as both post modernism and post ideologies. I turn to Gil Bailie (cf. Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads: 1996) for the apt description of this age. He takes the person of Bernard (a character in Virginia Woolf s novel, The Waves) to depict the Waves) modern person. In the novel, Bernard says: I have made up thousand stories. I have filled up innumerable notebooks with phrases to be used when I have found the true story, the one story to
which all the phases refer, but I have never yet found that story. Today, post modern descendants of Bernard continue to look for that story, in the absence of which, they try to breathe life into the texts, analysis and theories with which our study of peace and peacebuilding, to say the last, is in the state of amorphous incoherence. There are no ready-made story to proffer to peace makers and peace activists But the lesson of the story for our age is perhaps the needs for a real dialogue; precisely to connect the many texts and phrases once again and believe me we need to put aside our rhetoric and together provide that story Now that we have come at a critical juncture in defining and shaping our relationship in the context of a new enterprise beyond the narrow limits of the nation state construct, there is a sense of urgency to dare break new ground both in our discourses and actions. Our national and communal traditions need to rise above the heritage of mutual suspicion and fears and address squarely the conflictual relationships that continue to soil the earth and divide our faith and ethnic communities. I wonder if this is what the martyred President of Egypt Anwar Sadat expressed at the Knesset during his historic visit of the Holy City of Jerusalem on November 7, 1977.
Yet, there remains another wall. This wall continues and constitutes a psychological barrier between us, a barrier of suspicion, a barrier of rejection, a barrier of fear, of deception, a barrier of hallucination without any action, deeds or decision. A barrier of distorted and eroded interpretation of every event and statement. It is this official statement as constituting 70% of the whole process. Today, through my visit to you, I ask why dont we stretch out our hands with faith and sincerity so that together we might destroy this barrier? Our new solidarity has to give birth to a new relationship that heals, expands and empowers. Politics and economics are inadequate to shape that meaningful relationship. Here, I echo what Fr. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, SJ said years ago: The age of nations is past. It remains for us now, if we do not wish to perish, to set aside the ancient prejudice and build the earth.
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R EPUBLIC A CT N O . 10153
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Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Fifteenth Congress First Regular Session Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, July, Monday, the twenty-sixth day of July, two thousand ten. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10153 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ELECTIONS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM) WITH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy.In accordance with the intent and mandate of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7166, entitled: An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to synchronize national
and local elections. Pursuant thereto, the elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is hereby synchronized with the national and local elections as hereinafter provided. SEC. 2. Regular Elections.The regular elections for the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) shall be held on the second (2nd) Monday of May 2013. Succeeding regular elections shall be held on the same date every three (3) years thereafter. SEC. 3. Appointment of Officers-inCharge.The President shall appoint officersin-charge for the Office of the Regional G o v e r n o r, R e g i o n a l Vi c e G o v e r n o r a n d Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. SEC. 4. Manner and Procedure of Appointing Officers-in-Charge.There shall be created a screening committee, whose members shall be appointed by the President, which shall screen and recommend, in
Republic Act No. 10153
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consultation with the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate President, the persons who will be appointed as Officers-inCharge. SEC. 5. Qualifications.No person shall be appointed officer-in-charge unless he or she complies with the qualifications for Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor or Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the ARMM, as provided in Republic Act No. 6734, entitled: An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054, entitled: As Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 67343. SEC. 6. Study and Review of the Organic Act.The appointed Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the ARMM shall conduct a study and review of Republic Act No. 9054 and submit recommendations to the Congress of the Philippines within six (6) months from their assumption into office. SEC. 7. Separability Clause.In the event any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, other provisions
not affected thereby shall remain in force and effect. SEC. 8. Repealing Clause.Republic Act No. 9333 is hereby repealed. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations and other issuances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly. SEC. 9. Effectivity Clause.This Act shall take effect immediately upon the completion, of its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Approved, (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE President of the Senate (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. Speaker of the House of Representatives This Act which originated in the House of Representatives was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on June 7, 2011 and June 6,2011, respectively. (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES Secretary of the Senate
Republic Act No. 10153
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MARILYN BARUA-YAP Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP Secretary General House of Representatives Approved: June 30, 2011 (Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III President of the Philippines
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S UPREME C OURT D ECISION ON THE C ONSTITUTIONALITY OF R EPUBLIC A CT 10153
Supreme Court Decision on the Constitutionality of [129] Republic Act 10153
Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila EN BANC

