WWD Flex Fuel Aff

SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Flex Fuel Mandate Aff Index

Flex Fuel Mandate Aff Index.......................................................................................................................................................................1
1AC Inherency.............................................................................................................................................................................................5
1AC Plan......................................................................................................................................................................................................6
1AC High Oil Prices Destroys Global Economy ........................................................................................................................................7
1AC High Oil Prices Destroys Global Economy.........................................................................................................................................8
1AC Oil Spills Advantage............................................................................................................................................................................9
1AC Oil Spills Advantage..........................................................................................................................................................................10
1AC Democratization Advantage..............................................................................................................................................................11
1AC Solvency............................................................................................................................................................................................16
1AC Solvency............................................................................................................................................................................................17
1AC Solvency............................................................................................................................................................................................18
Inherency—A2 Status Quo Incentives Solve/Flex-Fuel Now...................................................................................................................19
Oil Spills Adv—US Oil Dependence → Oil Spills...................................................................................................................................20
Oil Spills Adv—Reducing US Oil Dependence Solves Oil Spills............................................................................................................21
Oil Spills Adv—Oil Spills Threaten Marine Life/Ecoystems....................................................................................................................22
Oil Spills Adv—Ethanol/Methanol Spills Don’t Hurt Environment.........................................................................................................23
High Oil Prices Bad—US Economy/A2 Housing = Alternate Causality..................................................................................................24
High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys US Economy/Alternative Energy Solves...............................................................................................25
High Oil Prices Bad—Global Economy/Oil Shocks.................................................................................................................................26
High Oil Prices Bad—Hurts Global Economy..........................................................................................................................................27
High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys US Economy..........................................................................................................................................28
High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys Japanese/European/US Economies........................................................................................................29
High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys Global Economy/A2 Econ = Resilient...................................................................................................30
Democratization Adv—Oil Undermines Democracy................................................................................................................................31
Potential 1AC Global Poverty Advantage.................................................................................................................................................39
Poverty Adv—High Oil Prices Exacerbate Global Poverty......................................................................................................................45
Poverty Adv—High Oil Prices Hurt Developing Countries......................................................................................................................46
Poverty Adv—US Fuel Choice Key to Third World Development...........................................................................................................47
Poverty Adv—Genocide Impacts..............................................................................................................................................................48
Poverty Adv—Poverty = Greatest Global Threat/Moral + Legal Obligation to Combat..........................................................................49
Poverty Adv—Ethical Responsibility Outweighs Disadvantages.............................................................................................................50
Poverty Adv—Destroying OPEC Oil Dominance Key to Social Justice..................................................................................................51
Potential 1AC Peak Oil Advantage............................................................................................................................................................52
Peak Oil Adv—All-Important 411….........................................................................................................................................................55
Peak Oil Adv—Oil Production Peak Coming Now...................................................................................................................................56
Peak Oil Adv—Destroys Global Economy...............................................................................................................................................60
1
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Peak Oil Adv—Destroys Global Economy...............................................................................................................................................61
Peak Oil Adv—Alternative Energy Key to Averting Peak Oil..................................................................................................................62
Peak Oil Adv—Now Key Time to Avert Peak Oil.....................................................................................................................................63
Peak Oil Adv—A2 Tech Advances/New Discoveries Solve.....................................................................................................................64
Peak Oil Adv—A2 Nobody Supports Peak Oil/Based on Faulty Science.................................................................................................65
Oil Prices Will Continue to ↑.....................................................................................................................................................................66
Global Oil Demand Will ↑.........................................................................................................................................................................67
US Oil Dependence Will ↑.........................................................................................................................................................................68
1AC Terrorism Impact Module..................................................................................................................................................................69
Oil Dependence Bad—Empowers Terrorists Globally..............................................................................................................................70
Oil Dependence Bad—Empowers Terrorists Globally..............................................................................................................................71
Oil Dependence Bad—Terrorist Attacks ↑ Global Oil Prices....................................................................................................................72
Nuclear Terrorism Impacts.........................................................................................................................................................................73
High Oil Prices Bad—1AC War on Terrorism Impact..............................................................................................................................74
1AC Strategic Flexibility Impact Module..................................................................................................................................................75
Oil Dependence Bad—Undermines US FoPo Flexibility.........................................................................................................................76
Oil Dependence Bad—Undermines US FoPo Flexibility.........................................................................................................................77
Oil Dependence Bad—Destroys US Hegemony.......................................................................................................................................78
US Hegemony Good Impacts....................................................................................................................................................................79
1AC Secessionist Conflicts Impact Module..............................................................................................................................................80
1AC Secessionist Conflicts Impact Module..............................................................................................................................................81
Secessionism Adv—Oil Revenues → Civil Wars......................................................................................................................................82
Secessionism Adv—Oil Revenues → Civil Wars......................................................................................................................................83
Oil Dependency Bad—A2 They’re Dependent on Other Resources.........................................................................................................84
Oil Dependency Bad—Cripples Oil-Producing State Stability.................................................................................................................85
Oil Dependency Bad—Civil Wars/Internal Conflicts ...............................................................................................................................89
1AC Iraqi Insurgency Impact Module.......................................................................................................................................................90
High Oil Prices Bad—Fuels Iraqi Insurgency...........................................................................................................................................91
High Oil Prices Bad—1AC Chavez Anti-Americanism Agenda...............................................................................................................92
High Oil Prices Bad—1AC Chavez Anti-Americanism Agenda...............................................................................................................93
High Oil Prices Bad—Empower Chavez...................................................................................................................................................94
High Oil Prices Bad—Allow Chavez to Fund Colombian Guerillas........................................................................................................95
1AC Iran Nuclearization Impact Module..................................................................................................................................................96
High Oil Prices Bad—Finances Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program...........................................................................................................97
High Oil Prices Bad—Empowers Iran.......................................................................................................................................................98
High Oil Prices Bad—Empower Caspian Human Rights/Democracy Violations.....................................................................................99
Oil Dependence Bad—US = Vulnerable to Oil Supply Disrupts............................................................................................................100
Oil Dependence Bad—Resource Wars....................................................................................................................................................101
Oil Dependence Bad—Resource Wars....................................................................................................................................................103
Oil Dependence Bad—Resource Wars/A2 China = Peaceful Rise..........................................................................................................104
Oil Dependence Bad—Resource Wars/A2 Victor...................................................................................................................................105
Oil Dependence Bad—Resources Wars/A2 Improbable.........................................................................................................................106
Oil Dependence Bad—Caspian Corruption Impact Module...................................................................................................................107
Oil Dependence Bad—Caspian Corruption Impact Module...................................................................................................................108
Oil Dependence Bad—Laundry List Impacts..........................................................................................................................................109
Oil Dependence Bad—Laundry List Impacts..........................................................................................................................................110
Oil Dependence Bad—Empowers Anti-American Regimes...................................................................................................................111
Oil Dependency Bad—Corruption of US Political System.....................................................................................................................112
2AC Trade Deficit Add-On......................................................................................................................................................................113
2AC Naval Power Add-On......................................................................................................................................................................114
2AC Diplomatic Maneuverability Add-On..............................................................................................................................................115
2AC Starvation Add-On...........................................................................................................................................................................116
2AC Sudan/Diplomatic Maneuverability Add-On...................................................................................................................................117
2AC Air Pollution Add-On......................................................................................................................................................................118
Air Pollution Adv—Alcohol Fuels Solve Air Pollution...........................................................................................................................119
Air Pollution Adv—Ethanol Solves Air Pollution...................................................................................................................................120
2
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Air Pollution Adv—Air Pollution Kills Millions Annually.....................................................................................................................121
Solvency—FFV Mandate Solves Price Spike Vulnerability...................................................................................................................122
Solvency—FFV Mandate = Best Solves US Oil Dependence................................................................................................................123
Solvency—FFV Mandate Solves High Oil Prices...................................................................................................................................124
Solvency—Ethanol Solves Oil Dependence/Energy Security.................................................................................................................125
Solvency—Methanol Solves Energy Dependence/Climate Change.......................................................................................................126
Solvency—Methanol Solves FF Dependence.........................................................................................................................................127
Solvency—FFV Mandate Key to Methanol Economy ...........................................................................................................................128
Solvency—Cellulosic Ethanol Solves Energy Security/Pollution...........................................................................................................129
Solvency—Alternative Fuels Key to Solve Peak Oil..............................................................................................................................130
Solvency—Alternative Energy Solves Oil Shock Vulnerability.............................................................................................................131
Solvency—A2 No Infrastructure/No Fuel Market Exists........................................................................................................................132
Solvency—A2 No Infrastructure/No Fuel Market Exists........................................................................................................................133
Solvency—A2 Can’t Break Oil’s Strategic Importance..........................................................................................................................134
Solvency—A2 Unsustainable Environmental Practices Turn.................................................................................................................135
Solvency—A2 No Flex-Fuel Tech Exists Now.......................................................................................................................................136
Solvency—A2 Transition Away From Oil Won’t Happen.......................................................................................................................137
Solvency—A2 You Can’t Sufficiently Reduce Oil Dependence.............................................................................................................138
Solvency—A2 You Can’t Reduce Oil Prices Enough to Solve...............................................................................................................139
Solvency—A2 Ethanol Production → Deforestation..............................................................................................................................140
Solvency—A2 Methanol Infeasible/Poses Safety Risks.........................................................................................................................141
2AC Answers To “Positive/Voluntary Incentives CP”............................................................................................................................142
2AC Answers to “Positive Incentives CP”..............................................................................................................................................143
2AC Answers to “States CP”...................................................................................................................................................................144
1AR Answers to “States CP”—California Economy Extension..............................................................................................................150
2AC Answers to “Exclude ‘X’ Fuel CP”.................................................................................................................................................151
2AC Answers to “Drilling CP”................................................................................................................................................................152
2AC Answers to “Drilling CP”................................................................................................................................................................153
2AC Answers To “Conservation/Energy Efficiency CP”........................................................................................................................154
2AC Answers to “Hydrogen Fuel Cells CP”...........................................................................................................................................155
2AC Answers to “Pure Electric Cars CP”................................................................................................................................................156
2AC Answers to “PHEV CP”..................................................................................................................................................................157
2AC Answers to “Delay CP”...................................................................................................................................................................158
2AC Answers To “Objectivism/Coercion”..............................................................................................................................................159
2AC All-Purpose Disadvantage Slayer....................................................................................................................................................160
2AC Answers to “T—Incentive = Positive” ...........................................................................................................................................161
2AC Answers to “T—Incentive = Positive”............................................................................................................................................162
2AC Answers to “Food Prices DA”.........................................................................................................................................................163
2AC Answers to “Bush Good Agenda Politics”......................................................................................................................................166
Generic Answers to “T—Incentive = Positive”.......................................................................................................................................169
Generic Answers to “T—Incentive = Positive” ......................................................................................................................................170
Generic Answers to “T—Incentive = Positive” ......................................................................................................................................171
Generic Answers to “T—Incentive = Positive”.......................................................................................................................................172
2AC Answers to “OPEC Flood DA”.......................................................................................................................................................173
Russian Oil Answers—Economic Reforms Turn....................................................................................................................................174
Russian Oil Answers—Diversification Turn...........................................................................................................................................175
Russian Oil Answers—Low Oil Prices Key to Russian Economy..........................................................................................................176
Russian Oil Answers—Inflation Turn......................................................................................................................................................177
Russian Oil Answers—Inflation Turn Extensions...................................................................................................................................178
Russian Oil Answers—Oil Not Key to Russian Economy......................................................................................................................179
3
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Russian Oil Answers—Russian Economic Growth Bad 2AC.................................................................................................................180
Russian Oil Answers—Russian Economic Growth Bad Extensions.......................................................................................................181
US/Saudi Relations Answers—Oil Not Key to Relations.......................................................................................................................182
US/Saudi Relations Answers—Relations ↓ Now....................................................................................................................................183
US/Saudi Relations Answers—High Oil Prices Hurt Relations Turn.....................................................................................................184
US/Saudi Relations Answers—US/Saudi Relations → Terrorism..........................................................................................................185
IPI Pipeline Answers—Undermines Indian Energy Security..................................................................................................................186
Saudi Regime Collapse Answers.............................................................................................................................................................187
Potential Commercial Tech Key to Heg Adv...........................................................................................................................................188
State Regs Bad for Auto Industry Adv.....................................................................................................................................................189
Corruption Impacts—Destroys Environment..........................................................................................................................................190
4
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC Inherency
No compelling market exists now for flex-fuel vehicles—only a flex-fuel mandate can incentivize the
development of an open fuels market that solves oil dependence
Blanchard 3/9/08 (Scott, independent advocate for energy security and maintains an energy-related blog at
energyvictory.blogspot.com, "Require flex fuel to stop OPEC's hold,"
http://www.al.com/opinion/birminghamnews/index.ssf?/base/opinion/1205050581156350.xml&coll=2)
A little-known section of the Energy Security Act of 2007 contained a provision that would require within five years all new vehicles sold (foreign and domestic) in the
United States be capable of running on alcohol fuels (a k a "flex fuel") as well as gasoline. It costs, on average, about $100 to make a car flex-fuel capable. The most
common flex fuel available today is ethanol, or E85, but flex-fuel cars can run on any alcohol-based fuel such as methanol or butanol
and, of course, on gasoline.
This one provision would have had the effect of creating an international standard for flex-fuel automobiles. In turn, it would have
had a domino effect forcing foreign automakers to equip their vehicles for flex fuel (or risk losing the huge U.S. market). With the
minimal costs involved to make the conversion, they would have done so without hesitation. It is estimated this would, within three
years of enactment, result in 50 million flex-fuel capable automobiles on the road in the U.S. and millions more worldwide, creating a
huge market for alternative fuels based on ethanol (E85) and methanol (M85/M50). For the first time in the history of mass transportation, gasoline
would be forced to compete with alcohol fuels.
This simple plan has been passionately outlined by Robert Zubrin in his recently released book titled "Energy Victory: Winning the War on Terror by Breaking Free of
Oil." In it, he outlines in very simple and straightforward terms how the key to breaking free from our oil addiction lies not in conservation, but rather in substitution.
"Indeed, where it takes a huge hike (in price) to reduce energy use, it only takes a small edge to cause a shift from one energy source to another. This is the key insight
needed to beat OPEC: We need to switch the world to a different fuel," writes Zubrin.
If we were to take the simple step advocated by Zubrin (and others), we would, for the first time in history, create a competitive market for
fuel that would ultimately provide the elusive trump card needed to break the oil cartel's vertical monopoly on oil prices. Oil is
currently more than $100 per barrel. This creates a huge opportunity market for domestic sources of energy such as ethanol and
methanol (E85 is competitive with gasoline as long as oil is selling for $50 per barrel or more). However, since the number of flex-fuel vehicles
nationwide is only about 3 percent of the total, no compelling market exists for station owners to install the Flex-Fuel E85 pumps
necessary to provide consumer choice (and thus kick-start this market). The open fuel standard provision would have changed all
that, and we would see a pro-Western national and international standard evolve without any further government intervention needed.
On March 1, the first retail E85/B20 pumps in the state of Alabama became operational. The Dogwood Shell Station in Vestavia Hills was the recipient of a state
alternative fuels grant and installed a "bio-fuels" island with two E85 pumps and two biodiesel (B20) pumps. The E85 pumps have a distinctive bright yellow hose and
handle, while the biodiesel pumps have vivid green hoses and handles to help distinguish them from the standard unleaded pumps. Let's hope this is the mustard seed of
hope that brings forth a wave of fuel choices for our state and nation as we seek to diversify our energy mix and take steps to achieve energy independence and security.
Fuel choice:
Let's also seek to persuade our members of Congress that it is in our interest to have fuel choice.
Had the Open Fuel Standard mentioned above been enacted (and not removed at the last moment due to lobbying by Nissan Motor Co.), we
would be well on our way toward weaning ourselves off the shackles of our oil addiction.
This step alone would break the oil cartel's monopoly on the world's fuel supply, forcing it to compete with ethanol and
methanol produced by farmers around the globe and particularly right here in Alabama. That's something we can all get behind.
Bush administration opposition has ensured that flex-fuel mandates have failed to pass
Zubrin Fall 07 (Robert, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributing editor of The New Atlantis,
is an astronautical engineer and author of Energy Victory, "Achieving Energy Victory," The New Atlantis,
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/achieving-energy-victory)
So what’s stopping FFV legislation from becoming reality in the United States? There have been a few half-hearted attempts in
Congress in recent years, but in the absence of any significant support from the president, these bills have gone nowhere. And
why doesn’t the White House support FFVs? In March 2006, I discussed this proposal with John H. Marburger III, the president’s science
advisor. He asked me a number of detailed questions about the FFV proposal, which I answered. I then asked him, “So why not implement the plan? If
the president introduced a bill calling for a flex-fuel mandate, he’d get bipartisan support and the bill would pass. It would be a real accomplishment for the
administration and for American energy independence.” Marburger answered: “We don’t believe in mandates.”
5
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC Plan
The United States federal government should mandate that all new vehicles sold in the United States be
flex-fuel capable.
6
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC High Oil Prices Destroys Global Economy

Oil supplies won’t keep pace with demand growth, ensuring oil prices rise towards $200 a barrel—this
will break the back of the global economy
Sato and Okada 6/25/08 (Shigeru and Yuji, Columnists @ Bloomberg, "Oil at US$200 would trigger global recession, Deutsche
Bank warns," Financial Post, http://www.financialpost.com/reports/oil-watch/story.html?id=612878)
The global economy would collapse if oil hit US$200 a barrel, said the top energy analyst at Germany's largest bank.
"Two-hundred dollar oil would break the back of the global economy," Deutsche Bank AG's chief energy economist Adam
Sieminski said in an interview on Wednesday in Tokyo. "Next step after US$200 would be global recession and bad news for
everybody."
Mr. Sieminski's comments come after Goldman Sachs Group Inc. forecast oil may rise to between US$150 and US$200 within two
years as supply growth, especially from producers outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, fails to keep pace with
demand. Deutsche Bank is due to release its oil-price forecast on June 27.
Investors are betting on oil reaching $250 dollars a barrel in the foreseeable future—this would not only
skyrocket fuel prices, but plunge the US, Europe, China, AND Japan into deep recessions
Janofski 6/16/08 (Michael, Bloomberg, "Gazprom CEO's $250 Oil Forecase Is Doom Traders Love (Update1),"
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aWwoUcZaR5BY&refer=home)
June 16 (Bloomberg) -- At $250 a barrel for crude oil, food prices double. The U.S., Japan and Europe plunge into deep
recession. Companies go bankrupt. Airlines are nationalized. Sport-utility vehicle sales dry up as gasoline tops $7 a gallon.
The scenario may not be unimaginable. Alexei Miller, chief executive officer of OAO Gazprom, the world's biggest natural- gas company, said
June 10 that crude will climb to $250 a barrel in the ``foreseeable future.'' Prices may reach that level only after a war or attack on major oil
installations, says Jeff Spittel, an analyst at Natixis Bleichroeder Inc. in New York.
While executives, elected leaders and economists disagree on the probability of Miller's vision, there is consensus that the price would jolt everyday life.
`Ìt would be a disaster for all the oil-importing countries, all the democracies and China,'' says James Woolsey, vice president of
consultant Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. in McLean, Virginia, and a former Central Intelligence Agency director. `Ànd it would be hugely beneficial for the
many monarchies and dictatorships that are the main suppliers.''
Some investors are already betting on Miller's forecast. At least 3,008 options contracts have been purchased giving holders the right to
buy oil at $250 a barrel in December, data compiled by Bloomberg show. The options closed at 64 cents on June 13.
Rising oil costs have been responsible for a third of global food inflation since 2004, according to London-based research firm New Energy Finance.
`Àt $7-a-gallon gasoline, you're probably looking at food prices almost double,'' says Peter Beutel, president of energy consultant Cameron
Hanover Inc. in New Canaan, Connecticut.
`Massive Shutdown'
Crude oil prices reached a record $139.89 a barrel today, more than double what they were a year earlier. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley
forecast the cost may reach $150 in the next few months.
At $250, ``there would be a massive shutdown of companies,'' says Carlos Mattei, procurement vice president for glassmaker Vitro SAB in
Monterrey, Mexico. ``Many of these small companies have to choose between paying the gas bill or payroll.''
Japanese economic collapse sparks nuclear war with China
The Guardian 2/11/02 (lexis)

Even so, the west cannot afford to be complacent about what is happening in Japan, unless it intends to use the country as a test case to
explore whether a full-scale depression is less painful now than it was 70 years ago. Action is needed, and quickly because this is an economy that
could soak up some of the world's excess capacity if functioning properly. A strong Japan is not only essential for the long-term health of the
global economy, it is also needed as a counter-weight to the growing power of China. A collapse in the Japanese economy , which
looks ever more likely, would have profound ramifications; some experts believe it could even unleash a wave of extreme nationalism that would
push the country into conflict with its bigger (and nuclear) neighbour.
7
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC High Oil Prices Destroys Global Economy

Rising oil prices presents the greatest threat to the global economy
The Record 6/19/08 ("Salvation comes in a fuel cell," http://news.therecord.com/Opinions/article/370032)

Meanwhile, the cost of oil that continues to surge like a tidal wave presents the greatest threat of all to the world's economy.
There were gasps when the price of a barrel of oil hit $140 this week; the experts say it could reach $250 within 18 months. It is unpleasant
if necessary to imagine how much this could raise the price of virtually everything we buy and shock the global economy into
depression.
Economic collapse causes terrorism, environmental collapse, and wars that risk extinction
Douglas Torgerson, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Studies – Trent University, Ontario, The Promise of Green
Politics: Environmentalism and the Public Sphere, 1999, p. 145-6
By adopting an uncompromising posture, green radicalism serves to high-light the danger that green reforms might well be absorbed
and rendered ineffective by the established order. Against reforims, green radicals emphasize the need to thoroughly transform
prevailing institutions and ways of viewing the human/nature relationship. In the absence of coherent and plausible programs for
radical transformation, however, desperate scenarios of crisis and catastrophe become inviting: “The very best thing for the planet,”
one radical green has thus declared, “might be a massive worldwide economic depression”: “Amid the terrible hardships this
would create for countless people, at least the machinery would stop for a while, and the Earth could take a breather.”5 Needless to
say, this repugnant hope ignores the obvious range of potential consequences arising from such a scenario. Social
insecurity and human misery could intensify human conflicts and promote neglect of environmental concerns as
people desperately sought to protect themselves, there could also be increased terrorism, even warfare of a type and
scale that would prove enormously destructive to life on earth.
8
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC Oil Spills Advantage

US oil dependence ensures future catastrophic oil spills
Campbell 93 (Thomas, General Counsel for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Spring, 45 Baylor L. Rev. 221,
lexis)
"Thousands of oil spills occur in the United States each year. Over the three-year period from 1988 through 1990, the federal government received
42,000 notifications of oil discharges, an average of 15,000 per year, or about forty notifications per day. In 1990 alone, there were twenty-four oil spills that exceeded
100,000 gallons, five of which were greater than 1 million gallons. In 1989, thirty-eight oil spills exceeded 100,000 gallons, including the devastating Exxon Valdez
spill ...." 1 Thus, "the growing public concern about the quality of our natural environment has prompted Congress in recent years to enact legislation designed to curb
the accelerating destruction of our country's natural beauty." 2
On August 18, 1990, President George Bush signed into law the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 "OPA", 3 which was passed unanimously by both houses of Congress. 4 This
Act was a response to what the President stated as being "the worst marine environmental disaster this nation has ever experienced." 5 "During this disaster 11
million gallons of oil spilled from the Exxon Valdez into the waters of Prince William Sound, Alaska. Since then, California, the Gulf
of Mexico, the Mid-Atlantic, and New England have suffered oil spills." 6
The nation's continued heavy dependence on oil will result in increasing transport of oil in tankers through U.S. waters and greater off-
shore exploration and production in deeper waters and harsher environments. These conditions can only increase the potential for future
catastrophic oil spills and the need to prevent such pollution and minimize its damage. 7
Oil spills disrupt the marine oxygen pump
Dempsey 84 (Paul Stephen, Professor of Transportation law and Director of the Transportation Law Program @ University of
Denver College of Law, 6 NW.J. INT’L L. & BUS. 459, lexis)
The ramifications of introducing such high concentrations of petroleum pollution into the oceans are severe. Oil pollution disrupts
phytoplankton, the microscopic plant life in the ocean that forms algae and serves an important function in the ecosystem. First, oil
interferes with phytoplankton photosynthesis. Such interference may eventually reduce the oxygen output and the carbon dioxide
uptake of ocean. Moreover, increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere may cause a "greenhouse effect," such that heat will not be allowed to radiate into space,
causing an increase in global temperatures. As a long term effect, the ice caps could eventually melt, causing the sea level to increase up to 200 feet, submerging most
coastal cities. 27
The proper functioning of the pump is key to all life on Earth
Bryant 03 (Donald A., Dep’t. of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology @ Penn. State University, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, August 19, http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/100/17/9647)
Oxygenic photosynthesis accounts for nearly all the primary biochemical production of organic matter on Earth. The byproduct of this
process, oxygen, facilitated the evolution of complex eukaryotes and supports their/our continuing existence. Because macroscopic
plants are responsible for most terrestrial photosynthesis, it is relatively easy to appreciate the importance of photosynthesis on land when one views the lush green
diversity of grasslands or forests. However, Earth is the “blue planet,” and oceans cover nearly 75% of its surface. All life on Earth equally
depends on the photosynthesis that occurs in Earth's oceans.
9
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC Oil Spills Advantage

Lastly, ocean destruction will ensure planetary extinction
Craig 03 (Robin Kundis- Associate Professor at Indiana University School of Law, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness
Protection”, McGeorge Law Review, Winter, lexis)
Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far
rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide,
worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production.
, "ocean ecosystems
856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. 857 More generally
play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living
organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." 858 In a
very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining
biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in
the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." 859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly
dependent on their biodiversity. [*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on
coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that
many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. 860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine
ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in
the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. 861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However,
economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have
considerable force and merit." 862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human
activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the
oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the
NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence
should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be
unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we
will take most of the biosphere with us.
10
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC Democratization Advantage

Overwhelming statistical and historical evidence demonstrates that high oil prices undermines political
freedoms and democratization
Thomas L. Friedman, Pulitzer Prize winning author and columnist for the New York Times, Foreign Policy, May/June 2006, “The First Law of
Petropolitics”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3426
As I followed events in the Persian Gulf during the past few years, I noticed that the first Arab Gulf state to hold a free and fair election, in which women
could run and vote, and the first Arab Gulf state to undertake a total overhaul of its labor laws to make its own people more employable and less dependent on imported
labor, was Bahrain. Bahrain happened to be the first Arab Gulf state expected to run out of oil. It was also the first in the region to sign a
free trade agreement with the United States. I couldn’t help asking myself: “Could that all just be a coincidence? Finally, when I looked across the Arab world,
and watched the popular democracy activists in Lebanon pushing Syrian troops out of their country, I couldn’t help saying to myself:
“Is it an accident that the Arab world’s first and only real democracy happens not to have a drop of oil?”
The more I pondered these questions, the more it seemed obvious to me that there must be a correlation—a literal correlation that
could be measured and graphed—between the price of oil and the pace, scope, and sustainability of political freedoms and
economic reforms in certain countries. A few months ago I approached the editors of this magazine and asked them to see if we could do just that—try to
quantify this intuition in graph form. Along one axis we would plot the average global price of crude oil, and along the other axis we would plot the pace of expanding
or contracting freedoms, both economic and political, as best as research organizations such as Freedom House could measure them. We would look at free and fair
elections held, newspapers opened or closed, arbitrary arrests, reformers elected to parliaments, economic reform projects started or stopped, companies privatized and
companies nationalized, and so on.
I would be the first to acknowledge that this is not a scientific lab experiment, because the rise and fall of economic and political freedom in a society can never be
perfectly quantifiable or interchangeable. But because I am not trying to get tenure anywhere, but rather to substantiate a hunch and stimulate a discussion, I think
there is value in trying to demonstrate this very real correlation between the price of oil and the pace of freedom, even with its
imperfections. Because the rising price of crude is certain to be a major factor shaping international relations for the near future, we
must try to understand any connections it has with the character and direction of global politics. And the graphs assembled here
certainly do suggest a strong correlation between the price of oil and the pace of freedom—so strong, in fact, that I would like
to spark this discussion by offering the First Law of Petropolitics.
The First Law of Petropolitics posits the following: The price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petrolist states.
According to the First Law of Petropolitics, the higher the average global crude oil price rises, the more free speech, free press,
free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, and independent political parties are eroded. And these
negative trends are reinforced by the fact that the higher the price goes, the less petrolist leaders are sensitive to what the
world thinks or says about them. Conversely, according to the First Law of Petropolitics, the lower the price of oil, the more
petrolist countries are forced to move toward a political system and a society that is more transparent, more sensitive to
opposition voices, and more focused on building the legal and educational structures that will maximize their people’s ability, both men’s
and women’s, to compete, start new companies, and attract investments from abroad. The lower the price of crude oil falls, the more petrolist
leaders are sensitive to what outside forces think of them.
I would define petrolist states as states that are both dependent on oil production for the bulk of their exports or gross domestic product and have weak state institutions
or outright authoritarian governments. High on my list of petrolist states would be Azerbaijan, Angola, Chad, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Kazakhstan, Nigeria,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela. (Countries that have a lot of crude oil but were well-established states, with solid democratic institutions and
diversified economies before their oil was discovered—Britain, Norway, the United States, for example—would not be subject to the First Law of Petropolitics.)
To be sure, professional economists have, for a long time, pointed out in general the negative economic and political impacts that an
abundance of natural resources can have on a country. This phenomenon has been variously diagnosed as “Dutch Disease” or the
“resource curse.” Dutch Disease refers to the process of deindustrialization that can result from a sudden natural resource windfall. The term was coined in the
Netherlands in the 1960s, after it discovered huge deposits of natural gas. What happens in countries with Dutch Disease is that the value of their currency rises, thanks
to the sudden influx of cash from oil, gold, gas, diamonds, or some other natural resource discovery. That then makes the country’s manufactured exports uncompetitive
and its imports very cheap. The citizens, flush with cash, start importing like crazy, the domestic industrial sector gets wiped out and, presto, you have
deindustrialization. The “resource curse” can refer to the same economic phenomenon, as well as, more broadly speaking, the way a dependence on natural resources
always skews a country’s politics and investment and educational priorities, so that everything revolves around who controls the oil tap and who gets how much from it
—not how to compete, innovate, and produce real products for real markets.
Beyond these general theories, some political scientists have explored how an abundance of oil wealth, in particular, can reverse or
erode democratizing trends. One of the most trenchant analyses that I have come across is the work of UCLA political scientist Michael L. Ross. Using a
statistical analysis from 113 states between 1971 and 1997, Ross concluded that a state’s “reliance on either oil or mineral exports
tends to make it less democratic; that this effect is not caused by other types of primary exports; that it is not limited to the
Arabian Peninsula, to the Middle East, or sub-Saharan Africa; and that it is not limited to small states.”
What I find particularly useful about Ross’s analysis is his list of the precise mechanisms by which excessive oil wealth impedes
democracy. First, he argues, there is the “taxation effect.” Oil-rich governments tend to use their revenues to “relieve social pressures that
might otherwise lead to demands for greater accountability” from, or representation in, the governing authority. I like to put it this way: The
motto of the American Revolution was “no taxation without representation.” The motto of the petrolist authoritarian is “no representation without taxation.” Oil-backed
regimes that do not have to tax their people in order to survive, because they can simply drill an oil well, also do not have to listen to their people or represent their
wishes.
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The second mechanism through which oil dampens democratization, argues Ross, is the “spending effect.”
Oil wealth leads to greater patronage
spending, which in turn dampens pressures for democratization. The third mechanism he cites is the “group formation effect.”
When oil revenues provide an authoritarian state with a cash windfall, the government can use its newfound wealth to prevent
independent social groups—precisely those most inclined to demand political rights—from forming. In addition, he argues, an
overabundance of oil revenues can create a “repression effect,” because it allows governments to spend excessively on police, internal
security, and intelligence forces that can be used to choke democratic movements. Finally, Ross sees a “modernization effect” at work. A massive
influx of oil wealth can diminish social pressures for occupational specialization, urbanization, and the securing of higher levels of education—trends that normally
accompany broad economic development and that also produce a public that is more articulate, better able to organize, bargain, and communicate, and endowed with
economic power centers of its own.
The First Law of Petropolitics tries to build on such arguments but to take the correlation between oil and politics one step further. What I am arguing in positing the
First Law of Petropolitics is not only that an overdependence on crude oil can be a curse in general but also that one can actually correlate rises and falls
in the price of oil with rises and falls in the pace of freedom in petrolist countries. The connection is very real. As these graphs
demonstrate, the pace of freedom really starts to decline as the price of oil really starts to take off.
And democracy skeptics ignore the question of “who started/caused war” and their exceptions to the
“rule” of democratic peace is overwhelmed by empirical evidence—the continued spread of
democratization is key to global nuclear peace
Muravchik 01 (Joshua, Resident Scholar @ American Enterprise Institute, "Democracy and Nuclear Peace," July 11-14,
http://www.npec-web.org/Syllabus/Muravchik.pdf)
The greatest impetus for world peace -- and perforce of nuclear peace -- is the spread of democracy. In a famous article, and subsequent
book, Francis Fukuyama argued that democracy's extension was leading to "the end of history." By this he meant the conclusion of man's quest for the right social order, but he also meant the
"diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states."1 Fukuyama's phrase was intentionally provocative, even tongue-in-cheek, but he was pointing to two down-to-earth
historical observations: that democracies are more peaceful than other kinds of government and that the world is growing more democratic. Neither point has
gone unchallenged.
Only a few decades ago, as distinguished an observer of international relations as George Kennan made a claim quite contrary to the first of these assertions. Democracies, he said, were slow to
Kennan's view was strongly influenced by the policy of "unconditional surrender" pursued in
anger, but once aroused "a democracy … fights in anger … to the bitter end."2
World War II. But subsequent experience, such as the negotiated settlements America sought in Korea and Vietnam proved him wrong.
Democracies are not only slow to anger but also quick to compromise. And to forgive. Notwithstanding the insistence on unconditional surrender, America treated Japan
and that part of Germany that it occupied with extraordinary generosity.
In recent years a burgeoning literature has discussed the peacefulness of democracies. Indeed the proposition that democracies do not
go to war with one another has been described by one political scientist as being "as close as anything we have to an empirical law
in international relations."3 Some of those who find enthusiasm for democracy offputting have challenged this proposition, but their challenges have only served as empirical tests
that have confirmed its robustness. For example, the academic Paul Gottfried and the columnist-turned-politician Patrick J. Buchanan have both instanced democratic England's declaration of
war against democratic Finland during World War II.4 In fact, after much procrastination, England did accede to the pressure of its Soviet ally to declare war against Finland which was allied
with Germany. But the declaration was purely formal: no fighting ensued between England and Finland. Surely this is an exception that proves the rule.
The strongest exception I can think of is the war between the nascent state of Israel and the Arabs in 1948. Israel was an mbryonic democracy and Lebanon, one of the Arab belligerents, was
also democratic within the confines of its peculiar confessional division of power. Lebanon, however, was a reluctant party to the fight. Within the councils of the Arab League, it opposed the
war but went along with its larger confreres when they opted to attack. Even so, Lebanon did little fighting and soon sued for peace. Thus, in the case of Lebanon against Israel, as in the case of
England against Finland, democracies nominally went to war against democracies when they were dragged into conflicts by authoritarian allies. The political scientist Bruce Russett offers a
different challenge to the notion that democracies are more peaceful. "That democracies are in general, in dealing with all kinds of states, more peaceful than are authoritarian or other
nondemocratically constituted states … is a much more controversial proposition than 'merely' that democracies are peaceful in their dealings with each other, and one for which there is little
Russett cites his own and other statistical explorations which show that while democracies rarely fight one
systematic evidence," he says.5
another they often fight against others.
The trouble with such studies, however, is that they rarely examine the question of who started or caused a war. To reduce the data to
a form that is quantitatively measurable, it is easier to determine whether a conflict has occurred between two states than whose fault it was. But the latter question is all
important. Democracies may often go to war against dictatorships because the dictators see them as prey or underestimate their resolve.
Indeed, such examples abound. Germany might have behaved more cautiously in the summer of 1914 had it realized that England would fight to vindicate Belgian neutrality and to support
France. Later, Hitler was emboldened by his notorious contempt for the flabbiness of the democracies. North Korea almost surely discounted the likelihood of an American military response to
its invasion of the South after Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly defined America's defense perimeter to exclude the Korean peninsula (a declaration which merely confirmed existing
U.S. policy). In 1990, Saddam Hussein's decision to swallow Kuwait was probably encouraged by the inference he must have taken from the statements and actions of American officials that
Washington would offer no forceful resistance.
Russett says that those who claim democracies are in general more peaceful "would have us believe that the United States was regularly on the defensive, rarely on the offensive, during the
Cold War."6 But that is not quite right: the word "regularly" distorts the issue. A victim can sometimes turn the tables on an aggressor, but that does not make the victim equally bellicose. None
would dispute that Napoleon was responsible for the Napoleonic wars or Hitler for World War II in Europe, but after a time their victims seized the offensive. So in the Cold War, the United
States may have initiated some skirmishes (although in fact it rarely did), but the struggle as a whole was driven one-sidedly. The Soviet policy was "class warfare"; the American policy was
"containment." The so-called revisionist historians argued that America bore an equal or larger share of responsibility for the conflict. But Mikhail Gorbachev made nonsense of their theories
when, in the name of glasnost and perestroika, he turned the Soviet Union away from its historic course. The Cold War ended almost instantly--as he no doubt knew it would. "We would have
been able to avoid many … difficulties if the democratic process had developed normally in our country," he wrote.7
To render judgment about the relative peacefulness of states or systems, we must ask not only who started a war but why. In particular we should consider what in Catholic Just War doctrine is
called "right intention," which means roughly: what did they hope to get out of it? In the few cases in recent times in which wars were initiated by democracies, there were often motives other
than aggrandizement, for example, when America invaded Grenada. To be sure, Washington was impelled by self-interest more
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than altruism, primarily its concern for the well-being of American nationals and its desire to remove a chip, however tiny, from the Soviet game board. But America had no designs upon
Grenada, and the invaders were greeted with joy by the Grenadan citizenry. After organizing an election, America pulled out. In other cases, democracies have turned to war in the face of
provocation, such as Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out an enemy sworn to its destruction or Turkey's invasion of Cyprus to rebuff a power-grab by Greek nationalists. In contrast,
the wars launched by dictators, such as Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, North Korea's of South Korea, the Soviet Union's of Hungary and Afghanistan, often have aimed at conquest or subjugation.
The big exception to this rule is colonialism. The European powers conquered most of Africa and Asia, and continued to hold their prizes as Europe
democratized. No doubt many of the instances of democracies at war that enter into the statistical calculations of researchers like Russett stem from the colonial era.
But colonialism was a legacy of Europe's pre-democratic times, and it was abandoned after World War II. Since then, I know of no
case where a democracy has initiated warfare without significant provocation or for reasons of sheer aggrandizement, but there are
several cases where dictators have done so.
One interesting piece of Russett's research should help to point him away from his doubts that democracies are more peaceful in general. He aimed to explain why
democracies are more peaceful toward each other. Immanuel Kant was the first to observe, or rather to forecast, the pacific inclination of
democracies. He reasoned that "citizens … will have a great hesitation in … calling down on themselves all the miseries of war."8 But this valid insight is
incomplete. There is a deeper explanation. Democracy is not just a mechanism; it entails a spirit of compromise and self-restraint. At bottom,
democracy is the willingness to resolve civil disputes without recourse to violence. Nations that embrace this ethos in the conduct
of their domestic affairs are naturally more predisposed to embrace it in their dealings with other nations.
Russett aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward one another. To do this, he constructed two models. One hypothesized that the cause lay in the mechanics of democratic
decision-making (the "structural/institutional model"), the other that it lay in the democratic ethos (the "cultural/normative model"). His statistical assessments led him to conclude that: "almost
always the cultural/normative model shows a consistent effect on conflict occurrence and war. The structural/institutional model sometimes provides a significant relationship but often does
not."9
If it is the ethos that makes democratic states more peaceful toward each other, would not that ethos also make them more peaceful in general? Russett implies that the answer is no, because to
his mind a critical element in the peaceful behavior of democracies toward other democracies is their anticipation of a conciliatory attitude by their counterpart. But this is too pat. The attitude
The citizens and officials of democracies recognize that other states, however governed,
of live-and-let-live cannot be turned on and off like a spigot.
have legitimate interests, and they are disposed to try to accommodate those interests except when the other party's behavior seems
threatening or outrageous.
A different kind of challenge to the thesis that democracies are more peaceful has been posed by the political scientists Edward G.
Mansfield and Jack Snyder. They claim statistical support for the proposition that while fully fledged democracies may be pacific, in th[e] transitional phase of
democratization, countries become more aggressive and warprone, not less."10 However, like others, they measure a state's likelihood of becoming
involved in a war but do not report attempting to determine the cause or fault. Moreover, they acknowledge that their research
revealed not only an increased likelihood for a state to become involved in a war when it was growing more democratic, but an almost
equal increase for states growing less democratic. This raises the possibility that the effects they were observing were caused simply
by political change per se, rather than by democratization.
Finally, they implicitly acknowledge that the relationship of democratization and peacefulness may change over historical periods. There is no reason to suppose that any such relationship is
governed by an immutable law. Since their empirical base reaches back to 1811, any effect they report, even if accurately interpreted, may not hold in the contemporary world. They note that
"in [some] recent cases, in contrast to some of our historical results, the rule seems to be: go fully democratic, or don't go at all." But according to Freedom House, some 62.5 percent of extant
governments were chosen in legitimate elections.11 (This is a much larger proportion than are adjudged by Freedom House to be "free states," a more demanding criterion, and it includes many
weakly democratic states.) Of the remaining 37.5 percent, a large number are experiencing some degree of democratization or heavy pressure in that direction. So the choice "don't go at all"12
is rarely realistic in the contemporary world.
These statistics also contain the answer to those who doubt the second proposition behind Fukuyama's forecast, namely, that the world is growing more democratic. Skeptics have drawn upon
Samuel Huntington's fine book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Huntington says that the democratization trend that began in the mid-1970s in Portugal,
Greece and Spain is the third such episode. The first "wave" of democratization began with the American Revolution and lasted through the aftermath of World War I, coming to an end in the
interwar years when much of Europe regressed back to t or military dictatorship. The second wave, in this telling, followed World War II when wholesale decolonization gave rise to a raft
of new democracies. Most of these, notably in Africa, collapsed into dictatorship by the 1960s, bringing the second wave to its end. Those who follow Huntington's argument may take the
failure of democracy in several of the former Soviet republics and some other instances of backsliding since 1989 to signal the end of the third wave.
Such an impression, however, would be misleading. One unsatisfying thing about Huntington's "waves" is their unevenness. The first lasted about 150 years, the second about 20. How long
should we expect the third to endure? If it is like the second, it will ebb any day now, but if it is like the first, it will run until the around the year 2125. And by then—who knows?--perhaps
mankind will have incinerated itself, moved to another planet, or even devised a better political system. Further, Huntington's metaphor implies a lack of overall progress or direction. Waves
rise and fall. But each of the reverses that followed Huntington's two waves was brief, and each new wave raised the number of democracies higher than before. Huntington does, however,
present a statistic that seems to weigh heavily against any unidirectional interpretation of democratic progress. The proportion of states that were democratic in 1990 (45%), he says, was
identical to the proportion in 1922.13 But there are two answers to this. In 1922 there were only 64 states; in 1990 there were 165. But the number of peoples had not grown appreciably. The
difference was that in 1922 most peoples lived in colonies, and they were not counted as states. The 64 states of that time were mostly the advanced countries. Of those, two thirds had become
democratic by 1990, which was a significant gain. The additional 101 states counted in 1990 were mostly former colonies. Only a minority, albeit a substantial one, were democratic in 1990,
but since virtually none of those were
democratic in 1922, that was also a significant gain. In short, there was progress all around, but this was obscured by asking what percentage of states were democratic. Asking the question this
way means that a people who were subjected to a domestic dictator counted as a non-democracy, but a people who were subjected to a foreign dictator did not count at all.
Moreover, while the criteria for judging a state democratic vary, the statistic that 45 percent of states were democratic in 1990 corresponds with Freedom House's count of "democratic" polities
(as opposed to its smaller count of "free" countries, a more demanding criterion). But by this same count, Freedom House now says that the proportion of democracies has grown to 62.5
percent. In other words, the "third wave" has not abated.
The fall of Communism not only ended the Cold War; it also ended the only universalist ideological challenge to democracy. Radical Islam may still offer an alternative to democracy in parts
of the world, but it appeals by definition only to Moslems and has not even won the assent of a majority of these. And Iranian President Khatami's second landslide election victory in 2001
suggests that even in the cradle of radical Islam the yearning for democracy is waxing. That Freedom House could count 120 freely elected governments by early 2001 (out of a total of 192
independent states) bespeaks a vast transformation in human governance within the span of 225 years. In 1775, the number of democracies was zero. In 1776, the birth of the United States of
America brought the total up to one. Since then, democracy has spread at an accelerating pace, most of the growth having occurred within the twentieth century, with greatest momentum since
1974.
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That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all history, was inevitable. So many peoples were
swept up in the democratic tide that there was certain to be some backsliding.
Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts rather
than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend remains powerful and clear. Despite
the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today than ever before. This progress offers a source of
hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned
Communism and turned to democracy. For other ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence
or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the greatest cause for worry may rest with the
Moslem Middle East where nuclear arsenals do not yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still more remote.
The absence of democracy creates multiple scenarios for extinction
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 95 (October, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990's,"
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could
easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly
corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on
Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated
with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not
go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not
ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do
not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long
run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to
protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to
breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable
foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
The continuation of petro-authoritarianism will distort the international system in ways that threaten
global stability—only US action to utilize new energy sources and lower global oil prices can ensure
successful democratization efforts
With all due respect to Ronald Reagan, I do not believe he brought down the Soviet Union. There were obviously many factors, but
the collapse in global oil prices around the late 1980s and early 1990s surely played a key role. (When the Soviet Union officially
dissolved on Christmas Day 1991, the price of a barrel of oil was hovering around $17.) And lower oil prices also surely helped tilt the
postcommunist Boris Yeltsin government toward more rule of law, more openness to the outside world, and more sensitivity to the
legal structures demanded by global investors. And then came Russian President Vladimir Putin. Think about the difference between Putin when oil was in
the $20–$40 range and now, when it is $40–$60. When oil was $20–$40, we had what I would call “Putin I.” President Bush said after their first meeting in 2001 that he
had looked into Putin’s “soul” and saw in there a man he could trust. If Bush looked into Putin’s soul today—Putin II, the Putin of $60 a barrel—it would look very
black down there, black as oil. He would see that Putin has used his oil windfall to swallow (nationalize) the huge Russian oil company, Gazprom, various newspapers
and television stations, and all sorts of other Russian businesses and once independent institutions.
When oil prices were at a nadir in the early 1990s, even Arab oil states, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, which has
substantial gas deposits, were at least talking about economic reform, if not baby-step political reforms. But as prices started to
climb, the whole reform process slowed, particularly on the political side.
As more and more oil wealth piles up in petrolist countries, it could really begin to distort the whole international system and
the very character of the post-Cold War world. When the Berlin Wall fell, there was a widespread belief that an unstoppable tide of free markets and
democratization had also been unleashed. The proliferation of free elections around the world for the next decade made that tide very real. But that tide is now running
into an unanticipated counter-wave of petro-authoritarianism, made possible by $60-a-barrel oil. Suddenly, regimes such as those in Iran, Nigeria, Russia,
and Venezuela are retreating from what once seemed like an unstoppable process of democratization, with elected autocrats in each
country using their sudden oil windfalls to ensconce themselves in power, buy up opponents and supporters, and extend their state’s
chokehold into the private sector, after many thought it had permanently receded. The unstoppable tide of democratization that
followed the fall of the Berlin Wall seems to have met its match in the black tide of petro-authoritarianism.
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Although petro-authoritarianism does not represent the sort of broad strategic and ideological threat that communism posed to the West, its long-term impact
could nevertheless corrode world stability. Not only will some of the worst regimes in the world have extra cash for longer than
ever to do the worst things, but decent, democratic countries—India and Japan, for instance—will be forced to kowtow or turn a
blind eye to the behavior of petro-authoritarians, such as Iran or Sudan, because of their heavy dependence on them for oil. That cannot be good
for global stability.
Let me stress again that I know that the correlations suggested by these graphs are not perfect and, no doubt, there are exceptions that readers will surely point out. But I
do believe they illustrate a general trend that one can see reflected in the news every day: The rising price of oil clearly has a negative impact on the
pace of freedom in many countries, and when you get enough countries with enough negative impacts, you start to poison
global politics.
Although we cannot affect the supply of oil in any country, we can affect the global price of oil by altering the amounts and types
of energy we consume. When I say “we,” I mean the United States in particular, which consumes about 25 percent of the world’s
energy, and the oil-importing countries in general. Thinking about how to alter our energy consumption patterns to bring down the price of oil is no longer simply a
hobby for high-minded environmentalists or some personal virtue. It is now a national security imperative.
Therefore, any American democracy-promotion strategy that does not also include a credible and sustainable strategy for finding
alternatives to oil and bringing down the price of crude is utterly meaningless and doomed to fail. Today, no matter where you are on
the foreign-policy spectrum, you have to think like a Geo-Green. You cannot be either an effective foreign-policy realist or an effective democracy-promoting idealist
without also being an effective energy environmentalist.
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A flex-fuel mandate would cause an immediate shift that would spark infrastructure buildups, private
investment, and tech advances while also making flex-fuel the international automotive standard—this
can achieve energy independence within 8 years
Zubrin 2/25/06 (Robert, author + president of Pioneer Astronautics, an aerospace engineering and research firm, "Embracing
flexible fuels would help U.S. free itself of oil imports," http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/2006/Feb/25/bzubrin-bflexing-
nations-muscle/)
The U.S. Congress can make America energy independent within eight years at the stroke of a pen. All that is required is to pass
a law stating that starting in 2008, all new cars sold in the United States must be flexible fuel vehicles.
Flexible fuel vehicles are cars that can use as fuel any combination of gasoline and alcohol. The alcohols so employed can be either
methanol or ethanol.
Flex-fuel cars are not a futuristic dream. In fact, this year Detroit will offer some 24 models of standard cars with a flex-fuel option
available for purchase. The engineering difference between the flex-fuel units and the standards models is in one sensor and a
computer chip that controls the fuel-air mixture, and the employment of a corrosion resistant fuel line. The difference in price from
standard units ranges from zero to $800, with $100 being typical.
U.S. production potential
The largest producers of both ethanol and methanol are all in the Western Hemisphere, with the United States having by far the
greatest production potential for both.
Ethanol is made from agricultural products. Methanol can also be made from such biomass materials, as well as natural gas and coal. American coal reserves alone are
sufficient to power every car in the country on methanol for more than 500 years.
Currently, ethanol can be produced for about $1.50 a gallon, without any subsidy. Methanol, which has no subsidy, is currently selling
for 90 cents a gallon. It is 105 octane fuel. A methanol/gasoline fuel mixture that is 85 percent methanol (known as M85, and 40 percent
ethanol mixture in gasoline would be E40, etc.) could be made right now for about $1.30 a gallon. E85 can currently be produced for less than
$2 per gallon, without any subsidy.
If American cars were made flexible fueled so they could use such fuels, the shift to their utilization would be immediate, as they
offer dramatic economy compared to $3-a-gallon gasoline.
Unleashing market forces
within three years of enactment of a flex-fuel mandate, there would be more
Seventeen million news cars are sold each year in the United States. So
than 50 million cars on the road in the United States capable of burning high-alcohol fuels. This would unleash market forces that
would quickly call into being high-alcohol fuel pumps across the nation, and mobilize large amounts of private capital to
support vigorous research programs to develop ever cheaper ways of synthesizing alcohol fuels.
If it were mandated that all cars sold in the United States had to be flex-fueled, foreign car manufacturers would mass produce
such units as well. This would create a large market in Europe and Asia for American methanol and ethanol, as well as that
produced in Brazil and other tropical agricultural countries. This would reverse our trade deficit, improve conditions in the Third
World, and cause a global shift in world economic power in favor of the West.
A boon to environment
By promoting agriculture, flexible-fueled vehicles act as global cooling agents. This is so because plants draw carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere, and because the
large surface areas of the leaves of plants increases water evaporation at the Earth's surface.
The water vapor thus produced transports heat from the surface to the upper atmosphere, where most of it is released to space. In addition, the use of alcohol also
reduces air pollution.
Methanol can be used as the raw material to produce dimethyl ether, which is a completely clean-burning diesel fuel. Such fuel could be used by ships (thereby securing
the vital fuel supply for the U.S. Navy), railroads and trucks, and eventually automobiles. Diesel engines offer efficiencies greater than 50 percent, substantially higher
than is possible with internal combustion engines, and equal to anything realistically possible from far more expensive, and as yet impractical, fuel cells.
To liberate ourselves from the threat of foreign economic domination, to destroy the economic power of the terrorist's financiers, and
to give ourselves the free hand necessary to deal as forcefully as required with oil tyrannies funding worldwide jihad, we must take
action that radically devalues their resources and increases the value of our own.
The necessary policy may be summed up in a single sentence: We must take the world off the petroleum standard, and put it
on the alcohol standard.
We can do this by passing a law requiring all new cars to be flex-fueled.
16
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC Solvency
A flex-fuel mandate would create an alcohol fuel market and related infrastructure not only domestically,
but also internationally—drastically lowers oil prices, solves third world development, enables us to win
the war on terrorism
Zubrin 2/14/08 (Robert, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributing editor of The New
Atlantis, is an astronautical engineer and author of Energy Victory: Winning the War on Terror by Breaking Free of Oil, "Breaking
OPEC’s Grip," National Review,
http://article.nationalreview.com/print/?q=ZTg5NjkyMmJhNjJiNjIxMWIwNDkzNWZmOWZlMjgzZTg=)
However, there is now a way to break OPEC, a surprisingly simple one. What is needed is for Congress to pass a law requiring that all
new cars sold (not just made, but sold) in the U.S. be flex-fueled — that is, be able to run on any combination of gasoline or alcohol fuels.
Such cars already exist — two dozen different models of flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) are being produced by Detroit’s Big Three this year — and they only cost about $100
more than identical models that can run on gasoline only. (The switch to FFV requires only two minor upgrades: in the materials used in the fuel line and
in the software controlling the electronic fuel injector.)
FFVs currently command only about 3 percent of the new-car market. After all, there is little upside for consumers to own one, with
alcohol-fuel pumps being nearly as rare as unicorns. Little wonder: Why should gas-station owners dedicate one of their pumps to alcohol fuels (like
E85 — a mix of 85-percent ethanol and 15-percent gasoline — or M50 — a mix of half methanol and half gasoline) when only a tiny percentage of cars can use them?
But, within three years of the enactment of an FFV mandate, there would be 50 million cars on American roads capable of running on
high-alcohol fuels. Under those conditions, fuel pumps dispensing E85 and M50 would be everywhere — creating, for the first
time, an effectively open market in vehicle fuels, and competition for OPEC oil.
By mandating that all new cars sold in the U.S. have flex-fuel capacity, we would induce all foreign automakers who want access to
the American car market to switch their lines to flex fuel as well, effectively making flex fuel the international standard. In addition to the
50 million FFVs we’d see in the U.S. in three years, there would be hundreds of millions more worldwide that could be powered by any number
of alternative fuels derived from numerous sources around the globe, forcing gasoline to compete everywhere. This would effectively break the vertical
monopoly that the oil cartel currently holds on the world’s fuel supply, constraining prices to the $50-per-barrel range (where alcohol
fuels become competitive).
Such a development would also create a market that would mobilize tens of billions of dollars of private investment into
techniques for the production of cellulosic ethanol and other advanced alcohol fuels. Those investments will further reduce the
price of alcohol fuels and will radically expand America’s and our allies’ potential resource base (although methanol already can be
produced from any kind of biomass, without exception, as well as coal, natural gas, and urban trash).
With such a production and distribution infrastructure in place, we could proceed to not merely contain the petrotyrranies, but crush them at our pleasure by
implementing tax and tariff policies that favor alcohols over petroleum. Instead of sending the U.S. president to beg Saudi dictators for favorable treatment from OPEC
dictators, we could defeat these often anti-American and terror-supporting regimes. Effectively, we could take over a trillion dollars a year that is now
flowing to the oil cartel, and direct it towards the world’s agricultural and mining sectors instead. This would not only be of great
benefit to U.S. farmers and miners, but an enormous boon to the third world, which otherwise faces brutal looting through the
regressive tax imposed by OPEC’s unconstrained price hikes. There is not just a strategic and economic case for breaking the
oil cartel, but a strong humanitarian case, as well.
The Islamists’ power lies in their control of oil. Our strength is in biomass and coal. These can be readily turned into alcohol fuels. By standardizing technology
that makes such alcohols usable to the vehicles on the road, we will open the fuel market in a way that will destroy the monopoly-
inflated value of our enemies’ resources, while greatly increasing the value of our own resources and those of our friends and allies.
Instead of financing terrorism, we could be funding world development. Instead of selling controlling blocks of Citibank or CNN to Saudi
princes, we could be selling tractors to Africa. That is the way to win the war on terror.
17
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC Solvency
Any delay ensures the US remains locked into petroleum for the indefinite future—the cheapest, easiest,
and most immediate step to solve oil dependency and incentivize alternative fuels is through a flex-fuel
mandate
Luft 5/21/08 (Gal, Executive Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, "Sovereign Wealth Funds, Oil and the New
World Economic Order," http://www.iags.org/Luft_HFRC_SWF_052108.pdf)
Break the oil cartel. In the long run, the only way to roll back the new economic order and restrain OPEC’s control over the world economy is to reduce the inherent
value of its commodity. This cannot be done as long as we continue to put on our roads cars that can run on nothing but petroleum. Every year 17 million new
cars roll onto America’s roads. Each of these cars will have a lifespan of nearly 17 years. In the next Congressional session 35 million
new cars will be added. If the next president presides for two terms he or she will preside over the introduction of 150 million new
cars. If we allow all those cars to be gasoline only we are locking our future to petroleum for decades to come. I cannot think of
something more detrimental to America’s security than Congress allowing this to happen. Congress can break OPEC’s monopoly over the transportation
sector by instituting fuel choice. The cheapest, easiest and most immediate step should be a federal Open Fuel Standard,
requiring that every new car put on the road be a flex fuel car, which looks and operates exactly like a gasoline car but has a $100 feature which
enables it to run on any combination of gasoline and alcohol. Millions of flex fuel cars will begin to roll back oil’s influence by igniting a boom
of innovation and investment in alternative fuel technologies. The West is not rich in oil, but it is blessed with a wealth of other energy sources from
which alcohol fuels - such as ethanol and methanol – capable of powering flexible fuel vehicles, can be affordably and cleanly generated. Among them: vast rich
farmland, hundreds of years' worth of coal reserves, and billions of tons a year of agricultural, industrial and municipal waste. Even better: in an alcohol economy,
scores of poor developing countries which right now struggle under the heavy economic burden caused by high oil prices would be able to become net energy exporters.
With hot climate and long rainy seasons countries in south Asia, Africa and Latin America enjoy the perfect conditions for the production of sugarcane ethanol, which
costs roughly half the price and is five times more efficient than corn ethanol. Hence, a shift to alcohol enabled cars will enable developing countries to generate
revenues and emerge as a powerful force that could break OPEC’s dominance over the global transportation sector.
A flex-fuel mandate spurs an international alcohol fuel standard—this would force oil prices down to $50
a barrel in the short term and reduce oil prices even further through cost-reducing process improvements
Zubrin 4/6/08 (Robert, president of the aerospace engineering and research firm Pioneer Astronautics, “Ten Questions with Robert
Zubrin," http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/4/6/12235/79208)
And here is the key thing: These alcohol fuel pumps would be appearing not only all across the USA, but all over the world. Because
if we made it the law that to sell a car into USA it had to be flex fuel, that would make flex fuel the INTERNATIONAL standard. The
Japanese, Koreans, and Europeans are not about to walk away from the American automobile market. So they would simply switch
their entire production lines over to flex fuel. What that would mean is that any car being marketed in any serious way anywhere in
the world would be flex fuel, and we would see hundreds of millions of them all over the globe in just a few years. This would create
an open-source fuel market, that would force gasoline to compete at the pump everywhere against ethanol and methanol produced
from any number of sources all over the world. This would break the vertical monopoly of the oil cartel, eliminating forever their
power to raise prices without constraint. The price of oil would be forced back down to about $50/bbl, because that is where
alcohol fuels become competitive, and then pushed down further as the huge non-monopoly controlled market mobilized
capital into R&D to drive cost-reducing process improvements.
18
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Inherency—A2 Status Quo Incentives Solve/Flex-Fuel Now

Status quo administration policies have been grossly insufficient and proposed conservation measures
will fail—every day we delay implementing a flex-fuel mandate increasing our vulnerability and
empowers oil interests
Gartenstein-Ross 5/2/08 (Daveed, NDT champion and vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies,
"Symposium: Energy Independence and the Terror War," http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=7DFE9F38-493C-
4887-9E33-4D267570E830)
The Bush administration has had more than seven years to steer the country’s energy policy, yet its combined policies amount to
slapping a few Band-Aids on a hemorrhaging wound. (This is of course not just the Bush administration’s fault: as a country, we have had more than
forty years to address this issue since the dangers of our oil dependence became crystal clear.) For example, the primary strategy of the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007 is a new national mandatory fuel economy standard that, in President Bush’s words, “will save billions of gallons of gasoline.” But as Zubrin
shows in his commendable book Energy Victory, conservation-based strategies are not, and will not be, sufficient. If we could duplicate the
technical success that Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards achieved from 1975 through 1990, Zubrin writes, we would not cut our
oil consumption at all. Instead, it would reduce our expected rate of increase of oil usage by only 2.2 million barrels a day, during a
period when the world as a whole is likely to raise its consumption another 30 million barrels per day. Whatever demand we
eliminate would be replaced fifteen times over.
President Bush has also congratulated himself on the ethanol policies that his administration has undertaken, but they are a far cry
from the large market for ethanol that Zubrin’s policy recommendations would spur. (By Bush’s account, we produced 6.4 billion gallons
of ethanol in 2007 versus the approximately 200 billion gallons of gasoline and petroleum diesel that we use annually.)
But fortunately, while our oil dependence is currently causing great harm, I don’t think the immediate solutions are mysterious. I agree strongly with the
recommendations put forward by Zubrin and Luft in this symposium. Fuel flexibility should be the first major policy we push for because it
provides immediate relief from this grave problem, but we should also move toward electrification of the transportation sector. The bottom line is that
we are worse off, and our enemies in a better position, for each day that action is delayed.
19
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Oil Spills Adv—US Oil Dependence → Oil Spills

