2 MILLER
v.
ALABAMA Syllabusthe Eighth Amendment.
Held:
The Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that man-dates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile homicideoffenders. Pp. 6
−
27.(a) The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-ishment “guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to ex-cessive sanctions.”
Roper
v.
Simmons
, 543 U. S. 551, 560. That right“flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for crimeshould be graduated and proportioned’ ” to both the offender and theoffense.
Ibid.
Two strands of precedent reflecting the concern with proportionatepunishment come together here. The first has adopted categoricalbans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the cul-pability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty. See
, e.g., Kennedy
v.
Louisiana,
554 U. S. 407. Several cases in this grouphave specially focused on juvenile offenders, because of their lesserculpability. Thus,
Roper
v.
Simmons
held that the Eighth Amend-ment bars capital punishment for children, and
Graham
v.
Florida
,560 U. S. ___, concluded that the Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense.
Graham
further likened life without parole for ju-veniles to the death penalty, thereby evoking a second line of cases.In those decisions, this Court has required sentencing authorities toconsider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his of-fense before sentencing him to death. See
, e.g., Woodson
v.
NorthCarolina,
428 U. S. 280 (plurality opinion). Here, the confluence of these two lines of precedent leads to the conclusion that mandatorylife without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment. As to the first set of cases:
Roper
and
Graham
establish that chil-dren are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purpos-es. Their “‘lack of maturity’” and “‘underdeveloped sense of respon-sibility’ ” lead to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.
Roper,
543 U. S.
,
at 569. They “are more vulnerable . . . to negativeinfluences and outside pressures,” including from their family andpeers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” andlack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producingsettings.
Ibid.
And because a child’s character is not as “wellformed” as an adult’s, his traits are “less fixed” and his actions areless likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”
Id.,
at 570.
Roper
and
Graham
emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harsh-est sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terriblecrimes.While
Graham
’s flat ban on life without parole was for nonhomi-