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPIE, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners, - versus SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents. G.R. No. 196271 Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, SERENO, REYES, and PERLASBERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: October 18, 2011
[130] Autonomy and Peace Review xx BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner, - versus SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and PACQUITO Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary, Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Respondents. xx REP. LAGMAN, REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN Petitioner, - versus PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. xx ALMARIM DATU DATU CENTI TILLAH,
G.R. No. 196305
G.R. No. 197221

CASAN CONDING CANA, and DEMOKRATIKO PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO BAY PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), (PDP-LABAN) Petitioners, - versus THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, TAN, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, Treasurer in his capacity as Treasurer of Philippines, the Philippines Respondents. xx TTY. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, MACALINTAL, - versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE PRESIDENT, OF THE PRESIDENT, through SECRETAR ARY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents. xx G.R. No. 197280
Petitioner, G.R. No. 197282
[132] Autonomy and Peace Review LUIS BIRAOGO, BIRAOGO BAROK Petitioner, - versus -
G.R. No. 197392
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETAR PAQUITO ARY SECRETARY PAQUITO JR., N. OCHOA, JR. Respondents. xx V. PARAS ARAS, JACINTO V. PARAS Petitioner, - versus EXECUTIVE SECRETAR PAQUITO ARY SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTIONS Respondents. xx MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., RespondentsIntervenor.
G.R. No. 197454
D E C I S I O N BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act ( RA ) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8 th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-incharge ( OICs ) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged
in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed. Factual Antecedents The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states: Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act
for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy. Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws. The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held onNovember 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao ( ARMM ). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification. RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act
Supreme Court Decision on the Constitutionality of Republic Act 10153 [137]
passed. This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. Congress passed the next law affecting A R M M R A N o . 9 1 4 0 [1] - o n J u n e 2 2 , 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later thanAugust 15, 2001. RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date. RA No. 9333 [2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill ( HB ) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM e l e c t i o n s s c h e d u l e d o n A u g u s t 8 , 2 0 11 . O n M a r c h 2 2 , 2 0 11 , t h e H o u s e o f Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor. After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law. As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271 [3] -assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA
No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. T h e r e a f t e r, p e t i t i o n e r B a s a r i M a p u p u n o No. 196305 filed in G.R. another [4] petition also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333. With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality: a) Petition for Certiorari and [5] Prohibition filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221; b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition [6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197282; G.R. c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction [7] filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392 and 197392;
d) Petition for Certiorari and [8] Mandamus filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454. Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and [9] Mandamus against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153. Subsequently, Anak Mindanao PartyList, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-inIntervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days. On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011. The Arguments The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective. The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative departments of
the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution. The Issues From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011: I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
II.
III. Whether the passage of RA No.10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
A.
Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054? Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws? Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution? IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates: A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B.
C.
B.
Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal. We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto . I. Synchronization as constitutional mandate
recognized
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General ( OSG ) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
[145]
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987. The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area. Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noonof June 30, 1992 . Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years. xxx Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992 . The first regular elections for P r e s i d e n t a n d Vi c e - P r e s i d e n t under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. We agree with this position. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, [10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. [11] The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.[12] This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. [13] These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections. This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on Elections , [14] we explained: It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vi c e - P r e s i d e n t have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the abovementioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the p h r a s e h o l d i n g simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605). That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. [15] As this Court explained in People v. Derilo , [16] [a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer s document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political s u b d i v i s i o n . [17] R e g i o n a l e l e c t i o n s i n t h e ARMM for the positions of governor, vicegovernor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected
officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of o u r d i s c u s s i o n s b e l o w, a s t h i s c o n c e p t
permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.
s I I . T h e P r e s i d e n t s C e r t i f i c a t i o n o n t h e Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of F i n a n c e , [19] e x p l a i n e d t h e e f f e c t o f t h e Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner: The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc. in Art. VI, Section
26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. xxx That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent. In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. [20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino : The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. review. [Emphasis supplied.] The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review. [21] The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the Presidents certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand. [22]
I n a n y c a s e , d e s p i t e t h e P r e s i d e n t s certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process. [23] We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground. III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054 The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of twothirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately. Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision. We find no merit in this contention. In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections,
which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law ; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections. This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history. To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, [24]leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. C o n s e q u e n t l y, R A N o . 7 6 4 7 , [ 2 5 ] R A N o . 8176, [26] RA No. 8746, [27]RA No. 8753, [28] and RA No. 9012 [29] were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently,
there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification. The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 [30] to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held t o a p p r o v e R A N o . 9 0 5 4 . T h e r e a f t e r, Congress passed RA No. 9333, [31] which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite. From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts. In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than twothirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is
higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS [33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality: M o r e o v e r, i t w o u l d b e noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative b o d y, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative b o d y, and a y, legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience. xxx A state legislature has a plenary lawmaking power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. statutes [34] (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and flexibility. III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the
plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective, [35] questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for t h e p u r p o s e . Wi t h t h e s e w o r d i n g s a s standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the r e g i o n s judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.[36] The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the
plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements. V. I V. T h e s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n i s s u e As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express constitutional recognition. [37] To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections
(which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013). During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; [38] (2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office. As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153 A . Basic Underlying Premises To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. [39] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. [40] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it e l s e w h e r e . [41] E x c e p t a s l i m i t e d b y t h e Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. [42] The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law. [43] The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the autonomous region. Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that the government must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted
under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government. The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and i n S e c t i o n 1 5 . [44] I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the n o t i o n o f i m p e r i u m e t i m p e r i o [45] i n t h e relationship between the national and the regional governments. In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national
and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted. These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save for barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013. The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution
and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures for transition from the old c o n s t i t u t i o n t o t h e n e w [46] a n d f o r t h e introduction of new concepts. [47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with us today. The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur [48] and Dinagat Islands, [49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected and