Oil dependence makes accidents and oil spills inevitable
Panoff 98 (JD Candidate @ Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College, Fall, 28 Envtl. L. 701, lexis)
n192. This is parallel to the dilemma presented by Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi in his hypothetical "gift of the evil deity." Id. at 1-3. In this hypothetical, an
evil deity offers to grant one wish that could be used for the betterment of society. However, in return, the deity will cause the excruciating death of several people.
When our society chooses to have an economy and lifestyle dependent on oil, we are aware that there inevitably will be
accidents and oil spills that will greatly affect both nature and the lives of many individuals.
Failure to reduce US oil dependency makes large-scale oil spills inevitable
Schoenfarber 95 (Jay, Winter, 9 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 147, lexis)

Greenpeace decided not to direct its attention toward strengthening response mechanisms, or the enactment of stricter oil pollution laws. 50 Instead, the organization
focused on what it thought was the real cause of the Valdez spill: oil dependency. The spill "is the most graphic illustration of what
potential disaster exists when there is dependency on oil". 51 According to Greenpeace, unless we decrease our dependency on oil, spills
like Valdez are inevitable.
20
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Oil Spills Adv—Reducing US Oil Dependence Solves Oil Spills

Reducing US oil dependence solves oil spills
Mohr and Shapiro 00 (Noam and Joseph, Researchers at the U.S. PIRG Education Fund, “Pumping up the Price: The Hidden
Costs of Outdated Fuel Efficiency Standards”, October, http://uspirg.org/reports/pumpinguptheprice2000.pdf)
Transporting the excess oil needed to accommodate low mileage vehicles contributes to the danger of oil spills. In 1989, when the
Exxon Valdez spilled almost 11 million gallons of oil into Alaska’s Prince William Sound, Americans saw how environmentally
devastating oil spills can be.38 Yet while the Exxon Valdez received widespread media coverage, oil spills are hardly unusual events.
Every year, the U.S. alone experiences thousands of spills, amounting to millions of gallons of oil. Oil spills kill wildlife and release
vapors which cause cancer and respiratory disease.
By reducing the amount of petroleum that must be stored and transported, updating CAFÉ standards would prevent more than
808 oil spills on average each year in the United States, amounting to more than 3.2 million gallons of oil spillage annually.39 This is
the equivalent of preventing an Exxon Valdez disaster about every three years.40 As the U.S. imports half the oil it uses,41 the
number of oil spills worldwide resulting directly from outdated fuel efficiency standards is likely far higher.
21
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Oil Spills Adv—Oil Spills Threaten Marine Life/Ecoystems

Oil spills threaten marine life and ecosystems
Parent 06 (Jason, associate with the Law Offices of Beauregard, Burke & Franco in New Bedford, Massachusets, Fall, 14 Buff.
Envt'l. L.J. 117, lexis)
Pollution is an on-going and increasing problem in our oceans. 94 Oil spills can have deadly impacts on marine life, as evidenced
by the Exxon Valdez incident. 95 That incident was particularly detrimental because on the coast of Alaska and in other colder areas,
oil takes longer to breakdown and can get trapped in the ice, making clean up more difficult. 96 Additionally, toxic contaminants, such as mirex
and PCBs, often from unknown sources, can impact marine mammals much in the same manner that contaminants in our drinking water can affect us. 97 Impacts on
mammals can be severe because "they bio-accumulate many of the toxic chemicals in their bodies, resulting in the release of more
concentrated doses further along the food chain when they are preyed or scavenged upon." 98 Finally, ocean dumping continues to [*136] take the lives of
many marine animals." 99 According to the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, "the most pervasive 'threat to marine mammals is the
degradation of the environment upon which they depend.'" 100 A wide variety of materials are intentionally or negligently dumped into the oceans.
101 Much of the debris can have detrimental impacts on marine life, causing asphyxiation, strangulation, entanglement, contamination, and a host of other potential
hazards. 102
22
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Oil Spills Adv—Ethanol/Methanol Spills Don’t Hurt Environment

Ethanol and methanol spills would have a negligible impact on the environment
Zubrin 06 (Robert, president of the aerospace engineering and research firm Pioneer Astronautics, “An Energy Revolution," The
American Enterprise, March, http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleid.18976/article_detail.asp)
Both ethanol and methanol are water soluble and biodegradable in the environment. The consequences of a spill of either would
be much less than that of petroleum products. If the Exxon Valdez had been carrying either of these fuels instead of oil, the
environmental impact caused by its demise would have been negligible.
23
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
High Oil Prices Bad—US Economy/A2 Housing = Alternate Causality

High oil prices are taxing the US economy into a depression—they act as a regressive tax that is the real
cause of the US housing crisis and other recession indicators
Atlantis, is an astronautical engineer and author of Energy Victory, "OPEC Strangling American Economy,"
http://patdollard.com/2008/05/opec-strangling-american-economy/)
As oil prices continue to top $120 a barrel, it is time for Congress to take definitive action to break the OPEC cartel, which is taxing
the United States into a depression.
This year, with OPEC-rigged oil prices exceeding $120 a barrel, Americans will pay $1 trillion for their oil supply, and the world as a whole will pay $4 trillion. These
petroleum costs are up more than a factor of 10 from what they were in 1999, and represent a huge highly regressive tax on the world economy. For
Americans, the $1trillion oil levy is equivalent to a 40 percent increase in income taxes across the board — with 60 percent the sum being
paid over in tribute to foreign governments.
Make no mistake: OPEC is responsible. This can be seen clearly by comparing OPEC and non-OPEC oil production since 1973, when the cartel’s governments took
effective control of the Middle Eastern oil supplies away from the international oil companies. Since 1973, non-OPEC oil production has doubled, in tune with the
doubling in size of the world economy over the same period. However, while OPEC has engaged in many wild, short-term production expansions and contractions to
manipulate the market, overall OPEC production has barely increased over the past third of a century despite the fact that they are sitting on top of 80 percent of the
world’s oil reserves — including all the most accessible oil reserves. This shows that they have had a long-term policy of limiting production in order to increases
prices. As economic growth in China and India increases worldwide demand, the OPEC policy of strangling production is threatening to send the U.S. economy into a
depression.
The OPEC policy of limiting production in the face of increasing demand is like that of a cruel dog-owner who puts a collar snugly around the neck of a young puppy,
but then refuses to let it out as the dog matures. So as the dog grows, the collar gets tighter and tighter until it chokes to death. But it is not the growth of the dog that
kills the dog; the culprit is the dog owner who refuses to let out the collar. This is what OPEC is now doing to the United States, the industrial world at large, and to the
Third World — whose impoverished people can least afford to pay for overpriced oil.
Averaged over the U.S. population of 300 million people, the $ 1 trillion OPEC-induced burden levies a tribute amounting to $3,300 per head —
for every man, woman and child in the country (or $13,200 for a family of four). The average American worker makes about $45,000 per year, or
$35,000 after taxes paid to Uncle Sam. In 1999, a worker supporting a family of four had to pay 3 percent of his disposable income for oil. Now Uncle Saud and Uncle
Hugo are taxing him for over 35 percent of his take-home pay. Is it any wonder that such people are not buying houses? Such a massive drain of
cash from the pockets of consumers must perforce cause the real estate market to collapse — as well as affecting many other
kinds of consumer goods.
24
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys US Economy/Alternative Energy Solves

US oil dependence will destroy the economy – alternative energy now needed to solve
Hale Stewart, a former bond broker with several regional firms, has been involved with the financial markets since 1995, July 3, 2007, “Why the U.S.' Oil Dependence is Bad for
the U.S. Economy”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hale-stewart/why-the-us-oil-depende_b_54822.html
Energy policy -- or more specifically U.S. oil dependence -- comes and goes in media focus. Its prominence usually increases in direct proportion to the current price of oil or gas. In addition,
there has been a growing movement called the "peak oil" movement, which argues world supplies are actually at or near their highest and will continually decline from here on out. While I
our oil dependence -- is economically
can't comment on the veracity of peak oil's claims, I can state without a doubt that the U.S.' national energy policy -- and specifically
disadvantageous. 1. The U.S.' dependence on oil has had a negative impact on the U.S. trade deficit. In September 2006, the San
Francisco Federal Reserve issued a paper titled Oil Prices and the U.S. Trade Deficit. It concluded: Oil prices have almost quadrupled
since the beginning of 2002. For an oil-importing country like the U.S., this has substantially increased the cost of petroleum imports.
International trade data suggest that this increase has exacerbated the deterioration of the U.S. trade deficit, especially since the second half of
2004. One factor can explain this evolution: The real volume of U.S. petroleum imports has remained essentially constant. One explanation for why the demand for petroleum imports has not
declined in response to higher prices comes from a model in which firms are fairly limited in their ability to adjust their use of energy sources, such as oil, in the short term. The report's
conclusion was not widely reported, although it should have been. Simply
put, the U.S.' dependence on oil has increased the trade deficit. 2. Higher energy
prices have an increasingly negative impact on incomes. As energy prices increase, the amount of disposable income available for
discretionary purchases decreases. Currently, family energy prices are at their highest level since 1987. The Christian Science Monitor recently reported: "Kilowatts, gallons --
they all add up. Energy is now sucking money out of Americans' bank accounts at a record level -- hitting $612 billion at an annual rate in the month of April, the last month of data. Over the
past two years, energy bills as a share of income have risen and are now at their highest point since 1987, but still below the levels of the 1970s and early 1980s. For low-income households,
some economists estimate energy consumption as a percentage of income is closing in on 10 percent." Ten percent of income going to a necessary expense is a big chunk of change. In addition,
This is not a good development for an economy that gets
higher energy prices usually decrease consumer sentiment, which can lead to decreasing consumer spending.
70 percent of its growth from people buying stuff. 3. Oil prices increase overall inflation. Here is a graph from the St. Louis Federal
Reserve's FRED system. The blue line is total inflation and the red line is energy inflation. Note the direct relationship between rising
energy prices and overall inflation. Simply put, as energy prices increase, so does inflation. High inflation means the Federal Reserve
is more likely to increase interest rates, which slows economic growth. In addition, higher inflation decreases incomes, especially
those at the lower end of the pay scale. 4. The U.S.' dependence on oil makes the U.S. economy subject to geopolitical problems. I
don't want to get too far into foreign policy here, but the U.S. and the Middle East have a very complex and difficult relationship,
especially now. Exposing the U.S. economy to the political complexities of a region where the U.S. is, shall we say, not exactly
popular is basically an economic suicide pact. So what do we do about this? The answer is simple. The U.S. must develop
alternate energy. This is a national security issue -- both politically and economically. The national security issue is explained in
reason number four above. Out dependence on a region that really doesn't like us exposes the U.S. to a huge security problem.
Additionally, let's assume the peak oil argument is right (and again, I'm no expert on this argument). If the overall supply of oil is at or
nearing its peak for all time, then the world must develop different alternate means of energy. This translates into the "jobs of
tomorrow" in a big way. Being the market leader in alternate energy would lead to a big boost for the domestic economy. And that
benefits everyone.
25
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
High Oil Prices Bad—Global Economy/Oil Shocks

Rising global demand ensures oil prices remain high for the foreseeable future—even the smallest supply
disruption would spark a global economic depression
McFarlane 5/7/08 (Robert, President Reagan's national security adviser, WSJ, "Don't Give Up on Energy Independence,"
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB121012141199772495.html)
The same sustained growth in China's and India's economies that is contributing to the rise of food prices is matched by a corresponding increased demand
for oil, which promises to keep oil prices high for the foreseeable future. Given the tightness of supply – with very little excess
production capacity anywhere in the world – if oil flows from the Persian Gulf were disrupted (as al Qaeda has promised, and which
could easily happen), we would see oil at more than $200 per barrel overnight. And it would stay at that level until the damage is repaired – a
period of up to a year – during which time the global economy would likely fall into deep depression.
High oil prices function as an economic DE-stimulus package—if oil reaches $200 a barrel, economic
depression and vulnerability to supply shocks will result
The enemy’s unconstrained ability to loot us is also threatening our economy. Consider this: Congress is raiding the public purse
to put $140 billion back in the pockets of American consumers, in the hope that this will provide an economic stimulus to prevent
recession. Yet by paying $100 per barrel of oil, we are allowing OPEC to set oil prices high enough to take more than triple that
amount out of Americans’ pockets. If Chávez and Amadinejad have their way, our economy will soon be drained at a rate of nearly
$900 billion per year, an economic de-stimulus tax package six times as large as anything Congress has put on the table to push
the other way.
The economic depression resulting from $200-per-barrel oil would be nothing compared with an oil cutoff, which could be
accomplished by an OPEC or Arab League embargo, or result from the irrational action of any number of lunatic forces at large in the
Gulf. In 1973, the Arab oil embargo threw our economy into chaos — and, at that time, we produced 70 percent of the oil we used
annually. Today, we produce only 40 percent of our own fuel, and the consequences of another cutoff would be catastrophic. Our
continuing vulnerability on this score is a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of Western civilization — a disaster
waiting to happen, and a tool for blackmail that prevents us from taking the necessary steps to defeat the Islamist threat.
26
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
High Oil Prices Bad—Hurts Global Economy

Global economy can’t handle high oil prices.
Market News International, 08
Market News International, 6/25/08, Lexis.

German Economics Minister Michael Glos warned Wednesday that the global economy might not be able to cope with a persistently
high oil price.
"If the oil price remains high or rises even further, then there is reason to be worried...about the global economy," Glos said in a
speech at a foreign trade conference here.
The Minister stressed that the oil price rise has been "too extreme, too fast, and for the industrialized countries it is very hard to
digest."
High oil prices have serious impacts on the global economy.
Tsujimoto, 08
Takahiro Tsujimoto, The Yomiuri Shimbun, 6/14/08, Lexis
"Elevated commodity prices, especially of oil and food, pose a serious challenge to stable growth worldwide, have serious
implications for the most vulnerable and may increase inflationary pressure," the G-8 nations said in the statement expressing their
strong concern over increasing inflationary pressure.
He also said price hikes have a great macroeconomic impact, as well as an effect on people's everyday lives.
Sustained high oil prices threaten global economic growth through inflation, higher input costs, reduced non-oil demand, and
budget/trade deficit increases
IEA, 04
International Energy Agency, Analysis of High Oil Prices on the Global Economy, May 2004, pg. 5-6,
www.iea.org/Textbase/Papers/2004/High_Oil_Prices.pdf
Oil prices remain an important determinant of global economic performance. Overall, an oil-price increase leads to a transfer of income from
importing to exporting countries through a shift in the terms of trade. The magnitude of the direct effect of a given price increase depends on the share of the cost of oil
in national income, the degree of dependence on imported oil and the ability of end-users to reduce their consumption and switch away from oil. It also depends on the
extent to which gas prices rise in response to an oil-price increase, the gas-intensity of the economy and the impact of higher prices on other forms of energy that
compete with or, in the case of electricity, are generated from oil and gas. Naturally, the bigger the oil-price increase and the longer higher prices
are sustained, the bigger the macroeconomic impact. For net oil-exporting countries, a price increase directly increases real national income through
higher export earnings, though part of this gain would be later offset by losses from lower demand for exports generally due to the economic recession suffered by
trading partners. Adjustment effects, which result from real wage, price and structural rigidities in the economy, add to the direct income effect. Higher oil prices
lead to inflation, increased input costs, reduced non-oil demand and lower investment in net oil importing countries. Tax revenues fall
and the budget deficit increases, due to rigidities in government expenditure, which drives interest rates up. Because of resistance to real declines in wages, an
oil price increase typically leads to upward pressure on nominal wage levels. Wage pressures together with reduced demand tend to lead to higher unemployment, at
least in the short term. These effects are greater the more sudden and the more pronounced the price increase and are magnified by the impact of higher prices on
consumer and business confidence. An oil-price increase also changes the balance of trade between countries and exchange rates. Net oil-
importing countries normally experience a deterioration in their balance of payments, putting downward pressure on exchange rates.
As a result, imports become more expensive and exports less valuable, leading to a drop in real national income. Without a change in
central bank and government monetary policies, the dollar may tend to rise as oil-producing countries’ demand for dollar-denominated international reserve assets grow.
27
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys US Economy

High oil prices are acting as a 40% increase in income taxes across the United States economy—this has
created depression-like ripple effects across multiple economic sectors
Zubrin Spring 2008 (Robert, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributing editor of The New
Atlantis, is an astronautical engineer and author of Energy Victory, “In Defense of Biofuels,"
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/in-defense-of-biofuels)
Before addressing the specific objections to biofuels, it is worth taking stock of the pernicious consequences of what President George W. Bush called, in his State of
the Union address in 2006, America’s regrettable “addiction” to oil. Just a few months after that speech, in June 2006, a group of government officials met
and decided to raise taxes on all Americans. None of the officials involved were elected by Americans, however, or appointed by our elected representatives,
and the meeting was not held in Washington. Rather, those who gathered in Caracas, Venezuela to deliberate on our “taxes” were representatives
of a group of foreign theocracies, tyrannies, and kleptocracies known as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).
OPEC is a cartel founded in 1960, an open conspiracy in which the rulers of a dozen countries manipulate the supply and price of oil. In 2008, given the present
price of oil, Americans will pay roughly $1 trillion for their oil supply; the world as a whole will pay about $4 trillion. These petroleum costs are up by
a factor of ten from what they were in 1999, and in essence represent a huge highly-regressive tax on the world economy. For Americans, the trillion-dollar
oil levy is equivalent to a 40 percent increase in income taxes across the board—with 60 percent of the sum being forked over to foreign
governments.
Averaged over the U.S. population of 300 million people, that $1 trillion for oil amounts to about $3,300 for every man, woman, and
child in the country—or roughly $13,300 for a family of four. The average American worker makes about $48,000 per year, or $37,000 after taxes paid
to Uncle Sam. In 1999, such a worker supporting a family of four had to pay 3 percent of his disposable income for oil. Now Uncle Saud and Uncle Hugo are taxing
him for over 36 percent of his take-home pay. Such a massive drain of cash from the pockets of consumers has profound economic
implications, rippling from the transportation sector into the housing market and the markets for many other kinds of
consumer goods. It has a massively depressing effect on the U.S. economy. Seen for the tax that it is—since, after all, OPEC inflates the price of
petroleum and its member governments reap the revenues—it is by far the largest tax increase in American history.
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High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys Japanese/European/US Economies

Europe, Japan, and US would experience major economic impacts if oil prices keep rising.
IEA, 04
The economic impact of higher oil prices varies considerably across OECD countries, largely according to the degree to which they
are net importers of oil. Euro-zone countries, which are highly dependent on oil imports, suffer most in the short term (Figure 3). Job
losses would be particularly large, aggravating current high unemployment levels across the region. Japan’s relatively low oil intensity
compensates to some extent for its almost total dependence on imported oil. GDP losses in both Europe and Japan would also
exacerbate budget deficits, which are already large (close to 3% on average in the euro-zone and 7% in Japan). The United States
suffers the least, largely because indigenous production still meets over 40% of its oil needs. Unemployment, a major current policy
concern, would nonetheless worsen significantly in the short term. Those countries that are neither significant importers or exporters also incur some
GDP losses in the short term, as it takes time for the higher earnings of domestic oil companies to be spent or distributed to shareholders while consumers feel the
impact of higher oil prices immediately. For the oil-exporting OECD countries, the impact on GDP is positive in the first year of the projection period, but in most
cases, GDP growth declines relative to the base case after two to three years due to a decline in exports of nonoil related good and services to oil-importing countries.
Sudden increases in the price of oil empirically result in economic downturns- US, Europe, and the Pacific prove.
IEA, 04
The economic and energy-policy response to a combination of higher inflation, higher unemployment, lower exchange rates and lower
real output also affects the overall impact on the economy over the longer term. Government policy cannot eliminate the adverse impacts described
above but it can minimise them. Similarly, inappropriate policies can worsen them. Overly contractionary monetary and fiscal policies to contain inflationary pressures
could exacerbate the recessionary income and unemployment effects. On the other hand, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies may simply delay the fall in real
income necessitated by the increase in oil prices, stoke up inflationary pressures and worsen the impact of higher prices in the long run. While the general mechanism
by which oil prices affect economic performance is generally well understood, the precise dynamics and magnitude of these effects – especially the adjustments to the
shift in the terms of trade – are uncertain. Quantitative estimates of the overall macroeconomic damage caused by past oilprice shocks and the gains from the 1986 price
collapse to the economies of oilimporting countries vary substantially. This is partly due to differences in the models used to examine the issue. Nonetheless, the effects
were certainly significant: economic growth fell sharply in most oil-importing countries in the two years following the price hikes of
1973/1974 and 1979/1980. Indeed, most of the major economic downturns in the United States, Europe and the Pacific since the
1970s have been preceded by sudden increases in the price of crude oil, although other factors were more important in some cases.
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High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys Global Economy/A2 Econ = Resilient

Empirically denied- oil shocks have caused recessions
Robert L. Hirsch, SAIC, Project Leader, Roger Bezdek, MISI, Robert Wendling, MISI, February 2005, “PEAKING OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION:
IMPACTS, MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT”, accessed July 13, 2008 <Campbell>
As illustrated in Figure IV-2, oil price increases have preceded most U.S. recessions since 1969, and virtually every serious oil
price shock was followed by a recession. Thus, while oil price spikes may not be necessary to trigger a recession in the U.S., they
have proven to be sufficient over the past 30 years.
Volatility and economic downfall result from high oil prices

A shortfall of oil supplies caused by world conventional oil production peaking will sharply increase oil prices and oil price volatility.
As oil peaking is approached, relatively minor events will likely have more pronounced impacts on oil prices and futures markets. Oil
prices remain a key determinant of global economic performance, and world economic growth over the past 50 years has been
negatively impacted in the wake of increased oil prices. The greater the supply shortfall, the higher the price increases; the longer the
shortfall, the greater will be the adverse economic affects. The long-run impact of sustained, significantly increased oil prices associate
dwith oil peaking will be severe. Virtually certain are increases in inflation and unemployment, declines in the output of goods and
services, and a degradation of living standards. Without timely mitigation, the long-run impact on the developed economies will
almost certainly be extremely damaging, while many developing nations will likely be even worse off.44 The impact of oil price
changes will likely be asymmetric. The negative economic effects of oil price increases are usually not offset by the economic
stimulus resulting from a fall in oil prices. The increase in economic growth in oil exporting countries provided by higher oil prices
has been less than the loss of economic growth in importing countries, and these effects will likely continue in the future.45
30
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Democratization Adv—Oil Undermines Democracy

Oil wealth causes loss of democracy – multiple reasons prove
Beyond these general theories, some political scientists have explored how an abundance of oil wealth, in particular, can reverse or
erode democratizing trends. One of the most trenchant analyses that I have come across is the work of UCLA political scientist
Michael L. Ross. Using a statistical analysis from 113 states between 1971 and 1997, Ross concluded that a state’s “reliance on either
oil or mineral exports tends to make it less democratic; that this effect is not caused by other types of primary exports; that it is not
limited to the Arabian Peninsula, to the Middle East, or sub-Saharan Africa; and that it is not limited to small states.” What I find
particularly useful about Ross’s analysis is his list of the precise mechanisms by which excessive oil wealth impedes democracy. First,
he argues, there is the “taxation effect.” Oil-rich governments tend to use their revenues to “relieve social pressures that might
otherwise lead to demands for greater accountability” from, or representation in, the governing authority. I like to put it this way: The
motto of the American Revolution was “no taxation without representation.” The motto of the petrolist authoritarian is “no
representation without taxation.” Oil-backed regimes that do not have to tax their people in order to survive, because they can simply
drill an oil well, also do not have to listen to their people or represent their wishes. The second mechanism through which oil dampens
democratization, argues Ross, is the “spending effect.” Oil wealth leads to greater patronage spending, which in turn dampens
pressures for democratization. The third mechanism he cites is the “group formation effect.” When oil revenues provide an
authoritarian state with a cash windfall, the government can use its newfound wealth to prevent independent social groups—precisely
those most inclined to demand political rights—from forming. In addition, he argues, an overabundance of oil revenues can create a
“repression effect,” because it allows governments to spend excessively on police, internal security, and intelligence forces that can be
used to choke democratic movements. Finally, Ross sees a “modernization effect” at work. A massive influx of oil wealth can
diminish social pressures for occupational specialization, urbanization, and the securing of higher levels of education—trends that
normally accompany broad economic development and that also produce a public that is more articulate, better able to organize,
bargain, and communicate, and endowed with economic power centers of its own. The First Law of Petropolitics tries to build on such
arguments but to take the correlation between oil and politics one step further. What I am arguing in positing the First Law of
Petropolitics is not only that an overdependence on crude oil can be a curse in general but also that one can actually correlate rises and
falls in the price of oil with rises and falls in the pace of freedom in petrolist countries. The connection is very real. As these graphs
demonstrate, the pace of freedom really starts to decline as the price of oil really starts to take off.
Oil wealth stops growth of democracies – Russia proves
James Hackett, The Washington Times, February 13, 2007, “Putin's new arms race”, lexis
The effort to build a missile defense site in Europe faces bitter opposition from Moscow. President Vladimir Putin calls it a new arms
race. It reminds us of the bitter Soviet opposition in the 1980s to the basing of Pershing II ballistic missiles in Europe, Moscow's long
fight to preserve the ABM treaty, and Russia's continuing battle against the expansion of NATO. Despite years of effort by the United
States and Europe to welcome Russia as a democratic and economic partner, Moscow's political and military leadership seems unable
to deal with the West except as an adversary. Mr. Putin has used Russia's oil wealth to turn a nascent democracy into an
autocracy run by a strongman and oil-rich associates from the old KGB.
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The connection between democracy and oil is magnified when oil prices increase – Mullahs prove
The reason this connection between the price of oil and the pace of freedom is worth focusing on today is that we appear to be at the
onset of a structural rise in global crude oil prices. If that is the case, this higher price level is almost certain to have a long-term effect
on the character of politics in many weak or authoritarian states. That, in turn, could have a negative global impact on the post-Cold
War world as we have come to know it. In other words, the price of crude should now be a daily preoccupation of the U.S. secretary of
state, not just the treasury secretary. Since 9/11, oil prices have structurally shifted from the $20–$40 range to the $40–$60 range. Part
of this move has to do with a general sense of insecurity in global oil markets due to violence in Iraq, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Sudan,
but even more appears to be the result of what I call the “flattening” of the world and the rapid influx into the global marketplace of 3
billion new consumers, from China, Brazil, India, and the former Soviet Empire, all dreaming of a house, a car, a microwave, and a
refrigerator. Their rising energy appetites are enormous. This already is, and will continue to be, a steady source of pressure on the
price of oil. Without a dramatic move toward conservation in the West, or the discovery of an alternative to fossil fuels, we are going
to be in this $40-to-$60 range, or higher, for the foreseeable future. Politically, that will mean that a whole group of petrolist states
with weak institutions or outright authoritarian governments will likely experience an erosion of freedoms and an increase in
corruption and autocratic, antidemocratic behaviors. Leaders in these countries can expect to have a significant increase in their
disposable income to build up security forces, bribe opponents, buy votes or public support, and resist international norms and
conventions. One need only pick up the newspaper on any day of the week to see evidence of this trend. Consider a February 2005
article in the Wall Street Journal about how the mullahs in Tehran—who now are flush with cash thanks to high oil prices—are turning
their backs on some foreign investors instead of rolling out the welcome mat. Turkcell, a Turkish mobile-phone operator, had signed a
deal with Tehran to build the country’s first privately owned cell-phone network. It was an attractive deal: Turkcell agreed to pay Iran
$300 million for the license and invest $2.25 billion in the venture, which would have created 20,000 Iranian jobs. But the mullahs in
the Iranian Parliament had the contract frozen, claiming it might help foreigners spy on Iran. Ali Ansari, an Iran expert at the
University of St. Andrews in Scotland, told the Journal that Iranian analysts had been arguing in favor of economic reform for 10
years. “In actual fact, the scenario is worse now,” said Ansari. “They have all this money with the high oil price, and they don’t need
to do anything about reforming the economy.”
Oil wealth destroys a nation’s democratic and social system – Nigeria proves
Or, consider the drama now unfolding in Nigeria. Nigeria has a term limit for its presidents—two four-year terms. President Olusegun
Obasanjo came to office in 1999, after a period of military rule, and was then reelected by a popular vote in 2003. When he took over
from the generals in 1999, Obasanjo made headlines by investigating human rights abuses by the Nigerian military, releasing political
prisoners, and even making a real attempt to root out corruption. That was when oil was around $25 a barrel. Today, with oil at $60 a
barrel, Obasanjo is trying to persuade the Nigerian legislature to amend the constitution to allow him to serve a third term. A
Nigerian opposition leader in the House of Representatives, Wunmi Bewaji, has alleged that bribes of $1 million were being offered to
lawmakers who would vote to extend Obasanjo’s tenure. “What they are touting now is $1 million per vote,” Bewaji was quoted as
saying in a March 11, 2006, article by VOA News. “And it has been coordinated by a principal officer in the Senate and a principal
officer in the House.” Clement Nwankwo, one of Nigeria’s leading human rights campaigners, told me during a visit to Washington in
March that since the price of oil has started to climb, “civil liberties [have been] on a huge decline—people have been arbitrarily
arrested, political opponents have been killed, and institutions of democracy have been crippled.” Oil accounts for 90 percent of
Nigeria’s exports, added Nwankwo, and that explains, in part, why there has been a sudden upsurge in the kidnapping of foreign oil
workers in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta. Many Nigerians think they must be stealing oil, because so little of the revenue is trickling
down to the Nigerian people.
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Oil prices dictate international free trade and democratization – Russia and Middle East proves
With all due respect to Ronald Reagan, I do not believe he brought down the Soviet Union. There were obviously many factors, but
the collapse in global oil prices around the late 1980s and early 1990s surely played a key role. (When the Soviet Union officially
dissolved on Christmas Day 1991, the price of a barrel of oil was hovering around $17.) And lower oil prices also surely helped tilt the
postcommunist Boris Yeltsin government toward more rule of law, more openness to the outside world, and more sensitivity to the
legal structures demanded by global investors. And then came Russian President Vladimir Putin. Think about the difference between
Putin when oil was in the $20–$40 range and now, when it is $40–$60. When oil was $20–$40, we had what I would call “Putin I.”
President Bush said after their first meeting in 2001 that he had looked into Putin’s “soul” and saw in there a man he could trust. If
Bush looked into Putin’s soul today—Putin II, the Putin of $60 a barrel—it would look very black down there, black as oil. He would
see that Putin has used his oil windfall to swallow (nationalize) the huge Russian oil company, Gazprom, various newspapers and
television stations, and all sorts of other Russian businesses and once independent institutions. When oil prices were at a nadir in the
early 1990s, even Arab oil states, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, which has substantial gas deposits, were at least talking
about economic reform, if not baby-step political reforms. But as prices started to climb, the whole reform process slowed, particularly
on the political side. As more and more oil wealth piles up in petrolist countries, it could really begin to distort the whole international
system and the very character of the post-Cold War world. When the Berlin Wall fell, there was a widespread belief that an
unstoppable tide of free markets and democratization had also been unleashed. The proliferation of free elections around the world for
the next decade made that tide very real. But that tide is now running into an unanticipated counter-wave of petro-authoritarianism,
made possible by $60-a-barrel oil. Suddenly, regimes such as those in Iran, Nigeria, Russia, and Venezuela are retreating from what
once seemed like an unstoppable process of democratization, with elected autocrats in each country using their sudden oil windfalls to
ensconce themselves in power, buy up opponents and supporters, and extend their state’s chokehold into the private sector, after many
thought it had permanently receded. The unstoppable tide of democratization that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall seems to have
met its match in the black tide of petro-authoritarianism.
Oil wealth makes nations less democratic – rentier states and Barro oil dummy prove
Michael L. Ross, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science at UCLA, 2001, “DOES OIL HINDER DEMOCRACY?”,
www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/ross/doesoil.pdf
Claims about the rentier state can be sorted into two categories: those that suggest oil wealth makes states less democratic and those
that suggest oil wealth causes governments to do a poorer job of promoting economic development. Often the two are conflated. This
article focuses on the first claim. According to Anderson, “The notion of the rentier state is one of the major contributions of Middle
East regional studies to political science.” 9 Indeed, some scholars of democracy now use a version of this argument to account for the
otherwise puzzling states of the Middle East. Huntington, for example, suggests that the democratic trend may bypass the Middle
East since many of these states “depend heavily on oil exports, which enhances the control of the state bureaucracy.”10 Others
have adapted the “rentier state” idea to oil-rich countries outside the Middle East.11 The claim that oil wealth per se inhibits democratization has not been
subjected to careful statistical tests, however, as most quantitative studies of democracy simply overlook it as an explanatory variable. And the handful that even acknowledge that oil-rich states
have odd properties do little to explain why. Przeworski and his collaborators, for example, drop countries from their database if their “ratio of fuel exports to total exports in 1984–1986
exceeded fifty percent”—an eccentric criterion that excludes six oil-rich states, all of which are located on the Arabian Peninsula.12 Barro’s study of democracy includes a dummy variable for
The Barro oil
states “whose net oil exports represent a minimum of two-thirds of total exports and are at least equivalent to approximately one percent of world exports of oil.”13
dummy is statistically significant and negatively correlated with democracy. But as in the analyses of Przeworski et al., the dummy
variable uses an arbitrary cut-point to distinguish between “oil states” and “non–oil states” and implies that oil has little or no
influence on regime type until some threshold is reached.
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Oil wealth destroys democracy – spending effect proves
A second component of the rentier effect might be called the “spending effect”: oil wealth may lead to greater spending on
patronage, which in turn dampens latent pressures for democratization.23 Entelis, for example, argues that the Saudi Arabian
government used its oil wealth for spending programs that helped reduce pressures for democracy.24 Vandewalle makes a similar
argument about the Libyan government.25 And Kessler and Bazdresch and Levy find that the Mexican oil boom of the 1970s helped
prop up—and perhaps prolong— one-party rule.26 While all authoritarian governments may use their fiscal powers to reduce dissent,
these scholars imply that oil wealth provides Middle East governments with budgets that are exceptionally large and unconstrained.27
Rulers in the Middle East may follow the same tactics as their authoritarian counterparts elsewhere, but oil revenues could make their
efforts at fiscal pacification more effective.
Oil wealth hinders democracy – group formation effect proves
The third component might be called a “group formation” effect. It implies that when oil revenues provide a government with enough
money, the government will use its largesse to prevent the formation of social groups that are independent from the state and hence
that may be inclined to demand political rights. One version of this argument is rooted in Moore’s claim that the formation of an
independent bourgeoisie helped bring about democracy in England and France.28 Scholars examining the cases of Algeria, Libya,
Tunisia, and Iran have all observed oil-rich states blocking the formation of independent social groups; all argue that the state is
thereby blocking a necessary precondition of democracy.29 A second version of the group-formation effect draws on Putnam’s
argument that the formation of social capital—civic institutions that lie above the family and below the state—tends to promote more
democratic governance.30 Scholars studying the cases of Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf states have all suggested that the
government’s oil wealth has impeded the formation of social capital and hence blocked a transition to democracy.
Oil wealth causes decreased democracy – repression and militarization proves
A close reading of case studies from the Mideast, Africa, and Southeast Asia suggests that oil wealth and authoritarianism may also be
linked by repression. Citizens in resource-rich states may want democracy as much as citizens elsewhere, but resource wealth may
allow their governments to spend more on internal security and so block the population’s democratic aspirations. Skocpol notes that
much of Iran’s pre-1979 oil wealth was spent on the military, producing what she calls a “rentier absolutist state.”34 Clark, in his
study of the 1990s oil boom in the Republic of Congo, finds that the surge in revenues allowed the government to build up the armed
forces and train a special presidential guard to help maintain order.35 And Gause argues that Middle East democratization has been
inhibited in part by the prevalence of the mukhabarat (national security) state.36 There are at least two reasons why resource wealth
might lead to larger military forces. One may be pure self-interest: given the opportunity to better arm itself against popular pressures,
an authoritarian government will readily do so. A second reason may be that resource wealth causes ethnic or regional conflict; a
larger military might reflect the government’s response. Mineral wealth is often geographically concentrated. If it happens to be
concentrated in a region populated by an ethnic or religious minority, resource extraction may promote or exacerbate ethnic tensions,
as federal, regional, and local actors compete for mineral rights. These disputes may lead to larger military forces and less democracy
in resource-rich, ethnically fractured states such as Angola, Burma, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Nigeria, Papua
New Guinea, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. This mechanism would be consistent with the research of Collier and Hoeffler and de
Soysa, who find that natural resource wealth tends to make civil war more likely.37
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Increased wealth from oil fails to further democracy – modernization effect proves
Finally, a third explanation can be derived from modernization theory, which holds that democracy is caused by a collection of social
and cultural changes—including occupational specialization, urbanization, and higher levels of education—that in turn are caused by
economic development. 38 Different scholars emphasize different clusters of social and cultural changes. Perhaps the most carefully shaped position comes from
Inglehart, who argues that two types of social change have a direct impact on the likelihood that a state will become democratic: 1. Rising education levels, which
produce a more articulate public that is better equipped to organize and communicate, and 2. Rising occupational specialization, which first shifts the workforce into the
secondary sector and then into the tertiary sector. These changes produce a more autonomous workforce, accustomed to thinking for themselves on the job and having
specialized skills that enhance their bargaining power against elites.39 Although modernization theory does not address the question of resource
wealth per se, an implicit corollary is that if economic development does not produce these cultural and social changes, it will not
result in democratization. As Inglehart notes: “Is the linkage between development and democracy due to wealth per se? Apparently
not: if democracy automatically resulted from simply becoming wealthy, then Kuwait and Libya would be model democracies.”40 In
other words, if resource-led growth does not lead to higher education levels and greater occupational specialization, it should also fail
to bring about democracy. Unlike the rentier and repression effects, the modernization effect does not work through the state: it is a
social mechanism, not a political one.
Oil wealth has substantial anti-democratic properties – statistics prove
The results suggest that the antidemocratic properties of oil and mineral wealth are substantial: a single standard deviation rise in the
Oil variable produces a .49 drop in the 0–10 democracy index over the five-year period, while a standard deviation rise in the Minerals
variable leads to a .27 drop. A state that is highly reliant on oil exports—at the 1995 level of Angola, Nigeria, or Kuwait—would lose
1.5 points on the democracy scale due to its oil wealth alone. A state that was equally dependent on mineral exports would lose 2.1
points.
Tests prove that oil wealth impedes democracy
These tests support both the validity and the generality of the oil impedes democracy claim. They suggest the following: that a state’s
reliance on either oil or mineral exports tends to make it less democratic; that this effect is not caused by other types of primary
exports; that it is not limited to the Arabian Peninsula, to the Middle East, or to sub-Saharan Africa; and that it is not limited to small
states. These findings are generally consistent with the theory of the rentier state.
Oil wealth hinders democracy – military spending proves
When Military/GNP is placed in the basic model of regime types, its coefficient is negative and marginally significant at the 0.10
level; its inclusion produces a 6 percent drop in the Oil coefficient (Table 6). The Military Personnel coefficient is negative and highly
significant, although it paradoxically induces a 7 percent rise in Oil. In both samples the Minerals coefficient is not significant and
cannot be interpreted. Overall, it appears that oil wealth may be linked to higher levels of military spending, which in turn tends
to impede democracy, as the repression effect suggests. But there is no evidence of a similar pattern for mineral wealth; nor is there
evidence to support the claim that oil or mineral wealth leads to higher levels of military personnel.
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Oil wealth negatively correlates with democracy – Qatar and Oman prove
Kevin K. Tsui, Department of Economics at the University of Chicago, December 29, 2005, “More Oil, Less Democracy?: Theory
and Evidence from Crude Oil Discoveries”, http://home.uchicago.edu/~ktsui/OilDemocracy.pdf
The case of Bahrain versus Qatar provides a useful matched pair sample. The two countries are very similar, except for their oil
history.54 Bahrain is the first Arab Gulf state to discover oil; the Awali field, a giant field and also the only oilfield in Bahrain, was
discovered in 1932.55 Bahrain’s proven oil reserves are however limited in comparison with that of its neighbors, and it is expected to
be the first Persian Gulf nation to run dry of oil.56 Interest in oil prospects in Qatar was aroused by the discovery in Bahrain. The
Dukhan field, Qatar ’s largest producing oilfield, was discovered in 1939 but commercialization was deferred until after World War II.
This oilfield alone is estimated to have 80 percent more oil than the total endowment in Bahrain. During the period 1960-1970, several
offshore fields were found, and Qatar’s oil output grew steadily.57 Qatar joined OPEC in 1961 and also became a member of OAPEC. Table 5A summarizes some key oil and
democracy statistics of the two countries. Oman is also included. Countries are ranked according to the size of oil wealth, from the lowest at the top. Bahrain is much more poor in oil than Oman
or Qatar; in terms of total oil discovered. Oman is an atypical Persian Gulf oil producers. Although it has similar amount of oil as with
Qatar, Oman’s oilfields are generally smaller, more widely scattered, less productive, and more costly per barrel than in other Persian
Gulf countries.58 The degree of democracy is negatively correlated with oil wealth.
Oil wealth destroys democracy – former Soviet bloc proves
Kevin K. Tsui, Department of Economics at the University of Chicago, December 29, 2005, “More Oil, Less Democracy?: Theory
and Evidence from Crude Oil Discoveries”, http://home.uchicago.edu/~ktsui/OilDemocracy.pdf
The collapse of the Soviet bloc provides another interesting case. It led to fifteen new post-Soviet states61 and another twelve post-
communist countries.62 At about the same time, these countries had to decide the form of their government. Among them, Czech
Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are perhaps the most democratic nowadays. Except for Hungary,
which has been producing an insignificant amount of oil, none of them have significant oil reserves for commercial production. Oil
and democracy statistics for the major former Soviet bloc oil producers are summarized in Table 5B.63 Albania, Croatia, and Ukraine
are relatively poor in oil; each with reserves below 1 billion barrels in 2004. Also, they all had passed their production peak before the late eighties and hence they are expected to be the first group of the post-
communist countries to run out of oil. None of them have any giant field either. According to the World Energy Council, most Albanian crudes are heavy and the sulfur content is generally high. Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan are by far more oil-rich: larger reserves, more giant fields, and later production peak. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan fall in
between the above two groups, but almost 40 perfect of Turkmenistan’s oil comes from giant fields whereas Uzbekistan has none.
Once again, more oil-wealthy countries tend to be less democratic. Moreover, oil-rich states are getting less democratic since they
became independent, whereas oil poor states are becoming more democratic over time.
Oil and democracy do not mix – look at top 10 suppliers of US oil
Frida Berrigan, a senior research associate with the Arms Trade Resource Center, a project of the World Policy Institute, February 6, 2004, “Oil and
Democracy Don't Mix”, http://www.alternet.org/story/17775/?page=entire&ses=698afe34ebd9d0332cdddef3b617bada
At a 1996 energy conference in New Orleans, Dick Cheney, then CEO of Halliburton said, "The problem is that the good Lord didn't
see fit to put oil and gas reserves where there are democratic governments." Laying the blame on the divine is a stretch, but it seems
that the vice president is right: Democracy and oil do not mix. Just look at the United States' top 10 oil suppliers. Algeria, Angola,
Nigeria and Saudi Arabia are repressive regimes with deplorable human rights records. Mexico and Venezuela, while democracies, are
marked by instability, inequality and civil strife. Iraq remains at war and under occupation. Only Norway, Canada and the United
Kingdom are fully functioning democracies. Why don't oil and democracy mix? At least part of the answer can be found in
Washington's policy of providing military aid and training to leaders who guarantee an uninterrupted flow of oil, defending it against
all threats -- even those coming from their own citizens. Since the beginning of the war on terrorism in 2001, the United States' top 10
sources of oil imports have experienced a 350 percent increase in U.S. military aid and training. In 2003, the United States plans to
provide these countries with $58 million in military assistance. In fiscal year 2001, their military assistance totaled $12.2 million.
36
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Oil wealth erodes democracy – new study proves
States News Service, 6/24/08, “AS OIL WEALTH RISES IN EURASIA, DEMOCRACY DECLINES SIGNIFICANTLY”,
lexis
To coincide with today's release of the Freedom House Nations in Transit 2008 report, three of the study's authors gathered at
RFE/RL's Washington, DC headquarters to discuss one of its key findings - that, as oil and natural gas revenues surge in Russia
and Central Asia, democratic institutions in these countries are eroding significantly. [Read more about the Nations in Transit
2008 Report] "The resource curse is taking root," Freedom House Director of Studies Christopher Walker told the group. "The
growing authoritarianism in oil and natural gas-rich countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is severely restricting the
ability of democratic institutions to operate." According to the report, the regression in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia has
occurred systematically and across sectors, including in the areas of electoral process, civil society, independent media and judicial
independence. "Russia's decline in all of the report's categories over the past eight years is dramatic," said Robert Orttung, the author
of the section on Russia and a Senior Fellow at the Jefferson Institute. "For years, Vladimir Putin has been using oil and natural gas
revenues to build up his police forces and consolidate power in such a way that there is no space for democracy to grow."
Oil wealth hurts democracy – even outside the Middle East
This article has four main findings. First, the oil-impedes-democracy claim is both valid and statistically robust; in other words, oil
does hurt democracy. Moreover, oil does greater damage to democracy in poor states than in rich ones, and a given rise in oil exports
will do more harm in oil-poor states than in oil-rich ones. Hence, oil inhibits democracy even when exports are relatively small,
particularly in poor states. Second, the harmful influence of oil is not restricted to the Middle East. Oil wealth has probably made
democratization harder in states like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Nigeria; it may well have the same affect on the oil-rich states
of Central Asia.
Oil wealth hurts democracy, economic sanctions and fuels corruption
Dick Lugar, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, March 13, 2006, State News Service, “ENERGY IS
ALBATROSS OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, LUGAR SAYS”, lexis
Fourth, even when energy is not used overtly as a weapon, energy imbalances are allowing regimes in countries that are rich in oil and
natural gas to avoid democratic reforms and insulate themselves from international pressure and the aspirations of their own people.
We are seeing Iran and Venezuela cultivate energy relationships with important nations that are in a position to block economic
sanctions. For decades, we have watched Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states use oil wealth to create domestic conditions that prevent
movement toward democracy. In Russia and Nigeria, energy assets have offered opportunities for corruption. In many oil rich nations,
oil wealth has done little for the people, while ensuring less reform, less democracy, fewer free market activities, and more enrichment
of elites. Beyond the internal costs to these nations, we should recognize that we are transferring hundreds of billions of dollars each
year to some of the least accountable regimes in the world. Some are using this money to invest abroad in terrorism, instability, or
demagogic appeals to populism. At a time when the international community is attempting to persuade Iran to live up to its non-
proliferation obligations, our economic leverage on that country has declined due to its burgeoning oil revenues. If one tracks the arc of
Iran's behavior over the last decade, its suppression of dissent, its support for terrorists, and its conflict with the West have increased in conjunction with its oil revenues,
which soared by 30 percent in 2005. Sometimes observers comfort themselves with the thought that most U.S. imports come from friendly nations such as Canada and
Mexico, rather than from Iran or other problematic countries. But oil is a globally priced commodity. Even if our dollars are not going directly to Iran, this does not
mean that our staggering consumption of oil is not contributing to the price paid to Iran by other consumers.
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Nations with oil wealth are less democratic – Friedman and studies prove
Brett D. Schaefer, June 20, 2006, “America's Growing Reliance on African Energy Resources”, lexis
Resource-rich developing nations (particularly oil-rich developing nations) have a troubling tendency to be less democratic, less
economically free, and more prone to instability. Thomas Friedman has noted several reasons why oil wealth undermines democracy.
These include: n12 * A taxation effect in which regimes benefiting from oil revenues are not checked by the need to raise revenues
through taxation and can thus ignore demands for more accountability from or participation in government, i.e., no representation
without taxation. * Revenues from higher prices create a windfall, which governments spend on patronage, repression of opposition
groups, and increased internal security. Economic freedom is undermined because resource-rich governments have little incentive to
diversify their economies and encourage development of economic activity outside the resource sector. n13 * The "Dutch disease"
phenomenon, which often accompanies rapid development of oil and other resources, in which an export-driven appreciation of a
country's currency undermines the competitiveness of other sectors of the economy. * The lack of accountability, misuse of resource
revenues, and lack of economic opportunities, which lead to a struggle for access to the source of wealth, dramatically increasing
chances for political instability. A study by Paul Collier of Oxford University indicates that in a five-year period, chances for civil war
in an African country are less than 1 percent if it lacks resource wealth and nearly 25 percent if it possesses such wealth.
Oil income is used to support authoritarian regimes – Putin, Chavez and Amhadinejad prove
Mortimer B. Zuckerman, editor-in-chief of U.S.News & World Report, chairman of the New York Daily News, September 10,
2007, “The Energy Emergency”, lexis
Political purposes. Then there are the implications of state-owned companies in countries like Russia and Venezuela that are not just
responding to market forces but are using their pricing and power for political purposes. The income generated by oil exports has
supported their authoritarian regimes, which means that political reform and liberalization may suffer as the oil wealth is used
by leaders in producer states to buy off their opposition. The oil revenues have clearly helped Vladimir Putin in Russia, Chávez in
Venezuela, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran. Indeed, they deliberately seek control of the energy sectors to make sure that they
themselves are the source of opportunity and wealth for their people. So how is our policy of promoting democracy going to work
when this oil wealth tends to empower authoritarian elites?
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Potential 1AC Global Poverty Advantage

High oil prices act as a huge regressive tax on the world’s poorest people, with genocidal implications—a
flex-fuel mandate would spark agricultural production and exports from Third World nations, creating
an enormous engine that solves global poverty
Zubrin 5/2/08 (Robert, resident of Pioneer Astronautics and also president of the Mars Society, "Symposium: Energy
Independence and the Terror War," http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=7DFE9F38-493C-4887-9E33-
4D267570E830)
Zubrin: I would like to make an additional point. As bad as $100 per barrel oil is for us, it is much worse for the poorer nations of the world.
It is one thing to pay $100 per barrel for oil when you live in a country where the average person makes $40,000 per year. It is quite another if you live in a country
where the average person makes $1,000 per year. To many third world countries, particularly in Africa, the effects of OPEC looting are not
merely recessionary, but genocidal. Indeed, the jacked up oil price is nothing else than a huge regressive tax levied by the world’s
richest people on the world’s poorest people.
Consider this: This year, Saudi Arabia’s high-priced oil business will reap that nation’s rulers over $300 billion. Much of this bounty will be wasted on a wild
assortment of narcissistic luxuries. The rest go towards funding of network of over twenty thousand Wahhabi madrassas worldwide. There, millions of young boys will
be instructed that the way to salvation is to kill Christians, Jews, Buddhists, animists, and Hindus, all as part of a global campaign to create reactionary theocratic states
that totally degrade women and deny all political, religious, intellectual, scientific, artistic, or personal freedom to everyone.
Simultaneously, Kenya, a nation whose population of 36 million is half again as great as that of Saudi Arabia, will scrape up around $3 billion in export earnings, and
use these funds to buy badly needed fuel, farm machinery, and replacement parts for equipment. (Kenya, incidentally, is not one of the world’s fifty poorest nations.
There are many others much worse off.)
Distributed elsewhere, the loot garnered by the Saudi terror bankers could triple the foreign exchange of 50 counties
comparable to Kenya. Distributed elsewhere, the $1.3 trillion per year taxed out of the world economy by the all the OPEC
tyrannies could lift the entire third world out of poverty.
By shifting to alcohol fuels, we can shift a very substantial amount of capital flows in precisely such a direction. Many third world
countries are tropical nations with very high agricultural potential. Within a few years of the establishment of a flex fuel mandate, we
will have a much larger domestic market for agricultural produce to make ethanol than American farmers can deliver to. That is a
very GOOD thing. It means that we will be able to give them all the business they can handle, and still have market share left over, which we could open to Latin
American and Caribbean ethanol, but dropping the current tariff. So countries like Haiti, which desperately needs an export income source, will be able to get it by
growing sugar ethanol for export to the USA. In the same way, Europe would be able to drop its agricultural trade barriers, and open itself up to ethanol exported from
Africa, and Japan likewise from south Asia. Effectively, we would be able to redirect about a trillion dollars a year that is now going to OPEC
and send it to the global agricultural sector instead, with about half going to advanced sector farmers and half going to the third world.
This would create an enormous engine for world development.
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High oil prices are brutally destructive for the developing world—establishing an alcohol fuel economy
sparks global wealth distribution that lives millions of people out of poverty—this is THE WAY
FORWARD for achieving a just and prosperous world
People need to understand this: OPEC's price rigging amounts to a huge extremely regressive tax on the entire world economy. Setting oil prices at $100/bbl is
harmful to the advanced industrial countries, but it is brutally destructive to the third world. It is one thing to pay $100/bbl for oil when you
live in a country where the average worker makes $45,000 per year. It is quite another when you make $1000 per year. Effectively, the high oil price amounts
to taking hundreds of billions of dollars away from the world's poorest people and giving it to the world's richest people.
Think about this: In 2006, Saudi Arabia, with a population of 24 million people (15% of whom work) raked in $200 billion in foreign exchange from its
oil exports. In the same year, Kenya, with a population of 36 million people (the majority of whom work) earned $2.5 billion in foreign exchange in
exports of all categories combined. Distributed elsewhere, the $200 billion taken by the Saudis for their overpriced oil would
double the foreign exchange of 80 countries comparable to Kenya.
By switching to an open source fuel economy, we could make such redistribution possible. Instead of paying out to buy their oil
from OPEC, tropical third world countries could grow their own fuel, and not only that, gain precious income by exporting ethanol to
the US, Europe, and Japan, where huge markets for such produce would exist. Effectively, we could take something like a trillion
dollars a year now going to the oil cartel, and redirect it to the world agricultural sector instead -- without about half going to
advanced sector farmers and then other half going to the third world. This would create a huge financial engine for world development,
and allow hundreds of millions of people to be lifted out of poverty. They would then become customers for our industry, and create jobs and
economic growth here. Instead of selling controlly blocks of stock of our banks and media organizations to Saudi princes, we could be selling tractors to Africa. That
is the way forward for achieving a just and prosperous world.
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Poverty is a form of structural violence that kills more than any war—every four days it kills more than
were killed in Hiroshima
Gilman 83 (Dr. Robert C. Gilman, Ph.D. President of Context Institute Founding Editor of IN CONTEXT, A Quarterly of Humane
Sustainable Culture One of the articles in The Foundations Of Peace (IC#4) Autumn 1983, Page 8
http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:p_T2jwNn8g4J:www.context.org/ICLIB/IC04/Gilman1.htm+nuclear+war+%22structural+
%22&hl=en)
THE HUMAN TENDENCY toward, and preparations for, open warfare are certainly the most spectacular obstacles to peace, but they
are not the only challenges we face. For much of the world's population, hunger, not war, is the pressing issue, and it is hard to
imagine a genuine peace that did not overcome our current global pattern of extensive poverty in the midst of plenty. Hunger
and poverty are two prime examples of what is described as "structural violence," that is, physical and psychological harm that
results from exploitive and unjust social, political and economic systems. It is something that most of us know is going on, some of us have
experienced, but in its starker forms, it is sufficiently distant from most North American lives that it is often hard to get a good perspective on it. I've come across an
approach that seems to help provide that perspective, and I'd like to describe it. How significant is structural violence? How does one measure the impact of
injustice? While this may sound like an impossibly difficult question, Gernot Kohler and Norman Alcock (in Journal of Peace Research, 1976, 13, pp. 343-356) have
come up with a surprisingly simple method for estimating the grosser forms of structural violence, at least at an international level. The specific question they ask is,
how many extra deaths occur each year due to the unequal distribution of wealth between countries? To understand their approach, we
will need to plunge into some global statistics. It will help to start with the relationship between Life Expectancy (LE) and Gross National Product Per Person (GNP/p)
that is shown in the following figure. Each dot in this figure stands for one country with its LE and GNP/p for the year 1979. All together, 135 countries are
represented (data from Ruth Sivard's World Military and Social Expenditures 1982, World Priorities, Box 1003, Leesburg VA 22075, $4). Kohler and Alcock used a
similar figure based on data for 1965, and I'll compare the 1965 data with the 1979 data later in this article. Except for a few oil exporting countries (like Libya) that
have unusual combinations of high GNPs and low Life Expectancies, the data follows a consistent pattern shown by the curve. Among the "poor" countries (with
GNP/p below about $2400 per person per year), life expectancy is relatively low and increases rapidly with increasing GNP/p. Among the "rich" countries, life
expectancy is consistently high and is relatively unaffected by GNP. The dividing line between these two groups turns out to also be the world average GNP per person.
The value of the life expectancy curve at that point (for 1979) is 70 years. Thus, other things being equal, if the world's wealth was distributed equally among the
nations, every country would have a life expectancy of 70 years. This value is surprisingly close to the average life expectancy for the industrial countries (72 years),
and is even not that far below the maximum national life expectancy of 76 years (Iceland, Japan, and Sweden). Kohler and Alcock use this egalitarian model as a
standard to compare the actual world situation against. The procedure is as follows. The actual number of deaths in any country can be estimated by dividing the
population (P) by the life expectancy (LE). The difference between the actual number of deaths and the number of deaths that would occur under egalitarian conditions
is thus P/LE - P/70. For example, in 1979 India had a population of 677 million and a life expectancy of 52 years. Thus India's actual death rate was 13 million while if
the life expectancy had been 70, the rate would have been 9.7 million. The difference of 3.3 million thus provides an estimate of the number of extra deaths. Calculating
this difference for each country and then adding them up gives the number of extra deaths worldwide due to the unequal distribution of resources. The result for 1965
was 14 million, while for 1979 the number had declined to 11 million. (China, with a quarter of the world's population, is responsible for 3/4 of this drop since it raised
its life expectancy from 50 in 1965 to 64 in 1979.) How legitimate is it to ascribe these deaths to the structural violence of human institutions, and not just to the
variability of nature? Perhaps the best in-depth study of structural violence comes from the Institute for Food and Development Policy (1885 Mission St, San Francisco,
CA 94103). What they find throughout the Third World is that the problems of poverty and hunger often date back hundreds of years to some conquest - by colonial
forces or otherwise. The victors became the ruling class and the landholders, pushing the vast majority either on to poor ground or into being landless laborers. Taxes,
rentals, and the legal system were all structured to make sure that the poor stayed poor. The same patterns continue today. Additional support is provided by the
evidence in the above figure, which speaks for itself. Also, according to Sivard, 97% of the people in the Third World live under repressive governments, with almost
half of all Third World countries run by military dominated governments. Finally, as a point of comparison, Ehrlich and Ehrlich (Population, Environment, and
Resources, 1972, p72) estimate between 10 and 20 million deaths per year due to starvation and malnutrition. If their estimates are correct, our estimates may even be
too low. Some comparisons will help to put these figures in perspective. The total number of deaths from all causes in 1965 was 62 million, so these estimates indicate
that 23% of all deaths were due to structural violence. By 1979 the fraction had dropped to 15%. While it is heartening to see this improvement, the number of
deaths is staggeringly large, dwarfing any other form of violence other than nuclear war. For example, the level of structural
violence is 60 times greater than the average number of battle related deaths per year since 1965 (Sivard 1982). It is 1.5 times as great as the
yearly average number of civilian and battle field deaths during the 6 years of World War II. Every 4 days, it is the equivalent of another Hiroshima.
Perhaps the most hopeful aspect of this whole tragic situation is that essentially everyone in the present system has become a loser. The plight of the
starving is obvious, but the exploiters don't have much to show for their efforts either - not compared to the quality of life they could have in a society without the
tensions generated by this exploitation. Especially at a national level, what the rich countries need now is not so much more material wealth, but the opportunity to live
in a world at peace. The rich and the poor, with the help of modern technology and weaponry, have become each others' prisoners. Today's industrialized
societies did not invent this structural violence, but it could not continue without our permission. This suggests that to the list of
human tendencies that are obstacles to peace we need to add the ease with which we acquiesce in injustice - the way we all too easily
look in the other direction and disclaim "response ability." In terms of the suffering it supports, it is by far our most serious flaw.
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Our affirmative is a grand affirmation of the human good and a powerful rebuke to the existing social
orders desire to stifle human initiative and crush human aspirations
So long as we do not have fuel choice, the nation will remain at the mercy of OPEC, forced to pay the tribute it dictates, giving hundreds of billions of dollars to
Islamists who promote global jihad and fund the development of nuclear weapons. But once we open the fuel market, we will put a permanent
constraint on the greed and power of our enemies.
And under those conditions, we will create markets for biofuels derived from Third World farm products, opening up income
opportunities for billions of poor people around the world—just what the envirostasists fear most. We will, in effect, redirect hundreds of
billions of dollars from the oil cartel to the world’s agricultural sector, creating an enormous engine for global development. That
would be a grand affirmation of the human good and a powerful rebuke to both the Malthusians and Islamists, whose
common program is not only high oil prices, but the stifling of human initiative and the crushing of human aspirations in order to
preserve a fixed natural or social order.
Instead of financing terrorism, our energy dollars could be used to fund world development. Instead of selling control of our banks and media to Saudi
princes, we could be selling tractors to Africa. Instead of buying arms for our enemies and chains for ourselves, we could be building a world of prosperity
and freedom. Instead of paying for death, we could be helping to spread life.
Global survival depends on ensuring Third World poverty alleviation—this is a moral and a practical
imperative
Solo 92 (Executive Director of Cultural Survival, "Who Do We Think We Are," Cultural Studies Quarterly, Spring,
http://www.cs.org/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=552)
That questions is particularly potent now that the Cold War is over.
In the Third World, centuries of colonialism and decades of superpower rivalry
have left a damaging legacy. Southern countries and other peoples victimized by colonial expansion and its consequent political and
economic systems are intensifying their calls for justice, not charity. The challenge is made even more difficult because a major export of the
developed world has been the concept of the nation state, with its emphasis on militarization and internal security.
On the positive side, one lesson to be drawn from the collapse of communism is that grassroots politics can lead to revolutionary changes in governments and
institutions of all kinds. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, new thinking, developed and embraced first by local actors, opened up political possibilities on an
international scale.
As the next millennium approaches, Cultural Survival hopes to take that lesson toward a second wave of political action that will help turn around relations between
North and South, just as ordinary citizens helped reverse the tide of East-West relations. But while Western movements have focused on the weapons of war, the politics
of the 1990s will center on a single interlocking agenda: human rights, the environment, and development. As its heart are some 600 million indigenous people. Their
fate is a pathway and litmus test of our progress toward a peaceful and sustainable world order. From the periphery of political,
economic, and social power, they are moving to the center of world attention. Our survival depends on ensuring that no one, particularly the
poorest of the poor, is thrown out of the canoe or viewed as dispensable. This is a moral and a practical imperative.
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Cost and political considerations shouldn’t be evaluated—embracing our ethic through political will can
end world poverty within a generation
Sheahen 03 (Allan, Author of Guaranteed Income, “DOES EVERYONE HAVE THE RIGHT TO A BASIC INCOME
GUARANTEE?” www.widerquist.com/usbig/discussionpapers/053-Sheahen-right.doc)
When we ask: “What will it cost?” we make a mistake. We should ask: “To what are we committed?” In World War II, we
didn’t say: “What will it cost to defeat Hitler?” We went out and did what we had to do.
In the late 1970s, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences – hundreds of experts from around the country – came out with a report concluding that
world hunger and the worst aspects of poverty could be ended within one generation. What was missing was political will. In
other words, there are enough resources on this planet to make sure that no one should go hungry or malnourished. But until that
political will becomes a reality, world hunger and malnutrition will continue to exist.
In the United States and in the richest industrial nations, productivity, wealth and national incomes have grown sufficiently to support an adequate BIG.
Granted, if a BIG is set at the poverty line, multiplying the grant by the population creates a frightening amount. But that calculation is misleading. A wide range of
current benefits can be eliminated or reduced once a BIG is in place.
If other social programs are abolished – such as housing subsidies, welfare programs, farm subsidies, price supports, student loans, business loans, employment
programs, all of which require massive bureaucratic costs -- the cost of a BIG can be quite reasonable.
The BIG, in all plans, is taxable. For many high earners, the tax they pay on their BIG grant, combined with the higher income tax they would pay (most likely by
abolishing personal exemptions), will largely offset the cost of the BIG grant.
Here’s one example of how a BIG might look for an individual, assuming a BIG grant of $6000 per year:
Marginal Overall
Earned Total Tax Income Net Tax
Income BIG Income Rate Tax Income Rate
0 6000 6,000 0 0 6,000 0
10,000 6000 16,000 0 0 16,000 0
20,000 6000 26,000 0 0 26,000 0
30,000 6000 36,000 10 1,000 35,000 2.8
40,000 6000 46,000 15 2,500 43,500 5.4
50,000 6000 56,000 20 4,500 51,500 8.0
100,000 6000 106,000 25 17,000 89,000 16.0
500,000 6000 506,000 33 149,000 357,000 29.4
1,000,000 6000 1,006,000 50 399,000 601,000 39.7
The social costs of allowing poverty to exist are enormous. It costs more to care for the physically stunted and mentally damaged victims of poverty
than it would cost to feed them as babies. It costs more to build prisons than it would cost to feed poverty-stricken, no-hope children early in their lives.
Moreover, a BIG could be “self-liquidating,” meaning it might cost nothing. As people’s incomes increased, much of the money would be spent on consumer goods.
That would stimulate the economy, creating new jobs, new taxpayers, and new income for the government to replace what was given out.
During the Guaranteed Income debates in the United States in 1970, even conservative Senator Russell Long admitted: “Cost is not the problem. The objection is
paying people not to work.”
Another renowned American conservative, Senator Robert Taft – “Mr. Republican” – said in 1949: “I believe that the American people feel that with the high
production of which we are now capable, there is enough left over to prevent extreme hardship, and to give to all a minimum standard of decent living and to all
children a fair opportunity to get a start in life.”
It is wrong to see social programs solely as costs, without assessing their considerable benefits. They constitute an investment in society. Programs
that provide basic life supports, help develop skills, and bring hope are indispensable in a civilized society.
BIG = basic income guarantee
Ongoing global poverty outweighs nuclear war and genocide—only our impact evidence is comparative
Spina 00 (Stephanie Urso, Ph.D. candidate in social/personality psychology at the Graduate School of the City University of New
York, Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society, p. 201)
This sad fact is not limited to the United States. Globally, 18 million deaths a year are caused by structural violence, compared to
100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. That is, approximately every five years, as many people die because of relative
poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths, and every single year, two to three times as many
people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in
effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war or genocide, perpetuated on the weak and
the poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. (See James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic, New
York: Vintage Books, 1997, 196).
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While we as individuals may not be responsible for the totality of these circumstances, and while we may
be powerless in some instances to change overarching problems, to continue with everyday life without
recognizing the fundamentally unfair and immoral allocation of resources and taking actions to solve us
dooms us to catastrophe
Pierik 02 (Roland, Tillburg University Law School + Visiting Scholar, Department of Philosophy @ Columbia University, "Book
review, forthcoming in the Leiden Journal of International Law," http://www.rolandpierik.nl/theory/Downloads/WPHR.pdf)
The chapters discuss a large variety of issues, but the central thought can be summarized as follows:
we, the governments and citizens of affluent
democracies, have a negative duty not to uphold a global structure that violates human rights (67, 145, 172). Pogge’s position can be
characterized as ‘moral institutional cosmopolitanism.’ Let me elaborate this characterization by explaining the constituting parts.
First, Pogge explicates a moral instead of legal notion of human rights (53). His defense is inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially art. 25 −
claiming that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being − and art. 28 − claiming that everyone is entitled to a social and
international order in which the rights and freedoms of the UDHR can be fully realized.
Secondly, Pogge understands human rights not in an interactional but in an institutional way:
On the interactional understanding of human rights, governments and individuals have a responsibility not to violate human rights. On my institutional understanding,
by contrast, their responsibility is to work for an institutional order and public culture that ensure that all members of society have secure access to the objects of their
human rights. … By postulating a human right to X, one is asserting that any society or other social system, insofar as this is reasonably possible, ought to be so
(re)organized that all its members have secure access to X (64-65).
Pogge explicitly understands human rights in an institutional way: human rights are primarily claims against coercive social institutions, and secondarily claims against
individuals that uphold (and benefit from) such institutions. Finally, Pogge’s defense is a cosmopolitan one, centering “on the fundamental needs
and interests of human beings and all human beings,” (178) and emphasizing “that every human being has a global stature as an
ultimate unit of moral concern” (169).
Pogge’s claim that we are not merely failing to help the global poor but actually harming them, needs an additional argument,
establishing our responsibility for their fate. Central in this argument is the existence of a global order, in which all national governments
participate, along with international and supranational institutions like the UN, EU, NATO, WTO, World Bank, and IMF. To show why this global world order
generates injustices Pogge presents three disjunctive arguments, addressing the
adherents of three different strands of Western political thought. First, shared institutions. States are interconnected through a global
network of market trade and diplomacy. This shared institutional global order is shaped by the better-off, and imposed on the worse-
off. We impose a global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably reproduces severe and widespread poverty. This order is
unjust if there is a feasible institutional alternative under which such severe human rights deprivations would not persist.
(199-201). Second, uncompensated exclusion. The better-off enjoy significant advantages in appropriating wealth from our
planet, such as the use of a single natural resource base like crude oil. The worse-off are largely, and without compensation, excluded from the
gains of this appropriation (201-203).
Third violent history. The inequalities in the social starting positions of the better-off and the worse-off have emerged from a single
historical process that was pervaded by massive, grievous wrongs, such as a history of conquest and colonization with oppression and
enslavement (203-204).
Pogge concludes that poverty in developing countries cannot be seen as disconnected from our affluence. The existing global
order, and the injustices it generates, implies that we violate a negative duty not to harm the global poor, that is, not to violate
their basic human rights. This negative duty implies that Western governments should not impose an institutional order under which, foreseeably and
avoidably, individuals lack secure access to some of the objects of their human rights. Pogge criticizes the foreign policy of Western societies, and especially their
policies that shaped the global order, for having pushed their self-interest to the extreme. He gives some examples: the negotiation of the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (125) and the WTO-regime (15-19), and concludes that:
Our new global economic order is so harsh on the global poor, then, because it is shaped in negotiations where our representatives ruthlessly exploit their vastly superior
bargaining power and expertise, as well as any weakness, ignorance, or corruptibility they may find in their counterpart negotiators, to shape each agreement for our
greatest benefit (20).
His complaint against the WTO regime is not that it opens markets too much, but that it opens our markets not enough and thereby gains for us the benefits of free trade,
while withholding them from the global poor (19). The idea that we might only have a humanitarian duty is thus beside the point. We are harming the global poor by
imposing an unjust global order, in which Western societies close their markets by protectionist policies, massively subsidize the local agriculture, and introduce anti-
dumping
measures in many of the sectors where developing countries are best able to compete, like agriculture, textiles and clothing.
The existing global institutional order is neither natural, nor God-given, but shaped and upheld by the more powerful governments and by actors they control such as
the EU, NATO, WTO, OECD, World Bank, and IMF. The current global order produces a stable pattern of widespread malnutrition and
starvation, and there are alternative regimes possible that would not produce similarly severe deprivations (176). It is the negative
duty of Western governments to aim for a global order under which basic human rights are not violated, that is, a global order
in which all individuals are able to meet their basic social and economic needs. Of course, national governments primarily
focus on the interests of their own citizens, but they should not do so at the expense of gross human rights violations abroad.
Indeed, they can improve the circumstances of the globally worst-off and meet the demands of justice without becoming badly-
off themselves.
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Poverty Adv—High Oil Prices Exacerbate Global Poverty