qualified. [50] A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local government from a sub-province to a province. [51] In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion. To r e t u r n t o t h e u n d e r l y i n g b a s i c concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e ., given the constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution
when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it? B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be d e t e r m i n e d b y l a w, s h a l l b e t h r e e years yearsand no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours] Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC: [52]
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time. In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows: It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution. Constitution [Emphasis ours.] Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or
mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow. [53] If at all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for. [54] In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and u n e q u i v o c a l l y, a l l o w i n g n o r o o m f o r a n y implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant
for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e. , to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. [55] Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. [56] Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC , [57] Adap v. C o m e l e c , [58] a n d M o n t e s c l a r o s v. [59] Comelec, where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the ; other hand, refers to local elective officials t h e A R M M G o v e r n o r, t h e A R M M Vi c e Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which they were originally elected. Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, [60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. [61] Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing
this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or [62] expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. C. The COMELEC has authority to order special elections
no
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881. The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident f r o m , a n d e x e m p l i f i e d b y, t h e f o l l o w i n g provisions of the Constitution: Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides: Section 8. Unless otherwise law, provided by law the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President, states: xxxx Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides: Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election appointment election, and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of l oc al officials[.] officials[ [Emphases ours] These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power. [63] Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections. After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. [64] But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of
Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. [65] Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote: Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence terrorism loss or violence, terrorism, destruction of election records, force paraphernalia or and other majeure, analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force e, e, m, majeure violence terrorism fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such elect cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours] A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but have to b e p o s t p o n e d because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure , and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision . Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term analogous
[183]
causes will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These analogous causes are further defined by the phrase of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible . Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because majeure, of (a) force (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof,s u c h election results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances. In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by the [66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor lawmakers. Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections. D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office. In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials, [67] is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes, [68] and extended the t e r m s o f t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d t h e Vi c e President [69] in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere s t a t u t e . [ 7 0 ] M o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y, n o t e v e n Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less , or more, than the constitutionally mandated three y e a r s [71] a s t h i s t i n k e r i n g w o u l d d i r e c t l y contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena. Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended t h r o u g h a h o l d o v e r, t h e t e r m c a n n o t b e shortened b y p u t t i n g a n e x p i r a t i o n d a t e earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections
shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall s u c c e e d o n e a n o t h e r, w h i l e t h e t e n u r e represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office). [72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.
Presidents E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-
synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity. At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly s t a t e d i n o r d e r t o b e r e c o g n i z e d . [73] T h e appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states: Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise law, provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours] This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth , officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. [74]
S i n c e t h e P r e s i d e n t s a u t h o r i t y t o appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-
charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial t e r m s . [75] A s i d e from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires. Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an
unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based on the above considerations,given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of Presidents the President s power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make? Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires. Vi e w e d f r o m a n o t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e , synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local government units [76] and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces. [77] These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis-vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of
the inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances. Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications. Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances. V I . Other Constitutional Concerns Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that
upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel e l e c t i o n s a n y w h e r e i n t h e c o u n t r y, t h u s allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs. This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively undertake with respect to elections. If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose the synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM. To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history past and current teach us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the past. [78] Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting ViceGovernor and a fully functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with e v e n t e m p o r a r i l y. To o u r m i n d , t h e appointment of OICs under the present circumstances is an absolute necessity. Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the
functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79] It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive r, p o s i t i o n s . H o w e v e r, i n t h e absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the case. present case The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has
supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise. A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government. In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there Necessarily, will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if Vi t h e G o v e r n o r o r t h e Vi c e - G o v e r n o r i s [80] missing. (Emphasis ours.) missing As in Menzon , leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly
cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take. B . Autonomy in the ARMM It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over the other. We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam pereat : that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, [81] and one mandate should not be given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear. [82] We
refer to the Courts declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., [83]thus: A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and a p p a r e n t l y, c o n f l i c t i n g provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them effect.[Emphasis full force and effect. supplied.] Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits. As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions: Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central government, but rather an efficient working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. We see this as
an effective partnership, not a separation. M r. R o m u l o . T h e r e f o r e , c o m p l e t e autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence. Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political framework of the [84] [Emphasis supplied.] nation. nation This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the
autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised government[.] [85] Of note by the national government is the Courts pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre [86] which we quote: Under the Philippine concept of local a u t o n o m y, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution. Conclusion Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. [87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it. [88] Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of
usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress. [89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic government the separation of powers. The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. [90] We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of
a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion. On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid. [91] Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. [92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. [93] As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary : [94] The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law
enacted. before it was finally enacted [95] [Emphasis ours.] Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm its validity. WHEREFORE, WHEREFORE premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: Velasco I join the dissent of J. Velasco with respect to the appointment of the OIC Governor and vote to hold the law as unconstitutional RENATO. RENATO. CORONA Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion T. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice I join the dissent of J. Carpio but disagree on the power of the Pres. to appoint OIC-Governor of ARMM PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice Velasco I join the dissent of Justice Velasco TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO TERESITA Associate Justice PERALT DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
P. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice Velasco I join the dissent of J. Velasco ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice
[208] Autonomy and Peace Review I join the dissent of J. Carpio JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice CATRAL JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice I join the dissent of J. Carpio P. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice CATRAL JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice I join the dissent of J. Carpio P. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice C E R T I F I CAT I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to thwriter of the opinion of the Court. RENATO RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

[1]
Entitled An act fixing the date of the plebiscite for the
approval of the amendments to Republic Act No. 6734 and setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on the last Monday of November 2001, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 9054, entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended, and for other purposes.
[2]
Entitled An Act amending fixing the Date or Regular
elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao pursuant to Republic Act No. 9054, entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended
[3]
Filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his
personal capacity, and in representation of Maguindanao Federation of Autonomous Irrigators Association, Inc., Hadji Muhmina Usman, John Anthony L. Lim, Jamilon T. Odin, Asrin Timbol Jaiyari, Mujib M. Kalang, Alih Al-Saidi J. Sapi-e, Kessar Damsie Abdil, and Bassam Aluh Saupi.
[4]
Petition for Prohibition with Very Urgent Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order dated April 11, 2011 was filed against Sixto Brillantes, as Chairperson of COMELEC, to challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 for not having
[210] Autonomy and Peace Review been submitted to a plebiscite. Since RA No. 9333 is inoperative, any other law seeking to amend it is also null and void.
[5]
With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writs of Preliminary Prohibitive and Mandatory Injunction dated June 30, 2011.
[6]
With Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a
Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction dated July 1, 2011.
[7]
With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining With Injunction and Preliminary Injunction with prayer With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and the
Order dated July 12, 2011.