High oil prices disproportionately impact the world’s poor—this exacerbates poverty and suffering
globally
Korin 5/22/08 (Anne, Co-director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, "Rising Oil Prices, Declining National Security,"
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/kor052208.htm)
While we in the U.S., which enjoys a per capita income of over $40,000 a year, are feeling the sharp pinch of high oil prices, we should all
consider the impact of these prices on the world’s poor. People throughout the world who live on $2 a day are suffering far more
than we can imagine as their economies hemorrhage. This has profound implications for global security, driving regional
unrest, increasing poverty, and nipping in the bud progress towards democracy. Countries that are still carrying debts from the
1970’s oil shocks, are being now looted by OPEC price fixing. In fact, we are witnessing a tremendous transfer of wealth from the
world’s poorest to the world’s producers of oil.
High oil prices act as a regressive tax on developing country economies—this undermines economic
development and exacerbates existing social illnesses
1. Regressive tax on the world economy. As a result in the rise in oil prices consuming countries face economic dislocations such as
swollen trade deficits, loss of jobs, sluggish economic growth, inflation and, if prices continue to soar, inevitable recessions. The
impact on developing countries, many which still carry debts from the previous oil shocks of the 1970s, is the most severe.
Three-digit-oil will undoubtedly slow down their economic growth and exacerbate existing social illnesses; it would also make
them economically and politically dependent on some of the world’s most nasty petro-regimes.
High oil prices leads to much larger deficits and servicing debts in the poorest developing countries.
IEA, 04
International Energy Agency, Analysis of High Oil Prices on the Global Economy, May 2004, pg.12,
Saharan African countries spent 14% of their GDP on fuel imports. As a consequence, sharp fluctuations in oil prices can lead to big shifts in their current account
balance – often amounting to more than 1% of GDP.8 This generally leads to a rapid economic adjustment involving a sharp contraction in domestic consumption,
because these countries have very limited access to international capital market to finance a temporary increase in the current account deficit. The vulnerability of oil-
importing developing countries to higher oil prices is also exacerbated by their limited ability to switch quickly to alternative fuels, the prices of which may increase
more slowly than those of oil products. And an increase in the oil-import bill also tends to destabilise the trade balance and drive up inflation more in developing
countries, where institutions responsible for economic management and investor confidence are more fragile. The deterioration in developing countries’ terms of trade is
often magnified by sharp currency depreciations, as capital inflows slump. Higher oil prices and the subsequent depreciation of their currencies
against US dollar also raise the cost of servicing external debt. This problem is most pronounced in the poorest developing countries,
especially those already running large current account deficits.
High oil prices hurt the economies of oil- importing developing in nations in Asia and Africa the most.
IEA, 04
International Energy Agency, Analysis of High Oil Prices on the Global Economy, May 2004, pg. 11,
The economies of oil-importing developing countries in Asia and Africa would suffer most from higher oil prices because their
economies are more dependent on imported oil. In addition, energy-intensive manufacturing generally accounts for a
larger share of their GDP and energy is used less efficiently. On average, oilimporting developing countries use more than twice as
much oil to produce one unit of economic output as do developed countries.
45
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Poverty Adv—High Oil Prices Hurt Developing Countries

The inability of developing oil-importing countries to switch quickly to alternative energy hurts their economies.
IEA, 04
International Energy Agency, Analysis of High Oil Prices on the Global Economy, May 2004, pg.12,
The vulnerability of oil-importing developing countries to higher oil prices is also exacerbated by their limited ability to switch
quickly to alternative fuels, the prices of which may increase more slowly than those of oil products. And an increase in the
oil-import bill also tends to destabilise the trade balance and drive up inflation more in developing countries, where institutions
responsible for economic management and investor confidence are more fragile. The deterioration in developing countries’
terms of trade is often magnified by sharp currency depreciations, as capital inflows slump. Higher oil prices and the subsequent depreciation of their currencies against
US dollar also raise the cost of servicing external debt. This problem is most
pronounced in the poorest developing countries, especially those already running large current account deficits.
High oil prices would have the most negative effect on developing countries.
IEA, 04
International Energy Agency, Analysis of High Oil Prices on the Global Economy, May 2004, pg. 9-10
The adverse economic impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing developing countries is generally more pronounced than for OECD
countries. The economic impact on the poorest and most indebted countries is most severe. On the basis of IMF estimates, the reduction in GDP
in the sustained $10 oil-price increase case would amount to more than 1.5% after one year in those countries (Table
2). The Sub-Saharan African countries within this grouping, with more oilintensive and fragile economies, would suffer an even bigger loss of GDP, of more than 3%.
As with OECD countries, dollar exchange rates are assumed to be the same as in the base case.
46
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Poverty Adv—US Fuel Choice Key to Third World Development

Expanding US fuel choice to include biofuels imported from development countries boosts US soft power
AND spurs economic growth in the developing world
Expanding U.S. fuel choice to include biofuels imported from developing countries has significant geopolitical benefits at a
time when U.S. global standing is eroding. Sugar, from which ethanol can be cheaply and efficiently produced, is now grown in one
hundred countries, many of which are poor and on the receiving end of U.S. development aid. Encouraging these countries to increase their
output and become fuel suppliers, opening our fuel market to them by removing the protectionist 54 cent a gallon ethanol tariff, could have far-
reaching implications for their economic development. By creating economic interdependence with biomass-producing
countries in Africa, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere, the United States can strengthen its position in the developing world
and provide significant help in reducing poverty.
The establishment of an alcohol economy enables developing countries to become net energy exporters—
this economically empowers the developing world
Break the oil cartel. In the long run, the only way to roll back the new economic order and restrain OPEC’s control over the world economy is to reduce the inherent
value of its commodity. This cannot be done as long as we continue to put on our roads cars that can run on nothing but petroleum. Every year 17 million new cars roll
onto America’s roads. Each of these cars will have a lifespan of nearly 17 years. In the next Congressional session 35 million new cars will be added. If the next
president presides for two terms he or she will preside over the introduction of 150 million new cars. If we allow all those cars to be gasoline only we are locking our
future to petroleum for decades to come. I cannot think of something more detrimental to America’s security than Congress allowing this to happen. Congress can break
OPEC’s monopoly over the transportation sector by instituting fuel choice. The cheapest, easiest and most immediate step should be a federal Open Fuel Standard,
requiring that every new car put on the road be a flex fuel car, which looks and operates exactly like a gasoline car but has a $100 feature which enables it to run on any
combination of gasoline and alcohol. Millions of flex fuel cars will begin to roll back oil’s influence by igniting a boom of innovation and investment in alternative fuel
technologies. The West is not rich in oil, but it is blessed with a wealth of other energy sources from which alcohol fuels - such as ethanol and methanol – capable of
powering flexible fuel vehicles, can be affordably and cleanly generated. Among them: vast rich farmland, hundreds of years' worth of coal reserves, and billions of tons
a year of agricultural, industrial and municipal waste. Even better: in an alcohol economy, scores of poor developing countries which right now
struggle under the heavy economic burden caused by high oil prices would be able to become net energy exporters. With hot climate
and long rainy seasons countries in south Asia, Africa and Latin America enjoy the perfect conditions for the production of sugarcane
ethanol, which costs roughly half the price and is five times more efficient than corn ethanol. Hence, a shift to alcohol enabled cars will enable
developing countries to generate revenues and emerge as a powerful force that could break OPEC’s dominance over the global
transportation sector.
An open fuels market would help ameliorate world poverty by making the developing nations fuel
suppliers
Korin 7/3/08 (Anne, chair of the Set America Free Coalition and co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security,
"Flex fuels: a weapon in the oil crisis," http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idarticle=15618)
Expanding U.S. fuel choices to include biofuels imported from developing countries can actually help ameliorate world
poverty and hunger. Sugar, from which ethanol can be cheaply and efficiently produced, is now grown in 100 countries—many of
which are poor and on the receiving end of U.S. development aid.
Encouraging these countries to increase their output and become fuel suppliers (and by removing our protectionist 54 cent-per-gallon
Brazilian sugar ethanol tariff) could have far-reaching implications for their economic development. By creating economic
interdependence with countries in Africa, Asia, and the southern hemisphere, the United States can strengthen ties with the developing
world, help reduce poverty, and wean itself from oil.
47
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Poverty Adv—Genocide Impacts

Left unchecked, genocide will eat away at the structure of global society, destroying the international
institutions critical for global civilization
Campbell 01 (Kenneth, associate professor of political science and international relations and director of the international relations
program at the University of Delaware, Genocide and the Global Village, p. 26)
Genocide is the supreme crime! It is arguably the worst crime that can be committed in the present global system of nation-states
and peoples. Genocide is equal to or worse than the crime of aggression. Genocide attacks civilization itself. Contemporary civilization is based
upon certain fundamental shared moral values; one of which is the principle that groups of people have the right to exist as a distinct nationality, race, ethnicity, and religion. The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) spoke to this point in an Advisory Opinion on the Genocide Convention in 1951:
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose…its object on the one had is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other
to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality.
In such a convention the contracting states do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, mainly, the accomplishment of those high purposes.
If left unchecked, genocide eats away like a cancer at the structure of global society, eventually undermining and destroying just those
international institutions designed to foster global cooperation, mitigate global conflict, and avoid global catastrophe such as
the world experienced in the 1930s and 1940s.
Most scholars, political analysts, and policymakers, unfortunately, treat genocide as a mere humanitarian concern, having little to do with the traditional interests of
nation-states. They too often fail to see genocide as a threat to strategic global interests, such as political stability, economic prosperity,
peace, and security. Genocide, in fact, occupies a unique area of overlap between humanitarian concerns and more traditional state interests to the degree that international peace and
security are indivisible in a world of rapidly increasing globalization. For globalization not only speeds up the positive effects of open markets, open technologies, and open societies, it
increases the spread of pathological behavior such as genocide.
Genocide goes beyond physical death to destroy the very fabric of social existence that makes life worth
living and death bearable—social death outweighs
Card, Emma Goldman Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, 2003 [Claudia, "Genocide and Social Death,"
Hypatia 18.1 (2003) 63-79, project muse]
Genocide is not simply unjust (although it certainly is unjust); it is also evil. It characteristically includes the one-sided killing of
defenseless civilians—babies, children, the elderly, the sick, the disabled, and the injured of both genders along with their usually
female caretakers—simply on the basis of their national, religious, ethnic, or other political identity. It targets people on the basis of who they
are rather than on the basis of what they have done, what they might do, even what they are capable of doing. (One commentator says genocide kills people on the basis
of what they are, not even who they are). [End Page 72] Genocide is a paradigm of what Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit (1996) calls
"indecent" in that it not only destroys victims but first humiliates them by deliberately inflicting an "utter loss of freedom and control
over one's vital interests" (115). Vital interests can be transgenerational and thus survive one's death. Before death, genocide victims
are ordinarily deprived of control over vital transgenerational interests and more immediate vital interests. They may be literally
stripped naked, robbed of their last possessions, lied to about the most vital matters, witness to the murder of family, friends, and
neighbors, made to participate in their own murder, and if female, they are likely to be also violated sexually. 7 Victims of genocide
are commonly killed with no regard for lingering suffering or exposure. They, and their corpses, are routinely treated with utter
disrespect. These historical facts, not simply mass murder, account for much of the moral opprobrium attaching to the concept of genocide. Yet such atrocities, it may
be argued, are already war crimes, if conducted during wartime, and they can otherwise or also be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. Why, then, add the specific
crime of genocide? What, if anything, is not already captured by laws that prohibit such things as the rape, enslavement, torture, forced deportation, and the degradation
of individuals? Is any ethically distinct harm done to members of the targeted group that would not have been done had they been targeted simply as individuals rather
than because of their group membership? This is the question that I find central in arguing that genocide is not simply reducible to mass death, to any of the other war
crimes, or to the crimes against humanity just enumerated. I believe the answer is affirmative: the harm is ethically distinct, although on the question of whether it is
worse, I wish only to question the assumption that it is not. Specific to genocide is the harm inflicted on its victims' social vitality. It is not just that
one's group membership is the occasion for harms that are definable independently of one's identity as a member of the group. When a
group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose their cultural heritage and may even lose their intergenerational
connections. To use Orlando Patterson's terminology, in that event, they may become "socially dead" and their descendants "natally
alienated," no longer able to pass along and build upon the traditions, cultural developments (including languages), and projects of
earlier generations (1982, 5-9). The harm of social death is not necessarily less extreme than that of physical death. Social death can
even aggravate physical death by making it indecent, removing all respectful and caring ritual, social connections, and social contexts
that are capable of making dying bearable and even of making one's death meaningful. In my view, the special evil of genocide lies in
its infliction of not just physical death (when it does that) but social death, producing a consequent meaninglessness of one's life and
even of its termination. This view, however, is controversial.
48
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Poverty Adv—Poverty = Greatest Global Threat/Moral + Legal Obligation to

Combat
Poverty, not military adventurism, rogue nations, or terrorism, poses the greatest threat to US and global
interests—we have a moral and legal obligation to eradicate it from society
Vear 04 (Jesse Leah, Co-coordinates POWER--Portland Organizing to Win Economic Rights, "Abolishing Poverty: A Declaration of
Economic Human Rights," http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/pwork/0407/040704.htm)
In resisting empire, I share with all of you a common cause and a common urgency, yet having seen and experienced conditions of poverty lends my
voice a special urgency today. For I may not know a whole lot about the US Space program and the role of weapons in space, but I do know first hand about the
immense human misery and suffering that plagues the surface of the earth down here below. And I know that it would take a pittance
of what is spent on this nation's militaristic endeavors to end this human suffering and ensure a decent standard of living for every
man, woman, and child. And I also know that while our nation contemplates sending missions to Mars to probe for any signs of life, the leaders of this same
nation couldn't care less about the lives right here on this planet - indeed the lives right here in our nation's own Capitol, in the shadow of the Washington Monument
and the halls of Congress, lives shuddering with hunger and sickness and desperation. These are things I know all too well.
I've heard about the "need" for an advanced missile defense system. I hear this kind of talk and I think to myself, yes, if only we could have some sort of defense
system! Millions and millions of Americans cry out for security! For every war our nation wages across the globe, there is a war raging right here in our own society - a
seemingly endless, silent war being waged against us - the most vulnerable, defenseless members of society. People like me. Yet no missile defense system will prevent
our enemy from striking. Our enemy is neither deterred by the world's largest army, with its overstuffed arsenal of missiles and bombs and
tanks and warships, nor is it kept at bay by the legions of armed sentries patrolling our borders. Our enemy does not come in the form
of foreign terrorists or so-called rogue nations. Armed with the mere stroke of a pen, our enemy comes in the form of years and years of national policies
that would rather see us starve than invest even a portion of our nation's wealth in our welfare. Locked in the cross-hairs of domestic and foreign
policies which intentionally put our bodies in harm's way, our terror is the terror of poverty - a terror boldly and callously proliferated by
our own government.
Surely one doesn't need the surveillance powers of high-definition weapons-grade satellites to see the faces of the some 80 million poor people struggling just to survive
in America; to see the worried faces of homeless mothers waiting to be added to the waiting list for non-existent public housing; to find the unemployment lines filled
with parents who aren't eligible to see a doctor and who can't afford to get sick; to see the children stricken with preventable diseases in the midst of the world's best-
equipped hospitals; to hear the rumble in the bellies of millions of hungry Americans whose only security is a bread line once a week; or to detect the crumbling of our
nation's under-funded, under-staffed schools. Meanwhile, billions are spent waging wars and occupying countries that our school children can't even find on a map.
Surely it doesn't take a rocket scientist to detect the moral bankruptcy of a nation - by far the world's richest and most powerful -
which disregards the basic human needs of its own despairing people in favor of misguided military adventures that protect no one, whether in nations half-
way across the globe, or in the outer reaches of our atmosphere. To see these things one needs neither a high-powered satellite nor a specialized degree. One needs only
to open one's eyes and dare to see the reality before them.
Yet even as you look you still might not see the millions of poor people in America. My face is only one of 80 million Americans who never get asked for in-depth
television interviews or for our expert commentary regarding the state of the economy or the impact of our nation's policies. In addition to all the indignities suffered by
poor people in America, we must suffer the further indignation of being disappeared - kept discretely hidden away from the eyes, ears, and conscience of the rest of
society and the world.
The existence of poverty in the richest country on earth cannot remain a secret for long. Americans, like the majority of the world's peoples, are compassionate, fair-
minded people. When exposed, the moral hypocrisy of poverty in America cannot withstand the light of day any more than the moral hypocrisy of slavery or race or sex
discrimination could. That's where the Poor People's Economic Human Rights Campaign comes in.
With this campaign, we are reaching out to the international community as well as the rest of US society to help us secure what are our
most basic human rights, as outlined in International Law. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an International Treaty signed in 1948 by all
UN member nations, including the United States, all nations have a moral and legal obligation to ensure the basic needs and well-being of
all their citizens. Among the rights outlined in the Declaration are the rights to food, housing, health care, jobs at living wages, and education. Over half a century
after signing this document, despite huge economic gains and a vast productive capacity, the United States has sorely neglected its promise. In a land
whose founding documents proclaim life, liberty, and justice for all, we must hold this nation to its promises.
And so, armed only with the force of International law and the force of our convictions, thousands of homeless, working poor, and unemployed families and individuals
from all across this great nation are coming together to take part in this campaign and form what Dr. Martin Luther King called "a multi-racial nonviolent army of poor
people." For as Dr. King once said: "The curse of poverty has no justification in our age… The time has come for us to civilize
ourselves by the total, direct, and immediate abolition of poverty."
49
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Poverty Adv—Ethical Responsibility Outweighs Disadvantages

Furthermore, given this ethical responsibility, we have an infinite responsibility to act in the face of
poverty. If rejecting the Aff is not necessary to prevent the disad impact, then the Aff is still the most
morally preferable option
Gert 04 (Bernie, Prof of Philosophy @ Dartmouth, Common Morality: Deciding What to Do, pg. 69)
This feature is often simply included as part of features 2 and 5, which are concerned with the harms and benefits that are caused,
avoided, and prevented. But it is not merely the consequences of alternative policies that are morally relevant. An alternative
action or policy may be morally preferable to the action being considered because it does not violate a moral rule. Paternalistic
deception, which might be justified if there were no nonpaternalistic alternatives, is not justified if there is a preferable alternative,
such as taking time to persuade citizens or patients rather than deceiving them. Explicit awareness of this feature may lead people to
try to find out if there are any alternative actions that either would not involve a violation of a moral rule or would involve causing
much less harm.
50
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Poverty Adv—Destroying OPEC Oil Dominance Key to Social Justice

Crippling OPEC’s ability to manipulate high oil prices is key to social justice
4D267570E830)
World food prices have been rising recently, at a rate of 4 percent a year, and oil cartel propaganda organs have been quick to place the
blame on bio-fuel programs. But these are false accusations. Despite the corn ethanol program, US corn exports have not declined at
all in recent years, and our overall agricultural exports this year are up over 23 percent. So its not corn ethanol that is driving up global
food prices, including those for fish, fruit, and every kind of crop. Rather it is high fuel costs, which have risen 40 percent over the
past year due to vicious OPEC price rigging. Not only that, these high fuel costs are driving up the cost of not just food, but nearly
every product that needs to be transported anywhere in the world. And again, the hardest hit victims are the world's poor.
For the sake of social justice, OPEC must be destroyed.
51
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Potential 1AC Peak Oil Advantage

Widespread belief puts the global oil production peak by 2010—we must adapt to a world of less oil
Yaffe 7/12/08 (Barbara, 54-year-old Montreal-born journalist + 2004 recipient of Columnist of the Year, "Oil shortage will become
a local issue," Vancouver Sun, http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=d7548db2-3a05-4feb-8da5-
340d06f0ca61&p=1)
What's peak oil? you ask. The term was coined in 2000 by Ireland's Colin Campbell who established the Association for the Study of
Peak Oil, based in Sweden. The organization explores issues related to declining reserves.
There's widespread belief that world oil production peaked or will peak between 2005 and 2010.
So, it's all about adapting to a world with less and less petroleum. Coincidentally, peak oil has become relevant at exactly a time when governments are
pushing citizens to use less high-carbon energy.
In British Columbia the push is being executed through a carbon tax -- the first such levy in Canada.
A federal carbon tax could follow if Liberals win the next election, though leader Stephane Dion has not yet explained how his tax would mesh with the B.C. one.
Between peak oil and carbon taxes, citizens have every good reason to want to wean themselves off hydrocarbons.
People have gotten used to "a growth paradigm," laments the peak oil executive, which has launched a online petition in its quest for a municipal task force.
"Politicians and businesses need to wake up and realize it's time to plan and implement solutions that account for shrinking liquid fuel supplies every subsequent year from now."
Opposition to B.C.'s carbon tax suggests there remains a good deal of resistance to change, especially among those who feel they don't have any alternatives to using petroleum-based products.
Some argue that increasing oil costs should be sufficient to force reduced consumption, without a carbon tax.
But what happens with increased prices is that consumers start searching for cheaper alternatives -- like coal, a dirtier energy option.
A carbon tax plays a crucial role in discouraging use of such dirty alternatives.
Trends indicate that global oil production will peak sooner rather than later—only by implementing new
energy policies aimed at solving oil consumption can solve
Yetiv 6/24/08 (Steve, Prof of Poly Sci @ Old Dominion University, The Virginian-Pilot, lexis)
WITH OIL prices skyrocketing, Americans are feeling serious pain at the pump and are trying to figure out why. Part of the answer may be that we are approaching peak oil sooner than many
people would have expected.
one fact at
"Peak oil" refers to a key turning point when global oil production peaks, signaling a future of slowly decreasing world oil production. No one can say when it will arrive, but
least suggests that it may come sooner rather than later: Until recently, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries barely tried to stem the rise of oil
prices from $50 per barrel in February 2007 to more than $130 per barrel today.
In the past, OPEC, and especially Saudi Arabia, have often increased oil production to try to prevent prices from rising high enough to trigger alternative energy exploration; a Western political
backlash; and the ire of the gendarme of the Persian Gulf -- the United States. When I visited OPEC headquarters in May 2003, OPEC researchers underscored how the organization was
keeping the price of the OPEC oil basket around $22-$28 per barrel (roughly $25-$31 on the New York Mercantile Exchange). OPEC succeeded in doing so more than 80 percent from June
2001 to June 2003.
Recently, the Saudis announced that they will boost daily oil production by 200,000 barrels per day by the end of July, though most of
this oil will probably not be sweet crude, which the world most needs. Moreover, Saudi Arabia reiterated that it has a $50 billion plan to increase
production by another 30 percent in the coming years. But, even so, how can we explain the lack of any action until now, as prices have spiked dramatically?
The answer is multipronged, but peak oil may be a factor. OPEC behavior may be a signal that it cannot easily meet long-run global oil
demand, on demand. Even if the Saudis reach 12.5 million barrels per day, that would still be well short of meeting such demand, unless they can boost
production further.
The International Energy Agency recently underscored its concern that future global oil demand will outstrip oil supply. The U.S. Energy
Information Administration significantly scaled back how many barrels of oil it expected the Saudis to produce in 2010. In 2000, its forecast for Saudi
production in 2010 was 14.7 million barrels per day. But last year, it dropped that figure to just 11.4 million barrels per day. That is no
small change.
A growing number of oil industry executives, including the CEOs of ConocoPhilips Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchesand Total, believes peak global oil production will hit at
100 million barrels per day. We're at 85 million barrels per day already .
If peak oil is creeping up slowly, does this mean we're doomed? Well, no. But, depending on when oil does peak, it may produce effects for which we are not prepared.
Oil prices could spike possibly to more than $200 a barrel . Such prices will increasingly spur work on affordable alternatives to oil, as we are already seeing today in nascent form, but it will
take a long time for such alternatives to penetrate the market. Our infrastructure is designed for oil. We can't switch away from it overnight.
In addition, Middle East oil will become even more important. The region now accounts for about one-third of global oil production, but holds two-thirds of the world's oil reserves. They will
be the last left as the rest of the world's production declines, from Africa to Russia and the United States.
Threats to the free flow of Persian Gulf oil have been largely exaggerated by oil markets in the past decade (there have been few serious disruptions, despite all the angst). But disruptions can
occur at any time, and will certainly have far more serious consequences as Middle East oil production becomes even more vital.
Fears about peak oil could also exacerbate tensions among great powers. For example, note China's obsessive concern about energy and Washington's growing concern about China's rising
power. Imagine how tense Sino-U.S. relations could become against the backdrop of dwindling oil supplies or even the rising perception of such dwindling supplies.
we need to hedge better against the effects of the oil era . The United States clearly needs a far more serious energy
The upshot is that
plan, coordinated with the other major global powers. And such a plan must target transportation, where much global oil is used, while not
wrecking the U.S. and global economy.
52
SDI 2008
FFV Aff

Global oil production will likely peak within 10 years, ushering in a period of skyrocketing energy prices
that cripple the global economy and spark energy wars—only acting now to move beyond oil can insulate
ourselves against the coming peak
Roberts 3/14/04 (Paul, writes about the energy industry for Harper's Magazine and other national publications, "Running out of oil
-- and time," http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/features/fex41452.htm)
For more than a century, Western governments have been relentlessly upbeat about the long-term outlook for oil. Whenever pessimists claimed
that supplies were running low -- as they have many times -- oil companies always seemed to discover huge new fields. It's now an article of faith among oil optimists,
including those in the US government, that global oil reserves won't run out for at least four decades, which seems like enough time to devise a whole suite of
alternative energy technologies to smoothly and seamlessly replace oil.
But such oil optimism, always questionable, is now more suspect than ever. True, we won't "run out" of oil tomorrow, or even 10 years from
now. But the long-term picture is grim. In the first place, it's not a matter of running out of oil but of hitting a production peak.
Since 1900, world oil production -- that is, the number of barrels we can pump from the ground -- has risen in near-perfect step with world oil demand. Today, demand
stands at about 29 bn barrels of oil a year, and so does production. By 2020, demand may well be 45 bn barrels a year, by which time, we hope, oil companies will have
upped production accordingly.
At some point, however, production simply won't be able to match demand. Oil is an exhaustible resource: The more you produce, the
less remains in the ground, and the harder it is to bring up that remainder. We won't be "out of oil"; a vast amount will still be flowing -- just not
quickly enough to satisfy demand. And as any economist can tell you, when supply falls behind demand, bad things happen.
During the 1979 Iranian revolution, the last time oil production fell off significantly, world oil prices hit the modern equivalent of $ 80 a barrel. And that, keep in mind,
was a temporary decline. If world oil production were to truly peak and begin a permanent decline, the effect would be staggering:
Prices would not come back down. Any part of the global economy dependent on cheap energy -- which is to say, pretty much
everything these days -- would be changed forever.
And that's the good news. The term "peak" tends to suggest a nice, neat curve, with production rising slowly to a halfway point, then tapering off gradually to zero -- as
if, since it took a century to reach a peak, it ought to take another 100 years to reach the end. But in the real world, the landing will not be soft. As we hit the peak,
soaring prices -- $ 70, $ 80, even $ 100 a barrel -- will encourage oil companies and oil states to scour the planet for oil.
For a time, they will succeed, finding enough crude to keep production flat, thus stretching out the peak into a kind of plateau and perhaps temporarily easing fears. But
in reality, this manic, post-peak production will deplete remaining reserves all the more quickly, thus ensuring that the eventual
decline is far steeper and far more sudden.
As one US government geologist put it to me recently, "the edge of a plateau looks a lot like a cliff."
As production falls off this cliff, prices won't simply increase; they will fly. If our oil dependence hasn't lessened drastically by
then, the global economy is likely to slip into a recession so severe that the Great Depression will look like a dress rehearsal.
Oil will cease to be viable as a fuel -- hardly an encouraging scenario in a world where oil currently provides 40 % of all energy and nearly 90 % of all transportation
fuel. Political reaction would be desperate. Industrial economies, hungry for energy, would begin making it from any source available -- most
likely coal -- regardless of the ecological consequences. Worse, competition for remaining oil supplies would intensify, potentially
leading to a new kind of political conflict: the energy war.
Thus, when we peak becomes a rather pressing question. Some pessimists tell us the peak has already come, and that calamity is imminent. That's unlikely. But the
optimists' forecast -- that we don't peak until around 2035 -- is almost as hard to believe.
First, oil demand is climbing faster than optimists had hoped, mainly because China and India, the sleeping giants, are waking up to embrace a Western-style
high-energy industrialism that includes tens of millions of new cars.
Second, even as oil demand is rising, oil discovery rates are falling. Oil can't be produced without first being found, and the rate at which oil companies
are locating new oil fields is in serious decline. The peak for world discoveries was around 1960; today, despite astonishing advances in exploration and
production technology, the industry is finding just 12 bn new barrels of oil each year -- less than half of what we use. This is one reason that oil prices, which had
averaged $ 20 a barrel since the 1970s, have been hovering at $ 30 for nearly a year.
Oil companies, not surprisingly, are getting anxious. Despite the fact that the current high oil prices are yielding massive company profits, companies are finding
it harder and harder to replace the oil they sell with newly discovered barrels. On average, for every 10 barrels an oil company sells, its exploration
teams find just four new barrels -- a trend that can go on only so long.
Indeed, most Western oil firms now say the only way to halt this slide is to get back into the Middle East, which kicked them out during the OPEC nationalizations of
the 1960s and '70s. This has, in fact, become the mantra of the oil industry: Get us back into the Middle East or be prepared for trouble. And the Bush administration
seems to have taken the message to heart.
Now, of course, the Middle East is looking less and less like the Promised Land. Western analysts have long feared that the Saudis and other oil-state leaders are too
corrupt, unstable and bankrupt to step up their oil production fast enough to meet surging world demand. The revelations, in which some Saudis themselves expressed
doubt over future production increases, have only heightened such concerns.
Put another way, we may not be able to pinpoint exactly when a peak is coming, but recent events suggest that it will be sooner than the
optimists have been telling us -- perhaps by 2020, or even 2015 if Asian demand picks up as fast as some analysts now expect.
What this means is that we can no longer sit back and hope that an alternative to oil will come along in time.
Such complacency all but ensures that, when the peak does arrive, our response will be defensive, costly and hugely disruptive.
Instead, we must begin now, with every tool at our disposal, to find ways to get "beyond petroleum" if we are to have any hope of
controlling the shift from oil to whatever comes next.
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Resource wars escalate to nuclear use—risks global extinction
Dr. Malcolm Riddoch, Faculty of Communications and Creative Industries, Edith Cowan University, June 19, 2004
(http://www.melbourne.indymedia.org/news/2004/06/72000_comment.php) <Campbell>
There are lots of recent 2004 reports speculating about the Saudi's ability to increase production suggesting that the peak plateau may
already have arrived with midpoint by 2008. OPEC is apparently pumping at its full rate, while everyone else from the Russians, US, North Sea to our own
oil fields are apparently depleting already. The first major oil shock could be as early as the fourth quarter of this year and some analysts suggest that the Saudi's are on
the verge of a collapse in their major Gawar oil field, the largest in the world. According to what I've read, if this all turns out to be true then we're currently on
the threshold of a gigantic transition in the structure of our modern globalised industrial civilization, a transition that
humanity seems completely unprepared for. More than just the price of petrol at your local bowser, cheap oil means cheap road/rail haulage and
international shipping as well as air travel, it means cheap food produced by mechanised industrial agriculture with its petrochemical pesticides and fertilizers, more
than just underwriting the value of the US dollar and their domestic economy it upholds the global stock markets and banking system. Cheap oil has paid for our
modern lifestyles since WW2. The end of cheap oil will mean a lot more than $4 per litre and rising, just to drive a car around. Beyond the current oil wars and the
short term economic effects of unstable oil supply and prices over the next 5 years, peak oil threatens an irreversible global economic decline that will force a massive,
radical and sustained change in our way of life as we transition to alternative energy sources and the economic/political order they support. The cost of everything will
rise and rise with the poorest of us the first to start suffering. A terminal economic decline will begin with a recession in Australia the size of the one that occurred in
WW2, and this possibility is already being discussed in our mainstream media. Think an end to public welfare across the board, food stamps and
eventually food riots, massive rising unemployment, the collapse of Medicare and public hospitals, a severe crisis in the cost and
delivery of water ... but at least the roads will be less congested, more room for the ultra wealthy and their gas guzzling limousines. At worst peak oil could
mean a complete global economic collapse sometime after 2010, middle class poverty and the breakdown of law and order, truly
gigantic starvation in the third world and the unrestrained outbreak of global warfare with the risk of numerous 'limited'
nuclear conflagrations. It could ultimately mean the extinction of the human species through global nuclear war and its
companions famine and pestilence.
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Peak Oil Adv—All-Important 411…

Here’s what peak oil is/means…
World oil demand is expected to grow 50 percent by 2025.4 To meet that demand, ever-larger volumes of oil will have to be produced.
Since oil production from individual reservoirs grows to a peak and then declines, new reservoirsmust be continually discovered and
brought into production to compensate for the depletion of older reservoirs. If large quantities of new oil are not discovered and
brought into production somewhere in the world, then world oil production will no longer satisfy demand. That point is called the
peaking of world conventional oil production. When world oil production peaks, there will still be large reserves remaining. Peaking
means that the rate of world oil production cannot increase; it also means that production will thereafter decrease with time.
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Peak Oil Adv—Oil Production Peak Coming Now

Powers are rising, and resources are shrinking- peak oil soon, now is key
Michael T. Klare, author of 13 books about resources, a contributor to Harper’s, Foreign Affairs, the LA Times, and The Nation, Director of the 5 college program
in Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, 2008. “Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet” pg. 32 <Campbell>
The sudden arrival of aggressive new contenders on the global resource playing field, coupled with the emergence of powerful energy
brokers like Russia, was bound to alarm the United States, Japan, and major European energy-consuming nations, prompting them to
accelerate their own efforts to secure abundant reserves of critical materials. The global resource race is, however, being propelled by
something else, no less powerful: a perception that the world’s stockpiles of essential commodities- oil in particular- are shrinking.
While the potential arrival of the “peak oil” moment has captured most of the resource headlines, international concern also extends to
natural gas and uranium, as well as copper, cobalt, chromium, titanium, and other industrial materials.
Oil supplies are dwindling- cheap oil is about to run out and competition will be unavoidable.
Michael T. Klare, author of 13 books about resources, a contributor to Harper’s, Foreign Affairs, the LA Times, and The Nation,
Director of the 5 college program in Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, 2008. “Rising Powers,
Shrinking Planet” p2 <Campbell>
The battle over Unocal also coincided with the emergence of widespread American unease over the adequacy of worldwide oil
supplies. Throughout the twentieth century, petroleum output had largely kept pace with rising international demand, as worldwide
energy stocks remained plentiful—and affordable. Cheap oil had, in fact, fueled the global ascendancy of the United States, which
seemed to reach its apogee in 1991 with the disappearance of the one other superpower of that epoch, the Soviet Union. Barely a
decade later, however, America began to see its dominance challenged—not by a new Great Power rising to match it, but because of
an entirely new phenomenon. Though still confident of its military superiority, the United States was faced with an imminent
shrinkage in global oil supplies at the same time it was growing more reliant on imported energy—a development that forced it to
depend on unfriendly (or unreliable) foreign suppliers and drove it into cutthroat competition with other oil-deficient nations like
China. According to numerous energy experts, the global oil industry was no longer able to increase output in tandem with rising
demand; some were even predicting an imminent downturn in production. "The world will soon start to run out of conventionally
produced, cheap oil," warned Professor David L. Goodstein, a physicist at the California Institute of Technology and author of Out
of Gas.1 Though other analysts disputed this pessimistic outlook, Goodstein's point of view was taken up by enough experts to add
urgency to the debate over Unocal's fate.
Now is key- peak oil is 2015, price spikes and volatility will result.
Jeremy Elton Jacquot, of the Los Angeles Times, Treehugger, 2008, “Shell CEO Admits Peak Oil Could be Here in 7 Years”, accessed July 10, 2008,
http://www.treehugger.com/files/2008/01/shell_ceo_peak_oil.php <Campbell>
In a rare moment of candor, Jeroen van der Veer, the chief executive of Royal Dutch Shell, acknowledged what many have long
considered a forgone conclusion: the end of the oil era is almost upon us, and sooner than you might think. The Oil Drum
retrieved an e-mail sent to all Shell employees in which the CEO admitted the obvious (emphasis ours):"Regardless of which route we
choose, the world's current predicament limits our maneuvering room. We are experiencing a step-change in the growth rate of energy
demand due to population growth and economic development, and Shell estimates that after 2015 supplies of easy-to-access oil and
gas will no longer keep up with demand."He went on to criticize the sluggish response by policymakers to the coming energy
crisis:"Taking the path of least resistance, policymakers pay little attention to curbing energy consumption - until supplies run short.
Likewise, despite much rhetoric, greenhouse gas emissions are not seriously addressed until major shocks trigger political reactions.
Since these responses are overdue, they are severe and lead to energy price spikes and volatility.
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Peak oil is expected to happen between 2008 and 2018, now is key to make a switch.
Science Daily, Uppsala University, April 1, 2007, “World Oil Production Close To Peak”, accessed July 10, 2008,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/03/070330100802.htm <Campbell>
Fredrik Robelius bases his forecasts on studies of global oil reserves, historical production, and new finds. He focuses on the very largest oil fields, so-called giant
fields, which produce a total of at least 500 million barrels of oil. Giant fields comprise only about one percent of all oil fields in the world, but
they
nevertheless account for more than 60 percent of total production. Unfortunately, the trend is heading downward when it comes to new
giant-field discoveries, both in terms of the number of fields and the volume of the fields located. The majority of the largest giant fields are found
around the Persian Gulf and are more than 50 years old. “The dominance of giant fields in global oil production supports the thesis that they will be crucial to what
future production will look like," says Fredrik Robelius. He developed a model based on historical production, the total exploitable reserves of the giant fields, and their
rate of diminution. The model assumes that oil fields have a constant rate of diminution, which Robelius has verified by studying a number of giant oilfields where
production has waned. The analysis shows that an annual rate of diminution between 6 and 16 percent is reasonable. To be sure that the future production of a field will
wind up inside the interval of the model, Robelius used both pessimistic and optimistic estimates. Then he combined the results from the model with field forecasts for
deep-water production, new finds, oil sand in Canada, and heavy oil in Venezuela to construct his forecasts. “All cases studies show that global oil
production will begin to drop off at roughly the same time as the giant fields. According to the most pessimistic scenario, the peak will
be reached in 2008, whereas the most optimistic scenario, assumed to follow a 1.4-percent annual increase in demand, places the peak
in 2018."
We are fast approaching peak oil- no reason to expect exploration will increase
Robert L. Hirsch, SAIC, Project Leader, Roger Bezdek, MISI, Robert Wendling, MISI, February 2005, “PEAKING OF
WORLD OIL PRODUCTION: IMPACTS, MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT”, accessed July 13, 2008 <Campbell>
Because oil prices have been relatively high for the past decade, oil companies have conducted extensive exploration over that period,
but their results have been disappointing. If recent trends hold, there is little reason to expect that exploration success will dramatically
improve in the future. This situation is evident in Figure II-1, which shows the difference between annual world oil reserves additions minus annual
consumption.7 The image is one of a world moving from a long period in which reserves additions were much greater than consumption,
to an era in which annual additions are falling increasingly short of annual consumption. This is but one of a number of trends that
suggest the world is fast approaching the inevitable peaking of conventional world oil production.
Peak is Coming- Alternative energy sources are needed to avert catastrophe

Lloyd's List, 9/27/2006 (Lexis-Insight & Opinion; Pg. 7 59260)
The peak will come one day, definitely for light oil that refiners like so much for manufacturing gasoline, and probably for all crude
oils, so the world needs to prepare. Some analysts argue that new technology and ever- increasing energy prices will mean technically
challenging oil will become more economic so reserves will never run out, but demand rises and depleting fields mean more supplies
are constantly needed. Robert Hirsch, a senior energy programme adviser with US group SAIC, thinks the world needs 20 years of preparation to prevent
economic problems after peak oil. "We are heading towards the peak in conventional oil and it is essential to prepare for a more sustainable
future. We need to be more conservative," he said at the Oil & Money conference in London. "After conventional peaks, decline
rates will need to be made up from alternative sources. We need to be looking for these a long time before the peak as there
will not be any quick fixes."
Peak Oil is Coming Soon- Experts say 2010-2011, Oil prices are certain to Skyrocket. Only applying our
current Tech now will prevent impacts
The Canberra Times, January 13, 2007 (Lexis)
But a growing number of experts are coming to believe that it will be upon us disturbingly soon, about 2010 or 2011.
Skrebowski, once sceptical of the more pessimistic estimates, is among them. "All the work I have done suggests that you just can't
get it beyond then," he says. Optimists put their faith in new discoveries and improved technology. But the world has now been
burning much more oil than it has found for a quarter of a century, and despite vast investment in prospecting, the discovery of new
fields is at a record low. Skrebowski points out that new discoveries will still be made even after world production is past its peak,
but that "the deadweight of the general decline will overwhelm them". Similarly, as oil prices rise it will be economic to get
more out of existing wells, but again this is not expected to be enough to reverse the sharp decline. And though there are vast
reserves in Canadian tar sands and US oil shales, these are costly and difficult to exploit, and unlikely to come onstream quickly
enough. Whenever it is, the world is not likely to get much warning from the market. Prices did not rise sharply in the US just before oil production peaked there,
mainly because the costs of production remained about the same. But nasty surprises can be expected before the world is far along the
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downward slope. Oil prices almost quadrupled during the 1970s oil shocks, even though production fell by only about 5 per
cent. And after the peak the decline would be permanent and intensifying, not short-term and reversible as it was then.
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Peak oil is occurring now; proven by multiple future forecasts.
Scotland on Sunday 5/25/08 (Bill Jamieson, Scotland on Sunday [Scotland], Business and money writer, ‘Driven to Despair’, May 25, 2008, pg. 6,
Lexis.)
US economy analyst Ed Yardeni says "peak oil' theory, once on the fringe, has gone mainstream in the past few weeks as oil prices
have soared to levels that only the peak oil theorists anticipated. The spot price is being driven up by soaring futures prices even
though the spot market is awash with so much oil that Iran has stored 10 to 12 offshore oil vessels in the Persian Gulf for lack of
buyers. The International Energy Agency, the world's leading energy monitor, is said to be preparing a sharp downward revision of its
oil-supply forecast, a shift that reflects deepening pessimism over whether oil companies can keep abreast of booming demand. The
Paris-based IEA is in the middle of its first attempt to comprehensively assess the condition of the world's top 400 oil fields. Its
findings won't be released until November, but the bottom line is already clear: future crude supplies could be far tighter than
previously thought. According to a Reuters survey of 12 analysts, oil production from countries outside Opec is stagnating and
forecast to remain below 50 million barrels per day this year, at 49.56 million barrels per day, lower than earlier forecast. An
unexpected fall in Russian oil production was one of the main factors prompting forecasters to revise down their projections of non-
Opec supply.
Oil supply will decline sometime within the next 13 years.

Financial Mail 6/06/08 (Claire Bisseker, Financial Mail, ‘Spillover’, Economy, Buisness, and Finance writer, June 06, 2008, pg
34, Lexis.)
Another school of thought - that of peak oil - is fast moving from the fringes to the mainstream, as much of what it predicted appears
to be coming to pass.Peak oil theorists argue that oil is a finite resource with a bell-shaped life-cycle curve. This implies that once the
peak is reached, further growth in production is impossible. Discoveries of oil have been on a declining trend since the 1960s and
about two-thirds of the oil-producing nations have passed their individual peaks.Since 1981, more oil has been consumed each year
than has been discovered. In recent years, "about five or six barrels have been used for each new one found", says Jeremy Wakeford,
an economist with the Association for the Study of Peak Oil & Gas (Aspo) in SA.Though it is uncertain precisely when global oil
production will peak, and what the post-peak rate of depletion will be, Aspo cites evidence that suggests that global oil production will
probably decline between 2007 and 2020, with a significant risk of the decline being rapid, with price spikes.
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Peak Oil Adv—Destroys Global Economy

Peak oil will devastate the global economy- takes money out of the pockets of individuals leading to less
spending and negative economic growth
Oil prices play a key role in the global economy, since the major impact of an oil supply disruption is higher oil prices.37 Oil price
increases transfer income from oil importing to oil exporting countries, and the net impact on world economic growth is negative.
For oil importing countries, increased oil prices reduce national income because spending on oil rises, and there is less available to
spend on other goods and services.38 Not surprisingly, the larger the oil price increase and the longer higher prices are sustained, the
more severe is the macroeconomic impact. Higher oil prices result in increased costs for the production of goods and services, as well
as inflation, unemployment, reduced demand for products other than oil, and lower capital investment. Tax revenues decline and
budget deficits increase, driving up interest rates. These effects will be greater the more abruptand severe the oil price increase and
will be exacerbated by the impact onconsumer and business confidence.Government policies cannot eliminate the adverse impacts of
sudden, severe oildisruptions, but they can minimize them. On the other hand, contradictorymonetary and fiscal policies to control
inflation can exacerbate recessionaryincome and unemployment effects. (See Appendix II for further discussion ofpast government
actions).
Peak oil will lead global recession, high inflation, interest rates, and energy prices, and slumping share
prices that will stay for decades.
Lloyd’s List 06 (Lloyd’s List, ‘The World Needs to Prepare now for Peak Oil’, longest-running newspaper for marine insurance, offshore energy, logistics,
global trade and law, September 27, 2006, pg. 7, Lexis.)
WITH oil demand set to continue to grow for decades and with oil fields gradually being depleted, the world needs to prepare in the
long term for life after peak oil, writes Martyn Wingrove . All hydrocarbon basins have a production peak and sharp decline curve, a
variety on a theme of bell-shaped curves, but so far the world has not yet reached the height of its own curve. Analysts have argued
for decades that the top of the curve, known as peak oil, will be reached soon and every prediction of a basin or country's peak has
been passed so far, usually on time. The peak will come one day, definitely for light oil that refiners like so much for manufacturing
gasoline, and probably for all crude oils, so the world needs to prepare. Some analysts argue that new technology and ever- increasing
energy prices will mean technically challenging oil will become more economic so reserves will never run out, but demand rises and
depleting fields mean more supplies are constantly needed. Robert Hirsch, a senior energy programme adviser with US group SAIC,
thinks the world needs 20 years of preparation to prevent economic problems after peak oil "We are heading towards the peak in
conventional oil and it is essential to prepare for a more sustainable future. We need to be more conservative," he said at the Oil
& Money conference in London. "After conventional peaks, decline rates will need to be made up from alternative sources. We need
to be looking for these a long time before the peak as there will not be any quick fixes." Mr Hirsch has advised organisations such as
the US Department of Energy's Information Administration EIA and the European Union on how to mitigate the supply shortage after
peak oil. He thinks that without proper planning the world will be plunged into recession with countries facing high inflation, soaring
energy prices, interest rates climbing rapidly and share prices slumping. These conditions could last for decades until the world learns
to cope with less oil. In previous high oil price periods, after Arab oil embargoes, inflation shot up, economies went into recession and
interest rates rose rapidly. Life was generally tough for the developed world and this could happen again at peak oil, said Mr Hirsch.
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Peak Oil Adv—Destroys Global Economy

Peak oil is upon us—the resulting $300 per barrel oil would destroy the global economy
Kenneth S. Deffeyes, Princeton U, May 27 2008 “Beyond Oil”, accessed July 10, 2008, http://www.princeton.edu/hubbert/current-events.html <Campbell>
,
In 2005, world oil production stopped growing and oil prices shot up uncontrollably. My graph of production versus price is now two weeks
old and the price is already off the top of the paper. This morning, West Texas Intermediate is $130 per barrel. In Econ 101, they taught us that increasing prices would
enlarge the supply. The economists may have envisioned a large inventory of oil wells, temporarily shut down because of low oil prices. What happened? We hit
"peak oil" – also called "Hubbert's peak," – a geological limitation to the oil supply in the ground. With no additional supplies, a
bidding war began in 2005 over the remaining oil in the ground. This is not a news story that goes away after a month.The news media are only
partially addressing the story. Two different friends e-mailed me about Paul Krugman's op-ed column in the New York Times of May 12, 2008. Krugman's primary
conclusion was that today's high current oil prices are not simply a speculative bubble. However, his preferred explanation came down to a single phrase, " . . . mainly
the growing difficulty of finding oil." Krugman does not distinguish between repairable and un-repairable difficulties. Repairable causes would include shortages of
terrain open for drilling, of deep-water drilling rigs, of roughnecks, of geophysicists. The huge un-repairable shortage is undiscovered oil. How big is the
problem? Multiplying production (barrels per year) times the oil price (dollars per barrel) gives a total cost in dollars per year. It's an enormous number; tens of trillions
of dollars per year. To put a scale on it, the three thin curves on the graph show the oil cost in contrast to the total world domestic product; the annual value the goods
and services added up for all the world's countries. The three curves show the oil cost at one percent, two and a half percent, and five percent of
the total world economic output. At $130 this morning, we are at six and a half percent.Oil production obviously cannot consume 100
percent of the world's income. My intuitive, uninformed guess is that it cannot go above 15 percent. If we see oil at $300 per barrel,
we will be looking out over the smoldering ruins of the world's economy.
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Peak Oil Adv—Alternative Energy Key to Averting Peak Oil

Alternative energy sources are the sensible response to oil production peaks
The Canberra Times 5/26/08 (The Canberra Times [Australia], ‘There is an Alternative to Slavish Reliance on Oil-Based
Fuels’, May 26, 2008, pg 14, Lexis.)
If fuel prices go up, so does the cost of transport to the consumer. It is not (or should not be) the truckie who bears the cost. The real problem is the organisation of the
industry. As your article notes, the big operators are not increasing the rates that they pay owner-drivers. This is just a continuation of a situation that has prevailed for
many years. Owner-drivers are milked by the big operators because the big companies have more market power and, in many cases, much better business management
skills. Until that situation changes, owner- drivers will continue to come into the industry full of hope, and leave it burdened with debt. Roger Quarterman, Campbell
Brendan Nelson's proposal to reduce petrol tax is counter-productive. Peak oil and its likely effects have been debated for years. The price of oil,
and of oil-based derivatives, may well increase hugely before oil is superseded as a transport fuel. A sensible response would be to
develop transportation, for people and goods, that in the short term uses oil more efficiently and in the longer term minimises reliance on oil
by developing alternative energy sources.
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Peak Oil Adv—Now Key Time to Avert Peak Oil

Now is the key time for mitigation efforts to minimize the impacts of peak oil
2. The problems associated with world oil production peaking will not be temporary, and past “energy crisis” experience will provide
relatively littleguidance. The challenge of oil peaking deserves immediate, serious attention, if risks are to be fully understood
and mitigation begun on a timely basis.
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Peak Oil Adv—A2 Tech Advances/New Discoveries Solve

You have economists; we have experts- geologists believe there just aren’t many new reservoirs to be
found.
Some economists expect higher oil prices and improved technologies to continue to provide ever-increasing oil production for the
foreseeable future. Most geologists disagree because they do not believe that there are many huge new oil reservoirs left to be found.
Accordingly, geologists and other observers believe that supply will eventually fall short of growing world demand – and result in the
peaking of world conventional oil production.
High prices and new tech doesn’t mean more oil.

Figure II-3 shows Lower 48 historical oil production with oil prices and technologytrends added. In constant dollars, oil prices increased by roughly a factor ofthree in
1973-74 and another factor of two in 1979-80. The modest productionup-ticks in the mid 1980s and early 1990s are likely responses to the 1973 and1979 oil price
spikes, both of which spurred a major increase in U.S explorationand production investments. The delays in production response are inherent tothe implementation of
large-scale oil field investments.
The fact that the production up-ticks were moderate was due to the absence of attractiveexploration and
production opportunities, because of geological realities.Beyond oil price increases, the 1980s and 1990s were a golden age of oil fieldtechnology
development, including practical 3-D seismic, economic horizontaldrilling, and dramatically improved geological understanding. Nevertheless, asFigure II-3 shows,
Lower 48 production still trended downward, showing nopronounced response to either price or technology.
In light of this experience,there is good reason
to expect that an analogous situation will exist worldwideafter world oil production peaks: Higher prices and improved technology
are unlikely to yield dramatically higher conventional oil production.10
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Peak Oil Adv—A2 Nobody Supports Peak Oil/Based on Faulty Science

Experts prove- peak oil will happen, just a matter of when.
The earth’s endowment of oil is finite and demand for oil continues to increase with time. Accordingly, geologists know that
at some future date, conventional oil supply will no longer be capable of satisfying world demand. At that point world
conventional oil production will have peaked and begin to decline. A number of experts project that world production of conventional oil could
occur in the relatively near future, as summarized in Table I-1.1 Such projections are fraught with uncertainties because of poor data, political and institutional
selfinterest, and other complicating factors. The bottom line is that no one knows with certainty when world oil production will reach a
peak,2 but geologists have no doubt that it will happen.
Peak oil theory is increasingly sound—geological knowledge has improved, no new major discoveries,
consensus of credible analysts
IMPACTS, MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT”, accessed July 13, 2008\ <Campbell>
With a history of failed forecasts, why revisit the issue now? The reasons are asfollows:1. Extensive drilling for oil and gas has
provided a massive worldwide database; current geological knowledge is much more extensive than in years past, i.e., we have the
knowledge to make much better estimates than previously.2. Seismic and other exploration technologies have advanced
dramatically in recent decades, greatly improving our ability to discover new oil reservoirs. Nevertheless, the oil reserves discovered
per exploratory well began dropping worldwide over a decade ago. We are finding less and less oil in spite of vigorous efforts,
suggesting that nature may not have much more to provide.3. Many credible analysts have recently become much more pessimistic
about the possibility of finding the huge new reserves needed to meet growing world demand.4. Even the most optimistic forecasts
suggest that world oil peaking will occur in less than 25 years.5. The peaking of world oil production could create enormous economic
disruption, as only glimpsed during the 1973 oil embargo and the 1979 Iranian oil cut-off. Accordingly, there are compelling
reasons for in-depth, unbiased reconsideration.
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Oil Prices Will Continue to ↑

Goldman Sachs analyst predicts crude oil to reach 150-200 dollars a barrel within the next six months to two years.
The Press Trust of India – July 15, 2008
(The Press Trust of India, Nationwide International News, “Goldman's oil guru sees crude falling to $75, but after 20 yrs,” 15 Jun. 2008, Lexis,
<http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu:2047/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4137970543&format=GNBFI&sort=BO
OLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4137970546&cisb=22_T4137970545&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=243622&docNo=1>)
Crude oil price may fall by nearly half to below 75 dollars a barrel, but after 20 years, feels Goldman Sachs analyst Arjun N Murti
who shot to fame as 'oil guru' for rightly predicting a sharp spike much in advance.
Incidentally, it was Murti, an Indian-origin energy analyst at the global investment banking giant, who predicted last month that
crude prices were heading towards a level of 150-200 dollars a barrel in the next six months to two years.
Oil specialists predict oil to reach $180 per barrel by the end of 2008.
Trading Markets – July 8, 2008
(Trading Markets, “Financial Mail, London, Midas column,” 8 Jul. 2008, <http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/news/Stock%20News/1742938/>)
On January 2 this year, the price of oil reached $100 a barrel. Today it is about $140, a surge of 40 per cent. Over the same period,
share prices have fallen more than 14 per cent. Most oil specialists predict oil will hit $180 this year, while most equity experts
predict further share falls over the next six months. This does not mean all stocks will slide in value. Some firms are expected to
buck the trend, including several in the oil industry. Midas has selected some of these, which are thought to have significant potential.
Our Midweek column has focused on oil services business Petrofac, explorer Regal Petroleum and minnow Mediterranean Oil & Gas.
Today, we look at Imperial Energy, Antrim Energy and Hunting.
Global financial services company ING expects crud oil to reach $200 per barrel by the end of 2008.
Reuters – July 10, 2008
(Blaise Robinson and Marie Maitre, “Energy stocks poised to catch up with surging oil,” Reuters, 10 July 2008, Lexis,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/feedarticle/7642828>)
"Crude oil at $200 (a barrel) by year end suddenly looks plausible, even if analysts resolutely refuse to make higher prices their base case," ING
analysts wrote in a note.
President Chavez predicts oil prices to climb to $200 per barrel as the U.S. continues to threaten Iran.
Associated Press Worldstream - July 3, 2008
(Christopher Toothtaker, “Venezuela's Chavez says oil prices will keep rising, attacks falling US dollar,” 3 July 2008, Lexis,
<http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu:2047/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4150411120&format=GNBFI&sort=REL
EVANCE&startDocNo=51&resultsUrlKey=29_T4150411127&cisb=22_T4150411126&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=138211&docNo=53>)
President Hugo Chavez said Thursday that oil prices will continue spiraling upward as world reserves decline and consumption
in wealthy countries including the U.S. climbs.
U.S. and European leaders are trying to blame rising oil prices on insufficient output from crude-producing nations such as Venezuela, but the real culprit is the United
States' thirst for fuel, Chavez said.
Dwindling reserves, a weak U.S. dollar, conflict in Iraq and Washington's "threats" against Iran, are also driving up prices, Chavez said Thursday, as oil prices reached a
record $145US (euro91) a barrel.
"They want to blame us: the Arabs and Venezuela. We are not to blame. Withdraw the troops from Iraq and you'll see how oil prices will drop," Chavez told visiting
delegates from countries belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement. "Stop the threats against Iran and Venezuela, oil-producing countries, and you'll see prices will tend
to decline."
Chavez predicted last month that light, sweet crude prices would reach $200 a barrel if the U.S. continued to threaten Iran and
consumption stayed strong. Soaring prices have fueled Venezuelan government spending, and Chavez on Thursday said "$100 a barrel would be more than
sufficient" to keep his country afloat.
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Global Oil Demand Will ↑

Global oil demand is likely to rise twenty fold in the near future
Guerin Green, Congressional testimony- Amy Jaffe of the Baker’s Institute, July 10, 2008, “Jaffe Congressional testimony on oil prices- peak oil”, Cherry
Creek news, accessed July 10, 2008, http://www.thecherrycreeknews.com/content/view/3206/2/ <Campbell>
Today, national oil companies (NOCs) hold nearly 80 percent of global reserves of oil; they also dominate the world’s oil production.
The challenge of meeting growing demand for oil will be daunting in the years ahead. Many emerging economies, such as China and
India, have made substantial per capita income improvements in the past decade and are at the launching point where private
automobile ownership and related fuel demand is likely to jump as much as twentyfold.
67
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US Oil Dependence Will ↑

US is dependent on foreign oil more than ever—this trend is set to increase over the future
The United States, as the world’s largest energy consumer, is facing daunting energy challenges. Demand for oil has been rising
steadily, but growth in supplies has not kept pace. The United States is the third largest oil producer in the world, but its production
has been declining since 1970 as older fields have become depleted. The United States is now more dependent on foreign oil than
ever before. It imported 12.3 million b/d in 2006 or about 60 percent of its total consumption of roughly 20.7 million b/d. That is up
from 35 percent in 1973. The share of imported oil is projected to rise to close to 70 percent by 2020, with the United States
becoming increasingly dependent on Persian Gulf supply. U.S. oil imports from the Persian Gulf are expected to rise from 2.5 million
b/d, about 22 percent of its total oil imports, in 2003 to 4.2 million b/d by 2020, at which time the Persian Gulf will supply 62 percent
of total U.S. oil imports, according to forecasts by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).More than three decades after the 1973 oil
crisis, U.S. supply of oil is no more secure today than it was thirty years ago. Moreover, its dependence on oil for mobility has
never been stronger. All told, there are over 242 million road vehicles in the United States, or one vehicle for every person. Each
vehicle is driven over 12,000 miles annually, and virtually all vehicles are powered by petroleum-based fuels, either gasoline or diesel.
As a result, despite the fact that the United States accounts for only 5 percent of the world’s population, it consumes over 33 percent of
all the oil used for road transportation in the world. By comparison, China, even with its growing economy, has about 13 million
vehicles and consumes only about 5 percent of all the road fuel produced in the world, despite having a population that is more than
four times the size of the United States.That rising U.S. oil imports have strengthened the hand of oil producers is fairly clear. Soaring
U.S. gasoline demand was a significant factor strengthening OPEC’s monopoly power in international oil markets in the 1990s. U.S.
net oil imports rose from 6.79 million b/d in 1991 to 10.2 million b/d in 2000 while global oil trade (that is, oil that was exported
across borders from one country to another) rose from 32.34 million b/d to 42.67 million b/d. In other words, the U.S. share of the
increase in global oil trade over the period was a substantial 33 percent, in OPEC terms; the U.S. import market was even more
significant, representing more than 50 percent of OPEC’s output gains between 1991 and 2000.
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1AC Terrorism Impact Module

US oil dependence is subsidizing global terrorism and the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by
terrorists
Using portions of the hundreds of billions of petrodollars they are annually draining from our economy, Middle Easterners have
established training centers for terrorists, paid bounties to the families of suicide bombers, and funded the purchase of
weapons and explosives. Oil revenues underwrite new media outlets that propagandize hatefully against the United States and the
West. They pay for more than 10,000 radical madrassahs set up around the world to indoctrinate young boys with the idea that the way to paradise
is to murder Christians, Jews, and Hindus. It was men energized by oil-revenue resources who killed 3,000 American civilians on
September 11, 2001, and who have continued to kill large numbers of Westerners in Iraq and elsewhere. We are thus
subsidizing acts of war against ourselves.
And we have not yet reached the culmination of the process. Iran and other states are now using petroleum lucre to underwrite the
development of nuclear weapons, and insulate themselves from the economic sanctions that could result. Once produced, these nuclear weapons
could be used directly or made available to terrorists to attack U.S., European, or Israeli cities and military forces. This is one of the
gravest threats to the next generation—and, again, we are paying for it ourselves with oil revenue.
WMD terrorism escalates to nuclear World War 3—risks extinction
Sid-Ahmed, Political Analyst, 04 (Mohamed, “Extinction!,” Al-Ahram Weekly, 8-26-04,

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of
the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped
up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It
would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more
critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a
conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects
the whole planet, we will all be losers.
69
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Oil Dependence Bad—Empowers Terrorists Globally

Continued oil consumption ensures terrorist coffers remain filled—this empowers terrorists globally
Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “Fueling Terror,” 2004, < http://www.iags.org/fuelingterror.html>
It is no coincidence that so much of the cash filling terrorists' coffers come from the oil monarchies in the Persian Gulf. It is also no
coincidence that those countries holding the world's largest oil reserves and those generating most of their income from oil exports, are
also those with the strongest support for radical Islam. In fact, oil and terrorism are entangled. If not for the West's oil money, most
Gulf states would not have had the wealth that allowed them to invest so much in arms procurement and sponsor terrorists
organizations.
Consider Saudi Arabia. Oil revenues make up around 90-95% of total Saudi export earnings, 70%-80% of state revenues, and around
40% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). In 2002 alone, Saudi Arabia earned nearly $55 billion in crude oil export
revenues. Most wealthy Saudis who sponsor charities and educational foundations that preach religious intolerance and hate toward
the Western values have made their money from the petroleum industry or its subsidiaries. Osama bin Laden's wealth comes from the
family's construction company that made its fortune from government contracts financed by oil money. It is also oil money that
enables Saudi Arabia to invest approximately 40% of its income on weapons procurement. In July 2005 undersecretary of the
Treasury Stuart Levey testifying in the Senate noted “Wealthy Saudi financiers and charities have funded terrorist organizations and
causes that support terrorism and the ideology that fuels the terrorists' agenda. Even today, we believe that Saudi donors may still be a
significant source of terrorist financing, including for the insurgency in Iraq."
If Saudi Arabia is the financial engine of radical Sunni Islam, its neighbor Iran is the powerhouse behind the proliferation of radical
Shiite Islam. Iran, OPEC’s second largest oil producer, is holder of 10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and has the world’s
second largest natural gas reserve. With oil and gas revenues constituting over 80 percent of its total export earning and 50 percent of
its gross domestic product, Iran is heavily dependent on petrodollars. It is a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism and supporter of some
of the world’s most radical Islamic movements such as the Lebanese Hizballah. Iran’s mullahs are fully aware of the power of their
oil. Its supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned in 2002: “If the West did not receive oil, their factories would grind to a halt.
This will shake the world!” As the world’s demand for oil increases, Iran grows richer --Iran’s oil revenues have jumped 25 percent in
2005—and more than able to snub the U.S. and its allies in their efforts to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons.
The line between the barrel and the bomb is clear. It is oil wealth that enables dictatorial regimes to sustain themselves, resisting
openness, progress and power sharing. Some semi-feudal royal families in the Gulf buy their legitimacy from the Muslim religious
establishment. This establishment uses oil money to globally propagate hostility to the West, modernity, non-Muslims, and women.
This trend is likely to continue. Both the International Energy Agency and the Energy Information Agency of the U.S. Department of
Energy currently project a steady increase in world demand for oil through at least 2020. This means further enrichment of the
oil-producing countries and continued access of terrorist groups to a viable financial network which allow then remain a lethal
threat to the U.S. and its allies.
Oil dependence is the single greatest obstacle to successfully countering global terrorism
Jaroslav Plesl, deputy editor in chief of Lidove Noviny, “Dependency on oil supports terrorism,” July 4, 2008,
<http://www.eurotopics.net/en/presseschau/archiv/article/ARTICLE31068-Dependency-on-oil-supports-terrorism>
Jaroslav Plesl, deputy editor in chief of Lidove Noviny, recalls that exactly ten years ago Osama Bin Laden qualified a crude oil price
of 144 dollars per barrel as "fair". This mark was reached yesterday, Plesl writes, and Islamic zealots can celebrate the event as a
victory in the struggle against the West: "70 percent of crude oil reserves lie under Muslim states that directly or indirectly
support Islamic radicals. In this way, American money - and that of the West in general - flows into countries that do
everything to weaken the democratic world. ... Our dependence on oil is consequently the major obstacle to successfully
countering Islamic terrorism. ... There is only one way to escape this dilemma: we need new sources of energy. But the West has
a key advantage over undemocratic countries. Democracy and competition are an extraordinary boon to innovation, and this will help
us now as it has before."
70
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Oil Dependence Bad—Empowers Terrorists Globally

Oil and terror are closely connected- oil wealth leads to authoritarian terror regimes
Michael T. Klare, a Current History contributing editor is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, 2002, “The deadly nexus: Oil,
terrorism, and America's national security” accessed July 10, 2008, proquest. <Campbell>
Since September 11, it has become painfully evident that a close relationship exists between terrorism, the global pursuit of oil,
and United States national security. This is not to say that terrorism, oil, and United States security are always connected. Still, the
realms of terrorism and oil obviously overlap in many parts of the world, producing a favorable climate for conflict. And it is in these
areas that United States national security has become deeply entrenched. The many challenges to United States security that are
rooted in these overlapping regions include: Al Qaeda and other international terror networks; Saddam Hussein and Iraq; the radical
Islamic regime in Iran; extremist Islamic factions in Saudi Arabia; internal unrest in the newly independent states of the Caspian Sea
basin; separatist and religious conflict in Indonesia; the guerrilla war in Colombia; and the strained United States relationship with
President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. Dangers arising from the intersection of oil and terrorism also figure in relations between the United States and other
major powers, including China and Russia. Indeed, nearly every aspect of United States national security is affected by this interaction. The relationship between oil,
terrorism, and national security has become especially significant because of the strong likelihood of armed conflict between the United States and Iraq. Although
President George W. Bush and his top aides have chosen to downplay the role of oil in the current crisis, focusing instead on the threat posed by Iraq's suspected
possession of weapons of mass destruction and reported links to Al Qaeda, the centrality of energy policy in the administration's long-term strategic calculations cannot
be discounted. Iraq possesses vast reserves of untapped oil-more than any other country except Saudi Arabia-and is expected to play a key role in satisfying the world's
ever-growing demand for crude petroleum.1 Given the president's oft-stated commitment to the enhancement of America's long-term energy security, White House
officials cannot be oblivious to the strategic benefits of gaining control over Iraq's prolific oil fields. The United States is not the only great power enmeshed in the
violent nexus between oil, terrorism, and conflict. Like the United States, Russia also has an intense interest in the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian region. During the
Soviet era, Grozny-the embattled capital of Chechnyabecame a major center for oil refining and distribution, and thus it is hardly coincidental that the various post-
Soviet administrations in Moscow have fought to retain control over the city against Muslim secessionists. Moscow is also cooperating with the post-Soviet regimes in
neighboring oil- and gasrich Central Asia to combat an upsurge in Islamic extremism, some of it linked to Al Qaeda. China, too, is involved in these struggles,
collaborating with Russia in combating the Central Asian extremists and cracking down on Uighur separatists in its own oil-rich region, Xinjiang. In these and other
cases, the links between terrorism, oil, and national security policy appear substantial. But are these connections accidental-the product of geological and geographical
chance-or is something more profound at work? Certainly, large oil reservoirs are located in areas that have long been the site of ethnic and national conflict--conflict
that often arose before these pools were discovered and likely will continue after the oil has been consumed. This is true, for example, of the Persian Gulf and Caspian
areas, which together contain about three-quarters of the world's known petroleum reserves. The discovery of oil in these areas can be said to have exacerbated local
conflicts, but not to have caused them. It can also be argued that geographical circumstances underlie United States military involvement in these volatile regions. The
Persian Gulf became important for the United States during the cold war for the same reason it was important to Britain in the nineteenth century: the gulf is located
along the strategic crossroads between East and West, and abuts the southern frontiers of the Russian/Soviet Empire. Although important, geography alone cannot
explain the deep and abiding relationship between oil, terrorism, and United States security affairs. Close examination suggests more fundamental links
that have long been present, but whose full significance can be gauged only now, in the wake of September 11. Three factors stand
out: the strategic importance of oil, the great wealth generated by oil production, and the association between oil production and the
rise of authoritarian regimes.
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Oil Dependence Bad—Terrorist Attacks ↑ Global Oil Prices

Terrorism makes oil prices higher
Kelli Arena , Ali Koknar, and Jim LaCamp, Justice Correspondent, Global Security Analyst, and RBC Wealth Management,
CNN, 5/29/08, <http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-7913022/Ties-Between-Oil-and-Terror.html>
ALI KOKNAR, GLOBAL SECURITY ANALYST: The key behind this seems to be the rising oil prices. It basically feeds the
insurgents, the terrorists, to attack the oil supplies. The more valuable it is, the better idea it is, from their perspective to attack
it.
ARENA: The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security estimates that attacks around the globe cut at least two million barrels a
day from world oil supplies and pushed prices up about $40. Attacks are obviously not the only reason that oil prices are up, but
the tiniest glitch these days can send prices soaring.
JIM LACAMP, RBC WEALTH MANAGEMENT: Any time a pipeline is affected, any time any production gets shut down, you
see oil prices jump up $1 or $2 a barrel, just because there are -- there is no slack in the system.
72
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Nuclear Terrorism Impacts

Nuclear terrorism poses a grave threat—the single detonation of a nuclear weapon would kill hundreds of
thousands
UCS (Union of Concerned Scientists), 06/06/07, “nuclear terrorism,” <http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/>

Of all the terrorist threats facing the United States and the world, perhaps the gravest is the possibility of terrorists constructing
or obtaining a nuclear weapon and detonating it in a city. If a terrorist group exploded just one nuclear weapon, hundreds of
thousands of people could die. Because there is no effective protection against a nuclear blast, the only real solution is to
prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear bomb materials or weapons in the first place.
The United States and other countries are paying insufficient attention to this problem and, in some cases, pursuing policies that increase the risk of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons.
A nuclear weapon requires either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. Fortunately, these materials are not found in nature and are difficult to produce. This means there are only two
plausible ways for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons. First, they could steal an intact nuclear weapon from existing arsenals or purchase a stolen weapon. More likely, terrorists could acquire
the material needed to build a nuclear weapon and the expertise to construct a workable bomb from this material.
Because only a relatively small amount of HEU or plutonium is needed to , terrorists could feasibly steal enough
material to build one or more nuclear weapons. A crude nuclear weapon would use 40-50 kilograms (88-110 pounds) of HEU; a more sophisticated
design would require 12 kilograms (26 pounds) of HEU or 4 kilograms (9 pounds) of plutonium. The theft of HEU would be especially worrisome,
because it is relatively straightforward to using this material.
Unfortunately, there are numerous potential sources of nuclear weapons and weapons materials worldwide and several types
of shortcomings in current security and accounting measures, some of which we list below.
Several countries possess large stockpiles of civil plutonium for use in nuclear power reactors. Civil stockpiles stored in Belgium, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, and the United
Kingdom comprise more than 230 metric tons of plutonium. Despite these enormous stockpiles, France, India, Japan, Russia, and the UK continue reprocessing in order to produce more civil
plutonium. While civil plutonium is not "weapon-grade," it can still be used to make nuclear weapons.
The United States has a relatively small amount of civil plutonium compared with these other countries because it decided in the 1970s to suspend the separation of plutonium from civil spent
nuclear fuel. But under the Bush administration’s proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program, the United States would reverse course and begin large-scale reprocessing to
extract plutonium from civil spent fuel.
Russia and the United States possess enormous stockpiles of military plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons. Russia's stockpile comprises some 150 metric tons and the U.S. stockpile
comprises 100 metric tons. Each country has pledged to dispose of 34 metric tons, but neither effort has gotten off the ground. Moreover, the method they have chosen—turning the plutonium
into fuel for nuclear reactors—could actually increase the risk of plutonium theft unless stringent security measures are applied.
HEU is used to fuel well over 100 research reactors worldwide in dozens of countries. Many of these facilities are in academic
or industrial settings with inadequate security—making them even more attractive targets for terrorists seeking nuclear
weapons materials.
In 2005, the U.S. Congress eliminated long-standing restrictions on exporting HEU to other countries for the purpose of making medical isotopes.
Russia and the United States possess enormous stockpiles of military HEU. Russia has more than 1,000 metric tons, half of which it now considers "excess" to its security needs and is being
converted to low-enriched uranium that cannot be used for weapons. The United States has more than 700 metric tons, of which it has declared 174 metric tons as excess. The HEU conversion
and disposal programs in both countries are proceeding slowly, and even after their completion, each country will be left with more than 500 metric tons of HEU—enough for 10,000 simple
nuclear weapons.
Thousands of so-called tactical nuclear weapons—many of which are quite small and do not have electronic locks to prevent their unauthorized use—are stored in Russia, some in poorly
secured locations. In addition, the United States maintains some 150 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as part of NATO forces, and stores roughly 1,000 such weapons within its own borders.
Tons of Russian nuclear materials are stored under inadequate security. During the Soviet era, the state limited access to cities in which these materials were stored, but did not keep strict
account of the material or worry about theft by citizens who did have access. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, that is no longer a viable strategy. Security upgrades (such as fences and
controlled access) have been made to many sites, but not all.
Even in countries such as France, Japan, and the United States, security measures for protecting weapon-usable materials
from theft are probably inadequate to protect against contemporary terrorist threats.
Nuclear terrorism sparks full scale nuclear war—risks planetary extinction
BERES 1984 (Louis Rene, Prof of International Law @ Purdue, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY; PG. 50-51)
Nuclear terrorism could even spark full scale nuclear war between states. Such war could involve the entire spectrum of nuclear conflict
possibilities, ranging from a nuclear attack upon a nonnuclear state to systemwide nuclear war. How might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come
about? Perhaps the most likely way would involve a terrorist nuclear assault against a state by terrorists “hosted” in another state. For example, consider the
following scenario: Early in the 1980’s Israel and her Arab state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral peace settlement. With a
bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt already several years old, only the interests of the Palestinians—as defined by the PLO—seem to have been left out. On the
eve of the proposed signing of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude nuclear explosives in the one kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli
cities. Public grief in Israel over the many thousand dead and maimed is matched only by the outcry for revenge. In response to the
public mood, the government of Israel initiates selected strikes against terrorist strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon the Lebanese government and it allies retaliate
against Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear forms, and all countries in the area have suffered
unprecedented destruction. Of course, such a scenario is fraught with the makings of even wider destruction. How would the United States react to the situation in the
Middle East? What would be the Soviet response? It is entirely conceivable that a chain reaction of interstate nuclear conflict could ensue, one
that would involve the superpowers or even every nuclear weapon state on the planet. What, exactly, would this mean? Whether the terms
of assessment be statistical or human, the consequences of nuclear war require an entirely new paradigm of death. Only such a paradigm would allow us a proper
framework for absorbing the vision of near-total obliteration and the outer limits of human destructiveness. Any nuclear war would have effectively permanent and
irreversible consequences. Whatever the actual extent of injuries and fatalities, it would entomb the spirit of the entire species in a planetary
casket strewn with shorn bodies and imbecile imaginations.
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High Oil Prices Bad—1AC War on Terrorism Impact

High oil prices empower oil-producing countries that directly support terrorism and are perceived as a
victory for radical Jihadists—this undermines our ability to win the war on terrorism
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, about ten years ago, Osama bin Laden stated that his target price for oil is $144 a barrel and that the
American people, who allegedly robbed the Muslim people of their oil, owe each Muslim man, woman, and child $30,000 in back payments. At the time, $144 a barrel
seemed farfetched to most. Today, bin Laden is a mere $20 a barrel short of his target and there is little doubt it will be attained. I would like to impress upon this
Committee that $144 a barrel oil will be perceived as a victory for the Jihadist movement and a reaffirmation that the economic
warfare component of its campaign against the West is a resounding success. There is no need to elaborate on the implications
of such a victory in terms of loss of U.S. prestige and our ability to prevail in the Long War of the 21st century. It is therefore
imperative that the U.S. Congress do its utmost to forestall such a setback.
Deeply embroiled in a struggle against radical Islam, nuclear proliferation, and totalitarianism, the U.S. faces a crude reality: While its relations with the Muslim world
are at an all-time low, more than 70 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and over a third of production are concentrated in Muslim
countries. The very same Shi‘a and Sunni theocratic and dictatorial regimes that most strongly resist America’s efforts to bring democracy to the
Middle East are the ones that, because of the market’s tightness, currently drive the world oil economy. While the U.S. economy bleeds, oil-producing
countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran—sympathetic to, and directly supportive, of radical Islam—are on the receiving end of
staggering windfalls. In 2006, the United States spent about $260 billion on foreign crude oil and refined petroleum products. This year, with oil hovering over
$125 a barrel, the figure could surpass $500 billion, the equivalent of our defense budget. At today's prices, foreign oil producers are extracting a tax of more than
$1,600 a year from every American man, woman and child.
Winning the war on terrorism is critical to human survival
Jerusalem Post 5/12/04 (lexis)

In the first case, he maintained that submission only serves to encourage terrorists and their leaders and boost their motivation, while
survival would depend on nations taking all necessary steps to reduce the risks, including international intelligence cooperation.
"Dealing with terrorism requires a broad range of responses, starting with clear and coherent policies. It is necessary to have quality intelligence, as well as law
enforcement, the military, and the means to counter technological and cyber-terrorism," said Alexander.
"We also need an educational response because the children of today will be the terrorists of tomorrow. Unless we can defuse the extremist ideological and theological
elements and their propaganda, the measures won't work.
"We have to deal with the root causes and try to improve economic and social conditions - a sort of global Marshall plan - but first it is necessary to deal with the terror
leadership.
"To this end some innocent civilians might be harmed but, make no mistake, this is war and to fight it nations have to pool their resources. No nation can deal with the
problem unilaterally.
"In the past, terrorism was regarded as a tactical rather than a strategic threat but it has become a permanent fixture and a challenge to
the strategic interests of nations.
"In fact," said Alexander, "it represents the most threatening challenge to civilization in the 21st century. The question of survival
will depend to a great extent on how civilized society tackles this threat."
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1AC Strategic Flexibility Impact Module

US oil dependence constrains our foreign policy by diminishing our ability to act freely in our strategic
interests
Minsk 02(Ronald E. Minsk, National Economic Council during the Clinton administration, PPI, Ending Oil Dependence
As We Know It, January 2002,
http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?contentid=250158&knlgAreaID=116&subsecid=155)
First, our nation’s dependence on oil has figured prominently in U.S. policy toward the Middle East in general, and has helped
embroil us in conflicts such as the Persian Gulf War. Moreover, oil dependence constrains our foreign policy by diminishing our ability to
act freely in our strategic interest and in that of our allies. In today’s conflict, the actions of nations that should be strong allies in the war on
terrorism—Saudi Arabia in particular—appear to be inhibited by domestic concerns about Islamic extremism, straining relations between the world’s largest oil
consuming nation and its largest producing nation. In addition, many of our allies are more reliant on oil than are we; today’s instability in the Persian Gulf could
weaken or threaten our allies, particularly in Asia.
US strategic flexibility is key to deter large-scale aggression and prevent conflict escalation
Spencer 03 (Jack, Senior Defense Policy Analyst @ Heritage, "Focusing Defense Resources to Meet National Security
Requirements," 3/21, www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1638.cfm)
Be prepared to fight with little or no warning in unanticipated places. The

emergence of global communications, advances in technology, and the
globalization of terrorism provide many opportunities for surprise attacks against the United States and its interests. Maintaining the
ability to fight and win wars in diverse situations and environments can discourage many of America's enemies from hostile acts.
Maintain adequate capability to deter aggression against America's allies. America faces enduring threats beyond terrorism, as demonstrated by North Korea's nuclear
weapons program. There are nations in every region of the world that threaten America's vital interests in the near term. Assuring stability
in those regions and protecting U.S. interests requires the ability to defeat any nation or group that threatens America's allies, which
itself provides effective deterrence against large-scale aggression. This should include both conventional forces and other capabilities such as an
effective ballistic missile defense and reliable nuclear forces. The Administration should take every step to strengthen its important alliances and
be ready to respond forcefully and immediately to aggression against America's allies.
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Oil Dependence Bad—Undermines US FoPo Flexibility

US oil dependence is a grave risk – forces US to be hostages and restricts reform
James Strock, former chief law enforcement officer for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, California's first secretary for
environmental protection, January 1, 2007, “The cure for oil addiction is leadership”, lexis
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to reducing U.S. dependence on foreign oil is the absence of a perceived crisis among the general public. U.S. oil dependence might be compared to a long-
term health condition that is rising steadily, like hypertension. The risk of grave damage is rising, but it can be ignored to an extent, for
a time, should one choose to. It's essential that the United States reduce its dependence on foreign oil so that the nation can remain free
of the pernicious influences that result. During the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York in September 2006, the world was presented the spectacle of successive, frankly
outrageous speeches from top officials of Venezuela and Iran. If not for their nations' oil reserves, these gentlemen would offer nothing more than a diversion. As long as U.S. oil dependence--"addiction,"
as President Bush has acknowledged--continues with no end in sight, the country is creating a future that is hostage to the whims of others. The
United States' immense imports--about 12 million barrels per day--are subsidizing the country's avowed enemies in the Middle East in a time of war, as well as other nations who are working against our national interests. The
over reliance on foreign oil has also enabled too much reliance on petroleum generally. U.S. consumers are wasting this precious resource in inefficient vehicles in the transportation sector, as we all see on the roads every
. It's important to note that reducing dependence on
day. In turn, the delay in reducing oil imports makes the inevitable steps toward a diversified energy portfolio harder to achieve
foreign oil will have beneficial economic, environmental, trade, and strategic implications. It is hard to imagine one area where
so much good can be done through policy change.
Oil dependency constrains US foreign policy flexibility—this is especially dangerous in light of the rise of
terrorism.
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen , member of House Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 12, 2008,
http://gopleader.gov/UploadedFiles/Energy%20memo%20edited3%20(2)%20(2).pdf
OPEC conspires to fix prices and restrict the supply of crude oil to the world market in order to maximize profits. Continued
dependence on Middle East oil constrains U.S. foreign and national security policy. Such constraints are evident in the
challenges we face in shutting down dangerous state-sponsored extremism, terrorist financing, and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Many leading U.S. analysts argue that oil sales proceeds can be directed by authoritarian regimes to fund extremist
organizations or to aid regional powers that harbor them.
Willful neglect by Saudi Arabia of the nefarious activities of members of the royal family are manifesting themselves in attacks by
domestic extremist organizations on critical energy infrastructure and pose an immediate threat to U.S. national security interests.
High oil prices not only impose real costs on the US economy, but also reduce US freedom of action and
our ability to conduct our foreign affairs
John Deutch, James R. Schlesinger, David G. Victor, “National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil
Dependency”, June 7,2008
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf
The high price of oil imposes real costs on the U.S. economy, lowering the living standard of American households. A $25 per barrel
price rise reduces real income by about 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). In addition, the payments for oil lead to large dollar
balances built up by oil producers, ‘‘petrodollars,’’ giving them potential leverage over U.S. capital markets.9 Our concern is not
primarily with the economic consequences of this adjustment process but rather with the reduced freedom of action and influence
for the United States in the conduct of its foreign affairs. In addition to constraining U.S. action, the revenues and dependencies in
the world oil market empower oil rich countries—such as Iran and Venezuela—to carry out foreign policies that are hostile to that of
the United States.
76
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Oil Dependence Bad—Undermines US FoPo Flexibility

Oil revenues gives exporting countries the power to adopt policies inimical to US interests and creates
alignments that constrain US foreign policy flexibility
John Deutch, James R. Schlesinger, David G. Victor, “National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil
Dependency”, June 7, 2008 http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf
First, the control over enormous oil revenues gives exporting countries the flexibility to adopt policies that oppose U.S. interests
and values. Iran proceeds with a program that appears to be headed toward acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Russia is able to
ignore Western attitudes as it has moved to authoritarian policies in part because huge revenues from oil and gas exports are available
to finance that style of government.
Venezuela has the resources from its oil exports to invite realignment in Latin American political relationships and to fund changes
such as Argentina’s exit from its International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby agreement and Bolivia’s recent decision to nationalize its
oil and gas resources. Because of their oil wealth, these and other producer countries are free to ignore U.S. policies and to pursue
interests inimical to our national security Second, oil dependence causes political realignments that constrain the ability of the
United States to form partnerships to achieve common objectives. Perhaps the most pervasive effect arises as countries dependent
on imports subtly modify their policies to be more congenial to suppliers. For example, China is aligning its relationships in the Middle East (e.g.,
Iran and Saudi Arabia) and Africa (e.g., Nigeria and Sudan) because of its desire to secure oil supplies. France and Germany, and with the much of the European Union,
are more reluctant to confront difficult issues with Russia and Iran because of their dependence on imported oil and gas as well as the desire to pursue business
opportunities in those countries. These new realignments have further diminished U.S. leverage. Particularly in the Middle East and Central Asia. For example, Chinese
interest in securing oil and gas supplies challenges U.S. influence in central Asia, notably in Kazakhstan. And Russia’s influence is likely to grow as it exports oil and
(within perhaps a decade) large amounts of natural gas to Japan and China.
US oil dependence constrains our foreign policy—this undermines US national security strategy
Minsk 02(Ronald E. Minsk, National Economic Council during the Clinton administration, PPI, Ending Oil Dependence
As We Know It, January 2002,
http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?contentid=250158&knlgAreaID=116&subsecid=155)
Then, just months after oil prices retreated into the more familiar $18 to $24 per barrel price range, the tragic events of Sept. 11 once again focused our attention on the
relationship between our energy policy and our national security. It is widely acknowledged that our reliance on Saudi oil and Saudi Arabia’s
role in the world oil market has prevented us from demanding or receiving full cooperation from Saudi Arabia during this time.
Although Saudi Arabia has assured the United States that it will maintain stable oil supplies either independently or in concert with its OPEC partners, our reliance
on this assurance constrains our foreign policy and ultimately undermines our national security strategy. And even though other
oil exporting governments have committed to maintain stable oil supplies, those commitments also constrain the manner in which
we conduct our foreign policy. Finally, growing concerns about Saudi Arabia’s ability to deliver on its assurances about oil market stability must be considered
in the context of the decades-old conflict with Iran and ongoing questions about the reliability of Iraqi oil production and its use as a weapon to further Iraq’s
geopolitical motives. These three countries represent 18 percent of world production, 46 percent of world reserves, and a significant portion of its readily available
excess production capacity.
77
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Oil Dependence Bad—Destroys US Hegemony

Oil dependency rapidly erodes US power and influence—it’s largely controlled by repressive
governments and OPEC
US Federal News, April 9,2008,pg. 2, LexisNexis Academic database
Energy is a central challenge to U.S. foreign policy, not simply one of many challenges. Global dependence on oil is rapidly eroding
U.S. power and influence because oil is a strategic commodity largely controlled by regressive governments and a cartel that
raises prices and multiplies the rents that flow to oil producers. These rents have enriched and emboldened Iran, enabled President
Vladamir. Putin to undermine Russia’s democracy, entrenched regressive autocrats in Africa, forestalled action against genocide in
Sudan, and facilitated Venezuela’s campaign against free trade in the Americas. Most gravely, oil consumers are in effect financing
both sides of the war on terrorism.
With oil prices at a record high and few signs that they will recede, there is an increasing danger of what Tom Friedman calls the "First
Law of Petropolitics" - that is, as oil prices rise, freedom declines in certain countries rich with oil resources.
This is because these regimes no longer have to open themselves to foreign investment or educate and empower their people in order
to gain wealth and stay in power.
While this is not a hard and fast rule, it certainly applies to Venezuela.
Oil dependency is the “Achilles heel” of US global leadership—our ability to promote our values and
interests is encumbered by our dependence on oil
States News Service 6/9/08 (June 9th, 2008, Lexis page)

The uncertainty concerning our energy future affects not only our economic "life-blood" but our national security as well. American
national interests must
be immunized from the dictates of a global petroleum cartel. We must not allow our potential energy vulnerability to become
the "Achilles heel" of our status as a global superpower. Our ability to pursue our interests and promote our values in the
conduct of American foreign policy must not be encumbered by our petroleum dependency.
78
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
US Hegemony Good Impacts

The ability to project power quickly and effectively is key to US global hegemony and independently
deters potential adversaries
Kagan and Kristol 00 (Robert and William, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace + editor of the
Weekly Standard, Wash Post, "Burden of Power is Having to Wield It," 3/19,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=231)
The question, then, is not whether the United States should intervene everywhere or nowhere. The decision Americans need to make is whether the United States should
generally lean forward, or whether it should adopt a posture of relative passivity . A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with
devastating effect to important regions of the world would make it less likely that challengers to regional stability will attempt
to alter the status quo in their favor. It might even deter them from undertaking expensive efforts to arm themselves for such a
challenge .
An America whose willingness to project force is in doubt, on the other hand, can only encourage such challenges. In Europe, in Asia and in
the Middle East, the message we should be sending to potential foes is: "Don't even think about it." That kind of deterrence offers the
best recipe for lasting peace, and it is much cheaper than fighting the wars that would follow should we fail to create such a deterrent.
The collapse of U.S. leadership will spark nuclear wars around the globe
Brookes – Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation – 7-4-2006 (Peter, New York Post, “Why They Need Us: Imagine a World
Without America,” http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed070406a.cfm)
consider for just
For all the worldwide whining and bellyaching about the United States, today - America's 230th birthday - provides an opportune time for them to
a moment what the world might be like without good ol' Uncle Sam.
The picture isn't pretty. Absent U.S. leadership, diplomatic influence, military might, economic power and unprecedented generosity,
life aboard planet earth would likely be pretty grim, indeed. Set aside the differences America made last century - just imagine a world where this
country had vanished on Jan. 1, 2001.
On security, the United States is the global balance of power. While it's not our preference, we are the world's "cop on the beat," providing
critical stability in some of the planet's toughest neighborhoods.
Without the U.S. "Globo-cop," rivals India and Pakistan might well find cause to unleash the dogs of war in South Asia -
undoubtedly leading to history's first nuclear (weapons) exchange. Talk about Fourth of July fireworks . . .
In Afghanistan, al Qaeda would still be an honored guest, scheming over a global caliphate stretching from Spain to Indonesia. It
wouldn't be sending fighters to Iraq; instead, Osama's gang would be fighting them tooth and nail from Saudi Arabia to "Eurabia."
In Asia, China would be the "Middle Kingdom," gobbling up democratic Taiwan and compelling pacifist Japan (reluctantly) to join
the nuclear weapons club. The Koreas might fight another horrific war, resulting in millions of deaths.
A resurgent Russia, meanwhile, would be breathing down the neck of its "near abroad" neighbors. Forget the democratic revolutions in Ukraine
and Georgia, Comrade! In Europe, they'd be taking orders from Paris or Berlin - if those rivals weren't at each other's throats again.
In Africa, Liberia would still be under Charles Taylor's sway, and Sudan would have no peace agreement.
And what other nation could or would provide freedom of the seas for commerce, including the shipment of oil and gas - all free of charge?
Weapons of mass destruction would be everywhere. North Korea would be brandishing a solid nuclear arsenal. Libya would not
have given up its weapons, and Pakistan's prodigious proliferator, A.Q. Khan, would still be going door to door, hawking his nuclear
wares.
Additionally, a world in which the US exercises leadership is critical in dealing cooperatively to solve
global problems and averting global nuclear war
Khalilzad – RAND Corporation – 1995 (Zalmay, “Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 84, Spring,
Lexis)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite
future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the
United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American
values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the
world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts.
Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid
another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more
conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
79
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC Secessionist Conflicts Impact Module

Despite the decrease in overall global conflicts, civil conflicts within oil-producing states are on the rise
Ross May/June ’08, Michael L. Ross, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles,
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008, page LexisNexis Academic
The world is far more peaceful today than it was 15 years ago. There were 17 major civil wars -- with "major" meaning the kind that
kill more than a thousand people a year -- going on at the end of the Cold War; by 2006, there were just five. During that period, the
number of smaller conflicts also fell, from 33 to 27.
Despite this trend, there has been no drop in the number of wars in countries that produce oil. The main reason is that oil wealth
often wreaks havoc on a country's economy and politics, makes it easier for insurgents to fund their rebellions, and aggravates
ethnic grievances. Today, with violence falling in general, oil-producing states make up a growing fraction of the world's
conflict-ridden countries. They now host about a third of the world's civil wars, both large and small, up from one-fifth in 1992.
According to some, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq shows that oil breeds conflict between countries, but the more widespread problem
is that it breeds conflict within them.
Oil revenues spark secessionist conflicts and civil wars in oil-producing states
Ross May/June 08 (Michael, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, "Blood
Barrels: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict," http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87301/michael-l-ross/blood-
barrels.html?mode=print)
For new oil and gas producers, the gravest danger is the possibility of armed conflict.
Among developing countries, an oil-producing country is
twice as likely to suffer internal rebellion as a non-oil-producing one. The conflicts range in magnitude from low-level
secessionist struggles, such as those occurring in the Niger Delta and southern Thailand, to full-blown civil wars, such as in Algeria, Colombia,
Sudan, and, of course, Iraq.
Oil wealth can trigger conflict in three ways. First, it can cause economic instability, which then leads to political instability. When people lose
their jobs, they become more frustrated with their government and more vulnerable to being recruited by rebel armies that challenge the cash-starved government. A
sudden drop in income can result in internal strife in any country, but because oil prices are unusually volatile, oil-producing countries tend to be
battered by cycles of booms and busts. And the more dependent a government is on its oil revenues, the more likely it is to face turmoil when prices go south.
Second, oil wealth often helps support insurgencies. Rebellions in many countries fail when their instigators run out of funds. But raising money in
petroleum-rich countries is relatively easy: insurgents can steal oil and sell it on the black market (as has happened in Iraq and Nigeria), extort
money from oil companies working in remote areas (as in Colombia and Sudan), or find business partners to fund them in exchange for future
consideration in the event they seize power (as in Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of the Congo).
Third, oil wealth encourages separatism. Oil and gas are usually produced in self-contained economic enclaves that yield a lot of revenue for the central
government but provide few jobs for locals -- who also often bear the costs of petroleum development, such as lost property rights and
environmental damage. To reverse the imbalance, some locals seek autonomy from the central government, as have the people
in the petroleum-rich regions of Bolivia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Sudan.
This is not to say that petroleum is the only source of such conflicts or that it inevitably breeds violence. In fact, almost half of all the states that have produced oil since
1970 have been conflict-free. Oil alone cannot create conflict, but it both exacerbates latent tensions and gives governments and their more
militant opponents the means to fight them out. Governments that limit corruption and put their windfalls to good use rarely face unrest. Unfortunately,
oil production is now rising precisely in those countries where wise leadership is often in short supply. Most of the new energy-rich
states are in Africa (Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Namibia, and São Tomé and Príncipe), the Caspian basin (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan), or Southeast Asia (Cambodia, East Timor, Myanmar, and Vietnam). Almost all are undemocratic. The
majority are very poor and ill equipped to manage a sudden and large influx of revenues. And many also have limited petroleum reserves -- just
enough to yield large revenues for a decade or two -- which means that if they succumb to civil war, they will squander whatever chance they had of using their oil
windfalls to escape from poverty.
80
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
1AC Secessionist Conflicts Impact Module

Secessionist conflicts risk nuclear war, proliferation, and spill over from state to state
Shehadi 93 (Kamal, Research Associate @ IISS, December, Adelphi Papers #283, p. 82)
This paper has argued that self-determination conflicts have direct adverse consequences on international security. As they begin to
tear nuclear states apart, the likelihood of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of individuals or groups willing to use them, or to
trade them to others, will reach frightening levels. This likelihood increases if a conflict over self-determination escalates into a war
between two nuclear states. The Russian Federation and Ukraine may fight over the Crimea and the Donbass area; and India and
Pakistan may fight over Kashmir.
Ethnic conflicts may also spread both within a state and from one state to the next. This can happen in countries where more than one
ethnic self-determination conflict is brewing: Russia, India, and Ethiopia, for example. This conflict may also spread by contagion
from one country to another if the state is weak politically and militarily and cannot contain the conflict on its doorstep. Lastly, there
is a real danger that regional conflicts will erupt over national minorities and borders.
Secessionism causes spiraling escalation and makes every other global problem worse
Gottlieb 93 (Gideon, Director of the Middle East Peace Project, Nation Against State, p. 26-7)
Self-determination unleashed and unchecked by balancing principles constitutes a menace to the society of states. There is simply no
way in which all the hundreds of peoples who aspire to sovereign independence can be granted a state of their own without loosening
fearful anarchy and disorder on a planetary scale. The proliferation of territorial entities poses exponentially greater problems for
the control of weapons of mass destruction and multiple situations in which external intervention could threaten the peace. It
increases problems for the management of all global issues, including terrorism, AIDS, the environment, and population growth. It
carries conditions in which domestic strife in remote territories can drag powerful neighbors into local hostilities, creating ever
widening circles of conflict. Events in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union drove this point home. Like Russian dolls, ever smaller ethnic groups
dwelling in large unites emerged to secede and to demand independence. Georgia, for example, has to contend with the claims of the South Ossetians and Abkhazians
for independence, just as the Russian Federation is confronted with the separatism of Tartaristan. An international system made up of several hundred independent
territorial states cannot be the basis for global security and prosperity.
81
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Secessionism Adv—Oil Revenues → Civil Wars

Oil revenues spark civil wars and domestic instability through the misallocation of “rents”—empirically
proven
Birdsall and Subramanian 04 (Nancy and Arvind, president of the Centre for Global Development and division chief at the
International Monetary Fund, "The resource curse," Australian Financial Review,
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=11370)
The most important explanation for the oil curse, however, has to do with the role natural resources play in impeding the development
of a society's economic and political institutions. Oil works its poison in many ways. Natural resources, unlike output created by
human endeavour, yield large "rents," which are rewards in excess of effort. But such rents are easy to appropriate – either by the state
or by the few who control the resources' extraction. In the former case, as in Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, one set of problems arises.
The state is relieved of the pressure to tax and has no incentive to promote the protection of property rights as a way of creating
wealth. As for the country's citizens, because they are not taxed, they have little incentive and no effective mechanism by which to
hold government accountable. This can lead to the unchecked abuse of state power and undermine the process by which political
systems reconcile conflicting interests and demands. Indeed, such conditions make it very hard for political institutions to develop.
When a subset of the population is able to control the natural resource wealth, meanwhile, it can "buy" or "become" the state, as
occurred in Angola or in what was then Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Even where the state and those who
control its resources remain distinct (as in Russia and Venezuela), public officials tend to become corrupt. Vicious fights over the
distribution of resources often result. These battles are often portrayed as ethnic rivalries, when in fact they may actually be simple
fights to monopolise wealth. Even when the resulting problems do not explode into outright civil conflicts, they discourage
investment and growth and corrode political institutions.
According to economic historians, this pattern explains the very different ways North and South America developed. In the latter, large
plantations of sugar allowed landed elites to maintain concentrated economic and political control, and these elites resisted democratic
reforms and the institution of property rights. In North America, by contrast, the cultivation of wheat and corn on small farms led to a
dispersion of economic power and more favourable conditions for democratisation and institutional development.
Nowhere have all the pathologies associated with oil manifested themselves more clearly than in Nigeria. In the late 1960s, the
Biafran war of secession – then Africa's biggest civil war, which killed a million people – was, in part, an attempt by the country's
eastern, predominantly Igbo, region to gain exclusive control over oil reserves. Nigeria has also suffered the assassination of two of its
leaders, six successful coups and four failed ones, and 30 years of military rule. Its "pirates in power," as one Africa historian called its
leaders, have plundered Nigeria's oil wealth to the tune of perhaps $US100 billion. The explosion in windfall-financed government
expenditures has also provided increased opportunities for kickbacks. All of these forces have contributed to poor economic growth
and other staggeringly malign results. Between 1970 and 2000, the number of people living below the poverty line in Nigeria
increased from 19 million to nearly 90 million, and inequality widened: the top 2 per cent of the population, which earned as much as
the bottom 17 per cent in 1970, now earns as much as the bottom 55 per cent.
Oil revenue induced corruption leads to civil unrest and revolution.

Oil is also linked to conflict and violence through its role in generating immense wealth for those who receive the royalties and other
rewards derived from the exploitation of a nation's petroleum reserves. Petroleum production and distribution is one of the world's
most lucrative industries, producing vast profits for the giant oil companies and also channeling enormous riches to the elites and
ruling dynasties that own the oil fields or control the disbursement of the royalties (or "rents") paid by companies for the right to tap
into these fields. These riches, in turn, have inspired efforts by rival elites and clans to gain control over the oil fields-in some cases
through the use of force. The concentration of so much affluence in the hands of so few has also produced resentment for those
members of society who have received little or no benefit from oil production, thus providing the tinder for revolutionary and
extremist movements aimed at the redistribution of wealth.
82
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Secessionism Adv—Oil Revenues → Civil Wars

History is on our side- Remember the civil war in the DRC? Yea that was caused by oil wealth.
In one of the most conspicuous recent instances of violent conflict over the control of oil rents, the Republic of Congo (Congo-
Brazzaville) was torn apart by a bloody civil war in 1997-1999. CongoBrazzaville possesses significant reserves of petroleum-as much
as 1.5 billion barrels, according to the United States Department of Energy (DOE)-and benefits from the prominent presence of
Western oil firms. Oil revenues have long been the mainstay of the economy and the national treasury, accounting for 94 percent of
export earnings and 80 percent of government income. For many years, this income was controlled by General Denis Sassou Nguesso,
the head of the Congolese Labor Party. In 1993 Sassou-Nguesso lost the nation's first multiparty elections to Pascal Lissouba of the
rival Pan-African Union for Social Development. Rather than surrender control of the government and its copious oil revenues,
Sassou-Nguesso organized an armed militia and began a revolt against Lissouba; other political factions then formed militias of their
own, and a fullscale civil war broke out. Reportedly, this conflict was sustained by payments from competing oil firms that sought
exclusive rights to exploit Congo's oil. Ultimately, Sassou-Nguesso regained control of the government and made himself president.
Oil revenues bad- Internal wars, corruption, no investment in health and education, failure to diversify,
lack of development, rich poor gap, death, and suppression of revolution.
International Relations Center, Foreign Policy in Focus, Michael Renner, “Fueling Conflict”, January 2004, accessed June 10, 2008,
http://www.fpif.org/papers/03petropol/war.html <Campbell>
In a number of developing countries, including Colombia, Sudan and, until recently, Angola, the revenues from oil production
are fueling internal wars. In other countries, including Nigeria and Indonesia, oil and gas exploitation has led to disputes, protests,
and repression, as domestic elites and foreign investors capture the bulk of the profits, while local communities are forced to shoulder
the heavy social, economic, and environmental burdens associated with oil production.Why are some countries susceptible to oil-
based conflicts? Ample resource endowment can have negative economic consequences, as countries grow overly dependent on these
resources, under-invest in critical social areas such as education and health, and fail to diversify their economies. Oil and other
resource extracting industries tend to create enclaves of wealth weakly linked to national economies. The more countries depend on
exporting oil, the worse they score in terms of human development. Specifically, they fall far short in terms of child mortality rates,
life expectancy at birth, and child education. They also experience significantly higher levels of inequality between the rich and poor
than other countries with comparable levels of income.This is not mere coincidence. Societies in which the main income flows from
oil royalties tend to suffer from extremely poor governance. Because such regimes rely less on revenues derived from a broad-based
system of taxation, they also have less need for popular legitimacy and feel less pressure to be accountable. Corruption and patronage
are rife.Many governments of oil-rich countries spend a very high proportion of state income on internal security. They purchase
weapons and maintain sizable armed forces to suppress democratic movements or other challenges to their power. In such situations,
rulers often foster and manipulate conflicts among different communities, factions, and ethnic groups as a means to hold onto
control. However, this intensifies friction within the society. Discontented and aggrieved groups turn increasingly to protest and
sometimes hostilities. Rivals rise to challenge discredited leadership. Ruthless criminal entrepreneurs, who sense opportunities for
pillaging resources, use violence to achieve their objectives. In a developing country with a poorly diversified economy, seizing
control of a prized resource is the most likely ticket to wealth and power.
83
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Oil Dependency Bad—A2 They’re Dependent on Other Resources

Oil has an impact more pronounced and more widespread on oil-producing nations—it’s the world’s
most sought after commodity and more countries are dependent on it
Ross May/June 08 (Michael, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, "Blood
Barrels: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict," http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87301/michael-l-ross/blood-
barrels.html?mode=print)
as the world's most sought-after commodity, and with more countries

Oil is not unique; diamonds and other minerals produce similar problems. But
dependent on it than on gold, copper, or any other resource, oil has an impact more pronounced and more widespread.
84
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Oil Dependency Bad—Cripples Oil-Producing State Stability
Oil-rich states tend to be more unstable, with lower per capita incomes and nondemocratic political systems.
Birdsall and Subramanian ‘04, Nancy Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian, President of the Center for Global Development and
Division Chief at the International Monetary Fund respectively, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004, page LexisNexis Academic
As the United States, the United Nations, and the Iraqi Governing Council struggle to determine what form Iraq's next government
should take, there is one question that, more than any other, may prove critical to the country's future: how to handle its vast oil
wealth. Oil riches are far from the blessing they are often assumed to be. In fact, countries often end up poor precisely because they
are oil rich. Oil and mineral wealth can be bad for growth and bad for democracy, since they tend to impede the development of
institutions and values critical to open, market-based economies and political freedom: civil liberties, the rule of law, protection of
property rights, and political participation.
Plenty of examples illustrate what has come to be known as the "resource curse." Thanks to improvements in exploration technology,
34 less-developed countries now boast significant oil and natural gas resources that constitute at least 30 percent of their total export
revenue (1). Despite their riches, however, 12 of these countries' annual per capita income remains below $1,500, and up to half of
their population lives on less than $1 a day. Moreover, two-thirds of the 34 countries are not democratic, and of those that are, only
three (Ecuador, São Tomé and Principe, and Trinidad and Tobago) score in the top half of Freedom House's world ranking of political
freedom. And even these three states are fragile: Ecuador now teeters on the brink of renewed instability, and in São Tomé and
Principe, the temptations created by sudden oil wealth are straining its democracy and its relations with next-door Nigeria.
In fact, the 34 oil-rich countries share one striking similarity: they have weak, or in some cases, nonexistent political and economic
institutions. This problem may not seem surprising for the several African countries on the list, such as Angola and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, that have only recently emerged from civil conflict. But it is also a problem for the newly independent, oil-
and gas-rich republics of the former Soviet Union, which have done little to consolidate property and contract rights or to ensure
competent management or judicial independence. And even the richer countries on the list, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, suffer
from underdeveloped political institutions. Concentrated oil wealth at the top has forestalled political change.
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The economic disasters and political fiascos that have plagued Nigeria and so many other oil producing countries could soon
affect the main oil producers in the middle east.
Nowhere have all the pathologies associated with oil manifested themselves more clearly than in Nigeria. In the late 1960s, the
Biafran war of secession -- then Africa's biggest civil war, which killed a million people -- was, in part, an attempt by the country's
eastern, predominantly Igbo, region to gain exclusive control over oil reserves. Nigeria has also suffered the assassination of two of its
leaders, six successful coups and four failed ones, and 30 years of military rule. Its "pirates in power," as one Africa historian called its
leaders, have plundered Nigeria's oil wealth to the tune of perhaps $100 billion. The explosion in windfall-financed government
expenditures has also provided increased opportunities for kickbacks. All of these forces have contributed to poor economic growth
and other staggeringly malign results. Between 1970 and 2000, the number of people living below the poverty line in Nigeria
increased from 19 million to nearly 90 million, and inequality widened: the top 2 percent of the population, which earned as much as
the bottom 17 percent in 1970, now earns as much as the bottom 55 percent.
Nor are such statistics unique to Nigeria. In different forms and at different times, natural-resource wealth has wreaked similar havoc
in Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Venezuela, and now threatens to affect tiny São Tomé and Principe. In Angola, an estimated
$4.2 billion has gone missing from government coffers over the last few years. In Venezuela, poverty has nearly doubled since the late
1970s and the share of national income going to business owners has increased from 50 percent to nearly 80 percent; as a result,
ordinary workers now get a mere 20 percent of the economic pie.
The oil-rich countries of the Middle East have so far escaped some of the worst side effects of mineral wealth -- but only because of
the sheer magnitude of their oil resources relative to the size of their populations. And they have not avoided the stunted political and
social development associated with oil. The UN Development Program's 2002 Human Development Report identified the lack of press
and other freedoms and the low status of women as key obstacles to the Arab world's long-run progress. Moreover, although current
economic performance in the Middle East may be broadly satisfactory, it cannot be expected to remain so for long. Venezuela shows
how even a relatively affluent country can deteriorate over time as the fight over easy oil wealth corrodes its political and economic
institutions.
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Oil undermines societies due to three main reasons: fluctuating prices, Dutch disease, and loss of basic government functions
once the counties shift their economy to oil.
There are several explanations for why oil undermines societies. World prices for oil and similar resources are notoriously volatile,
especially compared to those for manufactured goods, and so countries that rely on the export of natural resources are exposed to
much greater uncertainty and risk. Fluctuations in price can create a dangerous cycle in which governments spend wildly when they
are flush, only to be forced into disruptive and costly spending cuts (leaving schools without teachers, or public buildings unfinished)
when prices fall.
A second explanation for the oil curse is the so-called Dutch disease. As the Netherlands experienced when it discovered natural gas in
the North Sea in the 1960s, the exploitation of mineral resources can crowd out other activities in a country's economy. When
resources are discovered or their prices increase, a country's currency becomes stronger. This hurts domestic manufacturers, who soon
find it difficult to compete with lower-priced imports. More of the country's labor and capital starts to be deployed in local
nontradeable sectors, and unless corrective steps are taken, soon the whole country suffers, since it loses the benefits -- such as
technological innovation and good management -- that a strong domestic manufacturing sector can provide.
The most important explanation for the oil curse, however, has to do with the role natural resources play in impeding the development
of a society's economic and political institutions. Oil works its poison in many ways. Natural resources, unlike output created by
human endeavor, yield large "rents," which are rewards in excess of effort. But such rents are easy to appropriate -- either by the state
or by the few who control the resources' extraction. In the former case, as in Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, one set of problems arises.
The state is relieved of the pressure to tax and has no incentive to promote the protection of property rights as a way of creating
wealth. As for the country's citizens, because they are not taxed, they have little incentive and no effective mechanism by which to
hold government accountable. This can lead to the unchecked abuse of state power and undermine the process by which political
systems reconcile conflicting interests and demands. Indeed, such conditions make it very hard for political institutions to develop.
Natural resource wealth causes conflict when a small group of people own the wealth, and essentially “become” the state.
When a subset of the population is able to control the natural resource wealth, meanwhile, it can "buy" or "become" the state, as
occurred in Angola or in what was then Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Even where the state and those who
control its resources remain distinct (as in Russia and Venezuela), public officials tend to become corrupt. Vicious fights over the
distribution of resources often result. These battles are often portrayed as ethnic rivalries, when in fact they may actually be simple
fights to monopolize wealth. Even when the resulting problems do not explode into outright civil conflicts, they discourage investment
and growth and corrode political institutions.
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Unless the demand for oil decreases, thus dropping the price of oil, more and more poorer countries will seek part in this
money-making trade, increasing the violence further.
Ross May/June ’08, Michael L. Ross, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, Foreign
Affairs, May/June 2008, page LexisNexis Academic
The number of oil-producer-based conflicts is likely to grow in the future as stratospheric prices of crude oil push more countries in
the developing world to produce oil and gas. In 2001, the Bush administration's energy task force hailed the emergence of new
producers as a chance for the United States to diversify the sources of its energy imports and reduce its reliance on oil from the Persian
Gulf. More than a dozen countries in Africa, the Caspian basin, and Southeast Asia have recently become, or will soon become,
significant oil and gas exporters. Some of these countries, including Chad, East Timor, and Myanmar, have already suffered internal
strife. Most of the rest are poor, undemocratic, and badly governed, which means that they are likely to experience violence as well.
On top of that, record oil prices will yield the kind of economic windfalls that typically produce further unrest.
Oil rich countries are plagued with economic problems due to Dutch disease and misuse of income, along with political
corruption.
Ross May/June ’08, Michael L. Ross, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, Foreign
Affairs, May/June 2008, page LexisNexis Academic
The oil booms of the 1970s brought great wealth -- and later great anguish -- to many petroleum-rich countries in the developing
world. In the 1970s, oil-producing states enjoyed fast economic growth. But in the following three decades, many suffered crushing
debt, high unemployment, and sluggish or declining economies. At least half of the members of OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries) were poorer in 2005 than they had been 30 years earlier. Oil-rich countries that once held great promise, such as
Algeria and Nigeria, have unraveled as a result of decades of internal conflict. These states were plagued by the so-called oil curse.
One aspect of the problem is an economic syndrome known as Dutch disease, named after the troubles that beset the Netherlands in
the 1960s after it discovered natural gas in the North Sea. The affliction hits when a country becomes a significant producer and
exporter of natural resources. Rising resource exports push up the value of the country's currency, which makes its other exports, such
as manufactured and agricultural goods, less competitive abroad. Export figures for those products then decline, depriving the country
of the benefits of dynamic manufacturing and agricultural bases and leaving it dependent on its resource sector and so at the mercy of
often volatile international markets. In Nigeria, for example, the oil boom of the early 1970s caused agricultural exports to drop from
11.2 percent of GDP in 1968 to 2.8 percent of GDP in 1972; the country has yet to recover. Another facet of the oil curse is the sudden
glut of revenues. Few oil-rich countries have the fiscal discipline to invest the windfalls prudently; most squander them on wasteful
projects. The governments of Kazakhstan and Nigeria, for example, have spent their petroleum incomes on building new capital cities
while failing to bring running water to the many villages throughout their countries that lack it. Well-governed states with highly
educated populations and diverse economies, such as Canada and Norway, have avoided these ill effects. But many more oil-rich
countries have low incomes and less effective governments and so are more susceptible to the oil curse. Oil wealth also has political
downsides, and those are often worse than the economic ones. Oil revenues tend to increase corruption, strengthen the hands of
dictators, and weaken new democracies. The more money the governments of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela have received from oil and
gas exports, the less accountable they have become to their own citizens -- and the easier it has been for them to shut up or buy off
their opponents. A major boom in oil prices, such as the one that took the price of a barrel from less than $10 in February 1999 to over
$100 in March 2008, only heightens the danger.
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Oil Dependency Bad—Civil Wars/Internal Conflicts