[8]
for temporary restraining order dated July 11, 2011.

[9]
Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Injunction, Both Prohibitory and Mandatory dated July 1, 2011.
[10]
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress
under this Constitution shall be held on the second May, 1987. Monday of May, 1987 The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area. Section 2. The Senators Members of the House of Senators, Representatives, Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years. xxx Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second May, 1992. Monday of May, 1992 [emphasis ours]
[11]
To illustrate, while Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
fixes the term of office of elective local officials at three years, under the above-quoted provisions, the terms of the incumbent local officials who were elected in January 1988, which should have expired on February 2, 1991, were fixed to expire at noon of June 30, 1992. In the same vein, the terms of the incumbent President and Vice President who were elected in February 1986 were extended to noon of June 30, 1992. On the other hand, in order to synchronize the elections of the Senators, who have six-year terms, the twelve Senators who obtained the lowest votes during the 1992 elections were made to serve only half the time of their terms.
[12]
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996 ed.), p.

1199, citing Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 429-4.

[13]
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will
now read a section which we will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads: THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE 1992. This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized. MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992. I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three years. So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should

not have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to local officials and the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President and another six years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first synchronized necessarily, election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say? MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized. MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you. During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed that in order to synchronize the elections every three years,
[214] Autonomy and Peace Review which the body approved the first national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing. That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local and presidential elections.This time, in 1992, the President shall have This a term until 1998 and the first twelve Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election every three years. So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our elections every three years which was already approved by the body. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. xxx xxx xxx MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and Vice-President in 1992. MR. DAVIDE. Yes. MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the Senators and local officials with the election of the President? MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the provision of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.

MR. GUINGONA. Yes. MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the President up to the municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431; October 3, 1986)
[14]
G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417 and 100420, July 30,
1991, 199 SCRA 750, 758.

[15]
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,
G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413; Ordillo
v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).

[16]
271 SCRA 633, 668 (1997); Occena v. Commission on Webster s Third New International Dictionary Section 26(2) No bill passed by either House shall become
Elections, G.R. No. 52265, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 755.

[17]
Unabridged, p.1327 (1993).

[18]
a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
[19]
G. R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA A copy of the letter that the President wrote to Honorable
630.
[20]
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. as Speaker of the House of Representatives dated March 4, 2011 is reproduced below:
[216] Autonomy and Peace Review OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Philippines Malacaang 14 March 2011 HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR. Speaker House of Representatives Quezon City Dear Speaker Belmonte: Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the 1987 Constitution, I hereby certify to the necessity of the immediate enactment of House Bill No. 4146, entitled: AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM) WITH THOSE OF THE NATIONAL AND OTHER LOCAL OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9333, ENTITLED AN ACT FIXING THE DATE FOR REGULAR ELECTIONS FOR ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES to address the urgent need to protect and strengthen ARMMs autonomy by synchronizing its elections with the regular elections of national and other local officials, to

ensure that the on-going peace talks in the region will not be hindered, and to provide a mechanism to institutionalize electoral reforms in the interim, all for the development, peace and security of the region. Best wishes. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III cc: HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE Senate President Philippine Senate Pasay City Taken from: http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/congrec/ 15th/1st/15C_1RS-64b-031611.pdf. Last accessed on September 26, 2011.
[21]
See Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011.

[22]
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance , G.R. No. 115455, Tolentino, id., citing 1 J. G. Sutherland, Statutes and
Section 7, Article XIX of RA No. 6734 states: The first
October 30, 1995.

[23]
Statutory Construction 10.04, p. 282 (1972).

[24]
regular elections of the Regional Governor, Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Assembly under this Organic Act shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the ratification of this Act. The Commission on Elections shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the conduct of said election.