Oil wealthy countries face increased likelihood of civil war and economic collapse
Finally, these findings have implications for the fate of resource-rich states across the developing world. Many of the world’s most
troubled states have high levels of oil and mineral wealth. Earlier studies have shown that resource wealth tends to reduce
economic growth and to increase the likelihood of civil war. This article suggests there is a third component to “resource curse”:
authoritarian rule. These three effects may interact in pernicious ways, creating a “resource trap.” Authoritarian governments may be
less able to resolve domestic conflicts and hence more likely to suffer from civil war. Slow growth may make domestic unrest
tougher to resolve; civil wars, in turn, wreak economic havoc. There is nothing inevitable about the resource curse: states like
Malaysia, Chile, and Botswana have done relatively well despite their oil and mineral wealth. Yet most others have found—like King
Midas—that their resource wealth can be an unexpected source of grief.
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1AC Iraqi Insurgency Impact Module

Oil is feeding insurgencies in Iraq
ROBERT F. WORTH and JAMES GLANZ, reporters, New York Times, “Oil Dollars Fund the Insurgency, Iraq and U.S. Say,”
2/5/06, <http://healthandenergy.com/oil_dollars_fund_terrorism.htm>
Iraqi and American officials say they are seeing a troubling pattern of government corruption enabling the flow of oil money
and other funds to the insurgency and threatening to undermine Iraq's struggling economy.
In Iraq, which depends almost exclusively on oil for its revenues, the officials say that any diversion of money to an insurgency that is killing its
citizens and tearing apart its infrastructure adds a new and menacing element to the challenge of holding the country together.
In one example, a sitting member of the Iraqi National Assembly has been indicted in the theft of millions of dollars meant for protecting a critical oil pipeline against
attacks and is suspected of funneling some of that money to the insurgency, said Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, the chairman of Iraq's Commission on Public Integrity. The
indictment has not been made public.
The charges against the Sunni lawmaker, Meshaan al-Juburi, are far from the only indication that the insurgency is profiting from Iraq's oil riches.
On Saturday, the director of a major oil storage plant near Kirkuk was arrested with other employees and several local police officials, and charged with helping to
orchestrate a mortar attack on the plant on Thursday, a Northern Oil Company employee said. The attack resulted in devastating pipeline fires and a shutdown of all oil
operations in the area, said the employee, who was granted anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about the matter.
Ali Allawi, Iraq's finance minister, estimated that insurgents reap 40 percent to 50 percent of all oil-smuggling profits in the country.
Offering an example of how illicit oil products are kept flowing on the black market, he said that the insurgency had infiltrated senior management positions at the
major northern refinery in Baiji and routinely terrorized truck drivers there. This allows the insurgents and their confederates to tap the pipeline,
empty the trucks and sell the oil or gas themselves.
"It's gone beyond Nigeria levels now where it really threatens national security," Mr. Allawi said of the oil industry. "The insurgents are involved at all levels."
American officials here echo that view. "It's clear that corruption funds the insurgency, so there you have a very real threat to the new state," said an American official
who is involved in anticorruption efforts but refused to be identified to preserve his ability to work with Iraqi officials. "Corruption really has the potential of
undercutting the growth potential here."
An example of how the insurgents terrorize oil truck drivers occurred last month, as a 60-truck convoy of fuel tankers from Baiji that was intended to alleviate fuel
shortages in Baghdad was attacked by insurgents with grenades and machine guns despite the heavy presence of Iraqi security forces. In some cases Iraqi guards on the
Syrian border have been paid off to let stolen shipments through, and the oil is then sold on the black market, Mr. Radhi said.
Senior officials in Iraq's Oil Ministry have been repeatedly cited in the Iraqi press as complaining about what they call an "oil smuggling mafia" that not
only siphons profits from the oil industry but also is said to control the allocation of administrative posts in the ministry.
The former oil minister, Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum, told the London-based newspaper Al Hayat late last year that "oil and fuel smuggling networks have
grown into a dangerous mafia threatening the lives of those in charge of fighting corruption," according to a translation by the BBC.
Continued violence in Iraq sparks regional nuclear war
Stannard 12/3/06 (Matthew, Staff Writer @ SF Chronicle, "Military's dilemma -- stay or leave," http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/12/03/MNGBVMNLT51.DTL&type=printable)
sectarian fighting is causing Iraqis to

The problem, Biddle said, is that tactic assumes the threat of a U.S. withdrawal will force the Iraqis to come together. He argues that
identify more with their religious or ethnic groups than with their nation, so a U.S. withdrawal is more likely to drive them apart.
"If we just depart, the result is not likely to be the quick standup of working, functioning government ministries," he said. "It's more likely to be people lashing
out to they are afraid will first."
The long-term consequence of increased violence could be dire, Biddle said, if the losing side turned for help to neighboring states that shared its ethnic
identity.
"You could end up with a regional, potentially nuclear war in a part of the world that contains a significant fraction of the
global oil supply," he said. "If that happens, you can imagine that 8 or 10 years from now we might end up right back" there again.
Biddle = author, senior fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations
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High Oil Prices Bad—Fuels Iraqi Insurgency

Insurgencies in Iraq are using oil profits to sustain themselves
JOHN F. BURNS and KIRK SEMPLE, reporters, New York Times, 11/26/2006,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/world/middleeast/26insurgency.html?_r=1&oref=slogin>
The insurgency in Iraq is now self-sustaining financially, raising tens of millions of dollars a year from oil smuggling, kidnapping,
counterfeiting, connivance by corrupt Islamic charities and other crimes that the Iraqi government and its American patrons have been largely unable to prevent, a
classified United States government report has concluded.
The report, obtained by The New York Times, estimates that groups responsible for many insurgent and terrorist attacks are raising $70 million to $200 million a year
from illegal activities. It says $25 million to $100 million of that comes from oil smuggling and other criminal activity involving the
state-owned oil industry, aided by “corrupt and complicit” Iraqi officials.
As much as $36 million a year comes from ransoms paid for hundreds of kidnap victims, the report says. It estimates that unnamed foreign governments — previously
identified by American officials as including France and Italy — paid $30 million in ransom last year.
A copy of the seven-page report was made available to The Times by American officials who said the findings could improve understanding of the challenges the
United States faces in Iraq.
The report offers little hope that much can be done, at least soon, to choke off insurgent revenues. For one thing, it acknowledges how little the American authorities in
Iraq know — three and a half years after the invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein — about crucial aspects of insurgent operations. For another, it paints an almost
despairing picture of the Iraqi government’s ability, or willingness, to take steps to tamp down the insurgency’s financing.
“If accurate,” the report says, its estimates indicate that these “sources of terrorist and insurgent finance within Iraq — independent of foreign sources — are currently
sufficient to sustain the groups’ existence and operation.” To this, it adds what may be its most surprising conclusion: “In fact, if recent revenue and expense estimates
are correct, terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq may have surplus funds with which to support other terrorist organizations outside of Iraq.”
Some terrorism experts outside the government who were given an outline of the report by The Times criticized it as imprecise and speculative. Completed in June, the
report was compiled by an interagency working group investigating the financing of militant groups in Iraq.
A Bush administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, confirmed the group’s existence. He said it was led by Juan Zarate, deputy national security
adviser for combating terrorism, and was made up of about a dozen people, drawn from the C.I.A., the F.B.I., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department,
the Treasury Department and the United States Central Command.
The group’s estimate of the financing for the insurgency, even taking the higher figure of $200 million, underscores the David and Goliath nature of the war. American,
Iraqi and other coalition forces are fighting an array of shadowy Sunni and Shiite groups that can draw on huge armories left over from Mr. Hussein’s days, and benefit
from the willingness of many insurgents to fight with little or no pay. If the $200 million a year estimate is close to the mark, it amounts to less than what it costs the
Pentagon, with an $8 billion monthly budget for Iraq, to sustain the American war effort here for a single day.
But other estimates suggest the sums involved could be far higher. The oil ministry in Baghdad, for example, estimated earlier this year that 10 percent to 30
percent of the $4 billion to $5 billion in fuel imported for public consumption in 2005 was smuggled back out of the country for
resale. At that time, the finance minister estimated that close to half of all smuggling profits was going to insurgents. If true, that
would be $200 million or more from fuel smuggling alone.
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High Oil Prices Bad—1AC Chavez Anti-Americanism Agenda

Oil lubricates the anti-American agenda espoused by Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez
One of these states is Iran. With 10 percent of the world’s oil reserves and the world’s second largest natural gas reserve, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seems
unfazed by the prospects of international sanctions against his country as a result of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. At high oil prices, leaders of human-rights
violating countries like Azerbaijan, Chad, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, too, can persecute their people with impunity. Another setback to democracy was
delivered last May when Kazakhstan’s leader Nursultan Nazarbayev declared himself president for life. The control over a large part of the world’s oil and gas market
allows Russia to bully its European neighbors, to play “hard to get” on Iran, and to undermine democracy in former Soviet republics like Ukraine and Georgia. Should
Russia and other major gas producers like Iran go forth with plans to create an OPEC like natural gas cartel, we can expect further consolidation of power among the
energy producers. Oil also lubricates the so-called Bolivarian revolution led by Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who is using
Venezuela’s oil wealth to buy political influence in the Western Hemisphere and to consolidate an anti-U.S. bloc in the region.
US failure to check Chavez undermines the spread of democracy and free markets in Latin America
Dale 2/15/07 (Helle, Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, "Nuance in Chavez's Rhetoric Tells of Future
Plans for Region," http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm1360.cfm)
Hugo Chavez, much like Fidel Castro, is not an ideologue but an opportunist. Fidel Castro developed into a Communist when he realized that he would need Soviet funding for his Revolution.
Chavez has seen an opportunity in the vacuum left in the wake of decreased U.S. interest and influence in the region. Left alone,
Chavez will continue to rail against the evils of the U.S. and free markets, to exploit the desperation of Latin America's poor
through preaching about the perfection of the Socialist state, and to build his influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. To counter his message
and influence, the United States should:
Ignore Chavez's taunts and threats.
The U.S. message in Latin America should continue be one of good governance, belief in democratic
principles, commitment to the liberating powers of the free market, and respect for the rule of law. Chavez has been spending vast amounts of oil
revenue to finance his regional aspirations and preach about the evils of U.S. might while violence and poverty have increased in Venezuela. Answering his taunts will allow him to avoid the
real problems of Venezuela.
Swiftly approve free-trade agreements with Peru, Columbia, and Panama. Free-trade agreements are one of the best tools the U.S. has to counter anti-American and anti-democratic forces in
Latin America.
Extend trade preferences to Bolivia and Ecuador. These preferences are about toexpire. The leftist leaders of these countries have personally embraced Chavez but distanced themselves from
his actual policies. Free-trade agreements with these two nations may not be possible, and the U.S. does have disagreements with their governments. Nonetheless, extending trade preferences
will be a gesture of cooperation to the people of these countries and the wider region.
Pursue additional bilateral FTAs. Through negotiating bilateral FTAs, the U.S. can ensure that individual countries are willing to play by the rules of the free market and are committed to
upholding standards on labor practices and environmental issues. Linking trade agreements to commitments to good governance and free market practices allows the U.S. to deal with Latin
American countries based on their actions and practices.
Enhance security cooperation in the region. The U.S. should actively work with neighbors and allies to combat threats to security through cooperative efforts to battle transnational terrorism
and crime and illegal substances. This would create permanent working relationships and actively work to counter anti-American messages.
Conclusion
Chavez aims to counter U.S. influence in Latin America and the Caribbean by uniting the region under one socialist
Like Marti, Bolivar, and Castro, Hugo
regime. Chavez can be expected to continue to influence his neighbors through petro-diplomacy and rhetorical rants against the U.S. and free markets.
Unless the U.S. increases
its presence in the region through support for democratic institutions and market institutions, the aspirations of Marti, Bolivar, Castro, and now Chavez
may come to fruition.
This undermines global democratization
Fauriol and Weintraub 95 (Georges and Sidney, director of the CSIS Americas Program + Dean Rusk Professor at the Lyndon
B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at Univ. of Texas, Washington Quarterly, Summer)
Yet this triad of objectives -- economic

liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable development/ alleviation of poverty -- is generally accepted in
are also themes expounded widely by the United States, but
the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two varies by country, but all three are taken as valid. All three
with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin
America will compromise progress elsewhere in the world.
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High Oil Prices Bad—1AC Chavez Anti-Americanism Agenda

The impact is extinction
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 95 (October, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990's,"
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could
easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly
corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on
Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated
with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not
go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not
ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do
not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long
run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to
protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to
breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable
foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
The domino of Latin American failed states will spread starvation, disease, genocide, and WMD
warlordism around the globe
Manwaring 05 - Professor of Military Strategy @ U.S. Army War College. [Max G. Manwaring , Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of
International Politics at Dickinson College, VENEZUELA’S HUGO CHÁVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM, AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf]
state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge

The Issue of State Failure. - President Chávez also understands that the process leading to
facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability,
criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee
flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form
of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder,
kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human
rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts,
trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the
same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62
Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South
America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish
Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic
efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s
intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions
of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally
perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying
such a government are real.64
But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that
the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states,
rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his
Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal,
and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and
prosperity.65
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High Oil Prices Bad—Empower Chavez

Petrodollars fund Chavez’ anti-American campaigns.
Gerald F. Seib, (executive editor of the Wall Street Journal) “Pump Prices Hurt Americans Not Just In Pocketbook” July 6, 2008,
http://blogs.wsj.com/politicalperceptions/2008/07/08/pump-prices-hurt-americans-not-just-in-pocketbook/
Which leads to the third concern: that some of these mountains of petrodollars will in turn be used to advance anti-American political
agendas. The McKinsey report summarizes the problem dryly but succinctly: “The rise of a broader range of countries with sovereign
wealth funds heightens concerns about the potential noneconomic motives and political ramifications of their investments.”
It doesn’t take a lot of imagination to start seeing how the growing chunk of money in the hands of the wrong people can set back
broader American interests. Iran is, at least indirectly, using some of its oil money to finance attacks on U.S. soldiers in Iraq and to
build a troublesome nuclear program. Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez is financing his Western Hemisphere crusade against
American influence with petrodollars. When Russia had a dispute with Ukraine two years ago, it simply cut off natural-gas supplies to
increase its political leverage.
Oil production has given Chavez control over the U.S.’s economic stability and security.
Reuters 2007, Reuters, "Iran Offers Aid to Nicaragua, in a Sign of Deepening Ties," August 5, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/06/world/americas/06nicaragua.html
The decline in domestic crude oil production and commensurate rise in imports will enrich and empower many regimes unfriendly or
hostile to U.S. interests worldwide.
Venezuela is the fourth major supplier of foreign oil to the United States. As Chavez has asserted increasing control over the country's
oil reserves, rising world prices have helped to support his populist agenda and bolster his anti-American rhetoric. In 2006, Chavez
oversaw the conversion of 32 operating agreements with foreign oil companies in marginal or low-yielding oilfields into joint ventures
with PdVSA (Venezuela’s state oil company) majority ownership. In 2007, Chavez continued his purge of foreign oil investment in the
country through the expropriation of 6 major foreign oil companies - U.S.-based ConocoPhillips, Chevron, and ExxonMobil,
Norway's Statoil-Hydro, Britain's BP, and France's Total. Since then, ExxonMobil has been in a high-profile dispute with the
Venezuelan regime over compensation to be paid by Venezuela for its oil investments in the country. In response to a January 2008
court order in the UK that froze as much as $12 billion in Venezuelan oil sector assets in favor of ExxonMobil, Chavez threatened to
cut off all oil sales to the United States. Though this victory for the oil company was ultimately overturned by a UK High Court order,
the ExxonMobil case effectively demonstrates the nature of the Venezuela – U.S. oil relationship. During the last 3 years, Chavez’s
rhetoric has consistently included threats to stop selling oil to the United States. With an estimated 65 percent of Venezuela’s oil
exports coming to the United States, it is unlikely Chavez could ever afford to carry through on such threats, but the unpredictability
of his actions continues to undermine U.S. security and stability in the Western Hemisphere.
Furthermore, Chavez brazenly uses his petrodollars and oil resources as a tool against U.S. interests. He consistently uses Venezuela’s
membership in international organizations to disparage the United States and further his own political ambitions. In a 2007 speech to
OPEC members, Chavez went so far as to say, “We should continue to strengthen OPEC, but beyond that, OPEC should set itself up
as an active political agent."
Oil revenues strengthens the bonds between Chavez and Iran

.
Within the Western Hemisphere, Chavez continues to increase his influence via preferential oil arrangements with several countries in
the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. Most recently, Argentina’s current energy crisis compelled President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner to seek
stronger ties with Chavez following failed negotiations with Bolivia. In addition, his significant provision of large amounts of free oil to Cuba has
helped to sustain the longest reigning totalitarian regime in the Hemisphere.
Chavez’s burgeoning relationship with Iran’s leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has also hit close to home. Earlier this year, a group of
GOP members questioned several officials in the Administration regarding the reported venture between Iran and Venezuela to create
the Venezuelan-Iranian Oil & Gas Co., a $1 billion enterprise to concentrate on oil and gas developments in countries with tough business conditions for
international investors. Many remained concerned that through this project, American dollars might be used to support a state sponsor of terrorism.
Chavez’s eagerness to foster Iran’s presence in the region also warrants concern as Iran continues to negotiate significant, albeit
seemingly unbalanced, energy investments with various countries in the Western Hemisphere. For example, it has been reported that “Tehran has
agreed to provide Nicaragua funds for a $350 million ocean port and a $120 million hydroelectric project. In return, Nicaragua will export to Iran items like coffee,
meat, and bananas.”1 As a state sponsor of terrorism, it is especially disconcerting that these sham energy deals may in fact be paving the
way for the increased presence and power of Iran in the region.
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High Oil Prices Bad—Allow Chavez to Fund Colombian Guerillas

Oil profits enable Hugo Chavez to fund and empower violent guerilla groups in Colombia
John Sexton, Virginia Tech graduate, Verum Serum, “Citgo Gas Funds Terrorism,” March 3, 2008,
<http://www.verumserum.com/?p=1735>
This was too much for Chavez who immediately ordered 10 battalions of Venezuelan troops to the Columbian border and has been saber rattling excessively over the
past few days. Chavez had never publicly aligned himself with FARC, for obvious reasons, but he had never denounced them either. So
his reaction in itself was telling. Why would Chavez care what happens to a Columbian terrorist group? Well, now we know:
Colombia’s police chief, Gen. Oscar Naranjo, said documents recovered from a slain rebel leader’s computer indicate Chavez recently sent $300 million to
Colombian guerrillas. He said another document indicates the rebels sent money to Chavez when he was a jailed coup leader more than a decade ago.
Of course Hugo Chavez doesn’t have $300 million. That money came from his nations main export: gasoline. And the main consumer for
that product is the United States, where Citgo has some 14,000 stations. In other words, the money for the FARC terrorists and
their reign of terror is coming from you. Every time you buy Citgo gas some of that money is supporting FARC in its
kidnapping, drug running and murder of elected officials. Unless you want to support FARC, consider buying your gas somewhere else. That’s what
I’ll be doing.
Further escalation of the Colombian civil war results in regional conflict escalation and a weakening of
US leadership
Rabasa and Chalk 01 (Angel and Peter, Foreign Policy Analysts @ RAND, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and
Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability, www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1339/)
Colombia’s crisis has developed into a serious security concern for its neighbors. Panamanians feel helpless to prevent the use of their territory by
Colombian factions. Ecuadoreans are conscious of the vulnerability of their country’s vital oil installations in the Oriente, within striking distance of the Colombian
border, and fear that the Colombian drug-production problem could metastasize in Ecuador. All are concerned about refugee flows from Colombia. A further
deterioration of security in Colombia would pose a serious threat to the security and stability of neighboring states and drive a
greater regionalization of the conflict. So far the response of most of Colombia’s neighbors, as noted above, is to try to insulate themselves from the
consequences of the Colombian conflict. However, efforts to control the borders are unlikely to be successful, given the remoteness and inaccessibility
and the lack of government infrastructure in much of the border area.
The widening of Colombia’s conflict would severely test the viability of the existing regional security architecture and of U.S.
leadership in hemispheric security institutions. The states most threatened by the spillover of the conflict would seek U.S. assistance and leadership. Others
could try to work out an accommodation with the guerrillas. The United States would be confronted by the choice of leading a coalition-building effort to stabilize the
regional environment, letting events take their course, or deferring to initiatives led by other parties (for instance, Brazil) and accepting a commensurate loss of regional
influence.
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1AC Iran Nuclearization Impact Module

US oil dependence funds global terrorism and Iran’s nuclear program—we’re on track to spend more
money paying for imported oil from terrorist nations than we spend on the US military
A lot has changed since the turn of the 15th century, but Marshal Trivulzio’s famous aphorism still holds a great deal of truth. Yet Americans don’t seem to be heeding
its implications. In fact, in waging the war on terror, the United States seems to be doing its best to fund its enemies.
Consider the following: In 1972, the U.S. paid out $4 billion for oil imports, an amount equal to 1.2 percent of our defense budget at that
time. In 2006, we paid $260 billion — about half of what we paid for national defense. Over the same period, Saudi oil revenues have
grown in direct parallel: from $2.7 billion in 1972 to $200 billion in 2006 — which will likely exceed $300 billion this year. Much of
that money is being used to fund an international network of front organizations and Wahhabist madrassas devoted to
spreading terrorist ideology. Meanwhile, Iran is using its share of the take to fund its nuclear bomb program, as well as
terrorist groups like Hezbollah.
If something isn’t done to break the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) — the cartel that dominates and manipulates the global oil market — the
situation is likely to get much worse: With China and India industrializing rapidly, world demand for fuel is going up. OPEC is positioned to exploit
this new demand with radical price hikes that go well beyond the 50-percent increase it effected during 2007 alone. Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Iran’s
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are already calling for prices of $200 per barrel. In short, we Americans are financing a war against
ourselves — and the way things are going, we may soon be paying the enemy more than we are paying our own military.
Iranian nuclearization sparks regional nuclear proliferation—this is a recipe for nuclear war
Cirincione and Leventer 8/21/07 (Joseph and Uri, director for nuclear policy at the Center for American Progress + graduate
student at the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, "The Middle East's Nuclear Surge,"
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/nuclear_surge.html)
Iran is still probably five to 10 years away from gaining the ability to make nuclear fuel or nuclear bombs. But its program is already sending nuclear
ripples through the Middle East. The race to match Iran's capabilities has begun.
Almost a dozen Muslim nations have declared their interest in nuclear energy programs in the past year. This unprecedented demand for nuclear
programs is all the more disturbing paired with the unseemly rush of nuclear salesman eager to supply the coveted technology.
While U.S. officials were reaching a new nuclear agreement with India last month, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France signed a nuclear cooperation deal with Libya and agreed to help the
United Arab Emirates launch its own civilian nuclear program. Indicating that this could be just the beginning of a major sale and supply effort, Sarkozy declared that the West should trust
Arab states with nuclear technology.
Sarkozy has a point: No one can deny Arab states access to nuclear technology, especially as they are acquiring it under existing international rules and agreeing to the inspection of
International Atomic Energy Agency officials. But is this really about meeting demands for electric power and desalinization plants?
There is only one nuclear power reactor in the entire Middle East—the one under construction in Busher, Iran. In all of Africa there are only two, both in South Africa. (Israel has a research
reactor near Dimona, as do several other states.) Suddenly, after multiple energy crises over the 60 years of the nuclear age, these countries that control over one-fourth of the world's oil
supplies are investing in nuclear power programs. This is not about energy; it is a nuclear hedge against Iran.
King Adbdullah of Jordan admitted as much in a January 2007 interview when he said: "The rules have changed on the nuclear subject throughout the whole region. . . . After this summer
everybody's going for nuclear programs." He was referring to the war in Lebanon last year between Israel and Hezbollah, perceived in the region as evidence of Iran's growing clout. Other
leaders are not as frank in public, but confide similar sentiments in private conversations.
Egypt and Turkey, two of Iran's main rivals, are in the lead. Both have flirted with nuclear weapons
Here is where the nuclear surge currently stands.
programs in the past and both have announced ambitious plans for the construction of new power reactors. Gamal Mubarak, son of the current
Egyptian president and his likely successor, says the country will build four power reactors, with the first to be completed within the next 10 years. Turkey will build three new reactors, with
the first beginning later this year.
Not to be outdone,
Saudi Arabia and the five other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates) at the end of 2006 "commissioned a joint study on the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes."
Algeria and Russia quickly signed an agreement on nuclear development in January 2007, with France, South Korea, China, and the United States
also jockeying for nuclear sales to this oil state. Jordan announced that it, too, wants nuclear power. King Abdullah met Canada's prime minister in July
and discussed the purchase of heavy water Candu reactors. Morocco wants assistance from the atomic energy agency to acquire nuclear technology and in
March sponsored an international conference on Physics and Technology of Nuclear Reactors.
Finally, the Arab League has provided an overall umbrella for these initiatives when, at the end of its summit meeting in March, it "called on the Arab states to expand the use of peaceful
nuclear technology in all domains serving continuous development."
Perhaps these states are truly motivated to join the "nuclear renaissance" promoted by the nuclear power industry and a desire to counter global warming. But the main message to the West
from these moderate Arab and Muslim leaders is political, not industrial. "We can't trust you," they are saying, "You are failing to contain Iran and we need to prepare." It is not too late to prove
them wrong.
Instead of seeing this nuclear surge as a new market,
the countries with nuclear technology to sell have a moral and strategic obligation to ensure that their business does not
result in the Middle East going from a region with one nuclear weapon state - Israel - to one with three, four, or five nuclear nations.
If the existing territorial, ethnic, and political disputes continue unresolved, this is a recipe for nuclear war.
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High Oil Prices Bad—Finances Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Petrodollars are used by Iran to finance its nuclear program
Though the U.S. does not import Iranian oil, the mullahs continue to have a significant impact on oil prices. The Iranian regime
covets higher oil prices, as they are essential for Iran's economic survival. According to reports, oil accounts for roughly 85
percent of Iran's exports, comprising upwards of 65 percent of government income. Iran uses a good chunk of that money to raise
public-sector wages and to subsidize its own gasoline prices, keeping domestic discontent in check when unemployment and
underemployment are high. Finally, the Iranian regime utilizes that revenue to finance its nuclear program, unconventional
weapons and ballistic missile development programs, and militant proxies throughout the region.
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High Oil Prices Bad—Empowers Iran

Iran uses it’s revenue from oil to bully other countries, including the U.S.
While Iranian production has lagged in recent years due to its aging infrastructure, higher oil prices allow the regime to sell less oil
without the resulting loss in revenue. Yet, Iran does not need a consensus among OPEC member states to drive up the price of oil; they
can do it through their words and actions. When Ahmadinejad declares that Israel will be “wiped off the face of the map,” or when the
regime openly and belligerently defies the United States and responsible nations everywhere, they impact the price that Americans pay
at the pump.
Iran can also hinder other countries’ efforts to export oil or interfere with U.S. warships and those of its allies trying to protect such
commerce, whether by direct military action at sea or by sabotage on land. Such disruptions would have similarly adverse effects on
world markets because of the limited capacity of alternative export routes.
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High Oil Prices Bad—Empower Caspian Human Rights/Democracy Violations

High oil prices empower Caspian leaders to violate human rights and democracy
One of these states is Iran. With 10 percent of the world’s oil reserves and the world’s second largest natural gas reserve, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seems
unfazed by the prospects of international sanctions against his country as a result of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. At high oil prices, leaders of
human-rights violating countries like Azerbaijan, Chad, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, too, can persecute their people
with impunity. Another setback to democracy was delivered last May when Kazakhstan’s leader Nursultan Nazarbayev declared
himself president for life. The control over a large part of the world’s oil and gas market allows Russia to bully its European neighbors, to play “hard to get” on
Iran, and to undermine democracy in former Soviet republics like Ukraine and Georgia. Should Russia and other major gas producers like Iran go forth with plans to
create an OPEC like natural gas cartel, we can expect further consolidation of power among the energy producers. Oil also lubricates the so-called Bolivarian revolution
led by Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who is using Venezuela’s oil wealth to buy political influence in the Western Hemisphere and to consolidate an anti-U.S.
bloc in the region.
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Oil Dependence Bad—US = Vulnerable to Oil Supply Disrupts

Natural Disasters Highlight America’s Vulnerability to Disruptions of Oil Supply.
Southern States Energy Board, Building a Bridge to Energy Independence and to a Sustainable Energy Future, 7/06,
<http://democrats.senate.gov/journal/entry.cfm?id=297211>
“Tightening oil markets and record high prices have brought U.S oil vulnerability back into focus, and hurricane Katrina
demonstrated how quickly oil supply disruptions can impact the country. More serious supply disruptions will likely occur in
the future, caused again by natural forces like Katrina, or by terrorist acts, or purposeful rationing by the OPEC cartel and
rogue nations such as Iran and Venezuela.”
U.S. Is Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks on Oil Transportation Infrastructure.

Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2004, “Bush Republican Policies Have Weakened America's Energy
Security,” <http://democrats.senate.gov/journal/entry.cfm?id=297211>
“The tankers, pipelines, and trucks required to import oil from foreign countries to the United States is the Achilles heel of
U.S. transportation. This complex system is a constant target for Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and a disruption could have a
massive impact on global oil prices.”
Much of World’s Oil Passes Through Vulnerable “Choke Points” That Could be and Have Been a Target
for Terrorism.
Democratic Caucus's Senate Journal, 10/12/06, “Bush Republican Policies Have Weakened America's Energy Security,”
“A large fraction of the world’s traded oil already passes through a handful of strategic choke points, such as the Strait of
Hormuz. The infrastructure for delivering oil has several potential weak links, including major oil processing facilities that are
vital yet vulnerable to attack and difficult to repair.”
Global Energy Infrastructure Remains Dangerously Vulnerable.

Center for American Progress, 8/06, “Bush Republican Policies Have Weakened America's Energy Security”
“The global energy infrastructure and distribution channels have not been adequately protected or modernized. The global
energy infrastructure and the distribution channels used by the United States and the entire international community remain
dangerously vulnerable; yet, no comprehensive strategy for protecting and modernizing them has been implemented…
Terrorist attacks, in particular, pose a grave threat. In a videotape released last December, deputy al Qaeda leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri singled out energy infrastructure as a key strategic target for his followers. Just two months later, suicide bombers in Saudi
Arabia attacked the Abqaiq oil processing facility, where two-thirds of the country’s output – 6.8 million barrels per day – is refined.”
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Oil Dependence Bad—Resource Wars

Competition over oil and resources will lead to conflict between China and the United States.
in Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, 2008. “Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet” pg. 5-6 <Campbell>
Opponents of the deal then sought to wield a more potent and binding instrument: the little-known Exon-Florio amendment of 1988,
which authorized the executive branch to review any foreign investments in this country that might have potential national security
implications and block those considered injurious to national interests. To set the stage for such government intervention, Republican
opponents of the merger organized a July 13 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee. Many of the themes that have
since dominated public discussion of U.S. energy policy were raised at that meeting: that oil and natural gas resources are finite and
possibly inadequate to satisfy both rising American and international needs; that China was emerging as America’s most significant
rival in the struggle to secure the world’s untapped oil and gas reserves; and that this struggle could someday lead to violent conflict.
“In a world in which [energy] resources are certainly finite, and possibly contracting,” Pentagon consultant Frank J. Gaffney Jr.
testified, “we will inevitably find ourselves on a collision course with Communist China, particularly if world-wide demand for oil
approaches anything like the projected 60 percent growth over the next two decades.”
China’s rise will put it on a collision course with the US, risking war and decreasing relations.
Peter Hatemi, is a professor at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.and Andrew Wedeman is associate professor and chair of Asian Studies at the
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, China Security, Summer 2007, “Oil and Conflict in Sino-American Relations”, http://www.wsichina.org/cs7_5.pdf <Campbell>
Power transition theory is not the only model that posits deteriorating Sino-American strategic relations. In recent years, rapidly rising
Chinese energy demand has led to speculation about the consequences of increasing competition for oil imports.4 China and the
United States could find themselves at strategic loggerheads not because of shifts in relative power, but over access to oil. This is
“lateral pressure theory,” which states that when a country is forced to look beyond its own borders for new supplies, it will likely run
into conflict with existing consumers of that resource.5 Therefore, as the United States and China move closer to power parity,
intensifying “lateral pressures” generated by competition for oil imports could become a significant and destabilizing factor in Sino-
American relations.
Dependence bad- Resource wars with China and US Military intervention
International Relations Center, Foreign Policy in Focus, Michael Renner, “Fueling Conflict”, January 2004, accessed June 10, 2008,
http://www.fpif.org/papers/03petropol/war.html <Campbell>
It’s possible that the opponents of the war will not be entirely excluded, if only to induce them to accept and legitimate the new
masters of Iraq. But the manner in which the reconstruction contracts have been handled to date suggests a winner-take-all attitude in
Washington. For example, the Pentagon announced on December 9, 2003 that French, German, and Russian firms will be barred from
bids for U.S.-financed contracts “to protect the essential security interests of the United States.” Geopolitical Jockeying for
AccessCorporate interests are only part of the picture. Demand has prompted governments of major oil importing countries to apply
increasing pressure for access to oil in the Middle East and elsewhere. Only the European nations have managed to keep the growth of
their oil consumption in check. With the help of North Sea oil, the continent has reduced net imports by about 8% to a little more than
8 million barrels per day. Runaway consumption in the United States caused it to surpass Europe in net oil imports in the early 1990s.
The United States, for the first time, imported more oil from the Persian Gulf region than Europe did in 2001. U.S. oil imports have
increased by a whopping 65% over the last decade. Meanwhile, China is entering the skirmish. As its economy surges, domestic
supplies are incapable of satisfying the rapidly rising demand, and it is becoming more and more import dependent. The Middle East
is of growing interest to Beijing, and China’s state oil companies recently took steps toward securing a stake in oil from Central Asia’s
Caspian Sea basin. Outside the Middle East, major industrial powers and leading international oil companies are vying for access to
oil in the West African countries of Nigeria, Angola, and Chad, as well as in the Caspian region. As the industrial powers increasingly
rely on imported oil, the rivalry could lead to confrontations and interventions to ensure compliant regimes in exporting countries.Both
in the Middle East and in other regions, securing access to oil, pipelines, and shipping lanes go hand-in-hand with a fast-expanding
U.S. military presence. From Pakistan to Central Asia to the Caucasus, and from the eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa, a
dense network of U.S. military facilities has emerged, with many bases established in the name of the war on terror. In South America,
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the United States is getting more and more drawn into the civil war in Colombia. The Bush administration decided to provide training
and equipment for Colombian troops protecting an oil export pipeline against frequent bombings by rebel forces.
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Oil Dependence Bad—Resource Wars

Oil competition is a zero-sum contest resulting in conflict- and it won’t be small
Michael T. Klare, author of 13 books about resources, a contributor to Harper’s, Foreign Affairs, the LA Times, and The Nation,
Director of the 5 college program
in Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, 2008. “Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet” pg 30 <Campbell>
Singh's comments could have been uttered by leaders of any of the major energy-seeking nations, and his chosen riposte—to instruct
state-owned or home-based firms to accelerate their pursuit of foreign reserves—has been emulated by virtually all of them. The result
has been the energy equivalent of an arms race to secure control over whatever remaining deposits of oil and natural gas are up for
sale on the planet, along with reserves of other vital materials. This resource race is already one of the most conspicuous features of
the contemporary political landscape and, in our lifetimes, may become the most conspicuous one—a voracious, zero-sum contest
that, if allowed to continue along present paths, can only lead to conflict among the major.
Oil dependency sparks resource wars- 1) China, 2) Capital getting into bad hands, and 3) Global
warming.
Thomas Homer-Dixon, Michael T. Klare, Sherri W. Goodman, Paul J. Kern and David G. Victor, 2008, “Debating
Disaster: The World Is Not Enough”, accessed June 10, 2008, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16522 <Campbell>
RISING ENERGY prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have animated fears that the world may be headed
for a spate of “resource wars”—hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources. Such fears come in many stripes,
but the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly in three areas. First is the rise of China, which is poorly
endowed with many of the resources it needs—such as oil, gas, timber and most minerals—and has already “gone out” to the world
with the goal of securing what it wants. Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts others aside. A second potential path
down the road to resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into poorly governed but resource-rich countries. Money can
fund civil wars and other hostilities, even leaking into the hands of terrorists. And third is global climate change, which could
multiply stresses on natural resources and trigger water wars, catalyze the spread of disease or bring about mass migrations.
As demand increases, conflict over supplies will increase.

CQ Congressional Testimony of Senator Richard G. Lugar, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations, May 9, 2007,
“Climate Change and national security threats”, accessed July 12, 2008, lexis. <Campbell>
The American military is at the forefront of those working to develop energy resources that do not depend on the good will of
unpredictable and sometimes hostile regimes from volatile regions. As our 2 hearings underscored, at just $60 a barrel, the annual oil
import cost to the U.S. economy is well over $300 billion. This revenue stream emboldens oil-rich governments and enables them to
entrench corruption and authoritarianism, fund anti-Western demagogic appeals, and support terrorism. As global oil demand
increases and the world becomes more reliant on reserves concentrated in unstable regions, the likelihood of conflict over energy
supplies will dramatically increase, and energy exporting countries will have more opportunity to use their reserves as leverage
against energy poor nations.
Dependency leaves the US vulnerable to terrorism- increases risk of military intervention, conflict and
violence.
Michael T. Klare, a Current History contributing editor is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College,
2002, “The deadly nexus: Oil, terrorism, and America's national security” accessed July 10, 2008, proquest. <Campbell>
As long as the United States continues to increase its reliance on imported petroleum, it will find itself ensnarled in the deadly nexus
between oil, violence, and terrorism. This is not because people living in oil-producing areas are prone to harbor anti-American views-
some do and some do not-but because the production of oil in otherwise poor and undeveloped countries inevitably generates
behaviors that make conflict and violence more likely. Moreover, by designating the acquisition of imported oil a national security
matter, the United States increases the risk of American military involvement in oil-producing areas, often triggering acts of terrorism
directed at the United States.
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Oil Dependence Bad—Resource Wars/A2 China = Peaceful Rise

China’s rise is militaristic- they’ve been in resource-based conflicts before.
Peter Hartcher and Phillip Coorey, Sydney Morning Herald, September 2007, “The new order; When you find out who your real friends are”, accessed
June 10, 2008, lexis.<Campbell>
China is a rising great power, with a booming economy and a vast thirst for resources. It has territorial disputes with Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, among others, all with overlapping claims on the oil-rich seabed of the South China Sea.These
disputes are dormant but unresolved. The South China Sea was the scene of 13 resource-related military clashes in the 1990s, nine of
which involved China.Beijing has since adopted a more conciliatory posture, but in the meantime it is investing in a big defence build-
up.Professor Michael Klare of Hampshire College, Massachusetts, and author of Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global
Conflict, argues: "As with the Persian gulf and the Caspian Sea, the South China Sea harbours all of the ingredients for a
major military confrontation."The Pentagon's annual report on China's military, published in May, said its pursuit of weapons
strategies "is expanding from the traditional land, air, and sea dimensions ... to include space and cyberspace."The expanding military
capabilities of China's armed forces are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China's strategic
capabilities have ramifications far beyond the Asia-Pacific region," it added. China is working on aircraft carriers to project power far
beyond its shores.Partly in response, the other great rising power, India, is building new aircraft carriers and creating a big new eastern
naval base.
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Oil Dependence Bad—Resource Wars/A2 Victor

Victor is wrong- his analysis takes into place strain over resources causing direct wars, he’s wrong, it’s
the pre-existing strains in relationships that a competition of resources fans into conflict- he is also talking
about climate change primarily, our argument is competition.
Thomas Homer-Dixon, Michael T. Klare, Sherri W. Goodman, Paul J. Kern and David G. Victor, 2008, “Debating Disaster: The World
Is Not Enough”, accessed June 10, 2008, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16522 <Campbell>
PUNDITS, JOURNALISTS and Sunday morning news show commentators sometimes say silly things about the links between resources and war. “Iraq is all about oil”
or “Global warming caused the Darfur genocide.” And, sometimes, NGO leaders and policymakers say similar silly things when they want the media to pay attention to
a particular region or issue. It’s easy to criticize these statements. But thoughtful commentators, of whom David Victor is normally one, know they
contribute little by doing so. Yet, in this case, he’s pulled together several oft-heard arguments about why threats from resource wars
are overblown. Some of the skeptical positions have merit, but many are deeply misleading. No serious scholar of this issue says that
resource stress causes violence by itself; almost none asserts that the causal links between resource stress and violence are direct; and
very few argue that interstate war is the most likely outcome. Resource stresses are security dangers, though they are one among
many. They will not be the only cause of conflict, but they will add to the risk of war.If you listen to Victor, though, you might just get
lulled into a false sense of security. He beats down straw-man arguments, in the end offering nothing but false reassurances about the
security risks posed by resource stress. If the author had been willing to take on nuance, he wouldn’t have been able to write the kind
of simplistic and ideologically charged article that appeared in these pages. That’s because serious scholars who have spent years
studying the links between resources and mass violence—and I count myself in that group—rarely, if ever, make the kinds of
arguments Victor so boldly attacks.Rather, we argue that resource stress always interacts in complex conjunction with a host of other
factors—ecological, institutional, economic and political—to cause mass violence. Also, causation is almost always indirect. People,
groups and countries rarely fight over natural resources directly; instead, resource stress causes various forms of social dislocation—
including widening gaps between rich and poor, increased rent-seeking by elites, weakening of states and deeper ethnic cleavages—
that, in turn, make violence more likely. And, finally, this violence is almost always sub-national; it takes the form of insurgency, rebellion, gangsterism and urban criminality, not overt interstate
war.The claim that resource stress is sufficient by itself to cause violence is easily refuted. One simply has to identify cases where resource stress was present but violence didn’t occur. Likewise, the claim that resource stress
is a necessary cause of violence is easily refuted by finding cases of violence not preceded by resource stress. At various points in his article, Victor uses exactly these strategies to debunk the link between resources and war.If
resource stress causes violence in complex interaction with other factors, a much more nuanced refutation than what Victor offers is required. It’s all about context. Careful analyses of specific cases are needed. Darfur is just
one example. Here, the host of factors contributing to the violence and the tangled relationships among these factors are carefully identified, one by one. A critic who wants to refute this kind of claim needs to take on the facts
time.Victor doesn’t engage with this type of voluminous work.
of the case itself and marshal empirical evidence to challenge the claim’s specifics. This exercise is hard, and it takes
My research team and others around the world have undertaken painstaking analyses of cases as diverse as the Philippines, Pakistan, Haiti and South Africa. This
research has shown that severe resource stress—including water scarcity, forest loss, land degradation and collapse of coastal fisheries—multiplies the impact of a society’s existing vulnerabilities, including its ethnic
cleavages and skewed distribution of land, wealth and power. Rural folk who depend directly on the local environment for their day-to-day livelihoods become poorer, while powerful elites manipulate laws to gain control of
—and extract exorbitant rents from—increasingly valuable land, forests and water. As these resources dwindle in the countryside, people sometimes join local insurgencies against landowners and government officials. Other
times, they migrate in large numbers to regions where resources seem more plentiful, only to fight with people who already inhabit those regions. They might also migrate to urban slums, where unemployed young men,
, Victor too quickly dismisses the security dangers of climate change.
especially, can be primed to join criminal gangs or radical political groups.In light of these findings
“Serious thinking about climate change”, he writes, “must recognize that the ‘hard’ security threats that are supposedly lurking are mostly a ruse.” Yet, the recent report of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change identifies multiple pathways through which global warming will hurt poor people in the Third World and hinder economic development there more generally. Large swaths of land in subtropical latitudes—
zones inhabited by billions of people—will experience more drought, more coastal damage from storms, higher mortality from heat waves, worse outbreaks of agricultural pests and an increased burden of infectious disease.
The potential impact on food output is a particular concern: In semi-arid regions where water is already scarce and cropland overused, climate change could devastate agriculture. Also, many cereal crops in tropical zones are
already near their limits of heat tolerance, and even a couple degrees warming could lead to much lower yields.By weakening rural economies, boosting unemployment and dislocating people’s lives, global warming will
increase the frustrations and anger of hundreds of millions of people in vulnerable poor countries. Especially in Africa, but also in some parts of Asia and Latin America, climate changes will undermine already frail
governments—and make challenges from violent groups more likely—by reducing government revenues, increasing the economic clout of rent-seeking elites, overwhelming bureaucracies with problems and revealing how
incapable these governments are of helping their citizens. We’ve learned in recent years that this kind of societal failure can have consequences around the world and that great powers can’t always isolate themselves from
these consequences. So climate change could readily produce “hard security threats” by any reasonable definition of the phrase.At one point, Victor does acknowledge the reality of such complex causation: “Resource-related
conflicts are multi-causal”, he writes. But then he immediately draws a misleading conclusion from this fact: Because resource-related conflicts are multi-causal, he goes on, “primal ‘resource wars’ can never exist.” Here he
sets up, once again, a straw man. No serious analyst of resource-related conflict would say any conflict is exclusively about resources.Implicit in Victor’s argument here is the notion that if a conflict has multiple causes, and if
resource stress is one of these causes, then resource stress is probably not particularly important. The real cause is probably “deeper” and likely involves governmental or institutional failure. For instance, he writes:Some
analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide. . . .Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the
conflicts in Sudan. But none of these supposed causal chains stays linked under close scrutiny—the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance. . . .Climate is just one of many factors
.Yet Victor
that contribute to tension provides absolutely no evidence or argument to justify either his substantive claims about Rwanda or Darfur or his sweeping assertion that failures in governance are ultimately the
most important cause of these conflicts. How can he speak with such confidence? Is he an expert on these cases? What metric is he using to differentiate between the causal “weight” of different factors—resource,
governmental, institutional or otherwise?On the specifics of Rwanda, he is, in fact, decisively wrong: Several exacting and penetrating studies have now shown conclusively that cropland scarcity in
Rwanda strongly affected rural grievances that were exploited by radical Hutus in the lead-up to the 1994 genocide. And regarding Darfur, the case is by no means closed one way or the other. We’re still waiting for a close
on-the-ground analysis of causation. But many reputable scholars have argued, on the basis of substantial evidence, that a long-term decline in rainfall in the Darfur region contributed to a breakdown—which the Khartoum
Victor’s unsubstantiated assertions here betray a too-common bias of social
government exploited, to be sure—of traditional relations between nomads and pastoralists.
scientists: The forces of nature are ultimately subordinate to the forces of society. But the world is now too complex—and too multifactoral—
for such social-science grandstanding. All this can’t hide that we’ll have war, social dislocation, weakening of rural economies, widening gaps between rich and poor, deepening ethnic cleavages—
and that resource stresses play an important role.
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Oil Dependence Bad—Resources Wars/A2 Improbable

In an age of globalization, resource wars will be the most probable. Resource Wars will replace
conventional wars.
in Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, 2001, “Resource Wars” pg 213-14 <Campbell>
The conflict scenarios discussed in this book- from the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea to Sierra Leone and Borneo- all possess
distinctive characteristics and so tend to be viewed by analysts and policy makers as isolated phenomena. But the resource wars of the
post-Cold War era are not random or disconnected events. Rather, they are part of a larger, interconnected geopolitical system.
Whereas international conflict was until recently governed by political and ideological considerations, the wars of the future will
largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods- especially resources needed for functioning of modern
industrial societies. Whatever their individual roots, each of the conflicts described in previous chapters is a manifestation of this
global contest. It is the central thesis of this book that resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature
of the global security environment. This is so for all the reasons outlined in previous chapters: the priority accorded to economic
considerations by national leaders, the ever-growing demand for a wide range of basic commodities, looming shortages of key
materials, social political instability in areas harboring major reserves of vital commodities, and the proliferation of disputes over the
ownership of important sources of supply. As noted, some of these problems will be mitigated by market forces and the onward
progress of technology; others, however will be exacerbated by the corrosive side effects of globalization.
Oil is the most probable scenario- nations will fight wars and use military force to control resources.
in Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, 2001, “Resource Wars” pg 27 <Campbell>
Of all the resources discussed in this book, none is more likely to provoke conflict between states in the twenty-first century than oil.
Petroleum stands out from other materials- water, minerals, timber, and so on- because of its pivotal role in the global economy and its
capacity to ignite large-scale combat. No highly industrialized society can survive without substantial supplies of oil, and so any
significant threat to the continued availability of this resource will prove a cause of crisis and, in extreme cases, provoke the use of
military force. Action of this sort could occur in any of the major oil-producing areas, including the Middle East and the Caspian
basin. Lesser conflicts over petroleum are also likely, as states fight to gain or retain control over resource-rich border areas and
offshore economic zones. Big or small, conflicts over oil will constitute a significant feature of the global security environment
in the decades to come.
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Oil Dependence Bad—Caspian Corruption Impact Module

The Caspian holds crucial reserves that will increase their production in the coming years.
Michael T. Klare, author of 13 books about resources, a contributor to Harper’s, Foreign Affairs, the LA Times, and The Nation, Director of the 5 college program in
Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, 2008. “Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet” pg 119 <Campbell>
Just a few years into the new century, however, a more cautious assessment of the Caspian's potential came to prevail. "The Caspian
Sea region contains proven oil reserves estimated to be between 17 and 44.-billion barrels, comparable to Qatar on the low end and the
United States on the high end," the DoE reported in September 2005.n These figures, not the 200 billion barrels bandied about in the
1990s, currently dominate commercial assessments of the basin's long-term potential. But what most interests global energy firms
today are a rather different set of projections: those covering the region's day-to-day productive capacity. Because many of the
Caspian's most promising oil and gas fields are still undeveloped or just entering commercial production, the region is expected to post
ever-increasing output tallies at a time when so many other fields around the world are delivering less. Hence, according to the DoE,
combined Caspian oil production is projected to climb from 2.1 million barrels per day in 2005 to 4.3 million barrels in 2015,4.8
million in 2020, and 5.7 million in 2030.12 It is to secure a piece of this added output that so many energy-consuming nations have
been drawn to the Caspian Sea area.
Oil wealth causes governmental corruption- the Caspian will hold the same fact true.
Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, 2008. “Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet” pg 142-143 <Campbell>
What will all these efforts to exploit the Caspian basin’s energy reserves mean for the region itself? In the short run, oil and natural
gas output will rise, exports will increase, and vast fortunes will flow into the bank accounts of the companies involved and the local
officials who control the allocation of energy revenues. According to one estimate, Azerbaijan’s income from oil revenues in 2010
alone will be twice its entire gross domestic product in 2006. If this money were prudently invested in education, infrastructure, and
job creation, the citizens of these countries could hope to see considerable benefits, but most analysts express little confidence that the
Caspian’s elites and their cronies will prove any more interested in distributing energy revenues widely than those of most other
“petro-states” around the world- with predictable results. Edward Chow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace summed
up the typical situation in testimony before Congress: ”Increased oil income has coincided with more autocratic rule, enhanced the
ruler’s ability to temporarily pay off parts of the elite by sharing some of this wealth, and allowed deferral of desperately needed
fundamental economic and political reforms. Predictably enough, the stench of corruption is already pervasive in Azerbaijan, where
President Ilham Aliyev exercises ultimate control over the economy. Before succeeding his father, Heydar Aliyev, as chief executive
in 2003- in elections widely viewed as tainted- Ilham ran the state oil company, SOCAR, and he retains strong ties to the nation’s
energy industry. According to Guy Chazan of the Wall Street Journal, energy and other key industries are “dominated my mucky state
monopolies run by the President’s cronies.” A new round of parliamentary elections in November 2005 was advertised as fulfilling a
commitment to greater governmental accountability, but opposition parties were marginalized by heavy-handed government tactice,
and the president’s party claimed most of the available seats. This parliament will not be able to control the oil revenues, Ali Kerimli,
a leader of the opposition Azadlik (Freedom) bloc, told Chazan bluntly. “The president will decide everything.”
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Oil Dependence Bad—Caspian Corruption Impact Module

This leads to terrorism- citizens will get upset and turn on the government, leading to civil war and
terrorism. Leading to more IJG recruits and IJG overthrowing the government.
Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, 2008. “Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet” pg 143-144<Campbell>
The big losers, of course, are ordinary citizens- who, if history is any guide, will continue to be excluded from most of the benefits of
instant energy wealth. This kind of exclusion, in turn, fuels the rise of antigovernment movements and, in some areas, radical Islamic
Organizations. So far, the ruling elites of the Central Asian, and Caspian states have been able to muzzle the most potent expressions
of popular discontent through systematic repression and, when necessary brutal application of lethal force- but this is an inherently
risky strategy. As demonstrated in so many other areas where the rapid accumulation of oil wealth has been concentrated in a few
hands, failure to satisfy the rising aspirations of impoverished masses can lead to civic unrest, separatism, or armed rebellion.
Perhaps the greatest danger in this Muslim-majority region is that opponents of the prevailing Caspian regimes will be drawn to
extremist Islamic movements as a means of expressing their rage towards the corrupt and self-perpetuating elites that appear, so far, to
be the almost exclusive beneficiaries of the Caspian energy boom. With the electoral process viewed as little more than a farce, and
most established religious institutions subject to tight state control, the sole challenge to government authority in many of these
countries is coming from banned or underground religious movements such as the Ilamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG) and the
Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), a militant pan-Islamic organization with branches in forty countries, including Great Britain.
Members of these and similar groups have been accused of planning or conducting antigovernment assaults in Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and are believed to maintain links with Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations operating in the
region. Although the IJG and Hizb ut-Tanrir are not yet a threat to existing governments, they-or other movements like them- could
grow in numbers and potency as the promised benefits of oil wealth fail to improve the lot of the masses.
Continued growth for the IJG and Islamic movement in Uzbekistan is bad- decrease in US ability to fight
terrorism through Afghanistan, increase in instability and security and worse, WMD trafficking.
Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, May 2, 2005, “Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests”, accessed June 10, 2008, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21238.pdf <Campbell>
A series of bombings and armed attacks began in Uzbekistan on March 28, 2004, andcontinued through April 1, reportedly killing 47
individuals. President Karimov assertedthat the attacks were aimed against his government to “cause panic among our people,[and] to
make them lose their trust.” U.S. Air Force Secretary James Roche and Lt. Gen.David Barno, Combined Forces Commander for
Afghanistan, visited Uzbekistan in April2004, with Barno stressing that “we stand with Uzbekistan in facing down this
terroristmenace.” An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at al-Jihad al-Islami,reportedly an alias of the IMU)
claimed responsibility for the violence. Fifteen suspects(all of whom confessed their guilt) were sentenced in late August 2004 to 11-
16 years inprison. Some of them testified that Jalolov was the leader of IJG, that they were trainedby Arabs and others at camps in
Kazakhstan and Pakistan, and that the IJG was linked toHizb ut-Tahrir, the Taliban, Uighur extremists, and Al Qaeda. During this
trial,explosions occurred in Tashkent on July 30, 2004, at the U.S. and Israeli embassies andthe Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office.
The IMU and IJG claimed responsibility andstated that the bombings were aimed against the trial and “apostate” governments.
U.S.concerns about the ongoing attacks include increased instability that could affect thesecurity and future of K2, reduce coalition
access to Afghanistan by air or ground, andheighten the danger of trafficking in WMD technology and know-how.
Terrorist can acquire and use weapons of mass destruction

Ariel Cohen, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Federal Document Clearinghouse, 2005 “Subcommittee on international terrorism and nonproliferation”,
April 14 lexis
Experts believe that terrorists are willing to inflict massive casualties using WMD, that they are capable doing so despite technical
difficulties that may be encountered in execution of such an undertaking, and that they are capable of either stealing or building a
nuclear bomb, even of a technologically crude variety. Cases of stealing HEU were documented by IAEA. Nuclear terrorism presents at least four distinct
kinds of threats: -- Radiation dispersion devices (also known as "dirty bombs," powered by conventional explosives); -- Attacks on nuclear installations, such as
reactors; -- Seizure and detonation of intact nuclear weapons; and Stealing or buying of nuclear materials to build a nuclear bomb.
Insert nuclear terrorism impact (Sid Ahmed…)
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Oil Dependence Bad—Laundry List Impacts

Oil dependence bad – terrorism, hurts US interests, threatens our army, and undermines democracy
David Sandalow, an expert on energy policy and global warming, a former assistant secretary of state and senior director on the National Security Council staff, 5/22/08,
“HEARING OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS TITLE: RISING OIL PRICES, DECLINING NATIONAL SECURITY?”, lexis
Last year, more than 96 percent of the energy in our cars and trucks came from oil. Now, this seems normal to us. We grew up in a world in which oil is the only fuel
used to move cars and trucks. So did our parents. So did our grandparents. But I believe it is fundamentally abnormal for the entire global transportation system to rely on a single commodity. If I'm thirsty and don't feel like
this glass of water, I can have soda or orange juice. If I'm hungry and I don't want a hamburger, I can have a hot dog or pasta. But if I want to go anywhere on this planet today of any significant distance and I don't want to use
The overwhelming dependence of the global transportation system on this one commodity creates a national
petroleum, I am basically out of luck.
security threat that we ignore at our peril. Today I'll identify four such threats, noting in particular ways in which rising oil prices
exacerbate them. I'll conclude with recommendations for the single most important step I believe we can take to solve this problem.
The first threat: Oil dependence strengthens al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists. As you've already said in this hearing, Mr.
Chairman, for more than 50 years the need to protect oil flows has shaped U.S. policy in relationships in the Persian Gulf. These steps
to secure oil flows have come at a cost. By making us central players in a region torn by ancient rivalries, oil dependence has exposed
us to resentment, vulnerability and attack. Osama bin Laden's first fatwa in 1996 was titled, "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places." Today deep
resentment of the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf remains a powerful recruitment tool for Islamic fundamentalists, but we are constrained in our capacity to respond to it because of our dependence on oil. Compounding these
. The sharp increase in oil prices in recent months deepens these problems, further
problems, the huge money flows into the Persian Gulf help finance terrorist networks
enriching those who fund terrorists committed to our destruction. A second threat: Oil dependence strengthens oil-exporting nations
that oppose U.S. interests. Several leading oil exporters pursue policies that threaten the United States. Today the most serious threat, I
believe, comes from Iran, whose nuclear ambitions could put terrifying new weapons into the hands of terrorists. Yet efforts to respond
to this threat with multilateral sanctions have often foundered on fears that Iran would retaliate by withholding oil from world markets.
In short, three decades after the first oil shocks and a quarter century after the humiliating capture of U.S. diplomats in Tehran, we
remain hostage to the world's continuing dependence on oil. Other oil-exporting nations pose problems as well. President Hugo
Chavez, as the ranking member has already said, sends anti-American sentiments throughout Latin America. Third, and this is a point
I'd like to emphasize because it is not often appreciated, oil dependence endangers our men and women in uniform. Oil dependence jeopardizes the
safety of our troops. In Iraq during the past five years, many brave men and women have died in fuel convoys, which are often vulnerable to attack. Diesel generators display a heat signature easily detected by some enemies.
Rising oil prices here put a budgetary strain on the Pentagon, a leading purchaser of petroleum products. A one-dollar-a-barrel increase in global oil prices increases the Pentagon's fuel costs by $124 million a year. And
finally, oil dependence undermines democracy and good governance around the world. Oil wealth corrodes democratic
institutions. As oil prices have climbed in recent years, both Vladimir Putin and Hugo Chavez, for example, have moved away from
democratic institutions and towards more authoritarian rule.
US oil dependence threatens our national security and economy
Federal News Service, May 8, 2007, “HEARING OF THE ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE;
SUBJECT: REDUCING U.S. OIL DEPENDENCE” lexis
We're here to take testimony and better understand key steps and funding mechanisms that are necessary for reducing U.S. oil dependence and for future U.S. energy security. We'll also discuss the results of an analysis
the Energy Security Leadership
conducted to assess the economic impact of implementing the recommendations to the nation on reducing U.S. oil dependence. That's a report that's been put together by
Council. This is a group of distinguished business and military leaders who, like me, view U.S. oil dependence as detrimental to our
long-term security interests as well as our economic health. I think it's safe to say that the goal of all of us is to improve the national economic and energy security of the United States.
I'm a little tired -- especially today when I put gasoline in my vehicle -- a little tired of thinking about how that price might or might not be computed. The oil cartel -- the OPEC ministers will sit around a table, presumably in
a closed room, and make their decisions; then the major oil companies -- larger, always with two names now because of the mergers -- larger, stronger, with more muscle in the marketplace -- they actually are able to exert
their strength in the marketplace; then the spot market, which has become an orgy of speculation rather than simply a market of liquidity. And in addition to that, the majority of the oil that is sold and traded around the world
is done so through corporations that are owned by nation-states. So whenever I hear people talk about the free market in oil I have to suppress a grin because, of course, there is no free market in oil. There are a lot of
We are, in this country, the top oil consumer in the
influences that decide the price, most of which we don't know very much about. But it certainly is not what is a classical free market.
world. I have a chart that shows oil consumption. Most of us know that we suck about 84 million barrels of oil a day out of this planet
of ours. We stick little straws in the earth and suck oil out, about 84 million barrels a day, and we in the United States use fully one-
fourth of it every single day. We are prodigious producers of -- consumers, rather, of oil. And much of our oil comes from where it is
most vulnerable in the world. Some very vulnerable regions of the country have a substantial amount of the resources. We are about
60-plus percent dependent on foreign sources of oil. That clearly, it seems to me, is not in our best interests. About 70 percent -- just
shy of 70 percent, of the oil that comes into this country is used for transportation. And so we are unbelievably dependent, and growing in that dependence, on oil that
comes from very troubled parts of the world -- a substantial part of which, when we import it, is used for transportation.
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Oil Dependence Bad—Laundry List Impacts

Dependence threatens international and national security 6 reason- vulnerable oil supplies, resource
wars, use of energy as a weapon, funding corrupt regimes- undermining democracy, undermines global
economy renewable leading to terrorism, and climate change leading to famine, disease and migration.
CQ Congressional Testimony of Senator Richard G. Lugar, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations, May 9, 2007, “Climate
Change and national security threats”, accessed July 12, 2008, lexis. <Campbell>
During these hearings, I identified six fundamental threats to U.S. national security associated with our overdependence on imported
oil and other fossil fuels. Each of these six threats is becoming more acute as time passes. Any of them could be a source of
catastrophe for the United States and the world. First, oil supplies are vulnerable to natural disasters, wars, and terrorist attacks that
can disrupt the lifeblood of the international economy. Second, as large industrializing nations such as China and India seek new
energy supplies, oil and natural gas will become more expensive. In the long run we will face the prospect that the world's supply of
oil may not be abundant and accessible enough to support continued economic growth in both the industrialized West and in large
rapidly growing economies. As we approach the point where the world's oil-hungry economies are competing for insufficient supplies
of energy, oil will become an even stronger magnet for conflict.Third, adversarial regimes are using energy supplies as leverage
against their neighbors. We are used to thinking in terms of conventional warfare between nations, but energy is becoming a weapon
of choice for those who possess it. Nations experiencing a cutoff of energy supplies, or even the threat of a cutoff, may become
desperate, increasing the chances of armed conflict, terrorism, and economic collapse. Fourth, the revenues flowing to authoritarian
regimes often increase corruption in those countries and allow them to insulate themselves from international pressure and the
democratic aspirations of their own peoples. We are transferring hundreds of billions of dollars each year to some of the least
accountable regimes in the world. Fifth, much of the developing world is being hit hard by rising energy costs, which often cancel the
benefits of our foreign assistance. Without a diversification of energy supplies that emphasizes environmentally friendly energy
sources that are abundant in most developing countries, the national incomes of energy poor nations will remain depressed, with
negative consequences for stability, development, disease eradication, and terrorism.The sixth threat is the risk of climate change,
made worse by inefficient use of non-renewable energy. Our scientific understanding of climate change has advanced significantly.
We have better computer models, more measurements and more evidence -- from the shrinking polar caps to expanding tropical
disease zones for plants and humans -- that the problem is real and is exacerbated by man-made emissions of greenhouse gases. In the
long run this could bring drought, famine, disease, and mass migration, all of which could lead to conflict.
Laundry list- Dependence bad- political cutoffs by rivals, Iran cutting off the Strait of Hormuz, terrorist
attacks on production, spreading of instability from Iraq, proxy wars all over the middle-east,
nationalism, strikes, natural disasters, and political instability all prove we need a switch.
Since 2004, a growing scarcity of energy commodities worldwide has heightened concerns about key geopolitical risks and threats.
Concerns about these threats and other factors have led to an almost 250 percent strengthening in oil prices between April 2004
($36/barrel) and May 2008 ($125/bbl). Those threats included: *A politically-motivated cutoff of oil or natural gas supplies by a major
exporter (such as Russia to a European country or Venezuela to the United States) or group of exporters; * A confrontation with Iran
over its nuclear aspirations that results in sanctions against Iranian oil exports, an American or Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear
facilities or an Iranian and/or terrorist threat to oil shipping through the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which 16 million barrels
per day (b/d) to 17 million b/d of Mideast oil passes each day; * Terrorist attacks on major oil production facilities or export
infrastructure; *The possible spread of conflict or instability from Iraq into other oil producing countries or the escalation of a proxy
war involving Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Iran over the outcomes in Iraq; * A cutoff of oil or natural gas exports or a delay in
resource investment and development due to resource nationalism, domestic unrest, or crises in succession of political leadership; * A
work stoppage or strike by oil workers, possibly motivated by political trends involving power-sharing or human rights issues related
to internal instability in a major oil-producing country; *Destruction of oil production or fuel manufacturing infrastructure following a
severe storm or natural disaster.
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Oil Dependence Bad—Empowers Anti-American Regimes

Oil prices destroy the U.S. economy and bolster the economies of anti American countries.
But pain at the pump is only one reason energy now should be the central issue of this year’s campaign. Here’s the other, more
insidious one: High oil prices are shredding America’s financial independence and producing a massive transfer of wealth from U.S.
pocketbooks into the hands of suspect actors around the world, including Iran, Venezuela and Russia.
The U.S., in other words, now has an energy problem that is not only draining the bank accounts of its own citizens, but filling up the
bank accounts of some who work against American interests around the globe. It’s hard to imagine an issue that more deserves
campaign prominence.
Corrupted oil producing countries are buying out western companies with their oil revenues..
The outflow of petrodollars also translates into loss of financial independence on another front. Oil-producing countries are
accumulating piles of excess cash that they can use — and are using — to buy pieces of Western companies.
A new analysis by McKinsey Global Institute notes that Russia, which seems increasingly less in sync with American foreign-policy
aims, has “emerged as a major global financial player” because of oil money; it had $811 billion in foreign investment assets available
at the end of 2007.
But it isn’t just big Russia that has new money to invest around the globe, increasing its influence. The McKinsey report notes that the
smaller exporting countries of Algeria, Iran, Libya, Nigeria and Venezuela also are gaining global financial clout.
“When oil prices were lower, these countries channeled the bulk of their oil profits into domestic spending, with little left over to
invest abroad,” the report says. “But as crude prices have climbed, these five countries are emerging as significant investors in foreign
markets. They accounted for nearly one-quarter of net capital outflows from oil exporters in 2007….”
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Oil Dependency Bad—Corruption of US Political System

Oil revenues empower Arab oil exporters to use their wealth to corrupt the US political system
And the situation is even worse below the surface. In addition to financing terror directly and indirectly,
oil exporters are using their wealth to corrupt
our political system. Important Washington, D.C. law firms and lobbying organizations have been put on the payroll of Arab nations
to blunt any attempts at retaliation for their promotion of terrorism. Arab investors have made enormous buys in media organizations
that could allow them to influence U.S. public opinion.
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2AC Trade Deficit Add-On

A flex-fuel mandate would spur American manufacturing of flex-fuel automobiles and would make
America the world’s largest fuel exporter—this would reverse the trade deficit
The largest producers of both ethanol and methanol are all in the western hemisphere, with the United States having by far the
greatest production potential for both. Ethanol is made from agricultural products. Methanol can also be made from biomass, as well as from natural gas or coal. American
coal reserves alone are sufficient to power every car in the country on methanol for more than 500 years.
Ethanol can currently be produced for about $1.50 per gallon, and methanol is selling for $0.90 per gallon. With gasoline having roughly doubled in price recently, and with little likelihood of a
substantial price retreat in the future, high alcohol-to-gasoline fuel mixtures are suddenly practical. Cars capable of burning such fuel are no futuristic dream. This year, Detroit will offer some
two dozen models of standard cars with a flex-fuel option available for purchase. The engineering difference is in one sensor and a computer chip that controls the fuel-air mixture, and the
employment of a corrosion-resistant fuel system. The difference in price from standard units ranges from $100 to $800.
Flexible-fuel vehicles (FFVs) offer consumers little advantage right now, because the high-alcohol fuels which they could employ are not generally available for purchase. This is because there
are so few such vehicles that it doesn’t pay gas station owners to dedicate a pump to cater to them. Were FFVs made the standard, however, the fuel they need would quickly be made available
everywhere.
If all cars sold in the U.S. had to be flexible-fueled, foreign manufacturers would also mass-produce such units, creating a large market
in Europe and Asia as well as the U.S. for methanol and ethanol—much of which would be produced in America. Instead of being
the world’s largest fuel importer, the United States could become the world’s largest fuel exporter. A large portion of the money now
going to Arabs and Iranians would instead go to the U.S.A. and Canada, with much of the rest going to Brazil and other tropical agricultural nations.
This would reverse our trade deficit, improve conditions in the Third World, and cause a global shift in world economic power in favor
of the West.
Failure to stem the trade deficit destroys US financial hegemony and sparks global conflict
Elliot 06 (Larry, Economics Editor @ The Guardian, "America is living beyond its means," 10/5,
http://syncwithjayaram.blogspot.com/2006/10/america-is-living-beyond-its-means.html)
Consumers have been using their homes like ATMs - borrowing against rising prices - but this cannot go on forever. The US economy needs quite a prolonged period in which consumer
spending grows more slowly than the economy: that is the only way that the trade deficit is going to be reduced. There are those who say that the trade deficit is not a
problem for the US. They argue that it is perfectly sustainable to run sizeable deficits in perpetuity because the dollar's status as a reserve currency means that there will always be demand
for US assets. But there are two points here. First, running a permanent trade deficit affects the structure of your economy. It means fewer
manufacturing jobs where productivity tends to be higher and more jobs in the service sector, where productivity tends to be lower.
The US has struck a Faustian bargain with its trading partners, particularly China, responsible for about one third of the $700bn-plus trade total last year. As the
American economist Tom Palley puts it: "US consumers get lots of cheap goods in return for which they give over paper IOUs that cost less to print. Meanwhile, China creates millions of jobs
and builds modern factories that are transforming it into an industrial superpower, and it also accumulates billions of dollars in financial claims against the US. From this perspective, trade
deficits don't matter because there are no limits to either government or private borrowing, and because manufacturing doesn't matter either." The logic of this, Palley notes drily, is that the US
would benefit even further if China devalued its exchange rate and ran a larger trade surplus. The second point is potentially much more explosive: it is the one sketched out in the crystal ball
What would happen if, as a result of global developments over the coming decades, the dollar ceased to be the
gazing at the top of this piece.
reserve currency of choice. This was a point raised by Avinash Persaud, one of the financial sector's more original thinkers, in a recent lecture in New York.
Persaud's argument is as follows.
Throughout history, there has always tended to be one dominant reserve currency along with a host of lesser rivals. In the 19th century
Britain was the pre-eminent economy and sterling was the main reserve currency. Yet currencies don't retain their dominance forever; part of Britain's
problem at the time of Suez was that it was struggling to adjust to a world in which it was no longer the top-dog currency but the creditors came knocking at the door
asking for their cheques to be cashed. The US is living beyond its means, hoping that nobody cashes the cheques it has been merrily writing as
the current account has gone deeper into the red. That's the advantage of being a reserve currency, even though, as Persaud notes, there is no rule which says that you have to run current
account deficits simply because you are a reserve currency.
Britain didn't a century ago. In the decade or so up to the first world war it had a trade surplus of 5% of GDP. "That is a mirror image of the US today. The UK was in surplus by as much as the
That deficit has enabled the Chinese to build up their industrial strength at a rapid rate, so much so that it is probable that
US is in deficit."
China - and perhaps India - will have overtaken the US as the world's largest economy (on a purchasing power parity basis, at least) by 2050.
Persaud thinks that the upshot of this will be that in the next few decades the dollar will start to lose its reserve status just as sterling did in the last century.
"In the case of sterling's loss of reserve status, world war one and two accelerated a process that had begun more slowly before and ended abruptly with debt and inflation."
Today the process is also being accelerated - by wars where the end is as elusive as the enemy and by a consumerism built on a property bubble. Perhaps
we will not have to wait until 2050. In my lifetime, the dollar will start to lose its reserve currency status, not to the euro but to the renminbi or the rupee. This would
clearly have massive economic and geopolitical consequences. As Persaud rightly says: "If it was economically and politically painful for the UK,
even though its international financial position did not begin from a position of heavy deficit, what will it be like for the US which has become the world's largest
debtor. There will be an avalanche of cheques coming home to be paid when the dollar begins to lose its status."
And this "avalanche of cheques" is likely to make for the most horrendous geo-political tension. The idea that the US will give
up global financial hegemony without a fight seems fanciful in the extreme.
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2AC Naval Power Add-On

The creation of a methanol fuel market ensures its use by the US Navy—this provides fuel security
nations-muscle/)
Methanol can be used as the raw material to produce dimethyl ether, which is a completely clean-burning diesel fuel. Such fuel could
be used by ships (thereby securing the vital fuel supply for the U.S. Navy), railroads and trucks, and eventually automobiles.
Diesel engines offer efficiencies greater than 50 percent, substantially higher than is possible with internal combustion engines, and
equal to anything realistically possible from far more expensive, and as yet impractical, fuel cells.
Alternative fuels are key to US naval power—reduces the logistical tail and provides tactical advantages
Future Energies 03 (" U.S. Navy to Produce its Own Biodiesel," 10/30,
http://www.futureenergies.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=770)
“I think it is significant to note that the Navy is charged with protecting shipping routes to import petroleum to the United States,” said Joe Jobe,
executive director of the nonprofit National Biodiesel Board. “I admire the military leaders who have the foresight to use their existing resources to
create cleaner burning biodiesel. The Navy is the largest diesel fuel user in the world, and they’re working proactively and creatively
to use more renewable fuel. It’s truly groundbreaking.”
A Ribbon Cutting Ceremony for the Biodiesel Production Plant Validation Program was held on Thursday, October 30, at 2:00 p.m. at the demonstration site on NBVC
in Port Hueneme.
The demonstration validation plant’s annual capacity is one million gallons. The base plans on using 20,000 gallons a year. Nearby Channel Islands National Park,
which has used biodiesel for several years to help meet its goal of making the islands petroleum-free, will use 20,000 gallons a year. Ventura County will also use
20,000 gallons annually.
The U.S. currently imports approximately 60 percent of its oil -- of that, 800,000 barrels of oil a day come from Iraq.
“If you look at what it costs to send a gallon of diesel overseas, there is a potential to reduce the logistics tail when deploying since
we’re already sending vegetable oil overseas anyway to cook for the troops,” Buehler said. “It also gives us energy security for Navy bases. If
petroleum gets cut off, we can keep the base running on biodiesel. So in addition to reducing dependence on foreign oil, producing our own
biodiesel could provide a tactical advantage in case of crisis.”
Naval power key to responding to regional conflicts that risk WMD escalation
Green 97 (Kevin, Rear Admiral, Commander @ US Navy, NTC, Great Lakes, “What the Best Damn Navy in the World Is For,”
Vital Speeches of the Day, 7/15, p. ebscohost)
And the list of troubles wouldn't be complete without mentioning that by the year 2000, nine developing countries could have nuclear or biological
weapons, thirty countries might have chemical weapons; these are "weapons of mass destruction," capable of killing millions of people.
Border disputes have often led to armed conflict between nations. Professor Aaron Friedberg of Princeton University recently just listed the ones in the Pacific Rim,
border disputes alone. I'll have to take a breath here.
"Japan against Russia, Russia against China, China against India, Japan against South Korea, Laos against China, China against Burma, India
against Pakistan, Cambodia against Vietnam, China against Vietnam, China against Taiwan, Indonesia against Timor, Malaysia against the Philippines, and in
the case of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which may hold a bonanza of oil, we have seen war before over oil, China against Vietnam, against the
Philippines, against Malaysia, against Taiwan."
Those are just the border disputes. But they are between some of the most advanced and fastest growing economies in the world.
And most of these disputes are in countries that border the most heavily-traveled sea lanes in the world, the western Pacific rim. Nobody
knows if any will lead to armed conflict. Or even, if they do, that the United States will take a role. But we certainly have to be
prepared to do so, if we have to. Bottom line, we have to maintain our readiness. Because when the call comes, if it comes and it
always comes, eventually, we' l1 have to move quickly. Some Americans, though, would like to make further, deeper cuts in national security. One of them
quoted former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, who said, "I would be very surprised if another Iraq occurred." The writer forgot to mention that we were
all, including General Powell, very surprised the first time. "This, too, shall pass." Other surprises, perhaps quite unpleasant surprises, are virtually
certain. America has to be ready for them, the Navy-Marine corps team has to be ready for them.
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2AC Diplomatic Maneuverability Add-On

The flow of petrodollars to the coffers of oil producers has limited US diplomatic maneuverability on
central foreign policy issues like nuclear proliferation
The flow of petrodollars from consuming economies to the coffers of producers not only casts a large shadow over America’s
prospects of winning the war on terrorism but it also limits U.S. diplomatic maneuverability on central issues like human rights
and nuclear proliferation. Perhaps the most powerful statement of the impact on America’s ability to accomplish its foreign policy
goals came from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who in April 2006 told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “We do have
to do something about the energy problem. I can tell you that nothing has really taken me aback more, as Secretary of State, than the
way that the politics of energy is . . . “warping” diplomacy around the world. It has given extraordinary power to some states that
are using that power in not very good ways for the international system, states that would otherwise have very little power.”
This risks nuclear wars in hotspots around the world
Lopez 6/18/98 (Bernardo, Columnist, BusinessWorld, lexis)

With the US having less non-proliferation teeth in the India-Pakistan dispute, the chance of a localized nuclear war is enhanced and the US
will be helpless to contain the conflict because its hands have been severely soiled by the expose of Operation Tailwind.
The same situation is true in the conflicts in North Korea, Middle East, China-Taiwan and, lately, Eritrea-Ethiopia, where the
US has been playing a major role as a broker for peace. For a broker for peace must have an untainted image of a true
peacemaker.
115
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2AC Starvation Add-On

Flex-fuel mandate expands and diversifies the global fuel resource bases--this protects the developing
world from economic bleeding that causes starvation
Zubrin and Luft 5/6/08 (Robert and Gal, uthor of "Energy Victory: Winning the War on Terror by Breaking Free of Oil" and
executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, "Food vs. fuel a global myth," Chicago Tribune,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-oped0506fuelmay06,0,481881.story)
So, rather than shut down biofuel programs, we need to radically augment them, to the point where we can take down the oil cartel. Congress
can make this happen by passing a law requiring that all new cars sold in the U.S. be flex-fuel vehicles that can run on any combination
of gasoline, ethanol or methanol. The technology costs only about $100 per vehicle.
By making America a flex-fuel vehicle market, we will effectively make flex-fuel the international standard. Around the world,
gasoline would be forced to compete against alcohol fuels made from a number of sources, including not only commercial crops such as corn and sugar,
but cellulosic ethanol made from crop residues and weeds, as well as methanol made from any kind of biomass, coal, natural gas and recycled urban trash. By
creating such a fuel market, we can enormously expand and diversify humanity's fuel resource base, protecting all nations
from continued economic bleeding and, indeed, in some cases, starvation. That, and not blindly accepting the naysayers' propaganda demanding
the preservation of the oil monopoly, should be our course.
The impact is World War 3
Calvin 98 (William, Theoretical Neurophysiologist – U Washington, Atlantic Monthly, January, Vol 281, No. 1, p. 47-64)
Plummeting crop yields would cause some powerful countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands--if only because their
armies, unpaid and lacking food, would go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better organized countries would attempt to use their
armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their inhabitants if
not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for the remaining food. This would be a world-wide
problem--and could lead to a Third World War.
116
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2AC Sudan/Diplomatic Maneuverability Add-On

Oil revenues limit US diplomatic maneuverability over Sudan and empowers Chinese veto power at the
UN Security Council
Korin 7/3/08 (Anne, chair of the Set America Free Coalition and co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security,
"Flex fuels: a weapon in the oil crisis," http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idarticle=15618)
The flow of U.S. petrodollars to the coffers of foreign oil producers not only casts a large shadow over America's prospects of winning the war on terrorism, it
also limits Washington's diplomatic maneuverability on central policy issues like human rights and nuclear proliferation.
In April 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "We do have to do something about the energy problem. I can tell you
that nothing has really taken me aback more, as Secretary of State, than the way that the politics of energy is… ‘warping' diplomacy around the world.
It has given extraordinary power to some states that are using that power in not very good ways for the international system—states
that would otherwise have very little power."
One of these states is Iran. With 10 percent of the world's oil reserves and the world's second largest natural gas reserve, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
appears unfazed by the prospects of international sanctions against his country resulting from its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Oil also lubricates the so-called
Bolivarian revolution led by Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, who leverages Venezuela's oil wealth to buy political influence and consolidate an anti-western bloc in
the western hemisphere.
U.S. diplomacy is further complicated by the indefatigable thirst for energy in the booming economies of China and India, which are increasingly dependent on the very
same countries the United States is trying to rein in. The growing appetite for oil not only bankrolls rogue nations, but also feeds what could become a
global competition for control of energy resources. Rogue nations like Iran and Sudan can now quite literally buy the support of a third of
humanity.
They can also buy the protection of Chinese veto power on the U.N. Security Council simply by inking energy deals with this oil-hungry
emerging superpower.
Insert Sudan impact
117
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2AC Air Pollution Add-On

The use of alcohol fuels solves air pollution
The use of alcohol also reduces air pollution. In fact, environmental advantages were the motivation for the initial development of
the first FFVs in California in the 1980s. During the era of $1.50 per gallon gasoline, gasohol pleased ecological activists, but it was
economically disadvantageous. Recently, however, the comparative economics of alcohol fuels and gasoline have changed radically.
Left unchecked, air pollution risks extinction
Driesen 03 (David, Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. J.D. Yale Law School, 1989, Fall/Spring, 10 Buff.
Envt'l. L.J. 25, lexis)
Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem upon which all life depends and harming the health of
both future and present generations. The Rio Declaration articulates six key principles that are relevant to air pollution. These principles can also be
understood as goals, because they describe a state of affairs [*27] that is worth achieving. Agenda 21, in turn, states a program of action for realizing those goals.
Between them, they aid understanding of sustainable development's meaning for air quality.
The first principle is that "human beings. . . are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature", because they are "at the
center of concerns for sustainable development." 3 While the Rio Declaration refers to human health, its reference to life "in harmony with nature" also
reflects a concern about the natural environment. 4 Since air pollution damages both human health and the environment, air quality implicates
both of these concerns. 5
Lead, carbon monoxide, particulate, tropospheric ozone, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides have historically threatened urban air quality in the United States. This
review will focus upon tropospheric ozone, particulate, and carbon monoxide, because these pollutants present the most widespread of the remaining urban air
problems, and did so at the time of the earth summit. 6 Tropospheric ozone refers to ozone fairly near to the ground, as opposed to stratospheric ozone high in the
atmosphere. The stratospheric ozone layer protects human health and the environment from ultraviolet radiation, and its depletion causes problems. 7 By contrast,
tropospheric [*28] ozone damages human health and the environment. 8 In the United States, the pollutants causing "urban" air quality problems also affect human
health and the environment well beyond urban boundaries. Yet, the health problems these pollutants present remain most acute in urban and suburban areas. 9
Ozone, carbon monoxide, and particulate cause very serious public health problems that have been well recognized for a long time. Ozone forms in
the atmosphere from a reaction between volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, and sunlight. 10 Volatile organic compounds include a large number of hazardous
air pollutants. Nitrogen oxides, as discussed below, also play a role in acidifying ecosystems. Ozone damages lung tissue. 11 It plays a role in triggering asthma attacks,
sending thousands to the hospital every summer. It effects young children and people engaged in heavy exercise especially severely. 12
Particulate pollution, or soot, consists of combinations of a wide variety of pollutants. Nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide contribute to formation of fine particulate,
which is associated with the most serious health problems. 13 Studies link particulate to tens of thousands of annual premature deaths in the United States. 14 Like
ozone it contributes to respiratory illness, but it also seems to play a [*29] role in triggering heart attacks among the elderly. 15 The data suggest that fine particulate,
which EPA did not regulate explicitly until recently, plays a major role in these problems. 16 Health researchers have associated carbon monoxide with various types of
neurological symptoms, such as visual impairment, reduced work capacity, reduced manual dexterity, poor learning ability, and difficulty in performing complex tasks.
17
The same pollution problems causing current urban health problems also contribute to long lasting ecological problems. Ozone harms
crops and trees. 18 These harms affect ecosystems and future generations. Similarly, particulate precursors, including nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide, contribute to
acid rain, which is not easily reversible. To address these problems, Agenda 21 recommends the adoption of national programs to reduce health risks from air pollution,
including urban air pollution. 19 These programs are to include development of "appropriate pollution control technology . . . for the introduction of environmentally
sound production processes." 20 It calls for this development "on the basis of risk assessment and epidemiological research." 21 It also recommends development of
"air pollution control capacities in large cities emphasizing enforcement programs using monitoring networks as appropriate." 22
A second principle, the precautionary principle, provides support for the first. As stated in the Rio Declaration, the precautionary principle means that "lack of full
scientific certainty shall not [*30] be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation" when "there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage." 23 Thus, lack of complete certainty about the adverse environmental and human health effects of air pollutants does not, by itself, provide a
reason for tolerating them. Put differently, governments need to address air pollution on a precautionary basis to ensure that humans can
life a healthy and productive life.
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Air Pollution Adv—Alcohol Fuels Solve Air Pollution

The use of alcohol-based fuels reduces air pollution
nations-muscle/)
A boon to environment
By promoting agriculture, flexible-fueled vehicles act as global cooling agents. This is so because plants draw carbon dioxide out of
the atmosphere, and because the large surface areas of the leaves of plants increases water evaporation at the Earth's surface.
The water vapor thus produced transports heat from the surface to the upper atmosphere, where most of it is released to space. In addition, the use of alcohol
also reduces air pollution.
119
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Air Pollution Adv—Ethanol Solves Air Pollution

Ethanol-based fuels more significantly reduce emissions as compared to gasoline – and are
biodegradable, renewable, and made in America.
American Coalition for Ethanol 08 (accessed 7/10/08,

http://www.ethanol.org/index.php?id=34&parentid=8#Environment)
Fossil fuel-based gasoline is the largest source of man-made carcinogens and the number one source of toxic
emissions, according to the U.S. EPA. Ethanol is a renewable, environmentally friendly fuel that is
inherently cleaner than gasoline. Ethanol reduces harmful tailpipe emissions of carbon monoxide,
particulate matter, oxides of nitrogen, and other ozone-forming pollutants. The use of ethanol-blended
fuel helps reduce the environmental and economic impacts of gasoline consumption on our society. Read
more in the research Clearing the Air - a Review of the Real-World Impacts of Using Ethanol-Blended Fuel and
in Ethanol: A Convenient Solution to the Inconvenient Truth. Ethanol blends are likely to reduce carbon
monoxide emissions in vehicles by between 10% - 30%, depending upon the combustion technology. (U.S.
EPA) The American Lung Association of Metropolitan Chicago credits ethanol-blended fuel with reducing
smog-forming emissions by 25% since 1990. The use of 10% ethanol blends reduces greenhouse gas
emissions by 12-19% compared to conventional gasoline. (Argonne National Lab) In 2004, ethanol use in the
U.S. reduced CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions by approximately 7 million tons, equal to removing the
emissions of more than 1 million cars from the road. (Argonne National Lab) Research shows a 35-46%
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and a 50-60% reduction in fossil energy use due to the use of ethanol as
a motor fuel. (Argonne National Lab) Ethanol contains 35% oxygen, making it burn more cleanly and
completely than gasoline. E85 has the highest oxygen content of any fuel available, making it burn even more
cleanly and even more completely than any other fuel. E85 contains 80% fewer gum-forming compounds than
gasoline. Ethanol is highly biodegradable, making it safer for the environment. American-made,
renewable ethanol directly displaces crude oil we would need to import, offering our country critically
needed independence and security from foreign sources of energy.
120
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Air Pollution Adv—Air Pollution Kills Millions Annually

Air pollution independently kills millions annually—WHO reports prove
Fischlowitz-Roberts 02 (Bernie, "Air Pollution Fatalities Now Exceed Traffic Fatalities by 3 to 1," Earth Policy Institute, 9/17,
http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/Update17.htm)
The World Health Organization reports that 3 million people now die each year from the effects of air pollution. This is three times
the 1 million who die each year in automobile accidents. A study published in The Lancet in 2000 concluded that air pollution in France, Austria, and
Switzerland is responsible for more than 40,000 deaths annually in those three countries. About half of these deaths can be traced to
air pollution from vehicle emissions.
In the United States, traffic fatalities total just over 40,000 per year, while air pollution claims 70,000 lives annually. U.S. air pollution
deaths are equal to deaths from breast cancer and prostate cancer combined. This scourge of cities in industrial and developing countries alike threatens the health of
billions of people.
121
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Solvency—FFV Mandate Solves Price Spike Vulnerability

A flex-fuel mandate is the FASTEST WAY to protect ourselves from supply disruptions and oil price
spikes
May 6/5/08 (Clifford, president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and fmr NYT foreign affairs correspondent,
"Forcing Fuel Flexibility,"
http://article.nationalreview.com/print/?q=MGIxMzViMDNjOWY0MTQ1Y2ViNzdiMDJlOWFlMzNhZWI=)
The fastest way to begin protecting ourselves from supply disruptions and price hikes: Congress could establish an Open Fuel
Standard, requiring that every automobile sold in the U.S. be able to burn a variety of liquid fuels. The technology already
exists, and the cost is only about $100 per vehicle.
The prospect of many Flexible Fuel Vehicles (FFVs) coming onto the market would provide an enormous incentive to entrepreneurs
to compete for consumers’ dollars by producing alternative fuels more abundantly and more rapidly. (Leveling the playing field among fuel-
makers also should be on Congress’s to-do list.)
If incentives for automobile manufacturers are required to open up the fuel market to competitive forces, provide them. Consumers, too, should be encouraged to trade
in their old (high-polluting) mono-fuel vehicles for FFVs.
Gingrich has pointed out that the government — not least the military — drinks oceans of oil. Creating a free and competitive fuel market could bring
the price of that oil back down to $90, $70, or even $50 a barrel. That would translate into enormous savings — enough to pay for the
incentives.
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Solvency—FFV Mandate = Best Solves US Oil Dependence

Flex-fuel mandate is a practical, near-term, low-cost way to dramatically reduce US dependence on oil
Gaffney 2/14/08 (Frank, founder, president, and CEO of The Center for Security Policy, "'Unavoidable' Choices?," Washington
Times, http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=DA7067E2-F985-47AE-AB90-63251208978C)
We also must do something meaningful and effective about what President Bush has rightly called "our addiction to oil."
Fortunately, there is a practical, near-term and low-cost way to begin dramatically reducing our dependence on oil imported from places
that wish us ill: "fuel competition." This alternative to our present, near-exclusive reliance on a commodity controlled by a cartel can be
achieved by creating an infrastructure that will permit our transportation sector (where we use most of our imported oil and use it most profligately)
to use instead "Freedom Fuels" — namely, ethanol and methanol that we can produce here at home or import cost-effectively
from friendly countries.
How can we obtain such an infrastructure? Simple: By adopting an Open Fuel Standard that requires every new car sold in America to
have not only seat-belts and air bags but Flexible Fuel Vehicle (FFV) capability. An FFV can use ethanol or methanol or gasoline (or
some combination) thanks to a chip and some plastic fittings in the fuel system. Today, these cost a trivial $100 per car. When in three
years time, 50 million American cars have this feature (and another 50 million to 100 million overseas), the marginal additional cost
will probably be zero.
Not surprisingly, excitement is beginning to develop all over the country as more and more Americans discover the technology is available, here and now (there already
are 6 million FFVs on our highways). They are empowered by the opportunity FFVs present to do something real about our vital transportation sector's strategically and
economically reckless reliance on oil. Best of all, this is not a big government program deciding which of the various alcohol fuels from sources as diverse as
algae, kudzu, coal and trash will be "winners" or "losers." Fuel competition means market forces, not bureaucrats, will decide.
With the exception of a few vocal libertarians (whose opposition in this instance to competition and market-based decision-making seems inexplicable,
not to say bizarre), the idea of fuel competition seems to be one upon which we can all agree.
If we wish to avoid in our own land the unsavory fate of enslaved nonbelievers ("dhimmis") under Shariah, we had better hope the adoption of the Open
Fuel Standard is recognized as "unavoidable" — and soon.
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Solvency—FFV Mandate Solves High Oil Prices

A flex-fuel mandate would create a global open source fuel market that insulates the US and the world
from high oil prices
We need to do more—and can. Congress should take the critical step required to break OPEC’s vertical monopoly on our economic
lifeblood by passing a bill mandating that all new cars sold in the United States be flexible-fueled—that is, able to run on any
combination of gasoline, ethanol, or methanol. Such cars already exist and only cost about $100 more than comparable non-flex-fuel
models. By making flex-fuel a requirement for the American auto market, we will make it the international standard as well, and will
for the first time force gasoline to compete at the pump against alcohol fuels all over the world.
Such a flex-fuel-vehicle standard would create a global open source fuel market that would encourage the rise of not only existing
sugar and corn ethanol, but of other alcohols as well, including ethanol made from cellulosic material, and methanol, which can be
made from any kind of biomass without exception—as well as from coal, natural gas, and even recycled urban trash. (At this writing,
methanol is selling, without any subsidy, for $1.50 per gallon, equivalent in energy-per-dollar terms to gasoline at $2.80 per gallon.)
By making our cars compatible with such fuels, we will enormously expand and diversify our options, protecting not just
Americans but the entire world from escalating looting by the oil cartel.
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Solvency—Ethanol Solves Oil Dependence/Energy Security

Ethanol takes the place of imported oil, making America independent and secure from foreign energy
sources.
American Coalition for Ethanol 08 (accessed 7/10/08,

http://www.ethanol.org/index.php?id=34&parentid=8#Environment)
American-made, renewable ethanol directly displaces crude oil we would need to import, offering our
country critically needed independence and security from foreign sources of energy. Current U.S. ethanol
production capacity of 6 billion gallons per year can reduce gasoline imports by more than one-third and
effectively extends gasoline supplies at a time when refining capacity is at its maximum. According to the
Energy Information Administration, the 7.5 billion gallon ethanol production level minimum set in
the Renewable Fuels Standard could reduce oil consumption by 80,000 barrels per day. Ethanol is key to
reducing our country's trade deficit in crude oil, a figure that has been steadily increasing: $27 billion in
1987 up to $100 billion in 2002. The U.S. Commerce Department estimates that each $1 billion of trade deficit
costs the U.S. 19,100 jobs. The U.S. imports about two-thirds of its oil, and some experts predict our
dependence upon foreign crude could climb to 70% in the years to come. For every barrel of ethanol
produced (1 barrel = 42 gallons), 1.2 barrels of petroleum are displaced at the refinery. (Information
Resources Inc.) In addition to importing record amounts of oil, the U.S. has also been importing record amounts
of finished gasoline: 37 million gallons per day. (Energy Information Administration) U.S. fuel consumption
increased from 12 billion gallons per year in 1970, to 160 billion gallons in 2002. (Federal Highway
Administration)
125
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Solvency—Methanol Solves Energy Dependence/Climate Change

Methanol is an efficient transportation fuel and energy storage material, made from recyclable
atmospheric CO2.
Olah, Goeppert, and Prakash 06 (George Andrew, chemistry Nobel Laureate; Alain; and G.K. Surya; Beyond Oil and Gas:
The Methanol Economy; 2006; page 7)
The “Methanol Economy” – the subject of our book – elaborates an approach of how humankind can decrease and eventually
liberate itself from its dependence on diminishing oil and natural gas (and even coal) reserves while mitigating global warming
caused by their excess combustion giving carbon dioxide. The “Methanol Economy” is based on the interim on the efficient direct
conversion of still-existing natural gas resources to methanol or dimethyl ether, or their production by chemical recycling of
CO2 from the exhaust gases of fossil fuel-burning power plants and other industrial sources. Eventually, atmospheric CO2 itself
can be recycled using catalytic or electrochemical methods. Methanol and dimethyl ether are both excellent transportation
fuels on their own for internal combustion engines. Methanol is also an adequate fuel for fuel cells, being capable of producing
electric energy by reaction with atmospheric oxygen (air). Fuel cells provide a convenient, efficient source for electric power. It
should be emphasized that the “Methanol Economy” is not producing energy. In the form of liquid methanol, it only stores energy
more conveniently and safely compared to extremely difficult to handle and highly volatile hydrogen gas, the basis of the
“hydrogen economy”. Besides being a most convenient energy storage material and a suitable transportation fuel, methanol can also
be catalytically converted to ethylene and/or propylene, the building blocks of synthetic hydrocarbons and their products,
which are currently obtained from our diminishing oil and gas resources.
Methanol is an alternative energy source that can effectively diminish our dependence on foreign energy
sources
Olah 05 (George, Loker Hydrocarbon Research Institute and Department of Chemistry, University of Southern California, "Beyond
Oil and Gas: The Methanol Economy," http://www.trec-uk.org.uk/articles/methanol_synthesis.pdf)
Methanol, which is presently prepared from fossil-fuel-based syn-gas, can also be prepared by direct oxidative conversion of natural
gas (methane) or reductive conversion of atmospheric carbon dioxide with hydrogen (Scheme 1). In this way, hydrogen can
be stored by converting it into methanol—a convenient liquid fuel and raw material for synthetic hydrocarbons and their products—with carbon
dioxide from industrial effluents or the atmosphere.
This opens up the possibility of an alternative energy source to diminishing oil and gas resources and would lead to a feasible
“methanol economy”. Owing to the serious limitations of the hydrogen economy, I have been proposing for some time now the methanol economy as a
reasonable alternative.[7] Methanol provides an efficient means to store energy and can be used as a convenient fuel as well as a raw material
for manmade hydrocarbons and their products.
Methanol is an excellent fuel in its own right and it can also be blended with gasoline, although it has half the volumetric energy
density relative to gasoline or diesel. It is also used in the direct methanol fuel cell (DMFC) that we developed jointly with the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory of Caltech.[8] In this electrochemical cell, methanol is directly oxidized with air to carbon dioxide and water to produce electricity, without the need to first
generate hydrogen. This greatly simplifies the fuel-cell technology and makes it available to a wide scope of applications: for example, to
provide power to cellular phones and computers (already under development) and eventually to motor scooters and cars, or even to use it in large electricitygenerating
facilities. It was also found that methanol can be conveniently converted into ethylene or propylene in the MTO (methanol-to-olefins) process (Scheme 2). In turn, these
olefins can be used to produce hydrocarbon fuels and their products,[9] which are presently obtained from oil and gas. UOP, based on the earlier work of Jule Rabo and
coworkers,[9d] developed an industrial process for the production of ethylene from methanol using acidic zeolite catalysts, and industrial plants based on this process
are now under development.[9e]
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Solvency—Methanol Solves FF Dependence

Methanol is economically competitive with gasoline NOW and if successfully tapped, can liberate the US
and the world from our dependence on fossil fuels
Zubrin 06 (Robert, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributing editor of The New Atlantis, is an
astronautical engineer and author of Energy Victory, "The Methanol Alternative," The New Atlantis, Summer,
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-methanol-alternative)
Methanol is commonly known as “wood alcohol” because it can be produced from

The authors dub their proposal the “methanol economy.”
wood; it can also be made from coal, natural gas, methane hydrates, any type of biomass, or urban waste. It can be used as fuel for
internal-combustion engines, and eventually in fuel-cell vehicles. It can also be used as feedstock for producing dimethyl ether, an
excellent fuel for non-polluting diesel engines. In short, it is a convenient medium for storing energy and is easily transported
and dispensed as a fuel.
Integrating methanol into our energy system would have numerous benefits in the not-so-distant future. As the authors point out, it
would make the transportation of liquid natural gas much safer by converting it to less-hazardous liquid methanol before shipping it. Methanol could also be used to
produce plastics, synthetic fabrics, and many other non-fuel products currently made from petroleum.
Importantly, methanol can also be produced (in conjunction with an auxiliary electricity source, like nuclear power) by chemically recycling carbon dioxide, which can
be found naturally in the air or readily captured from atmosphere-polluting industrial emissions. The methanol produced can, in turn, be used to produce synthetic
hydrocarbons and other products now obtained from fossil fuels. If successfully tapped, methanol “has the ability to liberate mankind from its
dependence on fossil fuels for transportation and hydrocarbon products,” while reducing the amount of carbon dioxide pumped into the
atmosphere.
Consider ethanol as a comparison. The commercial competitiveness of ethanol is somewhat confused by the complex influences of a variety of subsidies and tariffs. By
contrast, methanol is currently selling—without any subsidy—for about $0.80/gallon. Given that methanol’s energy content is about
half that of gasoline, that price is the equivalent, in energy terms, of gasoline for $1.60/gallon. In other words, we can produce a
useful and economically viable vehicle fuel, using a huge domestic and Western hemispheric resource base, at prices lower
than gasoline.
Methanol is a convenient, safe energy source that can alleviate our dependence on fossil fuels
Schulz 10/2/06 (William, Editor @ Chemical and Engineering News, "A Methanol Proposal,"
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/books/84/8440books.html)
The chapter titled "Diminishing Oil and Gas Reserves" is a sobering read. The authors estimate, for example, that current oil reserves should meet demand for the next
40 years; 60 years for natural gas. And while it is true that there are finite reserves of oil, they write, "this is basically irrelevant because oil extraction will cease long
before its actual physical exhaustion. The point that matters is the cost to find and exploit new reserves. When this cost of exploration and exploitation becomes too
high, then oil will be replaced by some other source of energy, leaving part of the oil that's left in Earth's crust. The challenge is to find acceptable
substitutes before oil becomes so expensive to produce that it would disrupt the economic and social fabric of our society." One
wonders how far off that day really might be.
Other chapters in the book cover hydrocarbons, alternative energy, and a critical look at hydrogen and proposals for a hydrogen economy. They discuss President
George W. Bush's five-year $1.2 billion push for hydrogen-powered cars by 2020, as well as efforts by the European Union to develop hydrogen fuel cells.
But the authors caution that even with billions of dollars to spend, hydrogen researchers face an uphill battle in tackling the basic problems of safe, high-volume
hydrogen storage, distribution, and usage.
The methanol economy, they write, "offers a new way in which convenient and safe reversible energy storage and
transportation can be achieved in the form of a simple, easy to handle liquid chemical-methanol. The ready conversion of methanol to
synthetic hydrocarbons and their products will ensure that future generations will have access to the essential products and materials that today form an integral part of
our life. At the same time, the 'Methanol Economy,' by recycling excess atmospheric CO2, will mitigate one of the major adverse effects on the Earth's climate caused
by mankind, namely global warming."
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Solvency—FFV Mandate Key to Methanol Economy

Flex-fuel vehicles are the only feasible means of transitioning towards a methanol economy
Indeed, by focusing on the best technical solution without regard to policy implications, the authors sail past essential matters without stopping to seize them. This is
most evident on the subject of Flexible Fuel Vehicles (FFVs), automobiles that can operate with gasoline and/or various mixtures of gasoline and alcohol. The most
common FFVs in the United States are E85 or M85, meaning that they can function with up to 85 percent ethanol or methanol and 15
percent gasoline. On the subject of FFVs, Olah and his colleagues say:
Although the flexibility of the FFVs represent a powerful means to circumvent the fuel supply conundrum, and also a way to build up
the demand for methanol, it must be borne in mind that this is only a compromise.... In the long term, the use of cars optimized to run
only on methanol (M100) would be preferable, and would also greatly facilitate the transition to methanol-powered fuel cell vehicles.
Yet without the short term, there is no long term. The authors are correct that, in the abstract, “cars optimized to run only on methanol”
would be preferable. But such cars would find no buyers today—because there are no pumps to fuel them, nor will there be, until
millions of such cars are on the road. Thus the FFVs, which can run on a combination of gasoline, methanol, and/or ethanol, are
not “only a compromise.” Rather, they are the key transitional technology that can make the methanol economy a reality.
Manufacturing a car as an FFV requires only the use of a corrosion-resistant fuel line and a change in the programming of the chip controlling the car’s electronic fuel
injector. Thus FFVs can be produced—and currently are being produced in two dozen models, amounting to about 3 percent of total automobile sales in the
United States—with essentially no price differential between them and comparable models that only use gasoline. As a result, there is no downside
to making flex-fuel capability the standard. If it were required that all new cars sold in the United States had to be FFVs, there
would be 50 million automobiles capable of burning methanol on the road in the U.S. within three years. Under such conditions,
with methanol producible for a fraction of the cost of gasoline, the methanol pumps would appear soon enough, and the
methanol economy envisioned by Olah and his collaborators would soon follow.
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Solvency—Cellulosic Ethanol Solves Energy Security/Pollution

Cellulosic ethanol is a highly efficient fuel that globally improves trade, energy security, air quality, and
climate change.
Lynd, Cushman, Nichols, and Wyman 91 (Lee R., Janet H., Roberta J., and Charles E.; “Fuel Ethanol from
Cellulosic Biomass;” Science vol. 251, March 15, 1991.)
Ethanol produced from cellulosic biomass is examined as a large-scale transportation fuel. Desirable features include ethanol's
fuel properties as well as benefits with respect to urban air quality, global climate change, balance of trade, and energy
security. Energy balance, feedstock supply, and environmental impact considerations are not seen as significant barriers to the
widespread use of fuel ethanol derived from cellulosic biomass.
Cellulosic ethanol is abundant, inexpensive, and can be used in flex-fuel vehicles.
DiPardo 04 (Joseph, Energy Information Administration, “Outlook for Biomass Ethanol Production and Demand,” pg 14, 2004.)
Ethanol has enjoyed some success as a renewable fuel, primarily as a gasoline volume extender and also as an oxygenate for high-
oxygen fuels, an oxygenate in RFG in some markets, and potentially as a fuel in flexible-fuel vehicles. A large part of its success has
been the Federal ethanol subsidy. With the subsidy due to expire in 2008, however, it is not clear whether ethanol will continue to
receive political support. Thus, the future of ethanol may depend on whether it can compete with crude oil on its own merits. Ethanol
costs could be reduced dramatically if efforts to produce ethanol from biomass are successful. Biomass feedstocks, including
forest residue, agricultural residue, and energy crops, are abundant and relatively inexpensive, and they are expected to lower the
cost of producing ethanol and provide stability to supply and price. In addition, the use of corn stover would lend continued
support to the U.S. corn industry. Analysis of NREL technological goals for cellulose ethanol conversion suggests that ethanol could
compete favorably with other gasoline additives without the benefit of a Federal subsidy if the goals were achieved.
129
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Solvency—Alternative Fuels Key to Solve Peak Oil

Existing technology makes transitioning away from oil possible, but production of large amounts of
alternative fuels like ethanol and methanol are required
7. While greater end-use efficiency is essential, increased efficiency alone will be neither sufficient nor timely enough to solve the
problem. Production of large amounts of substitute liquid fuels will be required. A number of commercial or near-commercial
substitute fuel production technologies are currently available for deployment, so the production of vast amounts of substitute liquid
fuels is feasible with existing technology.
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Solvency—Alternative Energy Solves Oil Shock Vulnerability

Alternative energies can shield our economy from oil shocks while making our economy better, vehicle
technology can solve.
Alternative energy supplies provide ready substitutes if the price of oil rises too extremely and can shield the economy from the
negative impact from disruption of any one fuel source. It has been shown that the lower a country’s energy consumption to gross
domestic product (GDP) ratio or the shorter the period that oil prices will remain higher, the lower the cost of the tradeoff between
inflation and GDP loss. New technologies exist on the horizon that could allow more gains in energy efficiency. Examples include
micro-turbines for distributed power markets, improved vehicle technologies, including plug-in hybrid automobile technology,
household solar technologies, among others. Electricity in the United States is generated without recourse to oil-based fuels, providing
a unique opportunity for creative avenues for alternative energy policy that would promote the use of electricity in the transportation
sector.
131
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Solvency—A2 No Infrastructure/No Fuel Market Exists

The market created by a flex-fuel mandate would result in alcohol fuel pumps popping up everywhere
Yes, well the problem is fundamentally simple. The oil cartel has a vertical monopoly on the world's fuel supply, and that is why they can raise prices without
constraint. To defeat them, what is necessary is to create fuel choice. As I explain in the book "Energy Victory," the US congress can deal the fatal blow to OPEC with a
stroke of the pen, simply by passing a law requiring that all new cars sold in the USA be flex fueled -- that is able to run on any combination of alcohol or gasoline.
These cars are current technology. In fact this year Detroit will be selling 24 models that have this option, and they only cost about $100 more than the same model
without flex fuel capability. But they only currently comprise about 3% of the auto sales, because in most places there is no upside to
owning one, as there are no alcohol fuel pumps to be found. and the reason, of course, why there are no alcohol pumps out there is that
service station owners have no reason to set up such pumps while there are so few cars that can use them. But within 3 years of
enactment of a flex fuel mandate we would have 50 million cars on the road in the USA capable of running on alcohol fuels,
and under those conditions you would see E85 (85% ethano/15% gasoline) and M85 (85% methanol/15% gasoline) pumps
popping up everywhere.
A flex-fuel mandate would create a global alcohol fuel market in the short-term—this ensures that
infrastructure pops up IMMEDIATELY
Walters 11/27/07 (Alan, Staff, Energy Daily, "The Plan to Destroy OPEC," http://www.energy-
daily.com/reports/The_Plan_To_Destroy_OPEC_999.html)
Thus the effect of a US flex fuel mandate would be global, and within a few years, put hundreds of millions of cars on the road
worldwide capable of running indifferently on either methanol, ethanol, or gasoline. With such a market available, alcohol fuel
pumps and associated infrastructure would quickly appear, and the vertical monopoly that the oil cartel holds on the world's vehicular fuel supply
would be broken, as gasoline would be forced to compete everywhere against alcohol produced from multiple sources, including biomass, coal, stranded natural gas,
recycled urban trash, and so forth.
The market created by a flex-fuel mandate would create the conditions for the widespread construction
of alcohol fuel stations
7. Though 10% ethanol fuel has been common through much of the country for over a decade, there are still few locations where you can find E85 or
biodiesel blends. Would simply equipping cars to be biofuels capable be enough to encourage the availability of these fuels?
Yes, absolutely. The problem right now is lack of market. If you own a gas station, and you have three pumps, you are not going to dedicate one of them
to a kind of fuel that only 3% of the cars can use. But within three years of a flex fuel mandate we would have 50 million cars that can use
alcohol fuels, and under those conditions the pumps to sell to them will start appearing anywhere.
Any gas station owner can mobilize the capital to install a new pump. Any group of small town entrepreneurs can mobilize the capital to build an
ethanol plant. But what they can't do is make automobiles. That's why we have to tackle this with legislation at the demand end.
Once we have the market in place, all the rest will follow.
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Solvency—A2 No Infrastructure/No Fuel Market Exists

A flex-fuel mandate would quickly create a market for cheap, high-alcohol fuels
To liberate ourselves from the threat of foreign economic domination, undercut the financiers of terror, and give ourselves the free hand necessary to deal with Middle
Eastern extremists, we must devalue their resources and increase the value of our own. We can do this by taking the world off the
petroleum standard and putting it on an alcohol standard.
This may sound like a huge and impossible task, but with gasoline prices well over $2 per gallon, the means to accomplish it are now at hand.
Congress could make an enormous step toward American energy independence within a decade or so if it would simply pass a law
stating that all new cars sold in the U.S.A. must be flexible-fuel vehicles capable of burning any combination of gasoline and alcohol.
The alcohols so employed could be either methanol or ethanol.
The largest producers of both ethanol and methanol are all in the western hemisphere, with the United States having by far the greatest production potential for both.
Ethanol is made from agricultural products. Methanol can also be made from biomass, as well as from natural gas or coal. American coal reserves alone are sufficient to
power every car in the country on methanol for more than 500 years.
Ethanol can currently be produced for about $1.50 per gallon, and methanol is selling for $0.90 per gallon. With gasoline having roughly doubled in price recently, and
with little likelihood of a substantial price retreat in the future, high alcohol-to-gasoline fuel mixtures are suddenly practical. Cars capable of burning such fuel
are no futuristic dream. This year, Detroit will offer some two dozen models of standard cars with a flex-fuel option available for
purchase. The engineering difference is in one sensor and a computer chip that controls the fuel-air mixture, and the employment of a corrosion-resistant fuel system.
The difference in price from standard units ranges from $100 to $800.
Flexible-fuel vehicles (FFVs) offer consumers little advantage
right now, because the high-alcohol fuels which they could employ are not
generally available for purchase. This is because there are so few such vehicles that it doesn’t pay gas station owners to dedicate a
pump to cater to them. Were FFVs made the standard, however, the fuel they need would quickly be made available
everywhere.
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Solvency—A2 Can’t Break Oil’s Strategic Importance

Oil’s strategic importance must be broken by pursuing alternative fuels—the history of salt proves oil’s
monopoly can be broken
The unique strategic importance of oil to the modern economy—beyond that of any other commodity today—stems from the fact that the
global economy’s very enabler, the transportation sector, is utterly dependent on it, with 220 million cars and trucks in the United States alone
(today, contrary to popular belief, only 2 percent of U.S. electricity is generated from oil, and conversely only about 2 percent of U.S. oil demand is due to electricity
generation.) With 97 percent of U.S. transportation energy based on petroleum, oil is the lifeblood of America’s economy. America is
poor in oil relative to its need. It consumes one of every four gallons in the world but has barely 3 percent of the world’s proven reserves of conventional oil.
The United States now imports over 60 percent of its oil, more than twice the ratio of imports before the 1973–74 Arab oil embargo.
Neither efforts to expand petroleum supply nor those to crimp petroleum demand will be enough to reduce America’s strategic vulnerability anytime soon. When the
British Navy made the shift from coal to oil, then Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill famously remarked, “safety and certainty in oil lies in variety and variety
alone.” To diminish the strategic importance of oil to the international system it is now critical to expand the Churchillian doctrine
beyond geographical variety to a variety of fuels and feedstocks.
Oil’s strategic value derives from its virtual monopoly on transportation fuel. This monopoly, which gives intolerable power to
OPEC and the nations that dominate oil ownership and production, must be broken. Not long ago, technology broke the power of another
strategic commodity. Until around the end of the nineteenth century salt had such a position because it was the only means of preserving
meat. Odd as it seems today, salt mines conferred national power and wars were even fought over control of them. Today, no nation
sways history because it has salt mines. Salt is still a useful commodity for a range of purposes. We import some salt, so if one defines independence as
autarky we are not “salt independent”. But to most of us there is no “salt dependence” problem at all — because canning, electricity and refrigeration decisively ended
salt’s monopoly of meat preservation, and thus its strategic importance. We can and must do the same thing to oil.
134
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Solvency—A2 Unsustainable Environmental Practices Turn

Maturing alternative fuel markets will develop sustainable environmental practices AND cellulosic would
become viable, reducing dependence on corn based fuels
Hamilton 4/7/08 (Tyler, "It's time to 'flex' our energy muscles," Toronto Star,
http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/410812)
Zubrin counters that the corn ethanol debate has been overblown, and that it's poverty that's driving environmental destruction in
developing countries, not ethanol. Over time, as markets mature in these countries, more sustainable practices will develop
along with them.
It's a risky – you could even say naïve – bet. More realistic is the likelihood that the economics of making cellulosic ethanol, based on agricultural
residue, forest debris and municipal solid waste, will improve to a point where our dependence on food crops like corn will fall.
135
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Solvency—A2 No Flex-Fuel Tech Exists Now

Effective flex-fuel technology exists now—recent innovations prove
Two developments make a rapid transfer to high-alcohol fuels possible. One is the recent rise of gasoline prices, making methanol and ethanol economically attractive.
The other is a technological innovation: the development by the Netherlands Research Institute for Road Vehicles of a sensor capable of
continuously measuring the alcohol content in mixed alcohol/gasoline fuel, and using this information to regulate the engine.
With this breakthrough, some 4.1 million vehicles were produced between 1998 and 2004 capable of handling various alcohol/
gasoline combinations. That is already five times the number of gasoline/electric hybrids on the road, and vastly increased use of
such vehicles could happen overnight, for just a few hundred dollars extra per vehicle (compared to many thousands more for
hybrids).
136
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Solvency—A2 Transition Away From Oil Won’t Happen

The transition is possible—Brazil proves
This chicken-and-egg problem can be readily resolved by legislation. One major country has already done so. In 2003, Brazilian
lawmakers mandated a transition to FFVs, with some tax incentives included to move things along. As a result, the Brazilian divisions
of Fiat, Volkswagen, Ford, Renault, and GM all came out with ethanol FFV models in 2004, which took 60 percent of the country’s
new vehicle sales that year. By 2007, 80 percent of all new vehicles sold in Brazil are expected to be FFVs, producing significant fuel
savings to consumers, a boost to local agriculture, and a massive benefit to the country’s foreign trade balance.
137
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Solvency—A2 You Can’t Sufficiently Reduce Oil Dependence

Even a 50% reduction of US gasoline consumption would substantially increase energy independence
The United States uses 380 million gallons of gasoline a day. If we were to replace that entirely with ethanol we would have to harvest approximately four times as
much agricultural output as we currently grow for food production. Now it is true that we don’t need to replace all of our gasoline, at least not in the
short term. Replacing half would make us substantially energy independent. Furthermore, future processes might eventually wring out higher
ethanol yields per acre. Surplus ethanol from Brazil or other tropical nations could also be imported. Nonetheless, relying on ethanol alone would require putting under
fresh cultivation an amount of land greater than what we now use for food production. This would cause many strains.
138
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Solvency—A2 You Can’t Reduce Oil Prices Enough to Solve

The ethanol and methanol resources are widely available to replace all oil sold by OPEC and a 20%
replacement of OPEC oil from alcohol fuels would send oil prices tumbling—an open fuel market is key
We can't replace oil with corn ethanol alone. Corn ethanol has replaced 4% of our gasoline supply, which is an impressive achievement, and it might be able to replace
8%. But certainly not 100%. However corn is just one crop. Any sugar-rich or starchy crop can be used to produce ethanol using current
technology. New cellulosic ethanol technology is coming on line with allow us to use currently worthless crop residues, which will vastly
expand the available ethanol supply. Methanol can already be produced from all kinds of biomass without exception, as well from coal, natural gas,
and recycled urban trash. There is enough crop residues in the world right now, that if they were all converted into methanol we
could replace all the oil of OPEC. And in fact we probably would only have to replace about 20% of OPEC's production into
order to break the cartel and send oil prices tumbling. There certainly are the resources available to do that. But we need an
open fuel market to make it work.
US investments in alternative energy cause speculators to value oil lower—this ensures oil prices drop
globally
Yetiv and Feld 07 (Steve and Lowell, Professor of political science at Old Dominion University and senior international oil
markets analyst at the U.S. Energy Information Administration until March 2006, “America's Oil Market Power: The Unused Weapon
Against Iran,” World Policy Journal, p. proquest)
As is typical of world oil markets, this situation soon changed. Low oil prices and resurgent economic growth spurred rapid oil demand growth in Asia and elsewhere.
But supply couldn't keep up with demand. Oil companies' under-investment in world capacity and a series of oil crises in Venezuela, Nigeria,
and Iraq led to a reversal of the spare capacity situation by 2003. Predictably, oil prices rose sharply, approaching $40 per barrel by the end of
2004, $60 per barrel by late 2005-when spare capacity bottomed out at 1-1.5 MMBD, the lowest it had ever been relative to total world oil supply-and close to $80 per
barrel by the fall of 2007. If oil prices rise when spare capacity falls, what about the opposite? In fact, history shows that when spare
capacity increases, as it did in the mid-1980s and in the late 1990s, oil prices fall. When spare capacity spikes, oil prices can even collapse, as
occurred after-appropriately enough-the revolution in Iran during 1978 and 1979. The oil price collapse of 1985-86 resulted from the major oil price shock of the late
1970s, combined with a severe recession in the early 1980s. This concurrence slashed U.S. oil consumption by 3.6 mmbd in just five years, from 18.8 MMBD in 1978
to 15.2 mmbd in 1983. As a result, world spare oil production capacity surged, eventually leading to the collapse in oil prices-from nearly $40 per barrel in 1980 to just
$10 per barrel by early 1986. Today, there is strong reason to believe that an increase in world spare oil production capacity would cause oil
prices to decline once again (if not to the same dramatic degree). Imagine that the United States cut its oil consumption from currently projected
levels of 24 MMBD by 2020 by 3 MMBD over the next decade.1 Eventually, the American cut in consumption would increase world spare
capacity from its current level of around 2 MMBD (almost all of which is in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) to more than 5 MMBD. This would return world
spare oil production capacity to levels not seen since late 1998 and early 1999, when oil prices plummeted to $10 per barrel. True, it is
unlikely that we will see $ 10 per barrel again, but with a major reduction in the trajectory of U.S. oil demand and a concomitant increase in world spare capacity, we
would likely see a sharp decrease from the $80-100 per barrel prices we are currently experiencing.2 How could the United States develop its
latent oil market power? First and foremost, achieving this goal would require a serious shift in U.S. energy policy. Such a shift is
achievable and could sharply decrease U.S. (and world) oil consumption, dramatically altering oil market psychology. Oil futures
traders who largely set the price of oil would have to consider that demand for oil would drop from current expectations. As a result,
they would likely decrease the purchase of oil futures, thus causing a drop in the price of oil. Even before the impact of America's
new energy policies would be felt, oil prices would almost certainly fall on the expectation by oil traders of declining future U.S.
oil demand. A major policy shift by the United States could also move world oil markets out of the high anxiety state they have been
operating in for several years now: increase spare capacity and market anxiety almost inevitably will subside, because of the creation of a margin of error in the
event of perceived threats to supply or actual disruptions.
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Solvency—A2 Ethanol Production → Deforestation