[25]
Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of Regular
Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes, which fixed the date of the ARMM elections on the second Monday after the Muslim month of Ramadhan.
[26]
Entitled An Act Changing the Date of Elections for the
Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Section One of Republic Act Numbered Seventy-Six Hundred and Forty-Seven Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes, which changed the date of the ARMM elections to the second Monday of March, 1993 and every three (3)
years thereafter.
[27]
Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular
Elections of Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Further Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 7647 entitled An Act Providing for the Date of Regular Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes, As Amended, and for other purposes, which moved the regional elections to the second Monday of September and every three
(3) years thereafter.

[28]
Entitled An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for the
Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Provided for Under Republic Act No. 8746 and for other purposes, which reset the regional elections, scheduled
on September 13, 1999, to the second Monday of September 2000.

[29]
Entitled An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for
Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Second Monday of September 2001, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 8953, which reset the May 2001 elections in ARMM to September
2001.
[30]
Entitled An Act Fixing the Date of the Plebiscite for the
Approval of the Amendments to Republic Act No. 6734 and setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on the Last Monday of November 2001, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 9054, Entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended, and For Other Purposes.
[31]
Entitled An Act Fixing the Date of Regular Elections
for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Pursuant to Republic Act no. 9054, Entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
[220] Autonomy and Peace Review Mindanao, as Amended, which rescheduled the ARMM regional elections scheduled for the last Monday of November 2004 to the second Monday of August 2005.
[32]
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
[33] [34]
G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 280.
Id. at 295-297, citing Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36
(1915); LEWIS SOUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, Vol. 1, Section 244, pp. 456-457.

[35]
This has been established by the following exchange
during the Constitutional Commission debates: FR. BERNAS. So, the questions I have raised so far with respect to this organic act are: What segment of the population will participate in the plebiscite? In what capacity would the legislature be acting when it passes this? Will it be a constituent assembly or merely a legislative body? What is the nature, therefore, of this organic act in relation to ordinary statutes and the Constitution? Finally, if we are going to amend this organic act, what process will be followed? MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of what is now appearing in our report. First, only the people who are residing in the units composing the region should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite. Second, the organic act has the character of a charter passed by Congress, not as a constituent assembly, but as an ordinary legislature and, therefore, the organic act will still be subject to amendments in the ordinary

legislative process as now constituted, unless the Gentleman has another purpose. FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again. [Emphasis ours.]; III Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp.182183; August 11, 1986.
[36]
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject
to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
[37] [38]
See discussions at pp. 14-15. Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials.
(1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the autonomous region shall
[222] Autonomy and Peace Review continue in effect until their successors are elected and qualified. [emphasis ours]
[39]
Fernando, The Philippine Constitution, pp. 175-176
(1974).
[40]
Id. at 177; citing the concurring opinion of Justice Jose
P. Laurel in Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249, 266 (1936).

[41] [42]
Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212 (1946).
Ople v. Torres, et al., 354 Phil. 948 (1998); see concurring
opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Schneckenburger v.
Moran, supra note 40, at 266.

[43]
State ex rel. Green v. Collison, 39 Del 245, cited in

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Defensor-Santiago, Constitutional Law, Vol. 1 (2000 ed.)

[44]
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities and municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics w i t h i n
the
framework
of
this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
[45] [46]
An empire within an empire. Bernas, Joaquin, Constitutional Structure and Powers Such as the addition of sectoral representatives in the
of Government Notes and Cases Part I, 2005 ed., p. 1249.

[47]
House of Representatives (paragraph 2, Section 5, of Article VI of the Constitution), and the validation of the power of the Presidential Commission on Good Government to issue sequestration, freeze orders, and the provisional takeover

orders of ill-gotten business enterprises, embodied in Section 26 of the Transitory Provisions.
[48]
RA No. 9495 which created the Province of Quezon del
Sur Province was rejected by the voters of Quezon Province in the plebiscite of November 13, 2008.
[49] [50] [51] [52] [53]
RA No. 9355. Section 50, RA No. 9355 and Section 52 of RA No. 9495. Section 462, RA No. 7160.
Supra note 14.