Deforestation rates are declining AND it started occurring PRIOR TO ethanol production
Third, contra Searchinger, there is no evidence that the U.S. corn ethanol program is causing arable land to be cleared elsewhere. To
again quote Wang and Haq:
[Searchinger’s assumption about land-use changes] is seriously flawed by predicting deforestation in the Amazon and conversion of grassland into crop land in China,
India, and the United States. The fact is, deforestation rates have already declined through legislation in Brazil and elsewhere. In China,
contrary to the Searchinger et al. assumptions, efforts have been made in the past ten years to convert marginal crop land into
grassland and forest land in order to prevent soil erosion and other environmental problems.
To be clear: Deforestation is certainly happening—and was happening prior to the advent and expansion of the U.S. corn ethanol
program. If it is accelerating now, that could be due to any number of causes, but there is simply no evidence that global biofuels
investments are among them.
Turn—Third World biofuel farmers wouldn’t burn down forests—rather, they’d harvest them for their
potential use as biofuels
In addition to these specific flaws in the study’s assumptions, the claim of Searchinger and his colleagues to possess a computer model capable of predicting global
human behavior must be taken with a grain of salt. While it might be reasonable to suppose that Third World farmers would respond to either
high fuel or food prices by clearing more land for agricultural activity, the assumption in the Searchinger study that they would do this
by simply burning down their forests—thus creating a “carbon debt” that would take decades or even centuries of biofuel production to “pay back”—is
purely speculative. In fact, most of the Amazon deforestation is being driven not by agriculture but by lumber interests, and should
biofuel technology reach the point where either methanol or cellulosic ethanol can be adopted as an economically feasible fuel, then
forestry residues would become valuable biofuel resources themselves, and the last thing Third World farmers would want to do
would be to burn these enormous revenue sources. Instead they would harvest them, and as their energy content would be used to replace
petroleum, there would be no significant “carbon debt.”
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Solvency—A2 Methanol Infeasible/Poses Safety Risks

Methanol is comparatively safer, less environmentally harmful, and less toxic than gasoline
So if the economic and strategic questions can be answered, that leaves the matter of methanol and the environment. The authors deal with environmental concerns in a
cool, thorough, and methodical fashion. Unlike ethanol, which is edible, methanol is toxic—but so is gasoline. However, unlike gasoline or
petroleum, methanol is soluble in water and readily biodegradable by common bacteria, so spills of methanol, whether from defective
pumping stations or shipwrecked tankers, would have no long-term environmental impact. Furthermore, as the authors demonstrate, the toxicity of
methanol is commonly overstated. In point of fact, methanol is present naturally in fresh fruit, and so low doses of methanol have
always been a normal part of the human diet. Unlike gasoline, methanol is not a carcinogen or a mutagen, and the pollutants and other
emissions from methanol-powered internal combustion engines are far more benign than emissions from their gasoline-driven
counterparts. (Automobile emissions could even be reduced to zero with methanol-based fuel cells.) And if methanol is produced from carbon dioxide or from
biomass, its use in place of petroleum acts to counter man-made global warming as well. “Compared to gasoline or diesel fuel,” the authors conclude,
“methanol is clearly environmentally much safer and less toxic.”
Methanol is relatively cheap as a fuel source, it poses no safety or environmental risks, and can be
blended with gasoline as a new fuel source now
Moore 6/4/06 (Bill, "Beyond Oil and Gas: The 'Methanol Economy',"
http://www.evworld.com/article.cfm?archive=1&storyid=1041&first=8722&end=8721)
"I can give you my reasonable answer," he replied, adding that he is often asked this question. "First of all, you shouldn't drink
methanol. Methanol is harmful if you drink it or consume it. On the other hand, I haven't seen in my life anybody pulling up to a
gasoline station for a pint of high octane gasoline or diesel fuel and drink it.
"Methanol is a liquid. It boils around 56 degrees Centigrade. It's miscible in any amount safely with gasoline. It was used as a gasoline
mixing component in the United States and Europe for years. It faded away because oil was still cheap and even today it's relatively
cheap.
"The other question about methanol's safety is that when you incompletely burn methanol, you can also form some formaldehyde. But
look, we have developed catalytic converters for our cars… that allow gasoline and diesel to burn more completely. There is no
difficulty, whatsoever in modern cars to burn methanol without any harmful exhaust."
Olah sees no reason why we couldn't be using a blend of methanol with gasoline, just as we are starting to do increasingly with
ethanol.
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2AC Answers To “Positive/Voluntary Incentives CP”

Voluntary incentives fail—only mandates can spark tech improvements into the marketplace
ENS 5/29/03 (Environmental News Service, “How To Halve U.S. Transport Emissions By 2050,” http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/may2003/2003-05-29-06.asp)
Many of the actions that would reduce emissions from transportation would also lower U.S. dependence on imported oil, the authors
say.
Research and development and voluntary efforts will not be enough to do the job, they note. Mandatory policies will be necessary
to introduce technological improvements into the marketplace.
Fuel cells and hydrogen hold out the promise of eliminating greenhouse gas emissions from this sector, the report says, but government must provide "clear
policy direction in order to drive massive private investment by the fuel and vehicle industries."
The authors drew on existing literature for their conclusions. Their findings about light duty vehicles, for instance, came from a 2002 National Academy of Sciences
study on the effectiveness and impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards which found that light duty vehicles account for 75 percent of highway energy use
and their total carbon emissions are now comparable to major industrialized countries like Germany and Japan.
But market ready technologies are currently available that will allow fuel economy on new cars and light trucks to be increased by 25 to 33 percent over the next-to 15
years without reducing the size or performance of the vehicles.
"We are adopting technologies capable of improving fuel economy standards, but we're using them to increase horsepower and the size and weight of trucks," Greene
said. "Our study assumes no increase in their horsepower weight ratio, but no decline either.
Greene said that the current administration has made some moves in the right direction. The Congressional ban on the National Highway Traffic Safety Association
(NHTSA) study of the issue of raising fuel economy standards has been lifted. And the NHTSA has proposed raising fuel economy standards by 1.5 miles per gallon.
"That sounds like a small amount, but you can't raise it that quickly anyway, so it's not as puny as it sounds," Greene said. "The question is whether they will go beyond
that. That remains to be seen."
If global mobility is to continue to expand, especially in the developing world, a transition to other sources of energy must begin soon,
the report states. "Decisions made in the next several years could determine whether the world's transportation systems follow a
path of continued reliance on high carbon fossil fuels or take an alternative path toward more diverse, low carbon energy
sources."
Voluntary incentives won’t compel automakers to make their entire fleet flex-fuel
PetroZero.org 2/22/08 ("An open letter to Mr. Gore," http://www.petrozero.org/2008/03/open-letter-to-albert-gore-jr.html)

Although the automakers are not likely to voluntarily flex fuel enable their entire gasoline powered fleet (they've thus far used it
as a bargaining chip against CAFE requirements), congress is likely to compel them to and sooner than 2012; both as a matter of national security and as a
consumer choice initiative. Just as during the cold war, congress required automakers to equip every vehicle with FM radio (presumably to enable the emergency alert
system in the event of nuclear war), and just as seatbelts are required for passenger safety advocates of an “Open Fuel Standard” are pushing for
legislation to require all new cars sold in the US to have flex fuel capability for some of the same reasons, (in 2006 we spent nearly half as much on
oil imports as we spent on our annual defense budget)
The auto industry prefers regulations over voluntary incentives—they provide greater degree of
certainty, predictability, and accountability
Canada NewsWire 11/7/07 (lexis)

previous governments have pursued voluntary
Potential entry into force and use of the act has been a regulatory backstop for the last 25 years, while
approaches with the auto industry. This government has decided to use regulation over voluntary agreements as it provides a greater
degree of certainty, predictability and accountability.
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2AC Answers to “Positive Incentives CP”

Positive incentives actually DECREASE private investment in new clean technologies
Lacoursiere 2/8/06 (Catherine, Columnist @ InvestorIdeas.com, "Carrots & Sticks: Financing the Ethanol Economy,"
http://www.renewableenergystocks.com/CL/News/Ethanol_Economy.asp)
What’s more, businesses propped up by subsidies are less apt to attract much needed private investment. “Investors need to see a
path to profitability. We need to see that companies can survive in the absence of subsidies,” says Alex Illingworth, Director of Global
Fund Insight Investor and fund manager of the Insight European Evergreen and Ethical Funds. Ilingworth says that technologies
that are self sufficient are receiving investment interest. Solar power is becoming more attractive, he says. Even though the industry still depends on
subsidies, feed-in-tariffs are helping companies turn the corner to profitability. In contrast, Illingworth considers wave power and low-temperature fuel cells “too far
off.’ “In Germany, [because] we have relief on the sale of solar installations, the subsidies decrease over time but the company should be able to maintain profitability in
line with the reduction in subsidies.”
PERM DO BOTH – A COMBINATION OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE INCENTIVES SOLVES

COMPLIANCE BEST
Gibson and Healer 94. [J. Eugene, int’l attorney in DC, advises bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and nongovernmental
organizations on admin, enviro, and nonprofit law issues, Faith, a consultant in Arlington VA on int’l environment policy, law and
implementation, Environment Jan 1 – lexis]
Finally, all players should remember that the ultimate goal is to maintain or improve environmental conditions and thus to
improve the quality of people's lives. This objective underlines the importance of finding ways to build consensus and accept
progress in modest phases. It also means that efforts to increase compliance should be aimed at changing people's harmful
behaviors, rather than simply punishing them. Enforcement efforts should include fines and other penalties as a means, not an
end in itself. Using enforcement as a supplement to other tools usually proves more effective than using it as the centerpiece of
a compliance program. Programs should be designed for the affected sectors with a variety of positive incentives, such as awards
or market incentives, as well as negative incentives such as fines. However, the use of market incentives to promote environmental
improvements relies on a working legal environmental structure with clear goalsand standards. Market incentives depend on fiscal
laws and regulations and a certain level of economic development not yet present in some developing countries.
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2AC Answers to “States CP”

--Federal action is key to avert state-by-state regulations that cause chaos for the US auto industry
Business Week 5/20/02 ("Clean-Air Standards: An End Run around Washington,"

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_20/b3783047.htm)
Detroit was blindsided. Expecting an assault of environmental legislation from Washington this spring, the auto industry dispatched troops of lobbyists to the banks of
the Potomac to make a stand, successfully defeating a push for stricter national fuel-economy standards. But the real threat came from the other coast. After
environmental lobbyists worked their own contacts in California, the state senate approved a bill on May 2 that would force auto
makers to sell cleaner, more fuel-efficient cars in the state by 2008. "I was elated," says Sierra Club Executive Director Carl Pope. "This was such a sharp
contrast from how Congress has reacted to environmental legislation."
The California battle isn't over yet: The state assembly still needs to approve a final version of the measure, and Governor Gray Davis hasn't indicated whether he'll sign
it. But if--as expected--the environmental lobby wins this skirmish, it may ultimately prove just as significant as a victory in Washington would have. Why? California
is the only state that can create clean-air standards, since its laws predate federal regulations. But other states have the option of adopting California's
rules. So the environmentalists plan to take the same legislation to like-minded Northeastern states and then deeper into the heartland,
ultimately targeting key states such as Texas and Florida. "We have accepted the fact that environmental leadership is not coming from Washington," Pope says. "We
will focus on consumers and the states."
It's a strategy that could work--and that has Detroit hopping mad. After defeating the federal measure that would have required auto makers to boost
fuel efficiency in March, the industry thought it had wrapped up the issue. Now, though, Detroit may have to wrestle with the environmentalists in state
capitals. In the past, California's clean-air and low-emissions laws have gotten a warm reception in New York and New England, where
legislators have adopted California's existing limits on carbon monoxide, smog-causing nitrous oxide, and soot from cars. "Our biggest fear is that this becomes the
battle we already fought and won at the federal level," says Gregory J. Dana, vice-president of environmental affairs for the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers in
Washington.
That's likely to happen, which could ultimately bring the battle right back to Washington. Since the auto industry doesn't want the stricter California
standards adopted state by state, it might agree to somewhat tougher federal fuel economy and emissions laws. Says one General
Motors Corp. insider: "We can't have 50 different states telling us how to build cars. That would be chaos." And that's exactly what
the environmental lobby is counting on.
--Healthy US auto industry is key to the overall US economy
Hall 3/10/04 (Don, President @ Virginia Automobile Dealers Association, Richmond Times Dispatch, lexis)
AS IMPORTANT as the impact of such a drastic tax increase would be on Virginia car buyers, it would have an even greater impact on our overall economy. Since
the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the automotive industry has been one of the only sources of strength in our economy.
The direct impact will be to the dealerships themselves. New car and truck dealerships in Virginia account for nearly $20 billion in retail sales annually - more than 20
percent of Virginia's total retail sales. They employ more than 37,000 Virginians.
However, the indirect impact could be even more severe. New car and truck dealerships purchase more than $915 million in goods and services from other Virginia
businesses. This includes everything from advertising to utilities to insurance. Lost sales will result in lost buying power, which will ripple throughout our economy.
Most people don't realize how critical the automotive industry is to our economy. According to a 2001 report on the
"Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the U.S. Economy" prepared by the University of Michigan and the Center for Automotive
Research (CAR), for every worker directly employed by the auto industry, nearly seven spin-off jobs are created.
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Federal-state conflicts create regulatory uncertainty for the US auto industry
Polakovic 9/14/03 (Gary, LA Times, "U.S., State Clash Over Environment,"

http://www.lungsandiego.org/ASTHMA/press_california_fights_feds.asp)
Victor Weisser, president of the California Council for Environmental and Economic Balance, said the disputes create uncertainty
for businesses as they gauge whether state or federal authorities will decide the regulations. "I'm not sure the feds fully recognize how
difficult some of these issues are [that] we are dealing with in California," he said. "Everybody needs to do their fair share, and apparently the feds are not acting fast
enough. It's partisan politics, that's the sad part. The issues of air quality and economic health should transcend partisan politics."
Jim DiPeso, policy director for Republicans for Environmental Protection, said from his office in Tacoma, Wash., that California is
increasingly in conflict with the Bush administration because the state has exerted more authority on environmental matters
than other states and has a long tradition of pushing technology to achieve environmental gains. Speaking of California, he said,
"The nail that sticks its head up will get hammered."
Regulatory uncertainty cripples the auto industry—destroys their ability to plan for the future
Bragman 8/26/07 (Aaron, Global Insight, lexis)

President Bush has quietly let Congress continue on its path of legislative activity, with administration spokespeople stating that the efforts will probably come to
nothing, as the president is likely to use his veto power to reject any legislation that does not meet the guidelines set out in his State of the Union speech. The Senate has
already debated and approved its bill, and the House saw its discussion tabled just before the summer recess by the Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, with plans to
take up the debate next week when the House returns to session. Congressman John Dingell of Michigan intends to make fuel economy part of a sweeping, economy-
wide effort to control greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption. Automakers are pumping millions into lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill, but what effect they
will have if the regulations are not created by lawmakers but by the Administration's agencies is unclear. Bush's relatively short time left in office adds
another element of uncertainty into the mix; legislation that might be passed now and ultimately vetoed may come up again for consideration late next year,
when Bush will be in the lame-duck phase of his presidency. The outcome of the 2008 election could seriously impact whether strict legislation is signed into law or
continues to circulate in legislative limbo.
This uncertainty is playing havoc with automakers' product plans. Already one programme has been seen to be publicly cancelled--Chrysler's
plan for a large luxury sedan based on the next-generation rear-wheel-drive LX platform has been scrapped due in part to the estimated effect it would have on the
company's CAFE rating. The proliferation of GM's rear-wheel-drive architecture has been uncertain before, with GM vice-chairman Bob Lutz publicly
putting the programmes in doubt given the uncertainty surrounding future fuel economy and emissions ratings. Even vaunted "green"
Toyota has a vested interest in the outcome of the CAFE and emissions mandate fluctuations, given that it has invested billions in a new line of massive full-size trucks
that are sure to decrease the company's CAFE rating for domestically produced automobiles. Most automakers are proceeding with plans to increase fuel
economy regardless of the federal regulations changes, with the writing on the wall pointing to a definitive change in the mood of
domestic consumers and the price of oil increasing internationally to make fuel economy one of the top priorities of all international
automakers. However, without a solid regulatory framework, product planning becomes that much more difficult, made even more
so by the likelihood of continued fluctuation at least through the November 2008 presidential election.
State-level regulations place onerous burdens on the auto industry—uniform, FEDERAL regulations are
vital
Detroit News 6/17/07 (lexis)

It's not just the numbers that worry the automakers, it's how they will be enforced.
Congress has a responsibility to build fairness into its regulatory schemes. Automakers must have some certainty that whatever
standards the federal government mandates will be the law of the land.
But the California Democrats are seeking an exemption to allow California and 11 other states, as well the Environmental Protection
Agency, to set their own standards for tailpipe emissions -- which for all practical purposes is a regulation of fuel economy.
Automakers should be subject to one regulatory body -- the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration -- and should be able
to make one product that passes muster in all 50 states. To require different vehicles for different parts of the country places an
onerous burden on the industry and would likely make it impossible for them to build affordable vehicles.
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History proves—federal courts will strike down state attempts to regulate ANYTHING related to fuel
efficiency
Carlson 03 (Ann, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, 12/23, lexis)
Carlson: As I said in my introductory remarks, California every year has gotten a waiver from federal emissions standards to establish its own emissions standards. One
of the things California has done that differs from other states is to force auto manufacturers to develop a certain percentage of zero emission vehicles. There have been
a lot of problems with that program, but there have also been a lot of advances. The California Air Resources Board has responded to that problem in
part by changing the mix of what can meet the zero emissions vehicle [(ZEV)] requirements. One of its regulatory choices has been
struck down by a federal district court on grounds that an entirely different federal statute--the one that controls fuel economy
standards--preempts California from engaging in anything that relates to fuel efficiency. So if they are regulating emissions in a
way that relates to fuel efficiency--according to this court--that is preempted by federal law. One of the regulations in the ZEV regulatory scheme
briefly discusses fuel efficiency, which is the issue that the court struck down. This decision by federal district court judge is now being appealed.
Why do I tell you all this? It has bearing on California's regulatory alternatives under AB 1493. California has to be careful not to directly regulate fuel
economy, even though direct regulation of fuel economy would dramatically reduce carbon dioxide emissions. So California has to take different regulatory
approaches, since one potential legal challenge to anything that CARB does is federal preemption by federal statutes regulating fuel
economy standards. But there is another question. California historically has been allowed to regulate emissions that are related to air pollution; however, there is a
question under the Clean Air Act about whether California will receive a waiver for trying to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. That may be a different question, and
auto manufacturers are going to argue first that EPA should not grant California the waiver--that California doesn't have the legal authority to do it. Secondly, even if the
waiver is granted, [the manufacturers will argue,] "Look, the Clean Air Act is about regulating air pollution emissions, not greenhouse gas emissions."
Despite the Negative’s claims, states will adopt different regulatory approaches—this creates regulatory
inconsistency
DeShazo and Freeman 07 (JR and Jody, Professor and Director of the Lewis Center, UCLA School of Public Affairs +
Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental Law Program, Harvard Law School, June, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, lexis)
Industry pressure for a federal standard may also mount when regulatory uncertainty, induced or exacerbated by inconsistent state
activity, produces significant costs, even in the absence of direct product regulation. 25 This is more likely to be the case when firms
are preparing to make substantial long-term capital investments in the context of confusion about the short-term regulatory
playing field. 26 This uncertainty is likely to be especially pronounced when it arises simultaneously at the state, national, and international levels. With so much in
flux and so much at stake, both domestic and multinational firms will want clarity sooner rather than later.
States can increase regulatory uncertainty in this way either by taking action alone or by joining together with other states in
regional compacts. Moreover, because states will be responding to somewhat different interest group configurations within their own jurisdictions, there is a high
likelihood that different states will adopt different regulatory approaches. This practically ensures inconsistency and helps drive
industry to Congress. At the same time, some states are likely to be more important than others in provoking this reaction. Historically, California seems to have been
especially influential in prompting industry demand for federal uniformity, perhaps because of the state's disproportionate market power 27 and history of engaging in
product regulation targeting automobiles. 28
Regulatory uncertainty undermines investment in alcohol fuels
Parker and Smith 08 (Geoffrey and Eric, Freeman School of Business, The Impact of Carbon Emissions Policy and
Transportation Costs on Alternative Transportation Fuel Supply Chain Economics,"
ttp://engineering.academickeys.com/seeker_job_attachments.php?dothis=download&job_file%5BIDX%5D=32.)
As nations search for methods to reduce green house gas emissions,

there is a renewed focus on alternate fuels, such as ethanol, bio-diesel, and
butanol. Although several of these fuels have a long history of production, they have not been widely adopted in the absence of
significant government mandates or subsidies. For an alternate transportation fuel to displace conventional oil derivatives such
as gasoline and diesel, there must be a reasonable probability that the fuel can become competitive in total costs, including
production, distribution, and consumption. To date, no alternative fuels have passed this test in the United States. However, one cost that has long been
absent in energy prices is the cost of environmental emissions. Quantifying the exact cost of any emission is likely to remain impossible, but incorporating some non-
zero cost has the potential to significantly change the economics of the transportation fuel industry. The move to institute markets for carbon dioxide emissions makes
it possible that some previously omitted costs will be included in future energy prices in the U.S. as has been true in European markets for several years. A key issue,
however, is the timeline in which such markets are implemented and the resulting CO2 prices. Given the regulatory uncertainty, it is difficult to
justify major capital investments to reduce CO2 until a clearer picture of costs and benefits emerges.
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The lack of federal mandates create regulatory uncertainty that deters investment in clean energy
technologies
CSR Wire 11/15/07 ("Investors Seek Strong Environmental Measures in Energy Bill,"
http://www.csrwire.com/PressRelease.php?id=10159)
In sending the letter,

investors sent a strong message that regulatory uncertainty and the lack of federal regulations to spur clean
energy is discouraging investment in low-carbon, climate-friendly technologies that will flourish in the years ahead. The letter noted that
renewable energy investments hit a record $100 billion in 2006, with a growing portion of those investments taking place in China, India and Brazil.
"Every year the U.S. fails to enact strong federal energy policies is a missed opportunity to spur much-needed investments that
will create jobs, lessen our dependence on fossil fuels, capitalize on our global technological advantages and reduce carbon emissions
at the same time," wrote the investors.
Market predictability is key to creating INCENTIVES for investment in biofuels
McFarlane 5/7/08 (Robert, President Reagan's national security adviser, "Don't Give Up on Energy Independence," Wall Street
Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB121012141199772495.html)
The most important of these measures is the enactment of an Open Fuel Standard, so that the consumer has a choice at the fuel pump.
Unfortunately, without a predictable market, such as would be provided by mandatory flexible-fuel cars and trucks, there is a
strong disincentive among investors to risk the capital needed for second-generation alternative fuels like cellulosic ethanol to
take off. But without such a mandate, we are keeping ourselves tied exclusively to oil, with all the risks that involves.
Regulatory uncertainty undermines investment in biofuel projects in the Northeast
Gahagan and Associates 01 ("RE: MTBE & ETHANOL," Letter from Gahagan & Associates Submitted for the Record,"
http://epw.senate.gov/107th/gah_0427.htm
16. From a financing perspective, it will be more difficult to finance ethanol projects in the Northeast if there is regulatory
uncertainty. A change in the status quo could not only diminish environmental quality; it would not be good for business.
Regulatory uncertainty impedes tech developments
Lacoursiere 2/8/06 (Catherine, Columnist @ InvestorIdeas.com, "Carrots & Sticks: Financing the Ethanol Economy,"
http://www.renewableenergystocks.com/CL/News/Ethanol_Economy.asp)
There are two major shortcomings of US renewable energy policy. The first is short-termism. One need only observe the zigzag that
plots 10 years of wind energy sales in the United States to understand the impact of short-term subsidies. Sales shoot upwards in years
when wind subsidies are in place but sharply fall off when these incentives are suspended, or in suspended animation as myopic
politicians debate reinstatement. Regulatory uncertainty impeding technological progress is more certain than death and taxes.
To get to 2025, we need 20-year subsidies. No one disputes that Germany’s wind feed-in tariffs (FIT), which are guaranteed for 20 years, are behind its global lead in
wind installations. Spain, also a major wind player, has similar feed-in tariffs.
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State-based initiatives freak out the auto industry—uncertainties exist WITHIN EACH STATE
regulation AND they’re uncertain what states might regulate IN THE FUTURE
DeShazo and Freeman 07 (JR and Jody, Professor and Director of the Lewis Center, UCLA School of Public Affairs +
Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental Law Program, Harvard Law School, June, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, lexis)
The current set of state initiatives is likely to unnerve industry. This is because of the apparent seriousness of a few states about
reducing emissions, the targeting of products like fuels and automobiles, the complexity of the state initiatives when considered
cumulatively, and the uncertainty about potential state efforts to come. As described above, 116 a few states have actually established GHG reduction
targets and delegated real authority to the implementing agencies to regulate both the electricity and transportation sectors.
Affected industries may also be impressed by the sheer range of policy approaches adopted by the states. Within the electricity sector, [*1531] states aspire to regulate
the mix of energy generation and total utility emissions, as well as the design of new and retrofitted power plants. 117 Within the transportation sector, California seeks
to regulate the fuel content and emissions technologies of automobiles, with other states poised to follow suit. 118 Across both sectors, a number of states seek to induce
firms to participate in new types of markets such as trading carbon and renewable energy credits. 119
Firms operating in multiple states may well find that the states are adopting different approaches to achieve the same objective,
making compliance confusing and potentially costly. Even within a given state's program, there are often uncertainties about
how implementation will operate. These include matters such as which offsets will be acceptable to state oversight agencies, what
the timetables for compliance will be, when utilities will be permitted to participate in either carbon or renewable energy credit
trading, and what prices will be in these markets, among other things. This makes it difficult to plan for new plant construction,
plant expansions and retrofits, product expansion into new consumer markets, and compliance in current markets.
To date, firms within the transportation sector have fared relatively better than those in the electricity sector, but they are
appropriately concerned about what states might do in the future. This sector contributes nearly one-third of domestic GHG emissions. Although
California is the only state that has attempted to regulate both tailpipe emissions and fuel content, there are signs that other states are not far behind. 120
In sum, the nature and variety of the state initiatives, whether intentionally or not, have created substantial uncertainty in a context
in which firms must make long-term capital investments, and have raised the prospect of costly product differentiation
because of heterogeneous schemes. These are precisely the circumstances under which, consistent with DPT, we would expect industry anxiety to be at its
peak.
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Turn—California Economy
A. Additional standards undermine California’s economy by threatening job creation and creating
regulatory uncertainty
CalChamber 7/2/08 ("Bills Increasing Fuel Prices Pass Policy Committees,"

http://www.calchamber.com/CC/Headlines/07022008TS.htm)
SB 1240 interferes with the development of a competitive alternative fuels market and threatens job creation in California by
creating a costly Low Carbon Fuel Standard that conflicts with the existing standard created by Governor’s Executive Order S-7-04.
To meet increasing consumer demand, the fuels market needs to be full of options and represent a mix of alternatives.
Unlike the Governor’s executive order, however, SB 1240 limits the fuel that technology providers could use to meet the 10 percent reduction standard.
SB 1240 ignores the planning under way at the ARB and pre-judges the outcome of AB 32 and the Governor’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard. Establishing another
standard will only stall the reductions and create more uncertainty in the regulatory process.
SB 1240 = a restrictive fuel standard, passed the Assembly Natural Resources Committee.
B. California’s economy is on the brink of recession which would threaten the US economy—job losses
put its economy over the brink
National Realty News 3/13/08 ("Housing Troubles Put Economy on the Brink of Recession,"
http://nationalrealtynews.com/content/templates/default.aspx?a=845&z=1)
UCLA Anderson Forecast Economists Ryan Ratcliff and Jerry Nickelsburg, look back at the California economy since World War II and
make two conclusions. First, the U.S. and California economies move together: there has never been a recession in California
without a national recession. Second, the California recessions have twice been amplified and extended by long-lasting structural adjustments – the Southern
California aerospace contraction in 1990 and the Northern California tech bust in 2001. The recession-only downturns have been sharp-but-short contractions driven by
temporary job losses in manufacturing and construction. These recessions typically last less than a year, but both the aerospace and the tech adjustments took more than
half-a-dozen years to complete.
Today’s economy fits neither of these patterns – our economy is in “uncharted waters.” There are some negative signs, such as job loss
in real estate related sectors, but it is unlikely that these sectors can create enough job loss to generate the 2-3% declines in non-farm
payroll employment that have characterized past recessions.
The forecast is for a very weak California economy in 2008. The “double-whammy” of construction and financial activities job loss will continue to drag
at the economy. The economists write, “The current state of the California economy and our forecast fall short of the weakness in previous historical episodes that
we’ve chosen to label recessions … Based on comparing the current economy to past recession episodes, we once again conclude that real
estate weakness will remain a significant drag on the economy, leaving us treading water in 2008 – but not slipping under the
waves into recession.”
C. Economic crisis in California destroys the US economy and cripples US global influence
Gvosdev 03 (Nikolas, editor of In the National Interest, "Recall Madness-- and Much Ado about Missiles," 8/13,
http://inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue32/Vol2Issue32RealistPFV.html)
But the real issue is this: people "inside the Beltway" sometimes seem to forget that there is no "United States" apart from the fifty states (and associated territories and
commonwealths). A fiscal and economic crisis in California has a direct impact on the power of the United States, since some 13
percent of the total U.S. output is produced by California. California on its own is the sixth largest economy in the world, worth
some $1.309 trillion--yet this represents a decline of approximately 2.3 percent from 2000, when California's economy outperformed that of France. California
represents a significant share of the country's technological base and of its human capital. The high-tech weaponry which led to a
swift initial military victory in Iraq is in part a product of the technology and defense sectors of the California economy. A state
budget crisis that significantly cuts back on everything from education (including higher education, where so many innovative breakthroughs have taken place) to
health care has ramifications for how the United States projects its influence throughout the world. In previous issues of In the National
Interest, other authors have pointed out the dangerous implications of continued deficit spending by the federal government to support overseas operations, and this
problem can only increase if a continuing crisis in the principal engine of America's economy continues.
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1AR Answers to “States CP”—California Economy Extension

California’s economy is key to the overall US economy
Gvosdev 03 (Nikolas, editor of In the National Interest, "Recall Madness-- and Much Ado about Missiles," 8/13,
http://inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue32/Vol2Issue32RealistPFV.html)
And, of course, California is the bellweather for the nation as a whole. Twenty-nine states have either passed or are considering tax hikes to close
budget deficits. Several states--including Hawaii, Georgia and North Carolina--will call special fall sessions of their legislatures to deal with the fact that collected
taxes have fallen short of budget projections.
Yet the attitude is that the recall in California is amusing political comedy, nothing more. There seems to be almost no recognition of the fact that whoever sits in the
governor's chair after October 7 --whether Grey Davis survives or is "terminated" --must work quickly to solve the problems that have led California into its current
quagmire.
Few other countries in the world would be so blasé if political turmoil and economic collapse threatened the welfare of a key
component of its national power. The California crisis reminds us that there is no neat line dividing "domestic" and "foreign"
policy. Ensuring that California survives its current crisis is no less a priority than stabilizing Iraq or containing North Korea.
California's economy is weak, but not yet headed for recession
Zuckerman 6/18/08 (Sam, SF Chronicle, "UCLA economists expect no recession this year," http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/06/17/BUP411ANQ9.DTL)
A weak California economy, with little or no growth in employment, real household income and taxable sales, but no recession.
That's the widely watched UCLA Anderson Forecast's outlook for this year.
In their quarterly report on the California economy set for release today, UCLA economists are sticking with the no-recession call they issued in earlier forecasts. Their
analysis shows that strength in exports, agriculture and services will offset the severe drag created by the housing bust and the state's budgetary crisis.
Make no mistake. UCLA's forecast is dismal, anticipating continuing contraction in housing and poor business conditions in broad
sectors of the economy, such as retail trade and finance. The scant job growth will fail to keep up with the entry of new workers into the labor force, keeping the
unemployment rate above 6 percent for the rest of the year.
But the bottom isn't falling out. The Bay Area in particular is benefiting from its status as a Pacific Rim technology and tourism center. "The carnage is
palpable, but contained," UCLA forecasters conclude.
150
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2AC Answers to “Exclude ‘X’ Fuel CP”

True fuel flexibility requires that ALL alcohol fuels be available for use
Luft 5/2/08 (Gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, "Symposium: Energy Independence and the
Terror War," http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=7DFE9F38-493C-4887-9E33-4D267570E830)
It is important to ensure that the legislation doesn't enable automakers to get away with making E-85 cars that can only accommodate
ethanol. True fuel flexibility is one that enables all alcohols to compete. The cars should therefore be warranted to run on both
ethanol and methanol. With such legislation presented before the Senate all three senators who are running for president would be forced to endorse it, which
means that the next president would be on board.
Mandating that vehicles have the capability to burn BOTH ethanol and methanol is key to adequate fuel
supplies, lower prices, maximizing environmental benefits and a flexible alcohol economy
The United States uses 380 million gallons of gasoline a day. If we were to replace that entirely with ethanol we would have to harvest approximately four times as
much agricultural output as we currently grow for food production. Now it is true that we don’t need to replace all of our gasoline, at least not in the short term.
Replacing half would make us substantially energy independent. Furthermore, future processes might eventually wring out higher ethanol yields per acre. Surplus
ethanol from Brazil or other tropical nations could also be imported. Nonetheless, relying on ethanol alone would require putting under fresh
cultivation an amount of land greater than what we now use for food production. This would cause many strains.
So if we are to use alcohol fuels to achieve energy independence, a broader resource base is needed. This can be provided by
methanol, which can come from both a broader array of biomass materials and also from coal and natural gas. Methanol production from coal is
particularly important, since coal is America’s, and the world’s, cheapest and most prevalent energy resource. The United States could power its entire economy on coal
for centuries, and large reserves also exist in allied countries. Current coal prices stand in the range of three cents a kilogram, much cheaper than agricultural products,
so methanol can be made from coal at low cost. By mixing it at various rates with ethanol over time, we can increase supplies, reduce prices,
maximize environmental benefits, and vastly increase the flexibility of our alcohol economy. Insisting that future vehicles have the
capability to burn both alcohols is thus critical.
151
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2AC Answers to “Drilling CP”

Energy independence isn’t sufficient to break the power of OPEC—a flex-fuel mandate strikes an
immediate, devastating blow to OPEC’s ability to keep oil prices high and insulates our economy from
the crippling impacts of high oil prices
4D267570E830)
Zubrin: I'm glad you used the words "energy security," not "energy independence." While admittedly, being energy independent would be an
improvement on our current position, it is not good enough, because if the oil cartel still controlled the world market, they could still
collapse our economy by collapsing that of our allies and trading partners like Japan and Europe, and they would still be harvesting
trillions that they could use to finance jihad and the takeover of our corporations and media organizations.
So even if it were possible, walling ourselves in a defensive "energy independent" position would not suffice. Rather, we have to take the offensive and
destroy the power of the oil cartel internationally. The key to doing that is to destroy the vertical monopoly that they have on the
world's vehicle fuel supplies. The US Congress could strike a devastating blow in this direction simply by passing a law
requiring that all new cars sold in the United States be flex fueled -- that is able to run on any combination of gasoline, methanol, or ethanol. Such
cars are existing technology and only cost about $100 more than the same vehicle in non-flex fuel form.
If such a law were passed, it would make flex fuel the international standard for cars, as not only the Detroit Big 3, but all the foreign
manufacturers would shift their lines over immediately in response. This would put 50 million cars on the road in the USA within 3
years capable of running on alcohol fuels, and hundreds of millions more worldwide. With such a market available, alcohol
production and distribution facilities would multiply rapidly, and gasoline would be forced to compete at the pump against alcohol fuels
produced in any number of ways from any number of sources everywhere in the world. (Methanol, for example, can be produced from any kind of biomass, without
exception, as well as from coal, natural gas, and recycled urban trash. There are many starchy or sweet crops that can be used to make ethanol, with cellulosic options
increasingly viable as well.)
This opening of the fuel market would put a permanent constraint on OPEC's ability to raise fuel prices. Instead of being able to raise
oil prices to $200/barrel, which they are already discussing, prices would be forced back down to $50/barrel, because that is where alcohol fuels
become competitive. Then, once such an alcohol fuel infrastructure is well in place, we can proceed to roll the oil cartel right off the map by instituting tax and
tariff policies that favor alcohols over petroleum. That's how we beat the Islamists.
If we don't do that, with our current imports of 5 billion barrels per year, they will use a $100/barrel price to tax us $500 billion per
year (and rob the world at a rate of $1.2 trillion/year). The NY Times today had a front page article quoting leading economists as saying that this huge
tax (more than triple the size of the current economic stimulus treasury give-back) is grinding our economy into recession. So it is, but
it is worse than that. If they are allowed to keep taxing us in this way, they will use that enormous monetary power to not only massively grow their jihadi
movement, but to take over most of the major corporations and media organizations in the US, Europe, and Japan within a decade.
So not only our economy, but our independence is at stake. We need to break the oil cartel, and forceful action to create fuel choice
internationally is the way to do it.
The permutation solves oil prices best—your own author concedes
Stuttaford 7/1/08 (Andrew, Columnist @ National Review, "Getting it Right,"

http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NDY1OTY5M2IwZDM1NmEwNGQyNzFkNTA5MWI1NDE4ZDU)
It's essential to note that Professor Feldstein is not only talking about increasing future supply (although that is, of course,
important). Restricting demand is also part of the equation (something that may also have environmentally benign consequences).
That, in turn, must include conservation (including, I'd argue, tougher mandates on Detroit), and (where needed) regulatory
and other support for alternatives to oil - solar, wind, nuclear and so on.
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2AC Answers to “Drilling CP”

Increased oil supplies AND diversifying our energy sources is key to solving the energy crisis
Petrowski 7/10/08 (Joseph, President of Gulf Oil, "A Bipartisan Fix for the Oil Crisis,"
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121564783168740955.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries)
Our national interest is to add more energy, use it more efficiently, and diversify its source and type. This will serve to lessen the
power of any one choke point (geography, nation or source).
Using market mechanisms and the private sector (admit it, Democrats) alongside an engaged, effective and focused government
(admit it, Republicans), true leaders can solve this crisis decisively.
153
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2AC Answers To “Conservation/Energy Efficiency CP”

Energy conservation and hybrids could AT BEST reduce global gasoline use by 3 percent
Ritualistic calls by utopians, moralists, and environmental absolutists for energy conservation are utterly inadequate and doomed to failure. To see
this, simply run the numbers. Every year, about 17 million cars are sold in the U.S.—roughly 10 percent of the worldwide total. Even if Americans were to
buy only hybrid cars offering a 30 percent fuel saving over existing models, and none of them drove more, and there was no
expansion in the U.S. vehicle fleet, this effort would result in only a 3 percent annual reduction in global gasoline use.
Conservation, however, offers no prospect of being even this effective. Most industry analysts predict a hybrid market share of less
than 1 percent. At the same time, the total number of cars is increasing. Under any realistic conservation scenario, total gasoline consumption
will continue to rise and the looting of our economy by oil producers will continue. Conservation through gasoline efficiency is,
quite simply, a losing strategy. It is like trying to survive in a gas chamber by holding your breath. We need to break out of the gas chamber.
Domestic conservation measures will be overwhelmed by rising global oil demand AND OPEC would
merely cut production to keep prices high
In light of this, the top priority of U.S. national-security policy must be to break the oil cartel. This imperative has been apparent since the 1973 oil embargo, but no
progress has been made. The only policy solution we’ve tried — domestic energy conservation — has failed, and will continue to fail for
two reasons. First — putting aside the near-impossibility of getting American consumers to use less fuel — global demand will
continue to grow, so it’s scarcely conceivable that domestic conservation efforts could affect the global oil price. Second, even if
we could hypothetically create global conservation, OPEC could simply cut production to keep demand — and prices — high.
154
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2AC Answers to “Hydrogen Fuel Cells CP”

Hydrogen requires more energy to be made than it produces, it’s hugely fuel inefficient, and costs more
than methanol
Hydrogen is not a source of energy. In order to be obtained, it must be made—either through the electrolysis of water, or through the
breakdown of petroleum, natural gas, or coal. Either process necessarily consumes more energy than the hydrogen it produces.
When hydrogen is made by electrolysis, the process yields 85 units of hydrogen energy for every 100 units of electrical energy used to
break down the water. That is 85 percent efficiency. If the hydrogen is then used in a fuel cell in an electric car, only about 55 percent
of its energy value will be used; the rest is wasted to heat and so forth. The net result of these two processes: the amount of useable energy yielded by the
hydrogen will be only about 47 percent as much as went into producing it in the first place. And if the hydrogen is burned in an internal combustion
engine to avoid the high production costs of fuel cells, the net efficiency of this vehicle will be closer to 25 percent.
Hydrogen produced from hydrocarbons instead of water also throws away 40 to 60 percent of the total energy in the feedstock. This
method actually increases the nation’s need for fossil fuels, as well as greenhouse gas emissions. While hydrogen could also be
produced by nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, or wind power, the process would continue to be dragged down by the fundamental
inefficiency of hydrogen production. Such power supplies could always do more to reduce fossil fuel requirements simply by sending their electric power
directly to the grid.
The bottom line is that hydrogen is not a source of energy. It is a carrier of energy, and one of the least practical carriers we know of.
Consider: A standard molecular weight (or mole) of hydrogen gas, when reacted with oxygen, yields 66 watt-hours of energy.
Meanwhile, a mole of methane (the primary component of natural gas) produces 218 watt-hours of energy. An equal number of moles
of both can be stored in a tank of equal size and strength. Thus, a car that runs on compressed methane will be able to store more
than three times the energy, and travel three times as far, as the same car running on hydrogen. In addition, the methane
would be cheaper.
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2AC Answers to “Pure Electric Cars CP”

Pure electric cars can’t solve—they have severe range limitations that make them unable to satisfy
consumer needs
In addition to alcohols, coal, nuclear power, solar and wind energy can make electricity to power pure electric and plug-in hybrid cars. The latter have an internal
combustion engine and fuel tank, and thus are not limited in size, power, or range, but also have a battery that can be charged from an electric socket and can power 20-
40 miles of driving, giving the consumer the choice of driving on electricity or liquid fuel. Only 2% of U.S. electricity is generated from oil today. While plug-in
hybrids have unlimited range and a cost premium of several thousand dollars, pure electric cars are planned to be sold at competitive prices in several
countries, including the U.S. and Japan, as early as 2010. Because pure electric cars have a range limitation—at least two countries,
Israel and Denmark, are now in the process of developing an infrastructure for battery replacement to address this problem— they may not satisfy the needs
of many Americans. But electric cars can easily serve as a second or third family car. This “niche market” is roughly two thirds of America. Thirty one percent of
America’s households own two cars and an additional 35 percent own three or more vehicles. These are not the cars a family would use to visit grandma out of town but
cars that drive routinely well below the full battery range. There are over 75 million households in the U.S. that own more than one vehicle and that can potential
replace one or more gasoline only cars with cars with cars powered by made-in-America electricity.
156
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2AC Answers to “PHEV CP”

The perm has double solvency—PHEVs that are also flex-fuel would reach 500 miles per gallon of
gasoline
Since we hardly generate any electricity from oil, using electricity as a transportation fuel enables the full spectrum of electricity sources to compete with petroleum.
Plug in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) can reach oil economy levels of 100 miles per gallon of gasoline without compromising the size, safety, or power of a vehicle.
The key is changing our thinking from miles per gallon to miles per gallon of oil-based fuel – it is not the total energy consumption of the vehicle which is the problem,
it is the portion of that energy that comes from petroleum. If a PHEV is also a flexible-fuel vehicle powered by 85 percent alcohol and 15
percent gasoline, oil economy could reach over 500 miles per gallon of gasoline. Ideally, plug-in hybrids would be charged at night in home or
apartment garages, when electric utilities have significant reserve capacity. The Department of Energy estimates that over 70 percent of the U.S. vehicle market could
shift to plug-in hybrids without needing to install additional baseload electricity-generating capacity.
The permutation solves the link to OPEC flood MORE than the CP alone does
The oil cartel will surely respond to the emerging alcohol economy by dropping crude prices to a level that would make ethanol and methanol economically
unattractive. This is exactly what they did in the 1980s in response to a massive effort by Western countries to wean themselves from oil. Oil dropped to $8 a barrel and
alternative fuels producers lost their shirts. If cars had full fuel flexibility, allowing them, in addition to burning alcohols, to also tap into the
grid, OPEC would have to drop prices to $5 a barrel to compete with 3 cents per mile of electric drive. This is way below where they
can afford to go considering their youth bulges and domestic economic conditions. This is why the commercialization of plug in hybrid electric
vehicles, which allow us to drive the first chunk of our daily driving on electricity after which the car begins to burn liquid fuel, is so critical. Congress should therefore
provide tax incentives to early adopters of plug in hubrids--just as it did in the case of regular hybrids--while facilitating the emergence of a viable battery industry in
the U.S. A flex fuel plug-in hybrid will run approximately 500 miles on a gallon of gasoline. This could really pull the plug on
OPEC.
Our Aff is the prerequisite to a hybrid-based transportation sector
The first step is to open the fuel market via a flex fuel mandate. This can be done very quickly. The next step is to make the cars
more efficient by gradually transitioning to flex-fuel plug in hybrids that could get much of their motive power off the electric grid.
But that will be a more gradual process.
Flex-fuel capability will result in plug-in hybrids over time
Hamilton 4/7/08 (Tyler, "It's time to 'flex' our energy muscles," Toronto Star,
http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/410812)
On the other hand, adding flex-fuel capability could be done almost overnight with minimal added cost, quickly creating an open
market for competing fuels.
"As soon as we have an open fuel market like this, we'll start seeing E85 and M85 pumps at more gas stations. Over time, we can
start seeing more of these plug-in hybrids."
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2AC Answers to “Delay CP”

Every year that passes without a Congressional flex fuel mandate ensures our continued dependence on
foreign oil—swift action is vital
transformation will not

A nationwide deployment of flex-fuel cars, flex fuel plug-in hybrids, and alternative fuels could take place within two decades. But such a
occur by itself. In a perfect world government would not need to intervene in the energy market, but in a time of war, the United
States is taking an unacceptable risk by leaving the problem to be solved by the invisible hand. This is especially true since the energy
market is anything but free. It is manipulated by a cartel, heavily rigged in favor of the status quo, and, as the case of the ethanol tariff shows, riddled with
protectionism.
Every year that passes without Congressional action to ensure that new cars sold in America are flex fuel vehicles is another
year in which 17 million gasoline-only cars start their 17-year life on U.S. roads, further binding us to foreign oil. On the grounds of
national security and in the interest of stemming the hemorrhaging of our economy, Congress should take swift action to require that new vehicles
sold in the United States are flexible fuel vehicles. Such an Open Fuel Standard would level the playing field and promote free competition among
diverse energy suppliers. Choosing not to embrace an Open Fuel Standard, is choosing to preserve oil’s monopoly in the transportation
sector, and with it OPEC’s growing stranglehold over the global economy.
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2AC Answers To “Objectivism/Coercion”

Flex-fuel vehicles are key to fuel and consumer choice—this IS market economics
Today’s vehicles have an average lifespan of 17 years and, for the most part, can run only on petroleum. Every year 17 million new cars roll onto America’s roads.
For
a cost of less than $100 extra as compared to a gasoline-only vehicle, automakers can make virtually any car a flex fuel vehicle,
capable of running on any combination of gasoline and a variety of alcohols such as ethanol and methanol, made from a variety of
feedstocks, from agricultural material, to waste, to coal. (Alcohol does not just mean ethanol, and ethanol does not just mean corn.) Flex fuel vehicles provide
a platform on which fuels can compete and let consumers and the market choose the winning fuels and feedstocks based on
economics. In Brazil, where ethanol is widely used, the share of flex fuel vehicles in new car sales rose from 4 percent to 67 percent in
just three years, and this year stands at about 90 percent. These cars are manufactured by the same automakers that sell to the U.S.
market and entail no size, power, or safety compromise by consumers. The proliferation of flex fuel vehicles in Brazil has driven fuel competition at
the pump to the point where the Brazilian oil industry has had to keep gasoline prices sufficiently low to compete with ethanol in order not to lose more market share, so
low that it actually just received a government subsidy to do so. Competition in Brazil is working so well that a big Brazilian sugar and ethanol firm just bought out the
distribution assets of Exxon in Brazil.
A flex-fuel mandate is entirely consistent with the legitimate functions of government
Our nation’s founders stipulated that the purpose of our government is to provide for our defense, promote our welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. In our current economic and military dilemma, decisive action for energy
independence is one of the most dramatic steps we could take to achieve those ends. Congress should immediately require that
all future vehicles sold in the U.S.A. be flexible-fueled, thereby launching us into an alcohol-energy future that holds promise like
few other options within our grasp.
159
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2AC All-Purpose Disadvantage Slayer

All your incentives disads are non-unique—the federal government is already giving manufacturers
financial incentives to produce flex-fuel vehicles
Car Talk 07 ("Flex Fuel Vehicles and E85," http://www.cartalk.com/content/features/alternativefuels/flexfuel.html)

Here's one reason: the federal government has started giving manufacturers a financial incentive to produce flex-fuel vehicles. By
selling flex-fuel vehicles, they earn credits towards their mandatory CAFE fuel economy requirements. So by making vehicles that accept
flex-fuel, they can sell more gas guzzling, but higher-profit SUVs without incurring penalties.
160
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2AC Answers to “T—Incentive = Positive”

Counter-definition AND we meet—
Incentives can be positive or negative AND we’re BOTH a POSITIVE and NEGATIVE incentive—we’re
positive because we promote regulatory certainty and we’re negative because we employ coercive
regulation
Steinzor 98 (Rena, Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 103, lexis)
Incentives can be positive or negative. 181 In their purest form, positive incentives either save--or produce extra--money, or achieve some other tangible
benefit for the participating firm or group. If companies are able to save money on production or compliance costs, or to obtain a tax benefit or government subsidy,
they have a positive incentive to participate in reinvention initiatives; if some or all of this money is committed to projects delivering environmental improvement that
would not otherwise occur, public interest representatives have a positive incentive to participate. Less quantifiable incentives include achieving
regulatory certainty by expediting and consolidating permit reviews, reducing permit renewal requirements, or granting safe harbors from enforcement. [*155]
The analogous benefits for public interest representatives might be access to otherwise inaccessible information about the effects of pollution on the environment and
the opportunity to consult technical experts capable of interpreting such data objectively.
A positive incentive for one group is not necessarily a negative incentive for another: saving money on compliance while delivering equivalent performance is a clear
benefit for industry and a wash, or neutral result, for public interest representatives. However, a program composed solely or primarily of results that are neutral from
one group's perspective is unlikely to keep the group engaged in the process.
Negative incentives are more closely related to positive incentives than might appear at first blush. From industry's perspective, for
example, the main advantage of both positive and negative incentives is saving money. The key difference is the element of
coercion, or avoidance of a tangible threat, that is the central characteristic of negative incentives. In their purest form, negative
incentives include avoiding liability for cleanup costs or private damages, escaping punitive enforcement actions, and keeping a company's image from
becoming tarnished in the public eye. Avoiding adverse environmental effects and the perception that one's advocacy is ineffective are analogous negative incentives
from a public interest perspective.
Prefer our interpretation—
A) Our interpretation increases the QUALITY of Negative link ground AND significant, industry-wide
regulations are KEY TO AFF GROUND
Steinzor 98 (Rena, Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 103, lexis)
The most obvious alternative to the positive incentive of saving money is the negative incentive created by systematic and tough-
minded enforcement of existing regulations in targeted industrial sectors. If command and control requirements are truly as
onerous as their critics claim, 304 the best motivation for industry to find alternative methods for achieving like results is to
ensure that firms bear the full costs of the existing system.
EPA is currently struggling to maintain the minimal credibility of the enforcement programs it has delegated to the states 305 and will undoubtedly find it difficult to
even contemplate extraordinary new efforts. If the Agency is serious about developing industry-wide alternatives to traditional regulation, it must reconsider the utility
of enforcement as a negative incentive that could attract industry participants more effectively and quickly than any other.
The usefulness of negative incentives also applies to the participation of public interest representatives. The most effective negative incentive is the
prospect that significant, industry-wide changes in regulatory policy will be made in the context of reinvention initiatives, with or without
their participation.
B) Positive incentives are contingent in nature—this is WORSE for the Negative
Frishmann 03 (Brett, Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law, Summer,
51 Buffalo L. Rev. 679, lexis)
The Implementation Committee may review reports submitted by parties ad hoc, and is empowered to make on-site inspections to assess compliance and to use both
positive and negative incentives to encourage compliance or bring a party back into compliance. Positive incentives may take the form of financial or
technical assistance, while negative incentives may include warnings or suspension of rights or privileges (including, for example, the ability
to trade in controlled substances with other parties). 424 [*802] Importantly, positive incentives are generally made contingent on
participation of the party seeking assistance in the form of submission of detailed plans for national programs and/or annual reports on production and
consumption of ODSs. 425 As David Victor demonstrates, the noncompliance procedures established by the Montreal Protocol and implemented by the Implementation
Committee blend the management-oriented and enforcement-oriented approaches to compliance. 426
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2AC Answers to “T—Incentive = Positive”

C) Incentives MUST BE defined in context—prefer our CONTEXTUAL evidence
Grant 02 (Ruth, Prof of Poly Sci @ Duke University, "THE ETHICS OF INCENTIVES: HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND
CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDINGS," Economics and Philosophy,
http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FEAP%2FEAP18_01%2FS0266267102001104a.pdf&code=9429c10d2364b53f4
17e3dfa463249ff)
What are incentives? This initial question turns out to be quite a bit more difficult to answer than one might expect. The term has a
variety of meanings and usages, some in ordinary language and some in the technical vocabulary of disciplines like psychology and
economics; the question will be answered differently depending on who answers it and when; the term comes embedded in a
cluster of associated concepts. I have tried to discover what incentives are by asking first what the term ìncentives' is for. This is an inquiry with two aspects. I
consider historically why the term became useful when it did. I then consider analytically what this term expresses that is distinctive and cannot be adequately captured
by other vocabulary. Distinguishing incentives from rewards, from habituation, and from other related ideas is one means of establishing the boundaries of the
conception. The end result is some precision ± that is, the concept is given `definition' in the sense of form or outline ± without loss of richness and context. But beyond
this, the investigation yields interesting fruit: it reveals an important disjunction between English/Scottish and American traditions of thought; it highlights the extent to
which incentives were originally understood in contradistinction to market forces; and it clearly identifies incentives as instruments of social control deeply implicated
in ethical and political controversy from their inception.
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2AC Answers to “Food Prices DA”

The world is in the grip of the most pervasive food price inflation in history NOW
Brown 7/14/08 (Lester, President of the Earth Policy Institute, "Higher food prices are here to stay," The Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/14/food.energyefficiency)
These days it is hard to pick up a newspaper without seeing an article on soaring food prices and their consequences. In recent months,
wheat, rice, corn and soybean prices have soared to historic highs, doubling or tripling those of two years ago. The world is in the
grip of the most pervasive food price inflation in history.
In seven of the last eight years, world grain consumption has exceeded production, forcing a drawdown in stocks. As a result, world
carryover stocks of grain have dropped to 54 days of consumption, the lowest on record.
Food prices are directly tied to oil prices—higher oil prices triggers higher food prices
Brown 7/14/08 (Lester, President of the Earth Policy Institute, "Higher food prices are here to stay," The Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/14/food.energyefficiency)
With the growing capacity to convert food into fuel, the price of grain is now tied directly to the price of oil. If the food value of a grain is less than its
fuel value, the market will convert the grain into fuel. As oil jumped from $60 to $100 a barrel, the price of grain followed it upward. If oil goes
to $200 a barrel, grain prices will also keep climbing.
High food prices are caused by three factors—greater foreign demand from India and China, reduced
supplies due to drought conditions, and most importantly, HIGH OIL PRICES
McFarlane 5/7/08 (Robert, President Reagan's national security adviser, "Don't Give Up on Energy Independence," Wall Street
Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB121012141199772495.html)
Three factors have driven the increase in the price of food. The first is greater foreign demand. China and India are importing record
amounts of coarse grains to feed growing populations and livestock. In the U.S., however, even after accounting for corn devoted to
ethanol production, we produced 17% more corn food product and exported 23% more food product in 2007 than 2006.
The second factor is reduced supply. Serious drought conditions among traditional suppliers – especially Australia – have reduced
supplies in the global marketplace and stimulated speculation in futures markets.
The third factor is energy costs. By far the greatest contributor to higher food prices has been the run-up in the price of oil,
which impacts every stage of food production.
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Biofuels aren’t responsible for high food prices—rising global demand for food in India and China and
high oil prices are the cause
Zubrin and Luft 5/6/08 (Robert and Gal, uthor of "Energy Victory: Winning the War on Terror by Breaking Free of Oil" and
executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, "Food vs. fuel a global myth," Chicago Tribune,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-oped0506fuelmay06,0,481881.story)
It seems so obvious: With so much corn being turned into fuel, food shortages must inevitably result, and biofuel programs must be
the cause. However, that's completely untrue.
Here are the facts. In the last five years, despite the nearly threefold growth of the corn ethanol industry (or actually because of it), the U.S. corn crop grew by 35
percent, the production of distillers grain (a high-value animal feed made from the protein saved from the corn used for ethanol) quadrupled and the net corn food and
feed product of the U.S. increased 26 percent.
Contrary to claims that farmers have cut other crops to grow more corn, U.S. soybean plantings this year are expected to be up 18 percent and wheat plantings up 6
percent. U.S. farm exports are up 23 percent.
America is clearly doing its share in feeding the world.
Agriculture is not a zero-sum game. There are 800 million acres of farmland in the U.S., and only about 30 percent of it is actually
being used to grow anything. As a result of the ethanol program, the corn price received by farmers doubled over the last five years,
causing a huge increase in the amount grown in terms of acreage and yield.
The increased demand for food from the hundreds of millions of people in China and India rising out of poverty and moving to a more
calorie-rich diet affects the price of food the most. Second is the price of fuel.
Higher fuel prices increase the cost of production, transport, wages and packaging, the main cost of retail food. For example, a
$3 box of cornflakes contains 15 ounces of corn that cost 8 cents when bought from the farmer. So, farm commodity prices have
almost no effect on retail prices. But the effect of oil price increases can be huge.
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FFV Aff

Contrary to belief corn ethanol is not responsible for food prices – oil prices have 3 times greater effect
Marcia Clemmitt, veteran social policy reporter, CQ Researcher, 6/27/08, “Global Food Crisis”,
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu:2047/cqresearcher/cqresrre2008062706
Recently, the media and ethanol critics have demonized corn ethanol and attempted to solely blame rising food costs on higher
commodity costs and government policies promoting renewable fuel. In attempting to justify their opposition to ethanol expansion and the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS)
enacted by Congress in 2007, opponents continue to claim that higher corn prices are causing higher retail food prices. A look at the facts
surrounding food prices simply doesn't support that logic. More so, the effects of $120-per-barrel oil have far-reaching effects on
the consumer price for food. A recent study by the Oregon Department of Agriculture details the factors affecting food price: a
growing middle class in Latin America and Asia; drought in Australia; low worldwide wheat stocks; increases in labor costs; a
declining U.S. dollar; regional pests, diseases, droughts and frost; and marginal impacts from ethanol demand for corn and sugarcane.
One recent study found that a $1-per-gallon increase in the price of gas has three times the impact on food prices as does a $1-
per-bushel increase in the price of corn. In fact, just 19 cents of every consumer dollar can be attributed to the actual cost of farm
products like grains, oilseeds and meat. Retail food products like cereals, snack foods and beverage corn sweeteners contain very little corn. Consider that even when corn is priced at $5 per bushel,
a standard box of corn flakes contains less than eight cents' worth of corn. Corn is a more significant ingredient for meat, dairy and egg production. Still, corn represents a relatively small share of
these products from a retail price perspective. As an example, according to the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, it takes about three pounds of corn to produce one pound of beef. This
equates to 27 cents' worth of corn in a pound of beef when corn is $5 per bushel. Because corn and other grains constitute such a small portion of retail food products,
higher grain prices are unlikely to have any significant impact on overall food inflation, according to a number of experts. According
to [U.S. Department of Agriculture] economist Ephraim Liebtag, a 50 percent increase in corn prices translates to an overall increase
of retail food prices of less than 1 percent. Similarly, a recent analysis by Informa Economics found that higher corn prices "explain"
only 4 percent of the increase in retail food prices.
Corn ethanol not responsible for food crisis – it should be part of oil solution
Anne Korin, Co-Director, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security and David Sandalow, an expert on energy policy and global
warming, a former assistant secretary of state and senior director on the National Security Council staff, 5/22/08, lexis
MS. KORIN: I want to emphasize that there's been a campaign of disinformation against corn ethanol. And just so you know where I'm coming from, I
support repealing the 54-cent-a-gallon tariff on ethanol imports. Okay? So I'm not a corn ethanol -- I don't think it should be the exclusive fuel, but it's one of many solutions.
But there's been a campaign of disinformation against corn ethanol orchestrated by a public relations firm known as Glover Park
Communications, which you may want to bring here and ask who exactly is sponsoring this campaign beyond the GMA. First of all, these are the factors that are driving world
hunger. Number one, a good thing: Hundreds of millions of people in China and India have risen out of poverty and beyond a
subsistence diet and so their putting more calorie demand pressure on the market, especially because they consume more meat. And it takes 18 times more grain to produce a calorie of meat than it does a calorie of
-- if you just ate grain. Second, and this is bad news: the rise in oil price. The Kansas Fed estimates that every 1 percent increase in oil prices
drives a .52 percent increase in retail food price. Third -- and because oil feeds into transportation and labor and packaging -- third:
speculation. As capital flees the dollar, it's going into other commodities and putting pressure on every food commodity, not -- and so when you look at commodities like fish, nobody's making biofuels out of fish, or
rice. Nobody's making biofuels out of rice. In fact, China has a ban in place against making biofuels out of food grains. All of these are drastically increasing. It's not driven by corn ethanol. Now,
when you look specifically at the numbers for corn ethanol, net U.S. corn food and feed product -- remember, most of our corn doesn't
go to feed people, it goes to feed animals -- has increased despite the corn ethanol program. Net U.S. corn food and feed has increased 34 percent in the last five
years. Now, you may think, well maybe we're planting corn where we were planting other things before. Not so. The net U.S. food exports have increased 23 percent on the year. Food plantings of soy bean, wheat, everything
is increasing.Remember, we have a lot of farmland. But we -- only 30 percent of our farmland is actually used for farming. We actually pay farmers not to farm. So as price goes up, as prices go up, one of the things that
happened is that farmers plant more. So it is not the case that corn ethanol is driving hunger. REP. WOOLSEY: Okay. I have just a second. Mr. Sandalow? MR. SANDALOW: I think that the
role of corn ethanol in food price increases is real, but it has been wildly overstated in some of the media accounts. And I agree with Anne that a set of other factors are
more important, including rising oil prices, increasing demand in developing countries, weather problems and speculation. That said, corn-based ethanol, which I support, is a transitional
fuel. And the real reason to support corn-based ethanol at this point, in my opinion, is to build up an infrastructure so that as we
develop cellulosic ethanol and even more advanced biofuels like algae- based ethanol and biofuels; we'll have the infrastructure in place in order to have a real alternative to oil.
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2AC Answers to “Bush Good Agenda Politics”

There’s bipartisan support for flex-fuel legislation, it has the support for energy security advocates and
the farm lobby, and even the Big 3 automakers like the move because it gives them an advantage over
foreign automakers
Clayton 1/26/07 (Mark, Staff, Christian Science Monitor, "Gas substitutes boost the flex-fuel car,"
http://origin.csmonitor.com/2007/0126/p01s04-sten.html)
Following President Bush's call Tuesday for a 20 percent cut in gasoline consumption, Democrats and Republicans in Congress
have unveiled legislation that would require automakers to build "flex-fuel" cars that could burn the various alternative fuels.
The new legislation, which still must work its way through Congress, has some powerful backers. Energy-security advocates like
its emphasis on reducing reliance on foreign oil. Farm-state Democrats and Republicans like its boost of corn-based ethanol.
Even the Big Three automakers like the move to flex-fuel technology because it might give them an advantage over foreign
automakers building hybrid cars.
A flex-fuel mandate would spur strong bipartisan support and be a huge victory for Bush
Zubrin Fall 07 (Robert, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributing editor of The New Atlantis,
is an astronautical engineer and author of Energy Victory, "Achieving Energy Victory," The New Atlantis,
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/achieving-energy-victory)
So what’s stopping FFV legislation from becoming reality in the United States? There have been a few half-hearted attempts in Congress in recent years, but in the
absence of any significant support from the president, these bills have gone nowhere. And why doesn’t the White House support FFVs? In March 2006, I discussed
this proposal with John H. Marburger III, the president’s science advisor. He asked me a number of detailed questions about the FFV
proposal, which I answered. I then asked him, “So why not implement the plan? If the president introduced a bill calling for a flex-
fuel mandate, he’d get bipartisan support and the bill would pass. It would be a real accomplishment for the administration
and for American energy independence.” Marburger answered: “We don’t believe in mandates.”
Strong bipartisan support exists for flex-fuel mandates and both McCain and Obama have supported
strong flex-fuel provisions
Luft: Since we all seem to agree that fuel flexibility in our cars is the lowest hanging fruit, let's talk about how to make this happen. In
the past two sessions of Congress there was strong bipartisan support in both the Senate and the House for flex fuel legislation.
More than 30 senators from Sam Brownback on the right to Ted Kennedy on the left co-sponsored a bill including a
requirement that at least 50 percent of new cars be flex fuel.
Presidential candidates are also in agreement. Both Barack Obama's and John McCain's energy platform include strong flex fuel
provisions. Obama campaign pledged that an Obama Administration would ensure that all new vehicles have FFV capability by the end of his first term in office.
Flex-fuel mandates have bipartisan support AND the support of politically powerful Bill O’Reilly
PetroZero.org 6/10/08 ("Fox' Bill OReilly Calls for Flex Fuel Mandate," http://www.petrozero.org/2008/06/foxs-bill-oreilly-
calls-for-flex-fuel.html)
Bill Oreilly has come out in favor of the Flex Fuel Mandate calling for congress to pass a law requiring all new cars sold in the US to
be capable of running on flex fuel.
This idea is nothing new, but having an advocate with the visibility and reach of Fox's Bill Oreilly is without a doubt a major shot in
the arm for the idea. I've also been hearing paid news consultants beginning to profer the idea as well.
The original and most comprehensive blueprint for the mandate, also called the "Open Fuel Standard" has been put forth by the Set America Free
Coalition, the bi-partisan group composed of hawks, doves, evangelicals and environmentalists promoting energy security through flex
fuel and plug-in hybrids.
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Flex fuel is increasingly popular with the American public
Miller 8/29/07 (Esther, Reporter @ NBC25/WEYI, "Driving with flex fuel,"

http://www.weyi.com/news/news_story.aspx?id=47662)
High gas prices have a lot of drivers leaning toward flex fuel cars these days.
That can be a great choice, but there are a few things you should know before you buy.
Amy Yorke loves the lower price of E85 compared to regular gas, but in the end, it doesn't save as much money as she expected.
When asked how much she spends to fill up she responds, "For regular gas it's probably about $80 a fill up. If it's 20% between the two prices between regular gas and
that, then it's worth using. So it saves a little bit of money."
Another driver says he saves even less, "If you put in a full tank it might save you about 10 bucks," the driver says. "I've noticed the prices around this time of year have
been a little bit better than when it was in the off season in the winter time."
The bigger problem is finding an E85 pump. There are about 54 in the state.
Chris Graff with Hank Graff Chevrolet says that isn't stopping people from buying.
"I think we would sell more and more flex fuel cars if there were more gas stations out there (but) the great thing about flex fuel vehicles is that you can run E 85 in it or
regular based fuel. Impalas, Suburban Tahoes, Silverados, so there's no incremental loss to have E85 capability."
Graff says flex fuel popularity is thriving, but he says keep on thing in mind before you buy.
Public popularity is key to the President’s ability to secure his/her agenda
Edwards 05 (George, Prof of Political Science @ Texas A&M, "Riding High in the Polls: George W. Bush and Public Opinion,"
http://www.wadsworth.com/politicalscience_d/templates/student_resources/0534602371/downloads/0203.pdf)
The president’s relations with the public lie at the core of the modern presidency. Both politics and policy revolve around
presidents' attempts to garner public support, both for themselves and their policies. Three fundamental and widely shared
premises about the relationship between public opinion and presidential leadership underlay this mode of governance. The first is that
public support is a crucial political resource for the president, that it is difficult for others who hold power to deny the
legitimate demands of a president with popular support. A president who lacks the public's support is likely to face frustration and
perhaps humiliation at the hands of his opponents. As Bill Clinton exclaimed after he was acquitted in his impeachment trial, "Thank
god for public opinion."1
There’s a surge in popularity for flex-fuel cars now—they have both political support and consumer
popularity
Alternative Energy News Source 2007 ("Flex-Fuel: the Care of the Future,"
http://www.altenews.com/Flex%20Fuel%20The%20Car%20of%20the%20Future.pdf)
In various research reports and articles, we at Alternative Energy News Source have pointed out a variety of problems with the
American corn ethanol industry. However, we have not yet commented upon the future prospects of flex-fuel cars. There are many
reasons why, despite the problems with the American ethanol producers, there may be a surge of popularity in American “flex-
fuel” cars, cars with ethanol-capable engines, within the next ten years. More so than hydrogen fuel cell cars or hybrid cars, flex-fuel
cars may combine an attractive fuel with both political support and consumer popularity to become “the car of the future.”
Flex-fuel vehicles are gaining in popularity for a variety of reasons—ethanol isn’t imported, more
environmentally friendly, special interest lobbying
Car Talk 07 ("Flex Fuel Vehicles and E85," http://www.cartalk.com/content/features/alternativefuels/flexfuel.html)

Then, there are all the other reasons why flex-fuel vehicles and E85 are gaining in popularity: ethanol isn't imported from the
Middle East, it's somewhat more environmentally friendly, and it's aggressively marketed by special interests like the Amalgated Corn
Growers Association.
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The powerful farm lobby supports the plan
In short, either methanol or ethanol could be used very effectively, with roughly equal countervailing advantages. This has not stopped
proponents of either fuel from vociferously arguing their unique advantage and pushing for FFVs based exclusively on their
favored product. To date, the more effective faction in this debate has been the ethanol group, backed as it is by the powerful farm
lobby.
Ethanol appeals to groups such as farmers and energy security supporters and has empirically garnered
Congressional support
The Washington Post 4/30 (Steven Muffson, The Washington Post, ‘Siphoning off Corn to Fuel Our Cars’, April 30, 2008,
pg A10, Lexis.)
Rising food prices have given Congress and the White House a sudden case of legislative indigestion. In 2005, the Republican-led
Congress and President Bush backed a bill that required widespread ethanol use in motor fuels. Just four months ago, the
Democratic-led Congress passed and Bush signed energy legislation that boosted the mandate for minimum corn-based ethanol use
to 15 billion gallons, about 10 percent of motor fuel, by 2015. It was one of the most popular parts of the bill, appealing to farm-
state lawmakers and to those worried about energy security and eager to substitute a home-grown energy source for a portion of
U.S. petroleum imports. To help things along, motor-fuel blenders receive a 51 cent subsidy for every gallon of corn-based ethanol
used through the end of 2010; this year, production could reach 8 billion gallons.
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Generic Answers to “T—Incentive = Positive”

Regulations are BOTH positive and negative incentives
Oldfield 03 (Sara, Secretary General of Botanic Gardens Conservation International, The Trade in Wildlife: Regulation for
Conservation, p. 54)
What is unfortunately not so commonplace, however, is the recognition by this international environmental culture that effective regulation is far more than a matter of
proscriptive legislation. We only grasp this when we understand a central sociological insight, that regulation is comprised of a set of incentives, both
negative and positive. Incentive is thus the fulcrum of regulation. Regulation almost invariably requires an element of negative
incentive, proscriptions backed by powers to enforce them. But any regulatory system which relies primarily on negative incentives is--in the long
term--in trouble. Enforcement costs are high and the legitimacy of the system in the eyes of the enforced is called into question. History shows that such systems are
unstable and that sustainable systems of regulation are those that rely primarily on positive incentives--economic, cultural, and institutional--which are affordable.
Incentives can be negative AND they're and important tool in the context of the environment
Convention on Biological Diversity 07 ("Negative Incentive Measures," http://www.cbd.int/incentives/negative.shtml)

Negative incentive measures or disincentives are mechanisms designed to discourage activities that are harmful for
biodiversity. Examples of disincentives are user fees or pollution taxes.
The guidelines for selecting appropriate and complementary measures, contained in the Proposals for the Design and Implementation of Incentive Measures endorsed
by the sixth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, underline that disincentives continue to be an important tool for ensuring the conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity, and that they can be used in combination with positive incentives.
Incentives are things offered to an entity that help in making a decision—they can be POSITIVE OR
NEGATIVE
National Council on Economic Education 08 ("What are Incentives?" http://www.econedlink.org/?a=379)

What are Incentives? Incentives are things offered to you to help in the decision making process. Incentives are offered to
encourage you to act. Some incentives make people better off and reward them for their actions. Other incentives leave people
worse off and penalize them for their actions.
Commercial regulations like the plan are a form of negative incentive
Fox 07 (Dov, JD candidate (Yale Law School); DPhil (University of Oxford); BA (Harvard University), 33 Am. J. L. and Med. 567,
lexis)
This Article considers the moral and legal status of genetic engineering. The relation between morality and law generally has been the subject of [*571] extensive
debate. 19 What is right or wrong for people to do need not correspond to what is legal or illegal. Marital infidelity is not punished by fine or detention and in most
states, bystanders may lawfully refuse to save a person in distress, even when offering help would incur no risk or expense on the bystander. Within the procreative
sphere, even where it is clear that a parent ought, morally, to intervene genetically, many interventions should be neither required nor banned because compulsion or
prohibition, even for very worthy reasons, may carry moral or practical costs that outweigh the good of securing or preventing the practice in question. 20 There may
be more desirable ways of promoting or discouraging the practice, whether through positive incentives such as praise, tax credits, and
government funding, or through negative incentives such as stigma, education, and commercial regulations. 21 Ethical reflection on
ideal prescriptions about reproductive genetics can still help to inform public policymaking and judicial reasoning on issues concerning emerging powers of
biotechnology. The moral status of offspring selection should figure as one consideration among others in determining the legal status of prenatal engineering. 22
169
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Incentives can be positive or negative AND the enforcement of environmental regulations is a
NEGATIVE incentive
Jones, Wright, and Ternes 99 (Timothy, Walter, and Mary Ellen, Assistant Regional Counsel, Environmental Protection
Agency, Region VI, Chairman, Environmental and Natural Resources Practice Group in the Little Rock, Arkansas, office of Mitchell,
Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, and Associate, Environmental and Natural Resources Practice Group in the Little Rock,
Arkansas, office of Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, Winter, 21 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 191, lexis)
Economic incentives 197 can be either positive or negative. 198 They are analogous to the proverbial "carrot and stick." Positive
incentives, such as free compliance advice and technical assistance, may save-or provide additional money, or produce other kinds of tangible benefits for a facility. 199
When facilities produce financial savings on manufacturing or compliance expenditures, or receive a tax benefit or government subsidy, an incentive to implement these
policies is achieved. 200 In contrast, negative incentives might be viewed as penalties or costs associated with a given activity. Enforcement
of environmental laws is a negative incentive. It makes noncompliance more expensive for a business which therefore works
to avoid the threat. One author states: "In the purest form, negative incentives include avoiding liability for cleanup costs or private damages, escaping punitive
enforcement actions, and keeping a company's image from becoming tarnished in the public eye." 201
Both positive and negative incentives are important because they affect the value of a business. 202 Consequently, businesses seek to reduce, or at least [*230]
understand, the potential risks and costs of their regulated activities, including the possibility of criminal and civil liability that could result from
voluntary disclosure. 203 Large and small companies face similar risks. Nevertheless, the benefits of auditing for larger companies arguably outweigh the perceived
risk. Because of the greater financial and technical resources 204 larger companies are better able to absorb the costs of environmental management systems, fines and
implementation of corrective actions, than many smaller companies. 205
Incentives can be negative AND negative incentives include regulations
Powell 04 (Russell, Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, visiting at Santa Clara University School of Law,
82 Denv. U.L. Rev. 25, lexis)
The employment provisions of the ADA serve both as antidiscrimination and accommodation measures. 234 Civil rights legislation designed to combat the effects of
irrational discrimination also provided a cause of action for discriminatory hiring and firing practices as well as granting hiring preferences. 235 Given perfect markets,
it is true that irrational discrimination ought to disappear because it is not efficient. 236 However, there remains clear evidence of irrational discrimination against
people with disabilities in the labor market. 237 So, the ADA and related legislation effectively provides incentives for employers to overcome
discrimination. These are primarily negative incentives in the form of mandatory regulatory compliance and the threat of litigation.
Accommodation, however, is a cost borne at least initially by employers, intended to enable people with disabilities to compete in terms of worker efficiency. Ideally,
with reasonable accommodations, qualified people with disabilities can compete with non-disabled employees, dispelling assumptions that might perpetuate irrational
discrimination. However, placing the cost burden on employers could have the unwanted consequence of encouraging discrimination.
Stricter regulations are a form of negative incentives
Hagan 05 (Robert, J.D. candidate, 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, Fall, 22 J. Contemp. Health
L. & Pol'y 143, lexis)
For example, favorable tax treatment could be afforded to those businesses that go entirely smokefree or which provide separate enclosed smoking areas with separate
ventilation. Such an incentive allows the business owner to continue to meet both investment-backed expectations and the standard the government encourages. In
contrast to a "positive" incentive like a tax break, the government could provide "negative" incentives such as increased tax
burdens and stricter regulations with respect to alcohol permits and consumption for establishments that permit smoking. The government could also enact
laws providing for enhanced damages in cases sounding in tort imposing liability on owners of bars and restaurants for injuries arising from secondhand smoke
exposure. 174 Incentive schemes, whether positive or negative, would be tailored to weigh heavily in favor of bar and restaurant owners adopting voluntary smokefree
policies. 175
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INCENTIVES CAN BE BOTH.
Driesen 98. [David, Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; J.D., Yale University, 1989 “Is emissions trading
an economic incentive program?: Replacing the command and control economic incentive dichotomy” Washington and Lee Law
Review, Spring -- lexis]
Many scholars advocate increased reliance upon economic incentives to achieve environmental goals. But what precisely is an
economic incentive? [*323] What distinguishes reliance upon economic incentives from reliance upon traditional regulation to meet
environmental goals?
An economic incentive program can be defined as any program that provides an economic benefit for pollution reductions or
an economic penalty for pollution. Defining economic incentives to include both positive and negative incentives
includes pollution taxes in the definition. 155 Does command and control regulation qualify as an economic incentive program under
this definition? Imagine a pure command and control law. The law commands polluters to perform specific pollution reducing acts, but
provides no penalties for non-compliance. This law would probably motivate little or no pollution reduction, because polluters could
violate the commands without consequence. 156 Command and control regulation only works when an enforcement mechanism
exists. 1
INCENTIVES CAN BE POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE – PREFER OUR DEFINITION BECAUSE ITS

FROM THE EPA.
NCEE 01. [National Center for Environmental Economics under the EPA, “The US Experience with Economic Incentives for Pollution
Control” EPA January http://yosemite1.epa.gov/ee/epalib/incent2.nsf/Table+of+Contents]
II. Definition of Economic Incentives
incentives are defined broadly as instruments that use financial means to motivate
For the purposes of this report, economic
polluters to reduce the health and environmental risks posed by their facilities, processes, or products. These incentives
provide monetary and near-monetary rewards for polluting less and impose costs of various types for polluting more, thus
supplying the necessary motivation to polluters. This approach provides an opportunity to address sources of pollution that are not
easily controlled with traditional forms of regulation as well as providing a reason for polluters to improve upon existing regulatory
requirements. Under traditional regulatory approaches, polluters have little or no incentive to cut emissions further or to make their
products less harmful once they have satisfied the regulatory requirements.
NEGATIVE INCENTIVES ARE TOPICAL AND ARE THE MOST COMMONLY USED INCENTIVE
IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION.
NCEE 01. [National Center for Environmental Economics under the EPA, “The US Experience with Economic Incentives for Pollution
Control” EPA January http://yosemite1.epa.gov/ee/epalib/incent2.nsf/Table+of+Contents]
IV. Types of Economic Incentives

This report examines several types of economic incentives that are currently in use in the United States at all levels of government,
and it assesses their advantages and disadvantages. Although all these incentives give sources of pollution an impetus to minimize
their emissions, the incentives take widely differing forms. In fact, the variety of economic incentives in use today is one of the most
remarkable developments in environmental management over the past decade.
1. Fees, Charges, and Taxes
From the perspective of sources that are subject to environmental fees, charges, and taxes, these three terms are largely
interchangeable in terms of their effects. They all require that the generator of a designated type of pollution pay a fee (or charge or
tax) for each unit of pollution. These fees make attractive tools for managing the environment because they attach an explicit cost to
polluting activities and because sources can easily quantify their savings if they reduce the amount of pollution they emit. One
disadvantage is that fees do not guarantee the amount by which a source would reduce pollution.
Pollution-related fees, charges, and taxes are widely collected at all levels of government, and they are one of the most prevalent
economic incentives in use today. For example, fees linked to air emissions are imposed in California, Texas, and several other states,
while permit fees for water effluent discharge are based on the volume and toxicity of the discharge in Washington, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin, among others. Per-bag fees on households that dispose of solid waste are in effect in more than 3,000 communities across
the country. Fees that are tied to resources such as the use of grazing lands, water, and sewage systems are widely levied in the
United States.
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In the context of energy policy, incentives can be positive OR negative
National Cleaner Production Strategy 04 ("Draft for Comment-National and Regional Workshops,"
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=70148)
Incentives
Something, such as the fear of punishment or the expectation of reward, that induces action or motivates effort.
Incentives are something, positive or negative in nature, that induces action or motivates effort
Answers.com Business & Finance 08 ("incentive," http://www.answers.com/topic/incentive?cat=biz-fin)

Something, such as the fear of punishment or the expectation of reward, that induces action or motivates effort.
Incentives are the direct or indirect use of sanctions or inducements—examples prove they can be positive
OR negative
Weiss 99 (Janet, Professor of Organization Behavior and Public Policy @ University of Michigan, Edited by George Frederickson
and Jocelyn Johnston , Public Management Reform and Innovation: Research, Theory, and Application, p. 52)
Incentives are defined as the direct or indirect use of sanctions or inducements to alter the calculus of costs and benefits associated
with given behavior for the target individuals. Examples of public policies that rely on incentives are subsidies, social insurance,
grants, and taxes.
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2AC Answers to “OPEC Flood DA”

Refinery capacity is low now and can't expand fast enough to allow for a collapse in oil prices
Zhou 6/6/08 (Moming, Writer @ Marketwatch, "Saudi Arabia plans royal treatment for heavy crude,"
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/weekend-edition-saudi-arabia-plans/story.aspx?guid=%7B5608C8C0-4CCF-467C-AEE1-
4D15A93E5F03%7D&dist=hplatest)
The kingdom's plans to increase its refining capacity won't necessarily alleviate high oil and gasoline prices. It will take years
before new refineries start operating. World oil demand growth, including rising consumption in Saudi Arabia itself, could easily
outstrip additional capacity, analysts say.
"The refineries [in Saudi Arabia] won't be ready in five years, and we are expecting delays on all fronts," said A.F. Alhajji, an energy
economist at Ohio Northern University and a long-time observer of Saudi Arabia. Demand is too lofty to be accommodated by the
planned increase in capacity, he said.
"I believe oil prices in the next two to three years will stay high," he said.
Global spare production capacity is tight AND such capacity is in largely unusable heavy crudes
Melbourne Herald Sun 6/7/08 ("Global demand sees oil on fire," http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,23823430-
664,00.html)
THE recent oil price jump is due to rising demand in developing countries and the lack of spare supply capacity.
That means that even small disruptions to oil output drive prices higher.
Given the slow growth in oil supply, in prospect, only a world recession that cuts demand will bring oil prices down sharply.
Unfortunately, a world recession is looking increasingly likely.
The oil price is not just being driven by speculators. The underlying demand and supply balance is tight. There is very little spare capacity, with only
around two million barrels a day of spare capacity available, while demand is around 86 million barrels a day.
Most of this spare capacity is heavy crudes and refiners want lighter crudes to produce diesel where demand is booming.
There's less than 700000 million barrels of spare capacity
Schonberger 6/5/08 (Jennifer, Smallcapinvestor.com, "Oil remains the most profitable play (Part One of Two),"
http://www.smallcapinvestor.com/articles/06052008-oil_remains_the_most_profitable_play_part_one_of_two)
Votruba said that a major factor behind high oil prices for the foreseeable future is scaled-back oil production and burgeoning global
demand for tightened supply. Mexico’s production, for example, has slipped 9.1% in the first four months of the year.
“You’ve got a lot of countries that nationalized their oil production; that leads to decreased production and now we’re paying the price,” Votruba said.
In addition to Mexico, Russia and Saudi Arabia have cut back production. China and India are also slurping up oil, as billions of both countries industrialize and new
people begin driving automobiles. Government subsidies have also come into play, as gas in the Middle East, for example, goes for a very affordable $1 per gallon.
According to Votruba, there is currently less than 700,000 barrels of spare capacity in the market.
***Votruba, vice president and co-portfolio manager of the UMB Scout Small Cap Fund (UMBHX), told SmallCapInvestor.com
OPEC spare capacity is at low levels now
Daily Yomiuri 6/2/08 ("Govt report makes case for sectoral emissions cuts,"
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20080602TDY07301.htm)
Demand for oil has continued to rise since 1990, centering on China and other emerging countries, while the spare production
capacity of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has remained at low levels--a tight demand-supply situation that
has accelerated the flow of speculative funds into oil.
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Russian Oil Answers—Economic Reforms Turn

Oil revenues discourage Russian economic reforms which are key sustainable growth
Channel NewsAsia 8/8/04 (lexis)

Stephen O'Sullivan of the investment group UFG said: "Record oil prices are good for the state's coffers but they do not
encourage reforms" that are key to the development of Russia's economy.
The international ratings agency Standard and Poor's stressed in mid July that there was a growing risk of Russian reforms slowing
down as they ran into resistance from political and industrial interests as well as from public opinion.
A government awash in oil revenue could easily be tempted to delay unpopular structural economic reforms.
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Russian Oil Answers—Diversification Turn

--High oil prices create massive Russian revenues—discourage diversification of the economy
Molchanov 6/11/04 (Pavel, Financial Analyst, National Business Review, lexis)

Russia's most central obstacle to building a sustainable, industrialised economy is its excessive dependence on petroleum. It is an
unfortunate reality that almost 15 years after the end of the command economy, raw commodities are about the only product Russian
businesses can successfully sell abroad. Crude oil and natural gas represent nearly 30% of GDP - higher even than in some Opec
countries - and an even greater proportion of government revenue.
With world oil prices near an all-time high, the Kremlin's coffers are bulging. This may explain why the government seems content
with the economy's lack of diversification. With the exception of setting up a "rainy day" fund with some of the oil windfall, the government is doing
virtually nothing to encourage expansion of other sectors.
--Diversification of sources key to the Russian economy
Moscow News 6/23/04 (lexis)

Gref also forecasted a decrease in world oil prices that may have a negative impact on the Russian economy, if it does not relinquish
its dependency on export of raw materials such as oil. Oil exports in 2001 and 2002 totaled $ 30 billion (six to seven percent of GDP)
and in 2003 totaled $ 50 billion (about nine percent of GDP). The Minister also expressed confidence that the current structure of the
Russian economy presupposes that the actions of the government are "critical" for diversifying and accelerating the economy.
175
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Russian Oil Answers—Low Oil Prices Key to Russian Economy

Falling world oil prices makes nonoil sectors of the Russian economy more competitive—spurs double-
digit economic growth rates
Illarionov 6/8/04 (Andrei, Presidential Economic Adviser, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, lexis)
A: The impact of high oil prices on the rate of economic growth is twofold. On the one hand, high prices do ensure an inflow of
financial resources into the sector of the Russian economy engaged in production, transportation and export of oil and petroleum
products. That sector generates about 20 percent of the GDP and employs 1.7 percent of the working population (2.1 percent if one
counts in the pipelines). On the other hand, a fall of world oil prices suspends the growth of the real exchange rate of the ruble. As a
result, other sectors of the Russian economy which employ about 98 percent of the working-age population and produce 80
percent of GDP become more competitive. So, the high growth rate begins to spread to sectors other than oil.
The whole economy begins to grow at two-digit rates. Because growth is spread more evenly through the economy, the average
growth rates ends up being higher. This is what is happening in many CIS countries that are not oil exporters: their growth rates are
1.5-2 times higher than in Russia.
Falling oil prices are key to Russian economic growth—depress the value of the ruble to make nonoil
sectors more competitive and encourage policymakers to enact necessary reforms
Illarionov 6/2/04 (Andrei, Presidential Economic Adviser, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, lexis)
Q: Do you see any real threat to the Russian economy, like a sharp fall of oil prices or a banking crisis?
Illarionov: As for a fall in oil prices, I think it would not a threat but a present to the Russian economy. And I have said this many
times. Numerous studies, thorough and diligent econometric studies indicate that the Russian economy developed faster when oil
prices were lower, including in the last decade, than when they were high.
The mechanism is clear because high oil prices are one of the factors leading to the growth of the effective exchange value of the
ruble. The growth of the effective value of the ruble raises economic costs in general and makes the economy less competitive. If oil
prices decrease, the effective value of the ruble will either not grow at all or will grow very slowly, allowing the country to remain
competitive not only in a narrow segment of industries geared to the production and sale of oil, oil products, gas and non-ferrous
metallurgy, but in a broader spectrum of sectors and the entire economy in general. It's a choice between having several industries
growing successfully, while other sectors will be in a state close to stagnation, and having the whole economy developing in a
balanced way.
Russia had the highest rate of industrial growth in 1999 when oil prices were at their absolute minimum -- $8-9 per barrel. At
that time industrial growth for the whole industry was 17 percent and even 50 percent in machine building and light industry. But we
don't say anything like that when oil prices are high.
This is why I must say that we will face the biggest threats to our economic growth when oil prices are high. They will translate
both in lesser competitiveness and poorer quality of decisions, as well as poorer quality of the economic policy because high oil
prices do not require authorities to adopt painful but absolutely necessary decisions.
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Russian Oil Answers—Inflation Turn

--High oil prices contribute to Russian inflationary pressures
Bentley 6/6/08 (Ed, The Moscow News Weekly, "Russia's Roaring Economy not out of the Forest,"
http://mnweekly.ru/business/20080606/55331949.html)
The major factor causing inflation is the massive increase in oil prices since 2002. In the last six years there has been an increase from
approximately $20 a barrel to $125. Furthermore, there has been speculation that oil prices will continue to rise and according to Goldman Sachs and the Iranian oil
minister, they could hit $200 a barrel in two years.
Russia's economy is highly dependent on natural resources, with 28 percent of exports to the U.S. last year being oil and gas products. The high oil prices have
helped the Russian economy to grow, while even permitting for the creation of a massive stabilization fund. The downside is that the influx of
petrodollars contributes to inflationary pressure.
--Inflation poses a greater threat to Russian economic growth than a possible plunge in oil prices
RIA Novosti 6/11/08 (lexis)

- The International Monetary Fund said in its report that inflation, fuelled by an erroneous economic policy pursued by the
Russian government, is more dangerous for the country's GDP growth than a possible plunge in oil prices.
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Russian Oil Answers—Inflation Turn Extensions

Low inflation and diversification is key to Russian economic stability and sustainable, future growth
Lowering inflation would create a stable economy which would encourage investment and fuel future growth. Furthermore,
diversification is needed to ensure long term growth and protect against shocks in the energy market. As Chizhov suggested, developing high
tech industries would allow for substantial growths in GDP and productivity, extending beyond 2020.
Empirically, rising inflation causes Russian economic instability
Russia's biggest task is to balance economic growth while keeping inflation low. During the 1990s, inflation sometimes soared to
over 10 percent a month, wiping out people's savings and triggering mild panic in the economy. Although the inflation dragon has been
tamed, it continues to be stuck at over 10 percent annually. This year the inflation target has been revised up to 10 percent after price increases at the beginning of the
year. Meanwhile, the IMF predicts that inflation will finish at 11.4 percent for the year.
Increased inflation rates result in Russian economic slowdown via overheat
Nicholson 6/1/08 (Alex, "Russia 2008 Inflation May Accelerate to 14%, IMF Says (Update2),"
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=axKBXVsNZZzM&refer=home)
June 2 (Bloomberg) -- Russian inflation may accelerate to 14 percent this year and the risk of the economy overheating is mounting,
an International Monetary Fund official said.
Consumer prices rose an annual 14.3 percent in April, a five- year high, stoked by global food price increases and rising domestic wages. The economy grew 8 percent
in the first quarter, the Economy Ministry said in a preliminary estimate on April 17. Gross domestic product rose 8.1 percent for all of 2007.
``The risk is that inflation gradually increases to such a level that it requires a sharp tightening of monetary policy that could
cause a slowdown in growth,'' Poul Thomsen, head of the IMF mission in Russia, told reporters in Moscow today. The risk of the
economy `òverheating'' is increasing, he said.
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Russian Oil Answers—Oil Not Key to Russian Economy

Russia could survive a drop of oil prices to $55 a barrel***
Russia & CIS Business & Financial Daily 6/9/08 (lexis)

Russia would be able to withstand a drop in oil prices to $55 per barrel without any serious consequences, Deputy Prime Minister and
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said.
"Russia is prepared for oil prices to drop to $55 per barrel," he told journalists in St. Petersburg on June 7.
The Russian government has devoted a great deal of work to preparing the country for such a reduction in oil prices, he said.
"Such a reduction would have a small effect on economic growth, but it wouldn't be very significant," he said. Russian GDP is
currently growing on the back of other industries besides oil and gas, he said.
A 50% drop in oil prices won't destroy the Russia economy—oil is only 15% of GDP
Pravda.RU 4/8/03 ("Opinion: Russian Economy Will Not Suffer Even if Oil Prices Fall by 50%,"
http://english.pravda.ru/comp/2003/04/08/45732.html)
'The Russian economy will not suffer even if oil prices fall by half,' announced President of YUKOS oil company Mikhail Hordovsky
at a meeting with journalists in Moscow yesterday. As a Rosbalt correspondent reports, Mr Hordovsky pointed out that oil extraction
in Russia only accounts for 15% of GDP and therefore this industry is not of critical importance for the country as a whole.
'The Russian economy is relatively steady at present and this is unlikely to change,' said Mr Hordovsky.
179
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Russian Oil Answers—Russian Economic Growth Bad 2AC

--Economic growth results in Russian neo-imperialism
Pirchner and Berman 04 (Herman and Ilan, President and Vice President for Policy @ American Foreign Policy Council,
"Russia Revived," American Spectator, September, www.afpc.org/russiarevived.shtml)
Russians, in fact, have a lot to cheer about. On Putin’s watch, their country has made a dramatic economic turnaround. In February of
2002, Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest energy exporter, and today, less than six years after its catastrophic
1998 economic meltdown, Russia boasts close to $100 billion in hard currency reserves. Putin, for his part, has managed to translate
these soaring economic fortunes into real fiscal progress. Via measures like the imposition of a flat tax (accomplished in 2001), the
subsequent softening of long-standing restrictions on land ownership, and the start of rudimentary mortgage programs (heretofore
missing in post-Soviet Russia), the Kremlin has succeeded in devolving economic power and empowering ordinary Russians in a way
not imaginable just a decade ago.
Putin’s plans don’t stop there. Capitalizing on Washington’s post-September 11 focus on energy security, he has announced Russia’s
intention to provide the United States with fully 10 percent of its oil by the end of the decade. And in his 2004 State of the Federation
address, the Russian president articulated the exceedingly ambitious goal of doubling his country’s GDP by 2010.
Putin also is thinking big on the foreign policy front. Buoyed by economic and social successes, Russia’s international maneuvers
have grown increasingly assertive. Russia, once adrift, is now trying to regain its place as a “Great Power.”
Russia’s efforts abroad are animated by an old concept: the idea of Russia as empire. A little over a decade after the end of its last
imperial experiment, rising economic and political prospects are making the idea—and the ideology—of Russian expansion a topic of
growing currency in the Kremlin.
--Russian neo-imperialism undermines global stability and risks WMD use
Cohen 96 (Ariel, Senior Policy Analyst @ Heritage, Heritage Foundation Reports, 1/25, lexis)
Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and
free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $ 6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank
loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the
Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security.
As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass
destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted
Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only
Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could
imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. n15
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Russian Oil Answers—Russian Economic Growth Bad Extensions

Economic growth empowers Russia's neo-imperialist plants
Pirchner and Berman 04 (Herman and Ilan, President and Vice President for Policy @ American Foreign Policy Council,
"Russia Revived," American Spectator, September, www.afpc.org/russiarevived.shtml)
Solzhenitsyn is hardly alone. A widening number of politicians of all political stripes are gravitating to the idea of a “Greater Russia.”
These include not only people like Aleksandr Dugin, one of Russia’s most prominent—and controversial—political scientists, but also
ascendant statesmen like Dmitry Rogozin, a deputy chairman of the Russian Duma. Rogozin, in his 2003 book We Will Reclaim
Russia for Ourselves, makes the case that Russians “should discuss out loud the problem of a divided people that has a historic right to
political unification of its own land,” and are obliged over time to “create conditions” necessary for such a union.
This stance has found fertile soil, both within Russia itself and in Russia’s “near abroad.” According to a December 2000 domestic
poll, the results of which were carried by Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency, no less than 61 percent of Russians, 53 percent of
Ukrainians, and 69 percent of Belarussians favor unification of their states into one country. And, under Putin, this urge has found
expression. Through a series of political and legislative maneuvers, his government is laying the groundwork for an imperial revival.
Just such a restoration was on the mind of Putin and his key supporters in late 2001, when they pushed a remarkable new law through
the Russian parliament. That bit of legislation defines the parameters by which a foreign state or territory can become part of the
Russian Federation—providing the legal basis for a peaceful, or not so peaceful, territorial expansion. Moreover, it is hardly an
isolated incident. The newly selected prime minister, Mikhail Fradkov, in his March 2004 address to the Russian State Duma,
confirmed that territorial expansion is now being given new attention by the Kremlin. “In light of economic growth and questions of
demography,” Fradkov said, the Russian government would “in the future simplify grants of citizenship to Russians living
abroad.”
Russian economic prosperity empowers Putin to carry out his neo-imperialist plans
Glazov 04 (Jamie, Staff @ Frontpagemagazine.com, "KGB Resurrection," 4/30, http://www.borrull.org/e/noticia.php?id=32565)

I used to believe that anything, including a strong oil market, that bolstered the Russian economy and produced prosperity would be
likely to cause the growth of a middle class and, in time, more pressure for economic and political liberalization. The events of the last
eighteen months or so have convinced me that such is not correct. Putin has used the economic prosperity produced by a strong oil
market to consolidate his power and lead Russia toward a form of m -- oil prices have given him the idea that he can do
anything he wants. Oil can tend to centralize power in any society except in a mature democracy such as Norway.
181
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US/Saudi Relations Answers—Oil Not Key to Relations

Oil isn’t key to the US-Saudi relationship
Alterman 5/22/08 (Jon, Director of Middle East Program @ CSIS, "Understanding Saudi-US Relations: A Conversation with Jon
Alterman," http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2008/interviews/080521-alterman-interview.html)
Alterman: There are two issues. First I don’t think people appreciate how much we do with Saudi Arabia. It’s just not understanding the importance of
Saudi Arabia to the U.S. in a myriad of ways. It’s not just energy. It’s not just security. It comes to economic issues, counterterrorism issues,
regional diplomacy issues. There’s a centrality and importance to Saudi Arabia that I think most Americans don’t have an appreciation for.
Energy doesn’t control the US-Saudi relationship AND there are considerable differences on both sides
Alterman 5/22/08 (Jon, Director of Middle East Program @ CSIS, "Understanding Saudi-US Relations: A Conversation with Jon
Alterman," http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2008/interviews/080521-alterman-interview.html)
Jon B. Alterman: What’s striking is just how rich the US-Saudi relationship is. It’s not just an energy relationship. It’s not just a security
relationship. It has to do with virtually everything the U.S. does in the Middle East. The relationship has gone from being a comfortable
relationship to one with considerable sensitivities on both sides, and many more sensitivities in public than officials have in private.
182
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US/Saudi Relations Answers—Relations ↓ Now

US-Saudi relations are fraying now—Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Sept. 11
CBC News 5/16/08 ("Saudi Arabia announces small boost in oil production," http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/05/16/bush-
saudi.html)
Bush's Saudi stop was intended, in part, to celebrate 75 years of formal U.S.-Saudi relations and strengthen ties that, once strong,
have frayed over the perception Washington favours Israel too much in the dispute with the Palestinians, the Iraq war and the Sept.
11, 2001 attacks. Fifteen of the 19 airline hijackers were Saudis, and Americans blamed Saudis for allowing the religious extremism that gave rise to them.
The Saudis are losing faith in the US-Saudi relationship
Loven 5/16/08 (Jennifer, Associated Press, "Bush, Saudis to discuss soaring gas prices," http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hkf--
m78S6F3LZAcz4sVHGGCQSTgD90MKBIO0)
Jon Alterman, director of the CSIS' Middle East program, said the Saudis, with a public that doesn't like Bush and a ruling monarchy
with growing interests elsewhere, are not likely "to put themselves out to help this president."
"The Saudis don't have an alternative to keeping the U.S. in its corner, but their reliance on the United States, their confidence in the United
States is extremely shaken," Alterman said.
US-Saudi relations are fraying now—high oil prices, Iraq war, Palestinian issue
Richter 6/8/08 (Paul, Staff, LA Times, "New forces fraying U.S.-Saudi oil ties,"
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/washingtondc/la-fg-ussaudi8-2008jun08,0,4762521,print.story)
WASHINGTON — For decades, Saudi Arabia worked with its dominant customer, the United States, to keep world oil markets stable
and advance common political goals.
But the surging price of oil, which soared more than $10 a barrel Friday to a record-high $138.54, has made it plain that those days are over. New
forces, including a weak dollar and an oil-thirsty Asia, have blunted the United States' leverage and helped sour the two countries'
relationship.
As gasoline prices have risen, the White House has unsuccessfully exhorted the Saudis to step up production, and Congress has
threatened retaliation. But the situation now is a far cry from the days when the U.S. economy dominated the direction of the petroleum market.
"That gave us leverage," said Greg Priddy, an oil analyst at the Eurasia Group, a New York-based risk assessment firm. "There's certainly a perception that the power
equation has changed."
The weakening of the economic relationship comes when the vital U.S.-Saudi security relationship also has been fraying.
In the 1980s, the U.S.-Saudi bond that kept oil prices low was credited with helping weaken the Soviet Union during the waning days of the Cold War. And it helped
keep markets stable after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
But the Saudi government has been dismayed by the consequences of the war in Iraq and by what it sees as a weak Bush administration
commitment to the Palestinians.
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US/Saudi Relations Answers—High Oil Prices Hurt Relations Turn

Turn—rising oil prices have soured the US-Saudi relationship
Global Insight 6/10/08 (lexis)

Significance:The volatility and price surges have been blamed by many consumer nations on the unwillingness of the producer nations--in particularly the OPEC
states--to provide full third-party witnessed evaluations of their reserves, or on their lack of sufficient investment to end tight supply balance. The producers for their
part have blamed financial speculation--in particular caused by capital flight from the weak U.S. dollar into commodities--saying that there is ample supply for the
moment and a healthy stock build-up. Saudi Arabia, as OPEC's leading producer and a key U.S. ally in the Middle East, has taken the brunt of
U.S. political criticism over the rising prices, souring previously close personal relations between the U.S. presidential
administration and the Saudi royal family in recent years. Launching the conference should be an opportunity for the Kingdom either to deflect
some of the criticism onto other producers, or to be able to place some blame on what producers regard as unhelpful tax policies, especially in the developed consumer
nations.
184
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US/Saudi Relations Answers—US/Saudi Relations → Terrorism

T/ High Saudi-US relations are what lead to Al Qaeda’s hatred.
Although the continuing struggle between Al Qaeda and the United States has many roots, including hatred of Western political and
cultural influences, it revolves to a great extent around America's political and military alliance with the Saudi royal family. Although
this relationship has come under heavy strain as a result of Washington's discontent with Saudi Arabia's apparent failure to clamp
down on Islamic charities linked to Al Qaeda, the United States continues to station forces in the kingdom and to import large
quantities of Saudi oil. Thus, hostility toward the United States likely will continue to simmer in the region, producing a
recurring threat of terrorist violence.
T/ High Saudi-US relations engender Islamic militants wanting control- The Royal family takes the
money which upsets citizens and leads to groups seeking to overthrow the monarchy and channeling
money to terrorists.
terrorism, and America's national security” accessed July 10, 2008, proquest.<Campbell>
The most worrisome expression of this phenomenon, from an American perspective, is the subterranean struggle now taking place in
Saudi Arabia. This struggle pits the Saudi royal family, with its 7,000 superprivileged princes, against militant Islamists, who believe
that the House of Saud has lost its mandate to rule. One aspect of this decline in support for the royal family-its close ties with the
United States-has already been mentioned. Just as galling for many Saudi citizens is the brazen accumulation of immense wealth by
family members and its steady dissipation through frivolous and immoral consumption. According to the DOE, Saudi Arabia earned
$108 billion from oil exports in 2001-2002, accounting for 40 percent of the country's GDP and 70 to 80 percent of state revenues.
Almost all this oil income flowed into the coffers of the royal family or into accounts over which they exercised effective control.
Much of this money was poured into public works and social services, but vast sums were also diverted to personal use by the royal
princes. For example, in 2001, the public telephone company revealed that the princes had amassed unpaid telephone bills of $880
million over the previous two years. Information like this, coupled with periodic accounts of visits by prominent princes to Monaco
and other gambling resorts, has generated widespread resentment among ordinary Saudis, who have seen their average income drop by
as much as two-thirds over the past decade or so. Reflecting the views of many nonroyals, a Saudi economist said of the princes, "A
lot of them have the mentality of 'I own this country and you are here to serve me."'3 The growing popularity of such views has had
two serious repercussions-both damaging to United States security. First, the spread of antiroyal sentiment has generated support
and recruits for militant groups that seek the overthrow of the monarchy and its replacement with a more ascetic, Taliban-like
Islamic regime. Because Saudi Arabia does not have a parliament or political parties, and because the royal family has forbidden the
public expression of antimonarchical views, opponents of the regime have channeled their discontent into religious extremism and, in
some cases, terrorist attacks on the government and its American allies. Second, in responding to this threat, the monarchy has employed both the iron
fist and the velvet glovearresting and confining known dissidents, and buying off religious leaders through lavish payments to Islamic charities. It is this latter approach
that has proved especially hazardous to United States security: by giving money to charities controlled by the extremists, the royal family has unwittingly channeled
funds to Al Qaeda and other antimonarchy, anti-American terrorist organizations.
185
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IPI Pipeline Answers—Undermines Indian Energy Security

Iran can’t be trusted—the IPI pipeline would destabilize the Gulf, empower Russia, and decrease
regional and global energy security
Cohen, Curtis, and Graham 5/30/08 (Ariel, Lisa, and Owen, Senior Research Fellows @ Heritage, "Executive Summary:
The Proposed Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security,"
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2139es.cfm)
Conclusion. Iran's support of terrorism, hostile policies in the Middle East, pursuit of nuclear weapons, and mismanagement of its
economy make it a dangerous and unreliable business partner and call into question its capacity to supply natural gas to Pakistan and
India through the IPI. Potential transit problems in Baluchistan also make this project inherently risky.
As major energy consumers, the U.S. and India share strategic interests in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. Building the IPI would
be contrary to these interests, would destabilize the Persian Gulf, and would strengthen Russia's grip over Central Asia,
decreasing both regional and global energy security. Accordingly, the U.S. should fully back TAPI to increase India's and Pakistan's energy security
and reduce Russia's leverage in Central Asia.
The IPI pipeline empowers Iran and undermines Indian energy security by making them dependent on
foreign sources
U.S. diplomacy is further complicated by the indefatigable thirst for energy of emerging countries like China and India, which are becoming increasingly dependent on
the very same countries the United States is trying to rein in. The growing appetite of developing Asian powers not only plays into the hands of the aforementioned
rogue producing nations, but also feeds what could become a global competition for control of energy resources. Rogue nations like Iran and Sudan can now buy
themselves the support of a third of humanity – not to mention the protection of Chinese veto power on the U.N. Security Council – by signing energy deals with China
and India. India now at stands at a crossroads. As its electricity demand grows it faces three options. It can tie itself to Iran, the holder of
the world’s second largest natural gas reserve, via the proposed 1600 mile long Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. Last month, Iran’s
President Ahmadinejad visited India and Pakistan in an effort to seal the deal on this project. The implications of such a pipeline
should be very clear: decades long dependence of one billion Indians on Iran. Alternatively, India can continue to develop its coal
reserves and expand coal power generation. This is a sound approach from an energy security perspective; however, India has been
coming under global pressure – including that of the U.S. government - to curb its greenhouse gas emissions. India’s third option is to expand nuclear power
development, in collaboration with the U.S. At this point, foot dragging in Delhi is delaying ratification of a nuclear agreement with the U.S. It appears that
the
Iranian option may hold sway. As the largest democracy in the world, India is a vital ally to the United States. Congress should explore
all options – including encouraging India and Pakistan to pursue an alternative pipeline route from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan – to ensure that India does
not tie its economic future to Iran.
186
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Saudi Regime Collapse Answers

Regime change in Saudi Arabia won’t hurt the US economy—they lack the ability to successfully increase
oil prices, the economic impact will diminish over time
Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, National Review, 12/2/02, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4124
A new regime might decide to pump less oil in order to raise prices. Such a strategy would require international cooperation,
yet the oil producers have long found it difficult to coordinate prices hikes and limit cheating on agreed-upon quotas. Even if
effective, restricting sales would have only a limited impact. A decade ago, when oil was selling for about $20 a barrel, energy economist David Henderson, a
professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, figured that the worst case of an Iraqi seizure of the Saudi oil fields would be about a 50-percent price increase, costing the
U.S. economy about one half of one percent of GDP. Prices are today running close to $30 a barrel, but that includes an uncertainty premium over the prospective war
with Iraq. Thus, the real price hike today of a Saudi collapse probably would be similar to that of a decade ago. Moreover, it would fall on an economy more than one-
quarter larger.
In any case, the economic impact would diminish over time. Countries like Kuwait, Iran, Nigeria, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and others have the
ability to pump significantly more oil. A resolution of Iraq's status would bring substantial new supplies on line; Baghdad pumped 2.2 million barrels a day in 1990,
before becoming subject to sanctions after the end of the Gulf War. As economist Susan Lee puts it, should Riyadh turn off the pumps, "the U.S. would find itself plenty
of new best friends."
Sharply higher prices would bring forth new energy supplies elsewhere. Total proven world oil reserves were 660 billion barrels in 1980, 1,009
billion in 1990, and 1,046 billion at the end of 2000. Yet in the last decade alone the world's people consumed 250 billion barrels of oil. How could this be? A
combination of new discoveries and technological advances increased the amount of economically recoverable oil. Reserves rose even as oil prices dropped: Between
1980 and 1990, proven oil reserves jumped by 62 percent while prices for Middle Eastern petroleum were falling 43 percent. Prices eventually hit a dramatic low in
1998, down another 41 percent, before rising over the next two years.
America is dotted with high-cost wells that could be unplugged. The nation's outer-continental shelf alone is thought to contain more than 30 billion barrels of oil,
greater than our current proven reserves; since so little of the OCS, barely six percent, has been leased, those resources have not been proved. Barely 15,000 acres of the
19.6 million acre Arctic National Wildlife Reserve could contain a similar amount of oil (as well as supplies of natural gas). Even the modest estimate of five billion
barrels of recoverable reserves at current prices would be a significant addition to current supplies. However, we won't know how much is there without drilling, which
could be conducted in an environmentally sensitive manner. And while the desire to lower the cost of gasoline might be thought by some to be an inadequate reason to
develop these supplies, the prospect of terrorism and war related to America's access to Persian Gulf oil should change the benefit-cost ratio considerably.
Further, some 300 billion barrels of unrecovered oil, ten times our proven reserves and more than known Saudi resources, lie in beds of shale under the United States.
They are not counted, however, because they are not currently worth developing. But as prices rise and new techniques are developed, they may become economically
recoverable. Moreover, energy companies are looking for new oil deposits around the world, including the Caspian Basin, Russia, South China Sea, and West Africa.
Estimates of as-yet-undiscovered potential recoverable oil range from one trillion to six trillion barrels. At current consumption rates the Energy Information
Administration estimates that we have enough oil for another 230 years and "unconventional" sources, such as shale, that could last 580 years. And even these figures
are based on existing prices and technologies. Higher prices would stimulate exploration, as well as production of alternative fuels and conservation, reducing oil
consumption.
In short, an unfriendly Saudi Arabia might hurt America's pocketbook; it would not threaten America's survival. (In contrast,
control of the Gulf by a hegemonic rival -- notably the Soviet Union -- would pose a significantly different, and greater, security threat, but that prospect disappeared
with the end of the Cold War.) Thus, it is worth risking Saudi displeasure in order to try to starve al Qaeda of funds.
187
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Potential Commercial Tech Key to Heg Adv

Commercial tech developments are vital in enabling the military to achieve military effectiveness in the
future
Cohen 98 (William, fmr US Secretary of Defense, Report to Congress, “ACTIONS TO ACCELERATE THE MOVEMENT TO
THE NEW WORKFORCE VISION,” 4-1, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/NewWorkForce.html)
Joint Vision 2010,

the Department's conceptual template for achieving the required levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting, depends
heavily on DoD's ability to leverage new and emerging technological opportunities. Unfortunately, the rapid rate of technological
change is beginning to leave the Department technologically overwhelmed.
The only way for DoD to maintain the technological superiority that is essential for victory on the battlefield is to enhance its business
relations with industry, and to rely on competition to provide the preponderance of research, development, and test requirements. DoD
spends millions of dollars annually to maintain in-house and defense industry capabilities that duplicate those of other industry or other government agencies. Not only
is this unaffordable, but it gives the Department a task it cannot accomplish. In many areas, industry is now demonstrating that it does a far
better job of staying on the leading edge of technology, especially in critical information technology areas. DoD must be able to take
advantage of this.
188
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
State Regs Bad for Auto Industry Adv

Inaction by the Bush administration has caused states to fill in by regulating fuel efficiency
Lobe 10/2/04 (Jim, "US isolated as Kremlin endorses Kyoto," Asia Times Online,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FJ02Ag01.html)
While his administration appears to have gone from a position of skepticism over scientific claims that greenhouse emissions contribute to global warming to one of
acceptance that the relationship between warming and emissions is real, Bush has thus far rejected any effort to place mandatory limits on industry
emissions. His emphasis instead has been on voluntary actions to reduce the "intensity" of emissions; that is, the level of emissions per unit of economic
output.
In particular, he has failed to support a long-pending measure co-sponsored by fellow Republican Senator John McCain and Democrat Senator Joe Lieberman - and
supported by Kerry - that would require reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by energy, transportation and manufacturing companies to 2000 levels by 2010.
McCain recently denounced the administration's global-warming policy as "disgraceful".
At the same time, states and other local jurisdictions have tried to fill the vacuum with legislation and even lawsuits. In the most far-
reaching policy to date, California state regulators approved a new rule that will require automakers to sharply increase fuel efficiency
in order to reduce automobile emissions by 30% by 2016.
Because California is the country's biggest market, the new rule, if it survives court challenges, is likely to become the national
standard. For US manufacturers that sell much of their output abroad, Russia's ratification - and with it, the transformation of Kyoto into international law - poses a
similar challenge.
In addition to state action, Canada is increasingly contemplating regulating fuel efficiency—this will
create patchwork of regulations that harms automakers
Bustillo 1/18/05 (Miguel, LA Times, "Canada Considers Copying California’s Greenhouse Gas Law,"
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/18/local/me-canada18)
Canadian officials, who are considering regulations to reduce carbon dioxide exhaust from cars and trucks, are spending a few days
this week getting a firsthand look at their primary inspiration: California.
Although Canada has not decided whether it will follow California’s lead by requiring automakers to cut greenhouse gases to combat global warming, the country’s
environment minister noted Monday that doing so could have a powerful cumulative effect.
If Canada and New York and other Northeastern states all pass California-style greenhouse gas regulations, “we would be at least a third of the market,” Environment
Minister Stephane Dion said. “It is always difficult for Canada to go alone.”
Dion is part of a delegation of Canadian officials, including the country’s minister of transportation, that is touring California. The delegation is scheduled to meet with
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger today to learn more about the state’s pioneering greenhouse gas law.
The law, passed last year, requires automakers to reduce tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases nearly 30% by 2016. It is strongly opposed by automakers, who have
filed state and federal lawsuits to block it.
The Canadian officials said their government would prefer to follow the example of the European Union, which entered into a voluntary agreement with automakers to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
But if such a deal cannot be struck, Canada is prepared to go forward with a California-style regulation, the officials said. Canadian officials plan to
discuss the issue with representatives of the carmakers later this month.
“At the end of the day, we want results,” Transportation Minister Jean Lapierre said in an interview in Los Angeles on Monday. “We could go more directly into
regulations. But we would rather have a voluntary agreement.”
In addition to learning about the state’s global warming regulation, Canadian officials wanted to see how California was addressing its long-standing problems with air
pollution, traffic gridlock and urban sprawl. They also wanted to discuss Schwarzenegger’s hydrogen power initiatives.
On Monday, the Canadians were in the Los Angeles area, where they met with business leaders and toured the Diamond Bar headquarters of the South Coast Air
Quality Management District, the region’s main smog-fighting agency. Afterward, they toured the Port of Los Angeles and went to Santa Monica to visit the offices of
the Rand Corp. think tank and the environmental group the Natural Resources Defense Council.
Several Northeastern states have indicated that they plan to copy California’s tailpipe rule, expressing frustration with what
they see as a lack of action by the Bush administration to address climate change.
If Canada also follows California, economies of scale may force automakers to make the technology needed to meet the requirements – mainly variable-speed
transmissions and other fuel-economy boosters – mandatory in all cars. That is what eventually happened with another California innovation to reduce car emissions,
the catalytic converter, environmentalists say.
“The prospect of Canada adopting the California approach scares the automakers to death,” said Roland Hwang, a car pollution expert with the Natural Resources
Defense Council. “With the Canadians on board, we’d reach the tipping point.”
Auto manufacturers worry that the end result would be a patchwork of different carbon dioxide standards throughout the
states – and perhaps other parts of North America, if Canada moves forward with its own rule. That would make it more costly for
them to make cars and trucks for the different markets, they argue.
189
SDI 2008
FFV Aff
Corruption Impacts—Destroys Environment

Corruption has devastating impacts on the environment.
Winbourne, ’02 Svetlana Winbourne, Technical Director for Management Services International, USAID and MSI, Corruption
and The Environment, November 2002, p 5
Corruption undermines democracy and reduces economic growth. It diverts public funds to serve the private interests of some public
officials. It breeds poverty and public mistrust of impartial justice and the government. In the environmental and natural resources
sector, public sector corruption serves the private interests of bureaucrats and criminals by taking away from citizens their rights to
clean and complete environment, misallocating environmental resources, and diverting funds from conservation and preservation.
Corruption in the environmental and natural resources sectors may occur across a number of transactions, starting from bribery and
cronyism on the level of developing national policy and embezzlement in implementing environmental programs to bribery in issuing
permits and licenses and collecting “rents” while enforcing environmental regulations. It can be well organized from top to bottom and
link to organized crime (for example, in mineral, timber and wildlife trafficking), and it can be widely represented through a number
of governmental agencies and services. The environment can be affected by corruption in other sectors, for example, in agriculture,
privatization, public procurement, customs, the judiciary, and others. Thus, privatization conducted through corrupt procedures may
allow new owners to use privatized land or facilities in an environmentally damaging manner; or regulations and procedures
established in customs may open opportunities for trafficking in wildlife. Later, we will provide an example of how corruption in
public procurement resulted in environmental damage.
Corruption hurts the environment in a multitude of ways.

Winbourne, ’02 Svetlana Winbourne, Technical Director for Management Services International, USAID and MSI, Corruption
and The Environment, November 2002, p. 5
Corruption impacts:
· Establishes environmentally damaging policies and practices to enrich bureaucrats and criminals;
· Allocates environmental resources in an unfair manner allowing environmentally damaging practices;
· Diverts funds allocated for environmental programs to
private pockets (embezzlement, bribery);
· Allows trafficking in wildlife and other natural resources;
· Allows depletion of natural resources and pollution of environment through bribery in environmental inspections and permitting
system.
190

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SDI 2008

Flex Fuel Mandate Aff Index

1AC High Oil Prices Destroys Global Economy

Japanese economic collapse sparks nuclear war with China

The Guardian 2/11/02 (lexis)

1AC High Oil Prices Destroys Global Economy

The Record 6/19/08 ("Salvation comes in a fuel cell," http://news.therecord.com/Opinions/article/370032)

1AC Oil Spills Advantage

Oil spills disrupt the marine oxygen pump

The proper functioning of the pump is key to all life on Earth

1AC Oil Spills Advantage

1AC Democratization Advantage

1AC Democratization Advantage

1AC Democratization Advantage

1AC Democratization Advantage

The absence of democracy creates multiple scenarios for extinction

1AC Democratization Advantage

Inherency—A2 Status Quo Incentives Solve/Flex-Fuel Now

Oil Spills Adv—US Oil Dependence → Oil Spills

Failure to reduce US oil dependency makes large-scale oil spills inevitable

Schoenfarber 95 (Jay, Winter, 9 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 147, lexis)

Oil Spills Adv—Reducing US Oil Dependence Solves Oil Spills

Oil Spills Adv—Oil Spills Threaten Marine Life/Ecoystems

Oil Spills Adv—Ethanol/Methanol Spills Don’t Hurt Environment

High Oil Prices Bad—US Economy/A2 Housing = Alternate Causality

High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys US Economy/Alternative Energy Solves

High Oil Prices Bad—Global Economy/Oil Shocks

High Oil Prices Bad—Hurts Global Economy

Market News International, 08

Market News International, 6/25/08, Lexis.

High oil prices have serious impacts on the global economy.

High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys US Economy

High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys Japanese/European/US Economies

High Oil Prices Bad—Destroys Global Economy/A2 Econ = Resilient

Volatility and economic downfall result from high oil prices

Democratization Adv—Oil Undermines Democracy

Oil wealth stops growth of democracies – Russia proves

Democratization Adv—Oil Undermines Democracy

Democratization Adv—Oil Undermines Democracy

Democratization Adv—Oil Undermines Democracy

Oil wealth hinders democracy – group formation effect proves

Oil wealth causes decreased democracy – repression and militarization proves

Democratization Adv—Oil Undermines Democracy

Oil wealth has substantial anti-democratic properties – statistics prove

Tests prove that oil wealth impedes democracy

Oil wealth hinders democracy – military spending proves

Democratization Adv—Oil Undermines Democracy

Oil wealth destroys democracy – former Soviet bloc proves

Oil and democracy do not mix – look at top 10 suppliers of US oil

Democratization Adv—Oil Undermines Democracy

Oil wealth hurts democracy – even outside the Middle East

Oil wealth hurts democracy, economic sanctions and fuels corruption

Democratization Adv—Oil Undermines Democracy

Potential 1AC Global Poverty Advantage

Potential 1AC Global Poverty Advantage

Potential 1AC Global Poverty Advantage

Potential 1AC Global Poverty Advantage

Potential 1AC Global Poverty Advantage

Potential 1AC Global Poverty Advantage

Poverty Adv—High Oil Prices Exacerbate Global Poverty

Poverty Adv—High Oil Prices Hurt Developing Countries

Poverty Adv—US Fuel Choice Key to Third World Development

Poverty Adv—Genocide Impacts

Poverty Adv—Poverty = Greatest Global Threat/Moral + Legal Obligation to