In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections [146 Phil. 798
(1970)] the Court held that, The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to [the Constitutions] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. 146 Phil. 798 (1970).
[54]
In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration [No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA

413, 423], the Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique, stated: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
[55]
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water
District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011.

[56]
Pimentel v. Ermita , G.R. No. 164978, October 13,

A
2005, citing Bernas, Joaquin, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARY (1996 ed.) 768.
[57] [58] [59] [60]
481 Phil. 661 (2004). G.R. No. 161984, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 403. G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2011. Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials.
(1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and qualified.
[61] [62]
Guekeko v. Santos, 76 Phil. 237 (1946). Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. 187883, June 16, 2009, 589 Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, No. LSee CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1. See CONSTITUTION, Article IX (C), Section 2(1).
SCRA 356.
[63]
25349, December 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465.

[64] [65] [66]
Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 159268, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 654,
663, citing Lapid v. CA, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738, quoting Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. 29658, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 150.
[67]
CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 8.

[68]
Article XVIII, Section 2. The Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
[69]
Article XVIII, Section 5. The six-year term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and VicePresident under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
[70]
Cruz, Carlo. The Law of Public Officers, 2007 edition,
p. 285, citing Mechem, Section 387.

[71] [72]
Ponencia, p. 21.
See Topacio Nueno v. Angeles , 76 Phil. 12, 21-22
(1946); Alba, etc. v. Evangelista, etc., et al., 100 Phil. 683, 694 (1957); Aparri v. Court of Appeals, No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231.
[73]
Hon. Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National
Police Commission v. Hon. Alejandro S. Urro, et al., G.R.

No. 191560, March 29, 2011, citing Sarmiento III v. Mison, No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549.
[74] [75]
Sarmiento III v. Mison, supra.

If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 451 Phil. 812 (2003).

[76] [77] [78]
Supra notes 47 and 48. Supra note 50.

The after-effects of the Maguindanao massacre where
the Ampatuans stand charged, the insurrection by the MILF and its various factions, and the on-going peace negotiations, among others, are immediately past and present events that the nation has to vigilant about.
[79] [80] [81]
274 Phil. 523 (1991).
Id. at 532. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.

As noted under footnote 37. 118 Phil. 1468 (1963).
191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.

[82] [83] [84]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, August
11, 1986, p. 179.

[85]
Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 391 Phil. 84, 102 (2000).
560.
[86] [87] [88]
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936). Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, 343 Phil.
411, 427 (1997) citing Pangilinan v. Maglaya, 225 SCRA 511 (1993).
[89]
Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, , Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc.,
162335 and 162605, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468, 581.
[90]
2010, 618 SCRA 315.

[91]
et al., 210 Phil. 187, 207 (1983); Peralta v. Commission on Elections, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-

47791 and L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30; Ermita-
Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.
[92]
See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan , 421 Phil. 290
(2001); Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon.
Reyes , etc., et al., supra ; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.

[93]
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc.,

G.R. No. 100883, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 516.
et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.

[94] [95]
Id. at 523.

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AUTONOMY & PEACE REVIEW

A Quarterly Publication of the Institute for Autonomy and Governance

RE-IMAGINING NEW PATHS TO PEACE

KONRAD ADENAUER - STIFTUNG

[8] Autonomy and Peace Review

majority of those in Mindanao opportunities to improve their live s.

[10] Autonomy and Peace Review

REVISITING THE DYNAMICS CONFLICT AND EXCLUSION

[12] Autonomy and Peace Review

[14] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[16] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[18] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[20] Autonomy and Peace Review

a. Exclusion from benefits of national economic growth

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[22] Autonomy and Peace Review

b. Unsustainable growth patterns

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

Source: NEDA, 2008

[24] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[26] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[28] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[30] Autonomy and Peace Review

security, and human development in the Philippines. Makati City:

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[32] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[34] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[36] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[38] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[40] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

traditional sources of Revenue

non-traditional sources of Revenue

[42] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[44] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[46] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[48] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[50] Autonomy and Peace Review

Infant Mortality (per 1000 live births)

Source: World Bank, 2008

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

Source: World Bank, 2008

[52] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[54] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[56] Autonomy and Peace Review

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

[58] Autonomy and Peace Review